Abstract
Under a given tradable credit scheme, travelers' loss aversion behavior for credit charging during the route choice process is studied. A disutility function of loss aversion is applied to approach travelers' different attitudes towards credit loss and gain, and the transaction costs of buying and selling credits are also incorporated in the function. The user equilibrium (UE) and market equilibrium (ME) conditions considering loss aversion effects are formulated into a variational inequality (VI) problem. Analyses demonstrate that the system optimum (SO) credit scheme does not always exist. A proposition is further presented to guarantee its existence.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 138-154 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | Transportation Research. Part E, Logistics and Transportation Review |
| Volume | 68 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2014 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Funding
We wish to express our sincere thanks to the three enthusiastic anonymous reviewers whose quick but thorough and constructive comments have improved the exposition of the paper. The study is supported by the National Basic Research Program of China ( 2012CB725401 ), the National Natural Science Foundation of China ( 71361130016 ), the Hong Kong Grant Council ( HKUST621111 ) and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities ( 2012JBZ 005 ).
Keywords
- Loss aversion
- Mobility management
- Tradable credit
- Traffic equilibrium
- Transaction cost