The persistence of organized crime in post-caliphate Iraq: a case of crime-terror convergence?

In the advancing understanding of the crime-terror nexus, organized crime and terrorist entities are increasingly seen as capable of pursuing multiple agendas simultaneously, with the potential to ultimately reach convergence. Applying Makarenko’s theoretical work on crime-terror convergence, this article sets out to explain the persistence of organized crime in Iraq after the fall of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Caliphate, based on a literature study and three expert interviews. The vacuum caused by the Caliphate’s fall led to fierce competition between remnants of ISIS and Iran-backed Shia factions of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and a rearrangement of control over ISIS’ criminal enterprise. The Iraq-Syria border is used as a hub for the smuggling of weapons, drugs, oil, and people by both the ISIS remnants and the Shia PMF factions, while the border areas and roads leading to Baghdad are focal points for imposing illicit taxation. We argue that in post-Caliphate Iraq, ISIS remnants can be seen as hybrid criminal-political entities, while the Shia PMF factions cannot be defined as such in a definite manner. In their competition for power, both actors exploit local idiosyncrasies to garner support among the local population. By strengthening both their criminal and ideological-political components, these actors continue to destabilize the already fragile Iraqi state. Moreover, because Iran-backed Shia PMF factions obtained legitimacy and state backing as liberators from ISIS and became embedded in the Iraqi state apparatus, the state itself became a crucial contributor to the crime-terror nexus in post-Caliphate Iraq.