To see or not to see – queer theory and the conceptualisation of the Convention grounds in refugee law

When one types “feminist theory book” into a search engine, it becomes immediately clear that feminist theory encompasses a wide field of very different approaches, ideas and perspectives. This breadth and complexity is not much reduced if the search term is specified as “feminist legal theory”. The fact that there are multitudinous discussions on how the various ideas interrelate, including fundamental questions such as, for example, whether and how queer theory is part of the family of feminist theories, can seem overwhelming for anyone interested in using a feminist theoretical, conceptual or methodological approach in their work. However, the rich body of theories and angles that feminism provides is also very much an opportunity. Certain approaches may have explanatory value for some specific questions, whereas others are suitable for theorising others.

This blog is part of the series on feminist theory in legal displacement research, which showcases a variety of ways in which feminist theories in the broad sense can shed light on legal research surrounding forced migration. In this particular piece, I want to tell the story of how adopting a particular queer theory lens helped me see certain difficulties surrounding the conceptualisation of the Convention grounds in the refugee definition. I submit that the queer lens makes these challenges visible, and that recognising them enables us to – at least try to – use them productively. In this sense, the theme of the title, “to see or not to see”, applies in a dual manner to this piece. First, it asks how decision-makers “see” (gay) asylum claimants. Secondly, it asks what we “see” when using queer theory as a lens to analyse refugee law doctrine relating to the Convention grounds.