Abstract
Propaganda is typically understood as communication aimed at influencing or persuading an audience to adopt various opinions and behaviors, usually in politics and public discourse. Commonly, though, the term 'propaganda' has negative connotations: propagandistic discourse is viewed as based on lies and deceit, aiming at the emotional manipulation of the masses exclusively for the propagandist's benefit. Propaganda is often contrasted with rational discourse, particularly reasoned argumentation, which purportedly aims at truth without misleading its audience. In short, propaganda is 'bad' while rational argumentation is 'good', and the two categories are sharply distinguished. This chapter argues that this dichotomy is simplistic. Conceptions of rationality used to define propaganda negatively are often contentious, particularly the purported contrast between 'reason' and 'emotion'. Moreover, rational argumentation aiming at persuasion is functionally similar to propaganda, seeking to interfere with others' belief states. Thus, argumentation also has a coercive component. If so, the purported opposition to rational discourse is not a suitable response to propaganda's 'demarcation problem' (what counts as propaganda; what does not). This chapter presents a non-pejorative conceptualization of propaganda, discussing criteria that may distinguish 'good' from 'bad' propaganda from an ethical/moral point of view.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Extreme Philosophy |
Subtitle of host publication | Bold Ideas and a Spirit of Progress |
Editors | Stephen Hetherington |
Publisher | Taylor and Francis |
Pages | 203-219 |
Number of pages | 17 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781003824862 |
ISBN (Print) | 9781032317397, 9781032317380 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2024 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2024 Stephen Hetherington. All rights reserved.