Abstract
Fuel taxes differ largely between countries. This paper reviews a number of considerations from the theory of public finance that may explain these differences. Based on a multiple regression model, we find for tax competition in Europe that small countries tend to be more aggressive than large countries by charging lower fuel taxes to attract customers from neighbouring countries. There is strong evidence that fuel is just considered as one of the many sources for government expenditure: as the share of government expenditure in GDP is higher, the fuel tax tends to be higher. No support is found for the hypothesis that fuel taxes are higher in countries where externality problems are more severe (proxied by car density of the country). In this respect, the normative literature on pricing externalities has found little support in the realities of transport policy. © 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 79-92 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Journal | Energy Economics |
Volume | 27 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2005 |