Abstract
To evaluate search effort monitoring of unemployed workers, it is important to take account of post-unemployment wages and job-to-job mobility. We structurally estimate a model with search channels, using a controlled trial in which monitoring is randomized. The data include registers and survey data on search behavior. We find that the opportunity to move to better-paid jobs in employment reduces the extent to which monitoring induces substitution toward formal search channels in unemployment. Job mobility compensates for adverse long-run effects of monitoring on wages. We examine counterfactual policies against moral hazard, like reemployment bonuses and changes of the benefits path.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 879-903 |
Number of pages | 25 |
Journal | International Economic Review |
Volume | 60 |
Issue number | 2 |
Early online date | 18 Oct 2018 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - May 2019 |