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How intragroup dynamics affect behavior in intergroup conflict: The role of group norms, prototypicality, and need to belong

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Abstract

This study explores the role of intragroup dynamics in intergroup conflict. In a computer-mediated negotiation experiment ($N = 107$), we investigated how a group representative's standing in the group, group norm, and the representative's need to belong influence behavior in intergroup negotiations. We hypothesized that the extent to which peripheral representatives adhere to group norms is contingent on their need to belong, whereas prototypical representatives behave in norm-congruent ways regardless of their need to belong. In support of this idea, results showed that prototypicals behaved more cooperatively when the group norm prescribed cooperation rather than competition. By contrast, peripherals only adhered to the group norm when they had a high need to belong. These findings suggest that peripherals only represent the interests of their group when doing so furthers their self-interest. We discuss implications for theorizing about prototypicality, social exclusion, and conformity to group norms.

Keywords

group norm, group processes, intergroup negotiation, need to belong, prototypicality, representative negotiation

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Intergroup conflict represents one of the most pressing social problems of our time. The newspapers are filled with accounts of intergroup conflicts that greatly affect the people involved. The most constructive way of dealing with such conflict is through negotiation, which can be defined as a discussion between two or more parties aimed at resolving a perceived divergence of interests (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Intergroup negotiations are typically conducted by *representatives* (Adams, 1976;

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Walton & McKersie, 1965)—negotiators who represent the interests of a group. One key factor that distinguishes intergroup negotiation from interpersonal negotiation is the fact that representatives in intergroup negotiation defend not just their own interests but also the interests of their constituent groups. Indeed, in a sense, the ‘eyes of the group are on them’.

This position of representing a group means that representatives’ behavior in intergroup negotiation may be influenced not only by their own dispositions and motivations, but also by intra-group dynamics. Little is known about how representatives navigate this complicated situation. In the present study we address this issue, developing an analysis of how group norms relevant to negotiation (i.e., putting a premium on a cooperative vs. a competitive stance) may shape representatives’ negotiation behavior depending on their own position within the group (i.e., whether they are central or peripheral to the group) and their dispositional need to belong (i.e., whether they have a stable desire to belong with others and to be included in groups).

Representative’s standing within the group: the role of prototypicality

Standing within the group is an important predictor of behavior in intergroup conflict. Particularly, group members vary in the extent to which they are prototypical of the group, that is, representative of what group members have in common and what differentiates the group from other groups. Some group members possess characteristics that are more prototypical of the group, and therefore can be considered more representative exemplars of the group than others (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Group members who strongly match group prototypes can be referred to as *prototypical* members. Individuals who are less prototypical examples of their group can be referred to as *peripheral* members. Among other things, differences in centrality have been shown to affect perceived identity security (e.g., Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997),

intergroup discrimination (Noel, Wann, & Branscombe, 1995), aggressive outgroup behavior (Short & Stroudbeck, 1974), and self-esteem (e.g., Jetten, Branscombe, & Spears, 2002; Moreland, 1985).

Because being part of certain groups is a crucial basis of one’s self-concept (see Hogg, 2003; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987), peripheral group members are often motivated to secure their group membership (e.g., Noel et al., 1995), especially when group membership is attractive (Van Kleef, Steinel, Van Knippenberg, Hogg, & Svensson, 2007). Group members that are not central to the group therefore appear to be highly responsive to the social context (Jetten et al., 2002). One possible consequence of this motivation that is particularly relevant in the context of intergroup conflict concerns contentious behavior toward the outgroup. Compared to group members with a central, secure position in their group, individuals with a marginal, insecure status in a desirable group are more likely to engage in outgroup derogation (Noel et al., 1995) and to approach outgroups in a competitive way (Hermann & Kogan, 1968; Van Kleef et al., 2007; Wall, 1975).

Although it is tempting to interpret these findings as evidence that peripheral group members are more prone to engage in competitive behavior toward outgroups than are prototypical group members, this conclusion would be premature. Prior research has often focused on the behavior of group representatives in the presence of competitive goals. That is, representatives were either explicitly instructed to further the interests of their own group (e.g., Vidmar, 1971); had good reason to assume that competition was the norm, for example, when competing was the only way to secure favorable outcomes for the group (e.g., Benton & Druckman, 1974; Klimoski, 1972), or when competitive incentives were more salient than cooperative ones (e.g., Steinel, De Dreu, Ouwehand, & Ramirez-Marin, 2009). Furthermore, without explicit information about constituent expectations, peripheral negotiators tend to assume that their constituents favor a competitive

approach (Holmes & Lamm, 1979; Van Kleef et al., 2007).

In the current article, we integrate literature on the behavior of peripheral and prototypical group members in intergroup settings, the role of norms as defining characteristics of one's ingroup, and individual differences in the motivation to maintain relationships and propose an alternative explanation for the effect of group member prototypicality on competition in intergroup negotiation (e.g., Noel et al., 1995; Van Kleef et al., 2007): Peripheral group members behaved more competitively than prototypical group members in earlier studies because the desire to be a valued part of the group motivated them to exhibit norm-congruent behavior (and competition was the implicit norm). Next we review relevant literature on prototypicality, norms, and need to belong to derive specific predictions about the interactive effects of these variables on behavior in intergroup negotiation.

Prototypicality and behavior in intergroup settings

Several studies suggest that peripherals are highly sensitive to contextual cues that inform effective strategies aimed at improving their status in the group. For instance, Noel et al. (1995) found that peripherals displayed high levels of ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation only when doing so could improve their position within the group (i.e., under public conditions). Likewise, Van Kleef et al. (2007) found that, compared to prototypicals, peripherals negotiated more competitively with an outgroup when they were held accountable for their behavior and when group membership was attractive, but not when they were not accountable or group membership was less attractive. Similarly, Jetten, Branscombe, Spears, and McKimmie (2003) found that low-identifying peripheral group members were less loyal when they anticipated rejection by the group than when they anticipated acceptance. This finding suggests that peripherals' tendency to behave in a group-serving way depends on their identification with the group and on their

expectation that serving the group can provide them with a desirable outcome, such as acceptance by the group.

These studies thus suggest that peripherals adapt their behavior in order to enhance their position within their group, depending on their desire to be accepted by their group. In doing so, they are especially sensitive to contextual information that determines the effectiveness of their behavior in terms of securing group membership. Besides exhibiting ingroup favoritism and/or outgroup derogation (see Noel et al., 1995), an additional way in which peripheral group members may improve their position within the group is by stressing characteristics that they share with the ingroup prototype (Schmitt & Branscombe, 2001). The more group members embody the core values of the group, the more prototypical they are of that group. Thus, publicly endorsing group norms should be an effective way for peripheral group members to enhance their position within the group. Preliminary support for this idea comes from a study by Jetten, Hornsey, and Adarves-Yorno (2006), who found that peripheral group members strategically tailored self-reports of conformity to the social context, expressing more conformity when their responses were made public to an ingroup audience than when they were not. These findings support our view that peripherals in earlier studies behaved more competitively toward the outgroup than prototypicals because of their motivation to endorse group norms, and group norms implicitly or explicitly prescribe competition in many situations of intergroup conflict (Benton & Druckman, 1974; Druckman, 1994; Van Kleef et al., 2007).

Prototypicality and norm-congruent behavior

Norms are social regularities that are bounded by group memberships and describe behavior that defines group membership (Turner, 1991). From a social identity perspective, group norms are viewed as reflecting what defines the group (Hogg, 2001; Hogg & Turner, 1987; Turner et al., 1987; Van Knippenberg, 2000). Because the

norms that a group embodies are an important characteristic of the group, people can demonstrate their group membership by adhering to the group's norms. The research discussed above (e.g., Noel et al., 1995; Van Kleef et al., 2007) is consistent with the idea that people can assert their group membership through group-normative behavior: Defending the interests of one's own group by trying to achieve good outcomes and by derogating the outgroup may be seen as group-normative behavior in many conflict situations (Druckman, 1994; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Van Kleef et al., 2007).

Under some circumstances, however, groups may not appreciate competitive behavior of their representatives. For instance, in negotiations between groups who share a history of cooperation (like stores specializing in a brand article and the manufacturer of this brand), competitive behavior may be inappropriate. When a group values cooperation, outgroup competition is likely to be less appreciated. Indeed, several studies showed that representatives became relatively cooperative and lenient in their negotiation behavior when they believed that their constituency favored a cooperative approach towards the outgroup (Enzle, Harvey, & Wright, 1992; Gelfand & Realo, 1999; Gruder & Rosen, 1971; Steinel et al., 2009).

If a group favors cooperation rather than competition, the motivation to assert membership by adhering to group norms should produce cooperative rather than competitive behavior. Therefore, rather than engaging in blind competition or outgroup derogation, peripheral group members should engage in behaviors that they think are valued by the group. If the group values competition, they should compete, but if the group values cooperation, they should cooperate in order to make a favorable impression on their fellow group members and enhance their position within the group.

This is not to say that prototypical group representatives would not be sensitive to group norms. On the contrary, being prototypical of a group leads to self-definition in terms of the group membership (Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997) and thus to internalization of group norms

(Turner et al., 1987). Therefore, prototypical representatives' negotiation behavior, too, is likely to be shaped by group norms. Importantly, however, in contrast to prototypical representatives' norm-congruent negotiation behavior, the extent to which peripheral members' negotiation behavior is norm-congruent is likely to be more variable. Only to the extent that peripheral members are motivated to be accepted by the group will they be motivated to engage in norm-congruent behavior as a means to assert their group belongingness.

The role of need to belong

Capturing this moderating influence of the motivation to be accepted on the link between group norm and negotiation behavior allows us to further develop and extend our understanding of the motivational differences underlying the negotiation behavior of prototypical and peripheral group members. To do so, we rely on research by Baumeister and Leary (1995) that suggests that there are stable individual differences in the 'need to belong'. According to these authors, the 'desire for interpersonal attachments—the need to belong—is a fundamental human motivation' (p. 520). The need to belong makes people strive to build and maintain relationships with others. A strong need to belong can motivate people to exhibit group-serving behaviors. For example, De Cremer and Leonardelli (2003) showed that people with a high dispositional need to belong focused more on the collective interest of the group in large-group social dilemmas.

Extending these insights to the issue of prototypicality and norm-congruent behavior, we propose that dispositional differences in the need to belong shape peripheral group members' motivation to be accepted by the group, and thereby their adherence to group norms and concomitant negotiation behavior. That is, a peripheral position within the group may engender a motivation to assert group belongingness, but we propose it does so more strongly the stronger peripheral group members' need to belong. As a consequence, peripheral representatives' negotiation

behavior will also be informed by group norms to the extent that they have a high need to belong. That is, we propose that whereas prototypical representatives' negotiation behavior is group norm-congruent irrespective of their need to belong—their group belongingness is assured by their prototypical position—peripheral representatives' negotiation behavior is more norm-congruent the higher their dispositional need to belong.

Present study and hypotheses

Summarizing this analysis, our model is depicted in Figure 1. It posits that prototypicality predicts the motivation to be accepted by the group depending on the dispositional need to belong. Specifically, compared to prototypical members (who are already central to the group), peripheral members should have a stronger motivation to be accepted by their group to the degree that their dispositional need to belong is higher (*Hypothesis 1*). The representatives' motivation to be accepted by the group in turn predicts norm-congruent negotiation behavior. Specifically, to the extent that representatives have a stronger motivation to be accepted by the group, they should be more likely to behave in accordance with the group norm, behaving cooperatively when the group norm prescribes cooperation and competitively when it prescribes competition (*Hypothesis 2*).

In conjunction, these arguments lead to the prediction that the extent to which peripheral representatives behave in accordance with competitive or cooperative group norms is contingent on their need to belong, whereas prototypical representatives endorse the norm regardless of their need to belong. Thus, we hypothesize that the higher peripheral negotiators' need to belong, the more cooperatively they behave toward the outgroup representative when a cooperative norm is in place, and the more competitively they behave when a competitive norm is in place, whereas prototypical negotiators show cooperation or competition according to the group norm irrespective of their need to belong (*Hypothesis 3*).

Method

We used an adapted version of an established experimental set-up in which all participants were assigned to the role of group representative in an intergroup negotiation (cf. Van Kleef et al., 2007). Prototypicality was manipulated through bogus feedback on a personality test that supposedly divided the participants into two groups. Group norm was manipulated through instructions that groups composed of individuals with this specific personality characteristic value either cooperation or competition. To avoid confusing the status of being peripheral with being in a minority, we used two different group compositions: groups that consisted of one peripheral and three prototypical members and groups that consisted of two peripheral and two prototypical members. This counterbalancing factor had no effect and will therefore not be discussed further.

Participants and experimental design

A total of 107 undergraduate students (38 males and 69 females, average age $M = 23.10$ years, $SD = 5.72$) at the University of Queensland participated in the study and received course credit. The design included group norm (cooperative vs. competitive) and participants' prototypicality (prototypical vs.

Figure 1. Theoretical model.

peripheral) as between-participants variables, and competitiveness of demands as the central dependent variable. Furthermore, dispositional need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) was measured at the onset of the experiment using a validated scale developed by Leary, Kelly, Cottrell, and Schreindorfer (2001) and added as a continuous variable to the design. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions, and the experimenter was blind to this assignment.

Procedure and manipulations of independent variables

The procedure was similar to that used by Van Kleef et al. (2007). About six to eight participants came to the laboratory in each session. They were instructed that they would be working in groups in two parts of the experiment. First they would use the computer to complete tasks and communicate with their fellow group members, and next they would join their group to work together. Participants were seated in separate cubicles, and were introduced to the computerized part of the experiment. All following instructions were presented on the screen.

Participants read that they would be divided into two groups on the basis of their personality in order to investigate the effect of personality on group decision-making. Subsequently, participants completed a so-called 'personality questionnaire', which was used to manipulate prototypicality (see Noel et al., 1995; Van Kleef et al., 2007) and group norm. Upon completion of the questionnaire, participants were told that their group task would be to design three advertisement posters, which would be awarded a certain number of points, and that the groups would compete against each other for a reward. Participants learned that randomly selected representatives of the two groups would negotiate the reward system, determining how many points each group would get for each poster, and that it was important to obtain as many points as possible, as the members of the group that obtained most points would win a lunch voucher. Participants were then assigned the role of group representative, and engaged in negotiations with

a (computer-simulated) representative of the outgroup.

Manipulation of prototypicality We used a manipulation of prototypicality that has been successfully employed before (De Cremer, 2002; Noel et al., 1995; Van Kleef et al., 2007), providing participants with bogus feedback on a 'personality questionnaire'. Participants were told that the questionnaire assessed the so-called 'O-type/P-type personality'. Examples of items are 'I feel uncomfortable when someone's meaning or intention is unclear to me' and 'When trying to solve a problem I often see so many possible options that it's confusing.' Participants read that O-type and P-type persons differ in a number of respects, such as that they tend to think in different ways and come up with different solutions to creative problems.

They then learned that their responses on the questionnaire would not only reveal whether they were an O-type or a P-type person, but also how characteristic they were of their group. The computer would characterize each participant as a typical, a moderate, or a peripheral member of the respective personality group. Participants then saw a graphical representation of the O/P continuum (Figure 2). Their own participant number and three numbers ostensibly referring to other participants who were also classified as P-types were plotted on the graph. This indicated how well participants fit into their group. In the *prototypical [peripheral]* group member conditions, their number was plotted in the 'typical P-type' [*peripheral P-type*] box of the figure. Furthermore, participants in the *prototypical [peripheral]* group member condition received the following information:

Your test score is 63 [43]. As you can see, this score places you *at the core of [just inside]* the type-P category. You are a *typical [peripheral]* P-type. This means that had you responded somewhat differently to one or two of the questionnaire items, you would *still [not]* have been classified as a type-P person. *Not only do [Although]* you have more in common with other type-P persons than with type-O persons, you are

Figure 2. The O-type/P-type continuum.

actually a near perfect example of a type-P person [not very characteristic of the type-P group]. Because you are a typical P-person [Although you are a peripheral P-person], it is [still] nicer for you to be in the P-group than in the O-group.

This latter sentence was added to make sure that peripheral participants, too, would still feel they belonged more to the P-group (ingroup) than to the O-group (outgroup).

Manipulation of group norm In the cooperative group norm condition, participants read that P-type persons usually try to achieve the best outcomes for their group by approaching other groups in a cooperative, constructive way. In the competitive group norm condition, participants were told that P-type persons usually try to achieve the best outcomes for their group by focusing on their own group's benefits when dealing with other groups.

Negotiation task The computer ostensibly selected the representatives of the two groups at random. All participants were told that they would act as representative of the P-group and that they would negotiate with the representative of the O-group via the computer network. We used the negotiation task employed by Van Kleef et al. (2007), that was based on tasks developed by Hilty and Carnevale (1993) and De Dreu and Van Lange (1995; see De Dreu, Beersma, Steinel, & Van Kleef, 2007). The task captures the main characteristics of real-life negotiation (i.e., multiple issues differing in utility to the negotiator, information about one's own payoffs only, and the typical

offer-counteroffer sequence). Participants saw a payoff chart showing how many points their group could earn with each poster. They were told that their objective was to earn as many points as possible for their group. For each campaign, negotiators had to agree on one out of nine possible deals. An agreement on level 1 would yield most points to the participants; higher levels would yield consistently fewer points, and level 9 would yield 0 points (see Van Kleef et al., 2007, for details). The corresponding payoff table for the O-group was not displayed, and participants were told only that it differed from their own. Some seconds later, participants could enter a first offer, and were instructed that the negotiation would continue until an agreement was reached or until time ran out. About 30 seconds later, a preprogrammed counteroffer appeared, and it was the participant's turn to enter a counteroffer again. The counteroffers in the six rounds were 8-7-8, 8-7-7, 8-6-7, 7-6-7, 7-6-6 and 6-6-6. Following previous research, negotiations were interrupted after round six (e.g., De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Hilty & Carnevale, 1993) to guarantee that a possible agreement could not influence any subsequent dependent measures.¹

Measures

Need to belong was assessed with the scale by Leary et al. (2001). Participants rated ten statements (e.g., 'It bothers me a great deal when I am not included in other people's plans', and 'I have a strong need to belong') on 5-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The individual items were summed so that higher scores indicate a higher need to belong.

The dependent measures were competitiveness of demands (dependent variable), motivation to be accepted (mediator), and manipulation checks. Participants' demands (in points according to the payoff schedule) for each poster campaign in each of the six rounds of negotiation were averaged into an index of the negotiator's *average demands* (see De Dreu, Carnevale, Emans, & Van De Vliert, 1994; Steinel et al., 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2007), with higher scores indicating greater competitiveness.

After the negotiation, motivation to be accepted was measured with two items: 'How important is it for you that your group accepts you?' and 'How concerned are you that you won't be accepted by your group members?' (1 = not very important, 9 = very important). We used nine statements (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree) to check the group norm manipulation. Five statements related to cooperation (e.g., "The P-group would value their representative to be cooperative with other groups") were averaged into a composite score of *perceived cooperative norm*. Four statements related to competition (e.g., "To please the P-group, their negotiator should make tough offers to the other group") were averaged into a composite score of *perceived competitive norm*. To check our manipulation of prototypicality, we asked participants to indicate their position on the O/P-continuum (Figure 2). Participants received course credit for participation, were debriefed and thanked.

Results

Descriptive statistics, treatment of the data and analyses

Table 1 displays the means, standard deviations and intercorrelations of the dependent variables and manipulations. Gender and age had no effects (all $ps > .25$) and were excluded from the analyses. We dummy coded prototypicality and group norm (0 = peripheral, 1 = prototypical; 0 = cooperative, 1 = competitive) and centered need to belong. Unless otherwise reported, we used regression analyses, following the procedures described by Aiken and West (1991). We entered the main effects in Step 1 and the two-way interactions in Step 2. Where applicable, the cross-product of all three variables was used to predict the dependent measure in Step 3.

Manipulation checks

All participants answered the manipulation check for prototypicality correctly. Regression analysis involving perceived cooperative group norm as the dependent variable and group norm, prototypicality, and need to belong as predictors revealed only a main effect of group norm ($B = -0.895$, $SE = 0.227$, $t[103] = -3.95$, $p < .001$). A follow-up t test showed that participants perceived the norm to be more cooperative in the cooperative condition ($M = 6.39$, $SD = 1.04$) than in the competitive condition ($M = 5.47$, $SD = 1.27$;

Table 1. Means, standard deviations and intercorrelations of the variables

Measure	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Motivation to be accepted	5.08	1.83	.73 ^a						
2. Need to belong	32.78	6.31	.21*	.75 ^a					
3. Demand level	572.33	89.41	.01	.16	—				
4. Perceived cooperative norm	5.92	1.25	.09	-.05	-.27**	.79 ^a			
5. Perceived competitive norm	6.40	1.50	.06	.01	.28**	-.21*	.82 ^a		
6. Typicality	—	—	.03	.17	.11	.15	.09	—	
7. Group norm	—	—	.04	.11	.34***	-.37***	.40***	-.05	—

Note: $N = 107$. Prototypicality was dummy-coded 0 for peripheral and 1 for prototypical; group norm was dummy-coded 0 for cooperative and 1 for competitive.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

^aCronbach's alpha.

$t[105] = 4.08, p < .001$). Similar results emerged for perceived competitive group norm. Again, the only significant predictor in a multiple regression analysis was group norm ($B = 1.242, SE = 0.269, t[103] = 4.62, p < .001$). Participants perceived the norm to be more competitive in the competitive condition ($M = 6.99, SD = 1.26$) than in the cooperative condition ($M = 5.78, SD = 1.49; t[105] = -4.53, p < .001$). Our manipulation of group norm was thus successful.

Hypothesis 1: Two-way interaction of prototypicality and need to belong on the motivation to be accepted

The overall model, regressing the motivation to be accepted on prototypicality, need to belong, and their interaction, was significant ($F[3, 103] = 4.15, p = .008$; overall $R^2 = .11$). The motivation to be accepted was predicted by need to belong ($B = 0.136, SE = 0.039, t[103] = 3.50, p = .001$) and, in line with Hypothesis 1, by the interaction between prototypicality and need to belong ($B = -0.147, SE = 0.055, t[103] = -2.69, p = .008$). Simple slope analysis (see Aiken & West, 1991) showed that peripheral representatives were more motivated to be accepted by the group when they had a high rather than a low need to belong ($B = 0.136, SE = 0.039, t[103] = 3.50, p < .001$), whereas prototypical representatives' motivation to be accepted by the group was not contingent upon their need to belong ($B = -0.011, SE = 0.039, t[103] = -.29, ns$).

Hypothesis 2: Two-way interaction of motivation to be accepted and group norm on competitiveness

The overall model, regressing competitiveness on motivation to be accepted (centered), group norm, and their interaction, was significant ($F[3, 103] = 6.26, p = .001$; overall $R^2 = .15$). Competitiveness was predicted by the group norm ($B = 60.352, SE = 16.150, t[103] = 3.74, p < .001$) and, in line with Hypothesis 2, by the interaction between the

motivation to be accepted and group norm ($B = 20.461, SE = 9.143, t[103] = 2.24, p = .027$). Simple slope tests revealed that participants with a high motivation to be accepted made more cooperative demands when there was a cooperative group norm than when there was a competitive group norm ($B = 97.854, SE = 23.415, t[103] = 4.18, p < .001$), whereas participants with a low motivation to be accepted were unaffected by the group norm ($B = 22.851, SE = 23.130, t[103] = .99, ns$).

Hypothesis 3: Three-way interaction of prototypicality, need to belong, and group norm on competitiveness

The overall model, regressing competitiveness on prototypicality, need to belong, group norm, and their two- and three-way interactions, was significant, $F(7, 99) = 4.58, p < .001$ (see Table 2 for regression coefficients of all effects). As predicted under Hypothesis 3, the three-way interaction between prototypicality, need to belong, and group norm significantly predicted competitiveness. We probed the three-way interaction using the procedure described by Aiken and West (1991). This showed that prototypical group members acted according to the group norm, making more competitive demands under a competitive norm than under a cooperative norm ($B = 96.178, SE = 22.478, t[99] = 4.28, p < .001$; see Figure 3a). As anticipated, this effect was not moderated by need to belong ($B = -1.474, SE = 3.571, t[99] = -0.41, ns$). By contrast, and also in line with predictions, for peripheral group members the effect of group norm was moderated by need to belong ($B = 10.492, SE = 3.951, t[99] = 2.66, p = .009$; see Figure 3b). Simple slope analysis revealed that peripherals with a high need to belong behaved in accordance with the group norm, adopting a more competitive stance when the group norm prescribed competition rather than cooperation, $B = 103.452, SE = 37.881, t(99) = 2.73, p < .007$. Peripherals with a low need to belong, however, were not significantly influenced by the group norm, $B = -28.927, SE = 29.282, t(99) = -.99, ns$.

Table 2. Hierarchical regression analyses on competitiveness (Hypothesis 3)

	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>
<i>Step 1</i> Main Effects			
Prototypicality	19.710	16.512	1.19
Need to Belong	1.577	1.321	1.19
Group Norm	58.670	16.379	3.58**
Contribution to R^2	.14**		
<i>Step 2</i> Two-way Interactions			
Prototypicality	-11.297	17.218	-.48
Need to Belong	0.419	2.650	.16
Group Norm	27.607	22.955	1.20
Prototypicality $\times$ Need to Belong	-2.370	2.622	-.90
Prototypicality $\times$ Group Norm	63.048	32.096	1.93 [†]
Need to Belong $\times$ Group Norm	3.906	2.702	1.45
Contribution to R^2	.07*		
<i>Step 3</i> Three-way Interaction			
Prototypicality	-3.569	23.303	-.15
Need to Belong	-4.251	3.327	-1.28
Group Norm	37.262	22.911	1.63
Prototypicality $\times$ Need to Belong	5.177	4.230	1.22
Prototypicality $\times$ Group Norm	58.916	32.096	1.84 [†]
Need to Belong $\times$ Group Norm	10.492	3.951	2.66**
Prototypicality $\times$ Need to Belong $\times$ Group Norm	-11.966	5.326	-2.25*
Contribution to R^2	.04*		
Overall R^2	.25**		

Notes. N = 107. Prototypicality was dummy-coded 0 for peripheral and 1 for prototypical; group norm was dummy-coded 0 for cooperative and 1 for competitive. Unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors are reported. [†] $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.

Figure 3a. Competitiveness of prototypical group members as a function of group norm and need to belong.

Figure 3b. Competitiveness of peripheral group members as a function of group norm and need to belong.

Mediation analysis

So far, we have demonstrated that: (1) the interaction between prototypicality and need to belong predicts the motivation to be accepted (Hypothesis 1); (2) the interaction between the motivation to be accepted and group norm predicts competitiveness (Hypothesis 2); and (3) the interaction between prototypicality, group norm, and need to belong predicts competitiveness (Hypothesis 3). Our theoretical model suggests that the motivation to be accepted is the explanatory mechanism behind the effects of prototypicality, group norm, and need to belong on competitiveness. To explore this, we followed the procedure suggested by MacKinnon, Fairchild and Fritz (2007; cf. MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002; Shrout & Bolger, 2002) which tests the strength of the indirect path between the predictor and the criterion. This procedure takes into account that we did not find nor expect an interaction between prototypicality and need to belong on competitiveness (because this effect is qualified by group norm), and that we did not find nor expect simple mediation by motivation to be accepted (because this effect depends on group norm, see Figure 1). The first path of the indirect effect, i.e., the interaction between prototypicality and need to belong predicting the motivation to be accepted, was significant ($B = -0.147$, $SE = 0.055$, $t[103] = -2.69$, $p = .008$). The second path of the indirect effect, i.e., the interaction between motivation to be accepted and group norm predicting competitiveness when all predictors are included in the model, was also significant ($B = 19.298$, $SE = 9.170$, $t(100) = 2.10$, $p = .038$). A Sobel test indicated that the indirect effect was also significant ($Z = 1.66$, $p < .05$, one-sided), providing additional support for our model.

Discussion

Unlike interpersonal negotiations, where negotiation behavior is strongly affected by negotiators' personal goals and interests, in intergroup negotiation representatives must take into

account the interests of their group. In such representative negotiations, group norms relevant to the negotiation—that is, norms speaking to the desirability of competitive vs. cooperative negotiation behavior—become an important source of influence on negotiation behavior, inviting norm-congruent negotiation behavior. We demonstrated that such norm-congruent behavior depends on the representative's standing within the group and their dispositional need to belong. Specifically, we found that prototypical representatives act in accordance with the group's norm, regardless of their dispositions. Thus, they adopt a cooperative stance when the group favors cooperation and a competitive stance when the group favors competition. Peripheral representatives, in contrast, only adhere to the group norm when they have a high dispositional need to belong. This need to belong drives their motivation to be accepted by the group, which in turn motivates norm-congruent behavior.

The present study provides an important extension and qualification of previous research that could not distinguish between norm-congruency and competitiveness vis-à-vis the outgroup negotiation party. A study by Van Kleef and colleagues (2007) suggested that peripheral representatives are more competitive than prototypical representatives when they are accountable to a desirable group. The present findings paint a more nuanced picture: Peripheral representatives are not necessarily more competitive than prototypical representatives. Rather, they strategically behave in ways that they think will enhance their position within the group, but only when they have a high need to belong. In that case, they show norm-congruent behavior to assert their group belongingness. When the group favors competition, this leads to competitive behavior. When the group favors cooperation, however, this leads to cooperative behavior. Interestingly, peripheral representatives were unaffected by the group norm when they had a low need to belong. This indicates that peripheral members are highly sensitive to contextual factors and exhibit strategic behavior aimed at furthering their own position within the group.

when they are so motivated (see also Jetten et al., 2003; 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2007).

The behavior of prototypical representatives appears to be less motivated by self-interest. Prototypical representatives in our study behaved according to the group norm regardless of whether they had a high or low need to belong. The need to belong reflects individual differences in the desire to relate to others (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Prototypical members, by definition, are central members of their group, and hence need to belong does not affect their behavior in that group context, because their need to belong is already satisfied. Behaving according to the group norm instead can be expected to follow from the influence of their group prototypicality on their self-definition which leads them to internalize group interests and norms (cf. Spears et al., 1997). In a way, then, prototypical representatives' behavior is more predictable, because, unlike peripherals, they can be expected to defend the group's values irrespective of their individual tendencies.

Theoretical and practical implications

Our findings contribute to research on the need to belong. They show that the need to belong is especially important for people who occupy a peripheral position in their group. This has interesting implications for the study of ostracism and social exclusion (Williams, 2007; Williams, Forgas, & Von Hippel, 2005). Social exclusion makes people aware of the fact that they do *not* belong to a group, which should be especially problematic for individuals with a high need to belong. Our findings indicate that people with a low need to belong are less affected by their position in the group. This implies that they may also suffer less from being excluded. Thus, on the positive side, need to belong promotes group-serving behavior, but on the negative side it may also exacerbate the detrimental effects of social exclusion. Literature on social exclusion has focused on belongingness needs as a *consequence* of the threat of exclusion (e.g., Knowles & Gardner, 2008). Even

though previous research has not found moderating effects of need to belong on people's ability to cope with ostracism (Williams, 2007), our findings suggest that especially people with a high dispositional need to belong suffer from the threat of exclusion.

Our findings further suggest that competing only helps to assert one's group membership when competition is the norm. When the group favors a cooperative approach, however, competition towards an outgroup is no longer a means to show one's belonging to the group. Consequently, our findings demonstrate that people show their belongingness to the group not necessarily by behaving competitively, but rather by behaving consistently with the group norm. In intergroup negotiation, therefore, group norms are a crucial predictor of representative behavior. The only people whose behavior is not guided by group norms, according to our study, are peripheral members with a low need to belong.

On a more practical level, our data speak to the question of who should be sent to represent the group in intergroup negotiations. Groups may not always send their most prototypical member to intergroup negotiations. Instead, a peripheral member may represent the group for different reasons, for example, because of task-relevant expertise (e.g., when purchasing technical equipment), fluency in a language, availability, or negotiation experience (see similar evidence that it is not necessarily the most prototypical member that leads the group; Hogg & Van Knippenberg, 2003). One interpretation of previous research is that peripheral group members represent their group with a more competitive approach toward the outgroup (Van Kleef et al., 2007), which at least from some people's perspective may appear to be the 'better' stance. The current research indicates, however, that prototypical group members may be more reliable representatives in terms of acting in accordance with group norms. Peripheral group members only act in accordance with group-normative expectations when they are motivated to enhance their position in the group.

Limitations and avenues for future research

There are some limitations to our findings. First, there was no face-to-face interaction. Although scenarios and simulations are commonly used in intergroup relations research (e.g., Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002), our findings may be limited to computer-mediated interaction. Given the pervasiveness of negotiation as a form of social interaction and the increasing popularity of information technologies as a communication medium, the question of how representatives negotiate via computer-mediated communication is itself of great theoretical and practical importance (cf. McKersie & Fomstad, 1997). Nevertheless, some caution is needed when generalizing the results to other settings.

Our findings are also limited by the cultural background of our sample (Australian psychology students). Australia is a relatively individualistic culture (Hofstede, 2001). In more collectivistic cultures such as Japan, being accepted by one's group is even more important, there is greater emphasis on cooperation within the group, and less emphasis on cooperation with the outgroup (Triandis, 2001). This suggests that in collectivistic cultures individuals with peripheral status may be even more motivated to assert their group membership. In combination with a competitive group norm, this could lead to competitive intergroup interactions. Future research could explore whether our findings also hold in different cultural contexts.

The pre-programmed negotiation task used in the present study did not allow for integrative win-win agreements. Therefore, competition and cooperation can be regarded as two extremes of one scale: Larger concessions are indicative of more cooperative negotiation behavior, and smaller concessions reflect more competitive negotiation behavior (De Dreu et al., 2007). This must have been clear to our participants, as is evident from the fact that their offers on the three issues were highly correlated within each round of negotiation (Cronbach's $\alpha > .60$). In negotiations that *do* allow mutually beneficial trade-offs between negotiators, competition and cooperation may occur at the same time (e.g., holding firm

on a negotiation issue that is important to oneself, while conceding on an issue that is more important for the counterpart). Investigating the behavior of peripheral and prototypical negotiators in integrative negotiation settings is therefore an interesting avenue for future research.

Another avenue for future research concerns the behavior of the outgroup. In our study, the demands of the outgroup representative were standardized to enable clear conclusions regarding the effects of prototypicality, group norm, and need to belong. If our conclusion that peripheral representatives respond more strategically to contextual information than prototypical representatives is correct (see also Jetten et al., 2003; 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2007), then they might also be more susceptible to changes in the outgroup representative's behavior, especially if it provides opportunities to enhance their own position within the group.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this study demonstrates that intra-group influences interact with dispositions to predict motivation and behavior in intergroup conflict, speaking to Pruitt and Carnevale's (1993, p. 153) claim that 'when groups and organizations face each other in negotiation, within-group dynamics can have important consequences for the between-group negotiation'. By showing that a high need to belong in combination with a peripheral position in the group increases people's motivation to be accepted and thereby stimulates norm-congruent behavior, the present findings deepen our understanding of why and how intra-group dynamics shape intergroup negotiations.

Note

1. Two participants reached agreement in round 6. Removing their data did not change the pattern of results.

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