Abstract
We use a unique combination of register and survey data from Amsterdam to investigate the performance of school assignment mechanisms in prac-tice. We find that deferred acceptance (DA) results in higher mean welfare than the adaptive Boston mechanism. This is due to students making strategic mistakes. The welfare gain of a switch from actual Boston to DA is over 90% of the welfare difference between actual Boston and optimal (proxy) Boston. Disadvantaged and lower-ability students would benefit most from such a switch.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 388-455 |
| Number of pages | 68 |
| Journal | Journal of Political Economy |
| Volume | 131 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Early online date | 19 Jan 2023 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Feb 2023 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:The first version of this paper appeared in June 2015 as Center for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper no. 10656. We benefited from valuable comments from anonymous referees, Yinghua He, Fuhito Kojima, and Alvin Roth as well as from seminar participants at various places. We gratefully acknowledge the cooperation of secondary schools in Amsterdam. Oosterbeek and De Haan received support from the Research Council of Norway Toppforsk (grant 275906). Van der Klaauw acknowledges financial support from
Funding Information:
a Vici grant from the Dutch Science Foundation (NWO). Replication files are available in a zip file. This paper was edited by Magne Mogstad.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. Published by The University of Chicago Press.
Funding
The first version of this paper appeared in June 2015 as Center for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper no. 10656. We benefited from valuable comments from anonymous referees, Yinghua He, Fuhito Kojima, and Alvin Roth as well as from seminar participants at various places. We gratefully acknowledge the cooperation of secondary schools in Amsterdam. Oosterbeek and De Haan received support from the Research Council of Norway Toppforsk (grant 275906). Van der Klaauw acknowledges financial support from a Vici grant from the Dutch Science Foundation (NWO). Replication files are available in a zip file. This paper was edited by Magne Mogstad.