TY - JOUR
T1 - The anatomy of block accumulations by activist shareholders
AU - von Lilienfeld-Toal, Ulf
AU - Schnitzler, Jan
PY - 2020/6
Y1 - 2020/6
N2 - We conduct a large-sample analysis of investor activism in the US based on all 13D filings from 2001 to 2016. While hedge funds represent the largest filer group, the sample contains a diverse set of other activist shareholders. This raises the question to what extent other investors perform a governance role similar to hedge funds. Based on target firms' outcome variables, like announcement returns of activist campaigns and changes in operating performance measures, we find surprisingly few differences. However, hedge funds play a special role when it comes towards takeovers. They stimulate monitoring activities among relatively larger firms and they help to set payout policies.
AB - We conduct a large-sample analysis of investor activism in the US based on all 13D filings from 2001 to 2016. While hedge funds represent the largest filer group, the sample contains a diverse set of other activist shareholders. This raises the question to what extent other investors perform a governance role similar to hedge funds. Based on target firms' outcome variables, like announcement returns of activist campaigns and changes in operating performance measures, we find surprisingly few differences. However, hedge funds play a special role when it comes towards takeovers. They stimulate monitoring activities among relatively larger firms and they help to set payout policies.
KW - Activist blockholders
KW - Hedge funds
KW - Investor activism
KW - Stock ownership
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85082422767&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85082422767&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101620
DO - 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101620
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85082422767
SN - 0929-1199
VL - 62
SP - 1
EP - 22
JO - Journal of Corporate Finance
JF - Journal of Corporate Finance
M1 - 101620
ER -
