We introduce a family of proportional surplus division values for TU-games. Each value first assigns to each player a compromise between her stand-alone worth and the average stand-alone worths over all players, and then allocates the remaining worth among the players in proportion to their stand-alone worths. This family contains the proportional division value and the new egalitarian proportional surplus division value as two special cases. We provide characterizations for this family of values, as well as for each single value in this family.
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
The authors thank an associate editor, eight anonymous referees, Manfred Besner, and Xun-Feng Hu for useful comments. Zhengxing Zou thanks the financial support of the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 71771025, 71801016) and the China Scholarship Council (Grant No. 201806030046). Yukihiko Funaki is supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers JP17H02503 and JP18KK0046.
© 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.
- Balanced contributions
- Cooperative game
- Proportional value
- Surplus sharing