Tradable credit scheme for mobility management considering travelers' loss aversion

Yue Bao; Ziyou Gao; Meng Xu; Hai Yang

doi:10.1016/j.tre.2014.05.007

Tradable credit scheme for mobility management considering travelers' loss aversion

Yue Bao, Ziyou Gao^*, Meng Xu, Hai Yang

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to Journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

Under a given tradable credit scheme, travelers' loss aversion behavior for credit charging during the route choice process is studied. A disutility function of loss aversion is applied to approach travelers' different attitudes towards credit loss and gain, and the transaction costs of buying and selling credits are also incorporated in the function. The user equilibrium (UE) and market equilibrium (ME) conditions considering loss aversion effects are formulated into a variational inequality (VI) problem. Analyses demonstrate that the system optimum (SO) credit scheme does not always exist. A proposition is further presented to guarantee its existence.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	138-154
Number of pages	17
Journal	Transportation Research. Part E, Logistics and Transportation Review
Volume	68
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2014.05.007
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2014
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Loss aversion
Mobility management
Tradable credit
Traffic equilibrium
Transaction cost

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10.1016/j.tre.2014.05.007

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title = "Tradable credit scheme for mobility management considering travelers' loss aversion",

abstract = "Under a given tradable credit scheme, travelers' loss aversion behavior for credit charging during the route choice process is studied. A disutility function of loss aversion is applied to approach travelers' different attitudes towards credit loss and gain, and the transaction costs of buying and selling credits are also incorporated in the function. The user equilibrium (UE) and market equilibrium (ME) conditions considering loss aversion effects are formulated into a variational inequality (VI) problem. Analyses demonstrate that the system optimum (SO) credit scheme does not always exist. A proposition is further presented to guarantee its existence.",

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author = "Yue Bao and Ziyou Gao and Meng Xu and Hai Yang",

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doi = "10.1016/j.tre.2014.05.007",

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AU - Bao, Yue

AU - Gao, Ziyou

AU - Xu, Meng

AU - Yang, Hai

PY - 2014/1/1

Y1 - 2014/1/1

N2 - Under a given tradable credit scheme, travelers' loss aversion behavior for credit charging during the route choice process is studied. A disutility function of loss aversion is applied to approach travelers' different attitudes towards credit loss and gain, and the transaction costs of buying and selling credits are also incorporated in the function. The user equilibrium (UE) and market equilibrium (ME) conditions considering loss aversion effects are formulated into a variational inequality (VI) problem. Analyses demonstrate that the system optimum (SO) credit scheme does not always exist. A proposition is further presented to guarantee its existence.

AB - Under a given tradable credit scheme, travelers' loss aversion behavior for credit charging during the route choice process is studied. A disutility function of loss aversion is applied to approach travelers' different attitudes towards credit loss and gain, and the transaction costs of buying and selling credits are also incorporated in the function. The user equilibrium (UE) and market equilibrium (ME) conditions considering loss aversion effects are formulated into a variational inequality (VI) problem. Analyses demonstrate that the system optimum (SO) credit scheme does not always exist. A proposition is further presented to guarantee its existence.

KW - Loss aversion

KW - Mobility management

KW - Tradable credit

KW - Traffic equilibrium

KW - Transaction cost

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JO - Transportation Research. Part E, Logistics and Transportation Review

JF - Transportation Research. Part E, Logistics and Transportation Review

SN - 1366-5545

ER -

Tradable credit scheme for mobility management considering travelers' loss aversion

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Keywords

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