Stackelberg production-protection games: Defending crop production against intentional attacks

Marieke Musegaas, Loe Schlicher*, Herman Blok

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

Inspired by recent terrorist attacks on cereal production fields in Iraq, we introduce and study two types of Stackelberg games. In these games, the leader wants to maximize its production (e.g., cereal), while the follower tries to destroy this production as much as possible. In the first model, the leader can protect its production by spreading his production resources over multiple regions. In the second model, the leader can also decide to allocate some extra protection resources to the regions. For both games, we are interested in a follower's and leader's optimal strategy. We characterise optimal strategies for the follower and present two linear time algorithms (one for each game) that find an optimal strategy for the leader.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)102-119
Number of pages18
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Volume297
Issue number1
Early online date18 Apr 2021
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 16 Feb 2022

Bibliographical note

Stackelberg production-protection games: Defending crop production against intentional attacks

Funding Information:
The authors wish to thank dr. ir. Roy Lindelauf for his inspirational remarks that led to the leading example of this paper. The authors also would like to thank two anonymous referees for useful suggestions and comments.

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 The Author(s)

Keywords

  • OR in defense
  • production
  • protection
  • resource allocation
  • Stackelberg game

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