Structural empirical evaluation of job search monitoring

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

To evaluate search effort monitoring of unemployed workers, it is important to take account of post-unemployment wages and job-to-job mobility. We structurally estimate a model with search channels, using a controlled trial in which monitoring is randomized. The data include registers and survey data on search behavior. We find that the opportunity to move to better-paid jobs in employment reduces the extent to which monitoring induces substitution toward formal search channels in unemployment. Job mobility compensates for adverse long-run effects of monitoring on wages. We examine counterfactual policies against moral hazard, like reemployment bonuses and changes of the benefits path.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)879-903
Number of pages25
JournalInternational Economic Review
Volume60
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019

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Job search
Empirical evaluation
Monitoring
Wages
Unemployment
Job mobility
Bonuses
Substitution
Survey data
Moral hazard
Search behavior
Re-employment
Workers

Cite this

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Structural empirical evaluation of job search monitoring. / van den Berg, Gerard J.; van der Klaauw, Bas.

In: International Economic Review, Vol. 60, No. 2, 2019, p. 879-903.

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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