The value free ideal of science and non-epistemic values in regulatory toxicology

Osman Çağlar Dede*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book / Report / Conference proceedingChapterAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

The Value Free Ideal (VFI) suggests that non-epistemic (moral, political, environmental, economic and similar) values, commitments and aspirations have no legitimate role to play in scientific judgment-formation. This chapter introduces some of the key arguments for and against the VFI and discusses the implications of these arguments for conceptualizing the accountability of scientific experts in the context of evidence-based policy and regulation. It also introduces an example concerning toxicological assessments of agricultural pesticides. The chapter describes the contexts where the inclusion of non-epistemic value judgments in science is impermissible according to the proponents of the VFI and discusses the main arguments for and against the VFI. It illustrates some of the key concepts in the contemporary philosophy of science that challenge the VFI and transcend it by allowing non-epistemic values a more expanded role to play in scientific judgment than the VFI permits.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationTechnocracy and the Law
Subtitle of host publicationAccountability, Governance and Expertise
EditorsAlessandra Arcuri, Florin Coman-Kund
PublisherRoutledge
Chapter10
Pages223-244
Number of pages22
ISBN (Electronic)9781000390148
ISBN (Print)9780367898571
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2021

Bibliographical note

Copyright:
Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

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