Abstract
We introduce a novel framework to model limited lookahead in congestion games. Intuitively, the players enter the game sequentially and choose an optimal action under the assumption that the k - 1 subsequent players play subgame-perfectly. Our model naturally interpolates between outcomes of greedy best-response (k = 1) and subgame-perfect outcomes (k = n, the number of players). We study the impact of limited lookahead (parameterized by k) on the stability and inefficiency of the resulting outcomes. As our results reveal, increased lookahead does not necessarily lead to better outcomes; in fact, its effect crucially depends on the existence of ties and the type of game under consideration.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018 |
| Publisher | International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS) |
| Pages | 1941-1943 |
| Number of pages | 3 |
| Volume | 3 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781510868083 |
| Publication status | Published - 2018 |
| Event | 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018 - Stockholm, Sweden Duration: 10 Jul 2018 → 15 Jul 2018 |
Conference
| Conference | 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018 |
|---|---|
| Country | Sweden |
| City | Stockholm |
| Period | 10/07/18 → 15/07/18 |
Bibliographical note
Main Track Extended AbstractsKeywords
- Congestion games
- Greedy best-response
- Limited backward induction
- Subgame-perfect equilibrium
Cite this
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The curse of ties in congestion games with limited lookahead. / Groenland, Carla; Schafer, Guido.
17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018. Vol. 3 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), 2018. p. 1941-1943.Research output: Chapter in Book / Report / Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Academic › peer-review
TY - GEN
T1 - The curse of ties in congestion games with limited lookahead
AU - Groenland, Carla
AU - Schafer, Guido
N1 - Main Track Extended Abstracts
PY - 2018
Y1 - 2018
N2 - We introduce a novel framework to model limited lookahead in congestion games. Intuitively, the players enter the game sequentially and choose an optimal action under the assumption that the k - 1 subsequent players play subgame-perfectly. Our model naturally interpolates between outcomes of greedy best-response (k = 1) and subgame-perfect outcomes (k = n, the number of players). We study the impact of limited lookahead (parameterized by k) on the stability and inefficiency of the resulting outcomes. As our results reveal, increased lookahead does not necessarily lead to better outcomes; in fact, its effect crucially depends on the existence of ties and the type of game under consideration.
AB - We introduce a novel framework to model limited lookahead in congestion games. Intuitively, the players enter the game sequentially and choose an optimal action under the assumption that the k - 1 subsequent players play subgame-perfectly. Our model naturally interpolates between outcomes of greedy best-response (k = 1) and subgame-perfect outcomes (k = n, the number of players). We study the impact of limited lookahead (parameterized by k) on the stability and inefficiency of the resulting outcomes. As our results reveal, increased lookahead does not necessarily lead to better outcomes; in fact, its effect crucially depends on the existence of ties and the type of game under consideration.
KW - Congestion games
KW - Greedy best-response
KW - Limited backward induction
KW - Subgame-perfect equilibrium
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85054764572&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference contribution
SN - 9781510868083
VL - 3
SP - 1941
EP - 1943
BT - 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018
PB - International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
ER -