Selfish or servant leadership? Leadership and followership personalities in coordination games

J. Gillet; E. Cartwright; M. van Vugt

doi:10.1016/j.paid.2010.06.003

Selfish or servant leadership? Leadership and followership personalities in coordination games

J. Gillet, E. Cartwright, M. van Vugt

Research output: Contribution to Journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

We study the personalities of emergent leaders in two coordination games in groups of four players each with monetary incentives. Our results support the evolutionary hypothesis that leadership is a social good for the group: leadership benefits followers but is potentially costly for the individual taking on the leader role. Across the two economic games leaders do less well - earn less money - on average than followers. Furthermore, social participants choose to lead more often than selfish participants and there is no relationship between leadership behavior and personal dominance. Our results support the idea that leadership can be servant rather than selfish and we note the implications of this finding. © 2010 Elsevier Ltd.

Original language	English
Journal	Personality and Individual Differences
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2010.06.003
Publication status	Published - 2010

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title = "Selfish or servant leadership? Leadership and followership personalities in coordination games",

abstract = "We study the personalities of emergent leaders in two coordination games in groups of four players each with monetary incentives. Our results support the evolutionary hypothesis that leadership is a social good for the group: leadership benefits followers but is potentially costly for the individual taking on the leader role. Across the two economic games leaders do less well - earn less money - on average than followers. Furthermore, social participants choose to lead more often than selfish participants and there is no relationship between leadership behavior and personal dominance. Our results support the idea that leadership can be servant rather than selfish and we note the implications of this finding. {\textcopyright} 2010 Elsevier Ltd.",

author = "J. Gillet and E. Cartwright and {van Vugt}, M.",

year = "2010",

doi = "10.1016/j.paid.2010.06.003",

language = "English",

journal = "Personality and Individual Differences",

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AU - Gillet, J.

AU - Cartwright, E.

AU - van Vugt, M.

PY - 2010

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N2 - We study the personalities of emergent leaders in two coordination games in groups of four players each with monetary incentives. Our results support the evolutionary hypothesis that leadership is a social good for the group: leadership benefits followers but is potentially costly for the individual taking on the leader role. Across the two economic games leaders do less well - earn less money - on average than followers. Furthermore, social participants choose to lead more often than selfish participants and there is no relationship between leadership behavior and personal dominance. Our results support the idea that leadership can be servant rather than selfish and we note the implications of this finding. © 2010 Elsevier Ltd.

AB - We study the personalities of emergent leaders in two coordination games in groups of four players each with monetary incentives. Our results support the evolutionary hypothesis that leadership is a social good for the group: leadership benefits followers but is potentially costly for the individual taking on the leader role. Across the two economic games leaders do less well - earn less money - on average than followers. Furthermore, social participants choose to lead more often than selfish participants and there is no relationship between leadership behavior and personal dominance. Our results support the idea that leadership can be servant rather than selfish and we note the implications of this finding. © 2010 Elsevier Ltd.

U2 - 10.1016/j.paid.2010.06.003

DO - 10.1016/j.paid.2010.06.003

M3 - Article

SN - 0191-8869

JO - Personality and Individual Differences

JF - Personality and Individual Differences

ER -

Selfish or servant leadership? Leadership and followership personalities in coordination games

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