TY - JOUR
T1 - The interpose PUF
T2 - Secure PUF design against state-of-the-art machine learning attacks
AU - Nguyen, P.H.
AU - Sahoo, D.P.
AU - Jin, C.
AU - Mahmood, K.
AU - Rührmair, U.
AU - van Dijk, M.
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - © 2019, Ruhr-University of Bochum. All rights reserved.The design of a silicon Strong Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) that is lightweight and stable, and which possesses a rigorous security argument, has been a fundamental problem in PUF research since its very beginnings in 2002. Various effective PUF modeling attacks, for example at CCS 2010 and CHES 2015, have shown that currently, no existing silicon PUF design can meet these requirements. In this paper, we introduce the novel Interpose PUF (iPUF) design, and rigorously prove its security against all known machine learning (ML) attacks, including any currently known reliability-based strategies that exploit the stability of single CRPs (we are the first to provide a detailed analysis of when the reliability based CMA-ES attack is successful and when it is not applicable). Furthermore, we provide simulations and confirm these in experiments with FPGA implementations of the iPUF, demonstrating its practicality. Our new iPUF architecture so solves the currently open problem of constructing practical, silicon Strong PUFs that are secure against state-of-the-art ML attacks.
AB - © 2019, Ruhr-University of Bochum. All rights reserved.The design of a silicon Strong Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) that is lightweight and stable, and which possesses a rigorous security argument, has been a fundamental problem in PUF research since its very beginnings in 2002. Various effective PUF modeling attacks, for example at CCS 2010 and CHES 2015, have shown that currently, no existing silicon PUF design can meet these requirements. In this paper, we introduce the novel Interpose PUF (iPUF) design, and rigorously prove its security against all known machine learning (ML) attacks, including any currently known reliability-based strategies that exploit the stability of single CRPs (we are the first to provide a detailed analysis of when the reliability based CMA-ES attack is successful and when it is not applicable). Furthermore, we provide simulations and confirm these in experiments with FPGA implementations of the iPUF, demonstrating its practicality. Our new iPUF architecture so solves the currently open problem of constructing practical, silicon Strong PUFs that are secure against state-of-the-art ML attacks.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85079760983&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.13154/tches.v2019.i4.243-290
DO - 10.13154/tches.v2019.i4.243-290
M3 - Article
SN - 2569-2925
VL - 2019
SP - 243
EP - 290
JO - IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
JF - IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
IS - 4
ER -