The epistemic condition of moral responsibility

In this chapter I will canvas the central positions in debates about the epistemic condition of moral responsibility. In so doing, I will discuss some of the core theoretical and applied questions that concern the impact ignorance has on moral responsibility. My first task is to outline the structure of the epistemic condition and describe how the foreseeability of ignorance and ignorant wrongdoing is relevant to the question of whether the epistemic condition is met. I then go on to describe two of the main strands in the debate. I will then delve into two main perspectives on the topic: "volitionism," which posits that must trace to an instance of knowing or witting belief mismanagement, and "non-volitionism," which does not have this requirement and is therefore less restrictive in determining moral responsibility for ignorant actions. I will also examine the relevance of moral ignorance, difficulty, praiseworthiness, and luck to the epistemic condition. I conclude with a discussion of some issues in what might be called the applied ethics of the epistemic condition.