@techreport{d4eab8c99b0b4f97ba77ece51c1a18a6,
title = "Why do oaths work? Image concerns and credibility in promise keeping",
abstract = "We use a laboratory experiment to understand the channels through which honesty oaths can affect behavior and credibility. Using a game with asymmetric information in a financial market setting that captures some important features of advisor-investor interactions, we manipulate the common knowledge of the promise and investigate three non-pecuniary costs of breaking an oath: co-player image costs, audience-image costs, and self-image costs. For investors oaths are neither sufficient nor necessary to generate trust: ultimately investors rely on their experience. We link laboratory results to a survey we conducted in the Netherlands where oaths are required in the banking sector.",
keywords = "Promise-keeping, Honesty Oaths, Common Knowledge, Deniability, Financial Markets, Laboratory Experiment",
author = "Sorravich Kingsuwankul and Chloe Tergiman and Villeval, {Marie Claire}",
year = "2023",
language = "English",
series = "TI Discussion Paper Series",
publisher = "Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper",
}