The Limits of Epistemic Democracy

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

The so-called doctrinal paradox reveals that a jury that decides by majority on the truth of a set of propositions, may come to a conclusion that is at odds with a legal doctrine to which they all subscribe. The doctrinal paradox, and its subsequent generalization by List and Pettit (Econ Philos 18:89–110, 2002), reveal the logical difficulties of epistemic democracy. This paper presents several generalizations of the paradox that are formulated with the use of many-valued logic. The results show that allowing the individual or the collective judgements to be formulated in terms of degrees of beliefs does not ensure the possibility of collective epistemic decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)649-666
Number of pages18
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume28
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2007

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collective decision
logic
doctrine
democracy
decision making
Democracy
Paradox
Logic

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The Limits of Epistemic Democracy. / Van Hees, Martin.

In: Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 28, No. 4, 06.2007, p. 649-666.

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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AB - The so-called doctrinal paradox reveals that a jury that decides by majority on the truth of a set of propositions, may come to a conclusion that is at odds with a legal doctrine to which they all subscribe. The doctrinal paradox, and its subsequent generalization by List and Pettit (Econ Philos 18:89–110, 2002), reveal the logical difficulties of epistemic democracy. This paper presents several generalizations of the paradox that are formulated with the use of many-valued logic. The results show that allowing the individual or the collective judgements to be formulated in terms of degrees of beliefs does not ensure the possibility of collective epistemic decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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