Abstract
What is the nature of deep disagreement? In this paper, I consider two similar albeit seemingly rival answers to this question: the Wittgensteinian theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge propositions, and the fundamental epistemic principle theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over fundamental epistemic principles. I assess these theories against a set of desiderata for a satisfactory theory of deep disagreement, and argue that while the fundamental epistemic principle theory does better than the Wittgensteinian theory on this score, the fundamental epistemic principle theory nevertheless struggles to explain the variety of deep disagreement.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 983-998 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Topoi |
| Volume | 1 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Early online date | 29 Oct 2018 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2018 |
Funding
Research for this paper was supported through a Vidi grant (276-20-024) from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO).
| Funders | Funder number |
|---|---|
| Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek |
