Suppressing the Oblivious RAM timing channel while making information leakage and program efficiency trade-offs

C.W. Fletchery, L. Ren, X. Yu, M. Van Dijk, O. Khan, S. Devadas

Research output: Chapter in Book / Report / Conference proceedingConference contributionAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is an established cryptographic technique to hide a program's address pattern to an untrusted storage system. More recently, ORAM schemes have been proposed to replace conventional memory controllers in secure processor settings to protect against information leakage in external memory and the processor I/O bus. © 2014 IEEE.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication20th IEEE International Symposium on High Performance Computer Architecture, HPCA 2014
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Pages213-224
ISBN (Print)9781479930975
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014
Externally publishedYes
Event20th IEEE International Symposium on High Performance Computer Architecture, HPCA 2014 - , United States
Duration: 15 Feb 201419 Feb 2014

Publication series

NameProceedings - International Symposium on High-Performance Computer Architecture
ISSN (Print)1530-0897

Conference

Conference20th IEEE International Symposium on High Performance Computer Architecture, HPCA 2014
Country/TerritoryUnited States
Period15/02/1419/02/14

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