TY - JOUR
T1 - Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems
AU - Ansink, E.
AU - Weikard, H.P.
N1 - Social Choice and Welfare 38(2), 187–210.
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - We analyse the redistribution of a resource amongst agents who have claims to the resource and who are ordered linearly. A well known example of this particular situation is the river sharing problem. We exploit the linear order of agents to transform the river sharing problem to a sequence of two-agent river sharing problems. These reduced problems are mathematically equivalent to bankruptcy problems and can therefore be solved using any bankruptcy rule. Our proposed class of solutions, that we call sequential sharing rules, solves the river sharing problem. Our approach extends the bankruptcy literature to settings with a sequential structure of both the agents and the resource to be shared. In the paper, we first characterise the class of sequential sharing rules. Subsequently, we apply sequential sharing rules based on four classical bankruptcy rules, assess their properties, provide two characterisations of one specific rule, and compare sequential sharing rules with three alternative solutions to the river sharing problem. © 2011 The Author(s).
AB - We analyse the redistribution of a resource amongst agents who have claims to the resource and who are ordered linearly. A well known example of this particular situation is the river sharing problem. We exploit the linear order of agents to transform the river sharing problem to a sequence of two-agent river sharing problems. These reduced problems are mathematically equivalent to bankruptcy problems and can therefore be solved using any bankruptcy rule. Our proposed class of solutions, that we call sequential sharing rules, solves the river sharing problem. Our approach extends the bankruptcy literature to settings with a sequential structure of both the agents and the resource to be shared. In the paper, we first characterise the class of sequential sharing rules. Subsequently, we apply sequential sharing rules based on four classical bankruptcy rules, assess their properties, provide two characterisations of one specific rule, and compare sequential sharing rules with three alternative solutions to the river sharing problem. © 2011 The Author(s).
U2 - 10.1007/s00355-010-0525-y
DO - 10.1007/s00355-010-0525-y
M3 - Article
SN - 0176-1714
VL - 38
SP - 187
EP - 210
JO - Social Choice and Welfare
JF - Social Choice and Welfare
IS - 2
ER -