The Construction of Rights

Keith Dowding, Martin van Hees

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

This paper examines the sense in which rights can be said to exist. We examine various approaches to the definition and analysis of rights, focusing in particular on the compossibility of rights. Concentrating on three existing approaches to rights-social choice-theoretic, game-theoretic, and Steiner's approach-we suggest that rights are noncompossible in any interesting sense, that is, that the rights people have are nonexistent or vanishingly small. We develop an alternative account of rightswhich we claim is more in tune with moral intuitions-where compossibility is not important and rights cannot form the exclusive basis of morality or a theory of justice. Rights are constructed on the basis of more fundamental moral values. We demonstrate how they are constructed and the sense in which they exist even though they might not always be exercised, while acknowledging that rights that may never be exercised are hardly worth the name.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)281-293
Number of pages13
JournalThe American Political Science Review
Volume97
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2003

Fingerprint

social rights
intuition
morality
justice
Values

Cite this

Dowding, Keith ; van Hees, Martin. / The Construction of Rights. In: The American Political Science Review. 2003 ; Vol. 97, No. 2. pp. 281-293.
@article{222f9df4db69459daabc19a70c3fd7f7,
title = "The Construction of Rights",
abstract = "This paper examines the sense in which rights can be said to exist. We examine various approaches to the definition and analysis of rights, focusing in particular on the compossibility of rights. Concentrating on three existing approaches to rights-social choice-theoretic, game-theoretic, and Steiner's approach-we suggest that rights are noncompossible in any interesting sense, that is, that the rights people have are nonexistent or vanishingly small. We develop an alternative account of rightswhich we claim is more in tune with moral intuitions-where compossibility is not important and rights cannot form the exclusive basis of morality or a theory of justice. Rights are constructed on the basis of more fundamental moral values. We demonstrate how they are constructed and the sense in which they exist even though they might not always be exercised, while acknowledging that rights that may never be exercised are hardly worth the name.",
author = "Keith Dowding and {van Hees}, Martin",
year = "2003",
doi = "10.1017/S0003055403000674",
language = "English",
volume = "97",
pages = "281--293",
journal = "The American Political Science Review",
issn = "0003-0554",
publisher = "Cambridge University Press",
number = "2",

}

The Construction of Rights. / Dowding, Keith; van Hees, Martin.

In: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 2, 2003, p. 281-293.

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Construction of Rights

AU - Dowding, Keith

AU - van Hees, Martin

PY - 2003

Y1 - 2003

N2 - This paper examines the sense in which rights can be said to exist. We examine various approaches to the definition and analysis of rights, focusing in particular on the compossibility of rights. Concentrating on three existing approaches to rights-social choice-theoretic, game-theoretic, and Steiner's approach-we suggest that rights are noncompossible in any interesting sense, that is, that the rights people have are nonexistent or vanishingly small. We develop an alternative account of rightswhich we claim is more in tune with moral intuitions-where compossibility is not important and rights cannot form the exclusive basis of morality or a theory of justice. Rights are constructed on the basis of more fundamental moral values. We demonstrate how they are constructed and the sense in which they exist even though they might not always be exercised, while acknowledging that rights that may never be exercised are hardly worth the name.

AB - This paper examines the sense in which rights can be said to exist. We examine various approaches to the definition and analysis of rights, focusing in particular on the compossibility of rights. Concentrating on three existing approaches to rights-social choice-theoretic, game-theoretic, and Steiner's approach-we suggest that rights are noncompossible in any interesting sense, that is, that the rights people have are nonexistent or vanishingly small. We develop an alternative account of rightswhich we claim is more in tune with moral intuitions-where compossibility is not important and rights cannot form the exclusive basis of morality or a theory of justice. Rights are constructed on the basis of more fundamental moral values. We demonstrate how they are constructed and the sense in which they exist even though they might not always be exercised, while acknowledging that rights that may never be exercised are hardly worth the name.

U2 - 10.1017/S0003055403000674

DO - 10.1017/S0003055403000674

M3 - Article

VL - 97

SP - 281

EP - 293

JO - The American Political Science Review

JF - The American Political Science Review

SN - 0003-0554

IS - 2

ER -