Tradable credit scheme for mobility management considering travelers' loss aversion

Yue Bao, Ziyou Gao*, Meng Xu, Hai Yang

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review


Under a given tradable credit scheme, travelers' loss aversion behavior for credit charging during the route choice process is studied. A disutility function of loss aversion is applied to approach travelers' different attitudes towards credit loss and gain, and the transaction costs of buying and selling credits are also incorporated in the function. The user equilibrium (UE) and market equilibrium (ME) conditions considering loss aversion effects are formulated into a variational inequality (VI) problem. Analyses demonstrate that the system optimum (SO) credit scheme does not always exist. A proposition is further presented to guarantee its existence.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)138-154
Number of pages17
JournalTransportation Research. Part E, Logistics and Transportation Review
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2014
Externally publishedYes


  • Loss aversion
  • Mobility management
  • Tradable credit
  • Traffic equilibrium
  • Transaction cost


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