Abstract
We introduce a novel framework to model limited lookahead in congestion games. Intuitively, the players enter the game sequentially and choose an optimal action under the assumption that the k - 1 subsequent players play subgame-perfectly. Our model naturally interpolates between outcomes of greedy best-response (k = 1) and subgame-perfect outcomes (k = n, the number of players). We study the impact of limited lookahead (parameterized by k) on the stability and inefficiency of the resulting outcomes. As our results reveal, increased lookahead does not necessarily lead to better outcomes; in fact, its effect crucially depends on the existence of ties and the type of game under consideration.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018 |
Publisher | International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS) |
Pages | 1941-1943 |
Number of pages | 3 |
Volume | 3 |
ISBN (Print) | 9781510868083 |
Publication status | Published - 2018 |
Event | 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018 - Stockholm, Sweden Duration: 10 Jul 2018 → 15 Jul 2018 |
Conference
Conference | 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018 |
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Country/Territory | Sweden |
City | Stockholm |
Period | 10/07/18 → 15/07/18 |
Bibliographical note
Main Track Extended AbstractsKeywords
- Congestion games
- Greedy best-response
- Limited backward induction
- Subgame-perfect equilibrium