Transparent Emotions? A critical analysis of Moran's transparency claim

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I critically analyze Richard Moran's account of knowing one's own emotions, which depends on the Transparency Claim (TC) for self-knowledge. Applied to knowing one's own beliefs, TC states that when one is asked "Do you believe P?", one can answer by referencing reasons for believing P. TC works for belief because one is justified in believing that one believes P if one can give reasons for why P is true. Emotions, however, are also conceptually related to concerns; they involve a response to something one cares about. As a consequence, acquiring self-knowledge of one's emotions requires knowledge of other mental attitudes, which falls outside the scope of TC. Hence, TC cannot be applied to emotions.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)246-258
Number of pages13
JournalPhilosophical Explorations
Issue number18 (2)
Publication statusPublished - 2015


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