Abstract
Under a given tradable credit scheme, travelers' loss aversion behavior for credit charging during the route choice process is studied. A disutility function of loss aversion is applied to approach travelers' different attitudes towards credit loss and gain, and the transaction costs of buying and selling credits are also incorporated in the function. The user equilibrium (UE) and market equilibrium (ME) conditions considering loss aversion effects are formulated into a variational inequality (VI) problem. Analyses demonstrate that the system optimum (SO) credit scheme does not always exist. A proposition is further presented to guarantee its existence.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 138-154 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review |
| Volume | 68 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2014 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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Keywords
- Loss aversion
- Mobility management
- Tradable credit
- Traffic equilibrium
- Transaction cost
Cite this
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Tradable credit scheme for mobility management considering travelers' loss aversion. / Bao, Yue; Gao, Ziyou; Xu, Meng; Yang, Hai.
In: Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Vol. 68, 01.01.2014, p. 138-154.Research output: Contribution to Journal › Article › Academic › peer-review
TY - JOUR
T1 - Tradable credit scheme for mobility management considering travelers' loss aversion
AU - Bao, Yue
AU - Gao, Ziyou
AU - Xu, Meng
AU - Yang, Hai
PY - 2014/1/1
Y1 - 2014/1/1
N2 - Under a given tradable credit scheme, travelers' loss aversion behavior for credit charging during the route choice process is studied. A disutility function of loss aversion is applied to approach travelers' different attitudes towards credit loss and gain, and the transaction costs of buying and selling credits are also incorporated in the function. The user equilibrium (UE) and market equilibrium (ME) conditions considering loss aversion effects are formulated into a variational inequality (VI) problem. Analyses demonstrate that the system optimum (SO) credit scheme does not always exist. A proposition is further presented to guarantee its existence.
AB - Under a given tradable credit scheme, travelers' loss aversion behavior for credit charging during the route choice process is studied. A disutility function of loss aversion is applied to approach travelers' different attitudes towards credit loss and gain, and the transaction costs of buying and selling credits are also incorporated in the function. The user equilibrium (UE) and market equilibrium (ME) conditions considering loss aversion effects are formulated into a variational inequality (VI) problem. Analyses demonstrate that the system optimum (SO) credit scheme does not always exist. A proposition is further presented to guarantee its existence.
KW - Loss aversion
KW - Mobility management
KW - Tradable credit
KW - Traffic equilibrium
KW - Transaction cost
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84902147400&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84902147400&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.tre.2014.05.007
DO - 10.1016/j.tre.2014.05.007
M3 - Article
VL - 68
SP - 138
EP - 154
JO - Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
JF - Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
SN - 1366-5545
ER -