Similarity after Goodman

L.B. Decock, I. Douven

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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Abstract

In a famous critique, Goodman dismissed similarity as a slippery and both philosophically and scientifically useless notion. We revisit his critique in the light of important recent work on similarity in psychology and cognitive science. Specifically, we use Tversky's influential set-theoretic account of similarity as well as Gärdenfors's more recent resuscitation of the geometrical account to show that, while Goodman's critique contained valuable insights, it does not warrant a dismissal of similarity. © 2010 The Author(s).
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)61-75
Number of pages15
JournalReview of Philosophy and Psychology
Volume2
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011

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