The curse of ties in congestion games with limited lookahead

Carla Groenland, Guido Schafer

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    Abstract

    We introduce a novel framework to model limited lookahead in congestion games. Intuitively, the players enter the game sequentially and choose an optimal action under the assumption that the k - 1 subsequent players play subgame-perfectly. Our model naturally interpolates between outcomes of greedy best-response (k = 1) and subgame-perfect outcomes (k = n, the number of players). We study the impact of limited lookahead (parameterized by k) on the stability and inefficiency of the resulting outcomes. As our results reveal, increased lookahead does not necessarily lead to better outcomes; in fact, its effect crucially depends on the existence of ties and the type of game under consideration.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publication17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018
    PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
    Pages1941-1943
    Number of pages3
    Volume3
    ISBN (Print)9781510868083
    Publication statusPublished - 2018
    Event17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018 - Stockholm, Sweden
    Duration: 10 Jul 201815 Jul 2018

    Conference

    Conference17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018
    CountrySweden
    CityStockholm
    Period10/07/1815/07/18

    Bibliographical note

    Main Track Extended Abstracts

    Keywords

    • Congestion games
    • Greedy best-response
    • Limited backward induction
    • Subgame-perfect equilibrium

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