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The Settlement Country and Ethnic Identification of Children of Turkish Immigrants in Germany, France, and the Netherlands: What Role Do National Integration Policies Play?

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Germany, France, and the Netherlands have pursued different types of integration policies. Using data from a mixed method study, this paper investigates whether and how these differences have affected the settlement country and ethnic identification of the children of Turkish immigrants. The results indicate that integration policies do not affect ethnic identification, but an inclusive policy has a positive impact on settlement country identification. Multicultural policies do not seem to have any effect. Despite processes of exclusion and self-exclusion in all three countries, our respondents have developed a strong connection to their settlement country and in particular to their place of residence.

INTRODUCTION

What shapes immigrants’ identifications? There is an extensive literature on the identification of immigrants and their descendants. This research has found that immigrants’ identification patterns are shaped by a range of factors. These include migration-related factors such as country of origin, generation, and age at migration (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Berry et al., 2006; Zimmermann, Zimmerman, and Constant, 2007). Socio-economic factors such as level of education and social class are also relevant (Lee, 2005; Faas, 2009). Numerous studies have shown the impact of discrimination; (children of) immigrants who experience more
discrimination tend to identify more strongly with the ethnic group and less strongly with the settlement country (Verkuyten and Nekuee, 1999; Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Verkuyten and Brug, 2002; Rumbaut, 2005; Berry et al., 2006). Furthermore, there is some evidence that ethnic concentration and segregation at the neighborhood and school level affect identification patterns through their influence on the possibilities for interethnic contact (Rumbaut, 1994; Butterfield, 2004).

A factor that has received relatively little attention in previous studies is the role of settlement country integration policies (cf. Thomson and Crul, 2007). Western European countries have developed different policy approaches to immigrant integration. They have provided immigrants with varying degrees of citizenship rights and also taken different approaches to the accommodation of immigrant cultures (see, e.g., the studies by Castles, 1995; Geddes and Niessen, 2005; Koopmans et al., 2005). While there is an ever-growing amount of comparative integration policy studies (e.g., Brubaker, 1992; Joppke, 1999; Groenendijk, Guild, and Barzilay, 2000; Geddes and Niessen, 2005; Bauböck et al., 2006), so far little cross-national comparative research has investigated the effect of these differences on immigrants’ identification (but see the study by Berry et al., 2006). This is all the more remarkable given the influential role that is attributed to policies in political and societal debates on immigrant integration.

Most of the studies that have looked at the role of integration policies suggest that there is indeed a relationship with immigrants’ identification (Kastoryano, 2002; Heckmann, Lederer, and Worbs, 2001; Tucci and Groh-Samberg, 2008; Faas, 2010; but for a counter example, see the study by Berry et al., 2006). However, these studies have either focused on immigrant organizations and group identities (Kastoryano, 2002), or have looked at different groups in different countries, making it hard to determine whether found differences are because of national policies or differences in composition and background of the immigrant groups (Heckmann, Lederer, and Worbs, 2001; Tucci and Groh-Samberg, 2008).

In this paper, we investigate to what extent and in what way national integration policies impact immigrants’ identification patterns. We look at the identification of the children of Turkish immigrants in three countries that markedly differ in their integration policies, namely Germany, France, and the Netherlands (Brubaker, 1992; Castles, 1995; Koopmans et al., 2005). Turkish immigrants form a significant group in
each of these three countries. We focus on the children of immigrants instead of the immigrants themselves because the children have at least in part been socialized in the settlement countries and are therefore more likely to be influenced by the national policies. Both people who were born in their respective settlement countries from Turkish parents (second generation) and those born in Turkey who migrated as minors (in-between generation) are included in our analyses. In line with the work of among others (Berry, 1997, 2001; see also the study by Zimmermann, Zimmermann, and Constant, 2007), we view immigrants’ identification as consisting of two independent dimensions, namely settlement country identification and ethnic identification and will explore both these dimensions.

While realizing that the (children of) immigrants may also identify with other (broader or narrower) identities, as identity is a multilayered concept, we have chosen to focus on these two dimensions because they are most likely to be influenced by national integration policies. In the analysis of our qualitative data, however, we also discuss the role of local identifications as these seemed to be an important means of connecting to the country of settlement.

The analyses in this paper are based on a unique dataset consisting of a large-scale telephone survey and follow-up in-depth interviews with a subgroup of the respondents. The data have been gathered on the same narrowly defined target group in each country. This allows circumventing many of the problems of cross-national comparisons caused by cross-national differences in the definition of the target population (foreigners, immigrants, racial, or ethnic minorities) and in the composition of the immigrant population (different origin countries, timing, and type of migration). The in-depth interview respondents were also recruited in a way that maximizes cross-national comparability.

In what follows, we will first explain our conceptualization of identification and national integration policies. Based on a subsequent discussion of theories and empirical studies on the relation between policies and immigrants’ identification, we develop five hypotheses. We then present our three policy cases: Germany, France and the Netherlands. After an explanation of the data collection, the hypotheses are tested with the data from the telephone survey. In the multivariate regressions, we control for several factors that are known to influence identification. The results support some of

1The data presented in this paper are part of a larger study on the ethnic retention and host culture adoption of Turkish immigrants and their offspring (Ersanilli, 2010).
the hypotheses on the relation between policies and identification and refute others. Ethnic identification appears to be high regardless of the type of national integration policies. Settlement country identification is much lower and does show cross-national differences; though, these are not very much pronounced. The data from the in-depth interviews are used to explore the reasons for the relatively low settlement country identification and size and direction of the cross-national differences. Our analysis shows that identification is influenced by processes of both exclusion and self-exclusion. It also shows that despite apparent low levels of settlement country identification, the majority of the children of Turkish immigrants have indeed formed a connection to their countries of settlement.

**INTEGRATION POLICIES AND IMMIGRANTS’ IDENTIFICATION**

With regard to identification, one of the most influential models is that of J.W. Berry (see, e.g., 1997, 2001). He postulated that the retention of the ethnic culture and the adoption of the culture of the settlement country are two independent dimensions. Several studies have confirmed the existence of these two separate dimensions (e.g., Ryder, Alden, and Paulhus, 2000; but see the study by Birman, Trickett, and Vinokurov, 2002). Our study is modeled after Berry’s bi-dimensional model in that we treated settlement country and ethnic identification as separate dimensions in both the survey and the interviews. This allowed us to analytically distinguish between what stimulates ethnic identification and what stimulates settlement country identification.

There are several typologies that capture cross-national differences in integration policies. In this paper, we use the typology developed by Koopmans et al. (2005; see also the study by Koopmans and Statham, 2000) that builds on previous typologies (e.g., Brubaker, 1992; Castles, 1995). This typology consists of two dimensions. The first dimension is the extent to which citizenship is open to immigrants and the extent to which immigrants receive the same individual rights as the native population of the settlement country; we will refer to this as “individual equality”. The second dimension is the degree of accommodation of diversity, measured as support for ethnic or religious group formation and granting special rights or exempting cultural groups from general rules.
Accommodation of diversity is one of the focal points in debates on the effects of policies on immigrant integration. There are two rival perspectives. A first perspective argues that policies that accommodate immigrant cultures and religions can stimulate settlement country identification (Kymlicka, 1995; Parekh, 2002). If immigrants do not have to abandon their (parents’) culture of origin to become members of the settlement society, this lowers the emotional costs of settlement country identification (Berry, 1994). This leads to the hypothesis that in countries with a higher degree of accommodation of immigrant culture, immigrants show a higher degree of settlement country identification (H1, see Figure I).

Others have argued that the facilitation of cultural difference can have negative effects on immigrants’ orientation on the settlement society (e.g., Berry, 2001; Meyer 2002). From a cost-and-benefit perspective, they argue that when countries facilitate the setup of ethnic organizations and services in immigrant languages, this decreases the need for immigrants to orient themselves toward the settlement society. If accommodation takes the form of limited assimilation requirements for access to naturalization or permanent residence permits, the benefits associated with adoption of the settlement country culture and identity will be further reduced. Based on this perspective, we expect that in countries with a higher degree of accommodation of immigrant culture, immigrants show a lower degree of settlement country identification (H2).

Following this same cost-and-benefit perspective, it can also be argued that the accommodation of diversity will lead to a higher degree of ethnic identification (H3). The accommodation of diversity increases the benefits of ethnic identification, while reducing the costs. Benefits of

Figure I. Theoretical Model

![Diagram](Image)
ethnic identification are increased by the subsidies and political opportunities that accommodative policies provide for ethnic media, organizations, and consultative bodies. At the same time, accommodative policies lower the costs of ethnic identification because access to citizenship and participation in settlement society institutions is not conditional on abandoning the origin culture.

To understand the potential impact of the degree on individual equality on immigrants’ identification, Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1986) provides valuable insights. According to SIT, people want to belong to the higher status group – in case of immigrants, it can be assumed that this is the settlement society (Padilla and Perez, 2003; Ward and Leong, 2006; Verkuyten, 2006; see also the study by Bourhis et al., 1997). However, because people also want to maintain a positive self-concept, they are only likely to identify with a group if they feel they will be accepted as members. Put differently, they are more likely to identify with a group if they perceive the group boundaries as permeable. In countries with a high degree of individual equality, immigrants have easy access to citizenship and non-citizens also experience a relatively high level of rights. This legal inclusion indicates a permeable boundary between immigrants and the settlement society (cf. Alba, 2005). Legal inclusion is also likely to be related to a higher degree of openness to immigrants on the part of settlement society members. This is both because policies are determined in interaction with the settlement society and because society is influenced by policies (Bourhis et al., 1997). Therefore, in countries with a higher degree of individual equality, immigrants should show a higher degree of settlement country identification (H4).

A low degree of individual equality can lead to a process of reactive ethnicity (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Verkuyten and Brug, 2002). If immigrants do not get equal citizenship rights, they feel excluded from the settlement society. This cannot only have a negative effect on their level of settlement country identification, but also stimulate their ethnic identification, because in search of a positive social identity immigrants withdraw in their own group. This leads to our fifth and final hypothesis that in countries with a low degree of individual equality, immigrants will show a higher level of ethnic identification (H5). Of course feelings of exclusion can also be caused by factors other than integration policies such as a marginalized socio-economic position (low education, unemployment) or discrimination. Therefore, in our test of this hypothesis, we will control for these factors.
CASES: INTEGRATION POLICIES IN GERMANY, FRANCE, AND THE NETHERLANDS

Comparative policy studies have classified Germany, France, and the Netherlands as different integration policy types (Brubaker, 1992; Castles, 1995; Koopmans et al., 2005). The models approach of integration policies has been criticized for ignoring evidence of growing cross-national policy convergence and the implementation of policies that at first sight seem at odds with national traditions (Soysal, 1994; Weil, 2001; Joppke, 2007). A study by Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel (2010) that compared the policies in ten European countries including Germany, France, and the Netherlands in the period from 1980 to 2008 showed that despite developments in policies, differences between the three countries in our study have remained and are also fairly consistent. These findings are supported by other comparative studies (Geddes and Niessen, 2005; Banting et al., 2006).

Of the three countries in this study, the Netherlands has over the years most accommodated diversity. The Netherlands has an extensive system of ethnic and religious consultative bodies and ethnic and religious groups can set up their own state-funded broadcasting corporations and (Islamic) schools. Until 2003, the integration requirements for naturalization were modest. In 1984, the responsible State Secretary declared that for naturalization “identification with the Dutch people and history is not necessary” nor “letting go of the own culture and no longer feeling especially involved with the weal and woe of his country of origin” (quoted in Heijs, 1995:193). The rise of the right-wing populist Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and the subsequent center-right governments has not led to the end of accommodative policies. Although there have been changes such as the toughening of naturalization requirements, many other measures have stayed in place (Poppelaars and Scholten, 2008; Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel, 2010). The range of official consultative bodies has even been extended with two Muslim councils and the council for Chinese (Ersanilli, 2010). France in contrast tries to maintain a universal public sphere that is free of particularistic identities. With the exception of a few cities, it does not have ethnic consultative bodies nor provides funds for ethnic broadcasting corporations. Germany also has few accommodative policies. At the local level, there are consultative bodies, but these are based on foreign citizenship, not on ethnic group membership as in the Netherlands. Both Germany and France have long
had stronger integration requirements for naturalization than the Netherlands (Bauböck et al., 2006). In Germany, membership of an ethnic organization was long seen as contra-indication of integration.

France and the Netherlands have pursued policies that offer immigrants and their descendants a higher degree of individual equality than Germany. French-born children of immigrants automatically acquire French nationality at the age of majority. Immigrants can acquire French nationality after 5 years of residence. French citizenship is viewed as a crucial element in immigrant integration (Favell, 2001; Bertossi, 2009). Dutch-born children of immigrants can opt in to Dutch nationality. Immigrants who came to the Netherlands at a later age can naturalize after 5 years of residence. Germany has long had the most difficult access to citizenship. Since 2000, German-born children of immigrants are granted citizenship at birth. However, in return these children have to renounce the citizenship of their parents’ country of origin before the age of 23. It will take years before this change in policy will affect significant shares of the German second generation (cf. Alba, 2005). Legal protection from discrimination is more extensive in both France and the Netherlands than in Germany (Geddes and Niessen, 2005; Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel, 2010). It was not until 2005 that Germany implemented the European directive on discrimination. The Netherlands also offers non-citizens a high degree of equality; they are allowed to work in all sections of the civil service with the exception of the police and army and have voting rights in local elections after 5 years of legal residence. In France and Germany, permanent resident foreigners from non-EU member-states do not have voting rights and also have more limited access to civil service jobs (Ersanilli, 2010). The Netherlands, to conclude, has gone furthest in accommodating diversity, while also offering immigrants equal rights. France has not done much in the way of accommodating diversity, but grants immigrants equal rights, while Germany also has a low degree of accommodating diversity and has only recently started to extend immigrants equal rights.

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2Since 2003 this is dependent on a successful public order investigation. In that same year, the option-right was extended to people who arrived in the Netherlands before the age of four.

3In addition, this *ius soli* citizenship applies only when one or both parents have legally lived in Germany for at least 8 years.
RESEARCH DESIGN

Cross-national comparisons of immigrant integration are complicated by the large variances in composition of the immigrant population. As country of origin is known to influence the degree of ethnic and settlement country identification (see, e.g., the studies by Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Zimmermann, Zimmerman, and Constant, 2007), we focus on the same origin group in all three countries, namely Turks. Turks are the largest immigrant group in Europe. Large-scale migration was set-off by the guest-worker programs in the 1960s. After the end of guest-worker programs in the mid 1970s, large-scale family migration followed. Germany was the main destination of Turkish migrants and currently holds a Turkish origin population of almost 2.5 million. The two other most important destination countries were the Netherlands and France, that each currently has a Turkish origin population of about 350,000. As type and timing of migration can also influence integration, the target group is limited to people who migrated during the guest-worker era – that is, before 1975 – and their offspring who were born in the settlement country or arrived as minors under family reunification regulations. Turkey is a country with large regional differences in wealth, education, ethnic composition, and religious life. Because these regional differences might also impact integration, the target group is further limited to immigrants from South-Central and East-Central Anatolia. South-Central Anatolia is a predominantly ethnic Turkish and religiously Sunni Muslim region. East-Central Anatolia, by contrast, has more ethnic and religious diversity (Kurds and Alevis).

To minimize sampling bias, we used the same combination of sampling techniques in all three countries. The main sample was drawn from online telephone books on the basis of stems of common Turkish surnames. To compensate for a possible bias in this technique, the sample

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4South-Central Anatolia consists of the provinces Afyon, Aksaray, Karaman, Kayseri, Konya, Nevşehir, and Niğde. East-Central Anatolia encompasses Adıyaman, Amasya, Elazığ, Malatya, Tokat, Tunceli, and Sivas.

5Alevism is a humanistic current within Islam. In general, the relation between the sexes is different from that prevalent within Sunni Islam, and Alevi women rarely wear headscarves. According to rough estimates, Alevi women constitute up to 25 per cent of the Turkish population. In Turkey, Alevi women sometimes face discrimination because they are not considered to be “real” Muslims since they do not visit a mosque or observe Ramadan.

6For information on the success of this technique for different immigrant populations, see for example the study by Galonska, Berger, and Koopmans (2003).
has been supplemented with a sample of migrant holiday makers in the Turkish regions of Sivas and Karaman and a cross-generational and cross-national snowball sample.\footnote{Detailed information on the sampling techniques used in this study and response rates can be found in the study by Ersanilli (2010).}

The telephone survey was held between November 2005 and June 2006. All interviews were conducted by bilingual interviewers. Of these interviews, 794 were with members of the in-between and second generation. The demographic characteristics of the sample are similar across countries (see Appendix A). At the end of the questionnaire, respondents were asked whether they were willing to participate in an in-depth interview. These interviews were held in 2007. In this article, we analyzed the interviews with the 57 respondents who received at least part of their education in the settlement country. All interviews were conducted by the same person; a Dutch female researcher of non-Turkish immigrant background. The majority of the respondents were interviewed at home, and the others in cafes. When possible the interviews were recorded and fully transcribed.

Because nearly all respondents of the in-depth interviews were recruited through the survey sample instead of through snowball sampling as is common in qualitative studies, the representativeness of the respondents can be examined (see Appendix B).\footnote{To facilitate the interviewing, in each country, two regions with a high share of Turkish residents were selected. For Germany, interviews took place in the states of Nordrhein-Westphalia and Baden-Wuerttemberg, the French interviews in the regions Rhone-Alpes and Alsace and the Dutch interviews in the Randstad and the eastern provinces of Gelderland and Overijssel. One of the Dutch respondents and two of the German respondents had not participated in the telephone questionnaire but were contacted through snowball sampling. The averages of the demographic variables with inclusion of the respondents recruited through snowball sampling c are listed in an extra column of table B marked “SB”.} The demographic characteristics of the sample are similar across countries, with the exception of origin region and religious denomination. The German interview respondents are less prone to identify as Turks than the survey respondents. For identification with the settlement country, the differences are small and in the same direction for each country; the interview respondents more identify with the settlement country than the average of the survey. These differences between the in-depth interview and survey respondents have been taken into account in the analyses.
Identification with the settlement country and the ethnic group was measured with three survey items; “To what extent do you feel [group member]?”, “To what extent do you feel connected to [group]?” and “To what extent are you proud of being [group member]?” Answer categories ranged from 1 “not at all” to 5 “completely.” Respondents were first asked the three questions about their ethnic identification and subsequently about their identification with the country of settlement. Factor analysis showed a two-factor solution, supporting the idea that there are two distinctive dimensions of identification. The items form scales for settlement country identification (Cronbach’s alpha 0.78) and Turkish identification (Cronbach’s alpha 0.68).

To test our hypotheses on the differences between Germany, France, and the Netherlands, two country dummies are included. In the table presented below, Germany serves as the reference group.

As mentioned we controlled for a number of other factors known to influence settlement country and ethnic identification. First, we included a dummy variable for the second generation (with the in-between generation and reference group). Second, we included two dummies for education (with no or primary education as reference category). These dummies both capture the effects of education as settlement country institution and as an (contra-)indicator of social marginalization. As a

9For ethnic identification, the questions are referred to “Turks”. “Turks” is taken to mean all people who come from the country Turkey. Since Turkey is a country with several ethnic and religious subgroups, it is possible that the “ethnic” identification of some of our respondents lies partly or primarily with a (sub-)group such as Kurds. To call the identification with Turks, an “ethnic” identification is thus not always appropriate. For lack of a better alternative, we have, however, chosen to nevertheless use this term. Because of the sensitivity of the Kurdish question in Turkey and the Turkish diaspora, and because this would divert too much from our actual research subject, we have not further explored respondents’ identification with (sub)categories of the Turkish population.

10Because our sample includes second-generation members, we cannot control for age at migration. Though it would be possible to code all members of the second generation as being “0” at migration, this would result in unacceptable levels of multicollinearity.

11As Schiffauer et al. (2004) and Faas (2009) have found, schools are important places of transmission of national conceptions of citizenship. Depending on the school system and degree of centralization, different schools within the same countries can have some leeway in how they transmit the national curriculum and citizenship conception.
further (contra-)indicator of marginalization, we included a dummy for people who are currently employed. As some studies have shown gender differences in identification (e.g., Zimmermann, Zimmerman, and Constant, 2007), we added a dummy variable for women (with men as the reference group). Because some studies have shown an effect of ethnic concentration, we also included a control variable for the share of Turkish immigrants in the respondent’s place of residence. This way we also controlled for the difference in the relative size of the Turkish immigrant population across our three countries of study. As it cannot be assumed that people from the two Turkish regions and religious denominations have the same degree of host country and ethnic identification, we also included dummies for region (with South-Central Anatolia as reference category) and Alevites (with Sunnites as reference category). Finally, we added dummies for the different sample techniques with the phonebook sample serving as reference group.

From a Social Identity Theory perspective, we would not only expect a direct relation between policies and identification, but also an indirect effect through the attitudes and behavior of the society of settlement (Bourhis et al., 1997). The hypotheses for both ethnic and settlement country identification will therefore be tested in two models. The first model includes the country dummies and all control variables. In the second model, two additional independent variables are added as a further test of the hypotheses based on SIT. First, we add the degree of perceived discrimination. Respondents were asked “Can you tell me how often you feel discriminated in [country] because of your origin or religion?” The five-point answer scale ranged from 1 “never” to 5 “all the time.” Second, we add a question on the other-attribution of identity. Respondents were asked “to what extent do people in [country] perceive you as [settlement country member]?” The five-point answer scale ranged from 1 “not at all” to 5 “completely.”

**ETHNIC AND SETTLEMENT COUNTRY IDENTIFICATIONS; THE FINDINGS OF THE SURVEY**

We will first look at ethnic identification. The hypothesis following the material costs-and-benefits perspective (H3) predicted higher ethnic identification in countries with a higher degree of accommodation of diversity. As the Netherlands has accommodated diversity to a higher extent than France and Germany, we should see the highest scores in the Netherlands.
However, if the lower level of individual equality has led to reactive ethnicity (H5), we should see higher levels of ethnic identification in Germany. With a mean ranging from 4.33 in Germany to 4.46 in the Netherlands (see Appendix A), Turkish identification is high in all three countries. Table 1 presents the results of the multivariate analysis. The first column presents the results for the first model on ethnic identification. The cross-national differences are not significant, leading to the refutation of both hypotheses. Neither the degree of accommodation of diversity nor that of individual equality seems to have a significant impact on the level of ethnic identification of Turkish immigrants.12

Despite the lack of cross-national differences in our first model, we will still test the second model to see whether this affects our results. Before we added the two variables to the model, we first used them as

### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ethnic identification</th>
<th>Settlement country identification</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
<td>Ref.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.04 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.09 (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.04 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.07)</td>
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<tr>
<td>East-Central Anatolia</td>
<td>-0.14* (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.14* (0.06)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alevi</td>
<td>-0.38*** (0.10)</td>
<td>-0.36*** (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second generation</td>
<td>0.01 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.06)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.07 (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.06)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education, none primary</td>
<td>Ref</td>
<td>Ref</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary education</td>
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<td>0.09 (0.09)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Working</td>
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<td>-0.13* (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone book sample (ref cat)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holiday sample</td>
<td>0.17* (0.08)</td>
<td>0.18* (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snowball sample</td>
<td>0.08 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.10 (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of Turkish immigrants</td>
<td>0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seen as host country member</td>
<td>-0.10** (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of experienced discrimination</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.49*** (0.12)</td>
<td>4.69*** (0.13)</td>
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<td>$R^2$</td>
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<td>0.11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adj $R^2$</td>
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<td>0.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>709</td>
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</table>

Two-tailed t-tests, *$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$.

12This conclusion is also supported by the fact that the addition of the country dummies does not lead to a significant improvement compared to a model with only the control variables (LR-test of nested models is not significant).
dependent variables and tested for cross-national differences. If the more inclusive policies in France and the Netherlands also affect the settlement populations, we should find lower levels of discrimination and higher levels of ascribed settlement country identity. The scores for ascribed settlement country identity are comparable with those of settlement country identification, ranging from 2 in Germany to 2.7 in France (see Appendix A). Multivariate analysis using the same control variables as in the model presented in Table 1 showed significant cross-national differences; respondents in the Netherlands and France feel more strongly that they are seen as settlement country members than respondents in Germany do ($p < 0.01$ and 0.001, respectively, table not shown). The difference between France and the Netherlands is not significant. This suggests that the more inclusive policy is reflected in the society of settlement. Perceived discrimination is fairly modest with an average of 2.3 in the Netherlands and 2.4 in both France and Germany (see Appendix A). Strikingly, perceived discrimination does not vary significantly between the countries (table not shown).

Adding the two variables to the model on ethnic identification (column 2 of Table 1) significantly improves the level of explained variance ($p < 0.001$). The more people feel perceived as settlement country members, the less they identify as Turk. This is in line with earlier findings in Germany (Skrobanek, 2009) and the Netherlands (Verkuyten, 2006) that have found a negative effect of perceived permeability on ethnic identification. Contrary to earlier studies, however, perceived discrimination has no significant effect.\textsuperscript{13} Adding the two variables does not affect the cross-national differences; these all remain insignificant. We also find few significant effects for the control variables. People who are employed less identify with Turks than people who are not active in the labor market. This shows that socio-economic marginalization is related to stronger ethnic identification. However, the effects for level of education are not significant. Surprisingly, there is no significant difference between the in-between and second generation. The analysis further shows that Alevis and people from East-Central Anatolia have a less strong identification with Turks than Sunnis and people from South-Central Anatolia. Possibly this is because part of them are of Kurdish origin and have an ethnic Kurdish instead of Turkish identification.

\textsuperscript{13}This is not due to multicollinearity. The correlation between the two variables is only 0.15.
We now turn to settlement country identification. According to the hypothesis based on Social Identity Theory (H4), we should find a higher degree of settlement country identification in the Netherlands and France because these countries provide a higher degree of individual equality than Germany. The two hypotheses on the effects of the accommodation of diversity lead to rival predictions for the Netherlands. If it has a positive effect (H1), levels of settlement country identification should be higher in the Netherlands than in France and Germany, and if it has a negative effect (H2), they should be lower.

In all three countries, the level of identification with the settlement country is much lower than the ethnic identification. It ranges from 2.37 in Germany to 2.83 in France (see Appendix A). The multivariate analysis shows that settlement country identification is significantly lower in Germany than in France and the Netherlands (see Table 1). The difference between France and the Netherlands is not significant. These findings do not support either of the rival hypotheses on the effects of the accommodation of diversity; it suggests that this type of policy is neither a barrier nor a stimulus for settlement country identification. The results are in line with the prediction based on Social Identity Theory; the higher degree of individual equality in France and the Netherlands indeed seems to lead to a higher degree of settlement country identification. But how much of these cross-national differences are because of feelings of inclusion and how much to feelings of discrimination?

The addition of the two variables in the second model more than doubles the amount of explained variance (model improvement is significant at $p < 0.001$). The more people feel perceived as a settlement country member, the more they also identify as such. Discrimination, on the other hand, has only a marginally significant negative effect ($p < 0.10$) on settlement country identification. What is interesting to see is that although the differences between Germany on the one hand and France and the Netherlands on the other are still significant, they have become smaller. The decrease in the size of the coefficients is significant ($p < 0.001$ for France and $p < 0.01$ for the Netherlands). This supports the idea that policies with a higher degree of individual equality do not only have direct impact on immigrants’ identification, but also an indirect impact through the attitudes of the settlement society.

14 This pattern has emerged from other studies as well (see e.g., the studies by Phalet, Vanloteringen, and Entzinger, 2000; Berry et al., 2006).
These results suggest that integration policies have an effect on settlement country identification; however, the size of the effect should not be overstated. The country dummies account for almost half of the variance explained by the first model, but this is only about four percent of the total variance.\footnote{Other models that use identification as a dependent variable also show low R-squares. See for example the studies by Zimmermann, Zimmerman, and Constant (2007) and Ajrouch & Jamal (2007).}

If we look at the control variables, we see that contrary to previous studies (\textit{e.g.}, Portes and Rumbaut, 2001), members of the second generation do not show a higher degree of identification with the settlement country than the in-between generation. Settlement country identification does increase with level of education. The effect of education significantly decreases in the second model. This shows that people with a higher education have a stronger settlement country identification, in part because they feel more accepted as members of the settlement society. Labor market participation has no significant effect. Finally, people from East-Central Anatolia – who showed lower Turkish identification – show a higher level of settlement country identification.

How can we understand the high level of ethnic identification compared with the low level of settlement country identification? As our sample has spent part or all of their childhood in their settlement countries, one might have expected these children of immigrants to form a bond with these countries. Before we turn to the in-depth interview data to shed more light on this issue, it is interesting to first have a closer look at the data from the telephone survey. When analyzed separately, the three items used to measure identification (To what extent do you feel, feel connected, and are you proud of being [group member]?) show a remarkable pattern (see Figures II and III). First, the difference between the level of connectedness with settlement country members and Turks is much smaller than the difference in feeling Turkish/settlement country member and especially pride in group membership. Second, for Turkish identification, connectedness is the lowest scoring item, while for identification with the settlement country it is the highest scoring item.\footnote{When analyzed separately in multivariate regressions, none of the three ethnic identification items show cross-national differences, and all three items of settlement country identification show significantly lower levels in Germany than in the other two countries.} This indicates that settlement country

\footnote{Other models that use identification as a dependent variable also show low R-squares. See for example the studies by Zimmermann, Zimmerman, and Constant (2007) and Ajrouch & Jamal (2007).}
identification is experienced in a different way than Turkish identification. We will now turn to the data from the in-depth interviews to further explore this pattern.
In the interviews, the respondents were again asked about their identification with the settlement country and Turks. As in the telephone survey, the responses in general showed a strong identification with Turks. The majority \((N = 41)\) did identify with the settlement country but to a lesser extent than with Turks. Although a minority claimed a stronger settlement country than Turkish identification \((N = 7)\), a slightly larger group \((N = 9)\) claimed a uniquely Turkish identification. The arguments behind the two identifications differed. The Turkish identity was mainly grounded in origin, primarily in having Turkish parents. Being Turkish is experienced as a biological identity; you are a child of your parents:

I know that my parents come from there, and I am simply from there, I cannot be a German, I am a Turk
(Germany, second generation, male)

Many respondents also wanted their own children to preserve Turkish culture and identity, meaning to be fluent in Turkish and proud of their roots and culture. This attachment to Turkish culture seems to originate from the strong national self-awareness and pride of Turks. As one respondent puts it, “[i]n every Turk, nationalism flows through the veins.” Being Turkish is an identity you inherited from your parents and a cultural one in which you should take pride. This explains the high scores in all three countries on the questions to what extent they felt Turkish and felt proud of being Turkish.

The identification with the settlement country was based on living there, having grown-up there, and attending school there. Many respondents had a better knowledge of the settlement country society and culture than of Turkish society and culture.

I can express myself better in German and, I mean, I grew up here, learned everything here. I know that on the 24th Christmas is being celebrated here and the other things, the Day of German Unity, I know the German …, for example the German history better than the Turkish history.
(Germany, in-between generation, female)

The identification with the settlement country had thus an experiential basis. Yet, why was the settlement country identification then so low?
People’s identifications will be influenced, we reasoned, by their everyday experiences. Many live in segregated neighborhoods, and the majority of the respondents has a predominantly Turkish social circle. This is, however, not (only) a consequence of residential segregation but also of personal preference. Most respondents said that felt more at ease with other people of Turkish descent. They felt that settlement country members cannot understand certain issues and are insensitive to certain cultural and religious practices. Being Turkish also has behavioral consequences, such as respect for the elderly and no premarital sex. Because these are seen as important values that are not shared by the settlement society, this impedes friendships with settlement society ethnics and settlement society identification. Hence, the low identification with settlement country identity is partly the result of self-chosen exclusion. But what role does forced exclusion play?

Although several respondents reported many instances of discrimination, this was not the general experience. Their identification with the settlement country is hampered by a more subtle lack of acceptance: lack of recognition. This is in line with the results from the survey that also show a larger effect of recognition than of discrimination. Asked about identification with the settlement country, respondents in all three countries often reported that they do not feel accepted as settlement country members.

I live here, I have my residence here, I should be French. I do not feel excluded, I do my shopping, I go downtown, I do everything everybody does, but at those moments when people say ‘look you’re this’ then you wonder whether you’re really French. I vote, I listen to the news, I keep up to date on what happens in France, but unfortunately….
(France, second generation, female)

But the first impression of people, who don’t know me, they see the dark skin, and they are always, no matter where I am, surprised. ‘You speak accent-free German! Where are you from if I may ask?’ And then I amuse myself and say ‘I am from [name of German city]’. ‘No, I mean originally. You are so dark-skinned.’ [laughs] […] I am surprised every time again, that people think that those who are dark-skinned cannot speak German. We grew up here. We have been here for thirty years!
(Germany, in-between generation, female)

Their dark hair and uncommon names, and for some women their headscarves, were generally taken as a sign of “foreignness” no matter their passport, place of birth, or language proficiency. Zhou and Lee (2007) refer to this as the “immigrant shadow”; the idea that all people
with a certain physical appearance – in their study Asians and Latinos – are immigrants. They argue that questions on origin and compliments on language proficiency, that both hint at being perceived as immigrants, hinder the identification of these children of immigrants as “American.” The experiences of Turkish children of immigrants in Europe also reflect this immigrant shadow. Exclusion based on physical appearance is more often cited in the Netherlands and Germany than in France. This possibly reflects a less ethnic or “thick” national identity, but the fact that the French population is on average less light skinned and blond haired than the Dutch and German population might also play a role. That exclusion was also felt in the Netherlands and France, the two countries with the higher degree of individual equality, can explain why the cross-national differences we found in the survey were modest in size.

The experience of exclusion made some respondents idealize Turkey and dream of one day “returning.” The majority, however, said they had no intention to live in Turkey. Most felt as much foreigners (and were treated as such) in Turkey as in the settlement country. The above might suggest that we are dealing here with an alienated group of people. Yet, this is not the case. Coming back from a holiday in Turkey to the settlement country is perceived as coming home.

When I’m on holiday, I want to go back to Germany. Finally go home, to [place of residence]. I feel better there, I was born and raised there.
(Germany, second generation, female)

When I’m in Turkey I really feel like being on vacation, of not being at home. And when I return to France I am home. It is true that you sometimes don’t completely feel at home, because you are sometimes viewed negatively. Nevertheless I feel more at home in France than in Turkey [...] In Turkey people have another way of dressing, talking. They are not like us.
(France, in-between generation, female)

The connection with the settlement country is most felt at the local level (cf. Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, and Waters, 2004; Ehrkamp, 2005). This sense of home is not only present among respondents that live in large cosmopolitan cities but also among those who live in smaller towns and villages. The majority of respondents have lived in the same town since they arrived in the settlement country, or, for the second generation, since their birth. This has created a strong sense of attachment to the settlement country at the town or even the neighborhood level.
So you feel more at home in the Netherlands?

Yes. More at home. More at home. Yes, because your neighbourhood, when I go to the other side of town…When I see the skyline of my neighbourhood I already feel at home
(Netherlands, in-between generation, female)

So despite feelings of exclusion and strong attachments to Turkish identity, the majority of the respondents felt an affective connection to the settlement country. How can we account for this apparent contradiction? The German language knows several words for “home” that have different connotations. *Heimat* evokes the idea of roots, of having been there forever (Räthzel, 1994:89). It is an idealized place. *Haus* or *Zuhause* more refers to the physical home but also to a place where one feels secure. It seems then that our respondents in Germany, but also in France and the Netherlands, feel at home in the settlement country, yet could not and were not allowed to call it their *Heimat*.17 As one respondent from Germany expressed it:

I say my *Heimat* is Kurdistan, my *Zuhause* is Germany. That is my opinion.
(Germany, in-between generation, male)

Therefore, the respondents found the question “Do you feel more a member of the settlement country or more Turkish” difficult to answer. And thus one French respondent answered:

It is a mixture of both, if you’d like. We live as Turkish families in France.
(France, in-between generation, female)

The problem seems to be that there is no appropriate conceptualization for children of immigrants’ feelings of connectedness with the settlement country. This explains the peculiar asymmetry in the connectedness-item that we found in the survey and also the much lower scores on the feel and pride items for settlement country identity than for ethnic identity. They feel connected to the place they grew up in but are not recognized by the settlement country as fellow citizens. Therefore, they find it harder to identify as settlement country members and take pride in that identity. Yet, this is also because of how they experience their

17 Only one German respondent referred to Germany as her “Heimat.”
Turkish identity. They feel Turkish, because their parents are Turkish, which makes not feeling Turkish and being proud of it a denial of their parentage.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Previous studies have uncovered a broad range of factors that influence immigrants’ identification patterns. However, they have paid relatively little attention to the possible effects of national integration policies. This stands in contrast with the steady stream of integration policy comparisons. Some of these studies try to develop a list of best practices in response to the call in many countries for better policies to promote immigrant integration. It is therefore important to explore what the effects of national integration policies are. In this article, we asked to what extent national integration policies affect the settlement country and ethnic identification of the children of immigrants. We developed five hypotheses about possible relations between policies and identification. We tested these on a sample of the children of Turkish immigrants in three countries with different integration policies: Germany, France, and the Netherlands. The sample was collected in a way that maximizes cross-national comparability. Our study included both quantitative and qualitative data.

Analysis of the data from a telephone survey showed no significant cross-national differences in the degree of ethnic identification. Identification with Turks was high in all three countries. This refuted the hypothesis from the material cost-and-benefit perspective (H3) that predicted higher ethnic identification in countries with more accommodation of diversity (in our case, the Netherlands), and the reactive ethnicity hypothesis (H5) that predicted higher ethnic identification in countries with less inclusive policies (in our case Germany). In fact, the lack of cross-national variance suggests that policies have little to no impact on the degree of ethnic identification.

For identification with the settlement country, we did find cross-national differences. While overall settlement country identification is (much) lower than identification with Turks, the survey data showed that settlement country identification in Germany is significantly lower than that in France and the Netherlands. This fits with the hypothesis (H4) based on Social Identity Theory that individual equality has a positive effect on settlement country identification because it increases the
perceived permeability of the settlement group identity. However, the analysis showed no significant difference between the Netherlands and France. We thus found no support for the hypothesis (H2) that the accommodation of diversity has an adversarial effect on settlement country identification, nor did we find support for the hypothesis (H1) about a positive effect. The lack of difference between France and the Netherlands is striking in light of Alba’s (2005) argument on the “bright” boundary formed by religion in Europe. He argued that the way religion is institutionalized determines the brightness of the boundary between the settlement society and Muslim immigrants (2005:31–32), and there with the potential for settlement country identification. In Germany, the preferential treatment of Christianity and Judaism over Islam is overtly institutionalized (the former two are officially recognized religions, the latter is not). In France, Alba contended – in line with Zolberg and Long (1999) – the institutionalization is more subtle in nature. In the Netherlands, Islam has been granted the highest degree of parity with Christianity (Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel, 2010); nevertheless, this does not seem to have led to a higher degree of identification, nor a higher degree of feeling accepted by settlement country ethnics. An alternative explanation of this finding could be that the positive effect of accommodative policies in the Netherlands has been canceled out by the negative discourse on immigrants, and on Muslim immigrants in particular, since the Fortuyn revolt in 2002. A survey among Turkish and Moroccan origin youngsters in the Dutch city of Rotterdam that was held in 1999 and repeated in 2006, however, shows little change in settlement country identification (Entzinger and Dourleijn, 2008). This makes a rise of the far-right in the Netherlands an unlikely explanation of our findings.

We investigated to what extent the cross-national differences in settlement country identification can be explained by the degree of acceptance by settlement country members and experienced discrimination, because this mechanism is implicitly part of the hypotheses based on Social Identity Theory. We assumed that an inclusive policy would translate itself into less discrimination and more recognition as fellow citizen. Although we found no significant cross-national differences in discrimina-

18Although the accommodation of diversity does not impede identification with the settlement country, in another study we did find that it might have a negative effect on other aspects of socio-cultural integration (Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2011).
tion, German Turks did feel significantly less recognized as settlement country members than Turks in France and the Netherlands. Adding these two variables to the regression analysis lowered cross-national differences. This provides further support for the thesis that the lower settlement country identification of Turks in Germany is an effect of its more exclusionary integration policy. This conclusion should be treated with care, however, because the cross-national differences we found are rather small, suggesting that the influence of policies on settlement country identification is limited. The small size of the cross-national differences in our study can, however, also be a consequence of our choice of countries. There are a number of systematic differences between the policies in Germany, France, and the Netherlands, but they are all European liberal democracies. Therefore, their policies on the one hand differ from traditional immigration countries like Australia and on the other, from countries that are not liberal democracies. Of the three countries in our study, even the country that offers the lowest degree of individual equality (Germany) still offers immigrants many more rights than countries such as Dubai or Libya.

Previous studies have shown the impact of socio-economic marginalization on identification. We also found that education has a positive effect on settlement country identification and labor market participation a negative effect on ethnic identification. However, because we controlled for these factors in the multivariate regressions, they cannot explain the cross-national differences (or in case of ethnic identification, the absence of cross-national differences) that we found.

What to make of the high level of ethnic identification compared with settlement country identification and the small size of the country differences? To answer this, we first had a closer look at our survey data. Identification with the settlement country and with the Turks was measured in the survey through three questions; to what extent do you feel, feel connected to and take pride in Turkish and settlement country identity. The level of connectedness to the settlement country was not much lower than that of the connectedness to Turkey. Differences were much more pronounced for the degree to which respondents felt, and felt proud of being Turkish or a settlement country member. The data from in-depth interviews allowed further exploration of this pattern. Identification with Turks is strong in the sense that it is what they are and what they take pride in but to a lesser extent feel connected with. Turkey is not the world the respondents intimately know by experience. They often
feel at least as much alien there as in their country of settlement. Settlement country identification is weak in terms of what they feel they are and take pride in, yet is stronger in terms of actual connectedness with everyday world. They feel connected to the settlement country as the place where they grew up and spent their lives. In that sense, the settlement country is their home. It is an identification, however, that is primarily with a local, not a national identity.

Our respondents feel that because they are born out of Turkish parents, they are Turkish. Turkish identity is experienced as a matter of phenotype, ancestry, and culture, hence as an ethno-cultural identity. But so is the settlement country identity experienced by the settlement country majority population. At least, this is how we interpret the Turkish respondents’ experience of not being recognized as fellow settlement country citizens. This was most felt in Germany, the country with the least open citizenship regime. However, it was also frequently felt in the Netherlands and France, countries that have a more civic citizenship regime. Although a civic conception of citizenship is reflected in policies, everyday reality reflects a “thicker” notion of citizenship, which does not include people of a different ethnic origin, especially if they have a different skin color or religion. This makes it hard for the children of Turkish immigrants to say they are French, German, or Dutch. For the United States, Zhou and Lee (2007) have also found that the hesitation of second-generation Asians and Latinos to identify “simply as American” (2007:201) is often caused by a lack of acceptance on the part of the settlement society. We found our respondents’ weak identification with the settlement country to be a result of exclusion – at the policy and the settlement society level – but also of self-exclusion. To more accurately establish the effect of settlement country characteristics (symbolic and material exclusion) on settlement country identification, future research should include other immigrant groups to test whether our findings also hold true for groups that have a less strong ethnic identity and nationalism than Turks. To shed more light on the role of religious boundaries, it would be interesting to look at groups that are not Muslim such as certain sub-Saharan African and Southeast Asian groups. Furthermore, it would be valuable to repeat the study in more countries to see whether the same effects of the two policy dimensions will be found.
### APPENDIX A. SURVEY SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

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<th>Germany</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Mean</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Snowball sample</td>
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### APPENDIX B. IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

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<td>Freq. of experienced discrimination</td>
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