Abstract
It is widely documented that third parties punish norm violations, even at a substantial cost to themselves. However, little is known about how third-party punishment occurs in groups consisting of members who differ in status. Having a higher-status member promotes norm enforcement and group efficiency but also poses threats to collective goods when they strategically exploit people’s trust to maximize self-interest. Two preregistered studies consistently revealed a punitive mechanism contingent on target status and strategic exploitation. Third-party observers generated harsher punishment when high- but not low-status targets transgressed after publicly endorsing cooperation (Study 1) or procedural fairness (Study 2). The findings elucidate third-party punishment as a feasible mechanism to counteract exploitation and maintain social norms in interactions with status asymmetry.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 209-220 |
Number of pages | 12 |
Journal | Social Psychology |
Volume | 53 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jul 2022 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:This research was supported by China Scholarship Council under Grant No. 201606040158. The funder had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Hogrefe Publishing.
Keywords
- Deception
- Norm violation
- Punishment
- Social norm
- Social status