Setting the bar - an experimental investigation of immigration requirements

Menusch Khadjavi*, Jasper D. Tjaden

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We examine determinants of immigration requirements in a public goods game experiment with endogenous groups. Initially, the game consists of in-group players who enjoy an existing public good and out-group players who may subsequently enter the group. Motivated by different current migration flows and anti-immigration sentiments, our treatments are crafted to investigate how migrants’ power of self-determination and public debate among in-group players shape immigration requirements. We employ the minimal group paradigm and immigration requirements are set by in-group voting. In order to immigrate, out-group players have to fulfill minimal contribution requirements. Public debate fosters coherence between the requirements and in-group players’ contributions if migrants are free to reject requirements. Conversely, public debate among in-group players fosters economic exploitation of migrants with less bargaining power. Overall the study illustrates the novel potential of applying well-established tools from experimental economics to migration questions.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)160-169
Number of pages10
JournalJournal of Public Economics
Volume165
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2018
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Endogenous groups
  • Experiment
  • Immigration
  • Public good
  • Voting

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Setting the bar - an experimental investigation of immigration requirements'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this