The Problem of Psychology in Neo-Kantianism: On the Relevance of Richard Hönigswald

Christian Krijnen revises the widespread view that German idealism from Kant to Hegel and Neo-Kantianism only focused on absolute subjectivity and failed to deal philosophically with concrete subjectivity properly, leaving it to empirical psychology. Therefore, he discusses the transcendental philosophy of Hönigswald that, according to Krijnen, paradigmatically succeeded in integrating the ‘problem of psychology’ into the foundations of transcendental philosophy. This chapter shows why and how the problem of psychology is not a mere empirical issue to be addressed by empirical psychology but part of philosophy as a theory of objectivity. It discusses how, for Hönigswald, objectivity relates to the so-called ‘monas’ (concrete subject) as the performing factor of objectivity. Finally, this chapter uncovers the limitations of Hönigswald’s transcendental-idealist theory of concrete subjectivity in comparison with Hegel’s philosophy.