Spillovers and conflict in wage bargaining: Experimental evidence

A. Lehr, J. Vyrastekova, A. Akkerman, R. Torenvlied

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review


© 2016 Elsevier Inc.We investigate how information spillovers from other negotiations affect conflict in bargaining. Two theoretical mechanisms are studied: (1) social comparisons, which are hypothesized to increase conflict due to self-serving biases, and (2) rational learning, which is hypothesized to decrease conflict by reducing information asymmetries. Our experimental design allows for an interactive bargaining process and offers full control over the information available to negotiators. Consistent with studies of one-shot games, we find that spillovers resulting from social comparisons increase conflict; however, the bargaining process mitigates this effect. In bargaining situations in which spillovers also allow for rational learning, the conflict-increasing effects of spillovers are prevented.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)59-68
JournalJournal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Publication statusPublished - 1 Aug 2016
Externally publishedYes

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