TY - GEN
T1 - Suppressing the Oblivious RAM timing channel while making information leakage and program efficiency trade-offs
AU - Fletchery, C.W.
AU - Ren, L.
AU - Yu, X.
AU - Van Dijk, M.
AU - Khan, O.
AU - Devadas, S.
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is an established cryptographic technique to hide a program's address pattern to an untrusted storage system. More recently, ORAM schemes have been proposed to replace conventional memory controllers in secure processor settings to protect against information leakage in external memory and the processor I/O bus. © 2014 IEEE.
AB - Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is an established cryptographic technique to hide a program's address pattern to an untrusted storage system. More recently, ORAM schemes have been proposed to replace conventional memory controllers in secure processor settings to protect against information leakage in external memory and the processor I/O bus. © 2014 IEEE.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84904012684
UR - https://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84904012684&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/HPCA.2014.6835932
DO - 10.1109/HPCA.2014.6835932
M3 - Conference contribution
SN - 9781479930975
T3 - Proceedings - International Symposium on High-Performance Computer Architecture
SP - 213
EP - 224
BT - 20th IEEE International Symposium on High Performance Computer Architecture, HPCA 2014
PB - IEEE Computer Society
T2 - 20th IEEE International Symposium on High Performance Computer Architecture, HPCA 2014
Y2 - 15 February 2014 through 19 February 2014
ER -