When the money stops: Fluctuations in financial remittances and incumbent approval in Central Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia

Katerina Tertytchnaya, Catherine E. De Vries, Hector Solaz, David Doyle

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

Fluctuations in the volume and the value of financial remittances received from abroad affect the livelihood of households in developing economies across the world. Yet, political scientists have little to say about how changes in remittances, as opposed to the receipt of remittance payments alone, affect recipients' political attitudes. Relying on a unique four-wave panel study of Kyrgyz citizens between 2010-2013 and a cross-sectional sample of 28 countries in Central Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, we show that when people experience a decrease (increase) in remittances, they become less (more) satisfied about their household economic situation and misattribute responsibility to the incumbent at home. Our findings advance the literature on the political consequences of remittance payments and suggest that far from exclusively being an international risk-sharing mechanism for developing countries, remittances can also drive fluctuations in incumbent approval and compromise rudimentary accountability mechanisms in the developing world.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)758-774
Number of pages17
JournalAmerican Political Science Review
Volume112
Issue number4
Early online date12 Sep 2018
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2018

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Central Asia
Central Europe
Eastern Europe
fluctuation
money
responsibility
economic situation
political scientist
political attitude
compromise
livelihood
recipient
developing country
citizen
economy
Values
experience
literature

Cite this

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When the money stops : Fluctuations in financial remittances and incumbent approval in Central Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. / Tertytchnaya, Katerina; De Vries, Catherine E.; Solaz, Hector; Doyle, David.

In: American Political Science Review, Vol. 112, No. 4, 11.2018, p. 758-774.

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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