Abstract
The pejorative connotation often associated with the ordinary language meaning of “conspiracy theory” does not only stem from a conspiracy theory’s being about a conspiracy, but also from a conspiracy theory’s being regarded as a particular kind of theory. I propose to understand conspiracy theory-induced polarization in terms of disagreement about the correct epistemic evaluation of ‘theory’ in ‘conspiracy theory’. By framing the positions typical in conspiracy theory-induced polarization in this way, I aim to show that pejorative conceptions of ‘conspiracy theory’ are problematic for research open to the possibility of finding depolarization strategies. That is, because they preclude constructive engagement with the epistemic norms governing (the rationales foundational of) belief in conspiracy theories.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 438-453 |
| Journal | Social Epistemology |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 19 Feb 2023 |
Funding
Thanks to M Dentith, Charles Pigden, and Melina Tsapos, as well as the participants and audience of The 1st International Conference on the Philosophy of Conspiracy Theory at Pitzer College, Claremont (February 2022) and the participants of the online CTTSC EU Workshop (July 2022) for their helpful comments on elements of an earlier draft of this paper. This paper is dedicated to Ton Wijkhuizen, who I thank for his everlasting support and wisdom.
| Funders | Funder number |
|---|---|
| Melina Tsapos |
Keywords
- Conspiracy theory
- Depolarization
- Generalism and particularism
- Epistemic evaluations