Private and Corporate Investigations: Internal Security Governance Within Organisations

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Abstract This chapter focuses on the private efforts of organisations to maintain (or restore) internal order within their organisational context. In a field of security where the state is typically absent, corporate investigators provide start-to-finish services to employers who are faced with internal norm violations. Different sources and methods of investigation are discussed (the corporate investigations), as well as the solutions that may be chosen after the investigations have been finalised (the corporate settlements). While they lack the powers of investigation granted to public police forces, corporate investigators have extensive access to information. Many corporate investigations are settled without the involvement of any public law enforcement agency and stay completely within the private legal sphere. In this sense, corporate investigations create a system of private investigations and justice, which for a large part operates independently from criminal justice systems. This chapter, finally, engages with the question of the implication that the existence of this field of corporate security has for democratic societies by focusing on the autonomy of corporate investigators, public-private relations and the interests that are involved.
Introduction

It is now a well-known fact that the provision of security is (no longer) exclusively dependent on governments (see, e.g., Jones and Newburn 2006). The complex security needs of modern society exceed what (national) governments can realistically provide. Private sector involvement in crime control is widespread (White 2014a; Gurinskaya and Nalla 2018). It is therefore not surprising that the private sector has also attracted the attention of social scientists. While still a relatively small part of criminological research efforts (as compared to the extensive field of research focused on the more classical public security provision by governments), there is now a solid body of work focusing on private security and on the question of public-private relationships (see, e.g., Johnston 1992; Loader 1997; Wood and Shearing 2007). Most of this literature, however, is focused on the most visible forms of private security, being physical safety issues and the safeguarding of property in (semi) public spaces (see, e.g., Nalla and Wakefield 2014). Mostly, these private security functions are preventative: private security personnel may prevent crime from occurring through the guarding of staff, by patrolling specific spaces or by providing technical security services. Consequently, the main focus within private security research is on those private security functions which are mainly concerned with the prevention of future loss (e.g. Johnston and Shearing 2003; Shearing and Stenning 1985).

Even though many private security efforts are focused on the prevention of crime (and more generally, financial loss), we can also find private security services which are more concerned with reactive, or ‘after the fact’, policing. Specifically, private investigators provide investigative services to their clients after a suspicion of wrongdoing has arisen. Private investigators may provide services to individuals or organisations. This chapter concerns itself with the latter. To clarify this distinction, the term ‘corporate investigator’ is used to refer to investigators who are employed by commercial or (semi) public organisations. There is some debate with regard to the question of who may be regarded to be a ‘corporate investigator’ (or more broadly, corporate security). For example, Nalla and Morash (2002) reserve this term for in-house security departments within corporate entities. This chapter, however, defines corporate investigators more broadly, to also include private investigation firms, forensic accountants and forensic (departments of) law firms. A defining characteristic is that corporate investigators cater to (both commercial and [semi] public) organisations (instead of individuals) (see also Meerts 2019a). Specifically, the focus of this chapter lies with the investigation of internal
norm violations rather than the investigation of crimes and other unwanted behaviour that is external to the organisation. As will be demonstrated, the private (labour) law relationships that are involved in internal investigations provides corporate investigators with much room to investigate without the involvement of the criminal justice system.

This chapter, then, focuses on the private efforts of organisations to maintain (or restore) internal order within their organisational context. In a field of security where the state is typically absent, corporate investigators provide start-to-finish services to employers who are faced with internal norm violations (Gill and Hart 1999). While they lack the powers of investigation granted to public police forces, corporate investigators have extensive access to information. Many corporate investigations are settled without the involvement of any public law enforcement agency and stay completely within the private legal sphere. In this sense, corporate investigations create a system of private investigations and justice, which for a large part operates independently from criminal justice systems. This chapter explores, first, the investigative possibilities of corporate investigators and, second, the alternatives to criminal prosecutions they provide to their clients. In the discussion, this chapter engages with the question of the implication that the existence of this field of corporate security has for democratic societies.

Corporate Investigations

Corporate investigators are private actors. By implication, they have no powers of investigation. Consequently, they lack access to (all) the investigative possibilities available to law enforcement actors. However, the flip-side of this is that corporate investigators are able to operate with a greater flexibility than law enforcement actors (Williams 2005). As a result, corporate investigators are able to act both swiftly and efficiently. The connection between the client (the employer) and the person under investigation (the employee) furthermore provides corporate investigators with extensive access to information (Meerts 2019a). All this culminates in a situation in which corporate investigators have wide-ranging possibilities to investigate, without being restricted by the stringent rules that apply to law enforcement agencies (Meerts 2019b). The widespread view that corporate investigators are not regulated, however, deserves some nuancing. Even though the extent and manner of regulation differs per national jurisdiction, private investigators are generally subject to rules and regulations. Some national jurisdictions rely fully on self-regulation by the sector (such as the UK—see https://www.theabi.org.uk/), while others
have state-mandated forms of regulation (such as the Netherlands, see Meerts 2019a). To make matters more complicated, membership of representative organisations is generally non-compulsory and so the status of quality markers issued by representative organisations is often unclear.

A complicating factor is, furthermore, provided by the diversity of the corporate investigations market. Who is regarded to be an investigator (either in the eyes of the law or in general) differs. In broad terms, we can identify private investigation firms, in-house investigation departments within (large) organisations, forensic accountants and (forensic departments of) legal firms (Meerts 2019a). These different actors all have their own rules and regulations. An overarching legal framework for corporate investigations is generally absent (apart from general laws such as those regulating privacy and criminal law). In the Netherlands, for example, private investigation firms need a permit, while this requirement does not hold for other types of investigators. In addition, private investigation firms are liable to legal regulations, while forensic accountants and legal investigators have (non-binding) professional guidelines (in addition to their own system of disciplinary law). In-house investigators, finally, have internal regulations guiding their actions (Meerts 2019a).

We can, however state that at the minimum corporate investigators are subject to general laws regulating employer-employee relations (labour law), regulating which behaviour is criminal (criminal law) and regulating how the right to privacy is protected (privacy regulation). In addition, general principles of law are used to regulate investigations, such as proportionality, subsidiarity and confidentiality (Meerts 2019a). In this context, proportionality means that the use of investigative methods should be proportional to the intended result and to the interests that are served with the investigation. Subsidiarity refers to the fact that the methods used should be the least intrusive for the (privacy of) the persons involved. Even though (most) corporate investigators lack legal privilege, they do focus on confidentiality of their investigations: the results are reported to the client only (who can then decide whether or not to publicise the investigation). Other leading principles include the adversarial principle, containing the right to be heard of the person who is investigated, and the principle of fair play (which inter alia includes that the people who are involved in the investigation should be treated fairly, with respect and with due consideration of all interests involved).

An additional characteristic that sets corporate investigations apart from criminal investigations is their focus. Other than criminal investigations, corporate investigations may or may not be focused on criminal behaviour. The scope of the types of behaviours that can potentially be investigated is thus
much larger for corporate investigators. Whether or not the investigated behaviour is criminal is not a central question for most clients of corporate investigators (Williams 2005). The investigation is, first and foremost, focused on solving the problem at hand. As such the investigation is less interested in the who than the what. By implication, the corporate investigation may have a wider scope than a criminal investigation would have, for example because it includes the question of which organisational systems and safeguards failed in this instance.

One implication of the above is that corporate investigators utilise what Williams (2005) calls ‘legal flexibility’: investigations may make use of legal definitions and instruments across the legal spectrum, defining (potential) crime as a labour conflict or breach of contract rather than a criminal act (Williams 2005). Thus, corporate investigators are not confined to the criminal code as a guideline for their investigations and, most notably, for the solutions provided after the investigation is finalised (see below).

As mentioned before, the focus of this chapter is on investigations into internal wrongdoing. However, corporate investigators do not exclusively focus on internal matters. The behaviour under investigation may just as well be external to an organisation. The choice to focus on internal wrongdoing is based on the fact that both the access to information and the possibilities to react after the fact are more extensive for internal investigations. This exposes an interesting dynamic: the employee under investigation may be asked by his or her employer to voluntarily assist investigators; however, the extent to which this is voluntary in reality is unclear. An employer has extensive influence over his employees by threat of unemployment or other measures (Meerts 2019a). In addition, the infrastructure provided by the employer (the internal network, email systems, hardware such as computers and (smart)phones) may be used in investigations since the employee is not the rightful owner here. The access to information about employees is not unlimited, however, and a certain measure of privacy remains (e.g. private emails which are sent with the use of company resources). Corporate investigators, thus, depend for an important part on the access to certain information of their client and on the cooperation of all parties involved (Williams 2014).

The investigative possibilities of corporate investigators are thus limited by their lack of coercive powers, but at the same time we see that corporate investigators have extensive options to investigate at their disposal. In this paragraph, we explore the tools corporate investigators may use to complete an investigation. Generally, an investigation commences with a formal assignment (although, in the case of investigations executed by an in-house department, this may take an alternative shape). In this assignment, the problem is
stated and usually the expected activities are listed. Which investigative activities are to be executed depend on the circumstances of the case; however, the following sources of information and/or investigative methods are commonly used. Below we describe internal documentation, internal systems, open sources, personal communication (the interview) and other sources and/or methods (Meerts 2019a).

A first source of information for corporate investigations is what we may summarise as internal documentation. For an important part, this consists of financial administration and source documents such as contracts. In addition to internal documentation, internal systems may provide investigators with ample information. Importantly, these consist of communication networks and systems of hardware and software. Email and telephone systems, as well as cloud storage, (smart)phones, laptops, PCs, external memory devices and physical security systems (such as key card entry data, security cameras and GPS or track-and-trace systems) contain rich information which may be used within corporate investigations.

In addition to strictly internal sources of information, investigators may also look to sources outside of the organisation. One of these, which seems to have gained more and more momentum over the years, is what is known as open sources. While the use of open sources for information gathering within an investigative context is often referred to as ‘OSINT’, this is not entirely correct. OSINT is the abbreviation for Open Sources Intelligence, which refers to the gathering of intelligence. In the context of investigations, however, we should use the term ‘Open Source Investigations’, which refers to ‘online investigations that involve combing through publicly accessible resources for information related to potential crimes’ (Koenig et al. 2018: 682). Open sources are often used as a point of reference at the start of the investigation. In this way, social media, Internet search engines and databases such as the Chamber of Commerce can be used to get general information about a person and his or her social network. In addition, these sources may provide easy access background information and possibly create a timeline for the occurrences under investigation. The use of open sources is part of a larger debate on the legitimacy of both police actions and the investigative possibilities of corporate investigators. While open sources are (more or less) freely available, the use of them in a (police) investigation may constitute a violation of the right to privacy. As such, open sources may not be used without limitation (Koops 2013). While the use of open sources is increasingly regulated in the context of police investigations, for corporate investigators the way open sources are used is often based on principles of law rather than on strict regulations which are codified in law.
While internal and external sources of information may prove to be very useful, many corporate investigations rely heavily on information gathered through personal communications (Meerts 2019a). This may include informative conversations with the client and witnesses. In addition, corporate investigations often obtain much information from the person who is investigated. Since this information is provided outside of the legal context of a criminal investigation, these personal communications are not interrogations. Rather, they are interviews. One implication is that the person who is interviewed cannot rely on the same legal protection that exists in the context of criminal investigations. The cooperation of the involved person (not being a suspect in the sense of criminal law) is therefore voluntary. However, as a result of the power imbalance (both in experience with the process and in position) that exists between the involved person and the investigator (being the representative of the employer), we should critically assess the voluntariness of the cooperation in practice (Meerts 2016). While an employee cannot be forced to cooperate, the employer may exert pressure through threats of unemployment or other punishment in case the employee fails to cooperate with the investigation. Even in the face of regulations and principles of law, then, there is ample opportunity to move people to cooperate.

In addition to the above, other sources of information may be used to further the investigation. In theory, there is no limit to these; however, in practice these other sources and methods of investigation often contain observations and site visits, the use of mystery guests and asset-tracing and other (forensic) accounting methods such as the calculation of damages. All the information combined leads to the report of the investigation. While in many cases, the above sources of information are sufficient to provide a clear image of the investigated events, it is also possible that the investigations are ruled inconclusive. Whether or not a reconstruction of the events can be fully provided, the results of the investigations are presented in a report, which is often the basis for further action. The possibilities for this further action are discussed in the following section.

**Corporate Settlements**

With the report in hand, the client that has ordered the corporate investigation may decide upon further action. These responses that may follow from corporate investigations are referred to as corporate settlements. Corporate settlements are the result of corporate decision making and often take place without the involvement of the criminal justice system. However, not all
forms of corporate settlement avoid the criminal justice system. As we will see below, sometimes the help of law enforcement is actively sought out (Meerts 2019a).

These corporate settlements fall, in broad terms, within the categories of action based on internal regulations, on labour law, on private/civil law and on criminal law (Meerts 2018). In addition, it may be decided that no further action is necessary—for example when the investigations yielded no definite results or when the problem has already been solved in another way (e.g. when the person involved no longer works for the client) (Meerts 2019a). The involvement of corporate investigators with the decision on the type of settlement differs. Corporate investigator involvement in this part of the process is generally limited, however. The report following from the investigations may contain (legal) advice, depending on the background of the investigator. The actual decision nevertheless falls upon the client (and, potentially, its legal counsel).

There are many factors that may influence the decision about the reaction following from the results of the investigation. One major consideration is whether or not to involve the criminal justice system. Of course, this is only a possibility if the behaviour can be defined as criminal. However, the fact that the behaviour can be defined as criminal does not necessarily mean that it is framed in such a way. Corporate investigations often frame the behaviour in a different manner (as a civil matter), leaving room for forum shopping among public and private jurisdictions when choosing a corporate settlement (Meerts 2019a).

Meerts, Huisman and Kleemans (in press), when discussing the considerations that may steer the latter decision, show that commercial, practical and normative reasons may lead an organisation away from reporting the case to the police. A commercial reason may be fear of reputational damage. An example of a practical reason would be that, in practical terms, a report to the police does not solve the immediate problem an organisation is faced with. Normative considerations against reporting include the protection of the involved employee against a disproportional punishment (e.g. when the labour contract has been terminated as well). In addition to the before-mentioned considerations, this and other research shows that another important factor is the level of confidence organisations have in the criminal justice system (see, e.g., Gill 2013; Meerts 2019a).

On the other hand, strategic, pragmatic and normative considerations may also lead to the involvement of the criminal justice system. In addition, some organisations may have the standard policy to report (which does not necessarily mean that every instance will indeed be reported—see, e.g., Meerts
A strategic or pragmatic consideration leading to an official report to the authorities may be that the organisation is obliged to do so by law or that some details about the case are already public; in such a case, reporting is more beneficial to the reputation than not reporting. An example of a normative consideration for reporting is that an organisation deems this ‘the right thing to do’ (Meerts, Huisman and Kleemans in press). When the decision has been made to involve the criminal justice system, an organisation cedes control over the information and level of publicity of the process (Williams 2005).

For this (and other) reason(s), a report to the authorities is often made after corporate investigations have been finalised (Meerts 2019a). In this way, a certain amount of control is retained and the scope of the problem is (more or less) clear to the organisation. This may mean that damage control is easier and the reputation can be managed better. The decision to involve the criminal justice system may therefore have more far-reaching effects than when another solution is chosen; however, it is possible for organisations to manage it to some extent. Research shows that the information provided by the corporate investigations is often an important point of departure for the criminal justice investigations. Even though there is still a possibility that the criminal investigation will take a different turn, the information provided by the organisation through the report of the corporate investigations may therefore influence the scope and direction of the criminal investigation (Meerts 2019a).

When it has been decided not to involve the criminal justice system, other options are available. It should be noted that the decision to report to the authorities is rarely the only solution taken. Because of the uneasy fit between the objectives and processes of the criminal justice system and the interests of (commercial) organisations, some other form of corporate settlement is often used as well (Meerts and Dorn 2017). As mentioned above, one option is to make use of internal regulations within the organisation itself (Meerts 2018). The options provided here often range from minor (such as a warning) to severe (such as termination of the labour contract). In the latter case, labour law is used as a tool to respond to the matter at hand. Here as well, the possibilities differ in their degree of severity. For example, a contract may simply not be renewed (on the one side of the spectrum) or the termination of the contract may be shaped through a summary dismissal combined with a compensation payment to the organisation (Meerts 2018).

In addition to criminal law, internal sanctions and labour law, the options provided by civil law may also be used as a response to norm violations (Meerts 2018). Civil justice proceedings are generally less publicised than criminal justice proceedings. In addition, the standard of evidence is lower in civil cases, making it easier to arrive at a swift solution. An example of the use of
the civil justice system is a civil suit based on breach of contract, which may result in repayment of damages. Another, less public, option is the use of a settlement agreement (Meerts 2018). In a settlement agreement, parties come to an understanding with regard to the terms of separation and the amount payable.

Even though the involvement of corporate investigators in this phase is limited, corporate settlement are the result of corporate investigations. In this way, corporate investigations create a system of private corporate investigations and justice, which for a large part operates independently from criminal justice systems. Because of the limited in- and oversight that exist with regard to these private systems, it is important to take a closer look at the implications they might have. This is the subject of the discussion below.

Discussion: The Implications of Corporate Systems of Investigations and Justice

In the above, an overview is given of the services provided by corporate investigators and the activities they are involved with. This leads us to the question what the implication of the market of corporate investigations is for democratic societies in which the state is (still) viewed as the main provider for security. To explore this, we need to address some central themes which emerge from this chapter: the autonomy of corporate investigators; connected to this, public-private relations; and the interests that are involved. With the increasing emphasis on the responsibility of private actors, it is important to think about the positioning of corporate investigations and the professionals who execute them. For example, the Netherlands is (partly) moving towards a system of self-investigation in complex cases of financial crime, which then can be used in the criminal prosecution of the organisation (or individual) in question (see, e.g., Van Leusden 2020). The importance of corporate investigations may grow in such a context, since (far-reaching) decisions within the criminal justice system would be based on corporate rather than on criminal investigations. Additionally, as a result of the considerable invisibility of corporate investigations in general, the sector is rather difficult to oversee. As will be discussed below, this might have some serious consequences, especially for the individuals involved.

With regard to the autonomy of corporate investigators, it should be noted that the options to investigate and resolve internal norm violations within the private legal sphere often suffice. As a result, corporate investigators and their
clients are frequently able to act independently from the criminal justice system, with a high degree of autonomy. Corporate investigators are capable of marketing some strategic advantages (the use of secrecy, discretion and control; legal flexibility [forum shopping] and the way economic crime is framed) (Williams 2005). Even in instances in which control is ceded to the criminal justice system, a certain measure of control may be exerted through the manner in which a case is presented to the authorities and the timing thereof. Corporate investigators and their clients therefore enjoy a considerable sphere of discretion in the investigation of internal norm violations and the responses that follow.

Considering that there is a large sphere of discretion for private entities to investigate their internal norm violations and to search for an appropriate response, it is not surprising that many instances of internal norm violations in the private sphere. This has previously been qualified as ‘private justice’ (see, e.g., Henry 1983). In general terms, the prevalence of internal crime remains unclear: since the criminal justice system is not involved in the investigation and settlement of internal crime, the insight into what happens in the private sphere is very limited. The knowledge of private forms of justice relies for an important part on the extent to which information is volunteered by private actors, either resulting from a report to the authorities or as part of a cooperation effort with the authorities. Much, then, remains invisible to the public eye. As a result, there are only limited checks and balances in place to oversee that corporate investigators adhere to the rules.

In this light, the cooperation between public and private, or the lack thereof, is an important subject. While there certainly are examples of mutually beneficial cooperation, literature suggest that these are the exceptions, rather than the rule (see, e.g., Meerts 2019a; Meerts, Huisman and Kleemans in press). More often than not, public-private contact is focused on the transfer of information from private to public. This is important, because within a cooperation (to a certain extent), insight is gathered into the activities of the partner. When it is only a matter of private-to-public information transfer, this insight remains limited and the question of how the information is gathered might stay unanswered.

With regard to the interests which are involved, finally, previous research has shown that corporate investigators may take public interests into account. The procedural rights of the involved employee may, for example, be taken into account during an investigation (see, e.g., Meerts 2019a). This is not directly in the private interest of the client and may indeed make the investigation more difficult. The use of the adversarial principle, to take an example, slows down the investigation since the involved person needs time to respond
(and may take as much time as possible). This incorporation of other interests than those of the client is in line with the non-contractual moral agency that Loader and White (2017) introduce for the security sector in general. The authors argue that in addition to a focus on the private interests of their clients, private security professionals are also guided by moral concerns that go beyond the contractual obligations they have towards their clients. When we look at corporate investigations through this lens, we can discern some actions that are executed because they are ‘right’, as opposed to because they are in the best interest of the client. Indeed, some of these are made contractually mandatory by corporate investigators through the incorporation of certain principles of law in their code of conduct. Non-contractual moral agency may also influence the decision to report. While corporate investigators are often not directly involved in the settlement option chosen, they may exert a certain amount of influence over the decision whether or not to report to the authorities. This may, in part, stem from the fact that many corporate investigators have a public-sector background (see also White 2014b; Van Dijk and De Waard 2001). However, the fact remains that corporate investigators are private actors who investigate on behalf of their clients. As such, public interests are not the main concern of corporate investigations. The introduction of non-contractual moral agency only goes so far: its implementation relies heavily on the moral compass of individual corporate investigators and their employers and compliance is often difficult to enforce.

Why, then, is all of this relevant? If we look at the system of private justice, provided by corporate investigators, we may voice certain concerns. While there are notable advantages of the fact that corporate investigators provide clients with start-to-finish services when faced with internal norm violations, the combination of the focus on private interests and the fact that corporate investigators largely operate separately form the criminal justice system may also prove problematic in some ways.

To start with the positive, corporate investigations are a way to efficiently and professionally respond to internal crime and other undesirable behaviour, without burdening the already over-extended criminal justice system. Capable organisations are fending for themselves and the criminal justice system is not burdened with cases that take a lot of limited capacity. Consequently, this limited capacity can be used for matters which touch the common good more directly.

While the above advantages certainly are relevant, there also are some risks involved in the existence of systems of corporate justice. First, a recurring theme in research about the relationship between public and private security efforts is that private security may lead to class injustice: the commodification
of security may lead to a situation in which those with money can afford to buy security, leaving the rest of society behind in an unsafe environment (Loader and White 2017). This is certainly a point of interest—the more profitable the company, the better the corporate investigations that can be purchased. This may then lead to the situation in which others, not being able to afford corporate investigation services, either are unable to respond to internal norm violations in an appropriate manner or remain dependant on the criminal justice system (in which these types of crime are a low priority).

In addition to the legal inequality between organisations, there is potentially a measure of legal inequality for individuals who are suspected of a norm violation within organisations which do and do not use corporate investigators. The power imbalance that already exists between an employee and an employer is exacerbated by the use of corporate investigators paid for by the typically more affluent and powerful employer. On the other hand, an investigation may be beneficial to an (innocent) individual. Moreover, corporate investigations can be less intrusive than a full-blown criminal justice procedure (Meerts 2019a). The fact remains, however, that procedural protection within the context of corporate investigations is limited, which renders those under investigation vulnerable. A major point of concern, then, is the fact that legal protections are less defined and much more difficult to enforce within a sphere of corporate, private justice, compared to the criminal justice system. Where the private system is so invisible that the rights of the accused can easily be undermined, there is a real risk of abuse.

Williams (2006) notes that there are some fundamental issues which make the regulation of the corporate investigation sector a challenge. The sector produces its own barriers for its governance as a result of some key characteristics: the relative autonomy and low visibility of corporate investigations and settlements, the potential for forum shopping and strategic use of different legal venues and the fragmented nature of the sector and of the interests involved make it difficult to exert effective control over the sector.

The possibility of the (mis)use of power, combined with the focus on private interests and limited visibility, results in wariness among many law enforcement professionals. While there is no concrete evidence of large-scale abuse of their position by corporate investigators, the possibility remains. The scepticism with which some law enforcement professionals approach corporate investigations is understandable (Meerts, Huisman and Kleemans in press). Practically, however, the criminal justice system is partly reliant on corporate investigators to produce information that would quite possibly not be obtained without them. In addition, corporate investigations play an important role in the way organisations respond to (financial) crime and other
norm violations. When executed professionally, the private niche in which corporate investigators operate can be a valuable addition to the responses to crime. All this can create friction based on necessity versus distrust within public-private relations. The question of public-private cooperation is therefore a complicated one with no easy fix. It starts, however, with gaining insight into the rather opaque world of corporate investigation.

**Recommended Readings**

This chapter touches upon some interesting themes which are explored further in other work, which has been referenced throughout this chapter. While both the investigative activities and the possible corporate settlement options have briefly been discussed, this chapter does not go into detail. The interested reader is referred to the work of Gill (inter alia 2013), Gill and Hart (inter alia 1999), Meerts (inter alia 2016, 2018 and 2019a) and Williams (inter alia 2005, 2006 and 2014). With regard to the public-private relationships that (may or may not) occur in the context of investigation of internal crime specifically, readers are referred to Meerts (2019b). Dutch speakers are furthermore directed to a comprehensive report by Meerts, Huisman and Kleemans (in press), which is based on empirical research into public-private relations in the field of internal financial crime in the Netherlands.

A subject that is merely implicit in this chapter, is that of the question of the role of private security in general. This has been subject to much debate and the interested reader is referred to classic works such as Shearing and Stenning (inter alia 1983; 1985), Johnston (1992), Loader (1997), Garland (2001), Jones and Newburn (2006), Wood and Shearing (2007), Loader and White (2017) and Gurinskaya and Nalla (2018).

**Note**

1. The involvement of investigators with a legal background provides an interesting exception here. Even though to date, it is not entirely clear yet whether legal privilege may be used in the context of investigations (which are supposed to be impartial), the possibility is one of the selling points for investigators with a legal background (see Meerts 2019a).
References


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