Framing Immigration and Integration: Relationships between Press and Parliament in the Netherlands
Rens Vliegenthart and Conny Roggeband
DOI: 10.1177/1748048507076582

The online version of this article can be found at:
http://gaz.sagepub.com/content/69/3/295

Published by:
http://www.sagepublications.com

Additional services and information for *International Communication Gazette* can be found at:

Email Alerts: http://gaz.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts
Subscriptions: http://gaz.sagepub.com/subscriptions
Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav
Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
Citations: http://gaz.sagepub.com/content/69/3/295.refs.html
FRAMING IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION
Relationships between Press and Parliament in the Netherlands

Rens Vliegenthart and Conny Roggeband

Abstract / This article examines how the salience and framing of political issues in the press and in parliament influence each other and how this salience and framing is influenced by key events outside the media and parliamentary realms. The case focused on is the debate on immigration and integration in the Netherlands between 1995 and 2004. The empirical analyses are based on a computer-assisted content analysis of both parliamentary documents and newspaper articles. Results show bidirectional causal relationships between media and parliament. In the case of salience only long-term influence relationships are found, while framing influences follow an interesting pattern: an increase in the use of a frame in one arena leads to an increase in the other arena only if this frame has already been used regularly in the latter arena. External events have more considerable and consistent impact on issue salience and framing in both arenas.

Keywords / framing / immigration and integration / Netherlands / parliament / press / VAR analyses

Introduction

In recent years, the issues of immigration and integration have been central to political and public debates in most Western European countries. International developments such as 9/11, the war in Iraq and recent attacks in Madrid and London not only changed the amount of attention on the issue, but influenced the tone and focus of these debates as well. In the Netherlands, heightened attention to immigration issues and shifts in the framing of these issues are also due to internal political and societal developments – mainly the rise and assassination of new politician Pim Fortuyn and the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh – making this country a compelling case to study the complexity of framing processes.

In this relatively turbulent environment, multiple actors try to define salient events by trying to bring forward their diagnoses and prognoses of the problems involved. In this article, we focus on two central arenas in which these framing processes take place, the parliamentary and the media arena. In the first, the actors involved are elected representatives who interact with the executive power. In the latter, elected officials play a role, but also various other actors (e.g. opinion leaders, journalists, social movements) strive for a place. Due to this partial overlap in actors, but also because these arenas are vulnerable to all kinds of external influences, it is likely
that causal relationships exist between both arenas. Here, we ask in which arena is
which frame propagated and how does each arena influence the other. We track
the development of five frames and how frequently they are used in each arena.
We also explore how key national and international events influence the media and
parliamentary framing.

We collected both newspaper articles on immigration and integration in the
five national newspapers and official documents from the Dutch parliament between
1995 and 2004 and analysed these using computer-assisted content analysis. First,
we established the occurrence of different frames over time in each arena. Then we
used VAR modelling to look at causal relationships between the two arenas, while
controlling for major external events. Results offer insight into frame-formation
processes for this specific case, but could potentially be generalized to other countries
and other politically contested issues.

**Relationships between Parliamentary and Media Framing**

Although there are several studies available on the relations between political
agendas and media coverage, this research mainly focuses on the question of which
issue(s) (salience) are presented and not on how these issues are presented. There
are several reasons for this. First, convincingly assessing relationships between both
arenas requires labour-intensive coding that spans a relatively long period of
research. Second, the dominant theoretical concepts and approaches have directed
researchers in a certain direction, which has left some questions unaddressed. For
instance, one of the central concepts in political communication during the past
decades has been agenda-setting (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). Stemming from this
theory is the idea of agenda-building, which deals with how the media agenda is
created (Dearing and Rogers, 1996). The focus is on which issues make it on the
agendas and how salient they are, rather than how they are presented.

During recent years, the concept of framing has become more prevalent in the
social sciences. Framing helps us to understand how salient issues are presented.
Scholarly attention to this concept has grown rapidly, not only in the field of politi-
cal communication, but in various other social science subfields as well (e.g. Benford
and Snow, 2000; Entman, 1993; Valkenburg et al., 1999). No consensus has been
reached about how framing should be defined and operationalized in a media setting.
Current conceptualizations of framing vary in complexity (for an overview, see de
Vreese, 2005). Most of these conceptualizations, however, are at least partly in line
with the classical definition of the framing concept offered by Entman (1993: 53),
who speaks of ‘[selecting] some aspects of perceived reality and mak[ing] them
more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular defi-
nition of a problem, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment
recommendation for the item described’. Little is yet known about the relations
between framing in the media and in the political realm. The agenda-setting litera-
ture sheds light on this question, since it deals with the same overarching question:
who follows whom? Though agenda-setting and framing are inherently different
concepts, the underlying mechanisms for influence relations between media and
parliament might be similar. On the one hand, agenda-setting deals with which issues are on the agendas and which are not and can be seen as an ‘inter-issue’ contest between various actors promoting different issues. On the other hand, framing deals with the different way these issues are presented, which may be called an ‘intra-issue’ contest. However, in both instances actors try to influence agendas and make them as favourable as possible, either in terms of the problem salience or in problem ‘definition’. In their overview of the literature concerning the mass media’s agenda-setting influence on the political realm, Walgrave and van Aelst (2006) conclude that different studies have led to contradictory results. This is due to the divergent definitions and operationalizations of the political agenda that have been employed, on the one hand, and to a focus on either election campaigns or routine politics, on the other hand. Walgrave and van Aelst argue that findings indicating the media agenda’s influence on the political agenda depend on whether the researcher looks at institutional/substantial measures (e.g. laws, budgetary spending) or more symbolic policies (speeches, interviews). With regard to substantial measures little or no influence is found, whereas a strong influence is often established in the case of symbolic policies (e.g. Edwards and Wood, 1999). Here, we focus on parliamentary documents, which, according to Walgrave and van Aelst, encompass both institutional (the parliament as legislative power) and symbolic power (controlling the executive, or ‘grilling the government’ to use Walgrave and van Aelst’s terminology). Combining both symbolic and substantive elements, a moderate media influence on parliament can be expected.1

The second element that determines the media’s influence on politics is the time period under study: either election time or routine politics. Different studies have demonstrated that during election times there is limited or no influence from the media agenda on the political agenda, while in routine times more mixed results are found (e.g. Brandenburg, 2002; Kleinnijenhuis, 2003). According to Walgrave and van Aelst (2006), there might be several reasons for the limited influence of media on the political agenda during election campaigns. First, studies of election campaigns deal with short periods of time and are not able to grasp any long-term effects. Second, during election periods politicians vigorously try to garner attention to their points of view and to influence the media agenda, instead of the other way around. Third, in election times media devote more attention to politicians, thereby providing them with the opportunities to get their messages out. Fourth, particularly during election times certain rules, traditions and practices regarding fairness and balance limit the autonomy of the media. In the 10-year period we studied (1995–2004), three parliamentary national elections were held, but the largest part of our research period consists of ‘routinized’ politics, so there is no a priori expectation of limited or no media influence.

The next question is what form this influence takes. In general, an increase in issue-attention in the media leads to an increase in issue-attention on the parliamentary agenda. This influence, however, is more likely when the amount of attention on the issue is substantial (Eilders, 2000, 2002). Since we expect that the same mechanisms operate for framing, we assume that the increased use of a certain frame by the media leads to an increased circulation of this frame in parliament,
but this influence only occurs when the frame is present in a substantial amount of the total media coverage of the issue.

We not only expect media framing to influence parliamentary framing, but the reverse relationship as well. Several studies take both possible influence patterns into account and, again, show mixed results. Soroka (2002), researching the relation between parliament, media and public opinion for three issues in Canada in the period 1986–95, finds different relations for different issues. He argues that, in line with Zucker's obtrusiveness hypothesis, media effects on politics and public are limited for those issues that can be experienced directly by public and politicians (e.g. inflation). Wood and Peake (1998) show that for several foreign issues in the US, the media determine presidential actions, while the reverse relationship is not found. Brandenburg's (2002) study relating the daily issue agendas of the two main political parties in the 1997 UK parliamentary elections to various media outlets contradicts these findings. Taking nine issues into account, he finds that the content of all researched media outlets are to a certain extent guided by the political parties, while no influence of media content on the parties' agendas is found. Finally, two studies of the Dutch context are worth mentioning. Studying the salience of social-economic issues in party programmes, media coverage and among the public in the period 1980–6 Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg (1995) find a positive influence of the political agenda on the media agenda and a boomerang effect (i.e. a negative influence) from the media on the political agenda. Kleinnijenhuis's (2003) study, which takes into account a wide range of issues during the parliamentary election campaigns of 1994, 1998 and 2002, indicates that opinion-making in the media is to a large extent influenced by the earlier presented opinions of politicians. Even though this research does not compare the political agenda to that of the media, but only looks at media coverage, it confirms Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg's (1995) conclusion that 'media follow politics'.

To summarize, a positive influence of the political agenda on the media agenda is often found, but this finding is not robust. We assume a similar mechanism to the influence of media framing on parliamentary framing is operating. We therefore hypothesize that increased use of a frame within parliament leads to increased use of this frame in the media, but this influence only occurs when this frame is present to a substantial degree in parliamentary documents.

Events

Of course, events that occur both outside the media arena and the parliament play a crucial role in the agenda-building and framing of issues. Shifts in framing might occur because of events within institutionalized politics (e.g. elections that change the power relations within parliament) or sudden (inter)national events (e.g. the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, the murder of politician Pim Fortuyn) that dramatically alter the current political climate.

The media arena is particularly vulnerable to the occurrence of events (Kepplinger and Habermeier, 1995). News values determine why some but not other events make it into the news. Events have to pass the news threshold, which consists of
news values attributed to the real world. Galtung and Ruge (1965) note that what happens in the real world gets attributed some news factors (or not) that determine the chance that events make it into the news. Again, making it into the news is something different from significantly shifting the framing of an issue for a period of time. To accomplish this an event must (1) dominate the news for a longer period in time or change the political power base in society permanently and (2) be incongruent with the way the issue has been framed before the event or result in political actors propagating other frames gaining dominance in society.

Though it is argued that the political is more routinized and less influenced by external events than the media arena is (e.g. Wood and Peak, 1998), external ‘shocks’ are likely to have an impact as well. The most obvious influence is from parliamentary elections that change the composition of parliament and consequently the configuration of actors that are involved in the framing process. Assuming that different political parties with different ideologies propagate different frames, electoral gains for a certain party might help to gain standing and legitimacy for its framing of a certain issue, consequently leading to a more frequent use of this framing in both the parliamentary and media arena.

Even when an event meets the previously mentioned requirements, differences may persist regarding how the influence takes place. First, differences exist in what kinds of framing shifts are taking place. In some cases, this is quite predictable. For example, the attacks on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 are likely to increase the frequency of a frame that presents Muslims and Islam as a threat to western societies. In other cases, this is less obvious: the announcement of populist Pim Fortuyn to run for the parliamentary elections in 2002 could have led to a lot of media attention to his opinions on the issue of integration of minorities, which were a rather diverse palette of partly contradictory statements (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2003). The influence of this event on the parliamentary arena, if any, is even less predictable. Second, there are differences in the duration of the framing shift. Some events change the framing of the issue (semi-)permanently, as might be the case for events that cause a sustaining change in power relations within society, while others only change the framing during the course of the event or for a limited time period afterwards. Third, the size of the framing shift can differ. In some cases, shifts are subtle, with one frame gaining some ground at the expense of other frames. In other cases, like 9/11, events may cause much larger changes (paradigm shift), such as complete abandonment of certain frames, while others become dominant for the first time.

While we have some a priori expectations about how certain events might influence the parliamentary and media arenas, little theory-building and empirical research is available on this issue, so we treat it here mainly as an empirical, exploratory question. In the methods section, where we describe our events, we formulate some more specific expectations about the kind of influences each event may have. But first we address how we developed our frames and which key events we take into account.
Methods

Frames

De Vreese (2005: 53) argues that there is little consensus about how to identify frames in the news. According to him, roughly two strategies can be applied. The first is inductive in nature: no predefined frames are used and frames emerge during the course of analysis (e.g. Gamson, 1992). The second is deductive in nature and texts are analysed using predefined and operationalized frames. Furthermore, de Vreese also makes a distinction between generic and issue-specific frames. The former are more general in nature and can be applied to different issues in different contexts (e.g. Valkenburg et al., 1999), the latter are tailored to the specific issue and context under study (e.g. Shah et al., 2002).

In our study, we use predefined, issue-specific frames established through a qualitative pre-study. We chose issue-specific frames, because we analyse both media content and parliamentary documents. Since these documents differ in significant respects from newspaper articles, proposed generic news frames (e.g. human interest, economic consequences; Valkenburg et al., 1999) are unlikely to be present in parliamentary documents, so issue-specific frames are most appropriate for comparison purposes and to trace influences between the two arenas more precisely.

We start with the assumption that different representations of the problem are articulated in policy and media debates. These representations include a diagnosis (what is the problem, where is it located and what/who causes this problem?), connected to a prognosis (how should the problem be resolved, what ends and means should be used and who is responsible for the solution?) and a rationale or call to action (what courses of action are recommended, and who is responsible for this?) (Snow and Benford, 1988).

These basic elements of a frame are translated into an analytical tool that contains a number of categories and analytical questions (see Appendix 1). The first diagnostic category is about voice or standing and asks which actor speaks, on which occasion, to what audience or forum and in what form (interview, policy document, letter, essay, etc.). The second diagnostic category asks what is represented as the problem, why it is seen as a problem and what are the considered causes of the problem. It also analyses the attribution of roles in the diagnosis such as who is seen to have caused the problem, who is the problem holder and who are possible victims. The third category concerns the prognosis, which analyses the proposed solution to the problem, the formulation of goals and methods of achieving them. It also analyses the relationship between ends and means. The fourth category is the call to action (or non-action): who has a voice in suggesting the course of actions, who should act and who is acted upon? Accounting for these three framing components resulted in an extensive coding scheme (see Appendix 1). In an initial inductive phase we used our coding scheme to perform a qualitative analysis on the major policy documents in the field of migration and integration (see Appendix 2) to identify the various frames being used by the government. Based on this analysis, we identified five major frames that were present in the
political debate over time: multicultural, emancipation, restriction, victimization and Islam-as-threat.

**Multicultural Frame**

The multicultural frame, often seen as the prototypical Dutch frame in relation to migration and integration, presents (cultural) diversity as an asset that enhances the quality of society. In this frame, most emphasis is on the prognosis, promoting respect for cultural diversity and creating more space for difference. Dialogue and civil participation are viewed as the central means to create more understanding and respect towards cultural diversity and both immigrants and residents are called upon to participate in this. Other policy interventions to reduce inequalities in participation in education, labour and politics should respect and foster diversity. In this frame, the diagnosis is little elaborated.

**Emancipation Frame**

In the emancipation frame, the position and orientation of immigrants is problematized: they are viewed as backwards in participation, customs and beliefs. The prognosis views participation in the labour market and in decision-making as crucial to emancipation. The government should remove obstacles to participation through state policies and arrangements that help migrants in their integration and emancipation process. Migrants are called upon to actively shape their emancipation process.

** Restriction Frame**

This frame presents the entrance of new immigrants as a problem, especially when they are not economically independent. Implicitly the emphasis is on new immigrants who come to the Netherlands because of marriage with Dutch residents with a foreign background. These immigrants are labelled as ‘newcomers’. They not only constitute a problem because of their economic dependence, but also because they often have a ‘traditional’ non-emancipated orientation. It is an implicitly gendered frame and in the political debate politicians principally speak about female immigrants. Solutions presented are restrictions on incoming migrants, and not granting independent permits to these new immigrants. Immigrants are mainly presented as objects of the policy, not active subjects.

**Victimization Frame**

This frame is mainly applied in relation to women. Women are presented as victims of a misogynous religious culture that forces them to be obedient and cover themselves to be respected. The headscarf is presented as either a symbol of subordination or something women can be directly or indirectly forced to wear. Violence against women is the central mechanism to reinforce gender inequality, and examples
mentioned as ‘cultural violence’ are domestic violence, honour killings and genital mutilation. The solution to this problem is primarily protection, and secondarily emancipation of the women (which is perceived as making them more resistant to cultural pressures). Measures proposed to protect women against violence are legislation, shelter services and special police teams.

**Islam-as-Threat Frame**

In the Islam-as-threat frame, Islam is defined as a threat to ‘western’ civilization and values such as church–state relations, freedom of expression, gender equality and tolerance towards homosexuality. Proponents of this frame fear the ‘Islamization’ of Dutch society. The ‘Islamization’ of Dutch society is manifested by women wearing headscarves in public institutions. The proposed solution is to stress the neutrality of the state and to ban religion to the private sphere. Also, the residues of Dutch pillarization, especially in the school system, are questioned. The creation of Islamic schools is seen as reinforcing segregation in society. Immigrants are expected to assimilate ‘Dutch’ standards and norms.

Once frames were established a second phase was to translate these frames into search-strings to make possible an electronic analysis of all policy texts and digitally available newspapers between 1995 and the end of 2004. The occurrence of each frame per article is established using computer-assisted coding. Frames are distinguished using extensive search-strings per frame that indicate the presence of a given frame (see Appendix 3). This approach is based on one of the devices suggested by Gamson and Modigliani (1989) that signify the presence of a frame, namely ‘catchphrases’, which Pan and Kosicki (1993: 61–2) mention as an element of the rhetorical structure of a text. The search-strings were created based on the coding of the documents included in our qualitative analysis and complemented with a random sample of both parliamentary documents and newspaper articles. For each of these documents and articles, the coder established which frames were present and which word combinations were indicative of these frames. Though a ‘complete’ frame contains diagnostic, prognostic and motivational components, we did not take that as an absolute requirement for the presence of a frame. In newspaper articles especially, framing is often incomplete, among other reasons due to the limited length of the text.

Parliamentary documents were obtained using the search engine Parlando, which gives access to all documents presented to and discussed in parliament and senate. We used our search-strings to find all official policy documents as well as official parliamentary questions to members of government during the period 1995–2004 that included one or more of our frames. A total of 5376 frames was found in the sample.

To obtain data on the media debate on migration and integration, we analysed the five Dutch national newspapers with the highest circulation (Bakker and Scholten, 2003): Algemeen Dagblad, De Telegraaf, De Volkskrant, NRC Handelsblad and Trouw, using the same search-strings. All these newspapers are available electronically via LexisNexis for the period we have studied, except for De Telegraaf, which has only
been available digitally since 1998. We controlled for the absence of *De Telegraaf* between 1995 and 1998. This resulted in a total of 14,850 articles that contained a mean of 1.09 frames per article.

To check reliability of the search-strings, a researcher manually coded a sample of 30 articles. Reliability between computer and coder was established by calculating Hostli’s (1969) Intercoder Reliability Formula:

\[
\text{IR} = \frac{\sum M}{\Sigma(N1 + N2)}
\]

Where M signifies the total number of agreements between the computer and coder, N1 the total of the coding decisions made by the computer and N2 the total of the coding decisions made by the coder. Overall reliability was .91, which is more than acceptable.

**Events**

We use dummy variables to capture the effects of key events. Several events are expected to be influential in determining the intensity of news coverage about immigration and integration. The selection of events deserves special attention. One does not know in advance which events might affect the intensity of immigration and integration news and parliamentary coverage, and looking at this coverage itself for possibly relevant events can be considered as selecting on the dependent variable, which is theoretically and methodologically inappropriate. Therefore, we chose a somewhat common-sense procedure to establish key events. We distinguish three types of events that could potentially determine the intensity of reporting about immigration and integration issues.

The first type is parliamentary elections, here classified as institutional events, where we distinguish two different categories of events. First, as a result of election outcomes, the framing of immigration and integration issues might fluctuate because of changing power distribution among parties and changes in the composition of the government. In our research period, we distinguish the parliamentary elections of 1998 and 2002. The liberal-right Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD) booked electoral gains in 1998. In 2002, a week after party leader Pim Fortuyn was assassinated by an environmentalist, the new populist anti-immigration party, Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF), won about 17 percent of the votes and entered government as a coalition with the VVD and the Christian Democrats (CDA). We did not include the advanced parliamentary elections of January 2003, because even though they shifted the support for the various parties, the political attitude of the new government towards the issue remained similar. In general, one might expect that a shift in political power to more right-wing parties leads to a framing shift towards more immigrant-unfriendly frames (e.g. Islam-as-threat and restriction) at the expense of the other frames. Second, we included the election campaigns of 1998 and 2003 as separate events, since these are likely to be times in which debate on politically contested issues increases and in which politicians are likely to promote frames that they think will be electorally successful.
The second type of key events encompasses international incidents, here referred to as unpremeditated events. We take into account three key events: 9/11 needs to be considered, since it dramatically heightened the public debate about the integration of Muslim minorities in the Netherlands. Furthermore, the war in Iraq, starting in March 2003, and the bombing of several trains in Madrid in March 2004 are likely to have changed media coverage towards immigrants in general and Muslims in particular. In general, we expect these events to have resulted in an increased framing of Islam-as-threat.

A third type of key event relates to political and societal actors trying to influence public debate with their opinions. Here, we focus on unconventional opinions about the issues of immigration and integration and classify these attempts as deliberative events. Koopmans (2002) and Prins (2005) suggest that two national actors and their statements have been of central importance in the debate on immigration and integration. First, the publication of Paul Scheffer’s newspaper article on the multicultural fiasco, written in January 2000, which might have caused increased multicultural framing; and second, the political campaign of Pim Fortuyn, who was elected leader of new party Leefbaar Nederland in November 2001 and stirred up the public debate on the issues of immigration and integration.

A final event that we included is the murder of movie director and social critic Theo van Gogh in November 2004. He was assassinated by a Muslim extremist because of his controversial attitudes towards Islam. This event resulted in increasing tensions between Muslim minorities and other parts of the population and probably increased attention to the Islam-as-threat frame as well.

Analysis

To analyse the influences of the media and parliamentary agenda on each other and the effects of the key events on both, we conduct a vector autoregressive (VAR) analysis. In a VAR analysis, several equations are estimated simultaneously, each including a different dependent variable. The right-hand side of each equation includes lags of both the independent variable and lags of other variables. A VAR model, including two dependent variables y and z and constants c1 and c2, can be written as:

\( y_t = c_1 + a_{11}y_{t-1} + a_{12}z_{t-1} + \ldots + a_{1k}y_{t-k} + a_{2k}z_{t-k} + \epsilon_{1t} \)

\( z_t = c_2 + a_{21}y_{t-1} + a_{22}z_{t-1} + \ldots + a_{2k}y_{t-k} + a_{2k}z_{t-k} + \epsilon_{2t} \)

Our dependent variables are the monthly proportional uses of each of the frames in each of the arenas, meaning that the sum of scores of the five frames every month equals 1.00. We try to explain the proportional use of each frame in one arena with the previous use of this frame in both arenas. Furthermore, we also conduct an analysis for the total number of used frames, which indicates the influence of each arena on the total substantial attention (agenda) for the issue. Before we do so, however, our series must meet the requirement of (1) being stationary or (2) being co-integrated (Wu et al., 2004), which are necessary preconditions for unbiased VAR
estimation. For a series to be stationary, means and variances have to be stationary, which means that both should not be influenced by changes of time origin. This can be tested using the augmented Dickey–Fuller test. Table 1 presents the results of this test. We used the Akaike Info Criterion (AIC) to establish the appropriate lag length for the test.

Results indicate stationarity for all our variables, which makes a VAR analysis appropriate. The number of lags $k$ can be determined using various test statistics. Here we choose to use a Likelihood Test for Dropping Lags (Enders, 2002). We assume that influences between both agendas do not occur over a longer period of time than six months, which is in line with outcomes of classical agenda-setting research indicating influences up to a couple of months (Dearing and Rogers, 1996). We start with a model including six lags and drop lag by lag, until the likelihood test indicates the loss of significant explanatory power of the model.

The output of our analysis consists of unstandardized regression coefficients. Single coefficients should be interpreted with the highest caution, because of the high levels of co-linearity due to the multiple lags included for each variable. Therefore, we look not only at the direction and size of these coefficients, but also take the $F$-test for the whole blocks of lags of each variable, which indicates whether — overall — any significant causal relationship exists.

In our analysis, key events are entered on the right-hand side of both equations before entering the lagged values of the media and parliamentary framings. Key events are captured by including dummy variables for each of the events. These effects can be both temporary (having values as . . . , 0, 1, 0) or permanent (. . . , 0, 1, 1). Furthermore, effects occur directly, but it can also take some time before the event leads to changing in framing. We refrain from formulating explicit hypotheses about how various events affect the dependent variables, since we have no firm theoretical foundation on which to base these hypotheses. For some of the introduced effects, however, we can think of certain expectations. We anticipate, for example, that parliamentary elections have permanent effects, since they change the political power base for a longer period of time, but it might take several months, before this effect occurs due to, for example, coalition formations. We expect international events to have direct effects because they occur during a limited

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for Presence of Unit Root</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Parliament</th>
<th>Media</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total attention</td>
<td>−6.46 (1 lag)</td>
<td>−4.87 (0 lags)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multicultural</td>
<td>−6.20 (0 lags)</td>
<td>−3.72 (1 lag)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emancipation</td>
<td>−6.70 (1 lag)</td>
<td>−8.38 (0 lags)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restriction</td>
<td>−4.39 (5 lags)</td>
<td>−5.74 (0 lags)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victimization</td>
<td>−5.95 (0 lags)</td>
<td>−4.51 (4 lags)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam-as-threat</td>
<td>−3.69 (1 lag)</td>
<td>−4.27 (1 lag)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Akaike Info Criterion is used to establish appropriate lag length. All results indicate absence of unit root (1 percent level).*
period and lead to (unexpected) changes in the political environment. In most of the cases, this effect is likely to wear off quickly, though in the instance of 9/11 a more permanent change in attitudes towards the Islamic world and also Muslims in western societies may have occurred. For the deliberative events, the scholarly literature suggests that these events have led to an enduring shift in the political debate on the issue of immigration and integration (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2003; Koopmans, 2002). For the murder of van Gogh we expect an abrupt effect. Whether this effect is permanent or temporary will probably be hard to establish using our data, since our research period ends one month after the murder. For each of the events, the time-lag and the duration of the effect on framing will be assessed empirically by looking at the common model-test statistics ($R^2$, Akaike Info Criterion) for attention and framings, choosing for each dummy the lag length and duration that overall captures the consequences of the external event best. We allowed a maximum lag of three months for parliamentary elections and one for other events, to ensure that changes in framing are indeed likely to be caused by the specific event.

Results

Issue Attention

We begin by looking at the overall level of attention paid to the issues of immigration and integration in Dutch newspapers and parliament. Figure 1 presents the monthly totals of framings in newspaper articles and parliamentary documents.

FIGURE 1
Total Monthly Use of all Frames in Newspaper Articles and Parliamentary Documents
using each of the five frames. As we can see, the attention to these issues fluctuates dramatically over time. The attention in parliament is especially subject to yearly cycles, where in some months (especially July and August) parliamentary activity is low, while in other months the activity level is substantially higher. Media framing shows clear peaks during the months of September and October 2001, possibly due to the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York. A similar peak can be found exactly one year later, probably related to hindsight on 9/11. Furthermore, the murder of van Gogh (November 2004) apparently results in increased attention to the issue of immigration and integration. In general, for both media ($r = .55$) and parliament ($r = .44$) a positive correlation between point in time and number of documents exists, which indicates an overall increase in attention during the research period.

We now turn to the use of the various frames in each arena. Figure 2 shows the proportional use of each frame in parliament. Here, some interesting shifts have occurred. At the beginning of our research period, the mid-1990s, emancipation and multicultural framing dominated in parliament, which is in line with the official policy goals during that period (Duyvendak and Rijkschroeff, 2004; Entzinger, 2003). In minority policies, the emancipation of migrants is situated at the group level and not at the individual level. Minorities during this period were expected to integrate into Dutch society as a group, creating a new social ‘pillar’. This approach adheres to the traditional ‘pillarized’ structure of Dutch society and politics (Lijphart, 1968).

At the end of the 1990s, the restriction frame gains ground in parliamentary documents. Discussions about the limited integration of a considerable part of the minority population, in particular Moroccans and Antilleans, lead to a questioning of existing policies and measures. New legislation is proposed, aimed at preventing a new wave of immigrations through marriages, and placing specific integration
demands upon newcomers. After the events of 9/11 and following the declaration of the ‘War on Terror’, the Islam-as-threat frame becomes dominant while restriction and multicultural framing, especially, diminish. Parliamentary activity primarily focuses on how to deal with Muslim radicalism and how to protect the country from terrorist attacks.

Trends in the newspaper framing bear some similarity to parliamentary framing (Figure 3). The Islam-as-threat frame dominated practically the entire period, except from 1998 to 2000. This is partly due to reporting on foreign events, especially in the Middle East. Also, the opportunities for a more critical discussion of the potential tensions between the Islam and western cultures appear to be increasing in the public realm. As early as the beginning of the 1990s, VVD leader, Frits Bolkestein, Pim Fortuyn and various columnists are prominent actors in this debate. During the period 1998–2000, the multicultural frame is most prominent in newspaper reporting. This occurs later than its prominence in parliament and may be a reaction to its parliamentary dominance: in the media this frame is far more contested than it is in parliament. Paul Scheffer’s article on the ‘multicultural fiasco’ and the reactions in early 2000 are the clearest example of this. It is hardly surprising that from 2001 on, the Islam-as-threat frame surpasses all other frames in the press as it does in parliament.

Frames other than multiculturalism and Islam-as-threat are only marginally present in media coverage. However, the victimization frame, especially depicting immigrant women as victims of a violent culture, used by some to complement the dominant negative framing towards Islam, is used nearly as often as the multicultural frame in 2004. Other frames may be used less often because they are unique to juridical discussions, too ‘technical’, and therefore considered less newsworthy by journalists.

**FIGURE 3**

Proportional Yearly Use of Each of the Five Frames in Newspaper Articles

![Graph showing proportional yearly use of each frame](image-url)
We now turn to the bidirectional relationship between the two arenas. As demonstrated in Figures 1, 2 and 3, there is some overlap in the overall attention to the issue and the proportional use of each of the frames in each arena, but differences exist as well. Table 2 presents the correlations for the five frames in each arena and the total correlation between the two arenas. Surprisingly, the correlation between the two arenas is weak. For three of the five frames, we find no significant correlation, for the restriction frame the correlation is barely significant. Only the Islam-as-threat frame and the total attention show significant correlations between the two arenas. Our findings reveal that, though issues become relevant in both arenas simultaneously, the issue is framed in distinct ways in each arena. However, causal relations between the two arenas may become visible if we account for timing and external key events.

Table 3 presents the results of the analysis for total attention to the issues of immigration and integration. The likelihood test suggests that a model with four lags is the most appropriate one. As expected, there is indeed a strong yearly trend in the parliamentary arena, with the 12-month coefficient being highly significant. The recent past, especially the attention to the issue in the previous month, has a significant impact as well. Attention in the media arena also has an influence on parliamentary attention, but this influence is not straightforward: both positive and negative coefficients are found. Overall, this results in a rather limited impact. Interestingly enough, the media coverage one year ago has a positive influence on the current parliamentary attention to the issue. Apparently, there are long-term influential relationships where media coverage affects actions in parliament in the long run. Furthermore, several events have a significant impact on the overall parliamentary attention to the issues of immigration and integration. For instance, 9/11 has a positive and permanent influence, while Fortuyn’s entrance into the political arena has a negative influence. The latter is likely to be a statistical artefact, because it occurs only two months after 9/11 and probably indicates declining attention to 9/11 rather than the actual influence of Fortuyn. The third event that has a significant and permanent influence on the parliamentary agenda is the war in Iraq. The discussion about the Dutch government’s official position in relation to the Iraq War and the subsequent debate afterwards has included elements of the immigration and integration issue, perhaps the Islam-as-threat frame in particular. Remarkably

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multicultural</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emancipation</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restriction</td>
<td>.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victimization</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam-as-threat</td>
<td>.33***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>.34***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *$p < .10$; **$p < .05$; ***$p < .01$ (one-tailed); $N = 120$. 

TABLE 2
Correlation between Media and Parliamentary Framing
### TABLE 3
VAR Analysis for the Attention to Immigration and Integration in the Media and Politics (Period 1995–2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Parliament</th>
<th>Media</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>7.77** (3.61)</td>
<td>20.94 (20.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parliament</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(t-1)</td>
<td>.42*** (.10)</td>
<td>.08 (.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(t-2)</td>
<td>−.20** (.11)</td>
<td>−.48 (.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(t-3)</td>
<td>−.02 (.11)</td>
<td>.58 (.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(t-4)</td>
<td>.03 (.09)</td>
<td>.47 (.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F-statistic</strong></td>
<td>5.13*** (.00)</td>
<td>.92 (.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(t-12)</td>
<td>.42*** (.08)</td>
<td>74* (.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Media</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(t-1)</td>
<td>−.02** (.02)</td>
<td>.21*** (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(t-2)</td>
<td>.02 (.02)</td>
<td>−.10 (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(t-3)</td>
<td>.02 (.01)</td>
<td>.19** (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(t-4)</td>
<td>−.02** (.01)</td>
<td>−.19*** (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F-statistic</strong></td>
<td>1.94* (.06)</td>
<td>4.75*** (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(t-12)</td>
<td>.02** (.01)</td>
<td>28*** (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Election campaign 1998</strong></td>
<td>−11.61 (9.28)</td>
<td>−35.48 (53.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(t-2)**</td>
<td>.80 (2.32)</td>
<td>−2.35 (13.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scheffer (t-1)</strong></td>
<td>−.39 (9.32)</td>
<td>91.96** (54.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>9/11</strong></td>
<td>13.99** (7.20)</td>
<td>428.57*** (42.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fortuyn</strong></td>
<td>−16.34** (8.14)</td>
<td>−323.61*** (47.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Election 2002</strong></td>
<td>−8.18* (5.57)</td>
<td>40.80 (32.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(t-3)**</td>
<td>10.53 (12.30)</td>
<td>190.77*** (71.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iraq</strong></td>
<td>15.17*** (5.21)</td>
<td>−110.26*** (30.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Madrid</strong></td>
<td>12.48 (9.84)</td>
<td>305.86*** (57.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Van Gogh</strong></td>
<td>5.82 (9.66)</td>
<td>403.86*** (56.08)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** All parameters are estimated using OLS. Reported F-statistic is a standard Wald-statistic and tests for causality, in parenthesis, are reported standard errors (for coefficients) and *p*-values (for *F*-statistic).

- **a** Effect is permanent.
- **b** Effect is temporarily.
- *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 (one-tailed); N = 108.
enough, both the elections of 1998 and 2002 have no impact. A change in government and shifts in parliamentary standing of various parties do not change the attention to the issue in parliament. However, as we see further on, changes in parliamentary standing do change the framing of the issue.

Attention to the issue in the media is only minimally influenced by the parliamentary agenda: we find that attention in the parliamentary agenda one year earlier influences the media agenda, but the effect is barely significant. Furthermore, media attention in previous months influences current media attention, though this influence is not positive for each lag. Apparently, the press continues to address an issue for a certain period (e.g. several months) and then moves on to the next issue. In general, events are more likely to have an effect on the media agenda and these effects tend to be larger. Like the parliamentary agenda, 9/11 has a positive and permanent effect and the entrance of Fortuyn two months later is accompanied by a decline in attention to the immigration and integration issue. Also, Iraq has a highly significant influence, but this influence is negative. In the media, Iraq is not connected to the immigration and integration issue. Furthermore, both Scheffer’s multicultural fiasco and the terrorist attacks on Madrid have a positive, but temporal influence. The murder of van Gogh results in more attention to the issue in the last two months of our research period. Finally, a political landslide after the 2002 parliamentary elections, resulting in a more rightist government, increased the media attention to the issue of immigration and integration. During the 2003 election campaign, the issue became more salient in the media. This was not the case in 1998, when it was not a central issue in the campaigns of most political parties.

The VAR analyses show that our model explains 61 percent of the variance in the parliamentary agenda and 86 percent of the variance in the media agenda. Test statistics are satisfactory, with neither residual statistics indicating autocorrelation in the residuals.

Framing

Now, we turn to the framing of the issue. Table 4 presents the proportional use of all five frames in both arenas. We do not discuss all the results, but make some general remarks about the outcomes of the analyses and we pay attention to the most interesting results. Our likelihood test suggests various lag lengths for the different frames, ranging from 1 for the victimization frame to 6 for the Islam-as-threat, multicultural and restriction framing. None of our analyses finds autocorrelation in the residuals. Our models explain a considerable amount of the variances in our frames, though large differences exist: the $R^2$ is .24 for the variance in the media use of the victimization frame, while it is .78 for the parliamentary use of the Islam-as-threat frame. Except for the multicultural framing, we explain parliamentary framing better than media framing. So, we might be able to predict the amount of attention more accurately for the media arena, but the parliamentary framing is more consistent and can be predicted more precisely.

How do media and parliament influence each other? The answer is complex and patterns do not always correspond with our general expectation that the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Islam-as-threat</th>
<th>Multicultural</th>
<th>Victimization</th>
<th>Emancipation</th>
<th>Restriction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.88 (4.94)</td>
<td>41.10*** (9.40)</td>
<td>8.33* (5.42)</td>
<td>30.64*** (6.35)</td>
<td>6.04*** (1.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(t-1)</td>
<td>.54*** (.11)</td>
<td>.30 * (.21)</td>
<td>.32*** (.11)</td>
<td>.07 (.13)</td>
<td>.51*** (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(t-2)</td>
<td>–.13 (.12)</td>
<td>.14 (2.2)</td>
<td>-.05 (.11)</td>
<td>.09 (.12)</td>
<td>.65*** (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(t-3)</td>
<td>–.05 (.12)</td>
<td>-.09 (2.2)</td>
<td>-.03 (.10)</td>
<td>-.01 (.12)</td>
<td>.05 (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(t-4)</td>
<td>–.11 (.12)</td>
<td>-.10 (2.2)</td>
<td>-.09 (.10)</td>
<td>-.10 (.12)</td>
<td>-.04 (.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(t-5)</td>
<td>.10 (.11)</td>
<td>-.08 (2.2)</td>
<td>.03 (.10)</td>
<td>-.01 (.12)</td>
<td>.12 (.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(t-6)</td>
<td>-.05 (.10)</td>
<td>.40*** (.09)</td>
<td>-.06 (.09)</td>
<td>-.30*** (.11)</td>
<td>.20 (.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-statistic</td>
<td>5.77*** (.00)</td>
<td>1.86*** (.05)</td>
<td>1.81* (.05)</td>
<td>2.23** (.02)</td>
<td>4.04*** (.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election campaign 1998&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>10.02* (5.98)</td>
<td>–26.16** (11.37)</td>
<td>1.20 (.00)</td>
<td>19.86*** (8.07)</td>
<td>–6.73* (5.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election 1998 (t-2)&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>–5.4 (2.21)</td>
<td>–16.85*** (4.22)</td>
<td>–10.63*** (3.00)</td>
<td>11.06*** (3.46)</td>
<td>–1.11 (1.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scheffer (t-2)&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>–1.44 (5.78)</td>
<td>–12.23 (11.00)</td>
<td>10.73* (7.08)</td>
<td>14.13*** (8.17)</td>
<td>–1.69*** (5.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/11&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>19.37*** (4.52)</td>
<td>37.60*** (8.60)</td>
<td>6.88* (5.06)</td>
<td>–23.25*** (5.84)</td>
<td>–3.99 (3.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortuyna&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>–11.00*** (5.00)</td>
<td>–29.17*** (10.27)</td>
<td>2.26 (5.97)</td>
<td>10.75*** (6.68)</td>
<td>2.98 (3.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election 2002 (t-3)&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.40 (3.04)</td>
<td>7.19 (5.79)</td>
<td>–1.97 (5.36)</td>
<td>–5.37*** (4.01)</td>
<td>–2.38 (2.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election campaign 2003&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>–6.42 (6.11)</td>
<td>–20.15** (11.62)</td>
<td>–4.23 (7.10)</td>
<td>5.05 (8.18)</td>
<td>–45 (5.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.90*** (2.90)</td>
<td>–12.66*** (5.53)</td>
<td>–2.55 (3.15)</td>
<td>–1.03 (3.64)</td>
<td>2.97 (2.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madjid&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>–1.12 (6.21)</td>
<td>–7.77 (11.82)</td>
<td>3.22 (6.80)</td>
<td>–5.43 (7.84)</td>
<td>1.01 (5.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durbin-Watson</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>1.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centered R&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All parameters are estimated using OLS. Reported F-statistic is a standard Wald-statistic and tests for causality; lag selection on basis of likelihood ratio test for exclusion of last lag (starting point six lags);

<sup>a</sup> Effect is permanent.
<sup>b</sup> Effect is temporarily.

*<i>p < .10</i>; **<i>p < .05</i>; ***<i>p < .01</i> (one-tailed).
framing in one arena will influence the framing in the other arena. For the Islam-as-threat framing, most common in the media arena, we find a positive influence from parliament on media, though the only significant coefficient is at a rather long lag of six months. For the multicultural frame, which has been present substantially in both arenas, framing in the media arena positively influences the parliamentary arena, while inversely parliament has a negative influence on the media. In the case of victimization, we find a mutual positive relationship, while for the emancipation frame, which has been dominant in parliament, overall a small boomerang effect of parliament on media can be found. F-statistics for the analysis of the restriction frame suggest no relationship between the two arenas. The general pattern seems to be that media are reluctant to follow parliament when changes occur in the dominant parliamentary frames (emancipation and multicultural). Furthermore, there are positive influences from the media on parliament (multicultural and victimization) and from parliament on the media (Islam-as-threat and victimization). Apparently, if frames have already been dominant in one arena, increased use of those frames in the other arena reconfirms the importance of that frame for actors in the first arena and increases their use there. Actors in both arenas actively follow increases in framings that they already deemed important, while the media arena especially shows a counter-reaction for increases in those frames that parliament deems important.

Various external events also contribute to changes in the way the issue is framed. Consider the elections of 1998 and 2002. As expected, the outcome of the parliamentary election of 1998 with electoral gains for the liberal-right party leads to an increase in the use of the restriction frame in both parliament and the media. In parliament, this happens at the expense of the multicultural frame. In the media, we find another remarkable shift in framing, from Islam-as-threat to multiculturalism. As we have already noted, the media arena does not follow parliament when it comes to multiculturalism. Here, we suggest that a critical multicultural frame was advanced in the media after political support for the multicultural ideal declined. Remarkably enough, the 2002 parliamentary elections, which altered the political landscape considerably and resulted in a more right-wing parliament and government, did not change the framing of the issue of immigration and integration in either of the two arenas. Probably, this is due to changes that had already occurred in the months before the election, mainly due to 9/11. During the weeks before the elections of 1998 and 2003, a shift becomes visible in the media framing away from the Islam-as-threat frame towards frames propagated in the parliamentary realm (mainly multiculturalism and emancipation). Apparently, during election campaigns, politicians are better able to get ‘policy-related’ messages out and as suggested by Walgrave and van Aelst (2006), the press is more willing to give politicians the floor to express their politicized views.

In both arenas, 9/11 shifted the framing to the Islam-as-threat frame, at the expense of several other frames. Fortuyn’s entrance accompanies, though does not necessarily cause, a decrease in this effect, but the Islam-as-threat frame remains dominant after 9/11, as depicted in Figures 2 and 3. The two other events that can be labelled as ‘terrorist’ have only limited effects: the attacks on trains in Madrid
did not change the framing, while van Gogh’s murder led to more Islam-as-threat framing in the media and less restriction framing in parliament. The war in Iraq has different effects in each arena, following the same pattern as the general attention to immigration and integration. Apparently, in parliament politicians connect the war in Iraq to the threat of radical Islam, while this is not the case in the media arena. Finally, Scheffer’s multicultural fiasco resulted in some temporary changes, most significantly an increase in multicultural framing in both arenas.

Conclusions

In this article, we have investigated the intriguing relationship between the media arena and parliament’s framing of the issues of immigration and integration in the Netherlands from 1995–2004. Our VAR analyses accounted for agenda-setting, framing and effects of external events as possible explanations for both quantitative (issue salience) and qualitative (framing) shifts in each arena. Though the results are complex, some interesting patterns can be distinguished. Regarding the relationship between the overall attention to the issues in the two arenas, we found little short-term influence by one arena on the other, but results indicated a long-term bidirectional influence. Although external events influence both agendas, the impact on the media agenda is larger. International events such as 9/11 and the war in Iraq influence both agendas permanently. The effects of parliamentary elections are limited, while the effects of prominent actors trying to influence the public debate are ambiguous.

For our five issue-specific frames, we found an interesting pattern: increases in the use of a certain frame in one arena leads to increases in the other arena, but almost exclusively for those frames that have already been used frequently in the latter arena. The press is reluctant to adopt parliamentary frames that have not previously been popular in the media. Finally, external events have a considerable impact on how issues are framed in both media and parliament. In general, the outcome of the parliamentary elections of 1998 especially, with a shift away from multiculturalism in parliament towards more restrictive policies and 9/11, increasing Islam-as-threat framing in both arenas, altered the public and political debate significantly and permanently. The weeks preceding an election, show more media attention to those frames that are usually more present in parliament. More than influencing one another, both parliament and media are influenced by developments in the ‘outside’ world. In that respect, our results do not confirm statements on ‘mediacracy’, mediatization of politics and the like (e.g. Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999), suggested in some of the recent literature. A final noteworthy conclusion concerns the (un)predictability of both agendas. We predicted the salience of the issue more accurately for the media agenda, perhaps because it more directly reflects developments in the ‘real’ world. However, we were more successful at predicting the content of the parliamentary agenda, which may be due to the greater internal consistency of this agenda over time. This points to inherent institutional differences between the two arenas, with the media being more flexible, variable and event sensitive and parliament being less malleable, more routinized and stable.
Are our results generalizable to other contexts and other situations? Though some of the outcomes might be case specific, as for example the large impact of 9/11, the established mechanisms might be found in other contexts as well. We expect that several of the findings, for example the relative large differences between the framing in the media and the political realm and the relative weak bidirectional causal relationships, may well apply to other countries as well (Swanson, 2004). First, this may be the case since the media are becoming a more ‘globalized’ space (Norris, 1999), which may result in growing similarities in framing between the media outlets in different countries, whereas this is not the case for political framing, in which state sovereignty is said still to prevail and may even be reinforced (Kofman, 2005). This argument is also promoted by Thomas Meyer (2002), who claims that the political arena and the media are to an important extent separate spheres, with different agendas. Second, the issue of immigration and integration is simultaneously and paradoxically becoming a more international and national issue. Whereas there is a continuing international debate about the ‘clash of civilizations’ that ‘western’ nation-states are facing, the regulation of immigration and integration remains the territory of the state and may even reinforce ‘nation-statism’ (Kofman, 2005).

To test these hypotheses, more comparative cross-national and longitudinal research is necessary. We suggest that our approach, despite its shortcomings, especially in gaining possibilities to do a large-scale study at the expense of nuance, offers important opportunities to map debates in various arenas, based on a large amount of documents, compare these debates and establish relationships between the arenas.

Appendix 1: List of Sensitizing Questions to Code Frames

Full title
Issue (main issue, detail if necessary)
Date
Type/status of document
Event/reason/occasion of appearance
Audience

Voice/Standing

Voice(s) speaking
Perspective
References: words/concepts (and where they come from)
References: actors
References: documents
Other references: events, etc.
Form (argumentation/style/conviction techniques/dichotomies/metaphors/contrasts)
**Diagnosis**

What is represented as the problem? Why is it seen as a problem?
Causality (what is seen as a cause of what?)
Who is seen as responsible for causing the problem?
Problem holders (whose problem is it seen to be? Active/passive roles, perpetrators/victims, etc.?)
Normativity (what is a norm group if there is a problem group?)
Legitimization of non-problem(s)

**Prognosis**

What to do? Which action is deemed necessary and why?
Hierarchy/priority in goals
How to achieve goals (strategy/means/instruments)?
Attribution of roles in prognosis

**Call for Action**

Call for action or non-action
Who is acted upon? (target groups)
Boundaries set to action and legitimization of non-action

**Appendix 2: Parliamentary Documents Used for Qualitative Analysis of Frames**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>No. of documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Act of Integration of Newcomers, 9 April 1998</td>
<td>25,114, No. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration Policy 1999–2002</td>
<td>26,333, No. 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Legal Position of Women in Immigration Policy, Letter of the</td>
<td>27,111, No. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Secretary of Justice, April 2000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report of Parliamentary Debate about the Legal Position of Women</td>
<td>27,111, No. 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Immigration Policy (June 2000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration policy new style</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan for the Emancipation and Integration of Women and Girls from</td>
<td>29,203, No. 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Minorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary debates of Plan for the Emancipation and Integration</td>
<td>29,203, Nos. 9, 18, 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of Women and Girls from Ethnic Minorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary debate about Religious Manifestations of Civil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servants, 17 March 2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3: Search-Strings for Each of the Five Frames Used to Search Newspapers and Parliamentary Documents

*News on Immigration and Integration (see note 3)*
allochto* or vreemdeling* or immigrant* or asielzoeker* or minderheden

*Multicultural Frame*
(multiculture*) AND (diversiteit or respect or verschil* or particip* or dialoog or gesprek)

*Emancipation*
(allochto* or vreemdeling* or immigrant* or asielzoeker* or minderheden) AND emancip* AND (integr* or particip*)

*Restriction*
(importbruid* or nieuwkomer* or instroombeperking* or ((voorwaard* or eis*) w/5 immigratie) or (wetgeving w/5 immigratie) AND inburgering)

*Victimization*
(hoofddoek* or ongelijkheid or eerwraak) AND ((allochto* or vreemdeling* or immigrant* or asielzoeker* or minderheden))

*Anti-Islam*
(islam* AND (bedreiging* or terrorisme))

*Notes*

We would like to thank Liz Chiarello and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this article. Data on which this article’s analyses are based are available at the first author’s website: www.rensvliegenthart.com. Authors are listed in reverse alphabetical order and contributed equally to this article.

1. Parliamentary documents include all the official documents handled in parliament, including official questions by parliamentarians to government, proposals for legislation by government, etc. The most symbolic elements, namely the integral reports of parliamentary debates are not included in the analyses.

2. A more elaborate search, based on a broad search-string that is likely to capture a large part of the news on immigration and integration (see Appendix 3) resulted in a total of 10,087 parliamentary documents and 55,167 newspaper articles, resulting in a mean of 0.53 framings per parliamentary document and 0.27 framings per newspaper article. This difference is not surprising, regarding the larger length of parliamentary documents and the wider range of (also non-political) topics covered by newspapers.
3. The dummy capturing the campaign in the weeks before the 2002 parliamentary election did not change any of the framings significantly and is not included in further analyses. The absence of any further change during the weeks preceding this election is not so surprising: debate on the issues has already changed since 9/11 and the entrance of Fortuyn in the political arena several months before was already at the centre of attention by the end of 2001 and during the first months of 2002 (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2003).

4. It is also possible for events to have an effect that has a period of decline, which spans more than one month. Our empirical analyses, however, show us that all events included are most appropriately modelled as either permanent or temporary and abruptly declining, resulting in no significant effects in the following month.

5. A new immigration law was passed in 1998 (Fermin, 1999).

References


Rens Vliegenthart is a PhD candidate at the Department of Social-Cultural Sciences at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. His research interests include media coverage of social movements and contested issues, media effects and time-series analyses.

Address Department of Social-Cultural Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1081, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands. [email:v.vliegenthart@fsw.vu.nl]

Conny Roggeband occupies a senior researcher position at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and specializes in policy analysis, gender equality and political mobilization. Her current research examines policy framing on migration and gender in different European countries.

Address Department of Culture, Organization and Management, Faculty of Social Sciences, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1081, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands. [email: cm.roggeband@fsw.vu.nl]