PROOF

6

Social Conflict and Social Protest

*Jacqueline van Stekelenburg
and Bert Klandermans*

The place and time is the Netherlands, the last week of November 2007: the situation in Dutch higher education has become a topic of heated debates in the country. Several ambitious reforms have been implemented during the previous decades leaving a widespread feeling that these reforms have generated discontent rather than improvements, especially in secondary education. Some even talked about a crisis in Dutch secondary education (e.g. Ritzen, the former minister of education in the Dutch newspaper *Trouw*, 22 November 2007). In November 2007 secondary education pupils protested against so-called '1040-hours norm'. This norm refers to the number of hours' education that pupils are entitled to receive annually; schools are fined if they fail to deliver. Nonetheless, due to a lack of qualified teachers, quite a few schools were not able to meet these requirements. As a consequence, it could happen, for instance, that mathematics was taught by a physical instructor or that pupils had to sit in a classroom and wait for long periods of time. School management, teachers, students and their parents were all very unhappy with this situation and the time was ripe for mass protests. Some 20,000 secondary schools took to the streets on 23 November at 50 locations scattered all over the country to protest the declining conditions in their education. These protests were initiated by a guy called 'Kevin', a stereotypical 'guy next door' who wrote one MSN message that was 'virally' spread via virtual and face-to-face personal networks. One week later, on 30 November, 20,000 pupils again took

to the streets, this time mobilized by the national student union, which employed its mobilizing channels supplemented by television, radio and newspapers (see Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, forthcoming 2012 for a further elaboration on these different campaigns and protests).

Obviously, all protesting pupils were aggrieved and openly contested the established authorities in an attempt to improve the deteriorating quality of their education. However, not all aggrieved pupils protested (cf. Klandermans, 1997). In fact, passivity in the face of imperilled interests or violated values is more often the rule rather than the exception (Marwell & Oliver, 1993). Besides inactivity, there is a vast array of behaviours that people might exhibit as a reaction to experienced grievances. Wright and colleagues (1990) have proposed a framework based on three distinctions: the first between inaction and action, the second between actions directed at improving one's personal conditions (individual action, e.g. opting for another school with better conditions) and actions directed at improving the conditions of one's group (collective action, e.g. signing a petition, demonstrating). The third distinction is between actions that conform to the norms of the existing social system (normative action such as petitioning and taking part in a legal demonstration such as staged by Landelijk Actie Komitee Scholieren (LAKS), National action committee high school students and 'Kevin') and those who violate existing social rules (non-normative action such as illegal protests and civil disobedience).

From a social-psychological viewpoint such taxonomies of participation are relevant because one may expect different forms of participation to involve different motivational dynamics. Motivational dynamics of participation can be distinguished on two dimensions: *time* and *effort* (Klandermans, 1997). Some forms of participation are limited in time or are a once-only kind and involve little effort or risk – giving money, signing a petition, or taking part in a peaceful demonstration such as staged by LAKS and 'Kevin'. Other forms of participation are also short-lived but involve considerable effort or risk – a sit-in, a site occupation or a strike. Participation can also be indefinite but undemanding – paying a membership fee to an organization or being on call for two nights a month. Finally, there are forms of participation that are both enduring and taxing, such as being a member on a committee or a volunteer in a movement organization. This distinction accounts for the motivational dynamics underlying differential forms of participation. Indeed, why does one person go to a demonstration while others stay at home? Or why are many more people prepared to sign a petition than to go on strike? Or why is one person inclined to use violence to pursue the group goals, while others are not? These questions relate to the motivational dynamics of individual

protesters and are the core of the social psychology of protest. People – social psychologists never tire of asserting us – live in a perceived world. They respond to the world as they perceive and interpret it. Indeed, this is what a social psychology of protest is about – trying to understand why people who are seemingly in the same situation respond so differently.

Social psychology explores the causes of the thoughts, feelings and actions of people and thus has a lot to offer to the study of social conflict and protest. In this chapter, we will illustrate this point with an overview of the state-of-the-art theoretical approaches and a review of empirical evidence. The main section focuses on social-psychological approaches of mobilization and participation – the *antecedent* of protest. A much smaller section deals with the *consequences* of protest. Mobilization and protest participation are social psychologists' cup of tea, yet surprisingly, the social-psychological consequences of protest are an untouched area in the literature (see for a similar observation Louis, 2009). However, precisely in this process of participation and its aftermath we may be able to find the answers to one of the most intriguing questions in protest participation: that is the paradox of persistent participation (Louis, 2009). Indeed, activism frequently persists despite pessimism regarding the action's ostensible goals (Louis, 2009). Why do people keep on participating in protest although it does not effectuate the demanded political claims? We will discuss how such matters as disengagement, empowerment and increased politicization prevent or promote sustained participation. The chapter closes with a section in which we will try to assess where we stand at the moment and propose directions to proceed for the future.

Mobilization and participation

Successful mobilization brings together what Klandermans (2004) calls 'demand' and 'supply'. *Demand* refers to the will of (a segment) of the population to protest and show its discontent and indignation. The demand side of protest concerns the characteristics of a social movement's mobilization potential (Klandermans, 2012), the grievances and emotions protesters share, and the groups they are embedded in and identify with. *Supply* refers to social-movement organizations and their appeals, and the opportunities staged by organizers to protest. It relates to the characteristics of the movement. Is it strong? Is it likely to achieve its goals at affordable costs? Does it have charismatic leaders? Is it an organization people can identify with? Does it stage activities that are appealing to people? Take for example the secondary education protests: all aggrieved and indignant pupils in the Netherlands are part of the mobilization potential and thus can be

potentially mobilized for protests staged by LAKS and 'Kevin'. LAKS and 'Kevin' are both representatives of the supply of protest, albeit different. Demand and supply do not automatically come together. In the market economy, marketing is employed to make sure that the public is aware of a supply that might meet its demand. *Mobilization* can be seen as the marketing mechanism of the social-movement domain. Protest participation is seldom an impulsive act but an act that requires meticulous matching of a 'demand' and 'supply' of protest. Organizers must be willing to invest their resources and time in staging a campaign. Consensus must be mobilized to enlarge the pool of sympathizers. People need to know about an upcoming protest event and need to be motivated to participate (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987).

Mobilization

Mobilization is the process that gets the movement going. Demand and supply would remain as merely potential if processes of mobilization did not bring the two together. Mobilization is a complicated process that can be broken down into several conceptually distinct steps. Klandermans (1988) proposed to break down the process of mobilization into consensus and action mobilization. *Consensus mobilization* refers to dissemination of the views of the movement organization, while *action mobilization* refers to those who adopted the view of the movement and their transformation into active participants. The chairman of LAKS, just 17 years old, played a major role in mobilizing consensus regarding the so-called crisis in Dutch education. This young man – the spokesperson of the pupils – was well-bred good-looking and with an extremely ready tongue; he appeared as a revelation to journalists and aroused a kind of excitement among them. They, in return, enabled him to gain access to the media, thus providing LAKS with a platform for free publicity. This successful consensus mobilization created a large pool of sympathizers that LAKS and 'Kevin' could both draw from when they mobilized for action. The more successful the consensus mobilization, the larger the pool of sympathizers that a mobilizing-movement organization can draw from.

In their frame alignment approach to mobilization Snow and Benford and their colleagues elaborated *consensus mobilization* much further (see Benford, 1997 for a critical review; and Snow, 2004 for an overview). Social movements play a significant role in the diffusion of ideas and values: Rochon (1998) makes the distinction between 'critical communities', where new ideas and values are developed, and 'social movements' that are interested in winning social and political acceptance for those ideas and values. He writes: 'In the hands of movement leaders, the ideas of critical communities become ideological frames' (Rochon, 1992, p. 31).

Successful mobilization is a dynamic process that brings together ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ (cf. Klandermans and Oegema, 1987). On the supply side, organizations need to pay attention to the following four aspects of mobilization: (1) formation of mobilization potentials, (2) formation and activation of recruitment networks, (3) arousal of motivation to participate, and (4) removal of barriers to participation. On the demand side, individuals go through four synchronous steps towards participation: (1) becoming part of the mobilization potential, (2) becoming a target of mobilization attempts, (3) becoming motivated to participate, and (4) overcoming barriers to participation (see Figure 6.1).

Take for instance the aforementioned ‘crisis’ in Dutch education. The first step accounts for the successful consensus mobilization by LAKS. This step distinguished the general public into those who sympathize with the cause and those who do not. A large pool of sympathizers is of strategic importance, because for a variety of reasons many sympathizers never become active participants. The second step is equally crucial: it divides the sympathizers into those who have been a target of mobilization attempts and those who have not. The crisis in education was the ‘talk of the town’; consequently, 90 per cent of the mobilization potential were targeted by a mobilization attempt (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2012). The third step concerns the social-psychological core of the process. It divides the sympathizers who have been targeted into those who are motivated to participate in the specific activity and those who are not. Protest activities can be appealing to some but appalling to others, because they deem them to be for instance inefficacious or dangerous. Finally, the fourth step

Figure 6.1 The process of action mobilization.

Source: Klandermans & Oegema, 1987.

differentiates the people who are motivated into those who end up participating and those who do not. This last step is about barriers. For instance, the various barriers reported by motivated Dutch pupils who eventually did *not* participate were the weather conditions (it was extremely cold on the day of the protests), illness, and lack of parental consent.

Klandermans and Oegema's mobilization theory is based on a study that examined all four steps of the mobilization process from a mobilization campaign for the peace demonstration in The Hague in 1983, the largest demonstration the Netherlands had ever experienced. The week before the demonstration, they conducted a telephone survey to determine support for the campaign and respondents were asked if they intended to participate in the demonstration. After the demonstration, respondents were asked in a follow-up survey if they had taken part. This pre-event/post-event design appeared to be of utmost importance, as motivations and barriers underlying intended *and* actual participation could be observed. It turned out that the intention to participate was by no means a sufficient condition, as demonstrated by the proportion of motivated individuals that eventually did not participate (60 per cent). In yet another study, Oegema and Klandermans (1994) showed that post-hoc comparison of participants and non-participants would have been inadequate. In this study (with an identical design), they showed that non-participants who reported in the pre-survey that they intended to sign a petition, reported in the post-survey that they never had such intentions. Hence, post-hoc comparison of participants and non-participants is inadequate because people tend to reconstruct the past from the viewpoint of the present.

Another aspect that turned out to be important was the analytical distinction between the four steps. Distinguishing between the steps is justified theoretically because different theories are needed to explain separate aspects of mobilization and participation, and practically relevant as different efforts are required from movement organizations depending on which aspect of the mobilization process they are handling. Analytically distinguishing between the four steps revealed the *process* of mobilization. It made clear that three-quarters of the population felt sympathy for the movement's cause. Of these sympathizers, three-quarters were somehow targeted by mobilization attempts. Of those targeted, one-sixth was motivated to participate in the demonstration. And finally, of those motivated, one-third ended up participating. The net result of these different steps revealed that a small proportion of the general public eventually participated – 4 per cent.

All in all, this study revealed the complexity of mobilization processes and how to go about investigating them. It has shown that mobilization and the final turnout results from a tight interaction between demand and

supply factors. For instance, it shows the importance of a large pool of sympathizers, as the net result of the general public who actually participate in the protest is usually a very small proportion. It also shows the importance of the formation of a mobilizing structure: it is via these informal and formal networks that people can be targeted. But, most of all, it revealed the importance of motivation. That is, reducing the costs and increasing the benefits for participation. Indeed, with each step, varying numbers drop out: the better the fit between demand and supply, the smaller the number of people who drop out.

Mobilization with minimal organization

The economic 'demand' and 'supply' metaphor does not entirely translate into protest events, as there can be mobilization with minimal social-movement organization. Walgrave and Manssens (2000) showed that broad mass-based indignation evoked by judicial bias around the Marc Dutroux kidnapping case – and his serial killing of young girls – captivated television and newspaper audiences and functioned as a mobilizing actor. The moral indignation evoked by his crimes was strengthened by a widespread anger and frustration among Belgians induced by investigational errors and a general distrust of the judicial system. This mass indignation formed the basis for the famous White March. Yet, the Belgium White March seems to be an exceptional case. In general, the mobilizing power of the media should not be overestimated (Kingdon, 1984), and *if* they have the power to mobilize it is in case of so-called consensual issues (Verhulst, 2011). Consensual issues root in suddenly imposed grievances to evoke a communal sense of repulsion and indignation. Examples in place are the death of a child caused by drunk-driving (McCarthy & Wolfson, 1996) or senseless violence (Lodewijkx, Kersten & Van Zomeren, 2008). Such tragic events put consensual issues crudely at the top of public and political agendas, and discussions easily converge on a general standpoint. Who, after all, can be against safe roads or safe societies? The salience and high consensus of consensual issues compensate for the lack of organizational brokerage making mobilization via the mass media possible.

Nowadays, we see more mobilization with minimal organization through virtual networks or social media such as Facebook and MySpace. As a message spreads virtually, tens of thousands of people may be reached in a matter of hours or even minutes because people send the message to hundreds of 'friends' at a time. The protests initiated by 'Kevin' are an example of this kind of mobilization (Van Stekelenburg & Boekkooi, 2012; Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2012). These protests took the shape of several protests of relatively small groups geographically scattered and

diffused over a longer period of time that were *impromptu* organized and mobilized, and short-lived. 'Kevin's' call for action was 'virally' spread via virtual (e.g. MSN, social-network sites) and face-to-face personal networks. Unrest was uploaded on YouTube and people could watch on their mobile phones. The images of angry empowered pupils enhanced collective efficaciousness of potential protesters and thus triggered their motivation to take part in the protest. These YouTube films facilitated a rapid process of frame-alignment; in nearly real-life time, *potential* protesters came to share grievances, emotions and efficacy with *actual* protesters. Moreover, questions related to expected participation of others were instantly answered by the uploaded films and instant messages. Social media and smartphones, but also YouTube, facilitated organizing without organizations, and thus mobilization without supply.

This case shows that organizing without organizations via informal and virtual networks affects mobilization significantly. The lack of coordination and the loosely coupled informal (virtual) social networks have led to so-called *rhizomatic mobilization* (see Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2012). Rhizomatic mobilization moves from one person to another – individually, as part of a larger cc. list, via a listserv, or via a social network such as Facebook or MySpace. In a process that continues to reproduce itself, the message is copied and redistributed. An original sender cannot know where or when the message stops travelling, stops being copied and redistributed, stops being translated. Messages with higher degrees of resonance will be dispersed in greater densities. The emerging and fluid networks of actions unfold with little planning, are coordinated by ICTs, and are unbounded and uncontrolled. The resulting actions often emerge as simultaneous street demonstrations at multiple locations. Consider, for instance, the Arabian revolutions in the Spring of 2011, scattered from Tunisia to Syria. What seems spontaneous *impromptu* organized protest at first sight, in hindsight often appears to be more organized than was first presumed. The 'roots' of the Egyptian protests in the Spring of 2011, for instance, can be traced back to a strike of textile workers in 2008. When food prices tripled in 2008, the political temperature began to rise. Textile workers joined forces with other traditional organizations, including student groups, leftist parties, and Islamist organizations, and called a national strike. But the story took a dramatic new turn when Egypt's strikers were joined by a volunteer army of tens of thousands of tech-savvy young people, deploying the interactive media of Facebook, mobile phone text messaging, and YouTube. In the Dutch pupils protest, we observe a similar dynamic, behind the seemingly spontaneous *impromptu* protests initiated by Kevin appeared LAKS as a successful traditional mobilization 'machine'. Hence, formal organizations still seem important tools to

generate large crowds. This word of caution seems therefore appropriate in drawing too hasty conclusions. Indeed, for the time being there are more questions than answers about these 'new' forms of protests.

Participation

Participation brings us to the demand side of protest, which concerns the characteristics of a social movement's *mobilization potential* (Klandermans, 2012). A movement's mobilization potential can be characterized in terms of the grievances and emotions people share and the groups they are embedded in and identify with. Klandermans, speaking of the dynamics of demand, refers to the process of the formation of mobilization potential: grievances and identities politicize, environments turn supportive, and emotions are aroused.

Grievances

Grievances concern the 'outrage about the way authorities are treating a social problem' (Klandermans, 1997, p. 38). At the heart of every protest are grievances, be it the experience of illegitimate inequality, feelings of relative deprivation, feelings of injustice moral indignation, or a suddenly imposed grievance (Klandermans, 1997). Illegitimate inequality is what theories of relative deprivation and social justice are about; suddenly imposed grievances refer to an unexpected threat or inroad upon people's rights or circumstances (Walsh, 1981). Grievances resulting from violated principles refer to moral outrage because it is felt that important values or principles are violated (Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans & van Dijk, 2009). In more general terms, intergroup conflicts can be framed as conflicts of principle or conflicts of interest (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2009). Evidence suggests that in a conflict of interest people are more inclined to take an instrumental route to protest to enforce changes, whereas a conflict of principle more likely leads to protests in which people express their views and indignation (Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans & van Dijk, 2009).

Classical grievance theories proposed that people participate in protest to express their grievances stemming from relative deprivation, frustration, or perceived injustice (Berkowitz, 1972; Gurr, 1970; Lind & Tyler, 1988). Prominent among grievance theories was relative deprivation theory (Folger, 1986). Feelings of relative deprivation result from a comparison of one's situation with a standard – be it one's past, someone else's situation, or a cognitive standard such as equity or justice (Folger, 1986). If comparison results in the conclusion that one is not receiving what

one deserves, a person experiences relative deprivation. Runciman (1966) referred to relative deprivation based on personal comparisons as egoistic deprivation, and to relative deprivation based on group comparisons as fraternalistic deprivation. Research suggests that fraternalistic deprivation is particularly important for engagement in protest (Martin, 1986). Foster and Matheson (1999), however, showed that the relation is more complex. They demonstrate that when the group's experience becomes relevant for one's own experience – i.e. when the personal becomes political – motivation to protest increases; as a consequence, people who experience both personal deprivation *and* group deprivation are the strongest motivated to take on to the streets. On the basis of a meta-analysis, Van Zomeren and colleagues (2008) conclude that the cognitive component of relative deprivation (as reflected in the observation that one receives less than the standard of comparison) has less influence on action participation than the affective component (as expressed by such feelings as dissatisfaction, indignation and discontent about these outcomes).

Identity

Several studies report consistently that the more people identify with a group the more they are inclined to protest on behalf of that group (Klandermans et al., 2002; Mummendey, et al., 1999; Reicher, 1984; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Simon et al., 1998; Stryker, Owens & White, 2000; van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2008). Take for instance the Dutch pupils: the stronger they identified with other pupils, the higher the chance that they participated in the protests.

Identity is our understanding of who we are and who other people are, and, reciprocally other people's understanding of themselves and others (Jenkins, 2004). If a social identity becomes more salient than personal identity, people are inclined to define their personal self in terms of what makes them different from others, whereas they tend to define their social identities in terms of what makes them similar to others. The redefinition from an 'I' into a 'we' as a locus of self-definition makes people think, feel and act as members of their group and transforms individual into collective behaviour (Turner, 1999).

In the 1970s, a social-psychological identity perspective on protest emerged in the form of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Tajfel and Turner showed that social categorization according to some trivial criterion such as the 'blue' or the 'red' group suffices to make people feel, think and act as a group member. Compared with this 'minimal group

paradigm' real world intergroup conflicts with histories, high emotional intensity attached to them, and socio-political consequences can be seen as 'maximal group paradigms' that bring group membership powerful to mind. Social identity theory proposes that people generally strive for and benefit from positive social identities associated with their groups. Why, then, would people identify with groups that reflect negatively on them (e.g. disadvantaged or low-status groups)? The answer given by social identity theory is that three social structural characteristics affect how people manage their identity concerns. The first social structural characteristic is *permeability of the group boundaries*; the possibilities perceived by the individual to attain membership of a higher-status group. Permeable group boundaries allow disadvantaged group members to leave their group for a higher-status group, whereas impermeable boundaries offer no such 'exit'. When people do not perceive possibilities to join a higher-status group, they might feel commitment to the lower-status group. The second social structural characteristic is *stability*, the extent to which status positions are stable or variable. People who conceive status positions as variable see protest as a possible method to heighten group status, especially when the low group status is perceived as *illegitimate*. Members of a low-status group who perceive the dominant group's position as illegitimate and unstable can use a variety of strategies to obtain a more positive social identity. They may, for instance, redefine characteristics of their own group previously seen as negative; or they may engage in social competition of which protest is the clearest expression.

Why is group identification such a powerful motivational push to protest? First, identification with others is accompanied by an awareness of similarity and shared fate with those who belong to the same category. Furthermore, the 'strength' of an identity comes from its affective component (Ellemers, 1993). The more 'the group is in me' the more 'I feel for us' (Yzerbyt et al., 2003) and the stronger I am motivated to participate on behalf of the group. Social identification, especially the more politicized form of it, intensifies feelings of efficacy (see Simon et al., 1998, Van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2008). Next to shared fate, shared emotions and enhanced efficaciousness, identification with others involved generates a felt inner obligation to behave as a 'good' group member (Stürmer et al., 2003). When self-definition changes from personal to social identity, the group norm of participation becomes salient; the more one identifies with the group, the more weight this group norm will carry and the more it will result in an 'inner obligation' to participate on behalf of the group. Together these dynamics explain why group identification is such a powerful motivational push to protest.

Politicized identity

Collective identities must politicize in order to become the engine of protest. Typically, politicization of identities begins with the awareness of shared grievances. Next, an external enemy is blamed for the group's predicament, and claims for compensation are levelled against this enemy. Unless appropriate compensation is granted, the power struggle continues. Politicization of identities and the underlying power struggle unfold as a sequence of politicizing events that gradually transform the group's relationship to its social environment. If, in the course of this struggle, the group seeks to win the support of third parties such as more powerful authorities (e.g. the national government) or the general public, identities fully politicize (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). The more politicized the group members are, the more likely they will engage in protest directed at the government or the general public. To return to our secondary-educational pupils, for a fully politicized identity they should share the idea that the quality of their education is deteriorating, blame the government rather than their own study efforts, and level their claims to this government while winning the support of the general public. LAKS and 'Kevin' played a key role in this process.

Dual and multiple identities

Recent work on multiple identities (see Kurtz, 2002) emphasizes that people hold many different identities at the same time, which may push in the same direction or may come into conflict. When two of the groups people identify with end up on opposite sides of a controversy (for example, union members who are faced with the decision to strike against their company), people might find themselves under cross-pressure. Indeed, workers who go on strike, or movement activists who challenge their government, are often accused of being disloyal to the company or the country. González & Brown (2003) coined the term 'dual identity' to point to the *concurrent* workings of identities. These authors argue that identification with a subordinate entity (e.g. ethnic identity) does not necessarily exclude identification with a supraordinate entity (e.g. national identity). In fact, they hold that a 'dual identity' is the desirable configuration as it implies sufficient identification with one's own group to experience some basic security, and sufficient identification with the overarching identity to preclude divisiveness. There is evidence that immigrants who display a dual identity are more inclined to take to the streets on behalf of their group (Simon & Ruhs, 2008). This is further specified by Klandermans and colleagues (2008) who report that immigrants who display a dual identification tend to be more

satisfied with their situation than those who do not display such identity, but *if* they are dissatisfied they are more likely to participate in protest.

Emotions

The study of emotions has become a popular research area in the social psychology of protest. Such was not always the case. As compared to rational approaches, emotions were often regarded as a peripheral 'error term' in motivational theories.

Group-based appraisal theories of emotions have reintroduced emotions to the social psychology of protest. People are continuously evaluating or *appraising* the relevance of their environment for their well-being. After a quick and automatic evaluation of an event's implications for one's well-being and of one's ability to cope with the situation, other appraisal dimensions are evaluated. How does the event influence my goals? Who or what caused the event? Do I have control and power over the consequences of the event? Are the consequences of the event compatible with my personal values and (societal) norms? As a consequence, two persons can appraise the same event differently and have different emotional responses (see Roseman, Antoniou & Jose, 1996 for an overview of different appraisals).

Appraisal theory was developed to explain emotions experienced by individuals. If group membership becomes part of the self, events that harm or favour an ingroup by definition harm or favour the self, and the self might thus experience emotions on behalf of the ingroup. With such considerations in mind, Devos and colleagues (2002) developed a model of intergroup emotions predicated on social identification with the group. The main postulate of intergroup emotion theory is that when a social identity is salient, situations are appraised in terms of their consequences for the ingroup, eliciting specific intergroup emotions and behavioural intentions. Thus, people experience emotions on behalf of their group when the social category is salient *and* they identify with the group at stake (Devos, Silver & Mackie, 2002).

Anger is seen as the prototypical protest emotion (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2007; van Zomeren et al., 2004). For those of us who have been part of protest events or watched reports on protest events in the news media, this is hardly surprising. Indeed, it is hard to conceive of protest detached from anger. Van Zomeren et al. (2004) show that group-based anger is an important motivator of protest participation of disadvantaged groups.

Anger appears to be related to efficacy: people who perceive the ingroup as strong are more likely to experience anger and desire to take action;

people who perceive the ingroup as weak are more likely to feel fearful and to move away from the outgroup (Devos, Silver & Mackie, 2002; Klandermans, Van der Toorn & Van Stekelenburg, 2008). Anger moves people to adopt a more challenging relationship with authorities than subordinate emotions such as shame and despair (Taylor, 2012) or fear (Klandermans, Van der Toorn & Van Stekelenburg, 2008). In explaining different tactics, efficacy appears to be relevant, too. Group-based anger is mainly observed in normative actions where efficacious and thus hopeful people protest (Sturmer & Simon, 2009). However, in non-normative violent actions, contempt appears to be the more relevant emotion (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Tausch et al., 2008). This suggests two emotional routes to protest. The anger route is based on efficacy and is related to normative action. The contempt route is more likely when legitimate channels are closed (Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990) and the situation is seen as hopeless, invoking a 'nothing to lose' strategy and non-normative protest (Kamans, Otten & Gordijn, 2010).

Emotions function as *accelerators* or *amplifiers* of protest motives (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2007). Accelerators make things move faster, and amplifiers make them sound louder. In the world of protest, *accelerating* means that emotional motives to join a social movement translate into faster action, while *amplifying* means that these motives are stronger.

An integrating framework

Strikingly, so far a comprehensive framework integrating grievances, identities and emotions into a single model of collective action participation was lacking. We have been working on such a model over the last few years (Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans & Van Dijk, 2009, 2011). The model we have developed and begun to test assigns a central, integrating role to processes of identification. In order to develop the shared grievances and shared emotions that characterize a movement's mobilization potential, a shared identity is needed (see Figure 6.2).

The dependent variable of the model (*the strength of the motivation to participate in protest*) results from emotions and grievances shared with a group that the individual participants identify with. Grievances may originate from interests and/or principles that are felt to be threatened. The more people feel that the interests of the group and/or principles that the group values are threatened, the angrier they feel and the more they are motivated to take part in protest to protect their interests and/or to express their indignation. The model reveals that people participate in protest because they see it as an opportunity to change a state of affairs they are unhappy with (*instrumental route*), or because they identify with the others

Figure 6.2 Integrative model accounting for protest motivation.

Source: Van Stekelenburg et al., 2009; 2011.

involved (*identification route*), or because they want to express their values and their anger with a target that violated their values (*ideology route*) (cf Klandermans, 2004).

We developed this model of an integrating framework in the context of our demonstration studies (for more information see www.protestsurvey.eu). In these studies, data are collected during *and* after demonstrations. Some protesters are interviewed on the spot, others are given questionnaires to take home and return to the university after they fill them out. Participants are thus sampled at the actual demonstration, in the heat of the battle. Contrary to controlled studies conducted in a laboratory, this kind of field research is conducted in a crowded, unpredictable and erratic environment. To guarantee representativeness of the findings, we rely on two techniques developed, tested and refined by Walgrave and colleagues (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). The first technique is a device to make sure that every protester in the area where the protest event takes place has an equal chance of being selected by one of the interviewers, who are positioned on the outer edge of the protest event. They are instructed to select a protester on the outer circle, followed by another, ten steps inwards, and so on until the centre of the circle is reached. The second technique implies conducting short face-to-face interviews during the demonstrations, comprising questions identical to some in the postal survey. As we reach response rates close to 100 per cent for the face-to-face interviews, these can serve to assess response bias of the postal survey data, and thus provide proper sampling of the interviewees.

The model addresses the question as to why people are prepared to participate in protests. Such participation cannot be taken for granted. Why, after all, would people contribute to the production of a public good if one can consume it anyway? The model identifies two reasons why people are

prepared to overcome this so-called free-riders dilemma. The literature suggests efficacy (Klandermans, 1984; Olson, 1965) as the logics of action in the instrumental route. The feeling to be able to make a difference helps increase the benefits of participation and lower the personal cost of taking part. Social incentives – i.e. commitment, respect, honour and the pleasure of doing things communally – are the logic of action in the identification route (Stürmer et al., 2003). Moral incentives function as the logic of action in the ideological route. Violated (sacred) values generate moral outrage propelling people into action to express their views (Jasper, 1997). The more that a political or social ‘wrong’ is against people’s principles and values, the more they feel obliged to defend their subjective moral boundaries (Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans & van Dijk, 2009). In taking the instrumental route, people have to overcome the free-riders’ dilemma, but the identification and ideological route generate an inner obligation that helps to overcome this dilemma – even though the two routes create an inner obligation for different reasons. Maintaining one’s moral integrity may incite an inner moral obligation to *oneself*, versus the inner *social* obligation to other group members incited by group identification (Stürmer et al., 2003). These obligations release an energizing force if, and only if, one participates: therefore make free-riding less likely. Hence, one might take a free-ride on the production of a *collective* good, but one cannot take a free-ride on one’s own *inner felt obligation*. Successful mobilization requires an ever-changing mix of instrumental, social and moral incentives that work together to overcome free-rider problems.

Social cleavages and protest

Grievances are not randomly dispersed in society, but rooted in social cleavages. A social cleavage is an important division within society (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). Such a division must fulfill three defining requirements to be called a cleavage. First, it must involve one of the primary determinants of social identity, for example religion, class, gender or ethnicity. Second, the (usually two) groups opposed by the cleavage must be aware of and prepared to act on the basis of their conflicting identities. Third, the social division must lead to the creation of organizations/formal institutions (e.g. trade unions, political parties), which represent and defend the collective identity, and confront those organizations that inherently or explicitly represent the opposing identity across the cleavage. Cleavages therefore operate as fault lines along which opposing identities and grievances emerge and organizational fields break up; cleavages thus generate a demand and supply for protest. When a social-movement organization and its allies begin to mobilize, chances are that in response its

‘natural’ opponents begin to mobilize as well. Why socio-political conflicts so easily erupt in the context of social cleavages, will be explained in terms of embeddedness and shared fate, and salience.

Embeddedness and shared fate

Simon and colleagues (1998) describe identity as a ‘place’ in society. A place is a metaphorical expression and concerns people’s social embeddedness; that is, the networks, organizations, associations, groups and categories of which they are members. People are not randomly embedded in society. Social cleavages affect social embeddedness. People share interests, and identify and associate almost exclusively with other members of ‘their’ group. Cleavages create a place shared with others, which leads to shared experiences, grievances and emotions and the creation of a collective identity; social cleavages thus determine people’s place in society and give rise to shared fate. Hence, cleavages create ‘communities of shared fate’, and ‘sameness’ within cleavages and ‘distinctiveness’ between cleavages: and, as such, create shared identities *and* opposing identities (referred to as ingroups and outgroups in social identity theory).

Social embeddedness – the quantity and types of relationships with others – includes formal relationships such as being a member of the labour union (cf. Klandermans, Van der Toorn & Van Stekelenburg, 2008); informal relationships such as friends, family and colleagues; and virtual relationships such as active participation in blogs, social media, etc. (Van Stekelenburg & Boekkooi, 2012). As such, the internet has created an additional public sphere; people are embedded in virtual networks in addition to formal and informal *physical* networks.

Social embeddedness plays a pivotal role in the context of protest participation. Social networks function as communication channels; discursive processes take place to form consensus that makes up the symbolic resources in collective sense-making (Gamson, 1992; Klandermans, 1988), and people are informed of upcoming events and social capital as trust and loyalty accumulate in networks to provide individuals with the resources needed to invest in protest (Klandermans, Van der Toorn & Van Stekelenburg, 2008). The effect of interaction in networks or the propensity to participate in politics is contingent on the amount of political discussion that occurs in social networks and the information that people are able to gather about politics as a result (McClurg, 2003). Being integrated in a network increases the chances that one will be targeted with a mobilizing message and that people are kept to their promises to participate (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987). For example, people with friends or acquaintances who are already active within social movements are

more likely to take part in movement actions than those who do not have acquaintances in this domain (Klandermans, 1997). Klandermans and colleagues (2008) provide evidence for such mechanisms. For instance, efficacious Moroccan-Dutch and Turkish-Dutch were more likely to participate in protest in the Netherlands provided that they were embedded in social networks, especially ethnic networks (for instance, the Turkish labour association, which offers an opportunity to discuss and learn about (Dutch) politics). In other words, this is where people talk politics and, thus, where the factuality of the socio-political world is constructed and people are mobilized for protest.

Salience. The more salient a cleavage the more dense the multiorganizational field linked to that cleavage, and the more 'ready' its mobilization potential is to act in response to that cleavage. In fact, the salience of a cleavage reflects in a strongly elaborated supply and a well-defined demand of protest. Hence, identities rooted in cleavages are often organized identities, and organized identities are more likely to mobilize than unorganized identities. According to Klandermans and de Weerd (2000) being organized implies communication networks, access to resources, interpersonal control, information about opportunities (when, where and how to act), and all the things that make it more likely that intentions materialize. Organizers play a crucial role in this transformation of 'readiness' into action (Boekkooi, Klandermans & van Stekelenburg, 2011). In order to mobilize potential constituencies, organizers must develop 'master frames' that link a conflict to 'their' cleavage. Hence, organizers may frame the same conflict in different terms. Inequality, for instance, can be framed in terms of 'class' or 'ethnicity'. The more salient a cleavage and the better the organizers align the conflict to 'their' cleavage – the more their frames 'resonate' – the more successful their mobilization attempts.

Should I stay or should I go: sustained participation and disengagement

Most research on protest concerns a comparison of participants and non-participants in a specific instance of participation at a specific point in time – be it a demonstration, a boycott, a sit-in, a rally or a petition. In terms of our typology of forms of participation, this concerns short-term and mostly low-risk or little-effort participation. We have argued that such short-term activities have different motivational dynamics than sustained participation.

Sustained participation is nearly absent in social-movement literature. This is surprising, given that long-term participants keep the movement

going. A movement has only a limited number of core activists. For example, 5–10 per cent of the membership of the Dutch labour unions are core activists. Empirical evidence suggests that most core activists are perfectly aware of the fact that they are giving 90 per cent or more of the movement's supporters a free ride, but do not care. On the contrary, this is what seems to motivate them to take the job (Oliver, 1984). They are the true believers who care so much for the movement's cause that they are prepared to make that effort knowing that most others will not. Indeed, for 29 per cent of the core activists within Dutch unions, this was the single most important motivation for their sustained participation.

The dynamics of sustained participation

Activism frequently persists despite pessimism regarding the action's ostensible goals (Louis, 2009). Why do people continue participating in movements even if it does not effectuate their claims? Drury and Reicher (2009) suggest that participation generates a 'positive social-psychological transformation'. They argue that participation strengthens identification and induces collective empowerment. The emergence of an inclusive self-categorization as 'oppositional' leads to feelings of unity and expectations of support. This empowers people to oppose authorities. Such action creates *collective self-objectification*: that is, it defines the participant's identity opposite the dominant outgroup (Drury & Reicher, 2009). Protest participation strengthens empowerment and politicization, paving the path to sustained participation.

Sustained participation need not necessarily take the form of the same activity all the time. People often go from one activity to another, sometimes from one movement to another and, in so doing, build activist careers. Paths leading to sustained participation may vary. *Biographical continuity*, for instance, describes a life history whereby participation appears as the logical result of political socialization from someone's youth onwards, as in a right-wing extremist who is raised in a xenophobic milieu.

Conversion, on the other hand, implies a break with the past. For instance after someone is fired, s/he may decide to join an extreme Right organization. Critical events are supposed to play a crucial role in both situations. In the context of biographical continuity, the event means the last push or pull in a direction in which the person is already going, whereas in the context of conversion the event means an experience that marks a change of mind. Obviously, such conversion does not come out of the blue. It is rooted in a growing dissatisfaction with life as it is. The critical event is the last push towards change. Teske (1997) describes the example of a journalist who ends up in front of the gate of a nuclear weapons plant and whose

experience with the authorities' suppressive response to that demonstration turns him into an activist. The story of this journalist made clear that, on the one hand, it was no accident that he ended up at that gate. On the other hand, however, had the demonstration not taken that dramatic turn it would not have had this impact on his life.

Becoming a long-term activist is to a large extent a matter of biographical availability. Sustained participation, after all, requires discretionary time for an extended period. The concept of biographical availability was proposed by McAdam (see Goldstone & McAdam, 2001) in his study of participation in the Mississippi Freedom Summer. This project was a campaign launched in June 1964 to attempt to register as many African-American voters as possible in Mississippi, which had historically excluded most Blacks from voting. More than 1,000 students, mostly from universities such as as Yale and Stanford, participated in this project. In his study, McAdam shows that even though college students are free of life-course impediments to activism, the Freedom Summer applicants were freer still, while the actual volunteers were the freest of all (Goldstone & McAdam, 2001). Indeed, participants in the Mississippi Freedom Summer Campaign were students who were biographically available. But in terms of a life history, there is also *mental* availability: that is, susceptibility for the ideas a movement is propagating. For instance, consider the aforementioned White March in Belgium in response to the case of Dutroux. One can imagine that the parents of young children, in particular, were *mentally* available to agree with the injustice claims – *This cannot be true!* – made in the newspapers. The dynamics of sustained participation in social movements have a clear counterpart: namely, the dynamics of disengagement. Indeed, the sustainability of a fit between demand and supply is by no means obvious.

The dynamics of disengagement

Why do people defect from the movement they have worked so very hard to support? Surprisingly little attention has been given to that question. Compared with the abundant literature on why people join movements, literature on why they exit is almost nonexistent. The guiding principle of our discussion on disengagement centres around the following simple model (see Figure 6.3).

Insufficient gratification in combination with declining commitment produces a growing intention to leave. Eventually, some critical event tips the balance and makes the person quit. Obviously, the event itself only triggers the final step, yet its impact may be overestimated. After all, it was the decline in gratification and commitment that caused defection: the critical event only precipitated matters.

Figure 6.3 The dynamics of disengagement.

Source: Klandermans, 1997.

Insufficient gratification. In the previous sections we distinguished three fundamental motives to participate: instrumental, identification and ideological motivations. Social movements may supply the opportunity to fulfill these demands and, the more they do, the more movement participation turns into a satisfying experience. However, movements may also fall short on each of these motives. Most likely it is for movements to fall short in terms of instrumentality. Although it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of social movements, it is obvious that for many a movement goal is never reached. Opp (1988) has argued that people are very well aware of the fact that movement goals are not always easy to achieve, but that they reason that if no one participates then nothing happens. However, sooner or later some success must be achieved in order for the instrumental motivation to continue to fuel participation. Not only do movement goals often fail to be achieved, but they may lose their attraction to people. They may lose their urgency on the societal agenda. Finally, the individual costs or risks of participation may be too high compared with the attraction of the movement's goals. Repression adds to the costs and might make participation too costly for people (Tilly, 1978).

Movements offer the opportunity to act on behalf of one's group; this is attractive if people identify strongly with their group. But the composition of a movement may change – for instance from self-help groups around battered women to radical feminist-ideology groups – and, as a consequence, people may feel less akin to the others in the movement (Whittier, 1997). Schisms are another reason why movements fail to satisfy identity motives. Sani and Reicher (1998) demonstrate that schisms result from fights over the core identity of a movement; people who leave no longer feel that they can identify with the movement. Finally, people occupy a variety of positions in society, and consequently identify with a variety of collectives. A change in context may make the one collective

identity more salient and the others less so, and, therefore identification with a movement may wither. For example, in a study of farmers' protest in the Netherlands and Spain, Klandermans et al. (2002) observed that in Spain during a campaign for local and provincial elections the identification with other farmers declined. In the rural areas of Basque country, the farmers' identity is a highly salient one; however, in times of elections, the most important politicized identities in Spain – Partido Popular and PSOE – suppresses the farmers' identification with each other.

Declining commitment

Movement commitment does not last by itself. It must be maintained via interaction with the movement, and any measure that makes that interaction less gratifying helps to undermine commitment. One way to maintain interaction is to provide *selective incentives*, benefits that participants – participants only – derive from the activity itself, irrespective of whether they manage to provide the public good or not. Unions and other movement organizations have developed all kinds of services for their members in order to make membership more attractive. Although selective incentives may seldom be sufficient reasons to participate in a movement, they do increase commitment. Insufficiently provided selective incentives, however, may undermine commitment. Downton and Wehr (1997) discuss five mechanisms of social bonding which movements apply to maintain commitment: leadership, ideology, organization, rituals and social relations; the most effective is, of course, a combination of all five. Although not all of these mechanisms are equally well researched, each are known from the literature on movement participation as factors that foster people's attachment to movements. For example, it is known from research on union participation that involving members in decision-making processes increases commitment to a union (Klandermans, 1992), while Taylor and Whittier (1995) demonstrate how rituals in lesbian movement-groups strengthen the membership's bond to the movement.

The role of precipitating events

When gratification falls short and commitment declines, the participant develops an intention to leave. Yet, this intention to leave does not necessarily result in leaving. Many participants maintain a marginal level of participation for extended periods until some event makes them finally quit. For example, Goslinga (2002) calculated that a stable 25 per cent of the membership of Dutch labour unions considered leaving. As 'the event' is the immediate cause of disengagement it draws disproportionate

attention as explanation of exit behaviour, but note that the event only has this impact in the context of an already present readiness to leave. Such critical events can have many different appearances, and sometimes even appear trivial. When some decades ago Dutch labour unions changed to a different system of dues collection and members had to sign to agree with the new system quite a few members chose not to sign. Changing address may be seized as an opportunity to leave the movement, simply by not renewing contacts in the new place of residence. More substantial reasons might be a conflict with others in the organization, disappointing experiences in the movement, a failed protest, and so on. Such events function as the last drop that makes the cup run over.

Disengagement versus radicalization

When a movement is in decline, many activists quit. But becoming inactive is not the only response to movement decline. Indeed, radicalization has been described as an alternative response to movement decline (della Porta, 1995). Although violence tends to appear from the very beginning of a protest cycle, the more dramatic forms of violence seem to occur when the mass phase of the protest cycle is over (della Porta, 1995). Such violence as mobilization declines, is attributed to people's dissatisfaction with protest outcomes and their attempts to compensate for the 'reduction in numbers' with increased radicalism (della Porta, 1995), reinforced by a repression apparatus that becomes more effective towards the end of a cycle. In light of a declining movement and many 'exiters', sustained participation can take the form of radicalization. For instance, consider the violent Black Panthers that played a short but important part in the American Civil Rights Movement. They believed that the non-violent campaign of Martin Luther King had failed and that any promised changes to their lifestyle via the 'traditional' civil rights movement would take too long to be implemented or simply not be introduced. Hence, in light of the declining civil right movement, both disengagement *and* radical sustained participation were observed.

Conclusions

The Arab Spring protests in Greece and Spain, the Tea Party in the US, the riots in London: these are certainly contentious times. Many people ask the question: why do these people protest? An answer is often provided in terms of grievances. In this chapter, while discussing socio-psychological mechanisms of protest, we have tried to counter the idea that people

protest *because* they are aggrieved. Obviously, we did not try to say that those protesters were *not* aggrieved, but we argued that grievances on their own do not provide a sufficient reason to participate in protest. Indeed, although many people may have recognized the grievances and sympathized with the goals of the protests, only a small proportion of those who were aggrieved ended up as participants in those protests. Hence, although, protests bring socio-political conflicts into the open, they do not form more than the tip of the iceberg of larger masses who feel that their interests or values are violated. We have therefore argued that the key social-psychological question to address is: why do some aggrieved people protest, while others do not? Throughout this chapter we have shown that protest participation is seldom an impulsive act but an act that requires matching of a 'demand' and 'supply' of protest. Organizers must work hard to turn grievances into claims, to point out targets to be addressed, to create moral outrage and anger, and to stage events where all this can be vented. Consensus must be mobilized to enlarge the pool of sympathizers. People need to know about an upcoming protest event and need to be motivated to participate. And, after the protest, dashed hopes need to be turned into willingness to continue the fight for the good cause. Hence, the act of taking part in protest is a dynamic process, and it might well be that with each step of the mobilization process grievances become less and less important in answering the question as to why people protest.

Practical task for readers

Social conflicts are a fundamental element of our societies and as 'carriers of meaning' and 'suppliers of protest' social movements are the main carriers of these conflicts. Understanding the dynamics of protest is therefore crucial in understanding social conflicts. Compared with 25 years ago, the social psychology of protest has become richer, more sophisticated, and as such has a lot to offer to the study of protest participation. However, there are still a lot of issues unresolved. We want you to consider three issues in more depth.

- (1) The explanatory models of protest participation described in this chapter are rather static. We see room for improvement in a focus on dynamics and processes. A move from the static individual level of analyses to the processes underlying protest is therefore necessary. We need to acknowledge that

Continued

the characteristics of mobilization potential we discussed are mutable and vary over time and place; comparative studies are therefore needed to register this variation and its impact on protest participation. We need to examine the formation of demand and its transition into action, and the erosion of demand and its transition into disengagement.

- (a) In contrast to static approaches, dynamic approaches account for the element of time. This provides the opportunity to study concepts such as identification, participation motives, efficacy, emotions and feelings of injustice as consequence and antecedent of collective action. Please go through the 'Demand' section and try to imagine how the concepts described can be made more dynamic.
 - (b) A dynamic approach also offers the opportunity to examine the development of these concepts and their interrelation. This is not easy, as Ellemers observes: 'From an investigational point of view, it is difficult to deal with a variable that, at the same time, can be a dependent and an independent variable, can develop over time or change across contexts' (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 1999, p. 3). Design a study in which the development of 'Demand' can be investigated.
- (2) Imagine how the dynamics of supply and demand are shaped by the socio-political context. Remember that conflicts root in a socio-political context and are fought out in this context. So far, social-psychological research has hardly focused on the subjective experience of these meso- and macro-level factors. Try to reason how political opportunities or constraints, or the strength or weakness of social-movement organizations – or their proposed tactics – affect the routes that people take towards protest.
- (a) What variables at the meso- or macro-level could be important in affecting peoples' *subjective* interpretations of their collective disadvantages?
 - (b) How would you conceptualize *and* measure these variables? How would they affect people's willingness to participate in collective action?

Continued

- (3) A lot of scholars and journalists describe the so-called Facebook or Twitter protests. However, so far, very little empirical evidence is reported. Basic questions as to how they differ from traditional protests, whether they bring a different crowd to the streets, and what is the role of traditional organizations, remain unanswered.
- (a) Think of traditional and rhizomatic mobilization. Describe how they differ in terms of the mobilizing actors, the mobilizing structures, mobilizing channels and the kind of events they wage.
 - (b) To what extent will the protest participants differ in the traditional and rhizomatic campaigns? Describe this in terms of socio-demographics, their motives and their social embeddedness.

Suggested readings

For more information, we would like to suggest two books. The handbook edited by Klandermans and Roggeband (2007) provides an interesting overview of how different disciplines (sociology, political science, social geography, anthropology and social psychology) approach social movements. Klandermans (1997) provides an overview of the first two decades of the social psychology of protest. We also recommend a special issue of *Journal of Social Issues* (2009) on the 'Social and Psychological Dynamics of Collective Action', edited by van Zomeren and Iyar. On emotions in the context of protest we suggest Mackie & Smith (2002); on identity, Stryker, Owens and White (2002) – an interesting interdisciplinary overview on identity in the context of social movements.

References

- Benford, R. (1997). An insider's critique of the social movement framing perspective. *Sociological-Inquiry*, 67, 409–430.
- Berkowitz, L. (1972). Frustrations, comparisons, and other sources of emotion aroused as contributors to social unrest. *Journal of Social Issues*, 28, 77–92.
- Boekkooi, M., Klandermans, B. & van Stekelenburg, J. (2011). Quarrelling and protesting: How organizers shape a demonstration. *Mobilization*, 16, 498–508.

- della Porta, D. (1995). *Social Movements, Political Violence and the State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Devos, T., Silver, L. A. & Mackie, D. M. (2002). Experiencing intergroup emotions. In D. M. Mackie & E. R. Smith (eds.), *From Prejudice to Intergroup Emotions: Differentiated Reactions to Social Groups* (pp. 111–134). Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.
- Downton, J., Jr. & Wehr, P. (1997). *The Persistent Activist: How Peace Commitment Develops and Survives*. Boulder, CO & London: Westview.
- Drury, J. & Reicher, S. (2009). Collective Psychological Empowerment as a Model of Social Change: Researching Crowds and Power. *Journal of Social Issues*, 65, 707–725.
- Ellemers, N. (1993). The influence of socio-structural variables on identity management strategies. In W. Stroebe & M. Hewston (eds.), *European Review of Social Psychology* (vol. 4, pp. 27–58). Chichester: Wiley.
- Ellemers, N., Spears, R. & Doosje, B. (1999). Introduction. In N. Ellemers, R. Spears & B. Doosje (eds.), *Social identity: Context, Commitment, Content* (pp. 1–5). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Fischer, A. & Roseman, I. (2007). Beat them or ban them: The characteristics and social functions of anger and contempt. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 93, 103–115.
- Folger, R. (1986). Rethinking equity theory: a referent cognitions model. In H. W. Bierhoff, R. L. Cohen & J. Greenberg (eds.), *Justice in Social Relations* (pp. 145–162). New York: Plenum.
- Foster, M. D. & Matheson, K. (1999). Perceiving and responding to the personal/group discrimination discrepancy. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 25, 1319–1329.
- Gamson, W. A. (1975). *Strategy of Social Protest*. Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press.
- Gamson, W. A. (1992). *Talking Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Goldstone, J. & McAdam, D. (2001). Placing contention in demographic and life-course context. In R. Aminzade, J. Goldstone, D. McAdam, E. Perry, J. William Sewell, S. Tarrow & C. Tilly (eds.), *Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics* (pp. 195–221). New York and London: Cambridge University Press.
- González, R. & Brown, R. (2003). Generalization of positive attitudes as a function of subgroup and superordinate group identifications in intergroup contact. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 33, 195–214.
- Goslinga, S. (2002). Binding aan de vakbond (Union Commitment). Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam.
- Gurr, T. (1970). *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Jasper, J. (1997). *The Art of Moral Protest. Culture, Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Jenkins, R. (2004). *Social Identity*. Oxon, Canada: Routledge.
- Kamans, E., Otten, S. & Gordijn, E. H. (2010). Threat and power in intergroup conflict: How threat determines emotional and behavioral reactions in powerless groups. Manuscript.
- Kingdon, J. W. (1984). *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*. New York: Harper Collins.

- Klandermans, B. (1984). Mobilization and participation: Social-psychological expansions of resource mobilization theory. *American Sociological Review*, 49, 583–600.
- Klandermans, B. (1988). The formation and mobilization of consensus. In B. Klandermans, H. Kriesi & S. Tarrow (eds.), *From Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movement Research across Cultures* (vol. 1, pp. 173–196). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- Klandermans, B. (1992). The social construction of protest and multiorganizational fields. In A. D. Morris & C. M. Mueller (eds.), *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* (pp. 77–103). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Klandermans, B. (1997). *The Social Psychology of Protest*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Klandermans, B. (2004). The demand and supply of Participation: Social-psychological correlates of participation in social movements. In D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule & H. Kriesi (Eds.), *The Blackwell companion to social movements* (pp. 360–379). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Klandermans, B. (2012). The dynamics of demand. In B. Klandermans, J. van Stekelenburg & C. M. Roggeband (eds.), *Advances in Social Movement Theory*. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
- Klandermans, B., & de Weerd, M. (2000). Group identification and political protest. In S. Stryker, T. J. Owens & R. W. White (Eds.), *Self, identity, and social movements* (pp. 68–92). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Klandermans, B., & Oegema, D. (1987). Potentials, networks, motivations, and barriers: Steps toward participation in social movements. *American Sociological Review*, 52, 519–531.
- Klandermans, B. & Roggeband, C. M. (2007). *Handbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines*. New York: Springer.
- Klandermans, B., Sabucedo, J. M., Rodriguez, M. & Weerd, M. D. (2002). Identity processes in collective action participation: farmers' identity and farmers' protest in the Netherlands and Spain. *Political Psychology*, 23, 235–251.
- Klandermans, B., Van der Toorn, J. & Van Stekelenburg, J. (2008). Embeddedness and identity: How immigrants turn grievances action. *American Sociological Review*, 73, 992–1012.
- Kurtz, S. (2002). *All Kinds of Justice: Labor and Identity Politics*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Lind, E. A. & Tyler, T. R. (1988). *The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Lipset, S. M. & Rokkan, S. (1967). Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments: an introduction. In Lipset, S. M. & Rokkan, S. (eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives* (pp. 1–64). New York: Free Press.
- Lodewijkx, H. F. M., Kersten, G. L. E. & Van Zomeren, M. (2008). Dual pathways to engage in 'silent marches' against violence: Moral outrage, moral cleansing and modes of identification. *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology*, 18, 153–167.
- Louis, W. (2009). Collective action—and then what? *Journal of Social Issues*, 65, 727–748.
- Mackie, D. M. & Smith, E. R. (2002). *From Prejudice to Intergroup Emotions: Differentiated Reactions to Social Groups*. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.

- Martin, J. (1986). The tolerance of injustice. In J. M. Olson, C. P. Herman & M. P. Zanna (eds.), *Relative Deprivation and Social Comparison: The Ontario Symposium* (vol. 4, pp. 217–242). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Marwell, G. & Oliver, P. (1993). *The Critical Mass in Collective Action: A Micro-Social Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McCarthy, J. D. & Wolfson, M. (1996). Resource mobilization by local social movement organizations: Agency, strategy, and organization in the movement against drinking and driving. *American Sociological Review*, 61, 1070–1088.
- McClurg, S. D. (2003). Social networks and political participation: The role of social interaction in explaining political participation. *Political Research Quarterly*, 56, 448–464.
- Mummendey, A., Kessler, T., Klink, A. & Mielke, R. (1999). Strategies to cope with negative social identity: Predictions by social identity theory and relative deprivation theory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 76, 229–245.
- Oegema, D. & Klandermans, B. 1994. Why social movement sympathizers don't participate: erosion and nonconversion of support. *American Sociological Review* 59, 703–722.
- Olson, M. (1965). *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Opp, K. D. (1988). Grievances and social movement participation. *American Sociological Review*, 53(6), 853–864.
- Reicher, S. (1984). The St. Paul's riot: An explanation of the limits of crowd action in terms of a social identity model. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 14, 1–21.
- Rochon, T. R. (1998). *Culture Moves: Ideas, Activism, and Changing Values*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Roseman, I. J., Antoniou, A. A. & Jose, P. E. (1996). Appraisal determinants of emotions: constructing a more accurate and comprehensive theory. *Cognition and Emotion*, 10(3), 241–278.
- Runciman, W. G. (1966). *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice*. London: Routledge.
- Sani, F. & Reicher, S. (1998). When consensus fails: An analysis of the schism within the Italian Communist Party (1991). *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 28, 623–645.
- Simon, B. & Klandermans, B. (2001). Towards a social psychological analysis of politicized collective identity: Conceptualization, antecedents, and consequences. *American Psychologist*, 56(4), 319–331.
- Simon, B., Loewy, M., Sturmer, S., Weber, U., Freytag, P., Habig, C., Kampmeier, C., Spahlinger, P. (1998). Collective identification and social movement participation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 74, 646–658.
- Simon, B. & Ruhs, D. (2008). Identity and politicization among Turkish migrants in Germany: The role of dual identification. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 95, 1354–1366.
- Snow, D. (2004). Framing processes, ideology and discursive fields. In D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule & H. Kriesi (eds.), *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (pp. 380–412). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

- Stryker, S., Owens, T. J. & White, R. W. (eds.). (2000). *Self, Identity, and Social Movements* (vol. 13). Minneapolis: Minnesota Press.
- Stürmer, S., Simon, B., Loewy, M. & Jörger, H. (2003). The dual-pathway model of social movement participation: The case of the fat acceptance movement. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 66, 71–82.
- Sturmer, S., & Simon, B. (2009). Pathways to Collective Protest: Calculation, Identification, or Emotion? A Critical Analysis of the Role of Group-Based Anger in Social Movement Participation 65, 4, 681–705.
- Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In S. Worchel & W. G. Austin (Eds.), *The social psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 33–47). Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers.
- Tausch, N., Becker, J., Spears, R. & Christ, O. (2008). *Emotion and Efficacy Pathways to Normative and Non-Normative Collective Action: A Study in the Context of Student Protests in Germany*. Paper presented at the Intra- and Intergroup processes' pre-conference to the 15th General Meeting of the EAESP (Invited paper), Opatija, Croatia.
- Taylor, V. (2012). Social movement participation in the Global Society: Identity, networks and emotions. In J. van Stekelenburg, C. M. Roggeband & B. Klandermans (eds.), *The Changing Dynamics of Contention*. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
- Taylor, V. & Whittier, N. E. (1995). Analytical approaches to social movement culture: The culture of the women's movement in social movements and culture. In H. Johnston & B. Klandermans (eds.), *Social Movements and Culture*. (pp. 163–187). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Teske, N. (1997). *Political activists in America: The identity construction model of political participation*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tilly, C. (1978). *From Mobilisation to Revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
- Turner, J. C. (1999). Some current themes in research on social identity and self-categorization theories. In N. Ellemers, R. Spears & B. Doosje (eds.), *Social Identity: Context, Commitment, Content* (pp. 6–34). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Van Aelst, P., & Walgrave, S. (2001). Who is that (wo)man in the street? From the normalisation of protest to the normalisation of the protester. *European Journal of Political Research*, 39, 461–486.
- Van Stekelenburg, J. & Boekkooi, M. (2012). Mobilizing for change in a changing society. In B. Klandermans, J. van Stekelenburg & C. M. Roggeband (eds.), *Advances in Social Movement Theory*. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
- Van Stekelenburg, J. & Klandermans, B. (2007). Individuals in movements: A social psychology of contention. In C. M. Roggeband & B. Klandermans (eds.), *The Handbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines* (pp. 157–204). New York: Springer.
- Van Stekelenburg, J. & Klandermans, B. (2009). Social movement theory: past, present and prospect. In I. van Kessel & S. Ellis (eds.), *Movers and Shakers: Social Movements in Africa* (pp. 17–44). Leiden: Brill.
- Van Stekelenburg, J., Klandermans, B. & van Dijk, W. W. (2009). Context matters. explaining why and how mobilizing context influences motivational dynamics. *Journal of Social Issues*, 65(4), 815–838.

- Van Stekelenburg, J., Klandermans, B. & van Dijk, W. W. (2011). Combining motivations and emotion: The motivational dynamics of collective action participation. *Revista de Psicologia Social*, 26(1), 91–104.
- Van Stekelenburg, J., & Klandermans, B. (forthcoming 2012). Uploading unrest. Comparing mobilization and participation in traditional and rhizomatical mobilized protest.
- Van Zomeren, M., & Iyer, A. (2009). Toward integrative understanding of the social and psychological dynamics of collective action. *Journal of Social Issues*, 65, 645–660.
- van Zomeren, M., Postmes, T. & Spears, R. (2008). Toward an integrative social identity model of collective action: A quantitative research synthesis of three socio-psychological perspectives. *Psychological Bulletin*, 134, 504–535.
- van Zomeren, M., Spears, R., Fischer, A. H. & Leach, C. W. (2004). Put your money where your mouth is! Explaining collective action tendencies through group-based anger and group efficacy. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 87, 649–664.
- Verhulst, J. (2011). *Mobilizing Issues and the Unity and Diversity of Protest Events*. UA, Antwerpen, Belgium.
- Walgrave, S., & Manssens, J. (2000). The making of the white march: the mass media as a mobilizing alternative to movement organisations. *Mobilization*, 5, 217–239.
- Walsh, E. J. (1981). Resource mobilization and citizen protest in communities around Three Mile Island. *Social Problems*, 29, 1–21.
- Whittier, N. E. (1997). Political generations, micro-cohorts, and the transformation of social movements. *American Sociological Review*, 62, 760–778.
- Wright, S. C., Taylor, D. M. & Moghaddam, F. M. (1990). The relationship of perceptions and emotions to behavior in the face of collective inequality. *Social Justice Research*, 4, 229–250.
- Yzerbyt, V., Dumont, M., Wigboldus, D. & Gordijn, E. (2003). I feel for us: The impact of categorization and identification on emotions and action tendencies. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 42, 533–549.