Three transparency principles examined

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

This paper derives, from Richard Moran’s work, three different accounts of doxastic Transparency—roughly, the view that when a rational person wants to know whether she believes that p, she directs her attention to the truth-value of p, not to the mental attitude she has vis-à-vis p. We investigate which of these is the most plausible of the three by discussing a number of (classes of) examples. We conclude that the most plausible account of Transparency is in tension with the motivation behind Transparency accounts: it is disconnected from the deliberative stance.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)111-128
Number of pages18
JournalJOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH
Volume44
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019

Keywords

  • Alienated belief
  • First-person perspective
  • Rationality
  • Richard Moran
  • Self-knowledge
  • Theoretical vs. deliberative stance
  • Transparency

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Three transparency principles examined'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this