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Embeddedness and identity: Collective action participation among immigrants

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Over the past several years the Western world has become a less hospitable place for immigrants of Islamic descent. Dramatic events such as 9/11, attacks on Spanish and British railways, and the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh have generated unprecedented levels of Islamophobia in Western countries. Regulations for immigrants have become more restrictive, resulting in more limiting thresholds for immigration. Negative accounts related to immigrants and immigration appear in newspapers more frequently, and anti-immigrant political parties enjoy increasing popular support (Vliegenthart 2007). For their part, Islamic communities in the diaspora have responded to the less friendly environment with stronger identification with their own culture and with an increased political voice and organization. Indeed, there has been an increase in political protest by immigrant groups, along with an increase in other more conventional forms of political participation.

Although collective action is increasingly regarded as a regular form of political participation in democratic society, this is not necessarily true for immigrants. Collective action

1 We use Wright, Taylor, and Moghaddam’s (1990:995) definition of collective action participation: “Any time people are acting as a representative of the group and the action is directed at improving the conditions of the entire group.”
bears the risk of polarizing groups within nations and drawing further distinctions between the “native population” and “immigrant communities.” Immigrants, in particular Muslims, occupy a delicate position in their “host” societies. They are expected to assimilate into the host culture, and failure to do so is considered a sign of lack of loyalty. Immigrants’ loyalty to the country of residence is placed under even more doubt if they engage in protest. Under such circumstances, it is unclear what aggrieved immigrants should do. Should they stay away from protest action despite their grievances, or act like any other citizen by voicing their discontent?

Despite the societal and scientific relevance of these questions, there is little research regarding immigrants’ participation in collective political action. Yet, both the study of immigrants and the study of social movements would benefit from such research; if only to account for the complex social and political reality that confronts immigrant populations and their incorporation. In this article, we investigate why Muslim immigrants choose to either participate or refrain from participation in collective action. We show that the social psychological mechanisms that are known to steer collective action participation among average citizens work among Muslim immigrants as well, albeit in a qualified manner.

The question as to why people engage in collective action has occupied social psychological researchers of protest behavior for a long time, and it has received different answers over the years (for an overview, see Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2007). Classical theories proposed that people engage in collective action to express their grievances stemming from relative deprivation, frustration, and perceived injustice (Berkowitz 1972; Gurr 1970; Lind and Tyler 1988). Scholars of social movements, however, began to question the effects of grievances on protest movement participation and proposed that the question to be answered is not so much whether people who engage in protest are aggrieved, but whether aggrieved people engage in protest. They suggested that efficacy, resources, and opportunities would predict protest participation (in sociology, see McAdam [1982] and Zald and McCarthy [1979]; in social psychology, see Klandermans [1984, 1997]). Meanwhile, scholars such as Melucci (1985) and Taylor and Whittier (1992) in sociology, and Reicher (1984), Simon and colleagues (1998), and De Weerd and Klandermans (1999) in social psychology, began to explore the role of collective identity in protest behavior. Recently, the role of emotions has drawn the attention of collective action researchers (in sociology, see Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta [2000]; in social psychology, see Van Stekelenburg [2006] and Van Zomeren et al. [2004]).

This article builds on Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans’ (2007) integration of these elements into a single theoretical framework, but we propose a fifth element to consider—social embeddedness. Both resource mobilization theory and political process theory emphasize the role of social networks, particularly as mobilizing structures (Diani 1997; Diani and McAdam 2003; Kitts 2000; McCarthy 1996). The literature on social capital points to yet another role of social networks, proposing that social embeddedness provides individuals with the resources needed to invest in collective action.

To date, these theoretical predictions derived from dominant traditions within the social movement literature have rarely been tested among immigrant populations. We assume that immigrants, like other participants in collective action, engage in protest because they are aggrieved and angry, but what about the role of efficacy, collective identity, and social embeddedness? Having a sense of political influence in a country that is not one’s own may be a very different sentiment than the political efficacy native citizens feel. Furthermore, because collective identity and social embeddedness might both be ethically defined for immigrants, they are likely to play unique roles in determining immigrants’ and native citizens’ protest participation.

EXPLANATIONS OF PROTEST PARTICIPATION

GRIEVANCES

Grievances can be defined as a sense of indignation about the way authorities are treating a social or political problem (Klandermans 1997). Grievances have occupied a prominent position among the earliest explanations of protest participation. Generally, researchers assume
that people engage in collective action in response to being aggrieved. Relative deprivation theory, prominent among grievance theories, assumes that feelings of relative deprivation result from a comparison of one’s situation with a certain standard—one’s past, someone else’s situation, or a cognitive standard such as equity or justice (Folger 1986). If a comparison results in the conclusion that one is not receiving what one deserves, a person experiences relative deprivation. The literature further distinguishes between relative deprivation based on personal comparisons (i.e., individual deprivation) and relative deprivation based on group comparisons (i.e., group deprivation) (Kelly and Breinlinger 1996; Runciman 1966). Research suggests that group relative deprivation is particularly important for engagement in collective action (Major 1994; Martin 1986).2

On the basis of a meta-analysis, Van Zomeren (2006) concludes that the cognitive component of relative deprivation (i.e., the observation that one receives less than the standard of comparison) has less influence on action participation than does the affective component (i.e., such feelings as dissatisfaction, indignation, and discontent about outcomes).

More recently, social psychologists have applied social justice theory to the study of social movements (Tyler and Smith 1998). The social justice literature distinguishes between two classes of justice judgments: distributive and procedural justice. Distributive justice is related to relative deprivation in that it refers to the fairness of outcome distributions. Procedural justice, on the other hand, refers to the fairness of decision-making procedures and the relational aspects of the social process, that is, whether authorities treat people with respect and can be trusted to act in a beneficial and unbiased manner (Tyler and Lind 1992). Research has found that people care more about how they are treated than about outcomes. Based on these findings, Tyler and Smith (1998) propose that procedural justice might be a more powerful predictor of social movement participation than distributive justice, although they have not tested this idea (but see Blader [2007] for a test in the context of labor union participation).

**Efficacy**

It would be hard to deny that people who take part in protest activities are aggrieved, but grievances do not provide a sufficient reason to participate in collective action. According to resource mobilization theorists such as Oberschall (1973) and Zald and McCarthy (1979), grievances abound while collective action does not. Therefore, the key question to address is: why do some aggrieved people become mobilized, while others do not? These authors suggest that the availability of resources and the presence of opportunities play a key role. Groups with more resources and more opportunities are more likely to succeed in mobilizing collective action. Furthermore, Klandermans (1997) shows that people are more likely to participate in movement activities when they believe this will help to redress their grievances at affordable costs. Simon and colleagues (1998) call this the instrumental pathway to movement participation (see also Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2007; Van Zomeren et al. 2004). The key component for the instrumental pathway is efficacy—an individual’s expectation that collective action participation can make a difference and bring about the desired change. The more effective an individual believes collective action participation to be, the more likely the person is to participate.

**Identity**

Simon and colleagues (1998) propose the existence of an identity pathway to collective action in addition to the instrumental pathway. They reason that people do not participate in social movements for instrumental reasons only, but also to fulfill identity needs. Identity, specifically collective identity, became an important concept in the social movement literature in the past 25 years. Cohen (1985) and Melucci (1985) were among the first to emphasize the significance of collective identity formation in social movements, and this concept gained importance with additional research (see Stryker, Owens, and White 2000; Taylor and Whittier 1992). Meanwhile, social psychologists began to explore the role of group identification in

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2 Social psychologists are not the only scholars to apply relative deprivation theory in the context of social movements; political scientists use relative deprivation theory as well (see Gurr 1970, 1993; Meyer and Lupo 2007).
movement participation (de Weerd and Klandermans 1999; Kelly and Breinlinger 1996; Klandermans, Sabucedo, and Rodriguez 2002; Simon and Klandermans 2001; Simon et al. 1998; Stürmer 2000) and concluded that the more one identifies with a group involved in a protest activity, the more likely one is to take part in that activity.

Recent work shows that people simultaneously hold several identities that may come into conflict and guide behavior in different directions (cf. Kurtz 2002). Individuals might find themselves under cross-pressure (Oegema and Klandermans 1994) when two groups they identify with are on opposite sides of a controversy (e.g., union members faced with the decision to strike against their own company). Indeed, workers who go on strike or movement activists who challenge their government are often accused of being disloyal to the company or the country. This problem is especially relevant in the case of protest participation by immigrants, specifically Muslim immigrants, which can easily be (mis)interpreted as disloyalty to their new country of residence. González and Brown (2003) coined the term “dual identity” to point to the concurrent workings of identities. They argue that identification with a subordinate entity (e.g., ethnic identity) does not necessarily exclude identification with a supraordinate entity (e.g., national identity). In fact, they claim that dual identity is a desirable configuration, as it implies sufficient identification with one’s subgroup to experience basic security and sufficient identification with the overarching group to preclude divisiveness (see also Huo et al. 1996).

González and Brown’s concept of dual identity is akin to what Berry (1984) defines as integration. Berry distinguishes between four types of cultural adaptation, depending on the degree of identification with the culture of the country of origin and the culture of the country of immigration. The possible resulting forms of adaptation are integration (identification with both cultures), assimilation (sole identification with the culture of the country of immigration), separation (sole identification with the culture of the country of origin), and marginalization (identification with neither culture). There is evidence that integration, that is, holding a dual identity, provides more satisfaction with one’s situation than do the other forms of cultural adaptation (González and Brown 2003; Sam and Berry 2006). Furthermore, studies of Spanish and Dutch farmers and South African citizens (Klandermans, Roefs, and Olivier 2001; Klandermans, Sabucedo, and Rodriguez 2004) suggest that integration or holding a dual identity, rather than separation, assimilation, or marginalization, stimulates subgroup mobilization. This suggests that some degree of identification with the nation is needed to mobilize for political action. We expect that, overall, immigrants who report holding a dual identity will be more satisfied with their social and political situation than will those who do not hold a dual identity. If they are dissatisfied, however, we expect that dual identity immigrants will be more likely to participate in collective action.

**Emotions**

The social movement literature devotes surprisingly little time to the role of emotions. Recent work in sociology and social psychology, however, has introduced emotions to the study of social movements (Goodwin et al. 2000; Jasper 1998; Van Stekelenburg 2006; Van Zomeren et al. 2004). Jasper (1998) makes a distinction between emotions as antecedents of movement participation and emotions as they develop in the course of participation. We focus on the former in this analysis.

Emotions can be avoidance or approach oriented. Fear, which makes people refrain from taking action, is an example of an avoidance oriented emotion. Anger is an approach oriented emotion and is known to be an antecedent of protest participation (Van Zomeren et al. 2004). There appears to be a relation between emotions and efficacy. When people do not feel efficacious, they are more likely to experience fear; feeling efficacious, on the other hand, is associated with experiencing anger (Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000). Van Zomeren and colleagues (2004) show that anger is an important stimulant of protest participation and they describe a pathway to participation based on anger. Van Stekelenburg (2006), however, demonstrates that rather than functioning as a separate pathway to collective action, emotions amplify already existing motivations.

**Social Embeddedness**

In addition to the four factors drawn from Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2007)—griev-
ances, efficacy, identity, and emotions—we include a fifth factor in our theoretical framework, namely social embeddedness or involvement in civil society organizations. As early as 1965, Almond and Verba observed a positive correlation between active engagement in voluntary associations and subjective political competence. They argued that by engaging in voluntary associations, people learn how political institutions work. This became known as social capital (coined by Putnam 1993, 2000), which Lin (1999:35) defines as “resources embedded in a social structure which are accessed and/or mobilized in purposive actions.” Social capital has a structural component, namely social networks, and a subjective component, namely trust and loyalty. McClurg (2003) shows that the effect of interaction in social networks on the propensity to participate in politics is contingent on the amount of political discussion that occurs in social networks and the information that people are able to gather about politics as a result. This provides support for Almond and Verba’s (1965) initial observation that people learn about politics from participation in voluntary associations.

What interests us here is the question of how immigrants relate to civil society. Are they part of the same civil society as native citizens or do divisions in multicultural societies fragment civil society? Tillie and his colleagues (Fennema and Tillie forthcoming; Tillie 2004; Van Heelsum 2005) have addressed this question through studies of immigrant communities in Dutch cities, concluding that participation in civil society does foster political participation among immigrants. This holds at both the individual and the group level and for ethnic as well as cross-ethnic organizations. In these studies, the dependent variables were usually forms of conventional political participation (e.g., voting, standing in elections, attending meetings). Whether the influence of participation in civil society also holds for unconventional political participation (e.g., demonstrating, boycotting, protesting) remains to be seen.

Paxton (2002) explores this question at an aggregate level. She argues that associational life accumulates social capital, which “provides space for the creation and dissemination of discourse critical of the present government, and it provides a way for active opposition to the regime to grow” (p. 257). In other words, civil society provides the resources necessary for opposition movements and collective action. Her argument is supported by results from two panel studies of associational life, conducted among different samples from countries around the world. In sum, embeddedness in social networks seems to foster conventional political participation among immigrants and non-immigrants alike. A lively civil society also appears to foster participation in unconventional politics, but little is known about whether this applies to immigrant populations. We know that social embeddedness reinforces both conventional and unconventional political participation among native citizens; we know that it also reinforces conventional political participation among immigrants; but we do not know whether it reinforces unconventional political participation as well. We assume, however, that similar to conventional political participation, embeddedness stimulates participation in unconventional politics among immigrants and native residents alike.

**SUMMARY**

Our explanatory framework consists of five different antecedents of protest participation: (1) grievances, especially feelings of procedural injustice; (2) efficacy; (3) identity, specifically dual ethnic and national identity; (4) emotions, especially fear and anger; and (5) social embeddedness, particularly embeddedness in civil society organizations. In line with prior findings, we expect that immigrants who are aggrieved, specifically those who feel unfairly or disrespectfully treated, will be more likely to participate in collective action than will those who are not. This effect will be stronger for immigrants who feel politically effective—both individually and collectively. We also expect that immigrants who display a dual ethnic and national identity will be less aggrieved. However, we expect that dual identity immigrants who are aggrieved will be more likely to participate in collective action. Moreover, we expect that immigrants who report greater political efficacy will display anger in response to unfair treatment stemming from their ethnicity, while immigrants who report less political efficacy will be more likely to experience fear. In turn, immigrants who display anger rather than fear are expected to participate more exten-
sively in collective action. Finally, we expect immigrants embedded in social networks—both ethnic and cross-ethnic—to be more likely to participate in collective action than those who are not.

DATA AND METHODS

STUDY DESIGN

In 2002 to 2003, we conducted three separate studies using identical measures: two in the Netherlands among Turkish (N = 126) and Moroccan immigrants (N = 80), and one among Turkish immigrants (N = 100) in New York. The three studies used identical questionnaires translated into Dutch, English, Turkish, and Arabic.

In each study we used existing social networks to recruit the interviewees. In the Netherlands, 15 Turkish and Moroccan social science students at the VU-University interviewed 10 to 15 people each in their personal environments. They were told to approach a variety of people in terms of gender, age, and background. The interviewees were from the two largest cities in the country (Amsterdam and Rotterdam) and smaller cities in the surrounding areas. In New York, interviewees were approached through various organizations. As a consequence, a relatively large proportion of our New York respondents were members of cultural organizations (although there is no reason to assume that they were all members of the same organization). Within our sample, members of cultural organizations participated in collective action more frequently; thus, the proportion of participants in collective action in New York might be overestimated. However, the correlation of membership of cultural organizations with action participation among Turks in New York does not differ from that among Turks in the Netherlands. In that respect, the two samples are similar. Moreover, we are not interested in absolute levels of participation, but in accounting for variability in participation.

We compared findings from separate analyses of the three samples but found few systematic differences. Most importantly, the three samples have similar scores on the dependent variable of collective action. In the New York sample, we did find lower figures for perceived fairness, but the two Dutch samples are alike in this respect. Also, the three samples differ somewhat in terms of efficacy and ethnic identity. However, we are interested in replications of the observed relationships between our variables, rather than in a comparison between the three samples. In that respect, it is important to note that the relationships we found between the various variables are very similar. Therefore, instead of reporting the same results three times over, we collapse the three samples and report the results of our analyses on the combined sample.

No particular immigrant related events or campaigns were unfolding at the time of our interviews. In the wake of 9/11, the social climate for Muslims had become less friendly everywhere, but there were no additional negative events in the Netherlands or in New York that might have further aggravated the situation. Xenophobic attitudes and discrimination existed in the Netherlands and the United States long before 9/11, and there is no reason to assume that 9/11 reduced these sentiments. In both New York and the Netherlands there were signals of increasing xenophobia, but these were linked to general trends in both societies, not specific events. The terrorist attacks in Madrid and London had not yet taken place, the murder of Van Gogh was still to come.

SUBJECTS

Of the participants in the study, 60 percent are female and 40 percent are male. Their ages range from 18 to 73 (mean = 31.2; median = 28.0), and they have lived in their country of residence between 2 months and 52 years (mean = 17.6; median = 20.0). Fifty percent completed a lower level of education, 30 percent a medi-
um level, and 20 percent completed some form of higher education.5

**Measures**

**Participation in collective action.** We asked our respondents whether they had participated in the following activities in the past 12 months: petitions, hanging up political posters, painting slogans on walls, meetings or rallies about politics, demonstrations or marches, strikes, blocking traffic, occupying a building, consumer or tax boycotts, and violent action against humans or property. This includes both actions with a general goal and actions with goals specific to immigrants. We created a scale by counting the number of activities a respondent had participated in, ranging from 0 = no activities to 10 = 10 activities.

**Grievances.** We constructed four scales to assess people’s perceptions of the government’s use of distributive justice and procedural justice toward individuals or their ethnic groups. Examples of items include the following: distributive fairness toward the individual, “the (xxx) government makes sure that I get what I deserve” and “the outcomes of decisions that the (xxx) government makes are fair to me” (Cronbach’s alpha = .72); procedural fairness toward the individual, “the (xxx) government treats me in a fair way” and “the (xxx) government respects people like me” (Cronbach’s alpha = .87); distributive fairness toward the group, “the (xxx) government makes sure that people of my ethnic background who are living in (xxx) get what they deserve” and “the outcomes of decisions that the (xxx) government makes are usually fair to people of my ethnic background who are living in (xxx)” (Cronbach’s alpha = .77); procedural fairness toward the group, “the (xxx) government treats people of my ethnic background who are living in (xxx) in a fair way” and “the (xxx) government does not respect people of my ethnic background who are living in (xxx)” (Cronbach’s alpha = .75) (all scales range from 1 = very fair to 5 = very unfair).

To assess whether our respondents felt that authorities’ intentions can be trusted, we constructed a measure of political cynicism (1 = low level of cynicism; 5 = high level of cynicism). Examples of items include the following: “I don’t think public officials care much about what people like me think” and “it hardly makes any difference who I vote for because whoever gets elected does whatever he or she wants to do anyway” (Cronbach’s alpha = .82).

**Efficacy.** We measure efficacy at the individual and the collective levels. We measure individual efficacy by assessing the extent to which respondents agreed with statements such as the following: “people like me are generally well qualified to participate in the political activity and decision making in (xxx)” and “I feel like I could do as good a job in public office as most of the politicians we elect” (Cronbach’s alpha = .72). We measure collective efficacy by such assertions as the following: “dramatic change could occur in this country if people banded together and demanded change” and “organized groups of citizens can have much impact on the political policies in this country” (Cronbach’s alpha = .75) (both scales range from 1 = low efficacy to 5 = high efficacy).

**Identity.** We measure national identity and ethnic identity with the following items: “I feel connected to Americans/Netherlanders” and “I like to be seen as an American/a Netherlander” (Cronbach’s alpha = .85); “I feel connected to this group (Turks/Moroccans)” and “I like to be seen as a member of this group (Turks/Moroccans)” (Cronbach’s alpha = .87) (both scales range from 1 = no identification to 5 = strong identification).

**Emotions.** A subsample (N = 58) in the New York study answered questions6 about emotion.
tional experiences. We asked these respondents whether they feel angry, frustrated, powerless, hopeless, ashamed, humiliated, despicable, annoyed, scared, and worried when they “experience unfair treatment in the public realm (e.g., a restaurant) because of [their] ethnicity or religion” (answers range from 1 = not at all to 5 = extremely). Factor analysis with varimax rotation reveals a fear-factor (powerless, hopeless, ashamed, humiliated, scared, worried) with eigenvalue 4.35 that explains 43.5 percent of the variance and an anger-factor (angry, frustrated, annoyed) with eigenvalue 2.41 that explains 24.1 percent of the variance. We constructed a fear- and an anger-scale with Cronbach alphas of .87 and .85, respectively.

SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS. We asked our respondents whether they were a member of any of the following organizations: political party, religious organization, cultural organization, women’s organization, educational organization, trade union, residents’ committee, neighborhood committee, sports organization, and youth organization. In follow-up questions, we assessed whether the organizations were exclusively for immigrants or for citizens in general. We created a scale by counting the number of memberships, ranging from 0 = none to 10 = 10 memberships.

RESULTS

PARTICIPATION IN COLLECTIVE ACTION

The number of activities our respondents took part in during the 12 months prior to our study range from zero to seven (see Table 1). Roughly one-fifth (21 percent) engaged in only one activity; a quarter (25 percent) participated in more than one activity. The remaining 55 percent of our respondents did not take part in any collective action. Petitions, meetings, and demonstrations were the three most frequently mentioned activities. As this distribution is skewed, we calculated the natural logarithm for our further analyses.

ANTECEDENTS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

GRIEVANCES. The grievances measures encompass justice judgments and political cynicism. The degrees of perceived (un)fairness—whether individual- or group-related, distributive or procedural—are very similar. The correlations between the various justice judgments are high (Pearson r’s range from .50 to .75). Political cynicism is systematically positively correlated with all justice judgments (Pearson r’s between .28 and .47). Respondents who felt the government of their country of residence treated them unfairly were more cynical about politics.

Efficacy. The two efficacy measures tap individuals’ beliefs that they can make a difference in politics and the belief that people can make a difference if they band together. Our respondents felt more effective collectively than individually. The two efficacy measures are moderately positively correlated (Pearson r = .22). Respondents who felt individually effective felt more collectively effective as well.

Identity. Ethnic identification is much stronger than national identification, as one would expect given the literature. This suggests that identification with exclusive categories is stronger than identification with inclusive categories (Brewer and Silver 2000; Klandermans et al. 2002). The two types of identification vary independently from each other (Pearson r = .03). Based on these measures, we constructed the typology of supra- and subordinate identity7 presented in Table 2. Almost a quarter of our sample displayed a dual identity, that is, strong identification with both the nation of residence and one’s ethnicity. Another quarter of our respondents displayed neither a national identity nor an ethnic identity. The remaining respondents held an ethnic identity or a national identity only.

7 We decided to use a score of 3 as the breakpoint for national identity and 4 as the breakpoint for ethnic identity. Had we chosen 3 for both identities, almost everybody would have had an ethnic identity; had we chosen 4 for both identities, almost nobody would have had a national identity.
We assumed that dual identity would be associated with more satisfaction with one's situation. To test this assumption, we compared those who displayed a dual identity with those who did not in terms of distributive and procedural fairness judgments. Respondents who displayed a dual identity judged the way the government of the country of residence treated them—individually and as a group—as more fair (eta's ranging between .13 and .20; p's between .022 and .001). As hypothesized, those with dual identities felt more satisfaction about the way government treats people.

EMOTIONS. Fear and anger are the two emotions we registered. Unfair treatment triggered anger more than fear. Yet, the two emotional responses are related; a correlation of .30 implies that anger and fear co-vary to some extent. The correlations between emotions and fairness judgments reveal that procedures perceived as unfair to individual immigrants breed anger, while procedures perceived as unfair to immigrants as a group breed fear. Perceived unfairness of outcomes breeds fear as well. As expected, efficacy is positively related to anger (.20) and negatively related to fear (−.16).

SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS. Among our respondents, 28 percent were members of one civil society.

8 The correlation for anger with procedural unfairness to individuals is .33, with distributive unfairness to individuals it is .13, with procedural unfairness to groups it is .12, and distributive unfairness to groups is .22; the same correlations with fear are .30, .26, .34, and .35, respectively.

Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of Focal Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focal Variables</th>
<th>Mean (SD)</th>
<th>Participation in collective action</th>
<th>Distributive Unfairness Individual</th>
<th>Procedural Unfairness Individual</th>
<th>Distributive Unfairness Group</th>
<th>Procedural Unfairness Group</th>
<th>Political Cynicism</th>
<th>Efficacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grievances</td>
<td>3.09 (.87)</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.37*</td>
<td>.35*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Identity</td>
<td>2.74 (.81)</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.30*</td>
<td>.33*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic identity</td>
<td>4.00 (.76)</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.34*</td>
<td>.32*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotions</td>
<td>1.90 (.91)</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td>3.26 (.91)</td>
<td>.28*</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective efficacy</td>
<td>4.00 (.71)</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual efficacy</td>
<td>3.26 (.91)</td>
<td>.28*</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
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<td>.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political efficacy</td>
<td>4.00 (.71)</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Embeddedness</td>
<td>1.25 (1.38)</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership of organizations</td>
<td>1.25 (1.38)</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
organization and 34 percent were members of more than one. The remaining 38 percent were not involved in any organization. Sports organizations, cultural organizations, religious organizations, educational organizations, and women’s organizations were among the most frequently mentioned. One-third of those involved in organizations were members of organizations exclusively open to immigrants; the remaining two-thirds were members of organizations open to every citizen.

### Table 1. (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focal Variables</th>
<th>Mean (SD)</th>
<th>Individual Efficacy</th>
<th>Collective Efficacy</th>
<th>National Identity</th>
<th>Ethnic Identity</th>
<th>Fear*</th>
<th>Anger*</th>
<th>Membership of Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation in collective action</td>
<td>.88 (1.30)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grievances</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distributive unfairness individual</td>
<td>3.09 (.87)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural unfairness individual</td>
<td>2.94 (.76)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distributive unfairness group</td>
<td>2.87 (.83)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural unfairness group</td>
<td>3.02 (.57)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political cynicism</td>
<td>3.31 (.74)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual efficacy</td>
<td>3.26 (.91)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective efficacy</td>
<td>3.83 (.69)</td>
<td>.22*</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National identity</td>
<td>2.74 (.81)</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic identity</td>
<td>4.00 (.71)</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear*</td>
<td>1.90 (.91)</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger*</td>
<td>2.94 (1.28)</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.30*</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Embeddedness</td>
<td>1.25 (1.38)</td>
<td>.21*</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>.32*</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “Participation in collective action” and “Social embeddedness” are on a scale from 0 to 10; all others are on a scale from 1 = low to 5 = high.

*55 < n < 58; all others 302 < n < 306.

* p < .05 (two-tailed tests).
vant. We therefore restrict ourselves to that judgment. Not incidentally, this is the only fairness judgment related to anger (Pearson r = .33). Political cynicism is not correlated with collective action participation. Fairness judgments, however, suppress the correlation between political cynicism and action participation. Net of fairness judgments, political cynicism correlates negatively with action participation; that is, a high level of cynicism reduces protest participation.

**Efficacy.** Of the two efficacy measures, only individual efficacy significantly correlates with protest participation (Pearson r = .25). The more effective people felt, the more they had participated in collective action in the past year. As the zero order correlation of collective efficacy with collective action participation is not significant and no suppressor effects were found, we did not include it in further analyses.

**Identity.** Ethnic identity, rather than national identity, is related to protest participation, albeit modestly (Pearson r = –.13). This negative correlation implies that respondents who identified more with their ethnic group had participated less in collective action. We also checked whether immigrants with a dual identity are more or less likely to take part in collective action, but we found no such relationship.

**Emotions.** Although fear is more strongly related to perceived unfairness than is anger, anger rather than fear is related to action participation (Pearson r = .48). The more angry immigrants were about unfair treatment because of their religious or ethnic background, the more likely they were to have participated in collective action. This is in line with our predictions.

**Social Embeddedness.** Membership in civil society organizations is related to collective action participation (Pearson r = .37). Respondents who were not members of a civil society organization had a 25 percent likelihood of taking part in any collective action over the past year, compared with over 50 percent for members of at least one civil society organization and over 60 percent for members of exclusively ethnic organizations. Participants in protest activities were involved in all kinds of organizations, particularly cultural, educational, and women’s organizations. As membership in an exclusively ethnic organization appears to raise action participation, we created a dummy variable to differentiate between people who were affiliated with exclusive organizations and those who were not.

**Multivariate Analyses**

**Regression Analysis.** As the three samples differ in some aspects, we entered two dummies into our regression equations: Moroccans versus Turks and Netherlanders versus New Yorkers. We also include gender, age, education, and length of stay in the country of residence as control variables (see Table 3). Because the questions on emotions were administered only to a subsample of the New York sample, we report the analyses involving emotions separately.

Gender, age, and length of stay do not have an effect, but education does: people with higher levels of education participated more frequently in collective action. Adjusting for these characteristics, we found that Turkish respondents in Amsterdam and New York participated in collective action more frequently than did other respondents. Net of these control variables, the focal variables account for 20 percent of the variance in action participation.

Perceived unfairness is one of the stronger predictors of action participation. The more unfairly and disrespectfully immigrants felt they were treated by the government of their country of residence, the more they participated in collective action. When perceived unfairness is entered into the equation, the partial correlation of political cynicism increases from –.04 to –.17. In the next step, when political cynicism is entered into the equation, the regression coefficient of perceived unfairness increases from .21 to .31. These fluctuations are due to the fact that the direct effect of cynicism on action par-
The unique contribution to the variance explained by feelings of individual efficacy amounts to 3 percent. This effect is in line with our predictions: immigrants who felt they could have political influence were more likely to participate in collective action. Ethnic identity accounts for a small but significant proportion of the variance explained in action participation. The more immigrants identified with their ethnic group, the less they participated in collective action. Neither national identity nor dual identity adds significantly to the variance explained.

Social embeddedness does add considerably to the variance explained. When entered into the equation in the final step of the analysis, participation in civil society organizations in general and participation in exclusively ethnic organizations combined add 11 percent to the variance explained in action participation. This relationship is in line with our predictions: the more immigrants are involved in civil society, the more they participate in collective action.

The unique contribution to the variance explained by feelings of individual efficacy amounts to 3 percent. This effect is in line with our predictions: immigrants who felt they could have political influence were more likely to participate in collective action. Ethnic identity accounts for a small but significant proportion of the variance explained in action participation. The more immigrants identified with their ethnic group, the less they participated in collective action. Neither national identity nor dual identity adds significantly to the variance explained.

Table 3. Regression of Collective Action Participation* on Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan (1) vs. Turkish (2)</td>
<td>.259</td>
<td>.147†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (1) vs. New York (2)</td>
<td>.394</td>
<td>.174*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (0 = f; 1 = m)</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td>.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of education</td>
<td>.151</td>
<td>.035***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of stay</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grievance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural fairness individual</td>
<td>.247</td>
<td>.066***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political cynicism</td>
<td>–.148</td>
<td>.062*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual efficacy</td>
<td>.175</td>
<td>.060**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification</td>
<td>–.106</td>
<td>.054*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Embeddedness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership of organizations</td>
<td>.248</td>
<td>.061***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive organizations (dummy)</td>
<td>.177</td>
<td>.060**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
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<tr>
<td>R² change</td>
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<td>.26***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>279</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Natural logarithm of collective action participation; all variables are standardized, except for control variables.
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; † p < .10 (two-tailed tests).
.281, while that of participation in ethnic organizations increases from .082 to .128. Taken together, these findings suggest a mediating or moderating role of social embeddedness—regarding membership in both cross-ethnic and ethnic organizations.

**Structural equation modeling.** The regression analyses already suggest some mediating or moderating relations. Using structural equation modeling (SEM), we further investigated the relations between our focal variables. Figure 1 depicts the model that fits the data best (Chi-square = 10.348, df = 8, $p = .241$; CFI = .985; NFI = .942; RMSEA = .031).9

The model groups the five factors involved in the analyses into two clusters; each cluster builds on a tight reciprocal relationship between two factors: efficacy and embeddedness on the one side and political cynicism and procedural unfairness on the other side. Models with reversed variable orders within these pairs fit equally well. The direct links of these four factors with collective action participation corroborate the fundamental theoretical principles of collective action incorporated into our predictions. Immigrants in our sample were more likely to have participated in collective action when they were more aggrieved but less cynical, felt more efficacious, and were embedded in civil society. Through its relationship to procedural unfairness, ethnic identity is linked to the grievance cluster. The two clusters are fairly independent of each other, as indicated by the pattern of correlations between the two groups of variables.10

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9 We tested two alternative models: one model with only direct relations and another model in which efficacy and political cynicism were switched. Both models are clearly inferior to the model in Figure 1 (Chi-square = 106.560, df = 10, $p < .001$; CFI = .387; NFI = .403; RMSEA = .178 and Chi-square = 94.835, df = 8, $p < .001$; CFI = .449; NFI = .469; RMSEA = .189, respectively). The differences between the focal model and these two models are highly significant (Chi-square = 96.212, df = 2, $p < .001$ and Chi-square = 84.487, df = 0, $p < .001$).

10 Efficacy correlates with cynicism, fairness, ethnic identity, and dual identity at .05, .07, –.06, and .05, respectively; social embeddedness at –.09, .04, –.01, and .01, respectively. This is further confirmed by a factor analysis that generated two factors of comparable strength (31 and 24 percent, respectively): a “griev-

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11 Moderators and mediators. Social embeddedness moderates the link between perceived unfairness and collective action. Immigrants who participated in collective action felt they were treated unfairly and were embedded in civil society (see Figure 2, panel a). Among respondents who were not embedded in social networks, the correlation between perceived unfairness and action participation is .04 (n.s.); for those who were involved in cross-ethnic networks, the same correlation is .18 ($p = .05$); and among those who were involved in exclusively ethnic organizations, the correlation is .33 ($p < .01$).

Both indirect relations in the embeddedness cluster—efficacy via embeddedness and embeddedness via efficacy—are significant (Sobel $z = 3.11$, $p < .001$ and Sobel $z = 2.47$, $p < .05$, respectively). Mediation analysis reveals that the regression coefficient of efficacy reduces from .25 to .18 when social embeddedness is entered into the equation, while that of embeddedness reduces from .37 to .33 when efficacy is entered into the equation. Embeddedness also moderates the impact of efficacy on action participation. Among immigrants who were not embedded in civic organizations, efficacy correlates at .09 (n.s.) with collective action participation; among those who were embedded in cross-ethnic organizations, the efficacy correlation is .28, $p = .002$; and among those who were embedded in exclusively ethnic organizations, the efficacy correlation is .40, $p = .001$. As a result, we find the highest level of participation among members of ethnic organizations who felt efficacious (see Figure 2, panel b).

In our introduction, we referred to McClurg’s (2003) suggestion that embeddedness in social networks influences political participation when people discuss politics with others in their social networks. While they are discussing politics, people learn about the workings of political processes. Indeed, this is what our data seem to tell us. Discussing politics with other people appears to primarily reinforce feelings of efficacy (Pearson $r = .46$),11 especially if these dis-
cussions take place within exclusively ethnic networks (Pearson r = .66).

Within the grievance cluster, we see significant indirect links between political cynicism and fairness judgments on the one hand, and action participation on the other (Sobel z = 2.88, p < .01 for the fairness to cynicism path; Sobel z = 4.00, p < .001 for the cynicism to fairness path). As already mentioned, the direct and indirect paths work in opposite directions: the regression coefficients of each variable increase when the other is entered into the equation (from −.06 to −.20 in the case of political cynicism, and from .19 to .29 in the case of fairness judgments). The opposite paths are also suggested by the correlations between cynicism and action participation for people high and low on unfairness (−.20 and −.04, respectively), and the correlation between fairness judgments and action participation for people high and low on cynicism (.26 and .15, respectively). As a result, among immigrants who were cynical about politics, we find both the least politically active and the most politically active. The least politically active combine political cynicism with the feeling that they are treated fairly; the most politically active combine cynicism with the feeling that they are treated unfairly. Among immigrants who are low on political cynicism, fairness judgments had no effect (see Figure 2, panel c).

SEM reveals an indirect link only between ethnic identity and participation via perceived unfairness (Sobel z = 2.22, p < .05). We find similar patterns for national, ethnic, and dual identity. National identity, ethnic identity, and dual identity are all negatively correlated to fairness judgments (−.22, −.18, and −.17, respectively). A stronger identity, be it national, ethnic, or dual, comes with less perceived unfairness and, as discussed, less perceived unfairness goes with less action participation. As hypothesized, dual identity moderates the relationship between fairness judgments and action participation. We find a positive relationship between perceived unfairness and participation only among immigrants who display a dual identity (Pearson r = .23, p < .01 among those who display a dual identity versus Pearson r = .09, n.s. among those who do not; see Figure 2, panel d). When respondents who felt treated unfairly displayed a dual identity, they were more likely to engage in collective action than were people who felt treated unfairly but did not
Figure 2. Collective Action Participation as a Function of Embeddedness, Unfairness, and Dual Identity
display a dual identity. We find no such effects for national or ethnic identity.

**EMOTIONS.** Table 4 presents the results of two regression analyses conducted to assess the impact of emotions on collective action participation. Model 1 is similar to that presented in Table 3 but with a smaller number of cases. The results are similar to what we found in the full sample. Model 2 adds anger as a variable. It is important to note that anger adds significantly to the variance explained, but at the expense of the other variables in the equation. This suggests that anger acts both as an independent factor and as an amplifier of the other factors. Interestingly, the influence of ethnic identity remains unchanged. Indeed, taken separately, ethnic identity and anger combine to strongly motivate collective action participation (Adj. $R^2 = .31$).

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS**

Grievances, efficacy, identity, embeddedness, and emotions—the factors we extracted as meaningful from the literature on collective action—all add to our explanatory power when it comes to action participation among immigrants. In addition, we observed moderator and mediator effects that qualify these relationships. Aggrieved immigrants participated in collective action, provided that they displayed a dual identity and were embedded in social networks, particularly ethnic social networks. Immigrants who were cynical about politics tended to not participate in collective action unless they were aggrieved. Immigrants who felt efficacious were more likely to participate in collective action provided that they were embedded in social networks, especially ethnic networks. Such networks undoubtedly provided an opportunity to discuss and learn about politics. Immigrants who felt discriminated against because of their ethnic background displayed anger if they felt politically efficacious; they displayed fear, in contrast, if they did not feel efficacious. Finally, immigrants who felt angry were more likely to participate in collective action.

Are these findings restricted to this specific sample of immigrants, or can they be generalized to other immigrants or even citizens in general? Given the increased distrust Muslim immigrants have endured from host populations since 9/11, our results may not be very representative of immigrants on the whole, let alone native citizens, as the risks immigrants

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**Table 4. Regression of Collective Action Participation$^a$ on Independent Variables Including Emotions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1 B</th>
<th>Model 1 SE B</th>
<th>Model 2 B</th>
<th>Model 2 SE B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender (0 = f; 1 = m)</td>
<td>.339</td>
<td>.309</td>
<td>.282</td>
<td>.290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of education</td>
<td>-.899</td>
<td>.723</td>
<td>-.825</td>
<td>.677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of stay</td>
<td>-.014</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>-.012</td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership in organizations</td>
<td>.422</td>
<td>.178*</td>
<td>.302</td>
<td>.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive organizations (dummy)</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>.127</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td>.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual efficacy</td>
<td>.308</td>
<td>.133*</td>
<td>.246</td>
<td>.126*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural fairness individual</td>
<td>.287</td>
<td>.177†</td>
<td>.196</td>
<td>.169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political cynicism</td>
<td>-.037</td>
<td>.166</td>
<td>-.066</td>
<td>.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic identity</td>
<td>-.298</td>
<td>.139*</td>
<td>-.323</td>
<td>.130*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.352</td>
<td>.132*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>.36***</td>
<td></td>
<td>.44****</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$ change</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.08**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N = 54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^a$ Natural logarithm of collective action participation; all variables are standardized, except for control variables.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; † $p < .10$ (two-tailed tests).
broker in engaging in collective action are higher. As for the observed direct effects of grievances, efficacy, embeddedness, identity, and emotions, these are not unique for this sample, but the indirect effects might be more specific for immigrants. The moderating and mediating roles of embeddedness and dual identity, however, might also be less exceptional than they appear. People who engage in protest are always embedded in groups they identify with. Therefore, one can imagine that efficacy, embeddedness, dual identity, and grievances interact in ways similar to those found in our studies, but more research is needed to test this assumption.

Our findings can be understood in terms of two clusters: a social embeddedness cluster that consists of feelings of efficacy and embeddedness in social networks, and a grievances cluster that consists of political cynicism, perceived unfairness, and identity. The social embeddedness cluster encompasses two main effects: the more efficacious immigrants feel and the more involved they are in civil society organizations, the more they participate in collective action. Embeddedness and efficacy display a tight reciprocal relationship: immigrants who feel more efficacious are also more embedded in social networks, and vice versa. At the same time, the link between efficacy and participation is moderated by social embeddedness. Efficacy translates into participation only among immigrants involved in civil society, especially those in exclusively ethnic networks. In addition, our findings support the assumption that discussions about politics make immigrants more aware of the workings of political processes, especially if these discussions take place within ethnic networks.

The grievances cluster encompasses two main effects as well: the more cynical immigrants are about politics, and the more fairly they perceive their treatment by the government of their country of residence, the less they participate in collective action. Cynicism appears to reduce action participation when people are not aggrieved. While perceived fairness does not make a great difference among immigrants who are not cynical about politics, those who are cynical are strongly influenced by fairness judgments. At the same time, political cynicism is associated with perceiving unfair treatment, which in turn reinforces action participation.

Cynicism thus both reduces and reinforces action participation, depending on whether it is accompanied by perceived unfairness. Moreover, perceived unfairness particularly influences political participation among immigrants who display a dual identity. We suggest two possible explanations for this finding. Immigrants who display a dual identity may expect to be treated in a fair and respectful manner because they have a stronger identification with the host nation. If they are disappointed in the government, they then react in a stronger fashion. Moreover, because of their national identification they may be more inclined to believe that collective action makes a difference.

As predicted, anger and not fear is related to participation in collective action, despite a stronger relationship between fear and fairness judgments. The more angry people are in response to unfair treatment related to their ethnic background, the more they take part in collective action. Our findings suggest that anger not only contributes to explaining participation through a separate emotion pathway, but it also functions as an amplifier in the instrumental and identity pathways. This corroborates Van Zomeren’s (2006) conclusion, based on a meta-analysis of studies on protest participation, that the affective component of grievances is especially powerful in fostering action participation. It is not enough to assess that one is treated unfairly, it is also important to have an affective reaction—specifically anger—to translate that assessment into action (see also Van Stekelenburg 2006). Feelings of efficacy play an important role in determining whether fear or anger is generated in response to maltreatment. In line with prior research (Mackie et al. 2000), efficacy is associated with immigrants displaying anger but not fear, while lack of efficacy is associated with fear but not anger. The expectation that one can effectively interfere seems to make the difference between anger and fear.

Grievances at the individual level about procedures reinforce action participation more than grievances about outcomes, consistent with findings reported by Tyler and Smith (1998). At the group level, however, we found the opposite pattern, although the differences are small. In addition, contrary to expectations based on relative deprivation theory (Major 1994; Martin 1986; Runciman 1966), the largest correlation
between fairness judgments and collective action participation is at the individual level, not the group level. A possible explanation for this finding lies in the role of emotions. As reported, procedural unfairness at the individual level is the only fairness judgment to have a high correlation with anger, while the other judgments correlate more strongly with fear. As discussed, research suggests that anger activates, while fear de-activates (Van Stekelenburg 2006; Van Zomeren 2006). This may explain why only procedural fairness at the individual level fosters collective action participation. The question remains, however, why, at the individual level, only procedural fairness correlates with anger and the other justice judgments correlate with fear. Future research would do well to explore the relation of the various justice judgments with fear and anger.

Before we discuss the implications of these results, it is important to point to the limitations of our study. One obvious limitation is that our sample is neither representative nor random. It is unclear, however, whether a sampling strategy other than the one we use would produce a better sample. Immigrants are notorious for failing to respond to surveys; low response rates might produce worse samples than those we obtained. The robustness of our findings is evidenced, however, by their replication in three independent samples, differentiating between two ethnicities and two countries. An additional limitation of the study is its correlational design, which makes tests of causality impossible. Indeed, feelings of efficacy, political cynicism, and social embeddedness may just as well emerge from past participation in collective action rather than the other way around. The mediating and moderating effects, however, retain their significance, and in our view, these effects make our findings especially interesting.

What are the more general sociological lessons we might draw from this particular analysis? First and foremost, we expect that immigrants will constitute some of the major protest movements of the future in many Western countries. Understanding the social psychological mechanisms behind these movements is of relevance both scientifically and politically. Second, we were able to replicate the findings of previous studies. This is important because these replications were realized in independent samples very different from those studied before. This underscores the robustness of our theoretical framework. Third, we were able to document the influence of embeddedness and efficacy as it was generated by discussions about politics in cross-ethnic and ethnic networks. Such discussions generate shared cognitions and shared grievances, strengthening feelings of efficacy and evoking anger. These effects materialized within cross-ethnic and exclusively ethnic organizations, more so in the latter than in the former. This is interesting because feelings of efficacy seem to control whether grievances generate fear or anger. This suggests that grievances generate fear or anger depending on whether they are discussed in people’s social networks and the characteristics of those networks. Fourth, we demonstrated the moderating influence of dual identity on the translation of grievances into collective action participation. Ethnic and national identity alone did not have such effects. This shows that protestors are not disloyal to the nation; on the contrary, it is precisely the combination of ethnic and national identities that stimulates the transformation of grievances into action. Finally, we demonstrated that integration into civil society—whether through ethnic or cross-ethnic networks—as reflected in embeddedness and dual identity, reinforces action participation. These aspects of integration create the preconditions for immigrants to turn discontent into action. Being able to act upon one’s grievances reinforces people’s dignity and strengthens their feelings of political efficacy (Drury et al. 2005). The centrality of embeddedness and dual identity underscores the role of social capital in collective action mobilization (Paxton 2002). The view of social capital as a resource that is mobilized in purposive action is akin to the central tenet of resource mobilization theory. However, there is little overlap in research on resource mobilization and social capital, perhaps because the resource mobilization literature primarily focuses on the structural component of embeddedness, while the social capital literature emphasizes its subjective component, that is, trust and loyalty. Nonetheless, our findings suggest that resource mobilization and social capital are closely related and that considerations of social embeddedness and dual identity may provide links to bring the two literatures together.

Immigrants, especially second and third generations, strive toward being treated in a respect-
ful manner rather than as second-class citizens. Our findings suggest there is little to gain by forcing immigrants to assimilate. Pressure to assimilate could produce the opposite effect: a strong ethnic identification and a failure to identify with the nation. Despite this, many Western countries continue to impose policies of assimilation on immigrant groups. At the same time, it is important to encourage national identification to avoid separation (Koopmans 2002, 2003). Our findings suggest that both assimilation and separation are associated with lower levels of satisfaction with one’s situation than is integration, although marginalization (i.e., neither ethnic nor national identity) is associated with the lowest levels. Leaving immigrants the space to display and cherish their ethnic identity, while at the same time giving them reasons to identify with the nation, might be the most desirable situation.

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