Rorty in Dialogue with Contemporary Western Madhyamaka Interpreters on Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity

This dissertation falls within the framework of philosophy. It attempts to hermeneutically relate the work of Richard Rorty (1931-2007) with specific Western interpretations of the Indian Buddhist philosophy of Madhyamaka, a tradition founded by Nāgārjuna (ca 150-250 CE). These interpretations may show how a dialogue within the scope of Western philosophy could deliver some new points of view on morality. It concerns three difficulties I have identified regarding Rorty’s moral non-foundationalism. This position boils down to the following: morality is not based upon something non-human, whether the Will of God or the Intrinsic Nature of Reality; everything in the world is contingent, including language, the self, and society; the only way to deal with this is through irony; moral progress is nothing else than making society less cruel. The three problems posed by this account are: (a) it seems that an ethics is hardly possible when everything is contingent; (b) it seems that for a Rortyan ironist, solidarity is only a matter of taste; (c) it seems that Rorty’s ethnocentric approach creates obstacles to a global ethic. My research is focused on the following question: ‘How can a hermeneutical engagement with contemporary Western Madhyamaka interpreters (Finnigan, Garfield, Harris, Huntington, Siderits, Westerhoff, and others) clarify philosophical problems around Rorty’s concepts of contingency, irony, and solidarity?’ Before solving those problems, I distinguish five sub-questions: 1. What is the historical context of Rorty’s moral non-foundationalism? (Chapter One); 2. What does “ethics” mean for Rorty and contemporary Western Madhyamaka interpreters? (Chapter Two); 3. How can Western interpretations of the Madhyamakan approach to Buddhist emptiness clarify problems around Rorty’s concept of contingency? (Chapter Three); 4. How can Western interpretations of the Madhyamakan approach to Buddhist wisdom clarify problems around Rorty’s concept of irony? (Chapter Four); 5. How can Western interpretations of the Madhyamakan approach to Buddhist compassion clarify problems around Rorty’s concept of solidarity? (Chapter Five). To these questions, I answer: (ad 1) Rorty’s outlook is utilitarian without basing utility on human nature; (ad 2) although there is little that counts as ethical theory, ethics is crucial in Madhyamaka; morality, according to Rorty a result of a contingent process of development, is the willingness to be touched by the suffering of others; (ad 3) the realization of emptiness enlarges this willingness to care; (ad 4) the only wisdom with which to build a better world is irony; however, irony may lapse into cynicism; teaching the doctrine of emptiness can prevent that; (ad 5) conventional compassion is driven by the contingent presence of moral feeling; great compassion, expressed by the figure of the bodhisattva, is transmoral since it is a manifestation of the realized state of emptiness. Regarding problem (a), I argue that Rorty’s liberal ironism can benefit from Madhyamaka since it produces an ethic from the awareness of universal connectedness; this connectedness, however, is only there in the conventional reality because, ultimately, there are no entities with an interconnection. Regarding problem (b), I argue that solidarity, being only a matter of taste, ceases to be a problem if normativity is understood in a non-foundationalist, liberal way and if solidarity becomes “great compassion” (mahākaruṇā). Regarding problem (c), I argue that Rorty’s ethnocentrism partly obstructs a global ethic but also that the obstruction would disappear once liberal pragmatists engage in the practice of śūnyatāvāda. In this dissertation, I also make research suggestions to find a new way of thinking. This way might be generated by “graftage”; Madhyamaka, as interpreted by established Western Buddhist philosophers (M’), could be “grafted” upon Rortyan pragmatism (“Soterio-pragmatism”).