Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases

Theo Offerman, Giorgia Romagnoli, Andreas Ziegler

Research output: Contribution to JournalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

The popularity of open ascending auctions is often attributed to the fact that openly observable bidding allows to aggregate dispersed information. Another reason behind the frequent utilization of open auction formats may be that they activate revenue enhancing biases. In an experiment, we compare three auctions that differ in how much information is revealed and in the potential activation of behavioral biases: (i) the ascending Vickrey auction, a closed format; and two open formats, (ii) the Japanese–English auction, and (iii) the Oral Outcry auction. Even though bidders react to information conveyed in others' bids, information aggregation fails in both open formats. In contrast, the Oral Outcry raises higher revenue than the other two formats by stimulating bidders to submit unprofitable jump bids and triggering a quasi-endowment effect.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)787-823
JournalQuantitative Economics
Volume13
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 May 2022
Externally publishedYes

Funding

FundersFunder number
amsterdams universiteitsfonds

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