The unfriendly board: Antecedents and consequences of board dissent

Jianqiang Xiao; Sunny Li Sun; David H. Weng

doi:10.1016/j.emj.2020.10.002

The unfriendly board: Antecedents and consequences of board dissent

Jianqiang Xiao, Sunny Li Sun^*, David H. Weng

^*Corresponding author for this work

Management and Organisation

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Abstract

This study examines the antecedents and consequences of board dissent. Drawing from agency theory and the information-processing perspective, we propose that the level of earnings management is negatively associated with the likelihood of board dissent, and that this relationship is moderated by environmental complexity. We also contend that board dissent may improve firm performance, but it may prompt managers to use more deviant strategies. Using a sample of public firms in China, we find support for our hypotheses. Our findings contribute to the literatures on board effectiveness and corporate governance.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	135-146
Number of pages	12
Journal	European Management Journal
Volume	39
Issue number	1
Early online date	27 Oct 2020
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.emj.2020.10.002
Publication status	Published - Feb 2021

Funding

The authors thank Kangtao Ye at Renmin University of China for his early participation in this project. The first author thanks professor Erming Xu at Renmin University of China for his constant encouragement and support (NFSC No.71372157).

Keywords

Agency theory
Board dissent
Board effectiveness
Corporate governance
Information processing

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10.1016/j.emj.2020.10.002

The unfriendly board_Antecedents and consequences of board dissentFinal published version, 584 KBLicence: Article 25fa Dutch Copyright Act

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The unfriendly board: Antecedents and consequences of board dissent

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