Muslims in Surinam and the Netherlands, and the Divided Homeland

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Abstract

This article invites a rethinking of the relation between homeland, diaspora and religion. We reflect on Muslims of Indian origin whose ancestors left British India long before 1947, when the country was partitioned and the new nations of Pakistan and India were established. The article interrogates the understanding of the Indian diaspora with religion as its core feature. It cautions that such a conceptualization often leads to the perception of the Indian diaspora as a Hindu diaspora and consequently to the exclusion of Muslims of Indian origin. Empirical evidence is presented illustrating that Muslims of Indian origin in Surinam and in the Netherlands feel connected to each other as well as to Hindus of Indian origin through a shared sense of ethnic consciousness, a sense of distinctiveness, common history, the belief in a common fate and the perception of their homeland. We therefore argue in favour of the inclusion of these Muslims in the Indian diaspora (studies). Their exclusion means denying these Muslims their history as well as rendering them ‘homeless’. This amounts to a re-enactment of the 1947 partition in the countries which the Indian diaspora now tries to retain a collective memory of, and tries to reinstate as their original homeland in which Hindus and Muslims were ‘brothers of one mother’ i.e. Hindustan.

Introduction

Though initially only a few communities were defined as a diaspora (i.e. the Jewish, Greek and Armenian diasporas), its older perception as ‘a nation in exile’ was somewhat broadened and different notions of diasporas were adopted that allowed the inclusion of various groups that had experienced migration and the attendant anxieties of displacement, homelessness, and a wish to return. Consequently, overseas communities of Indian origin were conceptualized as an Indian diaspora. Accepting Cohen’s argument that a diaspora can emerge from a growing sense of group ethnic consciousness, many scholars now accept the reality of an Indian diaspora with members in different countries who share such a consciousness that is sustained by, amongst other things, a sense of distinctiveness, common history and the belief in a common fate. Adopting such a definition of the Indian diaspora, scholars generally accept the inclusion of so-called People of Indian Origin (PIO). Taking a closer look we conclude, however, that such studies on the Indian diaspora are in fact studies on Hindus with Hinduism firmly rooted in the present-day Indian nation. Muslims are generally left out of the analysis and, if mentioned at all, they are more often than not de-territorialized from India and re-territorialized to Pakistan.

In most diaspora studies the relation between the diaspora community and its homeland, whether imagined or real, plays a key role. Indeed, important criteria for calling a
particular group of migrants a diaspora are that the members of that group retain a collective memory of the original homeland and that they are committed to the maintenance or restoration of that homeland. Some scholars therefore argue that since the fundamental attachment of Muslims is not to the *watan* (homeland), but to the *umma*, or ‘the community of believers, all made equal in their submission to Allah’, overseas Muslims of Indian origin should not be considered as part of the Indian diaspora as they do not consider India as their homeland. Some go even a step farther and want to extend the diasporic logic to locate the Muslim *umma*. In order to come to terms with ‘the limits and crisis of the nation-state’ in a ‘global hegemonic order’, S. Sayyid argues, for instance, in favour of the perception of the *umma* as a diaspora without a homeland, united through a transnational network of faith. Though Sayyid recognizes the lack of unanimity among those who describe themselves as Muslims, he nevertheless feels that this diversity does not undermine the reality of a Muslim *umma* in its diasporic form. In similar vein, Barbara Metcalf argues that, ‘Muslims today are tied together globally through a range of institutions and media’ that she thinks, ‘further suggest the appropriateness of studying this ‘diaspora’ as a single phenomenon’. Other studies have shown however, that many Muslims are part of locally embedded and determined communities of Muslims and conclude that their understanding of ‘Islam’ is historically rooted in, and shaped by, their social experience.

While we neither deny the existence of a Hindu diaspora nor that of a Muslim *umma*, we feel that there is a need for empirical studies to establish Muslims’ relation to the Indian diaspora. In other words, there is a need for research on Indian Muslims’ territorial identities. In this article, we therefore explore the relation between Muslims whose ancestors were contract labourers who left (British) India between 1873 and 1916 to work on the plantations in the Dutch colony of Surinam, South America. They now live in Surinam as well as in the Netherlands, and it is questioned whether these Muslims can or should be studied as part of the Indian diaspora. We first of all agree with Michel Brun eau’s proposition that considering the variety in language, religion and social structure among Indians living outside (present-day) India, one should not speak of one single Indian diaspora but rather of several different Indian diasporas. In this paper we present narratives of Muslims of Indian origin in Surinam and in the Netherlands and question whether they identify themselves as ‘Muslims in an Indian diaspora’ (suggesting an extra-territorial identity) or in fact as a ‘Muslim diaspora’ (suggesting an identity spatially located nowhere). We conclude that these Muslims of Indian origin in both the Netherlands as well as in Surinam indeed fit the aforementioned definition of a diaspora but in a special way, namely as a Hindustani Muslim diaspora.

While academicians increasingly invoke diaspora as a ‘syncretized configuration’ with ‘shifting’, ‘flexible’, and ‘anti-essentialist’ identities with great ‘hybridity’, the questions we like to address in this article and which invoke an earlier definition of diaspora structured by ‘a teleology of origin’, ‘scattering’, and ‘symbolic and actual returns to the homeland’, might look irrelevant in the present nascent global society. Similarly, scholars who do not recognize the existence of many ‘Islams’, i.e. various syncretic Islamic traditions, might not believe in the necessity of research into the relation between religious loyalties and locality, in the sense of locatedness within geographical space. Yet, by presenting the case of Muslims in Surinam as well as in the Netherlands whose ancestors had reintroduced Islam into Surinam, we show the empirical deficiencies of theories that either exclude these Muslims from the Indian diaspora on the basis of religious difference or exclude them because they are included in a Muslim diaspora that transcends ethnic bonds and national boundaries. We argue that
such notions ignore the multiplicity of identities that exist among Muslims, and their mobile and constructed nature.

Besides, though diaspora studies frequently focus on the relationship of diasporas with their ‘roots’, they generally discuss migrant discourses without taking into account the historical changes ‘back home’, their bearing on diaspora policies, on homeland perceptions of the diaspora and on views of the homeland by the diaspora. We emphasize that in order to understand the relation of Muslims of Indian origin with their homeland, we have to take into account the partition of British India in 1947 (hereafter referred to as the Partition) and its bearing on attitudes towards Muslims in India in general and towards Muslims of Indian origin in particular. We also have to consider the impact of this Partition on religious grounds, on overseas Muslims’ attitudes towards India (and Pakistan).

**People of Indian Origin in Surinam: Till the Partition of 1947, a Unity with a Difference**

Between 1873 and 1917, 64 boats carried approximately 34,000 Indian indentured labourers from India (Calcutta now Kolkata) to Paramaribo, Surinam’s capital. The arrival of these British–Indians in Surinam was closely connected with the prohibition of African slavery in the region in 1863. Since the first half of the nineteenth century, British India had already become one of the alternative reservoirs of labour replacing the freed slaves in British colonies. Most British–Indian migrants in Surinam had come from the Bhojpuri area of British India, now covering the western part of Bihar and eastern Uttar Pradesh. On arrival in Surinam they started working as indentured labourers on a five-year contract. After five years of very demanding work on plantations, they could make use of a ‘free passage’ and return to Calcutta. By 1915, an estimated one-third had made use of this opportunity. Two-thirds, however, had decided to stay and settled in Surinam permanently.

Though these people shared some traditions and at times a language, their cultural traditions were rather different and they came with dissimilar ambitions, personal histories and were physically, as well as mentally, variously equipped to face the long journey and the new circumstances in which they had to live and work. Besides, most men as well as women had registered themselves as single. Family migration was rare. In short, these migrants were a varied lot with differences based on language, religion, regional background, class and gender among other differences. They also encountered migratory experience and faced different problems while settling in the Dutch colony.

Most of these migrants identified as ‘Hindus’, yet all the 64 boats that had brought indentured labourers to Surinam had also carried those who identified themselves as ‘Muslims’. According to the personal database of these indentured labourers, the first boat, the *Lalla Rookh*, counted at least 35 Muslims among the 410 people who had embarked. All in all, an estimated one-fifth of all these migrants from Hindustan were Muslim. Yet, religion was only one way of identification besides many others such as place of birth, language, gender, caste, education and class.

Among these migrants, a few might have considered themselves ‘transients’ and not ‘settlers’. Yet, subsequent generations came to realize that they were in a ‘position of no return’ and abandoned the idea of going back to India. Surinam became their country of ‘permanent abode’. During their stay in the depots or during the long journey to Surinam, which lasted for months, some ‘singles’ became ‘couples’ and friends became ‘brothers’, and many friendships and marriages (including
inter-religious) were long lasting. By 1947 moreover, despite all their differences and
despite having experienced a unique migration history and having been subjected to
different economic and political situations, the descendants of these Indian indentured
labourers in Surinam had evolved into a distinct community with its own and varied
dynamics. By that time these migrants identified themselves as ‘Hindustanis’, evidently
referring to the fact that they or their ancestors had migrated from the northern part of
British India, known at the time as Hindustan. They thus seem to have constituted a
‘Hindustani’ diaspora.

This indeed was a multi-faith diaspora but Hindu and Muslim migrants developed a
strong ethnic group feeling as ‘Hindustanis’ in Surinam with two common languages (i.e.
Dutch and Sarnami), many shared cultural practices, religious traditions, common
political behaviour, dress codes and food habits, similar educational levels and class
backgrounds as well as an orientation on Hindustan as their common land of origin
and Surinam as their common land of exile, called Sri Ram desh by Muslims and
Hindus alike. As they all had come from Hindustan they called themselves Hindustanis
and Muslims felt as much part of this Hindustani community as did Hindus.

As we will show, living away from their homeland Hindustan, had also led to an
increase in the perceived value and significance of religious affiliation; yet at least till
1947, religion did not divide this diaspora. Actually, already in British India during
the decades preceding Partition, Muslims and Hindus had been involved in discourses
on religious identity and territorialism. Those had been the years during which nation-
alist movements rose with accompanying nationalist narratives and ideologies. In this
social context, some Muslim spokesmen had made a distinction between ‘common
nationalism’ (mutahidah qawmiyyat) which referred to a community based on shared
textual tradition.

Clearly, in Surinam before 1947, though religiously different, these Muslims and Hindus were part of the same Hindustani qawm.

Internal Differences among the Muslim Hindustani Qawm

Our first acquaintance with Muslim Hindustanis was when family members of Munshi
Ram Khan, a Muslim indentured labourer of Surinam who had migrated from
British India, approached scholars affiliated to the International Institute of Social
History (IISH) in Amsterdam with a request for help with the translation and publication
in English of the autobiography of their grandfather Munshi Rahman Khan, written in
Devanagari. As we were already involved in research on the Indian diaspora, the
IISH assigned the task to us and also decided upon the necessity of an introduction to
the actual manuscript. Research for this introduction brought to light a mass of
additional written information and numerous interviews further broadened our under-
standing of this Muslim Hindustani diaspora in Surinam and in the Netherlands. This
material, collected from archives in Paramaribo, Kolkata, New Delhi and The
Hague—narratives available through oral history and secondary written sources—
enabled us not only to get a general picture of the inter- and intra-ethnic relationships
among and between these Hindustanis, but also broadened our understanding of why
and how these Muslims started a process of indigenization of Islam in the Caribbean
context and how they rooted in the new location as a diaspora based on ethnicity and reli-
gion with a lasting orientation towards India and Pakistan.

Presently, there are around 425,000 Muslims in Surinam and they constitute 20% of
the total population of the country. They comprise the Javanese who came from the
Indonesian Archipelago and have been living in the country for more than 50 years and there is also a growing Afro-Surinamese Muslim community. Most Muslims in Surinam are, however, from Indian descent. Scholars have argued that the history of Islam and Muslims in the Caribbean can be traced back to long before the voyages of Columbus in the fifteenth century. They also provide evidence that indicates that many of the slaves who were transported from West Africa to work in the Caribbean were in fact Muslims. Yet these scholars agree that ‘all these Muslim groups have submerged almost without trace’. With the arrival of Muslim ‘East Indians’ (as they were called in English), however, in Guyana, Trinidad, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Jamaica, St Lucia, St Vincent, Grenada and Surinam, Islam (or rather various Islamic syncretized traditions) was reintroduced in the Caribbean. In Surinam, the Dutch also brought indentured labourers from the Dutch Indies, principally Java, and most of them were Muslims.

It was exactly the localized culture of Islam that was highlighted by Muslims in Surinam and which linked them to different ‘homelands’. Muslims from Indian descent and those from Java rarely developed common Islamic programmes and institutions and the history of religious institutionalization is based on intra-ethnic rather than inter-ethnic religious cooperation. Nevertheless, among others, religion was ‘a significant source of identification, demarcation and support’ for these Muslims. Besides, and as among Hindus in Surinam, religion was not ‘a private affair’ but the ‘driving force’ for these Muslim Hindustanis who arrived in Surinam with the same baggage of ‘Indo-Iranian’ practices. Most of them were from the Sunni Hanafi Mazhab. They celebrated the Eids as well as Muhurram and Milad-un-Nabi and the strong influence of the Shia and the Sufis of north India could also be felt in Surinam.

Besides, the Urdu language united these Hindustani Muslims but separated them from the Javanese Muslims and other Muslims more influenced by the process of ‘Arabization’. Urdu in the opinion of some of these Muslims, does not only unite these Muslims on an ethnic basis but also links them to the cultural-religious traditions of the Indian subcontinent. R. Karsten also pointed out that these Muslims were more oriented towards (British) India than towards Cairo or Mekkah and quoted one of these Muslims as having said: ‘We could have written to Kairo (sic) or Mekka (sic) as well but the problem is that they publish in Arabic and never in Urdu or Persian.’ These Muslims in Surinam also preferred links with Lahore and did not seem to have much interest in pilgrimages to Makkah, according to Karsten. This continued even after 1947, with the difference that Lahore then became part of Pakistan. In short, rather than disliking this ‘Indianization’ of Muslim cultural practices, these Muslims in Surinam sought its preservation and invited maulanas from India and Pakistan for this purpose.

Nevertheless, though united as far as their geographical orientation is concerned, these Hindustani Muslims in Surinam, and much more so in the Netherlands, broke up in several organizations and are now divided over many mosques. Fragmentation and institutionalization began soon after the contract labourers settled as free immigrants in Surinam. The first and most profound division among Muslims is between Sunnis and Ahmadis. This separation goes back to the early twentieth century when Surinamese Muslim leaders were looking for scholars from (British) India to teach them about Islam. The Surinamese Islamic Association (SIV) approached Himayal Ill Islam in India for assistance, and he encouraged them to contact Moulvi Ameer Ali of Trinidad. Ameer Ali then came to visit Surinam and preached the ideology of Ahmadiyyaism.  Here, like in Trinidad, the introduction of the new ideology caused a schism among

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the Muslims. Soon, the SIV came to be dominated by the Ahmadiyya doctrine causing many Sunni Muslims to leave and form several orthodox groups. Further fragmentation of the Hindustani Muslims in Surinam continued in the course of the twentieth century, and since the 1960s and 1970s also in the Netherlands. Whereas much of the fragmentation can be explained by political conflicts and loyalty issues rather than by ideological differences, the division between Ahmadis (who constitute some 20% of all Hindustani Muslims) and Sunnis is based on significant theological differences.

In Pakistan, the opposition against these Ahmadis has always been very strong and in 1974 it even led to the declaration in Pakistan that the Ahmadis are not Muslims and forbade them to perform Haj in Makkah. In the Netherlands, though much less so in Surinam, polarization between Hindustani Ahmadis and Sunnis only began in the 1960s and 1970s, under the influence of Pakistani maulanas and imams. Until then the differences had largely been understood in terms of ‘Reformist Muslims’ and ‘Traditionals’. Today, many Sunnis still do not consider Ahmadis as Muslims. This frustrates attempts to work together and occasionally gives rise to serious frictions between the two denominations.

In the following section, we explain that despite these internal differences, and possibly because of them, the territorial orientation of Muslims in Surinam and in the Netherlands towards Hindustan did not change after 1947. This can be contrasted with the happenings that took place among Hindus and Muslims after the partition of their homeland.

**The Homeland Divided**

In 1947 an English barrister, Cyril Radcliffe, who had never previously visited South Asia, designed borders between areas dominated by Muslims and by non-Muslims, as determined by statistical census data. This looked like the logical outcome of a British tradition of ‘divide and rule’ during their long rule over the Indian subcontinent. By that time religion had become a primary criterion for the categorization of time periods and of society. When the first census of the whole of British India was taken in 1871, society was mainly divided on the basis of caste and religion. Though neither Muslims nor Hindus had constituted homogenous communities, these means of categorization for census purposes, along with a similar kind of history writing, presented Hindus and Muslims as fixed categories and divided history into a Hindu and a Muslim period. Later, when representational politics were introduced, the size of the population of these groups, described and enumerated in the census data, became very important, and religion became the basis on which the majority of Hindus started campaigning against the minority Muslims. In the long run, this led to a bifurcation of space that resulted in partition, which was supported by the so-called ‘two nation theory’ according to which Muslims were imagined as one homogeneous group, indeed as a separate nation, and Hindus as another.

In short, imagined communities became somewhat real communities and during the struggle for independence from British rule, several nationalists now had great difficulties to unite these communities under a common banner. Serious differences developed between a section of Hindus and Muslims, centred on the power-sharing formula. When a last attempt to build a political alliance between the Indian National Congress Party and the Muslim League failed in July 1946, the President of the latter political party, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, felt that he had no other choice than to subscribe to the
partitioning of British India, to support the establishment of two independent nations and to resort to direct action to achieve Pakistan. The spatial division of British India according to religious identification culminated in its actual partition according to Radcliffe’s outlines. In this way, ‘a truncated and moth-eaten Pakistan’ was created for the Muslims, with one wing in the east and one in the west, and in between those wings, the Hindus got their ‘Hindustan’.

Both nations, however, had envisioned secular states with clear provisions for the so-called religious minorities, i.e. Hindus in Pakistan and Muslims in India. Besides, an Indo–Pakistan agreement in April 1948 provided Hindu and Muslim minorities in both countries with machinery to put forward their complaints and get redress. Yet, the huge flows of Hindus who left or were planning to leave Pakistan and of Muslims from India in the direction of east or west Pakistan during the 1950s indicated that many people considered Pakistan the homeland for Muslims and India the homeland for Hindus.

Nevertheless, in independent India secularism has successfully withstood the onslaught of communal thinking expressed in the two-nation ideology, which, as illustrated elsewhere, ‘continues to play important roles in the constitution of collective identity and thinking’ in India. Secularism, whether it is expressed in such diverse alternatives, ranging from Maoism to Liberal Conservatism, is, however, severely threatened by communalism which includes sectarianism, ascriptive loyalties, racism and other such ideological dispositions. Communalist thinking in India represents ‘Hindustan’ as the homeland of Hindus only while right-wing political parties and organizations assert that such thinking always existed in India. They have even gained political power during the last decade with adverse results on the harmonious relations between Hindus and Muslims.

These two streams of thinking, secularism and communalism, fundamentally differ in the way they look upon Islam in India. Whereas communalism sees Islam as the ‘other’ of Hinduism, secularists question such a rigid separation of Islam and Hinduism as a monolithic religious tradition, and rather favour a more syncretic idea. Islam, in their view, is not alien to India but rather, as argued by R. Khan, ‘a confluence of at least four major regional, linguistic and cultural variations—the Arab, the Turkish, the Persian and the Afghan’, who ‘had converged to lay the substratum of a new and distinct heritage of Islam in India’. Khan also argues that:

The Indo–Muslim strands have woven into the texture of India’s national existence a rich design of ‘composite culture’ [. . .]. It is not surprising, therefore, to realise that the composite culture in India originated in an environment of reconciliation rather than of refutation, co-operation rather than of confrontation, coexistence rather than of mutual annihilation. The historic roots of crystallisation of composite culture in India can be traced to the period between the 12th and 16th centuries AD when in the Indo-Gangetic plain a continuous process commingling and fusion took place between heritages originating in three geographically determined culture-belts, namely the Arabian, the Central Asian-cum Iranian and the Indian.

Yet, the partitioning of India, which started long before 1947 and has lasted till date, has even made many a scholar forget about this distinct Islam (or Islams) in India. It is now often stated that Islam does not really belong in India. Besides, politicians in India and other Indian citizens often support such communal thinking founded on ideas formulated by organizations such as the Hindu Mahasabha founded in 1909 and the
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) established in 1925. Not only do they advocate homogenizing notions of ‘Hinduism’ and ‘the Hindu community’, they also make a sharp division between these and ‘Islam’ and ‘the Muslim community’.58

Call from the ‘Homeland’

Since the last decade, nationalism in India increasingly constitutes both citizens who are territorially concentrated (the nation) and also many of those who are territorially displaced (diaspora). As a consequence of both international (economic) and national events during the late 1980s, India had to open up its economy and, at the same time, in order to combat sub-national identities, it also started welcoming transnational identities.59 After more than 50 years, it seemed that ‘India’s forgotten children’60 once again became part of India’s foreign policy. The nation-state has increasingly started claiming its dispersed populations and has constructed itself as a ‘de-territorialized nation-state’.61 In some cases it is even argued that India should open its doors to those PIOs who are ‘squeezed out’ of other countries and have no other option than to return to ‘Mother India’. They would then ‘complete the full circle’.62

The new objectives of the government of India (GoI) are, ‘to include the Indian diaspora in the nation’ and ‘make them part of the global Indian family’.63 Yet, considering the fact that ‘while building homes (nation-states) for the self, nations have often rendered others homeless’, it is questioned which definition of diaspora is maintained, which groups are included in this ‘global family’, and who are now invited to ‘reconnect with their motherland’. These questions become all the more important as right-wing Hindu organizations and political parties in India such as the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), the RSS and, the most important opposition party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), gain considerable financial as well as ideological support from so-called overseas Hindus.65 Besides, certain countries are transgressed or given different status, importance and privileges. Similarly, one wonders about those whose ancestors headed from villages of British India, which are now part of Pakistan or Bangladesh. Besides, what about the Muslims we are here concerned with, whose ancestors migrated from Bengal, Bihar, and Punjab to Surinam long before the partition of 1947? Does the GoI include them in their definition of the Indian diaspora?

That India really ‘meant business’ was clear between 9 and 11 January 2003, when the Ministry of External Affairs of the government of India together with the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) organized the first Pravasi Bharatiya Divas in New Delhi. Apart from NRIs, PIOs including Hindustanis from Surinam and the Netherlands were invited to India to take active part in the panels and festivities organized during these three days. There was a hitch, however, when Lady Naipaul, wife of the writer V.S. Naipaul, Nobel laureate and PIO himself, disturbed the festive mood somewhat. She suddenly rose from her seat with a poser to the (then) Deputy Prime Minister of India on the secular credentials of the then (Vajpayee/BJP) Government and asked ‘why must Indian Muslims be expected to have Ram and Sita in their hearts’66. She and many PIOs with her might have wondered whether Muslims (or Christians) were also extended a warm ‘welcome back to India’. Or was the map of India only supposed to be hidden in the hearts of Hindu PIOs? The reply by the (then) Home Minister L.K. Advani was multifarious, but he also maintained that it was the partition of 1947 that was responsible for such kinds of dilemmas and now makes it difficult for India to include all as PIOs in its definition of the Indian diaspora.
Lady Nadira Naipaul, born in Mombassa and of Pakistani parentage, was not allotted more time to continue her query but she opened the floor for further thinking. A month later Ruchir Joshi, a writer and filmmaker based in New Delhi, questioned for instance why ‘Srimati Naipal, the Killer-Begum’ was defined by Tarun Vijay, editor of the RSS paper *Panchjanya*, as ‘non-Indian’. Moreover, he asked: ‘Why should an Indian Muslim be made to feel more affinity with Arab . . . than his own blood brother simply because of difference in the way of worship?’ This incident and subsequent reactions in the press clearly illustrate the ambiguous relations India has with the Muslim PIOs. Besides, all too often Islam is removed from India and re-territorialized to Pakistan or ‘the Arab world’ and with it, Muslims too.

Clearly, the Partition of 1947 is not a thing of the past and was, in the year 2003, still capable of dividing the lives of people who do not even reside in South Asia. Even though the victory of the Congress Party over the BJP during the Indian elections of 2004, has lowered the chances that the Indian diaspora is also divided and considered as a Hindu diaspora only, religion still seems to fundamentally influence the homeland perception of the Indian diaspora and clearly not all ‘Indian children’ are welcomed to the ‘shores of Bharat’.

The government of India has recently announced that it will provide PIOs with Indian nationality while they are allowed to keep another. Yet, dual nationality will not be accorded to all and the Indian High Level Committee (HLC) on the Indian diaspora recommend that, ‘dual citizenship should be permitted for members of the Indian diaspora who satisfy the conditions and criteria laid down in the legislation to be enacted to amend the relevant sections of Citizenship Act, 1955’. The HLC also includes two special chapters on Surinam and the Netherlands each and recommends for instance that, ‘Special measures should be designed to recognise and highlight the achievements of India’s French and Dutch speaking Diaspora’. India has plans with Surinam, such as the establishment of Indo–Surinamese joint ventures, a mechanism to trace the Indian roots of the PIOs, to start an Indo-Suriname Brothership Society and the establishment of a Hindi Chair at the University of Surinam. Besides, though Surinam does often not figure in PIO maps, the fact that in Surinam ‘East Indians’ constitute 38% of the population and still speak a ‘variant of the ‘Bhojpuri’ Hindi dialect known as ‘Sarnami’ is frequently highlighted by the GoI. On top of this, a particular section of the NRIs and PIOs from the Netherlands will be granted ‘double nationality’. However, pertinent questions are: who wants this and who will get this?

We shall now examine how Muslims in Surinam and in the Netherlands, who lost their physical and spatial connection to India, think of themselves as being rooted in India and whether they continue to derive their identity from that rootedness. Or alternatively, since India ‘disowned her (Muslim) children’ in 1947, have they not in turn ‘disowned their land of origin’? And finally, have these Muslims in any way contested Partition (as a process) or incorporated it in their notions of rootedness?

**Homeland Divided: Diaspora Divided?**

Clearly, partition is still at work in the ‘homeland’ (India) and influences the perception of the Indian diaspora. It is important, therefore, to proceed to the empirical level and question the attitude of Muslims of Indian origin in Surinam and in the Netherlands. In other words, one wonders whether the partitioning of Hindustan on the basis of religion also partitioned the Indian diaspora into an Indian (Hindu) diaspora and a
Pakistani (Muslim) diaspora. In 1953 the above-mentioned British-Indian contract labourer in Surinam, Munshi Rahman Khan, wrote the following verse in Hindi:

Dui jati bharata se aye, Hindu Musalamana kahalaye,
Rahi Priti donom maim bhari, jaisi dui bandhu eka mehatari

Two communities came from India, and they were known as Hindus and Muslims, between them existed an enormous love, as they were brothers from one mother.74

In this particular poem (chaupai), Rahman Khan describes the friendly relations that existed between Hindus and Muslims at the time of their emigration.75 He does not only express his dreams of loving relations between the two communities, but in a way also refers to the time when the contract labourers left British India: before the country was bisected into India and Pakistan in 1947, and before the so-called two-nation ideology seriously infested Hindu–Muslim relations in the subcontinent. After contract labourers, like Rahman Khan, left British India, the socio-political map of the subcontinent witnessed dramatic changes, however, and one wonders about the impact of this partition on the overseas community of Muslim Hindustanis in Surinam.

Rahman Khan, an ethnic Pathan, was born on 11 August 1874 in Barnhart village, Uttar Pradesh, north India, and set off for Surinam at the age of 24. After completing his five-year labour contract, he settled in Surinam on a permanent basis and, despite the regular correspondence with his relatives back home who repeatedly begged him to return, he never set foot in India again. Apart from poems, religious texts, an essay about mathematics and algebra for the primary school, and so on, Rahman Khan wrote his memoirs and produced a unique inside perspective on the history of British-Indian contract labourers in Surinam.76 Clearly, this first generation of Muslims left British India at a time when there was not much of a national identity or a ‘common bond of unity and fellow feeling’. People generally felt their ethnicity as Bengali, Sikhs, Rajput, Maratha or Hindustani, but not Indian.77 Neither nationalist nor communal identities had crystallized. The Muslims who migrated to Surinam left India long before the famous Lahore resolution of 1940, during which the Muslim League stated that ‘India should be grouped to constitute independent states […] because Hindus and Musalmans belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, and literatures’.78

Though oral and written sources reveal that also in Surinam, between 1927 and 1949, serious tensions between the Muslims and Hindus developed,79 we have shown elsewhere80 that, unlike in India where religious tensions resulted in the partition, in Surinam, Hindustanis finally opted for ethnic unity rather than religious divide81 and remained part of the Hindustani qawm. Moreover, there never seems to have been any organized support in Surinam for a division of British India on religious lines. On the contrary, people seemed rather disappointed with these developments in ‘their Hindu- stan’. For example, in July 1947 a group of young Hindustani intellectuals wrote in its monthly newsletter, Vikaash, the following about India’s independence and subsequent partition:

The moment has arrived … Freedom that has taken many years of furious fighting has finally been regained. It already has been determined that the remaining 15,000 British troops will leave Hindustan on 15 August. Energetic men who have given everything for the good cause can now look back on what they have reached for Hindustan. But alas! It could not be what they would have
wanted so much: their ideal of a United Hindustan has been destroyed, their hope has gone up in smoke . . . Yet! There is hope for the future! Especially the circumstance that Hindus and Muslims are not strictly separated gives reason for hope. One expects that both states will co-operate intimately, as they share so many interests.  

The two-nation ideology, communalism, and the partition have entirely changed Muslim-Hindu relations in the subcontinent. The birth of Pakistan (which was envisioned as the country for Muslims) affected the status of Islam and of Muslim citizens in India itself. In Surinam, however, other scholars have argued that ‘the Hindustani competition with Creoles’ for scarce socio-economic and political resources’ produced a strong tendency, ‘within the Hindustani group to neglect the internal socio-religious differences and to stress the fact that Hindustanis were a group originating in India, having a common history and therefore a common identity’. Actually, though Muslims of Surinam made history in 1946 when they founded the country’s first political party, the Muslim Party, this kind of (political) unity among Muslims in Surinam, during certain periods and in particular fields, did not separate Muslims from the other Surinamese as a separate Muslim diaspora without a homeland.

Despite communal frictions, or perhaps because of them, these Muslims strongly supported a common Hindu–Muslim Hindustani identity and identified Islam as an ‘Indian religion’. Privately as well as in public, religious distance between Hindu and Muslim Hindustanis was less than the racial and ethnic distance that existed between these Hindustanis and communities of Dutch (bakra), African (Ravan jat) Chinese (Shinoi), Amerindians (Indies) and Javanese descent (Malais). Though we have described in detail elsewhere that at times, and in several pockets, these Hindustanis were identified as two different and antagonized religious communities, generally they reacted to events such as partition, the introduction of universal suffrage in 1949 in Surinam and the declaration of independence from the Netherlands in 1975, on the basis of a shared identity as an Indian diaspora with Hindustan as their common homeland. During the 1949 elections, for instance, in response to Creole hegemony, Hindu and Muslim Hindustanis formed the United Hindustani Party (VHP) adopting the slogan: ‘Hindu, Moslem, Sikh, Christian; they are all brothers; India is the mother of them all.’ Most Surinamese Hindustanis seem to have been disappointed with partition. What is more, to their minds Hindus and Muslims could and should not be separated from each other and they took it upon themselves to avoid such a religious schism in Surinam. Yet, although most Hindu and Muslim Hindustanis chose the path of mutual collaboration along ethnic lines, this does not say much about Muslims’ attitudes in post-1947 Surinam, and in the Netherlands, towards truncated India and newly established Pakistan.

An Indo-Pakistani Orientation

Today, the more than 300,000 Hindustanis are distributed over two countries: Surinam and the Netherlands. Approximately 150,000 Hindustanis form a relatively large (possibly the largest) ethnic community in Surinam, surrounded by other powerful ethnic groups. The formation of political parties is along ethnic rather than religious lines and many Hindustanis (Muslims and Hindus) have been united in the United Hindustani Party since 1949. Though there are exceptions, most migrants were physically cut off from India, and until today, especially for Surinamese Hindustanis,
the journey to India is long and expensive, with India being more than 20,000 km away. Though Dutch Hindustanis visit India more frequently, we can distinguish a wide variety of sentiments for India among them. They feel ‘Surinamese’, ‘Hindostani’, ‘Hindustani’, ‘Indian’, ‘Dutch’ or a mixture of these and many other identities. Some of them also identify as Muslims. None of the Muslims we interviewed in Surinam and the Netherlands expressed the wish to start afresh in India. Though they identify with the plight of Muslims in India (in particular with those in Kashmir), they feel that as a religious minority they are better off in the Netherlands and in Surinam. Yet, the same is true for Pakistan (and for Bangladesh for that matter). While there is in particular a strong identification with the plight of Ahmadis there, Muslims we interviewed underline the fact that many Muslims have been expelled from their country as Pakistan has denounced the faith of Ahmadis as non-Muslim. They said they were therefore happy to live in a country where the institutionalization of mosques has taken place in a multicultural society and through the (Dutch) legal and secular system.

Though there is therefore no actual desire ‘to return to the homeland’, during our interviews with Muslims in Surinam and in the Netherlands, and during an Indian diaspora conference in Delhi in January 2003, people often expressed keen interests in their (territorially defined) roots and some of them had even tried to find their ancestral places. Clearly these informants could not identify much with present-day India. One even stated that: ‘Hindustanis have nothing to do with India. This is all a creation of the media.’ Another mentioned: ‘No, I am not a member of the Indian family. I am Surinamese and not proud of being part of the so-called Indian family.’ Those who had visited India often criticized present-day India for the way women are treated, the pollution, corruption, indifference of the rich towards the poor, ‘identity politics’ and, last but not least, general inequalities and discrimination against the ‘Muslim minority in India’. As one young Muslim woman narrated:

When I was in India, I really felt Surinamese. I wondered: ‘How do these people live here?’ You see a baby on the pavement and realise how lucky you are to be a Surinamese. Or you think: ‘Our food is much better!’

Another Hindustani Muslim explained:

When I was in India, I knew I was a Surinamese. When I attended the celebrations on 15 August [India’s Independence Day], I did feel quite a lot. Actually, I felt these celebrations symbolised the independence of Surinam.

In a similar way one male Muslim asserted:

If you bring a Surinamese to India and you tell him he can stay there, he would not be very happy about it. He would feel he has lost his roots.

Nevertheless, many affirmed a sense of familiarity with Indians and recognized the way in which they talked, walked, dressed and behaved; and one Hindustani Muslim therefore stated that he did not feel connected with India but with the Indians. However, if it comes to identification with present-day India, none of them argued that they are Indians or would like to become Indians. Some scholars propose that Pakistan has taken the place of India as the point of cultural and religious reference for the Muslim descendants of the emigrants. Van der Burg and Van der Veer, for example, wrote that:

The distance between Muslims and Hindus that existed in India was brought to Surinam by the contract labourers and now also exists in the Netherlands.
Inter-religious marriages are rare and participation in each other’s ceremonies is limited. The distance did not get smaller when, with the separation of Pakistan in 1947, it got a political meaning. From that moment onwards two cultural points of reference have existed: India for the Hindus and Pakistan for the Muslims.96

Similarly, Vernooy and Van der Burg refer to a Surinamese almanac of 1955 in which it was mentioned that the flag of Pakistan (green and white) is the official flag of the orthodox Muslim Organization, the Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat-Hanafi Surinaamse Moslim Associatie (SMA), and that these Muslims are oriented towards Pakistan.97 This organization, which was founded in 1932,98 is still one of the largest Hindustani Sunni organizations.99 Should we therefore conceptualize these Muslims as constituting a Pakistani diaspora after all?

In the 1970s, both Hindustani and Pakistani Muslim migrants started to arrive in the Netherlands in much larger numbers than before.100 They still constituted small communities however, and united in order to establish mosques in the larger cities. At the time, inter-ethnic marriages became popular and we came across many stories about such relationships. Muslim Hindustanis felt close to these Pakistanis, with whom they felt religious affinity and who, they considered, came from the ‘source’ of their Islam. Many of these marriages resulted in divorce, however, and Pakistani men turned to Pakistan for wives. As time went by, and both communities grew in numbers, they split up and reorganized themselves along ethnic lines. At present these inter-ethnic marriages have entirely lost their popularity. A number of informants told us that Pakistani men married Hindustani women in order to get a residence permit for the Netherlands and that they left their Hindustani wives as soon as they acquired such a certificate. Others related about wife beating and cultural differences. The Hindustani–Pakistani wedlock turned out to be an unhappy one.

The fact that these Hindustani Muslims in Surinam and in the Netherlands do not identify with present-day India or with Pakistan does not allow us to jump to the conclusion that they, therefore, are not part of the Indian diaspora or that they, as Muslims, constitute a diaspora by themselves without a homeland. Such an argument can only be maintained if these Muslims indeed do not have a ‘homeland’. This, coupled with the fact that they do not perceive ‘a founding act of displacement’, would make the category of diaspora inadequate, as it demands both a displaced population and a homeland, the point from which the displacement originates. We here argue that these Muslims in Surinam and in the Netherlands do not only perceive partition as a founding act of displacement but they also look upon their lost homeland, ‘Hindustan’, as the point from which their displacement originates. For these reasons we feel that these Muslims, along with the Hindus, should be conceptualized as an Indian or rather a Hindustani diaspora.

In fact, these Muslims reject partition and, therefore, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh as their homelands. They also realize, however, that they have lost their homeland, ‘Hindustan’, by the creation of partition. Nevertheless, they, as a diaspora, keep a memory alive of Hindustan as ‘the undivided homeland’ in which Muslims and Hindus shared most cultural and even religious traditions. What is more, they have committed themselves to the maintenance or even restoration of this undivided homeland. For that purpose they have re-territorialized their ‘Hindustan’ to Surinam and the Netherlands. They do not think about present-day India or Pakistan as their homeland but rather identify with the area once known in British India as Hindustan, the land of their forefathers. One Dutch Hindustani (who also identified himself as a Muslim and an Indologist) therefore proposed to speak of ‘an Indo–Pakistani orientation’.
In the following final section of this article we illustrate that such a re-territorialization not only provides these Surinamese and Dutch citizens with a 'homeland' and thus makes them part of the Hindustani diaspora, but it also allows them, as Muslims, to integrate their Islam(s) in the local context through the, somewhat contradictory, preservation and establishment of trans-local relations. In this way, they become a Hindustani Muslim diaspora.

**Becoming a Hindustani Muslim Diaspora through Trans-local Relations**

Steven Vertovec attributes the strong bonds of overseas Indians and PIOs with India to the Hindu connection: 'For many, if not most, such Hindus India is a sacred space abounding with sacred places .... It is mother India—Bharat Mata, conceived by many as a goddess herself'. In a similar fashion, we argue that Hindustani Muslims in Surinam and in the Netherlands identify as Muslims in diaspora and look upon Hindustan as the source of their Islam(s). Indeed, the Islam their forefathers had brought with them from Hindustan and which has been cultivated ever since, is based around localized culture and moulded to complement the culture and geography of the homeland, Hindustan. As stated before, the Ahmadiyya reform movement originates from what is now northern India. Moreover, the Hindustani Sunnis, who form the large majority of Hindustani Muslims, are strongly influenced by the Barelwi-school, which was founded at the end of the nineteenth century in Bareilly, British India, in response to a number of Islamic reform movements who wanted to purge the Indo-Muslim tradition from its pre-Islamic or syncretistic elements. The Barelwi-school strongly defended religious folk traditions such as the honouring of the Prophet Mohammed of the saints.

Yet, communities in Surinam, and even more in the Netherlands, are affected by the processes of globalization with increased mobility and a progressive blurring of national boundaries. Though the nation-state has not vanished and in some ways has even asserted itself, globalization has caused an intensification of connectedness among some as well as an intensification of differences among others. As in their 'homeland', Hindustani Muslim in Surinam and in the Netherlands live in multi-cultural societies where they have to negotiate the parameters of minority citizenship. These Muslims live in non-Muslim nations where Muslims are increasingly confronted with a feeling that they are the 'new enemies of the West'. Besides, they come into contact with other Muslim migrant groups from other nations and with other Islamic traditions and practices. We argue that, in order to retain their homeland in which intra-ethnic collaboration between Hindu and Muslim Hindustanis is thought of as more important than playing on religious differences, Muslims in both nations as part of a diasporic community do practice forms of identity that clearly incorporate multiple sites of affiliation. In other words, the 'territorial references of civic loyalty' are increasingly divided for many of these Muslims among different 'spatial horizons'.

**Twice Migrants**

During the 1970s about 80,000 to 100,000 Surinamese Hindustanis settled in the Netherlands, thereby becoming 'twice migrants'. Their decisions to leave the country had to do with Surinam’s nearing independence and Hindustani fear of Afro-Surinamese dominance. Today, Hindustanis form approximately 1% of the Dutch population.
Here, unlike in Surinam, they form a rather small and invisible (as many complain) community. Both Ahmadiyya and Sunni religious and cultural practices can still only be properly understood in relation to the local context and traditions of the colonial regime in British India, the history of Islam in the region and the influence of Christianity. In other words, the religious loyalties of these Muslims relate to various geographical spaces and this allows them to ‘nationalize’ Islam in their countries of residence.

Hindustani Muslims in the Netherlands live amidst Muslims from other (Dutch) colonies and Turkish and Moroccan migrants. Yet their mosques and prayer halls are organized along ethnic lines. In fact, most Hindustani Muslims feel they share more with Hindustani Hindus than with Muslims who do not look upon Hindustan as their homeland. Our research outcomes do not provide evidence that the two-nation ideology has in any simple way been incorporated in Muslim Hindustani ideas of rootedness and sense of belonging. They have neither merely exchanged (British) India for Pakistan as their religious and cultural point of reference nor have they exchanged their old ethnic identifications with a new post-modern, or ‘post-Westphalian’ Muslim identity. Although this may well be the case for some individuals or organizations, the majority of Muslims (also) identify as Hindustani and recognize Hindustan as their ‘homeland’. In order to retain and even expand this homeland, however, these Muslim Hindustanis resort to trans-local politics that even include new localities such as the ‘Arab world’. In this way, new syncretic forms of Indo–Iranian Islam are created that are fully embedded in the Dutch and Surinamese societies.

It is from India and Pakistan that they recruit their imams, and in 1988 the first four students graduated from a course, especially started by the Hindustani Muslim community in the Netherlands with the purpose of training imams as ‘custodians of the cultural and especially of the religious values of the countries of origin’ i.e. India and Pakistan. At the same time, however, these imams trained in the Netherlands are considered to fulfil their tasks better as they possess a proficiency in the Dutch language and have better understanding of the culture and history of the Dutch society. As their homeland has been broken-up, these Muslims try to preserve and develop its (Qadiriyyah mystical) traditions in Surinam and the Netherlands, which reinforce ethnic bonds with Hindus with whom they share a language, culture and, importantly, a homeland.

In the Netherlands too, there has been some tension between the two religious communities, in particular in the aftermath of September 11. Yet, in particular because of the fact that religion is ‘a significant symbol of identification, demarcation and support’ for both Hindu and Muslim Hindustanis, these two groups are tied together as a diaspora united in their perception of a common homeland: Hindustan. Such an orientation is thus preferred as it facilitates integration in the Dutch and Surinamese societies while at the same time trans-local relations are maintained and extended. In fact it provides these Muslim Hindustanis with multiple ‘homelands’: India, Pakistan and other countries with whom they share the religious traditions prevalent in the Indian subcontinent, such as Trinidad, Guyana, the United Kingdom, and Mauritius. Religious leaders from the United Kingdom, India and Pakistan visit the Netherlands to give lectures about Islam. Local mosque organizations organize trips to the United Kingdom to participate in religious festivities (and, as one informant pointed out, to shop in Southall). Financial help to build up mosques is accepted from various Arab countries and many more go to Makkah to perform Haj. Two of our informants estimated that at least five out of the 15 Hindustani mosques in The Hague have Pakistani maulanas. And someone else pointed out that the largest mosque of Amsterdam has an imam from India.
These links are not only based on religious loyalties but also on cultural loyalties, though the difference is often blurred. An interesting illustration of such a trans-localism and its impact on the indigenization of south-Asian culture in the local (Western) context is the following: during the birthday celebration of a 70-year old Hindustani Sunni, one of the speakers during the official ceremony informed the audience that naat poetry has almost disappeared from Trinidad and Guyana, and that it is vanishing from India and Pakistan, but that the art of chanting naat has been well maintained in the Netherlands and in Surinam. For this reason Muslims in Guyana recently decided to organize a naat festival in order to preserve the naat tradition in the country. People from Surinam and the Netherlands were invited.

Many more examples could be given that demonstrate the existence of a trans-local orientation among the Muslim Hindustanis but also reveal that such relations are, in fact, maintained to preserve and build up the cultural and religious traditions associated with the lost homeland. A Surinamese Muslim woman (Ahmadi) explained, for instance, that Hindustani relations with Pakistan were solely based on religious affinities and on no other bond. She added that there were many Muslims in India as well who retained similar religious notions. Moreover, she clarified that Hindustanis do not watch Pakistani films but Indian films. This woman had visited both India and Pakistan a number of times. Once, she and her husband located the birthplace of her husband’s grandfather in a village in present-day India. The people there remembered a story how, one day, a boy (her husband’s grandfather) had suddenly left the village and had never returned. Later, after partition, all other relatives had left for Pakistan and no one had remained in this particular village. Nevertheless, the couple had found ‘relatives’ in the village. When they had first arrived, members of a Sikh family, not related to them by kinship, had taken care of them. These people had told them: ‘You found us, we are your relatives now’. The couple immensely appreciated this gesture of their ‘adopted’ family members and still communicate with them. Another Hindustani informant, a Muslim who had migrated from Surinam to the Netherlands in 1970, asserted that Hindustanis and Pakistanis are connected through religion and language, but not through ethnicity. He stated that they visit the same mosques because of the common language (i.e. Urdu) used during the service, yet he was not very positive about the Pakistanis: ‘Their character is not pure, and they lie and cheat.’ He added however, that he admired them for one thing: ‘They respect their elders.’ The man himself felt more connected with India, however. But, he concluded: ‘India is far, and after all, Hindustanis are Surinamese.’

We have already drawn attention to the differences among Hindustani Muslims in Surinam. The Hindustani Sunni Muslims in the Netherlands have three competitive organizations at a national level. Firstly, there is the World Islamic Mission (WIM) in Amsterdam with 32 mosques, acknowledging Shaykh Nurani in Pakistan as its spiritual leader. Secondly, there is the Islamitische Wereldmissie, an organization in The Hague with two mosques and acknowledging the spiritual leadership of Pir Marouf in Bradford (United Kingdom). Lastly, there is the Internationale Moslim Organisatie (IMO) coordinating 28 mosque communities and recognizing Abd al-Wahhab Siddiqui, who lives in England, as its spiritual leader. The Ahmadiyyas are divided in two umbrella organizations: firstly, the Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isha’at Islam in Nederland (AAIIN), which is a Lahori (Pakistani) offshoot; and secondly the Ahmadiyyah Beweging in Islam (Ahmadiyyah movement in Islam). This diversity, and the links to several other nation-territories besides India, should, however, not be used as an argument against inclusion of these Hindustani Muslims in the (Indian) diaspora. We argue that though
there are these minor and major differences among Hindustani Muslims in Surinam and in the Netherlands, Muslim experience clearly tends to a unity but one that is ‘riddled with division and diversity’. Their unity rests on their common belief in a homeland, which they share with Hindu Hindustanis. However, since Hindustan has no territorial base any longer, these Hindustani Muslims have taken it upon themselves, and with the help of trans-local relations, to rebuild the homeland in their countries of residence with an Islam that is firmly rooted in those countries.

Conclusion

For more than a decade now, scholars point to the importance of Hinduism in defining the overseas communities of Indian origin as diaspora. Indeed, some 85% of all people of Indian origin overseas are Hindus and studies show that, for many among them, India holds deep spiritual, symbolic and sentimental reverence that is renewed through regular visits and pilgrimages. Hinduism, these scholars argue, is ‘an ethnic religion’ that is characterized by a strong sense of ‘rootedness in India’. The discovery of a ‘conscious that is sustained by, amongst other things, a sense of distinctiveness, common history and the belief in a common fate’, helps these scholars in feeling that their conceptualization of these overseas Indian communities as an Indian diaspora is legitimate.

Yet, as among these overseas communities there are many who do not identify as Hindus; one wonders about those without such a Hindu diasporic identity.

In this article, we did not argue against making religion the core feature defining the Indian diaspora but we questioned the identification of religion with Hinduism. We felt that if Hinduism is perceived as an enduring marker of identity in diaspora, it risks the exclusion of (other) religious minorities from this category. In this way Muslims, for instance, who constitute a significant element of the overseas Indians in several countries, are separated on religious grounds from Hindus, and the inclusion of Muslims into the Indian diaspora is subsequently made problematical.

We argued that the study of the Indian diaspora is incomplete if historical developments and contemporary politics in the ‘homeland’ are not taken into account. In the case of overseas Muslims, the partition of 1947 has fundamentally influenced the ways in which they identify with India and also the way in which India defines its diaspora.

We have shown that the Indian government policies are now directed towards a re-territorializing of Indians who live outside its borders and that the government of India now tries to include ‘people of Indian origin’ in their concept of the nation. Not all, however, are included as PIOs in the Indian family. Muslims who have migrated to Bangladesh and Pakistan during the violence that constituted partition are not included, for instance. In general, more Muslims of ‘Indian origin’ were firstly de-territorialized from India and subsequently re-territorialized to Pakistan, which is now supposed to be the real homeland of these Muslims.

Our case study shows that those who identify themselves as Muslims of Indian origin in Surinam and in the Netherlands also identify themselves as Hindustanis. Among them, however, a de-territorialization has taken place and none of our informants identify themselves as Indians. They also do not identify themselves as Pakistanis, however. They are, in fact, firmly rooted in the territory of their land of residence, be it Surinam or the Netherlands and they share their ethnic identities with Hindu Hindustanis, with whom they not only share many socio-cultural and linguistic traditions but also a historical luggage.

These Hindustani Muslims reject the partition of 1947, and therefore, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh as basis for identities. At the same time, they realize that they have lost
their homeland ‘Hindustan’ by the creation of partition. Nevertheless, they have kept a memory alive of Hindustan as a country in which Muslims and Hindus share some cultural and even religious traditions. They are also committed to the maintenance or even restoration of this homeland. For that, however, they have re-territorialized their homeland to Surinam and the Netherlands. If the Indian government includes them as PIOs and unequivocally considers these Muslims as part of the Indian diaspora, they might respond to the call of the ‘motherland’ and help to restore such a Hindustan in India as well.

Some scholars, representatives of the government of India and some Hindus, as well as Muslims in various places, feel however that these Muslims of Indian origin should not be conceptualized as part of the Indian diaspora. Denying their inclusion in the Indian diaspora would, however, amount to a re-enactment of partition of this ‘homeland’ and an expulsion of these Muslims from the Hindustani qawm. Without such a rooting in ethnic and territorial certitudes, Hindustani Muslims then might go in search for new collective identities not structured by the teleology of origin, scattering, and (eventual) return. This would be a loss of unique localized Islamic traditions and practices and might also disturb the present-day relatively harmonious communal relations that exist between Hindus and Muslim Hindustanis in Surinam and in the Netherlands.

NOTES

4. See, for instance, Conner (quoted in W. Safran on pp. 83–84, ‘Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return’, Diaspora, Spring 1991, pp. 83–99) who argues that those communities are diasporas in case they (among others) ‘retain a collective memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland—its physical location, history, and achievements’ and if they ‘believe that ‘they should, collectively, be committed to the maintenance or restoration of their original homeland and to its safety and prosperity’ and if ‘they continue to relate, personally or vicariously, to that homeland in one way or another, and their ethno-communal consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by the existence of such relationship’. The theoretical weakness of the category of diaspora has been the subject of an article by Floya Anthias who points out that the fact that a group of people hails from a particular place does not necessarily make them a valid sociological category. See F. Anthias, ‘Evaluating ‘Diaspora’: Beyond Ethnicity?’, Sociology, Vol. 32, No. 3, 1998, pp. 557–580. We show however that it still makes sense to recognize the (imagined) locatedness of people in territories though there is a need for a better understanding of this linkage between place and identities.
6. Ibid., p. 7.
9. In Dutch known as: ‘Suriname’ and ‘Nederland’. We here prefer English naming and spellings.
It refers to the indenture system, which was a legal contract that allowed individuals to be recruited for work in the colonies of the British Empire. The system was introduced in the 19th century as a way to address the labor shortage in the Caribbean and other colonies. The indenture system was different from slavery in that individuals were bound to work for a specific period of time, typically five to ten years, after which they were free to leave the colony. However, the conditions under which they were brought to the colonies were often harsh, and many indentured laborers never made it to their destinations.

The system was primarily used to recruit labor from countries in the Indian subcontinent, including India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. The indenture system was also used to recruit labor from other countries, such as China and Japan, but these were smaller in scale compared to the Indian recruitment.

The indenture system continued until the early 20th century, when it was replaced by more modern forms of labor recruitment, such as contract labor and temporary work. However, the effects of the indenture system can still be seen today in the Indian diaspora, as many individuals have drawn on their experiences as indentured laborers in their work and in their communities.

The indenture system was characterized by a high degree of control over the individuals who were recruited, as well as a lack of opportunities for advancement. The conditions under which they were brought to the colonies were often harsh, and many indentured laborers never made it to their destinations.

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24. Muslim leaders during the colonial period of India also identified themselves as belonging to the
Islamic Contestations. Essays on Muslims in India and Pakistan
22. In this article we write Hindustanis when referring to both Hindus and Muslims with Hindustan as
The Hindustan Times
21. Arvind N. Das, 'Exiled to Sri Ram desh',
20. Known as 'ship brotherhood' (jahazia bhai) and 'depot brotherhood' (dipua bhai). See Gautam,
Munshi Rahman Khan, op. cit., p. 3.
22. In this article we write Hindustanis when referring to both Hindus and Muslims with Hindustan as
their place of origin.
24. Muslim leaders during the colonial period of India also identified themselves as belonging to the
Hindustani qawm, which bore no reference to religion. Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani (1879–
1958), for instance, a leading political figure of the day of the Deoband-school and leader of the
Jamiyyat Ulama-I Hind allied with the Indian National Congress, felt that the term, far from
having religious implications, applied either to descent or behaviour. He listed a variety of uses of
the term such as language, region (arab, ajam [non-Arab; Irani], nation (irani, misri) [Egyptian]),
descent (sayyid, shahh, mochi [shoemaker]), colour (gara [white], kala [black]), and even occupa-
tion or lifestyle (outyoon ki quam [Sufis]). See: Metcalf, Islamic Contestations, op. cit., p. 186.
This Hindustani qawm was therefore based on territory (swatan) and was used by both Hindu as
well as Muslim migrants of Indian origin in Surinam.
25. 'Munshi' generally means clerk but here it is a respectful title for teacher.
26. This article is based on fieldwork carried out by the authors in India, Surinam and the Netherlands,
and is one of the outcomes of a post-doctoral research project (2001–2005) sponsored by the Neth-
erlands Foundation for Research in Tropical Countries (WOTRO) entitled ‘A Diaspora Coming Home? Overseas Indians re-establishing links with India’. This project was carried out by Dr Kathinka Sinha-Kerkhoff and her research assistant Alok Deo Singh (ADRI, Ranchi) and concen-
trated on PIOs in Mauritius, the Netherlands and Surinam. Dr Ellen Bal carried out research among
PIOs in the Netherlands and in Surinam and worked in close collaboration with Sinha-Kerkhoff.
She received two travel grants from WOTRO and one from the Department of Social and Cultural
Anthropology of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam to carry out fieldwork in Surinam. This article
also reflects another research interest of Sinha-Kerkhoff, who is simultaneously involved in a
research project sponsored by SEPHIS on ‘Partition Memories and Those Who Stayed Put: Muslims in India and Hindus in Bangladesh’.
27. See also: Naushad Boedhoe, ‘Hindostaanse Moslims’, in Hindostanen in Nederland, eds, Corstiaan
van der Burg, Theo Damsteeg and Krishna Autar, Leuven and Apeldoorn: Garant, 1990,
28. See online: <http://www.shef.ac.uk/usic/whatis/articles/carib.htm> (downloaded on 21 October
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid. So-called Javanese Muslims from the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) in Surinam are
kojanen, following the syncretic practices and beliefs of Java, which incorporates old Javanese
beliefs, including Hindu–Buddhist elements.
31. Ibid. Jan Ali argues that in the case of Fiji, ‘The adoption of certain aspects of Hinduism and Indian
ethnic culture into the practices of early Islam in Fiji gave Muslims a very ambiguous religious iden-
tity, which subsequently posed problems for them in securing representation in the Fijian political
1, April 2004, pp. 141–154 (pp. 148–149). We feel, however, that in Surinam, the Islam brought
along by Muslims and preserved, developed and in many respects changed by them into an even
more syncretized Surinamese Islam with a strong Indian or rather South Asian ethnic foundational
structure, helped these Muslims not only to maintain cordial and relatively harmonious communal
relations but also to successfully integrate in the plural Surinamese-Dutch society with its political
practice of voting for apam jahi, followed by all ethnic groups alike.
Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2002, pp. 381–399. See also: Moestafa, S.A. Nurmohamed,


40. Maulana is generally used for a Muslim doctor of law, a professor, a learned man among Muslims. Also: theologian. Imam refers to ‘leader’, especially to prayer-leader in the mosques.


45. M.A. Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, said in one of his speeches in 1940: ‘The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literatures. They neither intermarry nor interdine together and, indeed, they belong to two different civilisations, which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions’. See: P.N. Pandey, ed., A Book of India, London and Glasgow: Collins, 1965, p. 86.


49. As a part of this agreement Minorities’ Boards in both East Bengal (as East Pakistan was known at the time) and West Bengal were set up to take measures to remove fear psychosis from the minorities. See: S.K. Roy on pp. 47–48, ‘Refugees and Human Rights: The Case of Refugees in Eastern and North Eastern States of India’, in Refugees and Human Rights, ed., S.K. Roy, Jaipur, New Delhi: Rawat Publications, 2001, pp. 17–63.


56. Ibid., p. 60.


63. Hindustan Times, 8 December 2002.


66. Hindustan Times, 5 February 2003 and Indian Express, 12 January 2003. One of us was also personally present during this meeting.

67. Ibid.

68. Note, for example, the article ‘Outspoken Lady Naipaul’, in which M.L. Batura from Karnal writes: ‘It is a pity that Lady Nadira Naipaul dared to raise a controversial issue [relating to Lord Rama and Sita]. It is only in India that she enjoyed full freedom of criticism [with impunity]. Had she criticised any prophet in her own country [Pakistan] or in any other Islamic country, she would have been stoned to death.’ In: The Tribune, Tuesday, 4 February 2003.

69. This refers to a well-known patriotic poem written by the Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) that begins with the line: ‘On the shores of Bharat, Where men of all races have come together, Awake, O my Mind!’ See Pandey, A Book of India, op. cit., p. 20.


71. Ibid., p. 226.


78. Ibid., p. 4755.
Muslims in Surinam and the Netherlands


83. This refers to the descendants of African slaves in Surinam. Some among them were Muslims yet the majority identified themselves as Christians.


86. Disagreement over the way in which their label of identification had to be spelled in Dutch, illustrates that the closeness between Hindus and Muslims was not always taken for granted. In fact, this disagreement exists to date with one group arguing in favour of ‘Hindustanis’ and another group preferring ‘Hindostanis’. Arguments are various. Those who support a change of the letter ‘u’ into ‘o’ feel that to talk about a Hindostani diaspora is more suitable than a Hindustani diaspora as the former avoids excluding Muslims. Yet among those we interviewed there were some, including some Muslims, who felt that the change of Hindostan into Hindustan should be avoided as Hindustan refers to a geographical location, now divided over the three nations of Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, and not to particular groups that inhabited the region.

87. Bal and Sinha-Kerkhoff, ‘No ‘Holy Cows’ in Surinam’ (forthcoming). See also E. Dew, *The Difficult Flowering*, *op. cit.* Dew shows in his book that ‘ethnicity, though a powerful force when under effective, cohesive leadership, proved to be fragmentable’ (p. 98). Yet he agrees that at the same time Hindus and Muslims needed each other to face Creole dominance, and they consequently worked together over the years in a number of social and cultural associations, and at times participated together in coalition parties and common fronts.


89. In the case of both countries all figures need to be approached with some caution if they are compared with figures from other countries that register their migrants on nationality or religion. For Surinam, there are no updated figures available and in the Netherlands people are not registered according to religion but according to nationality. Moreover, in the Netherlands after 1988 every person, whether born in- or outside the country, with at least one parent born in a foreign country, was classified as belonging to an ethnic group. See for more details: Elije Buur, Anne Have-laar and Paul Abell, *Muslim Voices in the European Union: The Netherlands*, Phase One Report, Vol. II, pp. 1–70.

90. In 1949, Hindus and Muslims united in one political party to form a strong front against others. Although attempts have always been made to keep ‘religion’ out of the party it has to be noted that many Muslims did leave the party, without, however, reorganizing themselves in a Muslim Hindostani party. Officially the VHP has always remained a secular party.


93. At the request of most people we interviewed, we refrain from quoting names but nevertheless extend our sincere thanks to all our informants.

94. One of us attended this conference.


104. In 1972 the World Islamic Mission (WIM) was formed as a collaboration of a number of leading ulama from the *Brelwi* tradition residing in India, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom. They wanted to give international support to the school and to counterbalance the *Wahabis*, who had built strong organizations amongst the Indian and Pakistani migrants in the diaspora (particularly in England). The Headquarters of the World Islamic Mission are in Bradford, England. The President and Chief Patron is (the Pakistani) Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani Siddiqui Al Qadiri. See online: <http://www.wimmauritius.org/about.html>.


110. Landman, *Van mat tot minaret*, op. cit.


113. These trans-local links, used to retain and rebuild cultural and religious beliefs and practices of the homeland, are not new. Moulvi Ameer Ali for instance already established the *Ahmadiyya* link between British Guyana, Surinam and Trinidad in July–August 1934. Furthermore, the *Ahmaddiya* movement tended to maintain strong links with its centre, Lahore (now in Pakistan). ‘Schisms in Caribbean Islam’, op. cit., p. 175 also refers to ‘an Inter-Colonial Muslim Conference’ in August 1950 during which delegates from Barbados, British Guyana, Dutch Guyana (Surinam) and the host territory, Trinidad, met to consider the educational, social, economic, moral and religious problems of the Muslims in the Caribbean, with the aim of establishing ‘a closer relationship and forging cooperation among the Muslim community of those territories through a regional Muslim organization’ (*ibid.*, p. 177).

114. This refers to an area in outer London with a large Indian population, also known as ‘little India’.

115. *Naat*, or *nāt* is the term applied to a genre of praises of the Prophet Muhammad. Annemarie Schimmel writes that the poets of the non-Arab Muslim world were never tired of inventing new and wonderful epithets for Muhammed. In India even a number of Hindu poets joined the Muslims in the


119. Recognizing that indeed this diaspora is a multi-faith community, some scholars therefore prefer to talk about the ‘South Asian diaspora’. See, for instance, S. Vertovec, *Aspects of the South Asian Diaspora*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1991. Yet, since many ancestors of these so-called overseas Muslims had left their place of origin long before the establishment of the separate nations now compressed into South Asia, conceptualizing them as a South Asian diaspora seems inappropriate.