The Limits of Bayesian Thinking in Court

Ronald Meester

doi:10.1111/tops.12478

The Limits of Bayesian Thinking in Court

Ronald Meester^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Mathematics

Research output: Contribution to Journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

We comment on the contributions of Dahlman and of Fenton et al., who both suggested a Bayesian approach to analyze the Simonshaven case. We argue that analyzing a full case with a Bayesian approach is not feasible, and that there are serious problems with assigning actual numbers to probabilities and priors. We also discuss the nature of Bayesian thinking in court, and the nature and interpretation of the likelihood ratio. In particular, we discuss what it could mean that a likelihood ratio is in some sense uncertain.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1205-1212
Number of pages	8
Journal	Topics in Cognitive Science
Volume	12
Issue number	4
Early online date	31 Oct 2019
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/tops.12478
Publication status	Published - Oct 2020

Bibliographical note

Special Issue: Models of Rational Proof in Criminal Law, Editors: Henry Prakken, Floris Bex and Anne Ruth Mackor ‐ Levels of Explanation in Cognitive Science: From Molecules to Cultures Editors: Matteo Colombo and Markus Knauff.

Keywords

Bayesian networks
Evidence
Legal case
Likelihood ratios
Modeling

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10.1111/tops.12478

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The Limits of Bayesian Thinking in Court

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

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