Tender auctions with existing operators bidding

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

Consider a government tendering a facility, such as an airport or railway, when one of the bidders is an 'existing operator' who owns another facility that is a substitute or complement to the tendered facility. In 'standard auctions', bidders compete on how much to pay to the government. We find that, all else equal, the existing operator offers to pay more than a 'new bidder' and the operator is therefore more likely to win the auction. In consumer-price auctions, bidders compete on the price they will charge. New bidders offer to set the price at their marginal cost. With complements, the existing operator strategically offers a price that is below its marginal cost; with substitutes, it offers a price that is above its marginal cost. Price auctions are better for welfare than standard auctions: they lead to lower mark-ups and are less affected by having an existing operator in the auction.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-10
JournalEconomics of Transportation
Volume6
Issue numberJune
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016

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auction
marginal costs
Costs
Airports
consumer price
airport
Bidding
Operator
Auctions
German Federal Railways
welfare
Marginal cost

Cite this

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Tender auctions with existing operators bidding. / van den Berg, V.A.C.; Rouwendal, J.

In: Economics of Transportation, Vol. 6, No. June, 2016, p. 1-10.

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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