TY - JOUR
T1 - Three transparency principles examined
AU - van Woudenberg, René
AU - Kloosterboer, Naomi
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - This paper derives, from Richard Moran’s work, three different accounts of doxastic Transparency—roughly, the view that when a rational person wants to know whether she believes that p, she directs her attention to the truth-value of p, not to the mental attitude she has vis-à-vis p. We investigate which of these is the most plausible of the three by discussing a number of (classes of) examples. We conclude that the most plausible account of Transparency is in tension with the motivation behind Transparency accounts: it is disconnected from the deliberative stance.
AB - This paper derives, from Richard Moran’s work, three different accounts of doxastic Transparency—roughly, the view that when a rational person wants to know whether she believes that p, she directs her attention to the truth-value of p, not to the mental attitude she has vis-à-vis p. We investigate which of these is the most plausible of the three by discussing a number of (classes of) examples. We conclude that the most plausible account of Transparency is in tension with the motivation behind Transparency accounts: it is disconnected from the deliberative stance.
KW - Alienated belief
KW - First-person perspective
KW - Rationality
KW - Richard Moran
KW - Self-knowledge
KW - Theoretical vs. deliberative stance
KW - Transparency
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85081371150&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.5840/jpr20191029147
DO - 10.5840/jpr20191029147
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85081371150
SN - 1053-8364
VL - 44
SP - 111
EP - 128
JO - JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH
JF - JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH
ER -