Subject Sensitive Invariantism: In Memoriam

M.J. Blaauw

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

Subject sensitive invariantism is the view that whether a subject knows depends on what is at stake for that subject: the truth-value of a knowledge-attribution is sensitive to the subject's practical interests. I argue that subject sensitive invariantism cannot accept a very plausible principle for memory to transmit knowledge. I argue, furthermore, that semantic contextualism and contrastivism can accept this plausible principle for memory to transmit knowledge. I conclude that semantic contextualism and contrastivism are in a dialectical position better than subject sensitive invariantism is. © 2007 The Author.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)318-326
JournalPhilosophical Quarterly
Volume58
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008

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