This paper describes the Triton federated-avionics security testbed that supports testing real aircraft electronic systems for security vulnerabilities. Because modern aircraft are complex systems of systems, the Triton testbed allows multiple systems to be instantiated for analysis in order to observe the aggregate behavior of multiple aircraft systems and identify their potential impact on flight safety. We describe two attack scenarios that motivated the design of the Triton testbed: ACARS message spoofing and the software update process for aircraft systems. The testbed allows us to analyze both scenarios to determine whether adversarial interference in their expected operation could cause harm. This paper does not describe any vulnerabilities in real aircraft systems; instead, it describes the design of the Triton testbed and our experiences using it. One of the key features of the Triton testbed is the ability to mix simulated, emulated, and physical electronic systems as necessary for a particular experiment or analysis task. A physical system may interact with a simulated component or a system whose software is running in an emulator. To facilitate rapid reconfigurability, Triton is also entirely software reconfigurable: all wiring between components is virtual and can be changed without physical access to components. A prototype of the Triton testbed is used at two universities to evaluate the security of aircraft systems.
|Number of pages||9|
|Publication status||Published - 12 Aug 2019|
|Event||12th USENIX Workshop on Cyber Security Experimentation and Test, CSET 2019, co-located with USENIX Security 2019 - Santa Clara, United States|
Duration: 12 Aug 2019 → …
|Conference||12th USENIX Workshop on Cyber Security Experimentation and Test, CSET 2019, co-located with USENIX Security 2019|
|Period||12/08/19 → …|