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D.T. Runia

PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA
AND THE
TIMAEUS OF PLATO
I

VU Boekhandel

PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA
AND THE
TIMAEUS OF PLATO
I

Druk: Offsetdrukkerij Kanthers B.V., Alblasterdam

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VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT TE AMSTERDAM

PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA
AND THE
TIMAEUS OF PLATO

ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van de graad van
doctor in de letteren
aan de Vrije Universiteit te Amsterdam,
op gezag van de rector magnificus
dr. H. Verheul,
hoogleraar in de faculteit
der wiskunde en natuurwetenschappen,
in het openbaar te verdedigen op
donderdag 2 juni 1983 te 15.30 uur
in het hoofdgebouw der universiteit,
De Boelelaan 1105

door

DOUWE THEUNIS RUNIA
geboren te Marknesse

VU Boekhandel

Promotor: Prof. dr. A. P. Bos
Copromotor: Prof. dr. J. C. M. van Winden
Referent: Prof. dr. C. Datema

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PREFACE

Now that this dissertation, and with it my Academic training, has reached completion, it is a very great privilege to express my heartfelt gratitude to the many people and the diverse institutions, without whose assistance it could not have been written.

It is fitting to begin with my promotor, Prof.dr.A.P.Bos. The warm welcome which he gave my wife and me on our arrival in the Netherlands remains fresh in my memory. It was a suggestion of his that first turned my thoughts to a study of the writings of Philo of Alexandria. He showed a never-flagging interest in my research during the long years of preparation, while his continual stream of penetrating comments proved an indispensable stimulus. It was a great honour that Prof.dr.J.C.M.van Winden (RU Leiden), who at an early stage had given my plans encouraging support, accepted the task of acting as copromotor. The final manuscript received much benefit from his vast experience in the field of Classical and Patristic studies. My thanks are also due to Prof.dr.C.Datema for acting as referent and reading through the entire manuscript. The academic context of my research was the Vakgroep Antieke en Patristische filosofie in the Centrale Interfaculteit of the Free University. Its members, among whom I wish to mention especially Drs.P.Boot, Drs.T.A.Bolhuis, Drs.V.Kal and Miss M.Maes, provided fruitful discussion and warm encouragement. A source of inspiration to me was the shining example set by the late Prof.M.C.Smit. It is a matter of deep regret to me that he did not live to see the study, which did not escape the polymathic scope of his interests, finished. Last but certainly not least, I would like to use this opportunity to express my gratitude to my Australian teachers, and among them especially Mr. M.B.Keary (The Geelong College), Prof.G.W.Clarke and Dr.K.J.McKay (The University of Melbourne), who instilled in me a love for Greco-Roman antiquity and first acquainted me with the tools of Classical philology.

Other scholars, who were less directly connected with the institutions at which I studied, gave generous assistance. Words can hardly convey how much I am indebted to Prof.V.Nikiprowetzky (Paris). As soon as he heard of my project, he placed his time and unparalleled knowledge of Philonic studies at my disposal. Through the mediation of his extensive letters I was saved from numerous errors and was kept informed on the very latest developments in Philonic studies. The keen interest he showed in my work over a period of three years was a constant source of encouragement. Prof.M.Baltes (Münster) kindly answered enquiries on technical aspects of Platonist philosophy.

Prof.J.Dillon (Dublin) and Prof.B.L.Mack (Claremont U.S.A.) also showed interest in diverse aspects of my research. A very special vote of thanks must be given to Drs.J.J.S.Weitenberg (RU Leiden), who generously devoted many hours of his time to helping me confront the complexities of the Philonic works preserved only in an Armenian translation. Another Armenologist, Prof.A.Terian (Berrien Springs, U.S.A.), kindly gave me access to an exciting discovery which he had made and which was relevant to the subject of my study.

Grateful acknowledgement for financial support must be made to two institutions. A Travelling scholarship awarded by The University of Melbourne enabled me to commence the orientating period of research. A generous three-year grant supplied by the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research allowed me to devote all my time to the project and thus bring it to fruition. I am grateful to the Council and staff of the Fondation Hardt (Vandoeuvres-Geneva) for giving me the opportunity to write a difficult section of the work in ideal surroundings. The trip to Switzerland was financed by a Travel grant from the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research. Through the agency of the Buma Bibliotheek (Leeuwarden) and its assistant librarian, Mr.D.W.Kok, I was given access to the many specialized books and journals required for a study of this kind. The VU Boekhandel and its staff-member, Mr.F.Grijzenhout, gave me invaluable assistance in the preparation of the dissertation for actual publication.

My greatest debts I have left until last. For as long as I can remember my parents have encouraged me to study and explore those fields of knowledge in which I was especially interested. At the same time they showed me by their own example that there was more to life than merely the acquisition of knowledge and the pursuit of one's own interests. I regard it as particularly appropriate that I should graduate at the same university from which my father, twenty-eight years ago, received his doctorate. There was a great deal that my wife had to leave behind when we embarked together on our European adventure. Throughout the years she has been for me a never-failing source of support and strength, from the uncertain period at the start to the final busy months, when day in day out she assisted me in the arduous task of typing out a long and frequently esoteric manuscript. What I owe to her cannot be expressed in words. To my parents and to my wife — τοῖς μὲν γονέων ἀρστούς, τῇ δὲ γυναικῶν φιλότατῃ — I dedicate this book.

Kampen
Easter 1983

NOTICE TO THE READER

The subject of this study cannot be dealt with in an adequate manner unless attention is given to a considerable amount of technical detail. There is a danger that an excess of such detail will have a numbing effect on the reader. I have taken this into account in the organization of the study. Technical aspects are confined as much as possible to the 'Commentary' in Part II and the notes. The reader who is not so concerned with specialized matters is thus advised to commence by directing his attention first to Parts I, III and IV.

References to scholarly literature are generally (but not in all cases) given in full on the first occasion and thereafter in an abbreviated form. Full details of all works cited are given in the Bibliography at the end of the book. A number of important studies are regularly cited by the author's name only. These are indicated by means of an asterisk in the Bibliography.

Five abbreviations are used throughout the study for references to the major editions and translations of Philo's works:

C-W	Cohn and Wendland, <u>Editio maior</u>
EE	English Edition (Colson-Whitaker-Earp)
EES	English Edition Supplement (Marcus)
FE	French Edition (Arnaldez-Pouilloux-Mondésert)
GT	German Translation (Cohn-Heinemann-Adler-Theiler)

Other abbreviations are explained in the Bibliography at the end of the book.

Philo's treatises are indicated by means of the following abbreviations:

<u>Opif.</u>	De opificio mundi
<u>Leg.</u>	Legum allegoriae
<u>Cher.</u>	De Cherubim
<u>Sacr.</u>	De sacrificiis Abelis et Caini
<u>Det.</u>	Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat
<u>Post.</u>	De posteritate Caini
<u>Gig.</u>	De gigantibus
<u>Deus</u>	Quod Deus sit immutabilis
<u>Agr.</u>	De agricultura
<u>Plant.</u>	De plantatione
<u>Ebr.</u>	De ebrietate
<u>Sobr.</u>	De sobrietate
<u>Conf.</u>	De confusione linguarum
<u>Migr.</u>	De migratione Abrahami

<u>Her.</u>	Quis rerum divinarum heres sit
<u>Congr.</u>	De congressu eruditionis gratia
<u>Fug.</u>	De fuga et inventione
<u>Mut.</u>	De mutatione nominum
<u>Somn.</u>	De somniis
<u>Abr.</u>	De Abrahamo
<u>Ios.</u>	De Iosepho
<u>Mos.</u>	De vita Moysis
<u>Decal.</u>	De Decalogo
<u>Spec.</u>	De specialibus legibus
<u>Virt.</u>	De virtutibus
<u>Praem.</u>	De praemiis et poenis, de execrationibus
<u>Prob.</u>	Quod omnis probus liber sit
<u>Contempl.</u>	De vita contemplativa
<u>Aet.</u>	De aeternitate mundi
<u>Flacc.</u>	In Flaccum
<u>Legat.</u>	Legatio ad Gaïum
<u>Hypoth.</u>	Hypothetica
<u>Prov.</u>	De Providentia
<u>Anim.</u>	De animalibus
<u>QG</u>	Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesim
<u>QE</u>	Quaestiones et solutiones in Exodum

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE

AIM AND STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

About ten years before his death the Athenian philosopher PLATO, securely settled in the Academy which he had founded, made public the masterpiece of his old age, the dialogue known as the Timaeus.¹ The most striking feature of this work was the quasi-mythical manner in which it presented an account of the origin of the universe and of its most important inhabitant, man. Right from the start the dialogue proved to be a success. No other philosophical work in antiquity was so widely disseminated and the subject of so much discussion as the Timaeus. Although Plato showed a keen interest in the wisdom of the East, he was almost certainly unaware that his cosmogony bore at least a superficial resemblance to another creational account found in the Holy books of the Jews. By the fourth century B.C. the compilation of the first five books of the Old Testament, commonly known as the Torah or the Pentateuch, had reached the final form in which we still know them today. Containing material of great antiquity, they were attributed to the authorship of the Jewish prophet and lawgiver MOSES.² The books of Moses chiefly recount the history and laws of the people of Israel, but at the beginning of the book Genesis that history and the accompanying legislation are placed in a universal perspective. An account is given of how God created the universe and man. Almost four centuries after Plato wrote the Timaeus, the Alexandrian Jew PHILO set himself the task of composing philosophically orientated commentaries on the writings of Moses.³ These were by then available in a Greek translation, the Septuaginta, and continued also in this version to possess a binding authority on the Jews of the Diaspora. An influential and learned man, Philo was well acquainted with the Greek literary and cultural heritage of the Hellenistic world in which he lived. From his voluminous works it is apparent that he had a particular fondness for Plato's celebrated dialogue.

What, therefore, has Jerusalem to do with Athens? The answer, in our context, is that Alexandria has to do with them both. The group of three

writings outlined above form the point of departure for the present study. The aim of the study is *to make a comprehensive examination of the way in which Philo understands and utilizes the Timaeus of Plato in his entire oeuvre*. The reader of the study will be constantly reminded, however, that behind Philo's reading and use of the Timaeus lurks the dominating presence of the Mosaic legislation, to which as a Jew he never wavered in his loyalty. In particular three areas of research will occupy our attention.

Firstly it is our intention to investigate *the manner in which Philo makes use of the Timaeus*. Does he often quote or paraphrase its contents directly, or are his allusions to it usually more subtle and concealed? Are some parts of the work of greater significance for him than others? Are references to the dialogue spread evenly through his works, or are there particular points of concentration? Are there many passages where he directly discusses the doctrines of the Timaeus, or does he mainly use it in relation to the task of explaining scripture? What different kinds of usage can we discover, and what are the implications for Philo's exegetical practice?

A second task of our study is to determine *the influence of the Timaeus on Philo's thought*. If it should prove to be the case that Philo frequently and extensively refers to the Timaeus, it is highly likely that the work will have left significant traces of its presence on his thinking. What are the doctrines of the Platonic dialogue which he finds particularly persuasive? What is the effect that these doctrines have on his interpretation of scripture? Does he make any attempt to preserve the systematic coherence of Plato's analysis of visible reality and its relation to the divine immutable realm? And can we say that, in his interpretation of scripture, he incorporates Platonic doctrines in a coherent pattern of thought of his own? The main subjects of discussion here will necessarily be determined by the subject matter of the Timaeus, namely the creation and the structure of the cosmos and the implications thereof for theology, cosmology and anthropology.

The third main area of concern of this study will be to investigate *Philo's relation to the traditions of interpretation of the Timaeus*. The Timaeus does not make easy reading. Some passages are plainly inaccessible to the philosophically unschooled reader. Right from the outset many of its doctrines were the subject of controversy in the philosophical schools. It is highly improbable that Philo should have read the Timaeus without being aided and affected by the interpretations of the work circulating in his day, especially those of the school loyal to the words of the master, the Middle Platonists. Does Philo reveal many points of contact with traditional interpretations of the Timaeus? Does his manner of reading the work bear resemblance to that of philosophers who lived at about the same time as he? Is it possible to discover

the sources which may have assisted him in coming to a better understanding of what the dialogue has to say?

As final result of the study it should be possible to reach some conclusions on the way that Philo uses a philosophical textbook, on his attitude to the tradition of Greek philosophy in general and Platonism in particular, on the relation between philosophy and exegesis in his oeuvre, and on his place in the history of thought.

The way that the study is *structured* closely corresponds to the aims which have just been outlined. It will consist of four parts. In part one, the *Introduction*, the necessary background information will be presented - on recent developments in Philonic scholarship, on Philo's historical and cultural setting, on the career of the *Timaeus* and its interpretation from Plato to Philo, and, most importantly, on the method that will be used in carrying out the research in the remainder of the study. In the second part, entitled *Analysis*, the evidence will be set out. All the passages in which Philo refers to or makes use of the *Timaeus* will be collected together and analysed in a kind of 'Commentary'. This part will possess a somewhat hybrid character, for the sequence of subjects dealt with in the Platonic work is retained, but the passages discussed will of course be drawn from Philo's writings. The task of the third part, entitled *Synthesis*, is to collect all the pieces of evidence presented in the Analysis and organize them into chapters which will discuss in a synoptic way the three main areas of research outlined in the previous paragraph. The three chapters of this part correspond to those three areas of interest. Finally part four, the *Conclusion*, advances a little beyond the strict confines of Philo's use of the *Timaeus* and attempts to place the results of the inquiry in a more general perspective.

The aim of this study is, as already said, to investigate the use that Philo made of Plato's philosophical dialogue in *all* his writings. But, as the briefest perusal will confirm, the vast majority of those writings are concerned with the direct exegesis and explanation of the Pentateuch. For this reason it is inevitable that the relation between *philosophy* and *exegesis* will be a constantly recurring *Leitmotiv* in our study. 'Philosophy' we take to refer not only to the tradition of Greek philosophy found in the pages of Plato and outside them, but also in more general terms to the practice of reflecting and arguing on the nature and meaning of reality. 'Exegesis' in our context indicates above all the attempt to understand and expound the meaning of the scriptural text, but can also be applied to the exposition of other authoritative texts such as Homer or indeed Platonic writings. (The parallel aspects of such exegesis to the scriptural exegesis which Philo practises will engage

our attention, especially when we discuss the influence of Middle Platonism.) It is evident that the two terms, as we use them, are not mutually exclusive. Philosophical exegesis is possible, and so is exegetical philosophy, but it will not do simply to identify these two.⁴ The reader is asked to keep the problem of the relation between philosophy and exegesis in Philo's oeuvre in mind throughout his reading of our study, until we specifically address the subject in the concluding part.

Lastly a note of caution must be sounded. Though perhaps superfluous, to leave it unsaid is to take too great a risk. The subject matter of this study, by its very nature, entails a necessary and one-sided concentration on the philosophically orientated aspects of Philo's works. The least that can be said of Philo is that he was a many-sided author. Many aspects of Philonic studies - such as, for example, his handling of the Biblical text, his relation to Palestinian Judaism, his possible use of mythological motifs from the Hellenistic religions, the relevance of his writings for our knowledge of the political, social and liturgical activities of Alexandrian Judaism, and so on - are touched on only marginally, if at all. The reader of this study will thus not get a picture of Philo 'in the round'. But at the same time I will readily confess that I would not have undertaken a project of this scope, were it not my conviction that it is concerned with a very important facet of Philo's achievement.

CHAPTER TWO

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PHILONIC STUDIES

Is it necessary to commence a study on Philo with some remarks, however brief, on Philonic scholarship? One might well argue that it is better to plunge in medias res and let the texts speak for themselves. The function of scholarly studies should be to elucidate Philo's writings and contribute to the understanding of his thought, not to lead a life of their own. Perhaps one might envisage an ideal in which the ipsissima verba Philonis are approached with a mind unencumbered by the scholarly constructs and hypotheses accumulated over the centuries. But it must be conceded that such an ideal is impracticable, and indeed not without its dangers. A direct confrontation with Philo's writings is likely to prove a disconcerting experience for the unprepared reader. Those interested in ancient farming, for example, are certainly not going to find in the De agricultura what they are looking for. It is perhaps just as risky to approach Philo without consultation of secondary studies as it is to form a picture of him on the basis of such works alone. The result is that students of Philo's thought are inevitably influenced by the diverse currents of past scholarship, and even more by the trends of their own time.

The task for us here will not be to present a history of scholarship on Philo - this has been done often and successfully enough¹ - but to delineate certain developments in Philonic research which emerge in a number of recent studies. Explicit criticism of these studies will be limited, because the main thrust of their picture of Philo will be evaluated in the course of our study. The reader will detect, in the selection I have made, a certain bias in the direction of our theme, but the wider implications for an understanding of Philo's achievement as a whole will be evident. The remarks will be concluded with a brief mention of those studies which have already explored certain aspects of our subject, the use made by Philo of Plato's Timaeus.

2.1. A quintet of dissension

Philo was once described as 'die komplizierteste und den verschiedensten Einflüssen ausgesetzte Persönlichkeit des Altertums'.¹ There are absolutely no grounds for thinking that this rather dismaying statement has any validity - nothing at all is known about Philo's personality - but it certainly gives

an excellent indication of the great difficulties encountered by scholars in grappling with the writings that he bequeathed to posterity. Rarely has there been such a manifest dissensio eruditorum on the nature and significance of an author's achievement as in the case of Philo. We shall illustrate it with the briefest mention of five classic studies on Philo written between 1930 and 1950,² which each in their own way endeavoured to present a 'synthetic' portrait of Philo and have exerted a profound influence on the course of Philonic studies.

Isaac HEINEMANN, on the basis of a painstaking analysis of the presentation of the Mosaic legal prescriptions in the De specialibus legibus, concluded that Philo's Jewish piety determines the choice of the copious Greek 'Bildungsgut' in his writings, but that the dominance of Greek modes of thought is so great that his Jewish heritage is entirely spiritualized and its special character is in danger of becoming lost.³ Erwin GOODENOUGH went much further in his affirmation of Philo's Hellenization. Philo is a mystic philosopher in the Hellenistic tradition, but with important syncretistic oriental elements added.⁴ The Allegorical Commentary guides the mystic in his quest for knowledge of and ultimately union with the Deity via the two stages of the Mystery of Aaron and the Mystery of Moses, in which ascent the Law of Moses functions as no more than a starting-point. In Walther VÖLKER's study Philo the Jew makes an impressive comeback.⁵ There is much Greek material in Philo's writings, but it is wholly devoid of system and full of inconsistencies. It must be seen in the light of Philo's 'Grundhaltung' as a God-fearing, Law-abiding Jew, whose piety differs little from that of Jesus ben Sirach. Greek terminology and doctrines are no more than scaffolding, which can be methodically stripped away once the centrality of Philo's Jewish piety is recognized. The magisterial tomes of Harry Austryn WOLFSON on Philo are likely to deceive the reader if he is not careful.⁶ By using his 'hypothetico-deductive method' to uncover the latent processes of Philo's thought, Wolfson was able to present Philo as a 'philosopher in the grand manner', who develops a tight-knit philosophical system of his own in response to and in constant debate with Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics. But, note well, this philosophical system proves to be Jewish to the very core, being based on scripture as revelation and taking a number of scriptural presuppositions as its starting-point. Philo initiates the Jewish, Christian and Islamic philosophies of the Middle Ages and his teachings are the dominant influence in European philosophy until Spinoza. Wolfson was unable to explain, however, why Philo chose to present his philosophy in a form so unsuited to its systematic structure. It would be unfair to compare the study of André-Jean FESTUGIÈRE with the other four.⁷ He devoted only

one long chapter of his great work on the intellectual antecedents of the Hermetica to Philo, but in it he revealed an attitude typical of many classical scholars. Philo is a perfect example of the educated man produced by the dozen in the Hellenistic schools. Philosophical doctrines are detached from their context, and merely serve to illustrate Biblical texts or form the basis for rhetorical display. One can read the whole of Philo's works without coming across a single original thought...

The vast chasm which separates the extravagant claims of Wolfson and the contemptuous dismissal of Festugière reveals more forcefully than anything else the failure of the scholars of this generation to reach a consensus on the way Philo should be understood and evaluated.⁸ The points of dispute can be summed up under four headings.

(1) Heinemann's attempt to show that Philo achieved a synthesis of Hellenism and Judaism did not manage to solve all the problems associated with the relation between Philo Alexandrinus and Philo Judaeus. Is the core of Philo's thinking Jewish, or more specifically determined by the 'Grundhaltung' of Judaic piety (Völker, Wolfson), or has the importation of Greek philosophical and/or religious ideas transformed his thought into something that is no longer essentially Jewish (Goodenough)? Also the question of Philo's relation to Palestinian Judaism and the Rabbinical Oral Law remained unresolved, with Heinemann and Wolfson reaching exactly opposite conclusions.⁹

(2) What is the role of Greek philosophy in Philo's writings? For Wolfson Philo is most definitely a philosopher, who restructures the entire structure of Greek philosophy, systematically matching the great Greek philosophers on their own ground. Goodenough considered Philo to be more interested in mystical experience than philosophical reasoning, while Völker regarded the philosophy in Philo as a scaffolding which needs to be dismantled in order to understand him. For Festugière philosophy is too big a word for Philo's collection of topoi and banalities. Another question which constantly recurs is whether Philo's thought is primarily influenced by the philosophy of Plato or by the doctrines of the Stoa through the mediation of Posidonius.¹⁰ Wolfson and Goodenough opted for the former (even if much transformed), while Heinemann (as Zeller and Cohn before him) was inclined to choose the latter.¹¹

(3) A third crux is Philo's attitude to the Law of Moses. No one could deny that Philo considered it necessary to observe the Law and devoted a good deal of his writings to its explanation. But how important was it to him? Heinemann and Goodenough both considered that the Mosaic Law has a special place in Philo's heart, but that ultimately it is subordinated to the Law of Nature and the rationalism of the Greek philosophical tradition. Wolfson and

Völker, on the contrary, placed the Law of Moses at the centre of Philo's thought, but disagreed sharply on the nature of the edifice which he constructs on the foundation of that Law.

(4) The entire quintet of scholars had in common that they found it difficult to come to terms with the formal aspect of Philo's writings. Wolfson showed the virtue of frankness when he affirmed that the artificiality of the literary form of Philo's exegetical writings tends to obscure his true thought.¹² Goodenough would have had to agree, since there are more suitable ways of introducing the mystic ascent than in complex chains of exegesis. Völker considered that the source of the exegetical tractates was the homilies of the Synagogue; hence their edificatory tone and totally unsystematic and rambling character. But could one imagine even the most devoted student of the Law actually listening to Philo's convoluted exegetical explanations?

2.2. A quintet of recent studies

For a decade or so after the publication of Wolfson's great tomes there appeared to be a kind of lull in Philonic research. Not that the stream of books and articles on Philo dried up during these years. Much continued to be written and published,¹ but one gets the impression of consolidation rather than the quest for new avenues of research. If we should look for an event which ushered in the modern period of Philonic study, I would propose the commencement of the undertaking to translate the entire Corpus Philonicum into French under the editorship of Arnaldez, Pouilloux and Mondésert.² This ambitious project involved the cooperation of about twenty-five scholars, so that there is naturally a good deal of variation in the quality of the work produced. Some parts of series are no more than mediocre translations without notes or significant introductions, others are of the highest standard and virtually amount to complete commentaries on the works in question. On 11-15 September 1966 the translators, like the Septuaginta scholars of old, assembled together at Lyon and, in the company of other French experts on Philo and his 'Umwelt', held a Colloque which must be considered a high point in the history of Philonic studies.³ It is appropriate, therefore, that we begin our review of recent studies with a French scholar who participated in both the translation series and the Colloque.

(a) Harl - Philo as a homo religiosus

To Marguerite HARL the assignment was given to prepare a translation of the treatise Quis rerum divinarum heres sit.⁴ Recognizing the richness of

thought in this work and the important place it occupies in the expression of Philo's cosmological ideas, she devoted to it a lengthy introduction which virtually amounted to a separate monograph.⁵ Certain of her ideas on how to study Philo were repeated at the Colloque mentioned above, where her paper concentrated on the Philonic fragment, De Deo.⁶

Harl's starting point is the recognition of the 'double culture' of Philo, who expresses 'des idées grecques avec des expressions juives et des convictions juives avec des symboles grecs', whose works and thought constantly appear to play on diverse levels, 'soit que les images grecques expriment sa foi juive, soit que les images juives revêtent des convictions profondément grecques'.⁷ The question is whether there is a unifying element in Philo's thought. For her views on the nature of Philo's Greek culture Harl appears much indebted to Festugière, though she criticizes that scholar for being too severe and narrow in his judgment. Philo's Greek ideas and images are devoid of any novelty, being drawn from the philosophical koinē of his time.⁸ But a closer examination reveals his originality, for one discovers resonances quite different from those of the 'piété hellénistique commune'.⁹ The key to Harl's understanding of Philo's thought lies in the distinction which she habitually makes between the *philosophical* mode of expression and the *religious* mode which passes beyond the level of discursive thinking and logic and is primarily concerned with the relation to God.¹⁰ Philo has interiorized the Jewish religion and discovered a means of giving expression to his highly charged religious sensibility. He is the first representative of a new type of homo religiosus.¹¹

So in analysing what she considers to be the three main themes of the treatise – the relation between God and the cosmos as seen in the division of the universe, the Odyssey of the soul, the Levitic spirituality of abandonment of the world, supplication and consecration to God – Harl finds time and time again that Philo's text appears to be very Greek but is in fact profoundly Jewish, that Philo uses the language of Greek culture to express ideas that are deeply rooted in the Biblical text and in Jewish faith.¹² For example, the source of the notion of the Logos tomeus is so difficult to locate precisely in Greek philosophical ideas, despite many superficial parallels, because the primary impulse is given by the Biblical conception of God's dividing Word and exegesis of the fiery sword of Gen.3:24.¹³

One may well ask whether Harl in fact represents an advance in relation to the Völkerian interpretation of Philo. I think she does in two respects. From the methodological angle she is conscious of the importance of Philo's exegetical method and follows the sinuous thematics of Philo's text without enclosing them in a systematic straightjacket.¹⁴

...l'interprète du texte de Philon ne doit se satisfaire que lorsqu'il

a réussi à identifier, en les isolant, les différents éléments, conceptuels ou imagés, que Philon emprunte à sa double culture, grecque et juive; le plus souvent, il doit arriver à mettre ces éléments en équivalences, en doublets, que ceux-ci soient reconnus comme tels par Philon ou qu'inversement il cache l'un des modes d'expression. L'interprète de Philon doit, d'autre part, rassembler autour d'un passage le plus grand nombre de textes parallèles qui lui permettent de connaître les divers registres sur lesquels le thème est présenté, afin d'arriver à saisir, à travers tous, la cohérence de la vision des choses.

Through this method she is better able (e.g. than Völker) to do justice to the Greek philosophical themes used by Philo. Secondly, the attempt to find a 'coherence in Philo's view of things' represents a significant specification of the 'Jewish piety' which Völker and Heinemann left too vague. Harl regards certain Jewish ideas and symbols as giving a unity to Philo's cosmological thought (even if they are often illustrated by Greek 'doublets'), namely the ark of the covenant, the theme of migration and the notion of Levitic spirituality.¹⁵

(b) The Philo Institute - Philo and his tradition

A second major event in recent Philonic studies occurred in 1971. The Philo Institute was established in Chicago by a group of enthusiastic scholars, with the aim 'to encourage basic research in the Philonic corpus in particular, and to promote scholarship in Hellenistic Judaism in general'.¹⁶ In the following year a journal, Studia Philonica, was launched in order to stimulate Philonic research.¹⁷ It goes without saying that not all the members of the Institute hold the same views on Philo. Nevertheless a certain convergence can be detected, and it is not unfair to associate that body with a particular way of approaching Philo's writings.

At the first annual meeting Robert HAMERTON-KELLY presented a programmatic essay.¹⁸ Philo deserves renewed attention, to be expended not on further studies of 'ideas' and 'concepts', but rather on "'introduction" matters' such as the structure, intention, sources and traditions of each individual treatise. Philo's 'thought' presents such a bewildering picture because his writings are read in the way that the Bible was read in pre-critical times. Analysis of source material, genre, structure and vocabulary, if carried out with tact and precision, is likely to lead to fresh and interesting results. At the annual meeting four years later Burton MACK put forward a proposal which considerably widened the aims formulated by Hamerton-Kelly and at the same time brought them into sharper focus.¹⁹

Philo stands at the end of a long development of scriptural exegesis in the Alexandrian synagogue. His writings present such a complex picture because he has incorporated in them various exegetical methods and themes, employed with varying degrees of acceptance and reworked with varying degrees of

consistency. By means of an analysis of the entire Philonic corpus it may be possible to identify certain coherent exegetical traditions of the synagogue, and ultimately its history may be written. These theological traditions are emphatically *exegetical* in nature, representing various ways of reading and interpreting the Pentateuch. The procedure is unashamedly circular:²⁰

The characteristics of the exegetical systems must be won by studies which encompass the entire Philonic corpus in relation to the whole of the Pentateuch, before detailed analyses of the individual treatises can be done with care and profit. But the evidence from the detailed analyses needs then to be incorporated into the attempt to reconstruct the history of the systems.

Much of Mack's paper is devoted to outlining methods which, by investigating the formal and material aspects of Philo's treatises, will allow the identification of basic types of Pentateuchal interpretation.²¹ As a working hypothesis six types are proposed.²² Philo's own contribution to the development of Alexandrian exegesis cannot be determined until the nature of his received traditions and his reworking of them is clarified. It is likely, however, that this original contribution may lie in the 'psychologization' of allegories which had already been developed in the exegetical traditions.²³

Of great interest to us is Mack's way of dealing with the philosophical material found in the Corpus. Convinced that 'an exegetical tradition is more than the discovery of the reflection of Hellenistic philosophy in the pages of the Bible' and that the theological concerns of the Alexandrian synagogue were mapped out *before* an interest in Hellenistic philosophy arose, Mack proposes provisionally to *bracket* the question of the derivation of concepts, terminology and conceptual systems from the philosophical schools.²⁴ A classification of word-fields might show how certain theological traditions prefer to use certain conceptual conventions (Stoic, Platonic...) in their exegesis of scripture. Here in my view the circulus noted above is in danger of becoming viti-
osus, for also in Mack's other studies it is apparent that he regards mythological themes from Hellenistic (and Egyptian) religion as more important than philosophy in the formation of Philo's thought.²⁵ Noteworthy too is that the attitude towards the Law in the Alexandrian synagogue cannot be assumed to be fixed. It may prove possible to discover the existence of various ways of regarding the Books of Moses.²⁶

Mack's proposal is nothing if not ambitious. It now forms the basis for the Claremont Philo Project, a long-term project being carried out by a team of scholars. So at the present time his ideas form no more than a hypothesis and the results will have to be awaited.²⁷ The basic assumption that Philo's works record traditional material and reflect developments in Alexandrian exegesis seems to me entirely sound. The methods proposed cannot, however, give rise to high expectations. Unless an author indicates his sources, source-

criticism must always be based either on comparison with other writings or on the lack of coherence and consistency of the writer being studied. There is virtually no other evidence for the development of Alexandrian exegesis which can be used for comparative purposes. And if (as I think) Philo has been successful in integrating and indeed transforming his received traditions, investigation of his sources cannot proceed beyond speculation. There is, therefore, a real danger that the baby will be thrown out with the bathwater.²⁸

A more limited but in my view more fruitful attempt to relate Philo to the traditions of Alexandrian exegesis has recently been made by David HAY. In two articles he has collected all the explicit references in Philo's works to exegetical predecessors, both those who practised allegorical exegesis and those who went no further than literal explanation of the sacred text.²⁹ The hypothesis of a long-standing school or synagogue tradition behind Philo's writings is essentially confirmed. But at the same time the lack of criteria for determining where tradition ends and personal contributions begin clearly emerges. The question of Philo's originality and importance remains largely a matter of judgment.

(c) Nikiprowetzky - Philo as exegete of scripture

In 1977 Valentin NIKIPROWETZKY published his study entitled Le commentaire de l'Écriture chez Philon d'Alexandrie, in our view the most important work written on Philo since the great studies described in the previous section.³⁰ An apt title for the book might have been 'Prolegomena to the study of Philo',³¹ for Nikiprowetzky's aim is not to present yet another account of Philo's thought, but rather to examine what Philo's intentions were in writing his treatises and to determine, in consequence, the way that they should be read. Two particular problems engage his attention. Firstly it is necessary to identify the nature of the Jewish and the Greek components of Philo's thought. Secondly it is necessary to confront the disconcerting architecture of Philo's writings. Nikiprowetzky's thesis, put forward with extraordinary clarity and argumentative force, is that both these questions can be resolved if it is recognized that Philo is an exegete of scripture who writes commentaries in the technical sense of the term.

Among those who regard the Greek side of Philo as predominant there are two main approaches, both of which must be rejected. The presentation of Philo as a systematic philosopher in the classic mould inevitably leads to a distortion of his thought. He is essentially a critic of all the philosophical schools. The task of uncovering philosophical parallels for his thought is important (and as yet by no means exhausted), but can never amount to more than an auxiliary aspect of research.³² Equally misguided is the attempt

(Goodenough!) to discern a Jewish mystery in dependence on Hellenistic religious ideas. The language of mystery and ecstasy which is so common in Philo must be seen in the perspective of the Platonic literary tradition and should not be taken literally. The true 'mysticism' of Philo is motivated by Jewish realities and especially by the allegorical process. The scriptural text is as a dream, its hidden meaning accessible only to the prophetically inspired, as illustrated in the contemplative activity of the Therapeutae.³³ But also those who emphasize the Judaic aspect of Philo must specify the nature of his Judaism. The notion that Philo could read Hebrew and stood in close contact to the traditions of Palestinian Judaism is not supported by the evidence.³⁴

If, therefore, Nikiprowetzky follows Völker (and Harl) in emphasizing the centrality of the Judaic aspect in Philo, he goes further than they in specifying precisely what the focal point of his Judaic piety is.³⁵ It is located in his loyalty to the Law of Moses, which he regards as the fount of all wisdom and truth and to the exegesis of which he devotes all the time he can spare. The word φιλοσοφία is used in diverse senses, but in its most profound meaning as 'authentic philosophy' it refers to the study of scripture.³⁶ Those texts which portray θεωρία or φυσιογνωσία as nature-study in the manner of the Greeks are not on the same level as those which present it as exploring the hidden depths of the Law. Nikiprowetzky is strongly opposed to those views which regard the Mosaic Law as an inferior man-made copy of the higher Law of Nature.³⁷ The Law of Nature and the Law of Moses are identical in an absolute and not a relative sense. The Law of Nature which the cosmos obeys must be transposed to the level of man the microcosm, and this is achieved by the Law of Moses, which has God as ultimate author.

Philo's exegetical activity is fully consistent with his conception of the Law of Moses. The *exegete* starts off with the scriptural text as a received datum and attempts to uncover its hidden meaning, in contrast to the *philosopher*, who might use scripture as a starting-point for his own free-wheeling speculations. Scholars have been misled by Philo's use of philosophical terminology. In fact he virtually never gives his opinion in abstracto on a doctrine of Plato, Aristotle or the Stoa, but rather to enlighten his readers on a scriptural problem.³⁸ They have moreover not understood the intrinsic relation between the literary form of Philo's writings and his purpose in writing them. The exegetical treatises are not philosophical tracts, nor compilations (Bousset), nor records of synagogal sermons (Völker), nor study-guides for Sabbath-schools (Wolfson). They are *scriptural commentaries in the technical sense of the term*, reflecting exegesis in the Synagogue and based on the question and answer method used there.³⁹

What are Philo's aims in writing his lengthy series of commentaries?

They cannot be seen apart from their historical situation, which gives them their markedly apologetic character. The Laws of Moses are to be interpreted in a way acceptable to Hellenistic thinking, but within the limits imposed by the role of the exegete. Philosophy supplies a *language of reason* used by the exegete to plumb the depths of scripture.⁴⁰ It is primarily propaedeutic, supplying categories, concepts and ideas, and as such is a *sine qua non*.⁴¹

Si le texte scripturaire donne leur sens exact aux notions philosophiques que Philon met en oeuvre à son propos, ce sont ces mêmes notions philosophiques que le commentateur porte en lui-même, qui lui permettent d'apercevoir le sens profond de la Bible. Voilà pourquoi, dans le système exégétique de Philon, la culture philosophique, loin de fournir à un pur moyen apologétique, représente une condition *sine qua non*.

Nikiprowetzky is thus able to find a place for an aspect of Philo which has long troubled commentators, his *scepticism*.⁴² Philo is certainly not a true sceptic, but he recognizes that many central questions of philosophy are beyond the sure comprehension of the human mind, even with the help of the Law of Moses. The Essenians, who seriously occupy themselves with ethics and that part of physics which deals with God's existence and the creation of the cosmos, but leave the rest of physics and the whole of logic to the sophists, represent in some respects an idealization of Philo's own attitudes.⁴³

Much emphasis is placed on the important influence of Plato on Philo's thought, even though it must be recognized that Plato's ideas are transferred to Jewish realities.⁴⁴ To Plato Philo is indebted for the notion of 'authentic philosophy'. Just as in Plato the vision of being is reached by dialectic, so in Philo inspired exegesis of scripture leads to knowledge of God. Even the central theme around which Philo's interpretation of scripture is constructed, the theme of *migration*, is largely inspired by Plato's philosophy.

Nikiprowetzky presents Philo as a thinker of considerable stature. The negative picture so often painted of him (Festugière!) has been caused by the fact that his intentions have been radically misunderstood. It is only when justice has been done to both the Judaic and Greek poles of Philo's thought that one can pass beyond this polarity and recognize a 'mutation qualitative' which constitutes his originality. Philo created a new language which was destined to become an instrument of capital importance for religious thought.⁴⁵ The methodological conclusions which Nikiprowetzky draws are consistent with his main thesis.⁴⁶ It is futile to construct a Philonism as a coherent philosophical system in the way one can construct a Platonism or Thomism. Philo is betrayed if his ideas are wrenched from their exegetical context, for the sage is then married to Hagar and not to Sarah. A study of Philo is likely to be fruitful if one concentrates on an *exegetical* theme. All the relevant texts must be taken into account. It is unwise to posit a hierarchy of texts, inviting psychological speculation on a man whose personal experience is quite

unknown. Philo's true thought is his quest to uncover the hidden truth of scripture.

(d) Dillon - Philo as a Middle Platonist

In the same year 1977 the Irish-American scholar John DILLON published a book with the title The Middle Platonists.⁴⁷ Those readers who eagerly turned to this first book-length study of Middle Platonism may have been somewhat surprised to encounter a long chapter devoted to Philo.⁴⁸ Dillon twice emphatically states that he is attempting only a partial study of Philo, deliberately slanted towards the subject of Middle Platonism and leaving aside those aspects of his thought which have a Jewish background or are possibly original to himself.⁴⁹ Since, however, what he does say is persuasively presented and is likely to exert considerable influence, it seems reasonable to accord his study a place in our review.

In numerous ways it is evident that Philo had gone through the full Greek basic education, culminating in philosophical studies. He is particularly well read in Plato, his favourite dialogues being the Timaeus and the Phaedrus. Dillon envisages that Philo at a certain stage of his education experienced a kind of conversion, a rediscovery of his own culture and traditions.⁵⁰ He came to realize that the Books of Moses contained the highest and most profound philosophy, and that he could use his knowledge of Greek philosophy to extract that philosophy by means of the allegorical process. His view that the Greek philosophers owed their best ideas to Moses is in fact an extension of Middle Platonist views on the development of the philosophical tradition. But *in practice* Moses the great philosopher amounts to Moses the great Middle Platonist. The doctrines which he is made to profess bear an extraordinary resemblance to the Stoicized Platonism of Antiochus of Askalon and even more to the Platonism of Eudorus of Alexandria.⁵¹ Philo himself adds a distinctive streak of Jewish piety, which leads to a greater reverence for God than one would expect from a Greek philosopher, and also occasionally to a downgrading of the human intellect (if unaided by God's grace), i.e. a rather unexpected scepticism.

Dillon's account gains a polemical edge when he argues against the Wolfsonian conception that Philo constructed an eclectic synthesis of the entire tradition of Greek philosophy. But it would also be wrong to regard him as a superficial dilettante. He was a man who read the texts for himself, but drew on a coherent scholastic tradition to understand and explain them.⁵² Dillon's rejection of an 'eclectic' Philo concurs with a main thesis of his work. It is well-known that the Middle Platonists appropriated much Pythagorean, Stoic and Aristotelian terminology and doctrine. Dillon detects a consistent rationale

behind this practice which should not be described as 'eclectic'.⁵³ The Stoics and the Peripatos plugged certain gaps in Plato's work and 'modernized' it, while Pythagoreanism was seen as one of Plato's sources and so its doctrines could be presented as Platonic. Dillon's thesis therefore provides an attractive solution for the bewildering diversity of doctrines present in Philo's works. Within the framework of the scholastic manner of presenting philosophy (first the criterion and the telos, then Ethics, Physics, Logic)⁵⁴ he gives a most interesting and readable account of Philo's philosophical ideas, attempting to show that the Platonic ideas in his writings have a Middle Platonist background and that much of the so-called Stoic, Aristotelian and Neopythagorean material also filters down to him through this school. Vacillation and inconsistency are undeniably present, but on the whole Philo draws on a coherent tradition.⁵⁵

Can Philo be called a Middle Platonist? Dillon does not actually take this step, but since Moses is a 'fully-fledged Middle Platonist',⁵⁶ that label can hardly be refused his disciple. Indeed a certain ambivalence characterizes Dillon's portrait. It is confessedly partial, yet the reader is easily seduced into taking pars for totum. He soon forgets that Philo's primary allegiance was not to Pythagoras and Plato, but to the lawgiver Moses. Nonetheless the large number of Platonist doctrines which Dillon locates in Philo are highly significant. To many of them we must return in the course of our study. This provocative account forces us to take a stand.

(e) Winston - Philo philosophico-mysticus

The final scholar whose views on Philo we wish to include in this review is another American, David WINSTON. In 1981 he published a comprehensive anthology of Philo's writings, presented in an English translation.⁵⁷ In a densely-written introduction to his selection of Philonic passages he presents a novel interpretation of Philo that commands our attention.⁵⁸ In agreement with Dillon but going a step further, Winston presents Philo as a 'convinced and ardent Platonist' with pronounced mystical tendencies.⁵⁹ Philo is not to be seen as an original philosopher in the manner of Plato, but rather as a highly competent student of the entire range of the Greek philosophical tradition available to him. Although passionately devoted to a mystical form of Platonism, he was convinced that it was possible to assimilate this way of thinking to his Jewish heritage. There is much traditional scholastic material (both philosophical and exegetical) in his writings. His genius was to select, modify, amplify, refine and synthesize this great mass of material and place it in service of an elaborate religious-philosophical world-view.⁶⁰

Philo could have, asserts Winston, presented his synthesis of Judaism and Hellenism in the form of philosophical essays dealing with the major themes of Biblical thought, in this way providing his readers with a precise and systematic exposition of his thought. Why then did he choose to give complex philosophical exegesis of the Pentateuch? There is a parallel with Plato's use of the dialogic form.⁶¹ By writing a detailed scriptural commentary Philo wished to show that the mystical Platonism he championed was not his own construct, but could be derived from nearly every verse in the Mosaic writings. This procedure inevitably resulted in considerable obscurity, but Philo thought the price worth paying.⁶² Moreover his procedure appears to have been to speak to different audiences on different levels of comprehension:⁶³

It is the nature of such a pedagogical approach that it renders wellnigh impossible any effort to determine with precision which of the two traditions [i.e. the biblical and the philosophical] ultimately has the upper hand when irreconcilable differences between them can no longer be adequately suppressed. In the last analysis, it is the subtle inner flow of Philo's general thought that must guide our interpretation of any particular issue that is obscured by the almost deliberate ambiguity projected by so much of his writing.

In spite of such obscurities and ambiguities Winston finds it possible to identify the main thrust of Philo's thought. His philosophical views are essentially Middle Platonist.⁶⁴

In the confines of the introduction to the anthology naturally not all aspects of Philo's thought could be adequately dealt with. Winston focusses his account of Philo's philosophical ideas on two themes, the doctrine of creation and his mysticism. The theory of Wolfson that Philo espoused a creatio ex nihilo must be rejected. Philo posits a pre-existent matter, which from a logical point of view has God as its indirect source, but cannot be described as the direct result of God's creative activity.⁶⁵ In contrast to the pluralism of Plato, Philo's philosophy is a mystical monism (or monotheism).⁶⁶ It is thus highly important to realize that Philo does not believe in a temporal creation, but rather in a creatio aeterna. The cosmos is eternally being produced by the processes of God's thought.⁶⁷ In the conception of God's total transcendence Philo's prophetic (i.e. Biblical) inheritance and his philosophical inheritance converge. Man's goal and ultimate bliss lie in the knowledge or vision of God, and this can be achieved in two ways. In the lower way one can only make use of the discursive reason. For the higher way Winston rejects the Wolfsonian interpretation of revelation bypassing the faculty of reason. Instead he proposes an inner intuitive illumination involving a rational process of the analytic type.⁶⁸ Total union with the Ultimate is of course not possible, but the mystic can aspire to union with an aspect of God, his Logos, of which man's mind is a tiny fragment. In achieving this timeless

union Moses was 'divinized'. It is also Philo's aspiration:⁶⁹

...it becomes abundantly clear that Philo was at least a "mystical theorist" (if not a "practicing mystic") in the very core of his being and that his philosophical writings cannot be adequately understood if this signal fact is in any way obscured.

Winston goes so far as to claim that Philo's world-view is astonishingly similar to that of the God-intoxicated Spinoza, but that the similarity is obscured by the fact that his philosophy 'is couched in the conciliatory idiom of Platonic mysticism and is further deliberately disguised to camouflage its more radical dimensions'.⁷⁰

Winston's view of Philo is novel, but he stands squarely in the tradition of Americal Philonic scholarship. One might say, to adopt a Biblical formula, that the method is the method of Wolfson, but the conclusions are the conclusions of Goodenough (with the amendments of Dillon taken into account). Winston falls prey to the same 'reconstructivism' which is so jarring in the large tomes of Wolfson, as well as that same scholar's tendency towards 'parallelomania'.⁷¹ A Philonic system is constructed by piecing together doctrines assembled without regard for their context. Philo's actual writings are regarded as obscuring his true thought. But the mystical philosophy produced in this way resembles the Mystic Way of Goodenough, with the important difference that more significance is accorded to Platonist philosophy and less to the influence of Hellenistic mystery religions. Noteworthy is that Winston reverts to a conception of Philo's view of the Law of Moses similar to that held by Goodenough. The Mosaic Law is only a written reflection of the Archetypal Law or the Divine Logos. Through the use of intuitive reason Philo felt he could bypass the written Torah and reach its noetic source, the Divine Logos.⁷²

2.3. Some trends

The enthusiasm which scholars have shown in attempting to reach a fuller understanding of Philo's achievement has not been without result. In the past twenty years undeniable advances have been made in Philonic scholarship. They can be summarized in a list of *trends*, to each of which a positive evaluation must be accorded.

(1) There is a growing awareness of the *importance of methodology* in studying Philo. It is gradually being realized that the picture one forms of Philo will be in large part determined by the assumptions made concerning the nature of his writings and the way they should be read. Nikiprowetzky's study is the best example of a salutary attention to 'preliminary' matters. It is noteworthy that most scholars have forsworn the attempt to produce works of a

'grand synthesis' in the manner of the 'quintet of dissension' outlined above. Less ambitious projects are being undertaken.¹ It is only when a lot of smaller problems have been solved and a measure of consensus on certain basic issues has been reached that it will be advisable to embark once more on a study which will present a picture of the whole Philo.

(2) Increasingly the attempt is being made to see Philo *against the background of his own time*. On the Jewish side the relation to currents of Alexandrian exegesis is being explored, while also the nagging problem of Philo's knowledge of Palestinian traditions needs to be resolved. On the Greek side the investigation into Middle Platonist affinities is promising. But constantly the researcher is confronted with a lack of evidence. It is much easier to use Philo to cast light on his surroundings than to use his surroundings to cast light on him. The problems here are often underestimated.

(3) The most important movement towards consensus in Philonic studies is the recognition of the *central role played by exegesis* in his work. Philo regarded himself as a commentator on scripture, and this has crucial consequences for the way his writings must be read and evaluated. A lifetime of exegetical activity indicates an exceedingly high regard for the Law of Moses which is the subject of that exegesis. But no consensus has as yet been achieved on the status which Philo accords the Mosaic Law in relation to the doctrines of Greek philosophy to which he appears to subscribe. Here, for example, the views of Nikiprowetzky and Winston are still diametrically opposed.

(4) Another point of consensus that cannot be ignored is the growing agreement among scholars on the profound influence which *Plato and the Platonist tradition* exerted on Philo's thought. Philo's debt to Plato is greater than to any other Greek philosopher, but to a large extent his understanding of Plato's philosophy, it is now argued, is filtered through the scholastic traditions of Middle Platonism. Once again, however, apparent agreement conceals a strong undercurrent of disagreement. Even if most scholars concur in refusing to regard Philo as a systematic philosopher, there are still widely differing views held on the importance of Greek philosophy for an understanding of his thought. The analysis of Philo's writings in the studies of Mack and Dillon have admittedly quite different aims, but a cursory reading might give the impression that they have nothing in common except the name of their protagonist.

In the hope that the present study will not be regarded as 'trendy' in the pejorative sense of 'fashionable' and 'ephemeral', I regard it as a fortunate circumstance that its subject encourages the continuation of certain healthy trends in Philonic research - in its investigation of an aspect of Philo's debt to Plato, its recognition of his role as exegete, its concern for the

importance of methodology, and its endeavour to place Philo in his historical context in the development of the history of thought.

2.4. Previous research on our subject

Every student of antiquity does well to recognize, with Bernard of Chartres, that, if he should prove able to see further than his predecessors, that is only possible because of the grand view he obtains when perched on their shoulders. Although this study is the first to be devoted to Philo's use of the *Timaeus* as a whole, several works have covered an aspect of the subject and many scholars have made important contributions *en passant*.

Philo rarely makes explicit references to Plato, but the reader who is acquainted with the Platonic corpus will soon recognize echoes of the great Athenian philosopher. Among the ancient *testimonia* the first reference to Philo's Platonism is made by EUSEBIUS, who declares that he outclassed his contemporaries in his zeal for the *κατὰ Πλάτωνα καὶ Πυθαγόραν ἀγωγή*.¹ JEROME is the first author to cite the famous proverb, *ἡ Πλάτων φιλονύζει ἢ φύλων πλατωνίζει*.² The proverb is repeated with approval by numerous Patristic authors and gives rise to much discussion on whether it refers to the style or content of Philo's writings. But the remarks on Philo's Platonism are generally too brief to dwell on his debts to specific doctrines or dialogues of Plato.³ THEODORUS the Metochite (12th century) interestingly described him as not altogether despising *τὸ φυσικόν*, but showing more interest in *τὰ ὑψηλά*, ethics and mathematics.⁴ In the seventeenth century Philo was gradually liberated from his bondage as a Christian father, and a more historically orientated examination was made of his writings. Thus, for example, in 1693 Johannes Albertus FABRICIUS wrote a brief but important study entitled *Exercitatio de Platonismo Philonis Iudaei*.⁵ There can be no doubt, he writes, that Philo attended the Platonic schools at Alexandria and that he spent a lot of time reading Plato's works.⁶ And with regard to Philo's description of the *κόσμος νοητός* at *Conf.* 172 he remarks:⁷

Qui Platonis legerit *Timaeum*, idem quoque minime dubitabit, hoc loco a Philone Platoniam referri spirarique doctrinam. Ipse Philo in libro de mundo incorruptibili, Platonis verba, ne quis dubitet, in medium affert.

Since Fabricius' concisely written dissertation has no footnotes, the references remain inexact. But it is clearly implied that Philo has drawn on Plato's *Timaeus*.⁸

It is, however, especially the scholarship of the last century or so that must be taken into account in our investigations. In the following catalogue I shall list those scholars who have made some contribution to the theme of

Philo's use of the Timaeus. Explanatory and critical comments will be kept to the minimum, being reserved where necessary for the relevant part of our study.

Edward ZELLER, though regarding Philo's Stoic ideas as more important than his Platonic doctrines, endeavoured to give the doctrines drawn from the Timaeus a place in a systematic account of Philo's philosophical thought.⁹ In their monumental edition of Philo's Greek texts Leopold COHN and Paul WENDLAND indicate many of Philo's references and allusions to the Timaeus.¹⁰ In 1900 the excellent dissertation by Jacob HOROVITZ on the Platonic νοητὸν ζῶον and the Philonic κόσμος νοητός appeared.¹¹ It deals with the way Philo has adapted and altered the doctrine of the noetic model in the Timaeus. Of all the studies on Philo this one most nearly approaches the contours of our subject, and even after eighty years there is much to be learnt from it. In his monograph on the philosophical and religious ideas of Philo Émile BRÉHIER gives a useful list of passages from the Timaeus used by Philo, as well as some instructive remarks on his theology and cosmology.¹² The study of Thomas BILLINGS on Philo's Platonism is an extremely valuable collection of parallels between Plato's and Philo's writings.¹³ Philo's relation to the Platonist tradition, however, is wholly ignored, with the result that the contribution made by the Timaeus to his Platonism is seriously underestimated. In his solid account of Philo's anthropology Helmut SCHMIDT gives numerous references to relevant passages in the Timaeus.¹⁴ The important role played by the Timaeus in the structure of Philo's philosophical ideas was recognized by Harry Austryn WOLFSON, and it is referred to frequently in his two magisterial tomes.¹⁵

By the 1960's articles covering more limited subjects start to take over from the more expansive books and dissertations published hitherto. Despite its unspecific title the article written by Pierre BOYANCÉ in 1963 deals with rather specific aspects of Philo's relation to Middle Platonism and Neopythagoreanism. Due recognition is given to the importance of the Timaeus.¹⁶ With even greater precision and attention to detail Willy THEILER carries on this line of research in two articles, one on Philo and the beginning of Imperial Platonism, the other on the evidence concerning the Hellenized Timaeus found in the De opificio mundi.¹⁷ Valentin NIKIPROWETZKY has contributed an important article on Philo's account of the Mosaic cosmogony, as well as many significant remarks in his monograph on Philo.¹⁸ Philo's views on creation and the use of intermediaries in the creation process have been extensively studied by Hans-Friedrich WEISS, with special reference to the relation between Hellenistic and Palestinian Judaism.¹⁹ Arguing against Horovitz, he finds Stoic physics no less important than the Timaeus. In 1968 Ursula FRÜCHTEL published a study on cosmological representations in Philo.²⁰ She recognizes four different cosmological traditions, derived from various philosophical schools.

The role of the Timaeus tends to be played down. The work has been criticized for assuming too straight-forward a derivation of Philo's ideas from the Greek philosophical tradition.²¹ The book of Georgios FARANDOS on Cosmos and Logos in Philo is shoddily produced and, though recognizing the importance of the Timaeus, contains no new material.²² It presents Philo as a systematic Platonizing philosopher with the doctrine of μεταβάστασις as the key to his thought. In a competent and highly informative study of the ancient interpretation of the genesis of the cosmos presented in the Timaeus, Matthias BALTES has analysed all the Philonic passages which are relevant to that interpretative problem.²³ In so doing he pays closer attention to certain passages in the 'Armenian Philo' than has hitherto been customary. The important contributions of John DILLON and David WINSTON have already been outlined.²⁴ An article was published in 1979 on Philo's doctrine of creation by Giovanni REALE. Much indebted to Wolfson, it regards Philo as revising the Timaeus and producing the first philosophical elaboration of a true creationism in the history of philosophy.²⁵ On the subject of creatio ex nihilo Gerhard MAY had one year earlier reached results totally opposed to those of Reale.²⁶ Lastly perhaps a mention should be made of my own article on the interpretative problem of the De aeternitate mundi, in which the central role which the Timaeus plays in the structure of the treatise and its ideas is demonstrated.²⁷

CHAPTER THREE

THE HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL SETTING

Together with the Septuagint Philo's writings are the most famous product of Alexandrian Judaism. The significance of Alexandria, as the backdrop for Philo's entire life and career, cannot be overestimated. Indeed it is fair to say that the phenomenon of Philo's thought could have occurred nowhere else except in the city founded in Egypt by Alexander the Great.¹ Although by Philo's time it was entering the long period of its decline, Alexandria was still a formidable bastion of Hellenistic culture, embodied in the institutions and traditions of the Greek polis, in the proud classicism of its temples and colonnades, and above all in those visible symbols of cultural supremacy, the Museum and the Library. Other factors contributed to make Alexandria the most important city in the Eastern Mediterranean and even a rival of Rome. It was the administrative centre of Roman Egypt, a flourishing port and commercial centre, and a point of confluence for peoples (and their religious traditions) from Egypt and the entire Near East.

From the beginning of the Ptolemaic period Jews from Palestine had settled in Alexandria, and before long it was the largest and most influential Jewish community in the Diaspora.² The Jews in Alexandria received, as did other foreign groups, the right to form their own *πολιτεῖα*, i.e. they were allowed to organize their own affairs and live according to their customs and traditions, though not possessing full political autonomy. Alexandrian Judaism differs in certain marked respects from the Judaism of the Palestinian homeland. The cultural dominance of Hellenism in the Near East was complete, and even Palestinian Judaism was unable to escape its impact.³ But the influence which Greek culture had on the Alexandrian Jews was much more profound and far-reaching in its effects. Within a few generations Greek had become the language spoken by all Alexandrian Jews. It thus became a matter of necessity that the sacred scriptures of the Jews be translated into the Greek tongue. The Septuagint, containing the Torah in Greek, gave Alexandrian Judaism its identity.⁴ Philo's statement that the translation is in no way inferior to the original gives expression to the fundamental conviction which allowed the Jews of his city to remain loyal to their *πάτρια ἔθνη*.⁵

It is possible, therefore, to detect a contradictory double tendency in Alexandrian Judaism.⁶ On the one hand there existed a deep loyalty to the Mosaic Law and the Jewish way of life based on that Law. The focal point of the community's activities was the Synagogue where the Law was read and studied.

As has already been observed, there was a rich tradition of exegesis of the sacred text.⁷ The loyalty to the Law and Jewish traditions was indispensable for preserving the identity of the Jewish community. On the other hand every effort was made to participate vigorously in the diverse aspects of Hellenistic cultural life, at any rate by the upper and middle classes of the Jewish population. In the Hellenistic polis education, citizenship and social-standing were subtly interrelated.⁸ The education received in the gymnasium gave access to citizenship and full acceptance into the social and cultural life of the Greek city.⁹ There is every reason to believe that well-to-do Jews enjoyed a Greek education in the gymnasia of Alexandria, in spite of the unavoidable association of these institutions with the practices of Hellenistic civic religion.¹⁰ Wolfson's thesis, based on a priori considerations and not concrete evidence, that the Jews established their own schools and organized their own theatres, athletic games and other cultural events, has not found acceptance.¹¹ The school of the Jews remained the Synagogue.¹² But the temptation certainly must have existed to become so immersed in Greek cultural and social life that the ties with Judaism became tenuous and purely formal. On the whole the distinction between participation and assimilation appears to have been preserved; recorded cases of actual apostasy are rare.¹³

A rich body of literature was produced by the Hellenistic Judaism of Alexandria.¹⁴ Only scraps are preserved, but they indicate that the Jews, at first naively but later with more sophistication, tried to beat the Greeks at their own game. The antiquity and superiority of the Jewish people was brought forward, as well as the claim that the achievement of Greeks had been at least partly derived from the Jews.¹⁵ The political undertones of all this should not be overlooked.¹⁶ The Jewish community was caught in a no man's land between the full privileges of the Greek polis and the inferior status of the Egyptians and other races. The goal was to achieve citizenship and social recognition, without being forced to be wholly assimilated to the Hellenic way of life. These efforts were strongly resisted by the Greek populace. Of all the innovations made in Alexandria anti-semitism is certainly the least-edifying.¹⁷ A long and arduous struggle took place which the Jews were bound to lose and which ended in total defeat.

Philo, as a member of one of the wealthiest and most prominent Jewish-Alexandrian families,¹⁸ could not possibly have avoided extensive contact with Greek culture and society. There is every reason to believe that he enjoyed such contacts and participated with enthusiasm in Alexandrian cultural life. He regularly mentions theatrical performances, dinner-parties, athletic contests and even chariot-races in his writings.¹⁹ The sine qua non for such par-

ticipation, we have seen, was a thoroughly Greek-oriented education. What can be said with confidence about Philo's education? The question must be approached from three angles.

(1) General considerations. Growing up in the period before the Jews were finally debarred from entering the gymnasium,²⁰ Philo no doubt received the Greek education taught there.²¹ Because of his family's wealth it is also possible that he received tuition from Greek tutors, just as he imagines Moses to have done in the ideal education portrayed in the De vita Moysis.²²

(2) The evidence in his writings. Philo tells very little about himself, but there can be little doubt that the stylized account of his love-affair with παιδεία at Congr. 74-76 contains an autobiographical element. Before pursuing φιλοσοφία, he writes, I studied the subjects of the ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία, grammar, geometry and music. Other subjects such as rhetoric, mathematics and astronomy must have also been included.²³

(3) The evidence of his writings. An analysis of Philo's works shows the remarkable extent to which he absorbed the cultural heritage of Hellenism.²⁴ They are written in a correct and fluent Hellenistic Greek with slight Atticizing tendencies. They reveal an intimate acquaintance with the main body of Greek literature and philosophy. Certainly, compared with a true Hellenist like Plutarch, there is an element of predictability in the nature of Philo's knowledge,²⁵ but it is false to present him as a dabbler or dilettante. It would thus be most unexpected to discover that he had not read all the more important dialogues of Plato and certainly the best-known of them, the Timaeus. But this would be to anticipate the result of our study before it has commenced.

Not enough has been said about the aspect of Philo's education which concerns us most of all, his philosophical training.²⁶ Here more than anywhere else Philo's silence concerning the sources of his education is greatly to be regretted. During the earlier Ptolemaic period there was no tradition of philosophical schools at Alexandria - this aspect of learning was left in the capable hands of Athens - but in the first century B.C. we hear of men such as Aristo, Dio, Eudorus, Potamon and Arius Didymus teaching philosophy in the city.²⁷ Through lack of evidence, however, we can gain no proper idea of how philosophy was taught and transmitted in the Alexandria of Philo's day. The evidence of the Corpus Philonicum (and especially of the philosophical treatises) makes it quite clear that Philo possessed a thorough and wide-ranging knowledge of the diverse currents of Greek philosophy. One imagines that this was not solely the result of private reflection on the philosophical texts and commentaries to which his wealth gave him access, and that he must have received some kind of formal training. Dillon suggests that he may have atten-

ded the lectures of contemporary Platonists.²⁸ It is once more possible that he called in the assistance of philosophical tutors.²⁹ For the actual historical context of Philo's philosophical training we must grope in the dark, with only the incontrovertible evidence of his writings to guide us.

A final word should be said concerning the audience which Philo envisaged for his works. Even if he may have written them in the first place for his own personal satisfaction, he must have allowed their dissemination. Was his aim in the first place to reach fellow Jews, or also Greek readers who were sympathetic to Jewish ideas? It must be agreed with Sandmel that the former is more likely.³⁰ Many Jews in the upper circles in which Philo moved must have been indifferent or on the verge of apostasy. The most famous example is Philo's own nephew, Alexander, who in the words of Josephus 'did not remain loyal to his ancestral beliefs'.³¹ Philo tried to show that Jews need not be ashamed of their heritage, that loyalty to the Law did not entail a rejection, but precisely a deepening of the ideas of Hellenism. But one cannot help thinking that Philo would have greatly desired that Greeks too became sympathetic to his message of the non-inferiority (if not superiority) of Judaism.³² In our study we shall be concentrating on the intellectual aspect of Philo's synthesis of Judaism and Hellenism. Let it not be forgotten, however, that the writings which we analyse have a concrete historical background. They bear witness to, and indeed participated in, the bitter and protracted struggle for survival and recognition which was the fate of the Jewish community in Alexandria.³³

CHAPTER FOUR

THE TIMAEUS FROM PLATO TO THE AGE OF PHILO

The distance in time which separates Plato and Philo is almost exactly that which separates us from Shakespeare, Bacon and the translators of the King James Version of the Bible. The political and cultural differences between Plato's Athens and Philo's Alexandria may have been less than between us and Elizabethan England. Nevertheless, if a time machine could have transported Plato to Roman Alexandria, he would have been amazed, one suspects, and not a little uncomfortable. Many factors conspired to bring about that Philo and his contemporaries read the Timaeus in a different manner than Plato could have intended. But first one might ask why this specific philosophical work was read at all. Historical and cultural factors explain why Greek philosophy was pursued in Alexandria; for the popularity of the Timaeus primarily intellectual reasons must be sought. These will occupy our attention in the following sketch of the 'history' of the Timaeus from its first appearance to the age of Philo. Naturally specific interpretative problems and the complexities of philosophical argument cannot be adequately discussed in such an account. This would be the subject of a much-needed book.¹ The task will be here to clarify some lines of development. It will become clear in the course of our sketch that it will have to proceed a little beyond Philo's time, i.e. to the second century A.D., in order to understand the interpretative context of his reading of the Timaeus.

(a) a problematic inheritance

It is not known how the Timaeus was received when it first appeared. Perhaps Plato's fellow-philosophers and students were surprised to confront the fusion of myth, philosophy and natural science which came from the master's hand; perhaps the myths in earlier dialogues and the long tradition of Greek cosmogonies had prepared them for it. Plato must have been about seventy years old by then, old enough to be an emeritus. But philosophers do not retire easily. The Chernissian picture of him as a rather aloof figure, declining to discuss the interpretation of his works with his colleagues in the Academy, seems quite implausible.² Nevertheless there can be no doubt that in writing the Timaeus Plato bequeathed to his successors a problematic inheritance. Right from the start there were difficulties. The following list gives a selection of the main problems of interpretation which gave rise to controversy.³

(1) Is the creational event to be regarded as an act which takes place in time

or does it symbolize an eternal process of genesis? (2) What is the identity of the demiurge and what is his relation to the world of the ideas? (3) How are we to conceive the nature and activity of the receptacle? (4) What is the relation between the analysis of reality in the Timaeus and the metaphysics presented in books VI & VII of the Republic and the so-called Unwritten doctrines?⁴ (5) Is Plato's evaluation of the cosmos and its parts (especially the celestial beings) in the final analysis positive or negative? (6) How is man's soul related to the cosmic soul, the demiurge and the ideas?

The statement of Dillon that in the Timaeus Plato left behind problems which he himself 'must have declined to solve' seems to me unfortunate.⁵ Certainly Plato recognized his limitations. He continually emphasizes that his account of the cosmos is no more than probable; he refuses to reveal precisely who the demiurge is or to discuss the ἀρχαί of the elemental triangles.⁶ But for the rest he must have considered that the problems posed by the work could be solved by the enlightened reader. The Platonic dialogues are composed in such a way as to stand on their own.⁷ There is one exception to this rule in the Timaeus, namely the psychogony, which can only be understood against the background of the Sophist.⁸ But the reader who has access to the whole series of dialogues observes certain changes of emphasis and developments in Plato's thought.⁹ Two are relevant to the Timaeus. This work demonstrates a return of Plato's focus of attention to the phenomenal world of mutability and relative imperfection. Already in the Republic the philosopher was forced to return to the cave, but now he does so voluntarily.¹⁰ In the second place the Timaeus is a late work and its relation to the ἄγραφα δόγματα needs to be defined. Although certain elements are reminiscent of these late doctrines (the Pythagoreanism the numerical composition of the cosmic soul, the ἀρχαί mentioned above), its philosophical systematics will not allow an easy integration into the conception of an analogical derivation of the whole of reality from two highest principles, the One and the Unlimited Dyad.¹¹

Thus it can be asserted that certain interpretative difficulties posed by the Timaeus are inherent in its internal structure, while others result from the attempt to combine and systematize it with other Platonic works and doctrines. My opinion, which in the present context will have to be stated somewhat dogmatically, is that the problems of interpretation encountered almost immediately after the 'publication' of the Timaeus and thereafter remaining until the end of antiquity and beyond can be explained in the following manner. The cosmological account, though incorporating certain recent philosophical discoveries, is in fact Plato's last attempt to breathe life into the classic philosophy of the middle dialogues which will always be associated with his name. The basic division into the world of being and the world of

becoming, together with the parallel epistemological distinction between νόσος and δόξα, is essential to the structure of the dialogue's thought.¹² The demiurge is a novel figure, admitted through the adoption of a (limited) mythical framework.¹³ He is a νοῦς, and his function is to impose the order and perfection of the ideal world onto the disorderly realm of necessity.¹⁴ Sensible images need a medium in which (and out of which) to appear, so Plato introduces his τρίτον γένος, the receptacle or ἐκμαγεῖον.¹⁵ The mythical scenario is not meant to describe a creational event, but to explain the structure of reality, while at the same time vividly portraying the dependence of this cosmos on a higher, noetic world.¹⁶ No one will wish to deny the virtuosity of Plato's philosophical systematics.¹⁷ The more often I read the work, the greater is my admiration. But once again, it seems, a convincing solution to the double aspect of the same problem – the relation of the one and the many, and the participation of sensible particulars in intelligible forms – was not forthcoming.¹⁸ In response to this crux Plato was already developing those doctrines which attempted to derive the whole of reality from two highest principles. And so when his successors confronted the Timaeus, it was in terms of these late doctrines, as well as their own systematic efforts, that they endeavoured to read it. Hence the difficulties almost right from the beginning. It is in the Old Academy that we must start.

(b) the Old Academy and Aristotle

About a decade after the appearance of the Timaeus the leadership of the Academy passed to SPEUSIPPUS (407-339). No doubt he continued the policy of lively discussions and innovatory quest for truth established by his uncle Plato, for his fragments¹⁹ reveal him as an independent-minded figure, who rejected or modified a number of Plato's most basic doctrines. His successor XENOCRATES (396-314), to judge from the fragments,²⁰ was a less original and more conservative figure. As the last Scholarch who had known Plato, he felt the need to preserve and systematize the founder's teachings, though in practice he did not refrain from adding modifications of his own.²¹

In the fragments of both men there is evidence that the doctrines of the Timaeus were reflected upon.²² Both, as we shall see, gave it a non-literal interpretation;²³ both modified the doctrine of the ideas and endeavoured in different ways to incorporate the philosophical views of the Timaeus within a system of analogical derivation of the whole of reality from two highest principles.²⁴ For Speusippus the demiurgic Nous appears to be placed on the second level below the One and the Indefinite dyad.²⁵ Xenocrates, if we can believe Aëtius, took a different line and identified the Nous with the Monad as one of the two highest ἀρχαί.²⁶ He seems to have been more interested in cosmology

than his predecessor, and strongly promoted the idea of a 'great chain of being'. By dividing the cosmos into three regions and placing demons in the *μετάμεσα* between heaven and earth, he proceeds far beyond the simplicity of *Tim.*39e-40a.²⁷ A precious glimpse into his interpretative methods is given by Plutarch's account of his exegesis of the psychogony (*Tim.*35a-c).²⁸ There can be no doubt that he misconstrues the passage by interpreting it in terms of the doctrines of the two principles and the generation of numbers.²⁹

The *Epinomis*, generally ascribed nowadays to PHILIP of Opus, is also heavily indebted to the *Timaeus*, but its shift of emphasis from dialectic to contemplation of the cosmos and astronomy amounts to a revision of Plato's philosophy.³⁰ The author's proposal to establish a public and a private cult of the cosmos and the celestial bodies presages developments in Hellenistic thought.³¹ A later member of the Academy, CRANTOR (335-275), is described by Proclus as the first *ἐξηγητής* of the *Timaeus*,³² and may have written a commentary on it.³³ The three snippets of exegesis that have survived suggest that he earned the above title because he endeavoured to recover Plato's intended meaning rather than systematize and reinterpret in the Xenocratean manner.³⁴

But the member of the Academy whose influence on the interpretation of the *Timaeus* was the greatest has not yet been mentioned. I refer of course to ARISTOTLE (384-322), who did not leave the Academy – ultimately to found his own school – till after Plato's death and whose writings reveal the influence of his teacher on almost every page. Not surprisingly references to the *Timaeus* abound.³⁵ The overt comments are mostly critical, but do not conceal the covert stimulus which the dialogue gave to his own philosophy. In the gradual emancipation from his Platonic environment a decisive step forward was made in the dialogue *De Philosophia*. The doctrine of the ideas is rejected, as well as the notion that visible reality could be derived *λογικῶς* from higher principles, while the doctrine of the eternity of the cosmos was defended with powerful arguments.³⁶ In Aristotle's scholastic writings the distance between his philosophy and the doctrines of the *Timaeus* only increased.

The following changes in philosophical doctrine and reinterpretations of the *Timaeus* were the most significant. (1) The Stagirite was able to make the claim that he was the first to propound the doctrine of the cosmos' eternity *a parte ante et post* because he interpreted the cosmogony in a literal sense.³⁷ The defence of Speusippus and Xenocrates that the genesis of the cosmos was meant didactically, like the way mathematicians construct diagrams, was rejected.³⁸ To me it remains somewhat of a mystery why Aristotle should have chosen this interpretation when a reading in terms of *creatio aeterna* would have brought the *Timaeus* so much closer to his own thinking.³⁹ (2) Aristotle ignores

the demiurge and accuses Plato of ignoring the efficient cause.⁴⁰ Body and motion cannot be produced by ideas or supra-noetic principles. In his mature system he posits a highest Nous who causes motion ὡς ἐρῶμενον.⁴¹ (3) In cosmology Aristotle alters Plato's elemental theory by rejecting its mathematical basis, introducing the doctrine of natural place, and, most importantly, positing a fifth element with circular motion, out of which the heavenly bodies are composed.⁴² (4) The receptacle is reinterpreted in terms of his own doctrine of matter. The Platonic conception loses its raison d'être if separated from the doctrine of the realms of intelligible and sensible reality. Yet this is what the Stagirite did by equating it with his ὅλη principle, which is conceived as a material substrate (ἐξ οὗ) and is inseparably associated with the non-Platonic doctrines of potentiality/actuality and immanent form.⁴³

The mixture of criticism and reinterpretation which we have observed in Aristotle's treatment of the Timaeus proved very difficult for later interpreters to disentangle. Hence the frequent presence of Aristotelian doctrines in later Platonist interpretations of the Timaeus.

(c) in the Hellenistic world

It is gradually being discovered that the STOICS in their physical doctrines did not uncomprehendingly trample over the legacy of their predecessors with seven-league boots, but carefully moulded diverse elements of the philosophical tradition into 'an original system which in the succeeding centuries was to have more influence than the philosophies on which it drew.'⁴⁴ The Timaeus is thus not so much interpreted as exploited for creative purposes.⁴⁵ Taking up Plato's challenge in the Sophist,⁴⁶ they carried out a consistent corporealization of nearly every aspect of reality. Only bodies can act on bodies. This axiom swept the carpet from under the feet of the Timaeus (as well as Academic derivationism and Aristotelianism). But when we examine the fundamental Stoic doctrine of the two principles - the Logos as active ἀρχή, matter as passive ἀρχή - we find the constituent elements of the Timaeus being adapted into a new system.⁴⁷ The greatest debt of the Stoa lay in the fact that the Platonic dialogue helped them give man a place in the Universe. Man's soul is a fragment of the all-pervading divine Logos. In following the dictates of reason he lives according to nature and its law.⁴⁸ Two ideas are thus given further impetus, the contemplation of the cosmos already prominent in Aristotle and the Epinomis and the correspondence between macrocosm and microcosm so vital to the structure of the Timaeus.⁴⁹

After the Stoa's influential adaptation the Timaeus entered a period of partial eclipse lasting nearly two centuries. The philosophical schools paid it scant attention. Under the leadership of Arcesilaus the Academy commenced

its sceptical phase.⁵⁰ The Peripatos was busy with natural science, while Epicureans and Cynics propounded philosophies wholly inimical to Platonism. The influence of the Timaeus on the broad stream of Hellenistic thought lay chiefly in a particular way of regarding the cosmos and man's place in it. It appears in works such as Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus, the Phaenomena of Aratus and the De mundo. Noting that awe for the beauty and rationality of the Universe and especially its celestial regions was tending in this period to replace the old civic religion in the minds of the educated, Festugière entitled this intellectual movement as the 'religion cosmique'.⁵¹ We have travelled quite a long way from Plato's original depiction of the cosmos as a glorious but imperfect image of a perfect noetic exemplar.

Indeed it is important to observe that in the early stages of the Timaeus' long career it was not regarded as especially authoritative. Except Crantor no philosopher appears to have read it in order to recover Plato's intentions or because of an unconditional loyalty to his ipsissima verba. The doctrines of the Timaeus were for the most part reinterpreted and fitted into non-Platonic systems of thought. Some of these reinterpretations had a lasting, and often detrimental, effect on the way the dialogue was read.

(d) the return to a Platonizing dogmatism

Towards the end of the second century B.C. a change in the intellectual atmosphere can be discerned. Philosophers such as PANAETIUS of Rhodes (185-109) and POSIDONIUS of Apamea (135-50) showed a greater respect for the thinkers of the past and especially for Plato.⁵² ANTIOCHUS of Ascalon (c.130-67) made the call veteres sequi the Leitmotiv for his attempt to revive the Old Academy.⁵³ CICERO (106-43) was hardly a dogmatic follower of Plato but he calls him Plato deus ille noster.⁵⁴ This return to a kind of classicism is not enough, however, to explain the emergence, a little later, of the movement now known as Middle Platonism. Indispensable for that development were two things, a return from the scepticism of the New Academy to the reaffirmation of a Platonic dogmatism and a breakthrough of the dominance of Stoic systematics in the area of physics and theology.⁵⁵ In this way the foundation was laid for the preeminence of Platonism in later antiquity. The question of its origins is thus of great interest and importance.

For a long time it was thought that the figure of Posidonius provided the vital clue.⁵⁶ He was regarded as having initiated a movement towards a more religiously tinted, orientalizing philosophy. A chief instrument of his influence was his supposed Commentary on the Timaeus, but its existence is now considered doubtful.⁵⁷ A consensus on Posidonius' stature and contribution to the history of ideas has by no means been reached,⁵⁸ but it is agreed that his

philosophy does not proceed beyond an innovatory Stoicism⁵⁹ and that 'he cannot be claimed as the necessary and sufficient condition of the emergence of Middle Platonism'.⁶⁰ Also considerably tarnished is the theory that attributes a decisive role to Antiochus.⁶¹ Certainly his break with the scepticism of the New Academy must be recognized. But if his founding of a revived 'Old Academy' was a bold but shortlived experiment and he had no important pupils,⁶² he can hardly be considered the ἀρχηγέτης of the Platonist school tradition.⁶³ Antiochus appears primarily interested in epistemology and ethics. In contrast to his contemporaries he shows little interest in the Timaeus, which is in fact a good indication of the superficiality of his return to Platonism.⁶⁴

Recently the focus of interest has shifted from Asia Minor and Athens to Alexandria, and in particular to the shadowy figure of EUDORUS (floruit c.30 B.C.).⁶⁵ We know that he wrote a survey of the whole field of philosophy (dealt with προβληματοικῶς), and that he commented on doctrines of Plato, Aristotle and the Pythagorean tradition.⁶⁶ Plutarch refers to Eudorus in the De animae procreatione in Timaeo and it is thought likely that he is the source for much of the doxographical material in that work.⁶⁷ Clearly Eudorus was interested in problems of the interpretation of the Timaeus, such as the psychogony and the non-literal view of the cosmogony.⁶⁸ Perhaps he wrote a commentary on the dialogue.⁶⁹ His interest in the Neopythagorean principia suggests a return to the doctrine of (divine) transcendence, which is an indispensable prerequisite for the emergence of Middle Platonism.⁷⁰ It is thus possible that, perhaps via the survey of philosophical doctrines of ARIUS DIDYMUS (floruit c. 10 B.C.) Eudorus proved to be a turning point in the return to dogmatic Platonism.⁷¹ In SENECA (c.4 B.C.-65 A.D.) one can find snippets of doctrine which are certainly derived from a Middle Platonic school tradition (and in which, once more, the Timaeus is prominent).⁷² One should mention also the curious Pythagorean forgery 'On the nature of the cosmos and the soul', attributed to TIMAEUS LOCUS and purported to be the 'original' from which Plato plagiarized the Timaeus. It has been shown that certain doctrines in this work resemble what we know concerning Eudorus.⁷³

Two conclusions can be drawn at this point. The transition to a dogmatic Platonism remains rather obscure to us, but is clearly underway by the beginning of the 1st century A.D. This is precisely the time of Philo; hence the importance of his evidence.⁷⁴ Secondly, interpretation and discussion of the Timaeus appear to have played a vital role in the 'rediscovery' of Plato's doctrines. The scholar who has placed the most emphasis on this is H.Dörrie.⁷⁵ Contrary to other scholars he emphasizes a *discontinuity* in the Platonic tradition. By the 1st century B.C. contact with the authentic Academic tradition was lost, and in its place a 'naive Platonism' was reconstructed from the pages

of the Timaeus. Its most striking feature was an uncritical acceptance of a literal cosmogony. In the generation of Eudorus greater sophistication was developed, but the doctrinal basis had already been fixed (especially the doctrine of the three ἀρχαί). Dörrie's theory suffers from an excess of speculation.⁷⁶ It does retain, however, a certain attractiveness on account of the way that it can explain the disproportionately great role played by the Timaeus in supplying the fundamental doctrines of Middle Platonism.

(e) the Middle Platonists

The importance of the Middle Platonists in passing on the torch of Platonism is increasingly being recognized. But who were these philosophers? Where did they come from? And what were their methods and teachings? As we have seen, the origins of the movement in all likelihood lie in Alexandria. When, however, in the second century A.D. professing Platonists start to emerge in greater numbers they are spread throughout the Eastern Mediterranean, with even a local school in distant Carthage. The evidence does not point to any particular concentration of activity in Athens. One might perhaps speak of a Platonist diaspora.⁷⁷ PLUTARCH (c.45-c.125) remains a rather independent figure, difficult to pin down precisely, but revealing much indubitable Middle Platonist material in his copious works.⁷⁸ After him come the men most usually associated with Middle Platonism — GAIUS (floruit c.120), Calvenus TAURUS (floruit c.145), ALBINUS the pupil of Gaius (floruit c.150), APULEIUS of Madaura (123-c.180), ATTICUS (floruit c.175).⁷⁹ More on the periphery are men such as the sophist MAXIMUS of Tyre (floruit c.150), CELSUS (floruit c.165), and the famous GALEN (129-c.200) who on the whole records Platonic ideas rather than professes them. There is an air of mediocrity surrounding these figures. Middle Platonism did not produce a dominant figure like Plotinus who could produce a major synthesis. Scholars have tried to organize these thinkers into groups, such as the 'School of Gaius' and the 'Athenian school', but it is becoming increasingly clear that little is gained by such efforts.⁸⁰ The chief form of transmission was from teacher to pupil, not through the dissemination of books and commentaries.⁸¹ Given the fact that Middle Platonism had no organized focal point of activity, it is surprising that it still presents a reasonably unified picture.

Parallel to the Middle Platonists, but not wholly to be identified with them, are the Neopythagoreans. They include figures such as MODERATUS of Gades (floruit 60 A.D.?), NICHOMACHUS of Gerasa (floruit c.120), NUMENIUS of Apamea (floruit c.150).⁸² Their loyalty to the teachings of Pythagoras leads to a greater stress on the mathematization of reality and its derivation from the One, but many other doctrines are held in common with the Platonists.⁸³

Plato was taken to be a pupil of Pythagoras, as he himself admitted by using a Pythagorean as mouthpiece in his most important dialogue. The Neopythagoreans thus make extensive use of the Timaeus.⁸⁴ It is worth recalling that Clement of Alexandria described Philo as ὁ Πυθαγόρειος.⁸⁵

All the philosophers mentioned in the above two paragraphs lived after Philo. Some were active more than a century after his death. It is extremely unlikely that they had ever heard of Philo, let alone read his works.⁸⁶ Is there, then, any point in comparing his use of the Timaeus with their approach to the same work? I am convinced that there is. The chronic lack of evidence for the first centuries B.C. and A.D. (it is not that much better for the next century either) hampers us on all sides. Certainly Philo looks back sometimes to the period of the Middle Stoa. But, as we shall see, he clearly stands on the other side of the watershed which I have called the 'return of a Platonizing dogmatism',⁸⁷ and that makes all the difference. Now we must take a brief look at the methods and doctrines of the Middle Platonists.

(f) their methods

Since Middle Platonism, as we have seen, presents a reasonably unified picture, it is possible to give an impression of the 'ideology' and methods used by its proponents without running the risk of excessive generalization.⁸⁸

(1) They considered themselves followers of Plato and members of the Platonic αἵρεσις or school of thought,⁸⁹ whose task it was to preserve and transmit the Platonist tradition initiated in the Academy and now in 'diaspora'.

(2) Their view of Plato was dogmatic. Both the sceptical and the esoteric conception of his philosophy and writings was rejected.⁹⁰ Their account of Plato's philosophy was considered an authentic representation of his thought.

(3) They were loyal to the texts and considered it their task to explain Plato's writings. But their Plato is a Plato dimidiatus,⁹¹ drawn almost exclusively from the 'classical' dialogues (Phaedo, Republic, Phaedrus, Symposium, Timaeus) with a few snippets from elsewhere (e.g. Tht. 176a-c).

(4) The principle of their hermeneutics is, as formulated already by Eudorus, τὸ δὲ γε πολύφωνον τοῦ Πλάτωνος <οὐ πολύδοξον>.⁹² Plato's statements must be explained by means of other statements of Plato, as the result of which it is possible to construct a systematic account of Plato's philosophy (without, however, ever showing the profundity and penetration of a Plotinus).

(5) But this systematic enterprise is undertaken within the framework of a certain view of the history of philosophy. Plato was a disciple of Pythagoras; Aristotle and the Stoa learnt from Plato and made some legitimate 'modernizations'. In practice, therefore, certain Pythagorean ideas are found in their writings and numerous examples of Aristotelian and Stoic doctrines and termi-

nology (especially in logic and ethics). Given the consistent rationale of their method, it should not be labelled eclectic.⁹³

These methods, widely accepted and passed on from teacher to pupil, give Middle Platonism somewhat of a 'school' atmosphere, even though it never was a centrally organized movement. In this study, therefore, we shall have frequent occasion to allude to *scholastic* Middle Platonist doctrines, meaning thereby material that belonged to the fund of fixed Platonist dogma discussed and expounded by the Middle Platonists. Their writings too reek of the schoolroom, even though we may be somewhat misled by the chance survivals in our possession. They include commentaries on Platonic works (and occasionally those of other philosophers), surveys of the history of philosophy, introductory accounts of Plato's philosophy, treatises on individual philosophical problems, treatises with a dose of inter-school polemic.⁹⁴ Plutarch's polished literary dialogues are exceptional. Even Numenius' dialogue *Περὶ τὰ γὰ θεοῦ* mixes hieratic pronouncements with 'schoolmasterly' exposition.⁹⁵

(g) their doctrines in relation to the Timaeus

The influence of the Timaeus on the Middle Platonists' presentation of Plato's thought was disproportionately great, but naturally not exclusive. An excellent illustration is provided by one of the few works that has come down to us intact, the Didaskalikos of Albinus.⁹⁶ In its account of τὰ Πλάτωνος δόγματα it follows the usual post-Platonic tripartition of Logic, Physics and Ethics.⁹⁷ Not only does the section on Physics (including on the ἀρχαί) occupy more than half the work,⁹⁸ but its contents are dominated by the doctrines of the Timaeus. The following list gives, in very general terms, those philosophical doctrines found in Middle Platonism which are almost wholly derived from the Timaeus and its interpretative tradition.⁹⁹

- (1) The doctrine of the three principles - God, the ideas, matter. On this doctrine the entire edifice of the philosophical systematics is built.¹⁰⁰
- (2) Theology. The highest god is a transcendent νοῦς, reminiscent of Aristotle's Unmoved mover.¹⁰¹ He creates only indirectly, by inciting the second god (i.e. the rational part of the cosmic soul) to action. Plato's demiurge is thus split in two.
- (3) The ideas. The ideas are considered transcendent real entities, but their function is more 'physical' than epistemological, i.e. to serve as paradigm for the cosmos and all its natural parts (τὰ κατὰ φύσιν).
- (4) The ideas as God's thoughts. The ideas as transcendentalia are located in God's νοῦς as the object of his thought.¹⁰² Creation takes place when God looks to his thoughts as cosmic paradigm.
- (5) Matter. The Platonic receptacle is interpreted under the influence of

Aristotelian ὕλη and Stoic οὐσία. It is the unformed, quality-less substrate out of which the cosmos is created. A tendency towards (mild) dualism, in which matter is regarded as a source of evil, is sometimes encountered.

(6) Creation. Under the influence of Plato's account the structure of reality is explained in a creationistic way, even if a literal creation is denied.¹⁰³

(7) Cosmogony. The question of whether the γένεσις did or did not take place in time (i.e. whether the Timaeus should be read literally or not) was endlessly discussed. The division between literalists (Plutarch, Atticus) and non-literalists (the majority) is fundamental in Middle Platonism.¹⁰⁴

(8) The theme of divine Providence. God's providential activity¹⁰⁵ is explicitly affirmed, and efforts were made to correlate it with the problems of fate and free will. God is, by definition, never the cause of evil.

(9) The cosmic soul. The important role of Plato's cosmic soul is retained. But note two modifications: its functioning is portrayed very much in terms of the Stoic Logos; it can be regarded as irrational and as awakened and made rational by the creating god.¹⁰⁶

(10) Cosmology. A hierarchy of living beings, much more complex than that of the Timaeus, is introduced under the influence of the Old Academy.¹⁰⁷ There is much interest in demonology and much indecision as to whether to accept a fifth element.

(11) Man's soul. The doctrine of the tripartition and trilocution of the soul is retained, but it is considered that essentially the soul has two parts, τὸ λογικόν and τὸ ἄλογον.

(12) The telos. The doctrine of man's end in life is a part of ethics. It is summed up in the Platonic slogan ὁμολώσας θεῷ found in the Theatetus. By reading it into the Timaeus, it is connected with the conception of θεωρία.¹⁰⁸

(h) how was the Timaeus read and studied?

The scholastic atmosphere of Middle Platonism clearly had a strong influence on the way the Timaeus was read.¹⁰⁹ Once again Albinus gives a fine illustration of the procedure. In his Εἰσαγωγή he sets out a short 'Platonic reading course' for the aspiring pupil.¹¹⁰ He should start with the protreptic of the First Alcibiades, followed by the Phaedo which instructs him in the philosophic life. The Republic introduces the whole of παιδεία necessary for the acquisition of ἀρετή. The climax of the mini-course is predictable. By reading the Timaeus the student becomes acquainted with the structure of the universe and with its theology, so that he obtains a clear vision of the divine.¹¹¹

The text of the dialogue must have been widely available and widely studied, supply and demand reinforcing each other.¹¹² This is shown by the huge number of quotations in later writings, many of which are valuable for the re-

construction of the text.¹¹³ For those who wished to ascertain the bare essentials, epitomes and synopses were in plentiful supply.¹¹⁴ The more serious student could presumably make use of the rich store of scholarly literature devoted to the explanation and exegesis of the text. Unfortunately it is difficult to determine precisely what kind of exegetic works were produced and how widely they were available. Were, for example, full-length commentaries on the *Timaeus* written? This is a much disputed problem. Dillon attributes commentaries on the *Timaeus* to numerous Middle Platonists;¹¹⁵ Dörrie argues that the first full-length commentaries comparable to those of Proclus were produced by Porphyry.¹¹⁶ The latter position seems extreme in the light of the evidence supplied by the papyrus remains of the *Anonymous Theatetus Commentary*, which takes the form of a running commentary, albeit at a rather uninspiring level.¹¹⁷ Much, perhaps, depends on what one takes the description ὑπομνήματα to mean.¹¹⁸ Even if the 'commentaries' were not complete or very detailed, they must have dealt with all the philosophically more important parts of the text.¹¹⁹ Other ways of discussing the philosophical content of the *Timaeus* were practised in individual treatises (συγγράμματα) and in the genre of ζητήματα.¹²⁰ Summaries of Platonic philosophy and introductions to his thought were also, as we have seen, often heavily reliant on the *Timaeus*.¹²¹ Last but certainly not least, Timaeian doctrines were disseminated by means of doxographical works. The influence of these should not be underestimated in a culture not averse to taking shortcuts to learning.¹²² The *Timaeus* is usually not explicitly named, but its doctrines – so suitable for brief and lucid presentation – are ubiquitous.¹²³

There was, therefore, a whole gamut of ways to read and study Plato's most celebrated work, ranging from the superficial to the philologically and philosophically sophisticated. Moreover one must not forget that much academic or scholastic discussion on the *Timaeus* was of an oral nature,¹²⁴ whether actively passed on from teacher to pupil or reverberating no further than the columns of the stoa in which the devotees of philosophy met to talk and argue.

It would be a serious mistake, however, to conclude that the *Timaeus* was only read and studied by professional philosophers or students of philosophy. The very fact that it was regarded as the 'Platonists' Bible'¹²⁵ meant that its influence inevitably filtered down to men of letters and even those who had received only a smattering of learning. Indeed the *Timaeus* was the only Greek prose work that up to the third century A.D. every educated man could be assumed to have read.¹²⁶ This is well illustrated by the citations and allusions in early Christian writers such as Clement of Rome, Athenagoras, Justin, Theophilus, the author of the *Cohortatio ad Graecos*, Minucius Felix, few of whom one would wish to describe as genuine students of philosophy.¹²⁷ It is against

this double background of intensive philosophical study and widespread cultural dissemination that we must view the use made of the Timaeus by the Alexandrian Jew, Philo.

CHAPTER FIVE

METHOD

5.1 The method to be used in this study

The vital importance of methodology in the study of Philo was one of the results of our review of recent developments in Philonic studies.¹ The Philonist who wishes to study the writings and the thought of his author finds himself in a dilemma. The best way to elucidate the *writings* is to write commentaries on them or essays which adhere closely to Philo's own presentation. Harl was complimented in our review on her successful application of this method.² But the method has evident limitations for the study of Philo's *thought*. Even if the recommendation of Nikiprowetzky is followed and studies are made of exegetical themes,³ it will be necessary to collect together, analyse and, at least to a certain extent, organize and systematize material drawn from diverse parts of the Corpus Philonicum.⁴ This applies a fortiori to research (such as this study) which aims to investigate Philo's use of philosophical material and his relation to the Greek philosophical tradition.

It is moreover highly instructive to compare philosophical studies which are concerned with the same subject, but in relation to another ancient author. CLAGHORN has written a work entitled Aristotle's criticism of Plato's 'Timaeus', in which after the introductory section there are seven chapters on Aristotle's criticism of the receptacle, simple bodies, qualities, motion, time, soul, nature.⁵ The study of MATTER, Zum Einfluss des platonischen "Timaios" auf das Denken Plotins, has four main chapters dealing with the hypostasis of Soul, the hypostasis of Mind, time and eternity, matter.⁶ In both works passages dealing with the Timaeus are collected and systematically analysed with respect to both the main themes of the dialogue and relevant aspects of the philosophy of the authors who have reflected on it. Indeed BILLINGS' monograph on Philo's Platonism is structured on similar lines, with chapters on God, the intermediary powers, man's soul, ethics, but with the important addition of a section on his stylistic debts to the Greek philosopher.⁷ Also interesting are the two books by BALTES on the interpretative tradition of the Timaeus. In the one he gives a detailed and meticulously executed commentary on a text which is almost a précis of Plato's dialogue.⁸ In the other the reader is presented with a diachronic exposition of the way that one of the acutest problems of its interpretation was dealt with over the entire period from the Old Academy to Proclus.⁹

My conviction is that none of the methods described so far, whether used in studies on the history of Greek philosophy or on Philo, are suitable for the aims we have set ourselves. It will be necessary to employ a *new method* which corresponds to the peculiarities of Philo's writings and the distinctiveness of his thought. The essential feature of this method, as has already been indicated in the outline of the study's structure, is that it involves two stages, of which the first adheres closely to the text of both the Timaeus and the writings of Philo. The methodology of the two stages will need to be carefully explained.

(a) the method of Part II

The analytical part of the study will proceed in the form of a kind of sequential 'Commentary' on the Timaeus as read and used by Philo. The Commentary consists of ten *chapters*, each dealing in Platonic sequence with a part of the Timaeus [for example, 7. Timaeus 42e-47e: Man's descent into the body], while each chapter is divided into several *sections* depending on the Platonic themes located there [for example, 7.2. The teleology of sight]. The first section of each chapter is introductory [for example, 7.0.], and aims to give a brief resumé of the ideas and doctrines presented in the part of the Timaeus under discussion. In the headings of the *sub-sections* Philo's utilization comes to the fore [for example, 7.2.2. The mechanism of vision]. In these sub-sections, which naturally make up the bulk of the Commentary, the relevant Philonic texts that have been identified and collected are examined and analysed.¹⁰ The doctrines and themes found in these passages are related to the Platonic source and placed in the context of Philo's thought. For passages which are strongly indebted to the Timaeus the ideal treatment would be a full line-by-line commentary, but this practice will occur only rarely and for short sections. Otherwise the Commentary would be expanded to insufferable length. In most cases brief summaries and attention to specific details will have to suffice. It is important to illustrate ideas and doctrines with relevant Philonic parallels; in addition limited parallels must be drawn from Greek philosophical texts, Hellenistic-Judaic sources and (infrequently) Patristic literature. But it is best to avoid the excesses of 'parallelomania' in the interests of reader and writer alike. The abbreviation 'etc.' will be used repeatedly to indicate that more (and undoubtedly interesting) examples could be given.

What, however, constitutes Philonic utilization of the Timaeus? Philo's references to the dialogue cover the entire spectrum from direct quotation to implicit allusion. Moreover there is a 'grey zone' of imagery and word-usage which can be traced back to the Timaeus, but one is often hesitant to accredit

Philo, when he uses it, with awareness of its origin. A problem of circularity must be recognized. Because one concludes (or presumes) that the Timaeus held a central place in Philo's thinking, one is encouraged to identify allusions that become more and more recondite. Perhaps it would be methodologically sounder to separate the Commentary into two stages. An impressive quantity of certain quotations and allusions would encourage the reader to accept those that were more subtle or even speculative. But we have little choice but to group them all in one Commentary, and the results will have to vindicate our judgment in avoiding the pitfalls of a circularity that becomes unacceptable. The element of speculation is also not easy to avoid. Moderation must be shown whenever there is an irresistible temptation to conclude on the strength of one or two passages that 'Philo would have read the Timaeus in this or that way...'. With regard to another temptation, however, one can be firm. I refer to the tendency towards 'selectivism', i.e. the tendency to regard certain texts and treatises on a priori grounds as being more important than others. The primary aim of our Commentary must be to do justice to *all* the forty-eight Philonic treatises that are still extant.¹¹

An essential aspect of our method will be to relate the passages cited to their context, which means in practice not only their context in the treatises, but also in most cases their exegetical context. It would, however, be tedious to recount every time the long chains of exegesis which cause Philo to cite and explain this or that text. Very often we shall limit ourselves to placing the exegetical reference in brackets behind the Philonic passage [for example, Spec.1.327(exeg. Deut.23:2)]. Nevertheless the principle behind this procedure is exceedingly important. The exegetical background of much of Philo's use of philosophical material cannot and must not be ignored. Indeed at this point it might be argued that a serious deficiency of our method emerges. Because the Commentary is structured according to the themes and sequence of the Timaeus it is in fact too Platonocentric. Ideally one might envisage a second Commentary in the sequence of the books of Moses.¹² But much repetition would ensue and, anyway, space forbids. As a δεύτερος πλοῦς an Appendix will be compiled which contains all the Pentateuchal texts given exegesis by Philo with reference to the Timaeus of Plato.

In Part II of this study few concessions will be made to the reader. The material is frequently complex and technical, and a certain exhaustiveness must be the aim. Footnotes are almost entirely avoided. All references are given in the text, which does not facilitate fluent reading. For reasons of economy certain less important sections are printed in close type.

(b) the method of Part III

The method of this part is much simpler and its explanation will not delay us long. The task is to collect the results gained in the Commentary and present a synthesis which seeks to cover the main subjects of interest outlined at the beginning of this introduction. Its three sections correspond, as was said, to the three main areas of research of our study. Synthesis entails a certain amount of organization and systematization, but this must take place within the limits set by the results reached in the Commentary. On the whole there will be in this part no new discussions of Philonic and parallel texts. Countless references - to the point of monotony - will be made to earlier discussions in Part II. It is hoped that in this way unnecessary repetition between the two main parts of the study will be kept to a minimum.

In addition the style of this part is in marked contrast to that of the Commentary. The aim is readability and comprehensibility. There is no need to seek an exhaustive treatment of the results which have been gained. The copious use of footnotes, containing those numerous cross-references, ensures that the flow of the argument will not be checked.

(c) priorities

The Timaeus, in its systematic and highly compressed way, covers an impressive range of subjects in the area of theology, cosmology and anthropology (including psychology and physiology). The endeavour must be to give these subjects the treatment they require within the aims we have set. But certain priorities and limitations are inevitable. My policy will be to concentrate more on the primary aspects of genesis and structure and less on the secondary aspects which result from that genesis and structure, such as ethics, eschatology and so on. The Timaeus is only part of Plato's oeuvre. Although, as we have already seen, it receives a disproportionate amount of attention in the Platonist tradition, many other significant and much used texts remain. Philo's use of other Platonic dialogues will only be mentioned to the extent that it is relevant to his use of the Timaeus. Our study thus covers only *part* of the subject that Billings chose for his monograph, Philo's debt to Plato. Another limitation is imposed in relation to non-Platonic philosophical doctrines which Philo employs in his writings. Not seldom Philo uses such doctrines in a parallel way to those which he draws from the Timaeus. Once again it will not be possible to list these every time. The reader is warned in advance that our method is exposed to the danger of a certain one-sidedness in its orientation towards Philo's Platonism.

(d) other preliminary considerations

(1) The Greek text of Philo's works used and cited is basically the editio maior of Cohn and Wendland. But also the many excellent textual comments and emendations made by Colson in the Loeb edition of Philo are taken into account. Textual matters play only a limited role in our research. It is not practicable to cite large sections of Philonic text. The reader is expected to read the Commentary with a text and, if need be, a translation at his or her side.

(2) The Armenian transmission of about a quarter of Philo still, at this moment, gives rise to serious problems for the Philonist, problems which in my opinion are wildly underestimated by most scholars. The Armenian translations of Philo were made in the late 6th century by the so-called Hellenizing School. The Armenian language was adapted - in accordance (!), syntax and vocabulary - in order to be able to convey the more sophisticated thought of difficult Greek authors. The result is an Armenian of extraordinary difficulty and frequent obscurity.¹³ It is clear that the translators lacked the expertise in Greek philosophy required to deal with Philo's more philosophical passages.¹⁴ The Latin translations of Aucher in his editions of 1822 and 1826, which even today are still sometimes quoted or used as the basis for further translations, were an impressive performance, but frequently fall short of modern standards.¹⁵ It is to be hoped that a scholar such as A. Terian will be given the opportunity to make as much as possible of the Armenian Philo accessible to others who lack his special knowledge.¹⁶

My procedure in studying the Armenian Philo has been as follows. In each case the most recent (and presumably the best) translation has been used.¹⁷ Unfortunately the situation is at its worst for the treatise which is most important for our subject, the De Providentia.¹⁸ Whenever questions of special significance or difficulty were encountered, I consulted the Armenologist, Drs. J.J.S. Weitenberg (Leiden), who most kindly answered questions and provided translations. In a few instances his translations have been the basis of my translations (in the case of the De Providentia). His assistance is in every case acknowledged. The aim of our joint contributions to a further understanding of the Armenian Philo is exceedingly modest, and is kept strictly within the boundaries of my subject. It is to be hoped that they will soon be swept away in a torrent of superior translations and commentaries. A minor problem in Philo's Quaestiones is the fact that they vary in length from a few lines to nearly ten pages in Marcus' translation. In the case of the longer quaestiones I have added a reference to that translation [for example, EES 1.181] to facilitate location of the exact passage required.

(3) References to the Old Testament are *always* made to the Septuagint in the edition of Rahlfs (ninth edition), the numbering of which differs sometimes

from that of the Hebrew Bible.¹⁹ The precise wording of Philo's Biblical quotations is an important subject, on which the last word has by no means been said. It will, however, receive little attention in our study except when it can be shown that Philo's reading of the Timaeus has influenced his choice of readings in the sacred text.

(4) The text of Plato's works used in this study is that of Burnet in the series of Oxford Classical Texts.²⁰ In the case of the Timaeus the lines of the subdivision of Stephanus' pagination are cited as found in Burnet [for example, 29a5-6].

(5) Because of the great bulk of the Philonic corpus it is necessary to subdivide his lengthy sequences of treatises. In this study a tripartite division, with five groups in all, is followed.²¹

(a) The *exegetical* treatises, comprising:

- (i) the Allegorical Commentary - Opif. Leg.I-III Cher. Sacr. Det. Post. Gig. Deus Agr. Plant. Ebr. Sobr. Conf. Migr. Her. Congr. Fug. Mut. Somm.I-II;
- (ii) The Exposition of the Law - Opif. Abr. Ios. Mos.I-II Decal. Spec.I-IV Virt. Praem.;
- (iii) The Quaestiones - QG I-IV, QE I-II.

(b) The *philosophical* treatises - Prob. Aet. Prov.I-II Anim.

(c) The *historical-apologetic* treatises - Contempl. Flacc. Legat. Hypoth.

The criticism recently directed against this division, which has held sway in Philonic studies for nearly a century, is of little bearing on our subject.²² Also questions of chronology will be set aside, except that the theory that Philo's philosophical treatises are (immature) Jugendschriften is rejected.²³

(6) Only in incidental cases is credit given for discovery of allusions to the Timaeus in Philo's writings. This procedure, which is applied both to the discoveries of previous scholars and to my own research, is in no way meant to conceal the great debt, already acknowledged above,²⁴ to my predecessors.

5.2. Justification of a subject and a method

The subject of this study in my view scarcely required justification. The Timaeus occupies a highly significant place in the development and expression of Philo's thought, and it is high time that this subject be submitted to a comprehensive and thorough scrutiny. Also the considerable length of my study is predictable, given the bulk of the Philonic corpus and the great number of philosophical and scientific themes dealt with in the Platonic work. The method which will be employed has been carefully devised in order to cope

with the peculiarities of Philo's writings and the particular requirements of the subject. There is one aspect of our procedure, however, to which objections could be raised.

In a recent book entitled The beginnings of Christian philosophy Eric OSBORN has paid more than usual attention to methodological issues involved in the study of the history of philosophy.¹ Drawing on the work of the Australian philosopher, John Passmore,² he outlines various methods of pursuing the history of ideas.³ The one which he favours (though the best aspects of the others must be incorporated too) is the method of problematic elucidation. Philosophy and theology are concerned with argument and with the attempt to solve problems. In order to understand the thought of an author it is necessary to penetrate to the problems with which he was preoccupied and the arguments which he used in his attempt to solve them. Osborn is particularly severe on the method which he calls the 'doxographical approach' and which is compared with stamp-collecting.⁴ The doxographer is so busy tracing sources and uncovering parallels for the ideas found in his author that he shows no understanding for what actually motivated the man to embark on his philosophical enterprise. Could it be thought that our method, involving as it does the discovery of allusions and covert usage and making widespread use of parallels, is too descriptive and bears an uncomfortable resemblance to the philately to which Osborn objects?

Such a conclusion I would regard as unjustified. Firstly it is essential to have an eye for the manner of verbal and conceptual transmission in Western culture, to which we are so accustomed that we take it wholly for granted. As George Steiner says in one of his thought-provoking essays, 'in very large measure, most books are about previous books'.⁵ Thoughts are expressed and problems are resolved in a complex process of alluding to, adapting, remoulding previous statements and arguments. This is all the more true for the profound classicism (or, if you like, traditionalism) of later Greek culture, which lacked confidence in its own originality and was ever ready to look back to the achievements of the antiquiores. It is also all the more true for a man such as Philo, whose thought is dominated by a religion deriving most of its authority from a *book*. Naturally Philo expected his utilization of the Timaeus to be recognized by his readers. The popularity of the dialogue gave access to a common idiom shared by author and reader. It is an indication of the distance that separates us from his culture that it has become the task of the specialist to elucidate this idiom and make it accessible even to fellow-scholars. It is also an indication of profound changes in Western culture that the existence of a similar literary, philosophical or religious idiom cannot be presumed even among the educated.

In the second place - and this consideration is more important - although Philo is often treated as a philosopher and has also been called the 'first theologian',⁶ it cannot be *assumed* that he is directly preoccupied with the solving of philosophical or theological problems, for the analysis of which Osborn considers problematic elucidation to be the only appropriate method. Such preoccupations would have to be proven, and in so doing a lengthy (and sometimes tedious) process of examining word usage, drawing parallels and so on is not to be avoided. Nevertheless the methodological issues raised by Osborn should not be dismissed as irrelevant. It will be fruitful to return to his depiction of the philosopher as problem-solver when we finally evaluate Philo's status as a thinker, as seen in relation to his utilization of Plato's Timaeus.

PART TWO

ANALYSIS

CHAPTER ONE

TIMAEUS 17A-27D: THE DIALOGUE'S INTRODUCTION

- 1.0. Introductory
- 1.1. The setting (Tim.17a-20c)
  - 1.1.1. Feasting in return (17a-b)
  - 1.1.2. The summit of philosophy (20a)
- 1.2. Critias' speech (Tim.20a-26e)
  - 1.2.1. 'You Greeks always remain children' (22b)
  - 1.2.2. The theory of periodically recurring natural disasters (22a-23c)
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1.0. Introductory

The Timaeus is a dialogue, though the least dialogic of all Plato's works. The lengthy address of Timaeus of Locri is placed in a setting. Socrates and his three companions, Timaeus, Critias and Hermocrates, are engaged in a feast of words (cf.27b8). Having on the previous day given an account of an ideal state, quite similar to that found in the Republic but perplexingly without some of its most important features, Socrates now expresses a desire to see that ideal state actually in movement. Critias responds by telling the story of the virtuous Athenians of old, who had successfully defeated the hubristic rulers of the island Atlantis (a story he had heard from his grandfather, who had heard it from the lawgiver Solon, who in turn had heard it on his travels from an Egyptian priest). But before this story will be told in detail,

Timaeus will first *set the scene* by describing the genesis of the cosmos up to and including the nature of man (27a). When he has invoked the gods and goddesses with a prayer, Timaeus is ready to embark on his daunting task.

Although the story of Atlantis has always been the subject of much controversy, on the whole the opening section of the Timaeus has in both ancient and modern times received less attention than the rest of the work. The reasons for the relative neglect are obvious. The overwhelming importance attached to the cosmological and anthropological aspects of Timaeus' account has caused the introductory section, which does not seem directly relevant to the main part, to appear rather insignificant. The fact that Plato left his planned trilogy uncompleted means that the philosophical intentions of its introduction and overall schema must remain the subject of speculation. The speech of the Pythagorean philosopher now has a much more prominent place than it was originally planned to have. Because the speech is quite self-contained, the forfeiture of the rest of the trilogy (except the Critias, which is only a fragment) does not have the serious consequences it might have had. But, even though the introductory part of the Timaeus is thus relatively isolated, it nevertheless contains a number of important themes which Philo could have used. It should not be passed over in our Commentary.

1.1. The setting (Tim.17a-20c)

1.1.1. Feasting in return (17a-b)

The description of the banquet given by Ptolemy Philadelphus in honour of the seventy-two scholars, who had been invited from Jerusalem to Alexandria in order to undertake the translation of the Law of Moses into Greek, presents Philo with the opportunity to make an erudite verbal allusion to the opening scene of the Timaeus. At Mos.2.33 he writes: ἐπὶ ξενίαν κληθέντες λόγους ἀστέλους καὶ σπουδαίους τὸν ἐστιάτορα εὐώχουν ἀντεφροσινῶντες. C-W 4.207 correctly refer ἀντεφροσινῶντες to ἀνταφροσινῶν at Tim.17b4.

But the allusion is in fact more elaborate: ἐστιάτορα looks to 17a2, ξενίαν κληθέντες to 17b2-3, while λόγους is reminiscent of the τῶν λόγων ἐστίασιν which Socrates anticipates at 27b7. LSJ ad loc. give ἀντεφροσινῶν as a falsa lectio for ἀνταφροσινῶν. There is considerable confusion between these two verbal forms in the manuscripts of both Plato's text and the relevant passage in Proclus' Commentary. It is clear from Proclus' comments (in Tim.1.25.22-24) that he accepts the reading ἀνταφροσινῶν, which he justifies by pointing out the completive force of the prefixed ἀπό (cf. Festugière ad loc.). It would seem, indeed, that ἀνταφροσινῶν is the correct reading (cf. also ἀνταποδώσειν 20c1, ἀνταπολήψεσθαι 27b7). But Philo (as well as Aelian and Philostratus, cf. LSJ ad loc.) doubtless had ἀντεφροσινῶν in his text.

The allusion makes a small contribution to the Hellenizing atmosphere which is so palpable in the *De vita Mosis*. The questions of whether this treatise was specially directed at non-Jewish readers and whether it is an integral part of the *Exposition of the Law* are still much disputed. Cf. E.R. Goodenough, 'Philo's Exposition of the Law and his *De vita Mosis*' *HThR* 27(1933) 109-125, *Introduction* 33-35; Nikiprowetzky 195-197, 217, 220-221; Sandmel 47-52; Hecht *SPh* 6(1979-80)144.

1.1.2. The summit of philosophy (20a)

Timaeus the Locrian is described by Plato as having reached the summit of all philosophy (φιλοσοφίας...ἐπ' ἄκρον ἀπάσης ἐλήλυθεν 20a4-5). A little later he adds that this man is the best versed in astronomy (ἀστρονομικώτατος) and has made a special study of the nature of the universe (περὶ φύσεως τοῦ παντός 27a3-4). Should we see a deliberate reference to *Tim.*20a on Philo's part at *Opif.*8, where Moses is described as καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐπ' αὐτὴν φθάσας ἀκρότητα καὶ συνεκτικώτατα τῶν τῆς φύσεως ἀναδεδραχθεῖς?

The phrase ἐπ' ἄκρον (and, to a lesser extent, the Hellenistic variant ἐπ' ἀκρότητα) with the genitive, denoting the height of excellence or depravity in a particular pursuit, is of course exceedingly common.

Cf. Stephanus *TGL* 1.1337, who calls it a *frequentissima formula*. In Philo it is found at *Mos.*2.58 οὐκ ἐπ' ἄκρον ἦλθε σοφίας, *Virt.*226, *Contempl.*90 etc.; also at Plato *Laws* 701e, *Jos. Ant.*19.201, *Plut. Mor.*1048E, *Plot. Enn.*3.2.14.19 etc. But we are concerned here with the particular combination with φιλοσοφία, and that is much less easy to parallel. In both Plato and Philo there is but one occurrence, i.e. the texts we are dealing with. Also the context of the Philonic passage is important. The description of Moses is not a casual remark, but forms part of a very carefully written section at the beginning of the *De opificio mundi*, the treatise which initiates Philo's commentaries on the Law of Moses. The Jewish lawgiver has already (§1-2) been favourably compared with Greek nomothetes and philosophers, implicitly including Plato (as is made even clearer in the parallel passage at *Mos.*2.49). Moreover the opening chapters of *Opif.* are, as we shall see, crammed with references to the *Timaeus*. A few lines below the passage we are now discussing a virtual paraphrase of *Tim.* 28a is explicitly attributed to Moses (see below II 2.1.1. on *Opif.*12).

The evidence thus points to a deliberate allusion on Philo's part to Plato's description of Timaeus. Moses is implicitly being compared with the Italian philosopher¹ and with Plato himself. What then is Philo trying to say in this highly compressed affirmation of Moses' philosophical competence? Two aspects are being highlighted. The use of καὶ...καὶ should not be read as

introducing a kind of hendiadys, or as sequential (contra Völker 180n.4), but rather as mildly disjunctive, i.e. indicating a contrast or at the very least a complementarity. φιλοσοφία is a polyvalent term in Philo (see below IV 2.2. n.2), but in our view it is here meant to indicate the sum total of the received human efforts at reaching knowledge of God and the cosmos (to which the Timaeus made an important contribution). In his imaginary account of Moses' education at Mos.1.21-24 Philo describes how he was introduced to all the doctrines of Greek (sic!) and barbarian philosophy. This knowledge is thus contrasted with 'the numerous and most comprehensive² doctrines of nature in which he was instructed by means of oracles' (Opif.8), by which Philo means the knowledge concerning God and the world of higher realities disclosed to Moses when he ascended the mountain and temporarily left behind the limitations of bodily existence (Ex.24:15ff.).

1.2. Critias' speech (Tim.20a-26e)

1.2.1. 'You Greeks always remain children' (22b)

Plato, well aware that the historical records of the Egyptians were far more ancient and impressive than the paltry remains possessed by the Greeks, puts the following words in the mouth of the venerable old Egyptian priest (22b4-8):

'Solon, Solon, you Greeks always remain children (παῖδες), a real Greek greybeard (γέρων) does not exist... You are all young (νέου) in your souls (ψυχάς), for in them you hold no store of ancient belief (παλαιὰν δόξαν) handed down by hearsay from long ago (δὲ ἀρχαίαν ἀκοήν), no learning hoary with time (μάθημα χρόνῳ πολὺν)'.

This celebrated remark, emphatic in its contrast between inexperienced youth and venerable antiquity, is recalled by Philo on diverse occasions, as can be seen in texts such as QG 2.74 (Gr.frag. at Petit FE 33.125)(νεώτερον οὐ τὸν ἡλικίᾳ καὶ χρόνῳ ἀλλὰ τὸν ψυχῇ. νεωτεροποιὸν γὰρ ἡ κακία, πολὺν μάθημα ἢ πρεσβύτατον δέξασθαι μὴ δυναμένη), Post.152, Legat.1 (ἄχρι τίνος ἡμεῖς οἱ γέροντες ἔτι παῖδες ἐσμεν, τὰ μὲν σώματα χρόνου μήκει πολλοί, τὰς δὲ ψυχάς ὑπ' ἀναυσθησίας κομυδῇ νήπιου, cf. Pelletier FE 32.60). As these texts show, the contrast which Philo prefers is not simply between youth and old age, but between youth and true old age regardless of appearance (i.e. whether πολιός or not). See further Leg.3.175, Deus 120, Plant.168, Her.49, Fug.146, Abr.271, Contempl.67; on the motif see further Pelletier loc.cit.

Of more interest, however, is the passage at Sacr.76-79, in which the exegetical application of Plato's remark is most clearly observed, resulting in

a passage containing 'much richness of thought' (Colson EE 3.90). Philo is concerned with the allegorical exegesis of Gen.4:3, where he finds that two charges are made against Cain the self-loving soul (§52). The second of these is that he makes his sacrificial offering to the Lord from the fruits (ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν) and not, as the Law prescribes, from the first fruits (πρωτογεννήματα), indicating thereby that he honours created being (γένεσις) more highly than God (§72). The exegete is now drawn on to make a lengthy comment on the nature of an offering of first fruits, basing his discussion on the text Lev.2:14, where it is prescribed that the offering should be divided into the new (νέα), the roasted, the sliced, and finally the ground (§76-87). It is naturally the first category that causes the Timaeus text to be recalled. Philo's train of thought proceeds in three steps.

(1) To begin with, the category νέα conjures up the contrast between those who delight in mythology and the old days and those who wish to receive the new thoughts and fresh benefits unstintingly lavished by God the timeless One (§76; on the reference to the distinction between time and eternity see below II 5.3.2.). Given Philo's attitude to myth, the reference to τὸν παλαιὸν καὶ γέροντα καὶ μυθώδη χρόνον is entirely negative.

(2) The contrast between νέα and παλαιά evidently recalls to Philo's mind the word πολυός, for he now quotes Lev.19:32, the only text in the Pentateuch where it occurs. But this text adds a complication, because, if read in one particular way, it suggests a contrast between the hoary (πολυός) and the elder (πρεσβύτερος). The hoary, symbolizing ineffective time, is disparaged in a manner similar to the previous paragraph (§76), whereas the elder is deemed worthy of the highest honour (§77). Philo is a great believer in the principle, both Greek and Biblical, that what is prior in time merits reverence and respect. The antithesis πρεσβύτερος/νεώτερος is one of his favourite themes, always turning out to the advantage of the former, in spite of the paradoxical relation between older and younger often found in scripture (Cain/Abel, Esau/Jacob etc.; cf. for example the lengthy exegesis of Gen.9:24 at Sobr.6-29). The honour due to the elder is here shown by the citation of Num.11:16 (same text at Sobr.19). But the theme's intrusion here is surely rather awkward, since Philo is actually engaged in praising the virtues of the new. (A more straightforward exegesis of Lev.19:32, in which the hoary and the elder are not contrasted but seen as complementary is given at Spec.2.238.)

(3) At §78-79, however, a milder attitude towards what is ancient and hoary is adopted. At this point more overt references to Tim.22b appear. The old and hoary that is contrasted to the new has become the time-honoured beliefs (παλαιὰ δόξα cf.22b8) and ancient traditions of noble deeds (ἀρχαῖα ἀκοή cf.22b7) which historians and poets hand down to posterity. One should in fact neither reject learning grown hoary with age (πολυὸν μὲν μάθημα χρόνῳ μηδὲν ἀρνεῖσθαι, verbally taken from 22b8) nor desist from reading the writings of wise men and listening to proverbs and old tales. Such ἀρχαιολογία is useful, if not for the acquisition of perfect excellence, at least for civic excellence. But when God gives rise to new sprouts of self-inspired wisdom in the soul, the knowledge derived from teaching is immediately swept aside. All of a sudden a beam of light floods in and opens the eye of the soul (from Plato Rep.533d2). What is seen in such a vision (ὄψις) is superior to what is heard by hearsay (ἀκοή, cf.22b7). Philo confirms his interpretation by appealing to Lev.26:10, where it is said that the old (παλαιά) should be eaten, but must make way for the new (νέα) (the same text and same allegorical exegesis at Her.279, where see Harl's note (FE) on the Philonic theme of the sudden appearance of divine gifts).¹

We have analysed this short passage not because it is in itself so important, but because it presents us with a typical example of Philo's exegetical method, and moreover gives a fascinating glimpse into the workings of the exegete's mind. The skeletal structure of the passage is formed by the four Pentateuchal texts (Lev.2:4, Lev.19:32, Num.11:16, Lev.26:10). Around these texts are draped diverse themes from Philo's well-stocked allegorical store. The result is, as was said, much richness of thought, but at the same time a certain lack of clarity and thematic unity. Starting point is the category νέα found in the Biblical text, which clearly triggers off in Philo's associative mind the recollection of Plato's words νέου ἐστὲ τὰς ψυχάς... These words are not actually used, for the reason that Philo speaks of new thoughts and not new souls, but the rest of Plato's sentence on ancient beliefs and hoary learning does prove useful. Because of the exegetical context Philo has no choice but to give the concept of newness a positive connotation, whereas in Plato's text the juvenility of the Greeks is an indication of inferiority. One can thus speak here of an example of exegetical constraint. It would be wrong, however, to regard the influence of the Timaeus text as being confined to the level of an erudite piece of literary decoration. This for at least three reasons. (1) In all likelihood it is the recollection of Plato's words that causes Philo to recall to mind the antitheses νέος/πολύς and νέος/παλαιός and select the illustrative texts Lev.19:23 and 26:10 in his exegetical chain. (2) The recollection of the Timaeus is at least partially responsible for steering the exegetical comments in the new direction of a comparison between new inspired thoughts and ancient learning (in §75 Philo was still speaking of the diverse powers of the soul harmoniously adjusted by nature). (3) The relatively appreciative attitude towards the benefits of ἀρχαιολογία occurs under the influence of the Timaeus being utilized.

Thus, if our reconstruction of the allegorist's procedure is on the right track, his thought is represented by the exegesis of four Biblical texts, but the concatenation and, to a lesser extent, the interpretation of the texts is strongly influenced by the recollection of a Platonic dictum found in a quite different context.

We conclude with two brief observations.

1. The passage at Legat.1 is of more than usual interest because it has been taken by many scholars to supply information on the chronology of Philo's life, i.e. that by the time of the embassy to Rome Philo was an old man with white hair (e.g. Sandmel 3, cf. further Petit FE 28.35). Leisegang RE 20.1 1 and Schwarz Mélanges I.Lévy 598 are correct in concluding that the literary allusion undermines any chronological deductions based on the text.
2. Philo's use of Tim.22b in the above-mentioned texts is in each case allegorical (except the topical Legat.1). This stands in marked contrast to the use of the text in the Jewish and Christian apologetic tradition in order to demonstrate the modernity of everything Greek and the antiquity of the Jews

(cf. Jos.c.Ap.1.7, Cl.Alex.Str.1.69.3, Eus.PE 10.4.19 etc.). The preoccupation of Josephus and Clement with detailed historical records is quite foreign to the abstract and ahistorical attitude of Philo (contrast, for example, Philo Hypoth.8.6.9 and Jos.c.Ap.2.15-19). There are, however, striking parallels between the Contra Apionem and the Hypothetica (cf. Colson EE 9.409) and the possibility cannot wholly be ruled out that Josephus' apologetic application of Tim.22b was inspired by Philo in a lost section of that work.

1.2.2. The theory of periodically recurring natural disasters (22a-23c)

The reason for the relative juvenility and ignorance of the Greeks is that they have been unable to escape the destructive effects of periodically recurring natural disasters. Plato mentions the two most catastrophic types: destruction by fire, which incinerates those living on mountains and in deserts, as mythically described in the story of Phaëthon (22c); destruction by water, which overwhelms those dwelling on the plains, as in the proto-historical account of Deucalion's flood (22d). The result is that mankind periodically loses the technical skills and cultural achievements which it has gradually developed, and must start again virtually from scratch, as in the case of the Greeks after the flood (23a-b). The Egyptians have been rescued from at least the more recent catastrophes by the saving activity of the Nile (22d-e). By combining these traditional motifs and presenting a plausible schema in the manner of a 'philosophy of history', Plato doubtless laid the foundation for the theory's subsequent wide dissemination.

Other relevant Platonic passages are found at Crit.111-112, Laws 676-680 and the Politicus myth (a speculative systematization is presented in Gaiser Platons ungeschriebene Lehre 205-289). Cf. Arist.De phil.fr.8 Ross, Oc.Luc.41-43, Ps.Arist.De Mundo 6 400a23ff., Lucretius 5.411ff., Seneca NQ 3.27-30, Ovid.Met. 1.125-2.408, Lucian De Dea Syria 12, Dio Chry.Or.36.39ff., Jos.Ant.1.69-71, Cl.Alex.Str.5.9 etc. The Stoa deviated by remodelling the theory, in combination with other ideas, into their doctrine of cosmic $\epsilon\kappa\pi\upsilon\rho\omega\sigma\iota\varsigma$ (cf. Hahn 198f.).

The nucleus of Philo's adaptation of the Platonic theory is the claim that Moses in the book Genesis gives one example of each type of natural disaster, destruction by water in Noah's flood (Gen.6-8) and destruction by fire in the punishment of Sodom and Gomorrah (Gen.19). The adaptation is put to use in a number of ways.

1. The structure of the Pentateuch. At Abr.1-2 Philo gives a description, in the most general terms, of the contents of the book Genesis, in which the following should be observed: (1) τὰς μεγίστας τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς φθορὰς διὰ πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος, directly reminiscent of Tim.22c2; (2) war, barrenness and famine as examples of the small disasters left unspecified at 22c3; (3) the divi-

sion of men into virtuous and wicked (not specifically related to the disasters but, as we shall see, the connection is explicit). In two other texts, Mos.2.46-47 and Praem.1-2, Philo discusses the structure of the Pentateuch as a whole (the minor differences between them can be ignored here). The 'historical part' of the Mosaic code is described as containing the lives of virtuous and wicked men and their concomitant rewards and punishments.

The motivation behind this unexpected presentation is made clear in the wider context of Mos.2.45-65. Wholly superior to other nomothetes, Moses precedes his legislation with an account of the creation of the cosmos, thereby indicating that his laws are a most faithful embodiment of the Law of nature (§49-51, cf. Opif.1-3). Given the direct correlation between the cosmos' structure and the prescriptions of the Law, it is fitting that God uses cosmic disasters to reward or to punish those who live virtuously or wickedly in relation to that Law (§52-53). At this point, when Philo illustrates what he means, Plato's theory becomes visible in the background (§53, note esp. ὕδατος καὶ πυρός, καὶ πυρῶν περιόδους (cf.22d2), κατακλυσμοῦς). Those punished by the two cosmic elements were the contemporaries of Noah and the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah (§54-57), those rewarded Lot and Noah (§58-65; the doctrine of the pre-Mosaic patriarchs as νόμοι ἔμφυτοι is indispensable here, cf. Abr.3-6). Also the mention of ἐπιτύμια at Praem.2 shows that Plato's theory is lurking in the background (cf. also §22-23). When, however, we turn to Philo's actual descriptions of the two great catastrophes (Abr.39-46,133-141, Mos.2.54-65, Spec.2.170, Virt.201-202, Praem.22-23), the narrative is evidently based on the text of the LXX, though naturally with much rhetorical expansion, and any similarities with Plato's text are of a general nature. Thus, for example, at Abr.44 the whole earth is recorded as submerged (cf. Gen.7:19), quite contrary to Plato's theory at 22d8 (the difference is noted, incidentally, by Theophilus ad Aut.18).

It is necessary to conclude, therefore, that Philo's use of Plato's theory of periodically recurring natural disasters in the three passages with which we started has a *limited and specific purpose*, namely to contribute to a demonstration that the macro-structure of the Pentateuch has a reasonable and philosophically valid foundation. Because of this limited purpose, the discrepancies between the two accounts do not perturb him at all. The Mosaic version is in any case prior.

2. Allegory. So far the texts cited have been located in the Exposition of the Law. But the ἱστορικὸν μέρος of the Pentateuch also provides the basic material for the great Allegorical Commentary. In it a small number of isolated texts reveal an allegorical interpretation of the two great natural disasters (Det.170 (on the allusion to the Timaeus see below), Conf.23, Fug.92,

Ebr.223). Detailed exegesis of the two relevant Biblical texts in the Allegorical Commentary, if written, have not survived (except Deus 20-183 on Gen.6: 5-12, which says little on the actual flood). As compensation both sections are present in the Quaestiones in Genesim, at 1.93-2.64, 4.36-56. Philo here presents both literal and allegorical exegesis, paying great attention to detail. It is characteristic of his method in the work that he at all times adheres very closely to the Biblical text, proceeding verse by verse and rarely digressing, and makes no concerted attempt to place his interpretations in a wider framework of philosophical or historical views. At the most we can point to QG 2.43 (exeg. Gen.8:11), where Philo reflects on the theme of God's beneficence. The mention of a 'residue of antiquity' and a 'small and light seed of ancient virtues' probably recalls Plato's σπέρματος βραχέος at Tim.23c1-2.¹ The 'memory of good persons (or benefits)' hints at the theme we are about to discuss in connection with Mos.2.263. And the citation of Is.1:9 shows that Philo continues to associate the two natural disasters, attributing to them a parallel cosmological and allegorical significance.

3. The transmission of knowledge. At Mos.2.263 the cultural/historical rather than the cosmological aspect of Plato's theory comes to the fore. Already at the creation of the cosmos the seventh day was given high honour as the birthday of the world (Opif.89, Dec.96). But Philo wonders why this fact was unknown to the patriarchs and the institution of the Sabbath dated only from the time the Israelites received manna in the desert (Ex.16:23, cf. Mos.1.207). In response to this exegetical ἀπορία he suggests tentatively (τάχα που) that the answer may lie in the continual natural disasters (διὰ τὰς ἐν ὕδασι καὶ πυρὶ γενομένας συνεχεῖς καὶ ἐπαλλήλους φθοράς) which have prevented the memory of the ordinance from being handed down. Here greater emphasis is laid on the natural periodicity of the catastrophes, suiting the solution of the ἀπορία. In the passages earlier discussed this vital aspect of Plato's theory was virtually ignored, for the Biblical data did not require it. An ἀπορία which we are inclined to put to Philo is how Moses comes to have such a clear and detailed knowledge of ἀρχαιολογία and γενεαλογία, going back to the first man. We may conjecture what his reply would be from the further development of the passage in discussion, with its pronounced stress on prophetic inspiration (§263 ἐπιθελάσας, §264 θεοφορηθεὶς ἐθέσπισε, §265 προφήτεια, θεῶν πνεῦμα). The oldest records are thus possessed not by Plato's Egyptians but by Philo's Jews!²

4. Purification of the earth. A benefit of the cyclically recurring floods is that they refresh and purify the weary earth which has gradually lost its youth and vigour (Tim.22d6-7 καθάροντες, cf. Ps.Arist. De Mundo 5 397a34, SVF 2.1174 (in the ἐκπύρωσις)). Plato's words are certainly recalled

at Mos.2.64 (Noah's flood), probably at Aet.62, Prov.2.109. At the beginning of the cosmos the earth was pure (Opif.136), until polluted by Abel's blood (Praem.68). At Det.170 (exeg. Gen.6:5-7) we read: ὁπότε γούν τήν γῆν ὕδατι καθαίρειν ὁ δημιουργός διανοήθη καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν ἀμυθήτων ἀδικημάτων κάθαρσιν λαβεῖν... Plato's words are again recognizable (οἱ θεοί becomes ὁ δημιουργός and is given the deliberative verb from Gen.6:6), but the theme of purification is here exploited for allegorical purposes (see further below II 7.1.2. on the imagery of inundation).

5. The age of the cosmos. On the 'scientific' use of the theme of periodically recurring natural disasters at Aet.146-149 see the following subsection.

Now that Philo's use of the theme has been analysed, an important difference between the Platonic source and his usage must be pointed out. In the Timaeus Plato presents the periodically recurring catastrophes as purely *natural* phenomena, without any suggestion that there is a specific divine purpose behind them. In the cataclysm recounted at Tim.25c both the hubristic Atlanteans and the virtuous Athenians are overwhelmed. Elsewhere Plato does admit that civilization causes man to decline from his earlier pristine innocence (Laws 677-9), and in the Politicus myth he speaks of cosmic decay (273d), but any notion of divine retribution by means of natural disasters is entirely missing. Philo, on the other hand, remains true to the Biblical narrative and regards divine *punishment* as the very *raison d'être* of natural disaster. God's anger is kindled against the impious and iniquitous and he makes use of the elements of the cosmos as instruments of his punishment (Mos.1.96 etc., cf. Bréhier 171), though from the strictly correct theological viewpoint it is not God himself but his punishing power(s) who is responsible. The heavy stress on the theme of divine punishment, both retributive and paedeutical, which pervades Philo's works is without doubt a legacy of his Judaism (cf. Sap.Sal.5:20, 16:16-17, Aristeas 188, 2 Macc.6:12 etc.; Völker 94-95). There is some evidence to suggest, however, that by Philo's time the 'moralizing' interpretation was gaining favour also among Greek and Roman thinkers.

The majority of thinkers in the Hellenistic period concurred with Plato in regarding catastrophes as part of the natural course of events and denying them any moral significance (Aristotle and Peripatetics, Epicureans and Lucretius, author of De Mundo; but note Heraclides Ponticus, who attributed the earthquake at Helike to θεῶν μῆνις, fr.46 Wehrli). The Stoa regard the cosmic ἐκπύρωσις as a positive event (see J. Mansfeld Stud.Hell.Rel.170-183). Justin Martyr correctly distinguishes sharply between the determinism of the Stoic ἐκπύρωσις doctrine and Christian eschatology (Apol.2.7.4.). In our sources of the 1st and 2nd century A.D. a more anthropocentric note is heard. Ovid and Lucian assert that Deucalion's flood took place because of man's wickedness. Seneca says that after the universal flood (almost a watery ἐκπύρωσις)

omne ex integro animal generabitur dabiturque terris homo inscius scelerum et melioribus auspiciis natur (NQ 3.30.8). Philo's explanation of the events of Genesis would have seemed plausible enough to his contemporaries. But his insistence on the theme of divine punishment sets him apart. His successors must be located among the Christian apologists, although their eschatological perspective is foreign to him (on the problematic conclusion to Prov. I see below II 3.2.2. III 1.4.f).

1.2.3. Aet.146-149: Philo and Theophrastus

So far we have set aside the passage in which Philo makes the most detailed and direct use of Tim.22a-23c, for the reason that it occurs not against the exegetical background sketched in the previous section, but in a purely 'scientific' context. The passage forms the final section in the second part of the philosophical treatise, the De aeternitate mundi, in which Philo presents a long sequence of arguments in favour of the Aristotelian doctrine that the cosmos is ἀγένητος καὶ ἄφθαρτος (§20-149). The seemingly recent origin of human civilization cannot be used as a proof that the cosmos is young and hardly more than a thousand years old. One need only look at the facts of natural history (ἱστορία). At this point Philo turns to Plato's account of periodically recurring natural disasters, not only utilizing the basic thematics, but also interweaving many details of Plato's language in his own account:

§146: φθοραὶ τῶν κατὰ γῆν, οὐκ ἀθρώων ἀπάντων ἀλλὰ τῶν πλείστων, δυσὲ ταῦς μεγίσταις αἰτίαις ἀνατίθενται, πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος ἀλέκτους φοραῖς, paraphrase of Tim.22c1-2 (φασὶν referring as often to a single source); ἐν πάνυ μακράς ἐνυαυτῶν περιόδους, cf.22d2 διὰ μακρῶν χρόνων, but adding extra emphasis on the aspect of periodicity (cf. Mos.2.53).
 §147: ῥεῦμα αἰθερίου πυρός, cf.23a8 ῥεῦμα οὐράνιον; κατακλυσμός, κατακλύζοντος, cf.22a7,d7; the description of the actual conflagrations and inundations is rhetorically elaborated in a manner highly reminiscent of Abr.42-45, Mos.2.54-56.
 §148: τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις οἰκοῦντας τόπους ἀπόλλυσθαι..., paraphrase of 22d3-5; note how ξηροῦς (22d4) becomes δυσύδροις (only here in Philo) and elicits a remark on lack of water which amounts to a gloss on Plato's text.
 §149: δόξα μυρίων ἄλλων βραχυτέρων, cf.22c3 μυρίους δὲ ἄλλους ἕτεροι βραχύτεροι; νόσου cf.23a7 (also Laws 677a5).

But the procedure in this argument cannot be understood in isolation from a complicated context.

At Aet.117 Philo writes in the bald manner of a doxographer that Theophrastus declares that the proponents of the genesis and destruction of the cosmos are deceived by four main considerations: the unevenness of the earth's surface, the diminution of the sea, the dissolution of each of the universe's parts and the destruction of entire species of animals. The four arguments here referred to, which undoubtedly contain Stoic elements (the passage is taken up as SVF 1.106), are set out in more detail in §118-131. The refutation of each argument follows at §132-149. The entire section has provoked a century-long

debate on whether Philo is witness to a philosophical dispute, in which the young Zeno attacked Aristotle's theory of the eternity of the cosmos and the founder of the Lyceum was defended by his successor, the by then aged Theophrastus (the Stoic began teaching in about 300, the Peripatetic died in 288/7, so chronologically the dispute is not impossible).

Rather than give all the bibliographical details we refer the reader to the most recent discussion, A.Graeser, Zeno von Kitium: Positionen und Probleme (Berlin 1975) Anhang II: Zeno's Argumente gegen Aristoteles' These von der Ewigkeit der Welt 187-206, where most of the important contributions to the controversy are listed (to which add Pépin 300-303, Hahn 197, Mansfeld Stud. Hell.Rel. 144).

It is clear that much depends on one's estimation of Philo's use of sources. Some scholars consider that Philo adheres closely to his source Theophrastus (except some scanty personal contributions, such as the exotic tale in §128-129), others prefer to think that Philo himself has expanded a bare doxographical outline, yet others postulate between Theophrastus and Philo an intermediate source which is responsible for the confrontation of the two earlier philosophers in the manner of a dialogus mortuorum. We shall confine ourselves to the fourth argument, concentrating on the question which curiously has not been posed by any of the contributors to the controversy - is Philo responsible for the extensive use of the Timaeus in the argument, or did he find it in his source already? Similar problems with regard to the source usage in Aet. will occupy us on a number of occasions in our Commentary.

It is true that the heading under which Zeno's (if it is his) fourth argument is listed at §117, χερσαίων φθορᾶς κατὰ γένη ζῴων, corresponds imperfectly with the way the argument is presented at §130-131 and refuted at §145-149. Philo gives the impression of haste in wishing to wind up his long list of arguments. But if the assumptions of Stoic logic are recognized, the train of thought can be made clear (cf. Graeser 203-206). To Aristotle's declaration that 'if the cosmos is eternal, also its parts and what they contain are eternal', Zeno replied that 'if the parts of the cosmos are not eternal, then also the cosmos is not eternal' (cf. §124, the same argument at Prov. 1.9-19 = SVF 2.577-578, 591-593). The argument must have been developed along approximately the following lines.

1. The earth is part of the cosmos.
2. The earth contains the genus of land animals.
3. Of the genus land animals man is a species.
4. The τέχνη, without which man cannot live, are of recent origin.
5. Thus man himself is not eternal a parte ante.
6. All that is born must die (axiomatic).
7. Thus man is also not eternal a parte post.
8. Thus the genus land animals is not eternal.
9. Thus the earth is not eternal.
10. Thus the cosmos is not eternal, i.e. subject to destruction.

In order to refute the entire argument Theophrastus had only to nullify the

empirically based fourth proposition. The theory of periodically recurring natural disasters was thus essential for his refutation of the Zenonian argument.¹ It is certain that he subscribed to the theory himself (*Περὶ εὐσεβείας* fr.2 Pötscher = Porph. *De abst.*2.5.). But is it likely that he would have presented it in the way we have it in *Aet.*145-149, showing such manifest indebtedness to Plato's account in the *Timaeus*? The answer must, I think, be in the negative. Not only is it likely that Theophrastus would have followed the views of his master (Aristotle appears to have ignored or rejected cosmic conflagrations and laid all stress on a Great Winter accompanied by cataclysmic floods and followed by a gradual drying up of the residual marshes, cf. *Meteorol.*1.14). It is also safe to say that the slavish dependence on an authoritative text for the details of a general and widely-held theory is not the manner of the fourth or early third century, but of later times. Our strong suspicion is that the importation of Plato is the work of Philo, who has replaced a general reference to natural catastrophes in his source with the specific details of Plato's version. The suspicion is reinforced, though hardly proven, by the predilection which the Alexandrian shows for Plato's version elsewhere, as well as by the copious use made of the Platonic dialogue in the remainder of this treatise.²

1.2.4. Atlantis (24e-25d)

Philo alludes to Plato's famous account of the rise and fall of the kingdom of Atlantis explicitly only once, at *Aet.*141 in the second of the four Theophrastean arguments discussed already in II 1.2.3. As an example of an island that sank into the sea, the story of Atlantis helps to disprove the claim of the proponents of the destructibility of the cosmos that the sea is gradually receding (cf. §120-123). Philo conflates two Platonic passages:

*Tim.*24e6-7 ἡ δὲ νῆσος ἅμα Λιβύης ἦν καὶ Ἀσίας μεύζων... *Tim.*25c6-d6 ὑστέρῳ δὲ χρόνῳ σεισμῶν ἐξαίσιων καὶ κατακλυσμῶν γενομένων, μιᾶς ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς χαλεπῆς ἐπελθούσης... ἡ τε Ἀτλαντὶς νῆσος ὡσαύτως κατὰ τῆς θαλάττης δῦσα ἠφανίσθη· διὸ καὶ νῦν ἄπορον καὶ ἀδύρευνον γέγονεν τοῦ κετ' πέλαγος, πηλοῦ κάρτα βραχέος ἐμποδῶν ὄντος, ὃν ἡ νῆσος ἰζομένη παρέσχετο.

*Aet.*141 ἡ δὲ Ἀτλαντὶς νῆσος, ἅμα Λιβύης καὶ Ἀσίας μεύζων, ἡ φησὶν ἐν Τιμαίῳ Πλάτων, ἡμέρα μιᾶ καὶ νυκτὶ σεισμῶν ἐξαίσιων καὶ κατακλυσμῶν γενομένων δῦσα κατὰ τῆς θαλάττης ἐξαίφνης ἠφανίσθη, γενομένη πέλαγος, οὐ πλωτόν, ἀλλὰ βαρὰ θρόδες.

The quotation marks inserted by all editors are merely confusing, since Philo does not quote Plato *verbatim* but gives a *paraphrase* which adheres very closely to the text and incorporates a number of Plato's phrases and words. In the Philonic quotation given above we have deleted the quotation marks. The word

ἐξαίφνης is introduced by Philo without anything to suggest it in Plato's text. It not only gives a touch of the dramatic, but also helps in the avoidance of Plato's hiatus at δῶσα ἠφάνισθη. It is not impossible that Philo, if he is responsible for the paraphrase, composed this passage without consultation of the actual Timaeus text. But since, as we shall see, the dialogue is quoted verbatim at Aet.13,25-27,38, we may safely assume that his copy was on his desk, as it were, when writing the treatise.

Many of the remarks made on the passage Aet.146-149 in the previous section will also apply to the reference to Atlantis here. In all probability it has been added by Philo to the examples already present in his source.¹ Theophrastus' own view of the historicity of Plato's Atlantis story is unknown, if our passage is left out of consideration.² But again he is more likely than not to have followed Aristotle, who declared that the story was a fiction of Plato, the destruction of the island being simply the philosopher's way of removing his creation from the stage (inferred from Strabo 2.3.6, 13.1.36). So once more our scanty evidence points to a Philonic intrusion, as suspected by Colson EE 9.177 (but he gives no reasons for his suspicion). That Philo should consider the Timaeus to be recounting an actual historical event is not at all surprising, since the 'first exegete of the Timaeus', Crantor, regarded it as straight history (ἱστορίαν ψαλὴν Proclus in Tim.1.76.1), and also Posidonius appears to have shared this view (fr.F49.294-303 E-K).

1.3. Final preliminaries (Tim.27a-d)

1.3.1. The subject matter of the creation account (27a)

As the final preliminary task before Timaeus commences his long monologue it remains to indicate which subjects will be covered by the three speakers. Timaeus, the expert περὶ φύσεως τοῦ παντός (27a4), will speak first, beginning with the genesis of the cosmos and ending with the nature of man (27a6-7; cf. the retrospective glance at 90e1-2, τὰ νῦν ἡμῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς παραγγελθέντα δεξεσθαι περὶ τοῦ παντός μέχρι γενέσεως ἀνθρωπίνης). Critias (and Hermocrates after him) will take the ἀνθρώπους τῷ λόγῳ γεγονότας and show them in action, thus fulfilling Socrates' request made at 19b-d.

The subject which Plato assigns to the Pythagorean philosopher is recalled in one of Philo's analyses of the structure and content of the Pentateuch. We return to the passage at Praem.1 which has already been cited above in II 1.2.2. The lines which describe Moses' creation account are particularly resonant with the conceptuality and language of the Timaeus. First some atten-

tion must be paid to detail.

Praem.1 (text Colson EE 8.312; the emendation of the last two phrases at C-W 5.336 is rejected as unnecessary):

ἡ μὲν οὖν κοσμοποιία παγκάλως πᾶσα καὶ θεοπρεπῶς μεμήνυται, λαβοῦσα τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπὸ γενέσεως οὐρανοῦ καὶ λήξασα εἰς ἀνθρώπου κατασκευὴν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀφθάρτων τελειότατος, ὁ δὲ θνητῶν. ἀθάνατα δὲ καὶ θνητὰ ἐν γενέσει συνυφαίνων ὁ ποιητὴς εἰργάσατο τὸν κόσμον, τὰ μὲν γενόμενα ἡγεμονικά, τὰ δ' ὡς ὑπήκοα καὶ γεννησόμενα.

ἡ κοσμοποιία: Used by Philo as a *terminus technicus* not so much for the creation itself, but Moses' account of the creation; cf. Opif.3,129,170, Fug.178, Abr.2,258, QG 1.1 (Greek text at FE 33.42) etc.

παγκάλως πᾶσα καὶ θεοπρεπῶς μεμήνυται: Cf. the eulogy of Moses' creation account at Opif.4.

λαβοῦσα τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπὸ γενέσεως οὐρανοῦ: Cf. Tim.27a5-6 ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως. In Plato and many other authors κόσμος and οὐρανός are interchangeable in both meanings, i.e. as 'universe' and 'heaven', causing much interpretative confusion (cf. Tim.28b2-3, Pépin 145-146). Philo is aware of these semantic possibilities (cf. Aet.4) and in his own usage there are traces of such equivocation (cf. the detailed analysis at Nikiprowetzky 114). But there is no doubt that here he means 'heaven', as is indicated by the rest of the passage and also by the close parallel at Opif.82. Plato, on the other hand, certainly uses κόσμος in the meaning 'universe' at 27a6, in accordance with the sequence of his account, in which the body and soul of the cosmos come into being before any of its parts.

καὶ λήξασα εἰς ἀνθρώπου κατασκευὴν: Cf. Tim.27a6 τελευτῶν δὲ εἰς ἀνθρώπων φύσιν. All translators take κατασκευὴν to mean 'creation' or 'construction' (Cohn GT 2.383, Colson EE 9.313, Beckaert FE 27.43), i.e. referring in general terms to the account of man's creation at Gen.1:26-31, 2:7-8 (cf. the usage at Conf.168,179, where in both cases Gen.1:26 is actually cited). See also below II 9.3.1. on QG 2.1-7. Wolfson 1.118, by appealing to QG 1.53, sees a reference to Gen.3.21 here, and so wishes to prove that for Philo the creation account continues till the end of Gen.3. This view is most likely correct, but the argument used to prove it is sophistic.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀφθάρτων...: Reminiscent of Plato's well-known formula at 29a5-6, on which see below II 2.3.2. (where the textual change proposed by Shorey is discussed).

ἀθάνατα δὲ καὶ θνητὰ...: By 'immortals' Philo means especially the heavenly bodies as inhabitants of the heavens, by 'mortals' men as composite of body and soul on earth (cf. Opif.82). On the remainder of the sentence see further below II 6.2.2.

Opif.82, which has already been cited a number of times, is largely parallel to Praem.1, but the use of Tim.27a5-6 is specifically related to the exegetical ἀπορία of why man comes last in the creational sequence. God reasoned (διανοηθεὶς, cf. Tim.32c8,39e9 etc.) that it was fitting to unite together heaven as ἀρχή of creation and man as its τέλος, the former as τῶν ἐν αἰσθητοῖς ἀφθάρτων τελειότατος, the latter as τῶν γηγενῶν καὶ φθαρτῶν ἄριστος, or, if the truth be said, a βραχυὺς οὐρανός.

Nikiprowetzky 198 writes on the text at Praem.1: 'Cette définition de la κοσμοποιία correspond parfaitement à la formule qu'emploie Platon pour désigner la narration de Timée.' We entirely agree, except that the adverb 'parfaitement' goes too far. Philo changes Plato's κόσμου γενέσεως to γενέσεως οὐρανοῦ and focusses on the comparison between heaven and man. At Opif.82 the same comparison leads him to call man a 'miniature heaven', the only time he presents this variant of the macrocosm/microcosm theme (on further aspects of

the similarities between heaven and man see below II 5.2.1-2. 7.2.4.). There can be no question that the motive behind the change is to allow an improved correlation with the creation account as presented by Moses. Leaving aside the creation of the incorporeal world on 'day one' (Opif.16-35, exeg. Gen.1: 1-5), the *heaven* is created *first* on the second day (Opif.36-37, exeg. Gen.1: 6-8), while the *last* act of creation is the framing of *man* on the sixth day (Opif.69-88, exeg. Gen.1.26-31). The problem of where the creation of the animals and woman is to be placed in the creational sequence (on which see below II 10.2.1-2.) is set aside. Philo is talking in general terms and the parallel between Moses and Plato is too good to leave unused.

Once more we must conclude that, in Philo's view, the structure and subject matter of the Timaeus illuminate Moses' intentions in the composition of the Pentateuch. By describing the Genesis account in terms of the structural categories of Plato's celebrated cosmogony, Philo demonstrates in a subtle manner the former's rationality and philosophical plausibility. The exactness of the parallel is not so important, hence the slight change in formulation noted above, which brings the description closer to the actual details of the Mosaic account. As if to underline the parallel in red ink he makes a point of incorporating as much of the Platonic terminology and language as he can. It is worth recalling that terms such as ἀθάνατα and θνητά are nowhere to be found in the Mosaic account being described.

It is interesting to compare another adaptation of the Platonic formula of Tim.27a5-6. Introducing the 'theoretical' part of Platonic philosophy the Middle Platonist Albinus writes at Did.8.1:

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐπομένως περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν τε καὶ τῶν θεολογικῶν λέγωμεν θεωρημάτων, ἄνωθεν ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων ἀρχόμενοι καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῶν κατέλτοντες καὶ ἐπισκοποῦντες τὴν τοῦ κόσμου γένεσιν, τελευτῶντες δὲ εἰς ἀνθρώπων γένεσιν καὶ φύσιν. καὶ πρῶτόν γε περὶ ὕλης λέγωμεν.

Clearly the subject matter of the Timaeus has been expanded to include the ἀρχαὶ and θεολογικά, which Albinus, following the usual Middle Platonist practice, chiefly derives from the same dialogue. One might argue that the Timaeus actually encourages such a transformation, for the account of the cosmogony is preceded by a discussion of philosophical principles in 27d-29d (in which, however, there is no mention of ὕλη or the receptacle). It is perhaps not too fanciful to discern a similarity with Philo's brilliant solution to the problems of the Mosaic 'day one', in which the 'creation' of one of Plato's ἀρχαί, the model, is partially included within an account of the creation of the cosmos as a whole. Was Philo helped on his way by a precursor of Albinus' scholastic handbook (perhaps Arius Didymus)? Compare also Tim.Locr.7: πρὶν ὦν ὡρανὸν λόγῳ γενέσθαι ἥστην ἰδέα τε καὶ ὕλη καὶ ὁ θεὸς δαμουργὸς τῷ βελτίονος.

1.3.2. The invocation of God (27c)

Before Timaeus embarks on his undertaking he calls on the gods and prays that his discourse may be pleasing to them (such invocations appear to have become a literary mannerism of the late Plato, cf. also Tim.48d, Crit.108c-d, Laws 712b,715e,893b, imitated at Epin.980c). Although the invocation is presented as little more than a ritual performance (καλέσαντα κατὰ νόμον θεούς 27b9), it serves to underline the greatness and solemnity of the theme which is to be discussed. At the beginning of one of his philosophical treatises, Aet.1, Philo makes a particularly elaborate and felicitous adaptation of this text. The exordium of the De aeternitate mundi is a complex, densely written passage, and not every aspect can here be analysed in detail (for a discussion in the context of an analysis of the treatise as a whole see Runia 122-123).

Philo commences by picking up the distinction made by Plato between the invocation requisite for every undertaking great or small and the one now especially necessary on account of the gravity of the subject. He receives encouragement from the obvious connection between his treatise's subject and the thematics of the Timaeus, which in Plato's words is concerned περὶ τοῦ παντός... ἡ γέγονε ἡ καὶ ἀγενές ἐστιν (27c4-5, on the ἡ...ἡ see below). Philo's subject is in fact the ἀφθαρσία of the cosmos (§1,3), but as early as §7 he makes it clear that this question cannot be solved without taking into consideration the related problem of the γένεσις/ἀγενεσία of the cosmos. The verbal parallels between the two passages are limited in scope (27c1-3 ὅσοι... ἐπὶ παντός ὁρμῇ καὶ μικροῦ καὶ μεγάλου πράγματος θεὸν αἰεὶ που καλοῦσιν → ἐπὶ μὲν παντός ἀδήλου καὶ σπουδαίου πράγματος θεὸν καλεῖν ἄξιον, 27c6 ἀνάγκη → ἀναγκαϊότατον). Philo's method is rather to *expand and make explicit* that which, in terms of his own thought, is *implicit* in and can be read into Plato's words. We note the following.

(1) Whereas Plato is quite unspecific about the god/gods whom he is invoking (27b9 θεούς, 27c3 θεόν, 27c6 θεούς τε καὶ θεάς), Philo is careful to be precise. God is the ἀγαθὸς γεννητὴς (on God's goodness cf. 29a3,29e1 and see below II 3.1.1.; the term γεννητὴς is not found in the Tim. but cf.37c7,41a5 and see below II 2.2.2.), a fact which will prove to be entirely relevant to the question of the cosmos' indestructibility. Moreover God is both possessor and source of all knowledge (cf. Migr.40-42, QG 3.43 (EES 1.236) etc., and see below II 2.4.1. 3.1.3.), a fact which is here not implied by Plato but gives Philo's invocation all the more point, as will be seen in the exordium's further development.

(2) The comparison between God (source of knowledge) and cosmos (object of investigation) is systematically worked out, with use of language drawn

from the Timaeus. οὔτε...παντελέστερόν τι... οὔτε...τελεώτερον is strongly reminiscent of the praise of creator and product at 29a5-6. The contrast between νοητά/νοῦς/νοητόν and αἰσθητά/αἰσθησις/αἰσθητόν is a rephrasing of the basic distinction introduced in the Timaeus at 27d5-28a4, the intelligible realm here being closely identified with God.

(3) Plato does not relate the invocation to the dispositions of the participants in the dialogue, but says that they need to *call on themselves* in order to expound and listen properly (27d2-4). Philo, on the other hand, puts forward as a condition for those who labour to benefit from the divinely prof-fered knowledge (retaining the mss. reading πόθος) that they possess πόθος ἀληθείας πλείων (the Platonic language of ἔρως, ὕμνος and πόθος from the Phae-drus myth and the Symposium, so pervasive in Philo), in this way making the transition to the exordium's second part.

Already it can be concluded that Philo is making every effort to give the exordium a specifically Platonic colouring. The reason must be located in the fact that the solution to the problem of the cosmos' φθορά/ἀφθαρσία in the De aeternitate mundi is basically that of the Timaeus, brought in relation to the view of Moses at §19. The Platonic dialogue gives the right perspective on the relation between God and the cosmos. The Platonic colouring is further reinforced in the second half of the exordium, which is built up around an adaptation of Tim.29b-d. It will be analysed below at II 2.4.1.

A notable feature of the De aeternitate mundi is that it is structured along the lines of a θέσις, a literary genre which undertakes to examine a problem by arguing for and against a central proposition such as εἰ φιλοσοφη-τέον, εἰ διδασκτόν ἡ ἀρετή, or in our case here εἰ ἀφθαρτος ὁ κόσμος (§3)(cf. Runia 112-118). The fact that Plato speaks of τοὺς περὶ τοῦ παντός λόγους... η γέγονεν η καὶ ἀγενές ἐστιν, as if having in mind the θέσις proposition εἰ γενητός ὁ κόσμος ἢ οὔ, will have made the passage even more attractive for Philo's purposes in this treatise, even if all further formal resemblance is entirely lacking. So far I have left the words η...η unaccented because there are, depending on interpretation and accentuation, a number of possibilities. The interpretation of these little words was a source of dispute in ancient Timaeus commentaries; cf. Procl. in Tim.1.218.29ff. and Festugière's notes ad loc., also J. Whittaker, 'Textual comments on Timaeus 27c-d' Phronesis 27(1973) 387-391, BaItes 73,97,112-115. Philo would doubtless have read either εἰ...ἢ (the majority view in antiquity) or ἢ...ἢ in the meaning of εἴτε...εἴτε, in-terpreting that Plato here leaves the issue open, but settles it at 28b4-7. (Modern editions read ἢ...ἢ, but are, as Whittaker demonstrates, most likely incorrect.)

It should be noted that it became almost a commonplace for Platonists to begin works (or discussions of difficult problems) with invocations to God/the gods which incorporate an allusion to Tim.27c-d. See the extensive list compiled by H.D.Saffrey and L.G.Westerink, Proclus: Théologie Platonicienne vol. 1 (Paris 1968) 131. But the example that I consider closest to Philo is not cited. At Mor.351C-D Plutarch commences the treatise De Iside et Osiride with the following invocation:

πάντα μὲν, ὦ Κλέα, δεῦ τὰγαθὰ τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας αἰτεῖσθαι παρὰ τῶν θεῶν, μάλιστα δὲ τῆς περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπιστήμης ὅσον ἐφικτόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις μετιόν-
τες εὐχόμεθα τυγχάνειν παρ' αὐτῶν ἐκείνων, ὥς οὐδὲν ἀνθρώπῳ λαβεῖν μεῖζον
οὐδὲ χαρίσασθαι θεῶι σεμνότερον ἀληθείας. τὰλλα μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώποις ὁ θεὸς
ᾧν δέονται δίδωσιν, νοῦ δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως μεταδίδωσιν, οἵκετ' αὖ κεκτημένος
ταῦτα καὶ χρώμενος.

Unlike Philo Plutarch starts off by speaking of gods in the plural (since boons can come from diverse deities), but it is noteworthy that he shifts to the singular when speaking of God as source of ἀλήθεια, νοῦς, φρόνησις (since God as νοῦς is one). Plutarch stresses the limitations of human knowledge, as Philo will do in Aet.2. Interesting too is his remark that God does not *give* man νοῦς and φρόνησις but allows man to *share* in his own, a sentiment that recalls Philo's interpretation of God's 'inbreathing' in Gen.2:7. In short, would not an unwitting reader who stumbled across the beginning of Philo's treatise in all likelihood conclude that it was the work of a 'true-blue' Platonist?

CHAPTER TWO
TIMAEUS 27D-29D: THE PROEMIUM

2.0. Introductory

2.1. The cosmos: has it come into being? (Tim.27d-28a,28b-c)

2.1.1. Being and becoming (27d-28a)

2.1.2. A classic text (28b-c)

2.1.3. The problem of the γένεσις of the cosmos

2.2. The demiurge is introduced (Tim.28a-b,c)

2.2.1. The cause of becoming (28a)

2.2.2. God as 'demiurge', 'maker and father' (28b,c)

2.2.3. A celebrated text little used? (28c)

2.3. The model is introduced (Tim.28a-b,28c-29b)

2.3.1. The model must be καλόν (29a)

2.3.2. 'Best of causes, most beautiful of created things' (29a)

2.3.3. A most surprising exegesis of Tim.29b

2.4. Methodological prelude (Tim.29b-d)

2.4.1. The probable account (29b-d)

2.0. Introductory

The proemium (the designation is Plato's own, 29d5) lays the foundation for the rest of Timaeus' long discourse. It is more than a methodological prelude to the account of the cosmogony. Written in an extremely compressed style, its chief task is to present the *fundamental philosophical principles* upon which the entire account is built, and to which Plato returns on a number of occasions in some detail later on (37a-c,47e-49b,51c-52c). These principles, adhering to the basic ideas of Platonism and themselves the result of an (implicit) exercise in dialectics, are first outlined in abstracto, and then successively applied to the concrete phenomenon of the cosmos, once it has been formally introduced into the discourse. The carefully reasoned and structured sequence of Plato's presentation is made clear in an analysis of the proemium's contents.

1. Fundamental philosophical *principles* (27d-28b):

(a) the division into the realm of being and the realm of becoming (27d5-28a4;

- (b) whatever comes into being requires a cause (28a4-6);
- (c) the degree of excellence of the product is determined by the nature of the model to which the demiurgic creator looks (28a6-b2).
- 2. *Application* of the principles to the cosmos (28b-29a):
  - (a) the cosmos has come into being (28b4-c2);
  - (b) thus it comes into being by means of a cause (there follows a brief excursus on the nature of this cause) (28c2-5);
  - (c) the demiurge must have looked to an eternal model (28c5-29b1).

The remainder of the proemium is devoted to the question of the kind of knowledge that we can have of the cosmos and the kind of account that can be given of it (29b1-d3). Here the epistemological aspect of the division into the two realms is brought forward and its 'methodological' implications are made clear. The three applications of Plato's principles to the cosmos and the discussion on our knowledge of it each find their way into Philo's thought. This chapter of our Commentary is accordingly divided into four sections.

2.1. The cosmos: has it come into being? (Tim.27d-28a, 28b-d)

2.1.1. Being and becoming (27d-28a)

Wishing to sweep his readers into the very centre of his thought, Plato commences by stating the fundamental division of reality into the intelligible and sense-perceptible realms, a division which has repercussions for both *ontology* (τὸ ὄν/γένεσις) and *epistemology* (νόσις μετὰ λόγου/δόξα μετ' αἰσθήσεως). The doctrine of the two worlds formed a cornerstone of the Middle Platonist system of Platonic philosophy, for it allowed a clear differentiation from the Stoa and other rival schools. The text Tim.27d5-28a4 was a locus classicus for the basic dichotomy between unchanging, transcendent being and the world of flux and change, subject to the process of becoming.

It is accordingly quoted, paraphrased and adapted on numerous occasions; cf. Apul.De Plat.193, Nichomachus Intr.Arith.1.2.1, Numenius fr.7, Justin Dial.3.5, Sex.Emp.Adv.Math.7.142 etc. An interesting textual aspect of this usage is discussed by J.Whittaker, 'Timaeus 27dff.' Phoenix 23(1969)181-185; cf. also Baltes VChr 29(1975)268.

Philo accepts the division into the intelligible and sense-perceptible realms as a basic datum of the analysis of reality, given expression in the formula of the two worlds (νοητὸς κόσμος, αἰσθητὸς κόσμος) and in the numerous formulations of the *paradeigma* relation. One example out of hundreds is found at Plant.50. Giving an exegesis of Ex.15:17, where Moses sings of God's κατοικη-
τήριον and ἀνάσσει, Philo places these descriptions in the cosmological per-

spective which is predominant in De plantatione:

τὸ τὸν κόσμον εὐτρεπῆ καὶ ἔτοιμον αἰσθητὸν οἶκον εἶναι θεοῦ, τὸ κατεργάσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀγέννητον εἶναι, ὡς ᾤθησάν τινες, τὸ "ἀγίασμα", οἶον ἀγίων ἀπαύγασμα, μύμημα ἀρχετύπου, ἐπεὶ τὰ αἰσθήσει καλὰ τῶν νοήσει καλῶν εἰκόνες...

As almost always, the world of noetic reality is (here by implication) associated with God himself or his Logos. The opposition of τὰ αἰσθήσει καλὰ and τὰ νοήσει καλὰ shows Philo's awareness of the intimate connection between ontology and epistemology in the Platonic division of reality; cf. other texts such as Migr.103, Her.75, Spec.1.20, Praem.29-30, Aet.1,15, QE 2.96 etc. (see also below II 2.4.1.).

But it is above all in the explanation, in terms of the Timaeus, of the Mosaic account of the creation of the cosmos that Philo's understanding of the Platonic division becomes clear. In this context, at Opif.12, we encounter a more direct adaptation of the above-mentioned Timaeus text. Presenting some preliminary comments before starting on his actual exegesis, Philo has just polemicized against those thinkers who regard the cosmos as ἀγέννητος καὶ ἀδύλος (§7). This is a worthless and unprofitable doctrine, attributing anarchy to the cosmos (§11). But the great Moses recognized the fundamental difference between τὸ ὁρατὸν and τὸ ἀγέννητον. The former is, in close dependence on Plato, explained as πᾶν τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐν γενέσει καὶ μεταβολαῖς οὐδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτά ὄν (cf.28a3 γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὅντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν). To that which is ἀόρατον καὶ νοητὸν Moses assigned ἀδύλοτης (equivalent to τὸ ὄν ἀεί at 27d6),¹ while τὸ αἰσθητὸν is given the appropriate name of γένεσις (cf.27d6 γένεσιν). Philo then skips a few lines in the Timaeus. His words, ἐπεὶ οὖν ὁρατός τε καὶ αἰσθητός ὁδε ὁ κόσμος, ἀναγκαιῶς ἂν εἴη καὶ γεννητός, are a simplifying but effective paraphrase of Plato's argument at 28b7-c2, to which we shall return in the next sub-section.² It is therefore very much to the point that Moses should begin his Law with an account of the cosmos' γένεσις. In so doing he produced a fine piece of theology (μάλα σεμνῶς θεολογήσας).

As the above analysis has shown, Opif.12 provides us with a particularly blatant example of Philo's practice of placing doctrines of the Greek philosophers *in the mouth* of Moses.³ Two texts from the Timaeus are combined and applied to the Mosaic account of creation. Needless to say, Philo thinks he has good grounds for this move. But his train of thought is not so easy to follow, for the reason that in this one passage three lines of argument have been entwined together. Let us explain them one by one.

1. In Opif.7-11 Philo has already given a *theological* argument defending the doctrine that the cosmos is γεννητός. On this argument see below II 2.1.3. He now adds an *ontological* argument, closely aligned to the Platonic doctrine

of the two worlds (which has so far not been mentioned, if we except the hint of the noetic world given in the words αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν in §8). If the division into γένεσις and ὄν is accepted, it is evident that the cosmos, being ὁρατὸς καὶ αἰσθητός, belongs to the former and is therefore γενητός.

2. At the same time Philo is very much aware of the fact that the first book of the Law has received the title Γένεσις. Hence his statement that Moses gave the realm of sense the appropriate *name* (or word) γένεσις. Exegesis of this title forces the reader, in Philo's view, to recognize that Moses propounds the dichotomy of intelligible and sense-perceptible reality and emphatically declares the cosmos to be γενητός. As so often in his philosophical exegesis, the argumentation is emphatically circular. The Platonic doctrine allows one to understand the Mosaic title, but at the same time the Mosaic title validates the Platonic doctrine.

3. But Philo is also looking ahead to the following part of his interpretation of the Mosaic account. He is about to explain why Moses employs a schema of six days in order to recount the κοσμοποιία (§13-14). Moreover one of these days, namely 'day one' is exceptional and must be dissociated from the rest (§15). Philo will need the Platonic division into the two worlds here — the hexad is associated with γένεσις and the κόσμος αἰσθητός, the monad with ὄν and the κόσμος νοητός. The attribution of the doctrine of Tim.27d-28a to Moses in Opif.12 thus provides an indispensable transition to the next part of the exposition.

2.1.2. A classic text (28b-c)

Having introduced his doctrine of the two realms of γένεσις and τὸ ὄν, Plato immediately applies it to the main subject of his discourse, the cosmos. Has the cosmos always existed (28b6 ἦν ἀεί, cf. 27d6 τὸ ὄν ἀεί), having no ἀρχή γενέσεως, or has it come into being (28b6 γέγονε), starting off from some ἀρχή? The answer is pronounced, not without a touch of drama, in a single word: γέγονε (28b7), it has come into being. The reason given for this answer harks back directly to the doctrine set out in 27d6-28a4. Since the cosmos is visible, tactile and corporeal, it belongs to the domain of the αἰσθητά, and such things, apprehended by δόξα with αἰσθησις, appear as γυγνόμενα and γεννητά.

Already in the previous sub-section it was observed that in Opif.12 Philo paraphrases 28b7-c2 as a proof of the cosmos' γένεσις. The words of the Timaeus are directly attributed to Moses. In another passage, Prov.1.21, Philo quotes the text 28b4-c2 not as Moses' or his own opinion, but in order to present Plato's verdict on the question of whether the cosmos has or has not come

into being. The first part of this treatise (§6-36) is concerned with the doctrine of Providence in relation to the creation, maintenance and possible destruction of the cosmos. Philo turns to Plato as a thinker with a certain authority on such subjects. He is introduced as 'the Greek sage Plato' (§20). On the possible destruction (φθορά) of the cosmos Tim.38b6-7 is quoted, on which see further below II 5.3.1. On the γένεσις of the cosmos, Philo continues, he has indicated his opinion in an earlier part of the discourse. After these introductory words the text 28b4-c2 is quoted verbatim.

Because the Armenian translation gives a very literal rendering (to the extent that, according to Weitenberg, it is only comprehensible if one adduces the Greek text), it is possible to determine whether Philo deviates from the received text in his quotation. Some brief remarks on this question were made by F.C.Conybeare, 'Note on the Philonean reading of two passages in the Timaeus, 38B and 28B' JPhilol 21(1893)71-72. Three textual variations, all trivial, should be noted: (i) the word πρῶτον (28b5) is deleted (note how Aucher restores it to his translation); (ii) for ἐν ἀρχῇ δεῦν (28b5) the Armenian reads ἐν ἀρχῇ ζῆν (hence the bracketed vita in Aucher's translation), doubtless a mistake on the part of the translator (Weitenberg); (iii) instead of γεννητά (28c2) the translator probably found γενητά in his text (this reading is also found in certain Platonic mss., cf. Plut.Mor.1016E).

Philo attaches no commentary to this text. It is quoted as a proof-text and allowed to speak for itself. In the lines that follow other features of the Timaeian cosmogony, such as the model, demiurge and pre-existent matter, are introduced; see further below II 2.3.3.

Philo was not alone in using Tim.28b4-c2 as a proof-text. From the time of Aristotle onwards it was a *classic text* in favour of a literal reading of Plato's cosmogonic account (cf. Plut.Mor.1016E, Att.fr.37, Just.Dial.5.2; also Baltes 8,36,39,102,110 etc.). Plato's emphatic γέγονεν did not decide the question of the cosmos' γένεσις, but instead provoked a long-standing controversy among interpreters of the Timaeus, which even today is not entirely settled. To this subject, inasmuch as it is relevant to Philo, we now turn.

2.1.3. The problem of the γένεσις of the cosmos

The central place occupied by the problem of the γένεσις of the cosmos in the interpretation of the Timaeus in antiquity already drew our attention in the introductory part of this study (see I 4.b,d,g). In the Old Academy Plato's successors favoured a metaphorical interpretation, but Aristotle argued otherwise. When renewed interest was shown in the dialogue in the 1st century B.C., the literal view of the cosmogony was at first popular, and also later it retained some supporters. But by the heyday of Middle Platonism in the 2nd century A.D. the non-literal interpretation was generally accepted. All research on this subject has now been superseded by the monograph of Baltes

(cf. I 4.n.104; the comments of Pépin 86-94 remain instructive).

The German scholar demonstrates that the proponents of a literal interpretation, arguing that creation took place as an actual event (though not necessarily *in time*), placed a good deal of emphasis on the *wording* of the Timaeus, e.g. in the use of proof-texts (cf. 209-211). Also the doctrines of a pre-existent disorderly matter and/or pre-existent irrational cosmic soul (e.g. in Plutarch, Atticus, and perhaps Numenius) are crucial for this view. The interpreters who supported the opposing viewpoint showed, according to Baltes (cf. 22), a greater concern for the philosophical intentions of the work as a whole. In defence of their position that the cosmos did not come to be in a creational event, but always has been and always will be in a state of createdness (i.e. creatio aeterna or creatio continua) three main arguments are used (cf. 82, 211ff.):

- (1) a *methodological* explanation - the cosmogony is presented for didactic reasons (διδασκαλίας χάριν) or as a hypothesis (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως), i.e. in order to show the structure of the cosmos and the relation to its source;
- (2) a *metaphysical-ontological* explanation - the cosmos is γενητός in that it is dependent on, or continually being created by, a higher cause;
- (3) a *physicalistic* explanation - the cosmos is γενητός because it is found in a continual state of becoming and change.

For half a millenium these arguments were used over and over again, with an ever increasing degree of refinement and scholastic subtlety.

The Philonic passage which gives the clearest insight into his views on this interpretative controversy is Aet. 14-16. Having just given a verbatim quote of Tim. 41a7-b6 in support of Plato's δόξα that the cosmos is γενητός καὶ ἄφθαρτος (on this quote see below II 6.1.1.), Philo considers it necessary to add some elucidatory remarks. The passage falls into three brief sections, which will be dealt with one by one.

Philo starts off with a piece of polemic (§14):

τινὲς δὲ οἴονται σοφισζόμενοι κατὰ Πλάτωνα γενητὸν λέγεσθαι τὸν κόσμον οὐ τῷ λαβεῖν γενέσεως ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ τῷ, εὔπερ ἐγίγνετο, μὴ ἂν ἐτέρως ἢ τὸν εἰρημένον συστήναι τρόπον, ἢ διὰ τὸ ἐν γενέσει καὶ μεταβολῇ τὰ μέρη θεωρεῖσθαι.

The word σοφισζόμενοι indicates his sharp disagreement with the interpreters whose arguments he cites. The identity of these men is not made clear. It is not impossible that he has in mind members of the Old Academy such as Speusippus and Xenocrates; after all in §16 he adduces Aristotle's view. But he may also be thinking of contemporary commentators (perhaps Eudorus, cf. Plutarch Mor. 1013B, Baltes 85). In the two arguments given for a non-literal view the

first and third explanations outlined above can easily be recognized. The former is the ἐξ ὑποθέσεως argument (note the use of the conditional), going back to the Old Academy. The latter is based on the γυγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον of Tim.28a3 (cf. also 28c1-2). Baltes 86 affirms that it occurs here for the first time, but that its context indicates that it is older than Philo.

Two points of detail require closer attention. Colson's translation (EE 9.195) of εὐπερ ἐγίνετο as 'if it had been created' fails to convey the meaning of the imperfect tense, which indicates that the state of becoming continues into the present (cf. Kühner-Gerth *Ausführliche griechische Grammatik* 2.470, Smyth *Greek Grammar* §2310). We should thus translate: 'if it has come and still is coming into being...'.¹

The phrase with which Philo describes the viewpoint his opponents reject, οὐ τῷ λαβεῖν γενέσεως ἀρχήν, is also of great interest. It is manifestly based on Plato's words at 28b6, γενέσεως ἀρχήν ἔχων οὐδεμίαν. But the words γενέσεως ἀρχή are ambiguous. They can be understood *temporally* (i.e. as 'beginning of genesis', supporting the literal interpretation), or *ontologically* (i.e. as 'principle of becoming', favouring the metaphorical view). On no less than eight occasions Philo uses these words as a kind of *terminus technicus* in relation to the question of the createdness of the cosmos (or its parts); cf. Opif.54, Conf.114, Abr.162, Aet.14,53,118, Prov.1.6,21 (translation of Tim.28b6!) (cf.88). Now at Leg.3.78 it is certain that ἀρχή γενέσεως is meant in the ontological sense (used of God's ἀγαθότης καὶ χάρις). So Philo was certainly aware of the second possibility. What about the eight texts just cited? The combination with an aorist verb in Aet.14 and Conf.114 (οὐποτε...ἔλαβεν) puts the temporal meaning beyond doubt. Also in Aet.53,118, Prov.1.6,21 there can be no dispute concerning the intended temporality. I am thus persuaded that also in the two remaining texts γενέσεως ἀρχή means 'beginning of genesis' and that Philo ignores the potential ambiguity. There is abundant evidence that Plato's phrase at 28b6 was understood in a temporal sense by various Middle Platonists, Cicero and Alexander of Aphrodisias (cf. Baltes 29,45-46,63,73). But Philo's 'technical' usage remains striking (it is not given any attention by Baltes). Note also that Philo nowhere makes any attempt to define the term γενητός. Contrast the sophisticated analysis of the Platonist Taurus (ap. Philop.Aet.145.13ff., translated in Dillon 242-243).

Philo continues, with direct reference to the Timaeus (§15):

βέλτιον δὲ καὶ ἀληθέστερον ὑπονοεῖν τὸ πρότερον, οὐ μόνον ὅτι διὰ παντὸς τοῦ συγγράμματος πατέρα μὲν καὶ ποιητὴν καὶ δημιουργὸν τὸν θεοπλάστην ἐκεῖνον καλεῖ, ἔργον δὲ καὶ ἔγγονον τουτονὶ τὸν κόσμον, ἀπ'ἀρχετύπου <καὶ> νοητοῦ παραδείγματος μύμημα αἰσθητόν, πάνθ' ὅσα ἐν ἐκείνῳ νοητὰ περιέχοντα αἰσθητὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, τελειοτάτου πρὸς νοῦν τελειότατον ἐκμαγεῖον πρὸς αἴσθησιν,...

Having given the opinion of his opponents, Philo now explains the more correct view of the cosmos' γένεσις, which he finds contained in the passage just quoted in §13 and in the phrase τῷ λαβεῖν γενέσεως ἀρχήν (hence τὸ πρότερον). His justification for this interpretation he sets out first of all in a direct appeal to the wording of the Platonic text (hence καλεῖ). The last five lines of this paragraph thus amount to a little 'compendium' of phrases and doctrines from the Timaeus. It is a unique little passage, the only occasion in Philo's oeuvre that he gives an explanation of the Timaeus not directly bound to a quoted or paraphrased text. In subjecting these lines to a brief analysis, I record and add to the various identifications already made by Bernays

Abh.Berl.Akad.1883 64-65, Colson EE 9.195, Baltes 32-33.

τοῦ συγγράμματος: It is interesting to observe that Philo describes the *Timaeus* as a 'treatise' or 'discourse', not as a dialogue.

πατέρα μὲν καὶ ποιητήν: Cf. the famous pairing at 28c3; δημιουργός, cf. 28a6, 29a3 etc., also 41a7 δημιουργός πατήρ τε, just quoted above at §13. μὲν...δέ indicates that the basic contrast is between creator and created.

θεοπλάστην: The choice of word is most unusual – it is not found in the *Timaeus* and nowhere else in Philo (see also II 2.2.2.). Does it refer to the creation of the astral deities addressed in the text just quoted in §13 (so Bernays, Colson, Bormann GT, Baltes), or to the creation of the cosmos as ὁρατός θεός (§10,20, so Arnaldez FE)? ἐκεῖνον, which harks back to §13, points to the former interpretation.

ἔργον: Cf. 30b3,6; frequent in Philo, e.g. *Opif.* 9,171, *Deus* 106, *Her.* 199 (exeg. *Ex.* 30:35) etc.

ἔγγονον: Not Platonic, but cf. ἐγγόνω at 50d4, cosmos as μονογένης at 31b3, 92c9. Compare *Opif.* 10 καὶ γὰρ πατήρ ἐγγόνων...στοχάζεται τῆς διαμονῆς; cosmos as God's (younger) son, *Deus* 31, *Ebr.* 30, *Spec.* 1.96 (on which see below II 10.3.1.). The word ἔγγονον is used of the cosmos (following *Tim.* 50d4) at *Tim.* Loc. 2,5. The coupling ἔργον καὶ ἔγγονον indicates the complementarity of the technological and biological metaphor; see further below II 2.2.2.

ἀπ'ἀρχετύπου <καὶ> νοητοῦ παραδείγματος μῦγμα αἰσθητόν: Cf. esp. 48c4-49a1, also 28a6-b2, 28c5-29b2, 92c7. Philo's use of the unplatonistic adjective ἀρχετύπος reveals that he is here employing familiar Middle Platonist terminology for the paradeigma relation; cf. *Opif.* 16, *Ebr.* 133 etc. and below II 3.4.2.

πανθ'ὄσα...ἐν αὐτῷ: cf. 30c7-d1, 31a4-5; see below II 3.4.1. on *Opif.* 16, *Plant.* 2 and this text.

τελειότατον ἐκμαγεῖον: τελειότατος, cf. 68e3, 92c9; it is Philo's favourite superlative in praise of the cosmos' perfection. See below II 2.3.2. on the 'language of excellence' which he draws from the *Timaeus*. ἐκμαγεῖον of course goes back ultimately to Plato's description of the receptacle (50c2), but here it does not mean 'plastic substance' or 'stuff' (or space), but rather the 'imprint' from a seal or the 'casting' made from a mould in such a substance; see further below II 3.4.2. 8.2.1.

τελειότατον πρὸς νοῦν: Sc. παραδείγματος from above (cf. Leisegang 234; Baltes 33n.41 prefers to read it as an independent neuter; Colson's sc. ἐκμαγεῖον is improbable). πρὸς νοῦν/πρὸς αἰσθησιν is employed as *variatio* for νοητοῦ/αἰσθητόν, but at the same time indicates Philo's properly Platonic concern for the relation between ontology and epistemology; cf. esp. 27d5-28a4 and see II 2.1.1. 2.4.1.

In the third part of the passage (§16), Philo adds a further argument in favour of his interpretation of the Platonic δόξα that the cosmos is γενητός. Such was the view of Aristotle, and the testimony of a pupil (especially such a conscientious and innovative one) concerning his teacher should be trusted. Philo is clearly acquainted with Aristotle's literal interpretation of the cosmogony (on which see Baltes 5-18); his information may have been derived from a reading of the *De philosophia* (cf. §10-11 = fr.18 Ross). Baltes 33-34 considers that the *laus Aristotelis*, together with the *doxographicum* on Hesiod at §17 (cf. *De Caelo* 3.1 298b29), indicates a Peripatetic source for this part of Philo's doxography in §8-19. Pépin 251-277, looking at the doxography as a whole, compares other doxographies in Lactantius and Ambrose and postulates a tradition going back ultimately to Aristotle's *De philosophia*. It seems to me beyond doubt that Philo's doxography contains traditional elements. But a de-

tailed analysis of its contents shows that this material has been carefully selected and systematized in order to suit Philo's own purposes (cf. Runia 124-130). The entire structure would appear to collapse if Plato's opinion that the cosmos was created amounted to no more than a 'rephrasing' of the Aristotelian position, as would be the case if the arguments of the σοφιστόμενοι were accepted.

Even so, a serious interpretative problem remains in Aet.14-16. It was noted above that in §15 Philo appeals explicitly to the wording of the Timaeus text, a procedure that was customary among interpreters who favoured a literal view of the cosmogony. Unlike in Prov.1.21, however, he does not cite the usual texts that suggest a real creational event (e.g. 27d6-28a4, 28b2-c2, 29b1-2, 30a2-6, 41a7-b6). The words and phrases which he selects for his little compendium are those which emphasize the relation between creator and created product, model and replica. Yet it was precisely this relation that was emphasized in the metaphysical-ontological argument in support of the non-literal interpretation (i.e. that one of the three main arguments which, we recall, Philo did *not* mention in §14). Nothing that Philo writes in §15 would have been found disturbing by Platonists such as Albinus, Taurus, or even Plotinus, who were opposed to the literal interpretation which Philo appears to favour. The problem is therefore: was Philo unaware of the metaphysical-ontological explanation, or did he regard the view of γένεσις as 'eternal dependence on a higher cause' as incompatible with God's creatorship?¹ Bearing this problem in mind, it is time that we shifted our attention to some other texts.

The crucial difference between the texts in Opif. which we shall now examine and Aet.14-16 is that in them Philo no longer furnishes a *direct* interpretation of the Timaeus, but is concerned with exegesis of the Mosaic account of creation, for which task the interpretative difficulties of the Timaeus are at most of *indirect* relevance. Nevertheless in four texts these problematics remain distinctly resonant in the background.

Opif.7-10. Giving some preliminary comments on the fact that Moses begins his Law with a κοσμοποιία, Philo directs an attack against those thinkers who declare the cosmos to be ἀγένητός τε καὶ ἄδύλος. These men show an excessive admiration for created reality, while impiously attributing to its creator a vast inactivity (§7). The reference to divine ἀπραξία indicates that Philo's prime target among Greek philosophers is Aristotle;² but it is also possible that he includes the Xenocratean interpretation of the Timaeus, for the 'ontological' or 'didactic' view of γένεσις leaves the cosmos ἄδύλος (and so from the temporal point of view ἀγένητος).

The attribution of degrees of admiration to God and the cosmos, which in-

roduces a measure of *contrast* between creator and created work, is a new argument, not used (to my knowledge) in relation to the Timaeian controversy (its importance in Philo foreshadows a bright future in Patristic thought; cf. Pépin 278-291). This is not the case for Philo's following argument, which maintains that belief in cosmic uncreatedness entails a denial of the doctrine of Providence (§9, cf. 171). More than a century later it is used by Atticus (fr. 4.2) in support of a literal interpretation of the cosmogony, but no doubt it was already circulating much earlier.³ For Philo there is an evident connection between the doctrine of creation and the doctrine of Providence, as can be seen, for example, in the fact that the γένεσις of the cosmos is dealt with in both books of his *De Providentia* (1.6-8, 21-23, 2.45-51; on πρόνοια and the doctrine of the cosmos' ἀφθαρσία see below II 6.1.5.). At the same time one cannot help noticing the similarities between Philo's description of creator and cosmos here and his exposition of the *Timaeus*' contents in *Aet.* 15 (§9 τὸ τελειότατον ἔργον, §10 τὸν πατέρα καὶ ποιητήν, πατὴρ ἐκγόνων καὶ δημιουργὸς τῶν δημιουργηθέντων), the main difference being that in *Aet.* the doctrine of Providence is not explicitly mentioned (though strongly implicit in §13) and that in *Opif.* the role of the noetic model is ignored (being reserved for the detailed exposé in §16ff.).

The essential message which Philo wishes to convey is, therefore, that the cosmos must not be thought to be ἀγέννητος, because that view amounts to a denial of the relation between maker and created product. Just as in *Aet.* 14-15, the metaphysical-ontological argument (i.e. in favour of a non-literal cosmogony) is not specifically disqualified. Dillon 157 concludes from this text that Philo presents 'creation in the sense of dependence for its existence on an external cause', which, he adds, 'was the general Platonic view in later times'. It is understandable that Dillon reaches this view, even though, because it rejects an actual creational event, it may well be incorrect.⁴

Opif. 13-14. Why is creation said to have taken place in six days? The creator certainly did not need a length of time for his work, for it is probable that both planning and execution were carried out simultaneously (ἅμα πάντα). Philo finds the reason in the fact that things that come into being require order (τάξις). Order involves number and the number most appropriate to γένεσις is the number six. Philo's intentions receive further clarification a few paragraphs later.

Opif. 26-28. The words ἐν ἀρχῇ in Gen. 1:1 are not meant temporally, but indicate order and hierarchy, i.e. God made the heaven first (§28):

καὶ γὰρ εἰ πάντα ἅμα ὁ ποιῶν ἐποίησεν, τάξιν οὐδὲν ἥτιον εἶχε τὰ καλῶς γινόμενα· καλὸν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐν ἀταξίᾳ. τάξις δ' ἀκολουθία καὶ εὐρμός ἐστι προηγούμενων τινῶν καὶ ἐπομένων, εἰ καὶ μὴ τοῖς ἀποτελέσμασιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ταῖς τῶν τεκταινομένων ἐπινοήσιν· οὕτως γὰρ ἔμελλον ἡκριβῶσθαι τε καὶ ἀπλανεῖς εἶναι καὶ ἀσύγχυτοι.

The main idea of §13-14 is repeated, but the τάξις is now more closely related to the planning activity of the creator. The creational sequence indicates planned and ordered *structure*. Now, as we saw at the beginning of this subsection, one of the explanations for a non-literal reading of the *Timaeus* was that Plato presented the cosmogony for didactic reasons. A standard comparison, ever since the Old Academy, was the way in which mathematicians 'generate' diagrams for illustratory purposes, without wishing to affirm that triangles or squares come into being (cf. Baltes 20,211). Philo's explanation of the six days of creation certainly bears a resemblance to the above-mentioned interpretation. In both cases the creational sequence is a *device*, but the reasons for it differ. Philo does not stress (as he easily could have done) the didactic aspect, but rather the hierarchical or structural purpose of the sequence (perhaps because of its numerical features, which are also taken symbolically). Moreover the explanation is placed in the perspective of a *creatio simultanea*, not a *creatio aeterna*.

Opif.67-68. Philo returns briefly to the theme of sequential exposition when giving exegesis of the fifth and sixth days of creation, in which God creates the animals in the order fishes - birds - terrestrial animals - man (cf. Gen.1:20-31)(§67):

τότε μὲν οὖν ἅμα πάντα συνίστατο. συνισταμένων δ' ὁμοῦ πάντων, ἡ τάξις ἀναγκαίως λόγῳ ὑπεγράφετο διὰ τὴν ἐσομένην αὐτοῖς ἐξ ἀλλήλων γένεσιν.

Here the narrative (λόγος) reflects the τάξις involved in the process of γένεσις. This passage I find some what confused. The illustration of a seed developing into a fully-grown animal does explain the process of γένεσις, but is not so relevant to the hierarchical sequence of one genus being created after the other.

A comparison with the rich collection of material made accessible in Baltes' study shows how Philo's explanations, because they are adapted to the requirements of the Mosaic creational account, resemble the interpretations of the *Timaeus* exegetes only in a rather general way. The Platonists, emphasizing the didactic nature of the account (διδασκαλίας χάριν, θεωρίας ἔνεκα, σαφηνείας χάριν, ἐξ ὑποθέσεως), rarely dwell on the ordered nature of the created product being described. But compare Albinus ap. Procl.in Tim.1.218.31f. (ἵνα γενόμενον αὐτὸ (τὸ πᾶν) θεωρήσαντες τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ φύσιν κατέδωμεν (but is the φύσις that of τάξις or of γένεσις?), Baltes 97); Taurus ap. Philop.Aet.146.13-17 (the cosmos' γένεσις demonstrates the functional interrelationship (δύναμις) of its parts, Baltes 107); Plotinus Enn.3.5.9.24-29 (myth separates τὰ ὁμοῦ ὄντα and shows things distinct in τάξις and δυνάμεις, Baltes 125). The expression λόγῳ ὑπεγράφετο recalls the similar use of λόγῳ by Crantor, *Timaeus* Locrus, Plotinus (Baltes 211). Finally one should note that the Platonists also speak of γένεσις κατ'ἐπινόειαν (cf. Baltes 211), but that this is in reference to an account in the mind of the writer or the reader, not to a plan in the mind of the creator, as Philo intends in §28 (ταῦς τῶν τεκταυνομένων ἐπινόαις, i.e. with reference to the architect image in §17-18, but bearing in mind the difference between God and human builders).

The subject of the correct understanding of the cosmos' γένεσις recurs frequently in Philo's writings. Other texts of lesser importance are given at Runia 132 & n.114-120. Three other related issues have yet to be discussed: (1) Philo's description of the 'moment of creation' (and esp. the controversial passage Prov.1.6-8)(see below II 3.2.1-3); (2) Creation and the nature of time (5.3.1.); (3) the possibility of creatio ex nihilo (8.2.2.). Only when these further questions have been taken into account can we reach some final conclusions on how Philo approaches the problem of the cosmos' γένεσις in its double aspect, i.e. in relation to the interpretation of Plato's Timaeus and, more importantly, in relation to the interpretation of the Mosaic creational account. See below III 2.4. and 3.5.(2b).

Finally an appended note on Philo's mysterious Jewish-Alexandrian predecessor Aristobulus. Two passages in his fragments are relevant to the theme of this section and deserve a brief notice. Eusebius PE 13.12.3-4 records him as saying that the divine voice in the creational account should not be taken literally, but is meant to indicate 'execution of works' (κατασκευὰς ἔργων). 'It seems to me', he adds, 'that those tireless investigators, Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato, followed Moses when they say they heard the voice of God, contemplating the construction of the universe which was perfectly created and is unceasingly maintained by God (τὴν κατασκευὴν τῶν ὅλων συνθεωροῦντες ἀκριβῶς ὑπὸ θεοῦ γεγονυῖαν καὶ συνεχομένην ἀδιαλείπτως)'. It must be agreed with Hengel Judaism and Hellenism 165 that the apologist is thinking here of the Timaeus (written by Plato, told by the Pythagorean Timaeus to Socrates), which he regards as indebted to the Mosaic account. The implied correlation between God's creation and maintenance of the cosmos uncannily anticipates one of Philo's favourite themes.

A few pages later (PE 13.12.12) Aristobulus, discussing God's rest on the seventh day (see below II 6.3.2.), remarks that Moses signifies 'that God made the heaven and the earth and all its contents in six days, in order to reveal the times and indicate the order of precedence of the things created (ἵνα τοὺς χρόνους δηλώσῃ καὶ τὴν τάξιν προείπῃ τί τίνας προτερεῖ)'. Once again the notion of τάξις appears to anticipate Philo's explanation in Opif.13,27-28. P. Wendland (in A.Elter, De Gnomologiorum Graecorum historia atque origine (Bonn 1895) VIII 233) points out the parallel and, implying that a temporal view of the six days is rejected, uses it as an argument for his thesis that these fragments are the work of a later forger who made grateful use of the ideas developed by Philo (*ibid.*234). But there is no reason to believe that Aristobulus denies the temporal sequence involved in creation. Cf. N.Walter, Die Thorausleger Aristobulos TU 86 (Berlin 1964) 68: 'Aber auch die Ablehnung der Vorstellung, die Welterschöpfung sei in der Zeit vor sich gegangen, darf nicht aus Philon in Aristobulos' Worte eingetragen werden.' There is a marked difference in philosophical sophistication between Philo and his predecessor. The probability that Aristobulus was acquainted with the interpretative controversy concerning the Timaeon cosmogony is small.

2.2. The demiurge is introduced (Tim.28a-b,c)

2.2.1. The cause of becoming (28a)

Plato's second fundamental principle is that all that has come into being must necessarily have done so by means of some cause (ὕπ' αὐτοῦ τινός) (28a4-6). A few lines later this principle is applied to the cosmos. Plato describes the cause as ποιητὴς καὶ πατήρ, and declares that 'it is a hard task to find him and, having found him, it is impossible to tell everyone about him' (28c3-5). Thus he introduces into his narrative a creator god responsible for the cosmos' γένεσις. Although Aristotle was of the opinion that Plato recognized only two causes (the formal and the material) and neglected the efficient cause (cf. Met.A 6 988a8ff.), later interpreters found no difficulty in equating the αὐτόν τε with the Aristotelian efficient cause (cf. Procl. in Tim.1.261.24). This is particularly evident in the 'prepositional metaphysics' developed early on in Middle Platonism, in which God as the demiurge is the αὐτὸν ὅφ' οὗ (see further II 3.4.5. on Cher.126-127). At Albinus Did.10.3 the highest νοῦς is πατήρ τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι πάντων, but the Platonist has learnt from Aristotle Met.A that there are difficulties in attributing demiurgic activity to the First cause (10.2 ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἀκίνητος).

ὁ αὐτὸς or τὸ αὐτόν is one of the epithets most frequently employed by Philo to describe God's relation to the cosmos and its parts. Expressions such as τὸ πάντων αὐτόν (Deus 56), τὸ ἀνωτάτω καὶ πάντων ἄριστον αὐτόν (Plant.64), αὐτόν τὸ πεποιηκός (Abr.78), are located at frequent intervals throughout his works (cf. Leisegang 69-71). They express God's creatorship as described in the Mosaic κοσμοποιία and assumed in the exegesis of the remainder of the Pentateuch. The above-mentioned frequency is not caused by Plato's words at Tim.28a alone (cf. also 29a6 ἄριστος τῶν αὐτῶν), but results from the combination of this text with later Aristotelian and Stoic doctrines. Three in particular should be noted.

1. God as τὸ αὐτόν is the *first* cause (Conf.123), the *moving* cause (Fug.8), the *highest* and *eldest* cause (Spec.2.5). The influence of Aristotle's Prime mover is patent.
2. God is the *active* cause, opposed to passive matter. As is well-known, (cf. Weiss 38-44), Philo takes over the terminology of the Stoic doctrine in which the active and passive principles (τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον) are both qualifications of the same οὐσία. It is given eloquent expression in the famous passage at Opif.8, ἔγνω [Moses] δὴ ὅτι ἀναγκαϊότατόν ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τὸ μὲν εἶναι δραστήριον αὐτόν, τὸ δὲ παθητόν (cf. also Cher.77, Det.161, Spec.3.180, QG 3.3. (EES 1.180) etc.). There is disagreement between the translators of

this passage on whether αἴτιον should be understood with τὸ παθητόν (Arnaldez FE 1.147, cf. Weiss 42, Früchtel 12) or that τὸ παθητόν stands on its own and means 'passive object' (J.Cohn GT 1.29, Whitaker EE 1.11). The latter view is certainly correct, for, as we shall see below in our discussion of Fug.8-13, Philo denies any causality to passive and formless matter (cf. also Fug.133). Opif.8-9 also shows that for Philo there is a strong opposition between the active cause (νοῦς) and the passive object (ὑλη), not a complementarity as in the Stoa; see further below II 3.2.1.

3. God as cause *never ceases* to be active (Cher.87). It is characteristic (ἔδουον) of God to act, just as it is characteristic of that which has come into being to undergo action (Cher.77). The notion of God as ever active and pure ἐνέργεια is once again Aristotelian.

The text in Philo which most clearly alludes to Tim.28a4-6, Fug.12, is part of a most interesting passage. The starting point of Philo's exegesis is the Biblical theme of flight undertaken on account of hatred (Fug.7, citing Gen.31:19-21). In order to explain the reason for the hatred the interpreter takes recourse to philosophical allegory, as is particularly suggested by the text Gen.30:42, in which Laban is assigned the unmarked sheep (ἄσημα), Jacob the marked (ἐπίσημα). The notion of 'marking' brings to Philo's mind the τύπος imagery, which has philosophical significance particularly in two areas, the formation of the cosmos and the imprint of sense-perception and thought upon the mind. Here he concentrates on the former; in a parallel passage at Her. 180-181 the latter is stressed (see further below II 3.4.2.).

The allegory makes clear that Laban belongs to the class who deify (§8 θεοπλαστοῦντες) qualityless, formless and shapeless matter (οὐσία under the influence of the Stoa refers to ὑλη, cf. §9 ἡ ἄκοιτος ὑλη, Opif.21 etc.). Jacob, in contrast, is a member of the superior company who declare, with Anaxagoras (cf. Pl.Phd.97c, Diog.Laert.2.6), that νοῦς came and ordered all things, converting them from ὀχλοκρατία to μοναρχία, from ἀταξία to τάξις (the language of Tim.30a, cf. below II 3.2.1.).¹ Philo thus perceives a Biblical attack on that mode of thinking which attributes the form and structure that is visible in the cosmos to material forces or chance, and so effectively rejects the doctrine that God has designed and created the cosmos and maintains its structure through his providential care. For this same reason the eunuchs are expelled from the holy congregation; cf. Spec.1.327-329 (exeg. Deut.23:2). Such a materialistic philosophy (best represented in Greek philosophy by the Epicureans (cf. Aet.7, Fug.148, Somn.2.283ff.), but also relevant to proponents of scepticism) is quite a distance further down the highway of impiety than the doctrine of the Chaldeans, who at least recognized causes of order in the universe

(i.e. the celestial beings) but failed to perceive the one true supra-cosmic Cause (cf. Virt.212, Migr.179, Abr.78 etc.).

Jacob's task is to teach Laban his error, namely that he recognizes no efficient (δραστήριος) cause outside purely material realities (§11). For, affirms Philo dogmatically, the cosmos has come into being and has assuredly done so through the agency of some cause (§12). The phrase ὑπ' αἰτίου τινός indicates in the clearest fashion the reference to Tim.28a4-6, and is combined with the assertion, made a few lines further in 28b, that the cosmos has come into being (γέγονε, cf. 28b7). Now there comes an abrupt switch for which the reader is perhaps unprepared. Philo turns to the Logos of the creator (τοῦ ποιοῦντος, picking up αἰτίου), who is equated with the seal (σφραγίς) by which each part of the cosmos receives its τέλειον εἶδος and is perfect from the beginning because it is the ἐκμαγεῖον καὶ εἰκὼν of the perfect Logos (§12). The switch to the Logos is only comprehensible in the light of Philo's detailed exposition at Opif.16-25 and especially the assertion that the κόσμος νοητός is nothing else than the θεοῦ λόγος ἥδη κοσμοποιοῦντος. The cosmos only possesses its rational structure because it is the image of the noetic plan formed by the creator (i.e. the efficient cause) as his Logos before commencing the creative act. Form is the result of and inseparably connected with creative activity. Laban in his folly recognizes neither the Cause, nor his Logos, nor the archetypal noetic plan, nor the form present in the cosmos.

The term εἶδος in §12 is at first puzzling. It must be agreed with Theiler Vorbereitung 29 that it is used here in the technical Middle Platonist meaning of immanent form, separate from the Logos or σφραγίς as transcendent form (cf. Seneca Ep.58.20, Alb.Did.4.7,10.7). (On Philo's varied usage of the term εἶδος see Nikiprowetzky's analysis at REJ 124(1965)283-288; unfortunately our passage is omitted.) Confirmation is found in the illustration given in §13, where the γενόμενον ζῷον is described as quantitatively incomplete - it must still grow - but qualitatively complete, for its ποιότης (which determines the εἶδος) has been imprinted on it from the unchanging Logos.²

Two other texts are relevant to Philo's use of Tim.28a4-6. In an interesting but rarely cited passage, QG 4.87, Philo gives an exegesis of Abraham's double invocation in Gen.24:3. He concludes from the Biblical text that the heavenly beings recognize God as both creator (θεός) and ruler (κύριος), 'while we earthborn and corruptible creatures cannot deny God (θεός), for he who comes to create is necessarily imagined as the efficient cause, but we still do not acknowledge his kingship and government...' As a proof-text Ex.5:2 is added (cf. Ebr.19). Pharaoh recognizes God 'because of natural necessity, in so far as he perceives and admits that he was made by the Creator, but he denies that he knows the Lord...' The phrase 'he who comes to create' repeats the Anaxagorean δεικνύμενον employed in Fug.10, while the words 'necessarily' and 'because of natural necessity' recollect Plato's ἐξ ἀνάγκης in 28a4-5 and show that the

recognition of the efficient cause is based at least partly on Tim.28a.

In a similar way Philo attempts at Prov.1.12 to prove the existence of divine Providence. The transition from non-being to being cannot be explained unless some cause (i.e. αὐτόν τι) is recognized, through which the change takes place. Those things which have now come into being have always had a creator, for the first efficient cause is (by definition) not created by something else. The argument, based on the impossibility of an infinite regression, is well paralleled in an argument for the existence of God at Sex.Emp. Adv.Math.9.75. The same argument can easily be read into Tim.28a, but the Armenian transmission prevents us from determining a definite allusion to that text (Weitenberg). Prov.I is directed against sceptics with the kind of thinking represented by Laban. In the forefront of their ranks is Philo's nephew Alexander (cf. Prov.2.45-46).

2.2.2. God as 'demiurge', 'maker and father' (28b,c)

Plato was not the first Greek philosopher to describe γένεσις in terms of a craftsman-creator (cf. Solmsen JHI 24(1963)474,480). His exploitation of the conception in the Timaeus was so original and so thorough, however, that it was thereafter always associated with him and his cosmogonic account. Particularly striking was his description of the creator god as ὁ δημιουργός, quietly introduced in 28a6. There can be no doubt that in Philo's time any intellectual who came across the description of God as the demiurge would immediately think of the Timaeus (one might hope that even today this is still the case). Philo himself uses the term δημιουργός more than any other to describe God's creative activity; extensive lists of references are given at Leisegang 176, Mayer 72. The repeated use of the term is an unambiguous recognition of his debt to the depiction of the creator-god in the Timaeus.

But the epithet δημιουργός is not given exclusive rights. Philo also uses other words to describe God's role as demiurgic creator, as can be seen in the following list:

τεχνύτης: the most common alternative for δημιουργός; cf. Leisegang 776, Mayer 277. It is not found in the Timaeus (but cf. the stress on divine τέχνη at Laws 888eff.). Its popularity is due to the influence of the Stoa (cf. Weiss 52-54).

πλάστης: suggested by Gen.2:7, but Philo uses it only once, at Conf.194, where it is used of the fashioning of the parts of the soul and equated with τεχνύτης. The verb πλάττειν is also used only for the forming of man (Weiss 50). But note the compound words κοσμοπλάστης (Plant.3, Congr.48, cf. Migr.6, Her.166), θεοπλάστης (Aet.15, on which see above II 2.1.3.); both are found only in Philo,¹ and were doubtless coined by him.

κτίστης: this word too has Pentateuchal backing (cf. κτίζω in Deut.32:6 etc.) though it is not used in the account of creation in Gen.1-3. Much has been

written on the contrast made between δημιουργός and πλότης at Somn.1.76. It is to be agreed with Wolfson 1.301-302 and Weiss 55-58 that creatio ex nihilo need not be inferred. The word is used of God relatively infrequently, namely 6 times (Leisegang 476).

πλοητής: on this Platonic epithet see below.

The word δημιουργός itself means a 'craftsman' or 'manual worker'. That the creatorship of the cosmos should be related to such a humble occupation has often surprised commentators. Brisson 29-31 points out that the craftsman belongs to the third and lowest class of the ideal Platonic state.² Philo, sensitive to this problem, promotes him to an architect in his explanation of creation at Opif.16-18 (see below II 3.4.3.). I suspect that δημιουργός is for him primarily a philosophically respectable epithet for the creator. It suggests the process of making a product out of an unformed material ready to hand, but we are not immediately supposed to think of an unsophisticated potter or brickmaker.

The word is wholly devoid of a Pentateuchal background, and is also not found in the remaining books of the LXX (except a few trivial cases in late works heavily influenced by Hellenism, 2 & 4 Macc. and Sap.Sal.). Nevertheless, as we shall see below in II 3.4.4., Philo locates the prototype of the demiurgic workman in Bezalel, whom the LXX describes as engaged in the activities of ἀρχιτεκτονεῖν, ποιεῖν, λειουργῆσαι, κατεργάζεσθαι (Ex.35:32-33). On Philo's depiction of God as δημιουργός see the sound discussion at Weiss 44-52. On the word in Greek, Jewish and Patristic thought see W.Theiler, Art. 'Demiourgos' RAC 3.694-711. Both give parallels in Middle Platonic authors, e.g. Plut.Mor. 1014B, Alb.Did.12.1 etc.

A few lines further at Tim.28c3 the creator god is given another famous description. He is called the 'maker and father' of this universe. This specifically Platonic phrase also occurs frequently in Philo's writings. I have located no less than 41 instances (the list at Billings 19n.6 is very inaccurate and incomplete):

(a) in the Platonic order πλοητής καὶ πατήρ: Opif.7, Post.175, Conf.144,170, Her.98,236, Fug.177, Abr.58, Decal.105, Spec.1.34, 2.6, 3.199, 4.180, Virt.34, 64,77, Legat.293, Prov.2.62,72, QG 2.34 (Gr. text at FE 33.107), QE 2.33 (EES 2.75) - in all 21 cases;

(b) in the reverse order πατήρ καὶ πλοητής: Opif.10,21, Her.200, Fug.84, Abr.9, Mos.1.158, 2.48,256, Decal.51, Spec.2.256, 3.178,189, Praem.24,32, Contempl.90, Aet.15, Legat.115, QG 1.58, 4.130, fr.10 (Gr. text FE 33.223) - in all 20 cases.

If there should be any doubt regarding Philo's awareness of the Platonic provenance, it is proven by at least two passages: Opif.21, where he conflates Tim.28c3 and 29e1 and attributes it to τῶν ἀρχαίων τις (cf. Boyancé REG 76 (1963)106 and further below II 3.1.1.); Aet.15, where it is included in the brief Timaeus compendium (see above II 2.1.3.).

A detailed analysis of Philo's use of the phrase in all the passages we have listed would be tedious and unprofitable. Aside from the philosophical views read into it, the most interesting aspect is that the phrase appears to

have for Philo the connotation of a *public* recognition of God's creatorship of the cosmos, presumably because it comes from such an authoritative source. Two examples show this clearly: (1) use of the phrase as the climax in the invocation of the cosmological argument, in which God's existence is demonstrated from his works, cf. Spec.1.34, 3.189, QG 2.34 (see below II 7.2.3.); (2) its use in apologetic passages on behalf of the Jewish race, which is portrayed as having a special relationship to the Universal God, cf. Spec.4.180, Virt. 34,64, Legat.115.

That the philosophical intention of this double description was a burning interpretative issue in Middle Platonism is shown by Plutarch, who devotes one of his *Πλατωνικά ζητήματα* to the question why Plato describes the highest god (τὸν ἀνωτάτω θεόν) as πατέρα τῶν πάντων καὶ ποιητὴν (1000F-1001C; note the inversion of Platonic order, occurring also at Mor.718C). The Platonist gives three suggestions in response. (1) God is father of the gods and man, maker of irrational beings and inanimate things. (2) God is called father in the metaphorical sense, just as one can be the father of a literary work. (3) Plato distinguishes between coming into being (γένεσις) and birth (γέννησις). In the latter process God donates a part of his own self. The cosmos is a living being and God is its father.³

The distinction between the *technological* and the *biological* metaphor, which provides the main interpretative thrust in Plutarch's solution, is clearly recognized by Philo, as can be seen in his explication of Plato's phrase in Opif.10, Aet.15:

Opif.10 (giving background comments on the Mosaic creation account): τοῦ μὲν γὰρ γεγονότος ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τὸν πατέρα καὶ ποιητὴν αἰρεῖ λόγος· καὶ γὰρ πατὴρ ἐκγόνων καὶ δημιουργὸς τῶν δημιουργηθέντων στοχάζεται τῆς διαμονῆς...

Aet.15 (with direct reference to the *Timaeus*): ...ὅτι διὰ παντὸς τοῦ συγγράμματος πατέρα μὲν καὶ ποιητὴν καὶ δημιουργὸν τὸν θεοπλάστην ἐκεῖνον καλεῖ, ἔργον δὲ καὶ ἔγγονον τούτου τὸν κόσμον...

In another interesting example of the distinction the language adheres less closely to the Platonic account:

Spec.1.41 (Moses addressing God, cf. Ex.33:13): τοῦ μὲν εἶναί σε καὶ ὑπάρχειν διδάσκαλος καὶ ὑφηγητής μοι γέγονεν ὅδε ὁ κόσμος, καὶ ὡς υἱὸς ἀναδιδάξας με περὶ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ ὡς ἔργον περὶ τοῦ τεχνύτου...

Philo's use of these two metaphors in describing the process of creation (according to Moses) is a theme which must be carefully watched as our Commentary proceeds. Other descriptive epithets in Philo for God the creator which denote the biological metaphor and have a Platonic background are γεννητής (Aet. 1, Praem.46 etc., cf. 41a5,68e4), φουρργός (on which see below II 3.4.1.).

What are the Biblical precedents for Philo's adoption of the Platonic phrase? The word ποιητής does not occur in the LXX, but Moses' description of God's activity by means of the verb ποιεῖν throughout Gen.1-3 provides Philo

with a full justification. The notion of God's fathership is also prominent in the Old Testament, though not as common in the Pentateuch as one might expect. By means of allegory Philo can derive God's creatorship as father from unpromising material, e.g. from Deut.21:18-21 at Ebr.30,42. A more suitable text is Deut.32:6, οὐχ αὐτὸς οὐτός σου πατήρ ἐκτίσαστό σε καὶ ἐποίησέν σε καὶ ἔκτισέν σε;. In Conf.144-145 these words are brought in relation to the Platonic phrase ποιητῆς καὶ πατήρ.

But what does God as πατήρ mean to Philo? Völker (58) claims in this context:

...und wenn er auch häufig die platonische Formel vom ποιητῆς καὶ πατήρ reproduziert, so hat für ihn doch gerade dieses Wort πατήρ einen ganz bestimmten Klang: τὸ πέρας οὐδὲν ἢ εὐαρεστεῖν τῷ θεῷ καθάπερ υἱοὺς πατρὶ (Praem.167).

This remark is one-sided and tendentious. Readily it must be granted that for Philo God's fathership is not limited to what Plato intends in the Timaeus (cf. Billings 22-23). Indeed one recognizes a fundamental bivalence. God as πατήρ on numerous occasions denotes the Hellenic idea of ontological and creative source. No less frequently and no less significantly, it represents the relation between father and son, gracious forbearing parent and wilful struggling offspring, in which the Biblical background is clearly resonant (cf. Ps. 102:13, Prov.3:12 etc.). To stress one aspect to the exclusion of the other is to do violence to the richness of Philo's thought. Rather we should observe that in the association of God's fathership with the doctrine of divine Providence the two strains of thought merge together in a manner which is characteristically Philonic. A particularly fine example of this convergence is found at Prov.2.15 (where the allusion to the Homeric πατήρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε (Il.1.544 etc.) is bowdlerized away by Eusebius, but preserved in the Armenian; note that Plutarch refers to the same phrase in his exposition of Tim.28c3 (Mor.1000F)!).

2.2.3. A celebrated text little used? (28c)

Plato's text on the difficulty of finding God and talking to others about him (Tim.28c3-5) was one of the most widely used, indeed in Chadwick's phrase (Origen Contra Celsum 429n.1), 'perhaps the most hackneyed quotation' drawn from Plato's works in the writings of the Platonic tradition and the Christian apologists. The quotation was used in diverse contexts and for diverse purposes, of which the following are the most important:

(1) In support of a negative theology, which affirms that God is unknowable, or, if perhaps καταληπτός for a few, certainly indescribable; e.g. Cic.DND 1.30, Corp.Herm.fr.1.1.

- (2) In support of the contention (adhering closer to the text) that God's transcendence makes the task of discovering him very difficult; e.g. Apul.De Plat.191, Celsus ap. Or.c.Cels.7.42-43.
- (3) In support of the arcanum, i.e. that God's nature must not be revealed to those not qualified to receive it; e.g. Jos.c.Ap.2.224, Apul.Apol.64.8, Cl. Alex.Str.5.78 (drawing further support from Ex.20:21!).
- (4) In support of the contention that, since Plato declares the demiurge not impossible to find, he cannot be speaking of the highest, supremely transcendent God; e.g. Num.fr.17, Plot. ap. Procl.in Tim.1.305.25.
- (5) As an apologetic device to show that the Greeks were not wholly ignorant of the one true God; e.g. Justin Apol.2.10.6, Athenagoras Apol.6, Min.Fel.Oct.19.14.
- On the use of this text and the associated question of God's transcendence and unknowability cf. J.Geffcken, Zwei griechischen Apologeten (Leipzig 1907) 174-175, Wolfson 2.73, 110-126, 158-160, Festugière Révélation 4.92-140 (esp.94), A.D.Nock, 'The exegesis of Timaeus 28C' VChr 16(1962)79-86. Wolfson's claim that Philo, inspired by a number of Pentateuchal texts, was the first philosopher to extend Plato's doctrine of God's incorporeality and simplicity to that of his unnameability and unknowability, and that he was therefore responsible for a crucial innovation in the history of philosophy has been unanimously rejected by scholars, on the basis of texts such as the above-cited Cic.DND 1.30 and Philo's own text Somn.1.184 (cf. Festugière op.cit.307, Boyancé RPh 29 (1955)185-188, R.Mortley, Connaissance religieuse et herméneutique chez Clément d'Alexandrie (Leiden 1973) 5-11).

Given Philo's extensive preoccupation with the question of whether man can gain knowledge of God, it would be a priori most surprising if he wholly neglected Plato's famous comment. Yet there are certainly no overt references to the text in Philo's writings. Wolfson 2.73 saw an allusion at Post.167, and A.Wozok, Laktanz und die philosophische Gnosis (Heidelberg 1960) 254 (cited by Nock art.cit.82, who concurs), another at Abr.57-59, but neither suggestion is convincing. More persuasive is the view of Früchtel 156, who sees an 'exegesis of Tim.28c' at Spec.1.32ff.¹ Philo here declares that the $\kappa\alpha\tau\eta\rho\kappa\alpha\iota\ \eta\gamma\epsilon\rho\omega\upsilon\tau\omega\upsilon\ \tau\omega\upsilon\ \sigma\upsilon\mu\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\upsilon\ \text{is}\ \delta\upsilon\sigma\tau\acute{o}\pi\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \delta\upsilon\sigma\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\pi\tau\omicron\varsigma$, but that does not mean that the search for him should be abandoned (§32). There are two questions involved, concerning God's existence ($\Upsilon\pi\alpha\rho\epsilon\iota\varsigma$) and concerning his essence ($\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\alpha$). The former offers no trouble, the latter is not only $\chi\alpha\lambda\epsilon\pi\acute{o}\nu$ (cf. 28c4 $\epsilon\rho\gamma\omicron\nu$, $\chi\alpha\lambda\epsilon\pi\acute{o}\nu$ at 48c5, 49a3, also in a paraphrase of 28c3-5 at Corp.Herm. fr.1.1) but perhaps $\acute{\alpha}\delta\upsilon\lambda\omicron\nu\alpha\tau\omicron\nu$ (cf. 28c5, though differently used). After a brief section which uses the cosmological argument to demonstrate God's existence (§33-35), Philo returns at §36 to the question of God's essence. Even if the subject is $\delta\upsilon\sigma\theta\eta\rho\alpha\tau\omicron\nu\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \delta\upsilon\sigma\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\pi\tau\omicron\nu$, even if the discovery ($\epsilon\upsilon\rho\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$, cf. 28c4 $\epsilon\upsilon\rho\epsilon\upsilon\nu\ldots\epsilon\upsilon\rho\acute{o}\nu\tau\alpha$!) of the true God escapes human powers, nevertheless the undertaking is well rewarded. Witness to this are *those who have feasted on the doctrines of philosophy* (§37), and above all Moses, as seen particularly in his experience on the mountain recorded in Ex.33:13-23 (§41-50).

Plato's inclusion among these blessed banqueteers is not explicitly stated - as so often Philo is not very specific - but certainly it is probable

that his celebrated statement is at the back of Philo's mind in this passage. There are also quite a number of parallel passages, mostly variations on the same theme, almost all utilizing the distinction between existence and essence and containing exegesis of the text Ex.33:13-23 (also Ex.20:21); cf. Post.13-16, 167-169, Migr.195, Fug.164-165, Mut.7-15, Virt.215, Praem.36-46, QG 4.8, QE fr.3 (FE 33.282). It would be going too far to say that an allusion to Tim. 28c lurks in all these passages. The reader must be struck, however, by the frequency with which Philo uses adjectives containing the prefix *δυσ-* to describe the nature of the quest for knowledge of God – *δυστόπαστος*, *δυσκατάληπτος*, *δυσσέηρατος*, *δυσπερινόητος*, *δυσόρατος*, *δυσάλωτος*, *δυστέκμαρτος* (references at Mayer 84-85). Should it not be concluded that this group of adjectives conveys for Philo the useful kernel of Plato's cryptic remark?

But is it merely a coincidence that Philo does not put Plato's text to more emphatic and explicit use? I believe that it is not. The reason for the relative neglect is that the text is located precisely midway between the two poles of Philo's thinking on the subject, which is focussed on the admittedly common (cf. Festugière 4.6-17) but efficacious distinction between God's existence and essence. The former is evident, the latter incomprehensible, neither of which is unambiguously conveyed by Plato's remark (thus Spec.1.36 *ἢ εὖρεσιν αὐτοῦ διαφεύγει δύναμιν ἀνθρωπίνην* implies a *correction* of Plato, probably conscious). Its import would be more appropriate for the doctrine of God's powers, a mystery difficult to expound (cf. Cher.27). Philo is in fact constrained, as were the followers of Plato, to reflect on the relation between the demiurgic creator of the Timaeus and God as wholly transcendent Being. It was this problem, to which we shall return on more than one occasion, that led Numenius to his surprising interpretations of Tim.28c (see above and II 2.2.2.n.3).

2.3. The model is introduced (Tim.28a-b, 28c-29b)

2.3.1. The model must be *καλόν* (29a)

Plato's third fundamental philosophical principle is that the craftsman, in making his product, must look to a model (*παράδειγμα*), and that when he looks to an eternal and unchanging model the product will be *καλόν*, when to a model located in the realm of becoming *οὐ καλόν* (28a6-b2). There can be no doubt to which of the two the demiurge looked in creating the cosmos. Since he is the *ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων* and the cosmos the *κάλλιστος τῶν γεγονότων*, he must have used the model which is eternal, always in the same state and comprehen-

sible by understanding and rational discourse (28c5-29b1). Philo coalesces these two texts when he commences his exegesis of 'day one' in Moses' creation account (Opif.16):

προλαβὼν γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἄτε θεὸς ὅτι μύμημα καλὸν οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο ὀλίχα
καλοῦ παραδείγματος οὐδέ τι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀνυπαίτιον, ὃ μὴ πρὸς ἀρχέτυπον
καὶ νοητὴν ἰδέαν ἀπεικονίσθη...

Leaving aside certain terminological innovations (already observed above in II 2.1.3.), it must be said that the intentions of Plato's principle is well brought out in the Philonic rendering. The difference between the two lies in the relation between the demiurge and the model. Both Plato and Philo agree that the correlation between a good model and a good copy is a self-evident dialectical principle. But Plato presents the principle as being wholly abstract, and uses it to deduce the nature of the model, which is presumed already to exist. Philo, in contrast, considers the principle a reflection on the part of God the demiurgic creator (προλαβὼν...ὅτι...), which leads to the 'formation' of the noetic world. This difference is intimately connected with the doctrine that the ideas are God's thoughts, a theme to which we shall return when Philo's use of the model is more fully discussed below at II 3.4.1-4.

As Wolfson 1.181 points out, Philo is not unaware that the Platonic paradigm relation can claim Biblical support. The word παράδειγμα occurs in the Pentateuch once only, at Ex.25:9 (cf.27:8, Num.8:4), where Moses is described as receiving the pattern of the tabernacle and its contents before they are actually made by the craftsman Bezalel. In the passages Leg.3.95-102 and QE 2.52 Philo indicates the important connection which he perceives between this text and a correct understanding of the creational process.

At the same time it should not be overlooked that Philo frequently uses the relation between exemplar and copy in a loose imagistic sense, and not in the technical philosophical meaning intended by Plato. Thus the vernal equinox is an image and copy of creation (Spec.2.151), the figure of Moses a pattern to those wishing to copy him (Mos.1.158), and so on. See further the remarks at Billings 98-99.

2.3.2. 'Best of causes, most beautiful of created things' (29a)

Though large parts of the Timaeus are concerned with intricate points of philosophical and scientific detail, Plato remains ever mindful of the grandeur of his subject. Occasionally he breaks out into the exuberant language that his theme might warrant, using a characteristic phraseology (chiefly comprising a number of encomiastic superlatives) which can be conveniently labelled as a *language of excellence*. It is first intimated at 29a5-6, where the cosmos and the demiurge are described as ὁ μὲν γὰρ κάλλιστος τῶν γεγονότων, ὁ δ' ἀριστος τῶν αἰτίων. At 30a6-7 Plato affirms that θέμις δ' οὕτ' ἦν οὕτ' ἔστιν

τῷ ἀρίστῳ δρᾶν ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ κάλλιστον. The result is that the demiurge composes the universe ὅπως ὅτι κάλλιστον εἶη κατὰ φύσιν ἀριστόν τε ἔργον ἀπειργασμένος (30b5-6). Further on in the discourse, at 68e2-4, we encounter ὁ τοῦ καλλίστου τε καὶ ἀρίστου δημιουργός... ἡνύκα τὸν αὐτάρκη τε καὶ τὸν τελεώτατον θεὸν ἐγέννα... The climax is found in the concluding lines of the work (92c7-9). This cosmos is εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ θεοῦ αἰσθητός, μέγιστος καὶ ἀριστος κάλλιστός τε καὶ τελεώτατος γέγονεν εἰς οὐρανὸς ὅδε μονογενὴς ὢν.

The influence of these passages on Philo's thought and phraseology is quite out of proportion to the relative infrequency of their occurrence in the *Timaeus*. We commence with the two passages where Plato's words at 29a5-6 are explicitly quoted.

Plant.131. The lengthy pericope, of which the Platonic citation forms a small part, is set in motion by the quotation of Lev.19:23-25 at Plant.95 (partly repeated at §117), where Philo commences an exegesis of the text 'in the fourth year all its fruit shall be holy for giving praise to the Lord (ἀλ-νετὸς τῷ κυρίῳ v.24). Predictably these final words induce a meditation, commencing at §126, on the theme of praise and thanksgiving. Contrary to his usual methods, Philo here recounts a παλαιὸς λόγος (resembling a myth), which he thinks will illustrate his theme well.¹ When the creator had brought the creation of the entire cosmos to completion, he asked one of his subordinates whether anything was still lacking. The reply was that every part was complete, except the λόγος required to sing the cosmos' praises. God was pleased with the reply, and soon there appeared the πάμμουσον καὶ ὕμνωδὸν γένος, sprung from one of his powers, Memory (or Mnemosyne) (§127-129). The moral of the story, Philo continues, is that it is God's task to confer benefits (εὐεργε-τεῖν), while our only response can be to give thanks. This we must do by every literary means at our disposal, in both poetry and prose, so that the creator and the cosmos be given high honour, ὁ μὲν, ὡς ἔφη τις, ἀριστος τῶν αἰτίων, ὁ δὲ τελεώτατος τῶν γεγονότων (§130-131).

The citation of *Tim.*29a5-6 serves as the climax of Philo's brief application of the παλαιὸς λόγος to the theme of praise and thanksgiving; the long sentence in §131 is drafted in such a way that Plato's words can be integrated into its structure with a minimum of adjustment. The author's name remains anonymous (cf. further Platonic anonymity at *Opif.*21, *Her.*181, *Fug.*63,82), presumably because it is not relevant to the exegetical task at hand. As Pouilloux (FE 10.83) rightly remarks, Philo is relying on his memory, so that κάλλιστος in the Platonic text has been replaced by τελεώτατος, doubtless under the influence of 68e3,92c8. Moreover the order of the phrases has been reversed so that they can fit into the structure of the sentence better, it being more reverent to mention the creator before his product. Given these divergences it is better not to place the whole phrase in quotation marks (as done by C-W 2.159, Colson EE 3.278), even though it clearly *is* meant as a quotation.

QG 1.6. In this passage the context is at first sight quite different.

Philo asks, with regard to Gen.2:8, 'Why is God said to have 'planted Paradise' and for whom, and what is Paradise?'. Symbolically Paradise represents wisdom or knowledge of things divine and human and their causes (a common definition of σοφία, cf. Congr.79 and Alexander's note at FE 16.242). It was fitting that, after the creation of the cosmos was completed, the βίος θεωρητικός be instituted, for without wisdom the creator of all things could not be praised.

But after the cosmos wisdom came into being, since after the creation of the cosmos Paradise was made in the same manner as the poets say the chorus of Muses (was formed), in order to praise the creator and his works, just as Plato said, the creator as the greatest and best of causes (τὸν μέγιστον καὶ ἄριστον τῶν αἰτίων), the cosmos as the most beautiful of created things (τὸν κάλλιστον τῶν γεγονότων). (translation Marcus EES 1.4-5, modified in order to correspond more literally to the Armenian version; retranslations Weitenberg)

Curiously both Marcus (EES 1.5) and Mercier (FE 34A.69) consider that Philo is alluding to Tim.92c, but it is evident that, as in the parallel passage, he is utilizing 29a5-6.

Though once again the sequence of the two phrases is inverted, this time κάλλιστος is not replaced by τελευτάτος. The small expansion of the phrase ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων can again be traced to the influence of 92c7-8, though it is not impossible that the Armenian here uses a doublet.

What is the relation between these two passages? Though having different exegetical starting points, they have more in common than just the Platonic citation alone. In QG 1.6 the story of the birth of the Muses, now presented in a very concise form, is again coupled with the theme of praise and the same quote from the Timaeus. There is clearly, in the mind of the exegete, a closer relation between the texts Gen.2:8 and Lev.19:24 than might at first appear. Both are concerned with the planting of trees (cf. Gen.2:8 ἐφύτευσεν, Lev.19:24 καταφυτεύσετε), and this has consequences for their allegorical meaning. The 'fruit...for giving praise to the Lord' in Lev.19:24 is allegorically connected with the σοφία or ἀρετή symbolized by the pleasure planted in Eden. Both indicate the wisdom or logos given to man to enable him to carry out the duty of praising and giving thanks to the creator.² In the light of the thematic and exegetical parallels between Plant.126-131 and QG 1.6, should we postulate a common source, whether a 'secular' source which combines the story of the Muses and Plato's quote, or an 'exegetical' source which related the two themes to the themes of praise and thanksgiving (as well as of planting)? Such a hypothesis seems to me by no means compelling. Philo is just as likely giving here an example of a self-reminiscence, repeating a happy combination of themes used previously. Such overlap and repetition occurs frequently between the Quaestiones in Genesim et Exodum and the Allegorical Commentary.

In the above two passages three related themes of central importance in Philo's thought can be discerned: *admiration* of the cosmos and its creator, *praise* and hymn-singing of the cosmos and its creator, *thanksgiving* to God the creator by man (and also by the cosmos, cf. Mos.2.191). Compare the following list of passages, which could easily be extended: Deus 7, Agr.50-54, Her.110-111, 196-200, Mut.218-223, Mos.2.148,191,239, Spec.1.210-211, Virt.72, QG 4.130, Prov.2.63; cf. also the etymology of the name Judah (references at Earp EE 10.357), and the exegetical theme of feasting at Spec.2.151-156,168,180, Abr.92 etc.

It would be a serious mistake, however, to conclude that Philo is alone in reading these themes into the Timaeus. A quite remarkable parallel to the two Philonic passages discussed above is found in Plutarch.³ In propounding his interpretation of the Timaeian cosmogony the Platonist affirms (Mor.1014A-B):

βέλτιον οὖν Πλάτωνα περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ὑπὸ θεοῦ γεγονέναι λέγειν καὶ ᾄδειν "ὁ μὲν γὰρ κάλλιστος τῶν γεγονότων ὁ δ' ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων"...

The phrase λέγειν καὶ ᾄδειν is uncannily reminiscent of Philo's formulation in Plant.131. Having no doubt just consulted the text of the Timaeus for his exegesis, Plutarch is in a position to quote Plato's words at 29a5-6 with complete accuracy. Another Platonist, Plotinus, describes Plato as having in the Timaeus praised the cosmos and called it a 'blessed god'(34b8), who receives its soul from 'the good demiurge'(29a3)(Enn.4.8.1.42-44). The same attitude of admiration for the cosmos and its source is affirmed in his own writings, e.g. at Enn.3.2.3.21ff.(the cosmos' soliloquy), 2.9.9.32ff. (against the Gnostics). Galen too speaks of a ὕμνος ἀληθινός in honour of the demiurge (cf. R. Walzer, Galen on Jews and Christians (Oxford 1949) 24-25 on UP 3.10 = 1.174.6-13 Helmreich). The admiring and reverential attitude towards the cosmos and the creating deity (or nature) was one of the Timaeus' most influential legacies to Hellenistic and later thought, as Festugière amply demonstrated in his study Le dieu cosmique. But in Philo's stress on the theme of *thanksgiving* a more specific strain of Biblical and Judaic piety can also be perceived (e.g. Ps.145, Sap.Sal.16:28-29 etc; cf. Völker 205,332, Harl FE 15.136, Alexandre FE 16.169), even if the last-named scholar is quite correct in pointing out that the interiorized attitude of thanksgiving is not unknown in Greek authors.

Returning for the last time to Philo's words at Plant.130-131, we may deduce that Plato's eulogistic phrases are not utilized at the end of the passage merely for a splash of literary colour. They in fact give a *concrete illustration* of the attitude of praise and thanksgiving which Philo wants to see realized in encomiastic compositions of poetry and prose. Read through Philonic spectacles the Timaeus is a prose hymn in praise and honour of the cosmos, but also in praise of and in thanksgiving to God, the creator of the cosmos

and the source of all being. Tim.29a is preferred to the even more effusive 92c for this very reason, because in it the creator too is given high honour.

Plato's language of excellence, as set out in 29a5-6 and the other texts mentioned at the beginning of this section, is found in numerous passages throughout Philo's writings. Instances have already been noted in Aet.1, Praem.1, Opif.82, Aet.15 (see above II 1.3.1. 1.3.2. 2.1.3.). Another noteworthy example is Spec.1.210. In giving a symbolical exegesis of the whole burnt-offering (Lev.1:3-13) and in particular of the injunction to divide the sacrificial animal into its limbs (1:6), Philo explains that when the mind gives thanks for the creation of the cosmos, he should do so both *περὶ τοῦ ὅλου* and *περὶ τῶν ὁλοσχερεστάτων αὐτοῦ μερῶν ὡς ἂν ζῶου τελειότατου μελῶν* (i.e. the οὐρανός, ἥλιος, σελήνη etc.). The expression *ζῶον τελειότατον* immediately recalls the language of the Timaeus, and so gives the act of thanksgiving a proper 'cosmological' background (see also below II 3.3.1.).

Compare also the following passages: Opif.9,14 (τὸν τελειότατον μὲν ὄντα τῶν γεγονότων), Deus 106, Plant.6,91, Conf.97,180, Her.199, Abr.2,74, Mos.2.267, Contempl.5. The flexibility with which Philo can use the Timaeian language is illustrated by the following applications: Congr.50 (οὐρανός),⁴ Aet.73 (περὶ βολος of heaven), Mut.223 (man), Migr.220 (cosmos as macro-anthropos). Plutarch shows a comparable utilization and adaptability at Mor.720B ἡ μὲν οὖν ὕλη τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀτακτότατόν ἐστιν, ἡ δ' ἐδέα τῶν παραδειγμάτων κάλλιστον, ὁ δὲ θεὸς τῶν αἰτίων ἄριστον; 1014C ἔταξε (ὁ θεός) καὶ διεκόσμησε καὶ συνήρμοσε, τὸ κάλλιστον ἀπεργασάμενος καὶ τελειότατον...ζῶον.

Final note. In a brief note in CPh 7(1912)248 Shorey writes on Praem.1 ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀφθάρτων τελειότατος, ὁ δὲ θνητῶν φθαρτός (φθαρτός is not found in all mss. and is deleted by C-W and Colson): 'In place of the obviously corrupt φθαρτός I would propose φέρτατος. This restores the balanced structure of the two nouns and appropriate adjectives, which Philo, following his master Plato, employs in speaking of the creator and the creation of the universe and man. Cf. Timaeus 29A... and Philo De opificio mundi 82...' Shorey is quite right that a final adjective is needed. Not having the assistance of the two lexica available to us, however, he was no doubt unaware that Philo never uses the adjectival form φέρτατος, and so his proposed emendation does not convince. But using Opif.82 as a parallel, we may wonder whether φθαρτός is not a corruption of ἄριστος, in which case the passage is even more reminiscent of its Platonic model.

2.3.3. A most surprising exegesis of Tim.29b

At 29b1-2 Plato begins the final section of his proemium (indicated by αὖ, also used for purposes of transition at 28a4,c2), which will discuss epistemological and methodological problems associated with his account. Because of the peculiar nature of Philo's usage, however, we must deal with the first sentence separately. We return to the passage at Prov.1.21 where, as has already been observed (above II 2.1.2.), Philo, wishing to give Plato's opinion

on the γένεσις of the cosmos, quotes Tim.28b4-c2 verbatim. In the lines that follow he continues to deal with the subject of the creation of the cosmos, as portrayed in the Timaeus, but the argument becomes exceedingly difficult to follow. Our method will be first to give a translation of the passage (prepared in consultation with Weitenberg), followed by some textual and grammatical notes (to which the small numbers in the translation refer). On this basis an attempt will be made to read some sense into the passage. It must be granted that the text makes such a disjointed impression that the possibility that it is corrupt or badly misunderstood by the Armenian translator cannot be ruled out. We have no choice, however, but to do the best we can with the transmitted text. The only study made of this passage so far is the brief but valuable analysis at Baltes 36-37, with which I disagree on some points.

Translation

§21. ...And they affirmed¹ that the creation of the sensible cosmos was a demonstration (or proof) for (the existence) of the intelligible cosmos. And so he (Plato) says, 'Since these (two worlds) exist, it is entirely necessary that this cosmos be an image of something (or someone)',² at the same time calling this³ (cosmos) a demonstration (or proof)⁴ of the creator and showing that the sensible cosmos has come into being. With the result that God is always maker of the intelligible things and also gives sensible things the beginning (or principle) of their becoming.⁵ And the cosmos according to Plato is a concord of heaven and earth and the natures in it, consisting of fire and of earth and of water and of air, and of gods and of demons and of men and of animals and of plants and of matter.⁶

§22. Plato recognized that these things are constructed by God,⁷ and that unadorned matter has been turned into the cosmos with its adornment.⁸ For these were the first causes, from which also the cosmos came into being. Since also the lawgiver of the Jews, Moses, described water, darkness and the abyss as being present before the cosmos came into being.⁹ But Plato (spoke of) matter, Thales the Milesian water...

Notes

1. Aucher dixerunt; in this bald form at least the word appears corrupt. Philo uses φασί impersonally with great frequency, but if he uses the past tense he will specify the commentators he has in mind at the very least with τινές, but usually in greater detail (e.g. Leg.3.115, Aet.89 etc.). If the 3rd person plural is correct, we may agree with Baltes 36 that Philo refers to contemporary Platonists. Aucher erroneously placed this section in quotation marks, apparently wishing to recognize a quotation of Tim.92c (cited in a footnote). There is no such allusion, although we shall see that that text does provide, in Philo's eyes, a good parallel for 29b1-2.

2. I.e. a direct translation of Tim.29b1-2, τούτων δὲ ὑπαρχόντων αὖ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τούδε τὸν κόσμον εἰκόνα τινὸς εἶναι. My translation, which differs from the meaning intended by Plato, will be justified below.

3. Picking up 'this cosmos' in the Platonic quote. Aucher's translation with its triple istum is confusing.

4. The same word used in the second line. It is a common word with a wide semantic spectrum, used to translate δεῦγμα, ἀπόδειξις, ἐπιδειξις, παράδειγμα, ἐνδειγμα, τύπος.

5. Aucher's relative clause is a free translation. The original probably read καὶ ὁ τοῦς αἰσθητοῦς τὴν ἀρχὴν παρέχων τοῦ γίνεσθαι vel sim.

6. On this definition of the cosmos see the analysis below at II 5.4.3.
7. The Armenian does not give the usual word for 'create' or 'come into being' here, but one that can mean κατασκευάζω, ἀρμόζω (cf. the definition), κοσμέω etc.
8. Difficult to translate. Weitenberg suggests *et ornatu carentem* (one word) *materiam in mundum (cum) ornatu venire/prodire*. The description of matter as 'in itself unadorned' given by Aucher (and the translators dependent on him) is not justified. The contrast between ἀταξία and τάξις is drawn from Tim.30a, on which see below II 3.2.1.
9. On this reference to Gen.1:1-2 see below II 3.2.3.

In spite of the many problems of detail, the general movement of Philo's thought in this passage can be clearly discerned. In wishing to present Plato's opinion on the createdness or uncreatedness of the cosmos, Philo has quoted Tim.28b4-c2. On its own this text can prove that Plato considers the cosmos γενητός, but says little on how that γένεσις should be conceived. So now Philo proceeds to relate the creation of the cosmos to the other important elements in the Timaeon account, i.e. the demiurgic creation, the intelligible world as model, matter. At the end of the passage he affirms that 'these were the first causes from which the cosmos came into being'. Baltes 37 concludes that he is alluding to the Middle Platonist doctrine of *three* ἀρχαί (God, form, matter). I am inclined to the view that, since Philo expressly states that the ideas are made by God, there can only be *two* ἀρχαί here (God, matter). This is consistent with his statement at Opif.8, analysed above at II 2.2.1.). (Note, however, that the doctrine of two causes is attributed to Plato, not to Moses, who posits a pre-cosmic chaos.)

But the problem of two or three causes has little bearing on the interpretation of the remainder of the passage. The key question for that is: Why does Philo select precisely Tim.29b1-2 to elucidate Plato's understanding of the cosmos' γένεσις? The two specific problems are: (1) What is the connection between the first sentence, introducing the views of the Platonists, and the quote that follows it? (2) It is clear that Philo bases two conclusions on the quote, indicated by the participles 'calling' and 'showing' which succeed it. How can these be derived from Plato's words? Without wishing to deny that other solutions are possible, I suggest the following interpretation.

(1) The affirmation of the Platonists in the first sentence is a rephrasing in the most basic terms of the application of the third fundamental philosophical principle presented in the proemium, i.e. that there must be a model and that the excellence of the cosmos dictates that a most excellent (i.e. noetic) model was used in its creation. Cf. Somn.1.188 (exeg. Gen.28:17!), καὶ ὁ νοητὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ κόσμος ἐνοήθη... The acceptance of the doctrine of the 'two worlds' is prerequisite for what follows. Hence I suggest that Philo has read the doctrine into the actual wording of the quote, namely in

the words τούτων δὲ ὑπαρχόντων (whereas Plato means 'these things being so', i.e. 'these things' refer to the whole application of the three philosophical principles to the cosmos (cf. Cornford 23)).

(2) How can he now proceed to extract from the quoted text the conclusion that Plato 'calls this cosmos a demonstration of the creator'? The word 'call' suggests a literal reference to the Timaeus text (cf. καλεῖ Aet.15). Thus I suspect that Philo is explaining the words εἰκόνα τινός in 29b2. In this case τινός will not mean 'something' and refer to the model (as Plato meant, cf. 29b4), but rather will mean 'someone', signifying God the creator (cf. αὐτοῦ τινός at 28a4,c2). This interpretation is aided by two other texts in the Timaeus which can be taken to indicate an εἰκὼν relation between God and the cosmos: 29e3, in which God makes πάντα παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ; 92c7, in which a varia lectio reads εἰκὼν τοῦ ποιητοῦ instead of εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ (see further below II 3.5.1. 10.3.1.). At the same time the quoted text 'shows' that the cosmos is γενητός because such is the consequence of the ontological status of a εἰκὼν. The transition to the next sentence which concisely defines God's relation to the two worlds – as eternal ποιητής of the νοητά and bestower of an ἀρχή τοῦ γίνεσθαι on the αἰσθητά – is natural enough (ἀρχή picks up γενέσεως ἀρχήν and ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τινος ἀρξάμενος in the earlier quote). Then follows an abrupt switch to the sense-perceptible cosmos, whose 'adornment' is defined in order to unveil the 'unadorned matter', i.e. the second 'cause' explained further in §22.

The most striking feature of Philo's interpretation of the Timaeus in our passage, if the analysis given above is on the right track, is the way that creator, model and created product are closely associated together. The cosmos proves the existence of a model, but is also the image of its creator. The same close association was already observed in the brief Timaeus compendium found in Aet.15 (see above II 2.1.3.). The clue to this interpretation of the dialogue lies in the doctrine that the noetic world represents God's thought when undertaking to create the cosmos. More details are forthcoming when Philo reads this interpretation into 'day one' of the Mosaic account of creation (see below II 3.4.1-4. on Opif.16-25). It emerges there that the cosmos is only εἰκὼν of God inasmuch as it is εἰκὼν of his Logos (equated with the κόσμος νοητός), which in turn is εἰκὼν of God (see esp. Opif.24-25). With all due allowance made for the Armenian translator's lack of familiarity with the technicalities contained in our passage, it remains improbable that these further details were presented in it. The doctrine of the Logos is significantly absent in the De Providentia (except for a brief mention en passant in 1.23).

It may be concluded, therefore, that Philo gives the short sentence at

Tim.29b1-2 a most surprising interpretation. By applying a subtle twist to the phrases *τούτων δὲ ὑπαρχόντων* and *εἰκόνα τινός* he feels able to draw important conclusions on the relation of the cosmos to its creator and noetic exemplar. Philo's method is clearly that of the *proof-text*. A text is divorced from its context and used to confirm a presupposed doctrine. Certainly if Philo had taken into account the argument of the part of the Timaeus in which his quote occurs he could not possibly have given the interpretation outlined above. One is reminded of the manner in which he gives exegesis of the Biblical text. Scholastic Middle Platonism did not hesitate to use similar methods in their Platonic exegesis. But I have not come across any parallel interpretations of Tim.29b1-2 in their writings.¹

2.4. Methodological prelude (Tim.29b-d)

2.4.1. The probable account (29b-d)

Plato, the 'philosopher of transcendence' (De Vogel), can only concern himself with a 'scientific' account of the physical world under carefully circumscribed conditions. These are outlined in the final section of the proemium (29b1-d3). There is, he asserts, a direct correlation between the nature of the intelligible and sensible worlds on the one hand, and the analysis or account (*λόγους* 29b4) that can be presented of them on the other. The account of the intelligible paradigm will have the same unchangeable and incontrovertible characteristics that the noetic world itself possesses. An analysis of sensible phenomena, however, is concerned with an *image* of the paradigm and so can result only in a *probable* account (wordplay on *εἰκῶν/εἰκός* 29c2). Any attempt at exact and irrefutable scientific explanation is doomed to failure. So don't be surprised, says Timaeus at 29c4-7, if I can't deliver a wholly consistent and accurate account. Remembering that we are but men (*φύσιν ἀνθρωπίνην ἔχομεν* 29d1), we should be content if we produce a probable tale (*εἰκότα μῦθον* 29d2). Plato's doctrine here contains two aspects which must be carefully distinguished from each other.

1. The kind of cognition that can be obtained on a given object is determined by that object's ontological status. It is simply not possible to acquire truth or knowledge concerning physical phenomena. Probability or belief or opinion must be the aim (28a1-2, 29c3). But one opinion can be sounder and closer to the truth than another, as Plato recognizes by introducing the concept of 'true opinion' (*ἀληθῆς δόξα*, cf. 37b9, 51d4).¹ His endeavour is thus to present the most plausible and truest account of the structure of the cos-

mos that he can. The importance of the (most) probable account for Plato can be gauged from the fact that he repeats it no less than 18 times throughout the dialogue. The reader cannot possibly miss it.

2. The correctness or otherwise of a cognitive act, whether of a sensible or an intelligible object, is dependent on the nature and capability of the subject of that act. This aspect is given less emphasis in our passage. Plato only briefly mentions the limitations imposed on us by our human nature (29d1). Compare, however, the passage on the cognitive abilities of the cosmic soul (37a-c). Concerning sensible reality it possesses *δόξαι καὶ πίστεις βέβαιου καὶ ἀληθεύς* (37b9), and it is safe to conclude that its knowledge of the intelligible world (cf. 37b3) is also superior. Other texts which emphasize the superior knowledge and true opinion of the gods and the imperfect cognition of man are 34c2-4, 48c6-e1, 53d4-7, 65b7-d1, 68b6-8, d2-7, 69a1-2, 72d4-8 (but note that at 53d7 Plato speaks of knowledge possessed by *θεός* and *men who are dear to him*).

Philo, as noted above in II 2.1.1., was well aware of the intrinsic relation between ontology and epistemology, and repeats Plato's formulas on a number of occasions. Our task in this section will be in the first place to examine whether he makes use of the specific passage *Tim.*29b-d. In the process it will be possible to make some observations on the attraction which the Alexandrian felt for Plato's doctrine of the probable account.

The passage in which Philo's use of *Tim.*29b-d is most prominent is the second half of the *exordium* of the *De aeternitate mundi* (§2); it is a direct continuation of the opening words, which are based on *Tim.*27c and were discussed above at II 1.3.2. First some attention must be paid to the text. Its poor state has led to the proposal of a number of emendations. The text now cited is that of C-W (cf. also Colson EE 9.184-186):

εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐνασκηθέντες τοῦς φρονήσεως καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ πάσης ἀρετῆς δόγμασιν ἀπερρυψάμεθα τὰς ἐκ παθῶν καὶ νοσημάτων κηλῖδας, οὐκ ἂν ἴσως ἀπηξίωσεν ὁ θεὸς ἄκρως κεκαθαρμένους καὶ φαιδρυναμένους αὐγοειδῶς¹ ψυχᾶς ἐπιστήμην τῶν οὐρανίων ἢ δι' ὀνειράτων ἢ διὰ χρησμῶν² ἢ διὰ σημείων ἢ τεράτων ὑφηγεῖσθαι· ἐπεὶ δὲ τοὺς ἀφροσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακιῶν ἀναμαζάμενοι [στοχασμοὺς³ καὶ]⁴ τύπους δυσεκπλύτους ἔχομεν, ἀγαπᾶν χρή, καὶ εἰκόσι <στοχασμοὺς>⁵ δι' αὐτῶν⁶ μύμημά τι τῆς ἀληθείας ἀνευρίσκωμεν.

1. αὐγοειδῶς Mangey: αὐτοειδῶς mss. 2. χρησμῶν Cohn: χρήσεων mss. 3. μολύσμοις coni. Bernays. 4. *secl.* Cohn. 5. *inseruit* Cohn, εἰκοσι <καὶ στοχασμοὺς> *maluit* Colson. 6. δι' αὐτῶν Bernays: δι' αὐτῶν mss.

A note on the text. Bernay's conjecture *μολύσμοις* must be rejected because the word is nowhere used by Philo. The dispute between Cohn and Colson (cf. EE 9.186) on whether we should read *εἰκόσι* (καὶ) *στοχασμοὺς* can be settled in Cohn's favour on the basis of the following parallel texts: *Ios.*7,104,143, *Mos.*2.122, *Decal.*18, *Opif.*72,157, *Spec.*1.334 (the last three in the singular). The text cited above is thus satisfactory.

Philo makes the allusion to Plato's text apparent by means of the phrase ἀγαπᾶν χρῆ (29c8). Also εἰκόσι picks up 29c1,8,d2, but τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον is replaced by μύμημά τι τῆς ἀληθείας. Philo's objection to the Platonic phrase is predictable on account of his dislike for myth, but the manner of its replacement surprises because it declines to utilize the opportunity for paronomasia exploited by Plato at 29c2 (cf. below on Praem.29). But not only verbal reminiscence is instructive. The entire contrast between the ἐπιστήμη τῶν οὐρανίων perhaps accorded by God to purified souls and the μύμημά τι τῆς ἀληθείας with which we sin-stained mortals must be content is surely a characteristically Philonic expansion of the hint of the limitations of human knowledge given by Plato at 29d1.

What precisely, however, is meant by the ἐπιστήμη τῶν οὐρανίων? All translators take it to be an objective genitive, meaning 'knowledge of heavenly things' (cf. Bernays Abh.Berl.Akad.1876 219, Colson EE 9.185, Bormann GT 7.78, Pouilloux FE 30.75). On this interpretation οὐρανίων is a loosely worded alternative for θεῶν or νοητῶν, for the science of the heavens is hardly likely to have been the knowledge which God imparts to those whom he especially favours. It was this science which Abraham had to abandon in his migration from Chaldea to the promised land. A more persuasive rendering can be given if the word is read as a subjective genitive. Perhaps God will grant to specially purified souls the knowledge *possessed* by those beings who dwell in the celestial regions, i.e. the heavenly bodies, angels or demons, disembodied souls. Here we touch on one of the most fundamental and pervasive aspects of Philo's thought, which one might term the 'hierarchy of recipients of knowledge'.

In fact on closer inspection this hierarchy has a double aspect. Accepting the theory of the 'great chain of being', Philo regards the cosmos as populated by a variety of living beings at diverse levels of capability and significance, together forming an unbroken chain from the highest to the lowest form of life (see further below II 5.4.3.). Man is the middle link, higher than plants and animals, lower than disembodied souls, demons or angels, heavenly beings. Clearly the higher the rank in the sequence, the greater the cognitive capacity. Following Plato Philo argues that incarnation of the rational soul entails a loss of cognitive ability that can only partially be overcome in this life (cf. below II 7.1.2.). Disembodied souls possess greater and purer knowledge than we can hope to gain in the incarnated state. Axiomatic is that God is the source of all knowledge (stressed, we recall, in Aet.1), and that he grants it to the whole chain of his creatures according to the fundamental principle aphoristically placed in God's mouth at Spec.1.43, χαρίζομαι δ' ἐγὼ τὰ οὐκ εἶτα τῷ ληφόμενῳ. The result is a *cosmic* hierarchy of

recipients of knowledge.

But also among incarnated human beings there are various levels of knowledge and belief. At one end of the scale are those who are so weighed down by bodily desires that they can only grope in darkness. At the other end are those privileged beings who are so little hindered by the dead-weight of their bodies that they all but float in the air and join their disembodied fellow-souls. In between are those who must sweat and toil² to gain a measure of insight into the mysteries of created and uncreated reality. At Gig.60-61 Philo speaks of men of earth (ensnared by the body), men of heaven (the φιλομαθεῖς, exercising their minds), men of God (enrolled in the noetic world, cf. below II 10.1.3.). Elsewhere other Biblically founded and allegorically expounded classifications are used, in which the two upper levels are represented by Moses and Bezalel, Abraham and Lot, Isaac and Ishmael, Jacob and Israel, and so on. Resultant is now a *human* hierarchy of recipients of knowledge.

In speaking of the ἐπιστήμη τῶν οὐρανίων in Aet.2 Philo blurs the boundary-lines of the two hierarchies which we have just outlined. It is implied that specially privileged souls can receive knowledge that strictly speaking belongs to beings higher on the cosmic scale. But Philo does not claim such divine election for himself. Too soiled with wickedness and folly, he and his readers must content themselves with a less than perfect apperception of the truth.

Texts which illustrate the themes of the hierarchy of recipients of knowledge and the limitations of human knowledge on account of sin and bodily impediment are: Leg.3.97-103, Gig.31,60-61, Deus 51-68, Plant.26-27, Conf.176-178, Her.63-74,98-99, Congr.50-52, Fug.161-163, Mut.16,33-34,70,218-232, Somn.1.148-152,205-207, Mos.2.66-67, Spec.1.41-50, Praem.36-46, QG 1.54, 3.43 (EES 1.236), 4.30,196⁹ (text EES 2.273), QE 2.29, fr.2-4 (FE 33.282-284). To expatiate on the philosophical sources and context of these two themes would involve us in too great a digression. But the immense influence of the Phaedrus myth (compare esp. 250b-c with our passage) should not be left unmentioned. An interesting parallel is found at Seneca NQ 7.29.3: Haec sunt quae aut alios movere ad cometas pertinentia aut me. Quae an vera sint, dii (cf. οὐρανίων) sciunt, quibus est scientia veri (cf. ἐπιστήμη, ἀληθείας). Nobis rimari illa et coniectura (cf. στοχασμοῦς) ire in occulta tantum licet, nec cum fiducia inveniendi nec sine spe; cf. also Plut.Mor.351C-E,382F, Max.Tyr.Or.37.5.

Philo's indication of the *means* by which ἐπιστήμη τῶν οὐρανίων is conveyed to the purified souls - through dreams or oracles or signs or wonders - is perhaps somewhat unexpected in the Platonizing context. Unmistakably Philo refers to the practice of prophecy and divinely inspired divination, so prominent in his writings (cf. Mos.2.188-191, Congr.132, Somn.1.1-2, 2.1-2), to which the Platonic theme of divine inspiration is relevant but certainly not equivalent (cf. Billings 66-69, Wolfson 2.11-22). Philo's own preoccupations ring through loud and clear. Assuredly he has in mind the Jewish prophet and lawgiver Moses, whose verdict on the cosmos' indestructibility (Aet.19) forms

the climax of the treatise's introductory section (cf. Runia 16-17, 20-21). The words δι' αὐτῶν at the end of the section return to the *means* of cognitive acquisition. God remains the source of any knowledge we gain (Colson's translation 'by our own efforts' could mislead on this), but we are forced to acquire that semblance of the truth 'through ourselves', i.e. by means of our own (limited) cognitive resources.

In the phrase μίμημά τι τῆς ἀληθείας Philo employs the same paradeigma relation which forms the basis of Plato's methodological excursions in 29b-d (cf. also μίμημα παραδείγματος at 48e6). It would seem, however, that Philo's use of μίμημα here involves a rather different use of the paradeigma relation. He is *not* saying that, because the object of his enquiry is the cosmos which is a visible copy of the eternal paradigm, the results he will gain can accordingly only be an imitation of the truth. (Indeed is it not implied that it is possible (for some) to acquire truth on cosmological questions?) Rather the notion of imitation expresses in metaphorical and non-technical terms the imperfect knowledge available under the conditions analysed above (on Philo's metaphorical use of the paradeigma relation see the brief remark at II 2.3.1.). This imperfect knowledge will be formulated in probable conjectures (εἰκότες στοχασμοί).

As we observed above, Plato places so much emphasis on the notion of scientific probability in the Timaeus that it will stick in the mind of even the most casual reader. Philo too is on occasion keen to point out that scientific enquiries can make no claim to absolute truth. The following two passages are very much in line with Plato's emphasis on the 'probable account'.

Her.224 (on the symbolism of the candlestick, exeg. Ex.25:31ff.) τὴν δὲ τῶν πλανήτων τάξιν ἄνθρωποι παγίως μὴ κατεληφότες — τί δ' ἄλλο τῶν κατ' οὐρανὸν ἔσχυσαν κατανοῆσαι βεβαίως; — εἰκοτολογοῦσιν, ἄριστα δ' ἐμοὶ στοχάζεσθαι δοκοῦσιν οἷ...

Prov.2.72 (in reply to Alexander): 'Don't go any further. I'm quite well aware that those who love to argue find in the heavenly phenomena numerous difficult questions and reasons for directing accusations (against Providence). But to find in human weakness a ground for accusing Divinity is the height of injustice. It is only right that God, as maker and father (cf. Tim.28c3) should know the true reasons for the various phenomena, but that no mortal beings should ascertain the secrets of nature; for also in the area of knowledge there is a hierarchy (lit. for also that looks to order). So, aiming at probability, we shall reply to this insinuating accusation.'

Note, however, that in these texts the Platonic correlation between probability and cognition of sensible phenomena is not stressed. In fact the strain of probabilism, or even scepticism, in Philo's thought goes much further than merely to warn against over-confidence in the area of scientific investigation. As Nikiprowetzky has shown (183-191, 209-214; see above I 2.2.c), such scepti-

cism is found not just in well-known passages such as Ebr.167-202, Somn.1.21-33, Ios.125-142 (each of which make use of source material), but occurs surprisingly often right throughout Philo's works. Many questions in science and philosophy are beyond the reach of human understanding (an example below at II 7.2.1.). On many issues we can only gain guidance through consultation of the knowledge revealed to the God-beloved prophet and contained in the Law. But also in the task of interpreting the sacred text, Philo does not claim to offer bullet-proof exegeses of the oracles of Moses, only tentative efforts at explication, sometimes assisted by moments of divine inspiration. Two texts are especially striking in our context.

Opif.72 (on the quaestio of why Moses uses the plural in Gen.1:26): τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀληθεστάτην αἰτίαν θεὸν ἀνάγκη μόνον εἰδέναι, τὴν δ' εἰκότι στοχασμῷ πιθανὴν καὶ εὐλογον εἶναι δοκοῦσαν οὐκ ἀποκρυπτεόν.

Decal.18 (on the quaestio of why the Laws were given in the desert and not in the cities): αὐτὸς εἰσὶν ἐν στοχασμοῖς εἰκόσιν αἰτίαι λεγόμεναι περὶ τοῦ διαπορηθέντος· τὰς γὰρ ἀληθεῖς οἶδεν ὁ θεὸς μόνος.

These passages are reminiscent not only of Tim.29b-d, but even more of texts such as 53d6-7, 72d5-7. The epistemological qualifications applied by Plato to the study of dialectics and science are transferred by Philo to problems of exegesis. Compare also Cher.55, Mos.2.122, Spec.1.214, QG 3.14. Note a similar procedure on the part of Plutarch when he embarks on Platonic exegesis at Mor.430B, 719F, 1013B (Eudorus!), 1014A.

It must be recognized, therefore, that, although Philo explicitly utilizes the doctrine of Tim.29b-d, in that utilization changes of emphasis can be detected which cause it to deviate from Plato's intentions. This is noticed above all in the fact that he is clearly less interested than Plato in the ontological status of the object of cognition. Only in the realm of theology does it remain of paramount importance; man cannot come to know God's essence (cf. above II 2.2.3.). But the rigid division between unshakable knowledge of intelligible objects and (at the most) true opinion concerning sensible objects, though not wholly ignored, is relegated to the background. On the other hand, Plato's hint of the limitations of human knowledge is heavily exploited. It gives support to the idea of a hierarchy of recipients of knowledge.

A fine illustration of these changes can be found at QG 1.54, a difficult but fascinating text which has not received the attention it deserves. To the question 'to whom does God say, "Behold, Adam is as one of us, to know good and evil"? (Gen.3.22) Philo replies:³

'One of us' indicates plurality, unless he happens to be speaking with his powers, which he used as instruments in making the whole universe. As for the word 'as', it is indicative of an example and likeness and comparison, not of identity. For the intelligible and sense-perceptible good and its contrary is known by the gods in one way, and by men in another. Indeed, just as the natures of those who inquire and comprehend, as well as the natures of the things securely perceived and comprehended,

differ, so also does the comprehending ability. In men these things are always likenesses and types and images, but in the gods they are archetypes, models and brilliant paradigms of obscure things. The unbegotten and uncreated father, however, does not mingle or associate with anyone...

As in Aet.2, the paradeigma relation is used metaphorically of the kind of cognition possessed rather than of the object of cognition, producing a confusing effect when viewed from the Platonic background.

There can be no doubt that the changes in emphasis we have recorded disclose the influence of the period in the history of Platonism between Arcesilaus and Philo of Larissa, when in the interpretation of Plato the doctrines of scepticism and then probabilism held sway. Philo's consistent use of terms such as στοχασμός, πιθανός, πιθανότης, εἰκασία, εἰκῶς λογισμός, ἐποχή etc. is taken from the New Academy and the Sceptical school (cf. the version of the tropes of Aenesidemus given in Ebr.170-202, and also the texts at De Vogel Gr. Phil.3.184-230). The strong conviction of the limitations of human reasoning was also fostered in this intellectual environment (though not necessarily resulting from the belief in man's οὐδένευα, as in Philo!).⁴ But, as Nikiprowetzky correctly emphasizes, Philo's scepticism is a false scepticism, for it does not deny the possibility of gaining secure knowledge and by no means attempts to question God's existence and other essential doctrines. Philo's Judaism contributes here, but also the return of dogmatism initiated by Antiochus of Ascalon. A not dissimilar mixture of scepticism and dogmatism is present in Plutarch, notably in the well-known 'Heraclitan' passage Mor.391E-394C. Orthodox Platonists such as Albinus and Apuleius repeat the Platonic distinction between ἐπιστήμη and δόξα without hesitation (Did.4.3-6, De Plat.194).

A word must also be said about Praem.28-30, another passage which shows independent-minded use of Tim.29b-d. Philo is explaining the significance of the 'trust in God' attributed to Abraham (Gen.15:6). Such πίστις entails a healthy distrust in the powers of λογισμός and αἰσθησις, each of which is accredited, in wholly Platonic terms, with an object of cognition and a goal (respectively νοητά, ὁρατά, ἀλήθεια, δόξα). But neither of these goals can satisfactorily be reached.

τὸ μὲν ἀνύδρυτον καὶ πεπλανημένον τῆς δόξης ἐνθ' ἑνὶ ὁρᾷ· εἰκόσι γὰρ καὶ πιθανοῦς ἐφορμεῖ· πᾶσα δὲ εἰκὼν ὁμοιότητι εὐπαραγωγῇ ψεύδεται τὸ ἀρχέτυπον.

Also λογισμός finds itself failing and collapses like an exhausted athlete (§29). Only the man who passes beyond the σώματα and ἀσώματα and takes God as his sole support receives βεβαιωτάτη πίστις and ἰσχυρογνώμων λογισμός (§30). The description of the short-comings of δόξα quoted above has been the subject of much discussion (Colson EE 8.328-329, Beckaert FE 27.56-57, Nikiprowetzky 142), focussed on the relation of the words εἰκόσι...εἰκῶν. The last-named scholar points out the Platonic background (Phdr.272e, Tht.163a, Soph.236a), but surprisingly does not mention Tim.29b-d. But this passage is surely relevant, for it supplies both the epistemological schema of the two realms and the wordplay on εἰκῶν and εἰκός (29c2 εἰκόνος εἰκότας). εἰκόσι is here the dative plural of εἰκός, and the juxtaposition with εἰκῶν reflects Plato's wordplay (I fail to see how Colson can argue that εἰκόσι is meant here as 'coming

from both or either [εἰκός and εἰκῶν]').

The emphasis of Philo's passage, however, is rather different than that found in Plato. Philo stresses the *deceptiveness* of δόξα and the *weakness* of λογισμός, whereas Plato assumes the *excellence* of νόησις and the *limitations* of δόξα (note Philo's use of the adjective εὐπαράγωγος, used disparagingly by Plato of ἐλπίς as πάθος at 69d4). Moreover the πίστις which Philo is talking about (based on Gen.15:6) bears no relation to Plato's πίστις at 29c3, which is associated with δόξα and γένεσις. πίστις means here something like 'firm conviction based on trust'. It is not opposed to secure knowledge (cf.§30), but supplies the grounds for such knowledge by impelling the soul to dependence on God.⁵ Thus, in spite of the clear use of Tim.29b-d in Praem.28-29, the passage is in fact far less 'Platonic' than the other text to which it at first sight seems so similar, Aet.2.

CHAPTER THREE
TIMAEUS 29D-31B: THE ACT OF CREATION

- 3.0. Introductory
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3.0. Introductory

Having set out the principles necessary for his account, Plato now speeds on to the act of creation, the pivotal point around which the entire cosmogony is centred. But first a question is raised. Why did the demiurge undertake his creative act? The answer is both succinct and profound: because he was good and wished to make everything as much like himself as possible (πάντα ὅτε μάλιστα παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ 29e3). Confronted by a disharmonious and disorganized realm of chaos, he led it from disorder to an ordered state (εἰς τάξιν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας 30a5). He moreover reasoned that intelligent beings are superior to their unintelligent counterparts, and so he gave the cosmos intelligence

(νοῦς) and also soul (ψυχή), because intelligence cannot be located in body without the mediation of soul. Through divine providence, therefore, the cosmos is an ensouled, rational living being (ζῶον ἔμψυχον ἔννοον τε 30b8). Keen to pursue his craftsman metaphor as consistently as he can, Plato asks what stood before the creating god as model for his work. The model was the transcendent and perfectly complete idea of the living being (τὸ παντελὲς ζῶον 31b1), containing within it the ideas of all other living beings. The postulation of this unique model also provides a ready-made answer to the question why there should be only a single cosmos. The cosmos must correspond as closely as possible to its perfect model, and thus must also possess the characteristic of unicity.

It is virtually impossible to avoid using the word 'creation' when describing the main event of the Platonic cosmogony. Yet this word, with its rich overtones of centuries of Christian dogma, can easily give rise to misunderstanding. In the German language a useful distinction can be made between 'Weltbildung' and 'Weltschöpfung'. Clearly it is the former that Plato intends. The demiurge, good craftsman that he is, does not start with nothing, but prepares and fashions a kind of 'material' that already lies to hand. The reader of the *Timaeus* who is eager to know more about that 'material' has to exercise a certain amount of patience. Plato returns to the subject in 49a (see below II 8.0.).

3.1. The goodness of the demiurge (*Tim.*29d-30a)

3.1.1. The goodness of God the creator (29d-30a)

Plato's statement that the goodness of the demiurge is the motive for his creation of the cosmos is considered by Philo to be directly applicable to the creative activity of God the creator, and is accordingly reflected in a large number of Philonic texts.

A first indication of the importance which Philo attaches to the doctrine can be gained from the prominent place it is given in his explanation of the Biblical account of 'day one' of creation. The entire passage *Opif.*21-23 is an adaptation of *Tim.*29d7-30a7, as will become clear in the analysis given in this and the two following sub-sections. Having concluded his discussion on the Logos as place of the κόσμος νοητός and God's powers (§20), Philo introduces in §21 the δύναμις κοσμοποιητική, which has as its source the truly good (τὸ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθόν). This statement requires further explanation:

εἰ γὰρ τις ἐθέλησειε τὴν αἰτίαν ἧς ἕνεκα τόδε τὸ πᾶν ἐδημιουργεῖτο δι-

ερευνᾶσθαι, δοκεῖ μοι μὴ διαμαρτεῖν σκοποῦ φάμενος, ὅπερ καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων
εἰπέ τις, ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸν πατέρα καὶ ποιητήν...

The language used is meant to disclose the source. Even before the allusion is formally indicated, αἰτίαν and τόδε τὸ πᾶν recall 29d7, while the words ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸν πατέρα καὶ ποιητήν amount to a paraphrasing conflation of 29e1 and 28c3. Plato's name is not mentioned (just as the ἄνδρες φρόνιμοι whom Plato followed (30a1) remain anonymous), but the allusion to the *Timaeus* is made even more evident by the (obviously deliberate) reference to the famous description of the creator in 28c3 (on which see above II 2.2.2.). A similar statement is found in *Cher.*127: εὐρήσεις... τῆς δὲ κατασκευῆς (τοῦ κόσμου) αἰτίαν τὴν ἀγαθότητα τοῦ δημιουργοῦ. The context of this remark is an exposition of Middle Platonist 'prepositional metaphysics', in which the Aristotelian doctrine of causes is adapted to the requirements of Platonic doctrine. We shall return to this theme below at II 3.4.5., where its relevance to Philo's train of thought in *Opif.*16-25 will be observed.

In two more passages of the *Allegorical Commentary* Philo returns to the theme of God's motive in creating the cosmos, *Leg.*3.78 and *Deus* 108 (cf. also *Plant.*91, cited below in II 3.1.2.). Significantly both involve exegesis of the text Gen.6:8, ὡς δὲ εὗρεν χάριν ἐναντίον κυρίου τοῦ θεοῦ. The righteous man makes a truly excellent find, that all things in the cosmos and the cosmos itself are a χάρις or χάρισμα of God. If one should ask what is the αἰτία γενέσεως (cf. 29d7), says Philo at *Deus* 108, I shall reply what Moses teaches, namely ἡ τοῦ ὄντος ἀγαθότης. To those inquiring after the ἀρχὴ γενέσεως (cf. 29e4 (!) and above II 2.1.3.), he affirms at *Leg.*3.78, the correct answer would be the ἀγαθότης καὶ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ. Plato's doctrine is now explicitly attributed to Moses, but is at the same time connected with the unplatonistic theme of God's grace. Indeed the goodness and the grace of God are so closely associated in Philo's mind that the word χάρις in the Biblical text induces him, without any support from the context, to recollect the creational account. As creator God shows his beneficence and kindness to all that he has made, whether great or small. Man's response must be to give thanks, but also, should the occasion require, to call on God's mercy, coming as suppliants to the creator to ask for the perpetuity of his works (*QG* 2.13, cf. *Mos.*2.61). Characteristically Philonic in these two passages is also the shift from microcosm to macrocosm. Grace to the righteous man is placed in the larger context of grace to the entire cosmos, of which man is part.¹

It is interesting to observe that in the three main passages discussed so far Philo introduces the question of God's motive for creation with a qualifying phrase such as 'if anyone should ask...'. Is this in recognition of the fact that the question properly belongs to the speculative business of philosophy, rather than to direct exegesis of scripture? In the Mosaic ac-

count of creation no explicit motivation, whether pronounced by God himself or deduced by the writer, is given for the creative act. All that we read are the words in Gen.1:31 that 'God saw all the things he had made, and behold, they were very good (καλὰ λίαν, cf. κάλλιστον Tim.30a7, also 30b1,5 etc.)'. Philo makes surprisingly little use of this text (only at Migr.42,135, Her. 159).² But he has up his sleeve another means of locating Plato's doctrine of God's goodness in the κοσμοποιία of Moses.

As was noted above in relation to Opif.21, Philo associates the conception of God's goodness with the doctrine of the divine powers, thereby introducing the Platonic theme into one of the most consistently presented and systematically developed areas of his thought (on which see Wolfson 1.217-226, Bormann 45-65). For a concise summary of the doctrine we may turn to one text out of many, Cher.27 (exeg. Gen.3.24):

κατὰ τὸν ἓνα ὄντως ὄντα θεὸν δύο τὰς ἀνωτάτω εἶναι καὶ πρώτας δυνάμεις ἀγαθότητα καὶ ἐξουσίαν, καὶ ἀγαθότητι μὲν τὸ πᾶν γεγεννημέναι, ἐξουσίᾳ δὲ τοῦ γεννηθέντος ἄρχειν...

One of the two powers is constantly associated with God's creative activity and given the title ποιητικὴ δύναμις or εὐεργετικὴ/χαριστικὴ δύναμις. In a large number of texts the characteristics of divine goodness and/or beneficence are mentioned as an intrinsic aspect of the creative power; cf. Opif.21, Leg.3.73, Cher.27, Migr.183, Her.166, Somn.1.162-163,185, Spec.1.209, QG 1.57, 2.51,75 (sometimes the beneficent power is seen as subordinate to the creative power, e.g. in QE 2.68). A pillar of support for Philo's doctrine of the divine powers is their correspondence with God's two chief names (Abr.121, Mos. 2.97, QE 2.62 etc.). God's creative activity and his goodness are represented by the name θεός, while the name κύριος indicates his sovereignty. Philo has observed, as he makes clear at Plant.86, QG 2.16, that the name θεός is used right throughout the creation account in Gen.1 (first appearance of κύριος in Gen.2:8, when paradise is planted and man placed there). Therefore, as the result of his idiosyncratic exegetical methods, he can deduce that the doctrine of divine goodness is found right throughout the creation account, even though it is not explicitly mentioned.

In two other passages, which certainly show the influence of Tim.29e-30a, the theme of the creator's goodness is given a slightly different twist on account of the exegetical context. Mut.46 discloses an ethical application (exeg. Gen.32:28). The ἀστέως should emulate God, who has shown his bounty to his creatures in the act of creation and continues to care for them. In Spec.4.186-188 the application is similar, but with political overtones (exeg. Lev.19:16). The ruler should aim to imitate the creator in benefiting his subjects rather than doing them harm, and so become assimilated to God. The celebrated Platonic τέλος, ὁμοίωσις θεῷ, is thus brought in relation to God's

creational activity. We glimpse here an interesting extrapolation on Philo's part, for nowhere in the Timaeus does Plato affirm that we must try to become like the demiurge. See further our discussion on Tim.90d below at II 10.1.6.

Once again we have here an exceedingly popular and much cited text in Middle Platonist authors; cf. Diog.Laert.3.72, Plut.Mor.1015A-B,1102D, Ps.Plut.De fato 573C, Alb.Did.12.1, Att.fr.3.2,4.13, Num.fr.20. As the Numenian text vividly shows, the Platonists could hardly avoid confronting the question of how the goodness of the demiurge in Tim.29e was related to τὰγαθόν, described in Rep.509b as not οὐσία but εἶτε ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας. Dörrie EH V 211 has convincingly argued that reflection on these two texts was decisive in the development of a hierarchical transcendental theology in later Platonism (cf. also J.Whittaker, 'Ἐπέκεινα νοῦ καὶ οὐσίας' VChr 23(1969)91-104, Baltes VChr 29(1975)259). Already in Philo we find hints of such discussion, though the details lack coherence. In Opif.8 the νοῦς τῶν ὄλων is κρείττων ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν (Wolfson 1.201 sees here a piece of upmanship vis-à-vis Plato). In Opif.21 the δύναμις κοσμοποιητική has as its source τὸ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθόν. In Deus 108 the creator dispenses his benefits, ἀπιδὼν εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀγαθότητα (a clear adaptation of the way the demiurge looks to the model, cf. 29a3 πρὸς τὸ αὐτόν ἐβλεπεν). Philo evidently regards τὰγαθόν as equivalent to or an attribute of God as τὸ ὄν. It is emphatically not parallel to God, let alone at a higher level of transcendence. The formulas ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας and ἐπέκεινα νοῦ are not found in Philo (Whittaker's citation (art.cit.102) of Leg.2.46 in order to show that God is above the νοῦς is unfortunate, since the context shows that the human νοῦς is meant).

According to the sources available to us, Philo is the first thinker to associate the goodness of Plato's demiurge with the Judaeo-Christian conception of God the creator, an event of enormous significance in the history of ideas. Even twenty centuries later Philo's (and Plato's) words continue to find echoes in Christian theology. We give two examples:

K.Barth, Church Dogmatics III 1 (Eng.trans. Edinburgh 1958) 330: 'The creation of God carries with it the Yes of God to that which He creates. Divine creation is divine benefit. What takes shape in it is the goodness of God.'

H.Berkhof, Christelijk geloof (Nijkerk 1975³) 161: 'If created reality, which can give us so much delight but also make us so terrified, came into existence through the exclusive initiative of the Father of Jesus Christ, then despite everything it must be a *benefit*. The creation is good because the creator is good.' (my translation)

If the theme of God's goodness can still be used even in a time when so much of Plato's (and Philo's) teleological optimism has evaporated away, is it any wonder that Tim.29e exercised such a powerful attraction on Philo and, later on, on Christian thinkers? Texts such as this one are among the chief motivating forces which led to the Platonizing tendencies of Patristic theology. Examples of the use of Tim.29e in Patristic authors are: Justin Apol.1.10.2, Iren.Adv.Haer.5.4.2, Aug.DND 11.21 etc. Such an illustrious heritage should not, however, cause us to overlook the fact that Philo's conception of God's goodness might not necessarily correspond to what Plato had in mind in the Timaeus.

3.1.2. No envy in the divine (29e)

In two celebrated passages Plato, reacting against ideas of divine vengeance and nemesis in early Greek theology, affirms that there is no room for a grudging or envious spirit in the divine: Phdr.247a7, with an *epistemological* purport; Tim.29e1-2 with a *cosmological* purport. Philo, regarding the epistemological and cosmological aspects as complementary, echoes both statements on frequent occasions. On his allusions to Phdr.247a see the list at Petit FE 28.146, to which can be added Congr.122, Praem.39, QG 4.103,107,142. The influence of the Timaeus text makes its presence felt in the following texts:

Opif.21: οὐ χάριν τῆς ἀρίστης φύσεως οὐκ ἐφθόνησεν οὐσίᾳ μηδὲν ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐχούση καλόν, δυναμένη δὲ πάντα γίνεσθαι.

Deus 108 (exeg. Gen.6:8): ἄφθονα τὰ ἀγαθὰ...

Plant.91 (exeg. Gen.28:21): ὁ δεσπότης καὶ ἡγεμὼν τῶν ὅλων οὐδὲν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ φύσεως μεταβάλλων, μένων δὲ ἐν ὁμοίᾳ, ἀγαθὸς ἐστὶ (Tim.29e1) συνεχῶς καὶ φιλόδωρος ἀνελλιπῶς, τῶν ὄντως ἀγαθῶν ἀφθόνων καὶ ἀενάων αὐτίος τελειότατος τοῖς εὐδαιμονοῦσι (text Colson EE 3.258).

Migr.183 (exeg. Deut.4:39 and brought into relation with the doctrine of the powers): αὐτὴ δὲ κυρίως ἐστὶν ἀγαθότης, φθόνον μὲν τὸν μισάρετον καὶ μισόκαλον ἀπεληλαυῖα ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς, χάριτας δὲ γεννᾷσα αἷς τὰ μὴ ὄντα εἰς γένεσιν ἄγουσα (cf. Tim.30a5) ἀνέφηνεν (formulation here influenced by Phdr.247a7, cf. Fug.62, De Deo 12).

Congr.171 (exeg. Gen.16:6, Deut.8.2-3): τίς οὖν οὕτως ἀνόσιός ἐστιν, ὥς ὑπολάβειν κακωτὴν τὸν θεόν...; ἀγαθὸς γὰρ (Tim.29e1) καὶ ἀγαθῶν αὐτίος, εὐεργέτης, σωτήρ, τροφεύς, πλουτοφόρος, μεγαλόδωρος, κακίαν ὄρων ἱερῶν ἀπεληλακῶς (again the influence of Phdr.247a7).

QG 1.55 (exeg. Gen.3.22): 'The Deity, however, is without part in any evil and is not envious of immortality or of the good of anyone else. And here is a most certain proof. Without being urged by anyone, he created the cosmos as a benefactor, granting unsubdued, disordered and passive substance (οὐσία) the benefit of a great and harmonious order and array of blessings (translation Marcus, altered to include the improvements of Mercier FE 34A.125).'

The words in Opif.21 cited above (which find a striking parallel in QG 1.55) form part of the adaptation of Tim.29e-30a which Philo introduces in order to expound the Mosaic doctrine of the creation of the cosmos (successively analysed in our Commentary in II 3.1.1-3. 3.2.1.). God's lack of envy and unstinting bountifulness, presented by Plato in a quasi-abstract manner as characteristic of one who is good, is brought by Philo in direct relation to the unformed matter confronted by the creator in the process of creation (on the term οὐσία see below II 3.2.1.). The effect is to heighten the actuality of God's creative act, which takes place by means of the distribution of his benefits.

3.1.3. The distribution of divine beneficence

God, because he is good, devoid of envy and unstintingly bountiful, does

not wish to withhold divine beneficence from his creation. And yet the cosmos which he created, though perfect in its kind, does not share the full perfection which he himself possesses. In his description of the act of creation Plato includes two qualifying phrases – ὅτι μάλιστα 29e3, κατὰ δύναμιν 30a3 – which indicate a measure of limitation in the transferral of the demiurge's goodness to the cosmos he brings into being. These qualifying phrases can be interpreted in two ways, which we may describe as 'from above' or 'from below'. Either the divine beneficence is too great for the material realm fully to accept, or the intractability of the chaotic matter partially frustrates the divine purpose.

It is clear from Philo's words at Opif.23 that he opts for the first alternative, more consistent as it is with the doctrine of divine omnipotence:¹

...ὁ θεὸς ἔγνω δεῦν εὐεργετεῖν ἀταμειύτοις καὶ πλουσίαις χάρισι τὴν ἄνευ ὥρεως θείας φύσιν οὐδενὸς ἀγαθοῦ δυναμένην ἐπιλαχεῖν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς. ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος εὐεργετεῖ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ χαρίτων – ἀπερίγραφοι γὰρ αὐταὶ γε καὶ ἀτελεῦται –, πρὸς δὲ τὰς τῶν εὐεργετουμένων δυνάμεις· οὐ γὰρ ὡς πέφυκεν ὁ θεὸς εὖ ποιεῖν, οὕτως καὶ τὸ γινόμενον εὖ πάσχειν, ἐπεὶ τοῦ μὲν αἱ δυνάμεις ὑπερβάλλουσι, τὸ δ' ἀσθενέστερον ὢν ἢ ὥστε δέξασθαι τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῶν ἀπέτρεν ἄν, εἰ μὴ διμετρήσατο σταθμισάμενος εὐαρμόστως ἑκάστῃ τὸ ἐπιβάλλον.

Once again epistemology and cosmology are seen to run parallel. Here is applied to the cosmogonic situation the same fundamental principle noted above at II 2.4.1. in relation to God's bestowal of knowledge, χαρίζομαι δ' ἐγὼ τὰ οἰκεῖα τῷ ληφόμενῳ (Spec.1.43, cf. Post.145, Deus 80 etc.). God's goodness has to be *distributed* and *measured out* to its recipients in a manner commensurate to their capacity for accepting it.

In this text Philo speaks in rather general terms. He is not specific about who is doing the distributing and measuring and what measurements are involved. But the context demands that the process of distribution and measurement be related to the work of creation, illustrated in the image of the divine architect who plans and constructs the megalopolis. The measurer is thus the divine Logos or, in more abstract terms, the noetic cosmos as divine plan for the cosmos' structure (in the following paragraphs, §24-25, the Logos and the noetic cosmos are seen to amount to the same). Other Philonic texts confirm this interpretation. At QG 1.4 the Logos is described as 'first principle, archetypal idea, premeasurer of all things (προμετρητής, retranslation Marcus)'. At QG 4.23 the name Gomorrah (Gen.18:20), meaning 'measure', is taken to refer to the divine Logos, 'by which have been measured and are measured all things that are on earth – principles (or ratios), numbers and proportions in harmony and consonance being included, through which the forms and measures of existents are seen'. In other passages it is the ideas or forms which do the measuring; cf. Opif.130, Spec.1.327, QE 2.33,52 etc.). In Sacr.59 and QG

4.8 Philo undertakes to give an exegesis of the τρία μέτρα (of wheat-flour!): the three measures are God (in the guise of the Logos), the creative and the regal powers, measuring the noetic, supra-lunary and sub-lunary realms respectively (a classification of exegetical convenience). These are seen as three, but in reality God is one and alone the measure of all things (cf. Laws 716c).²

On the role of the ideas as giving measurement in Middle Platonism compare Albinus Did.9.1:

ἔστι δὲ ἡ ἰδέα ὡς μὲν πρὸς θεὸν νόησις αὐτοῦ, ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς νοητὸν πρῶτον, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὕλην μέτρον, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὸν αἰσθητὸν κόσμον παράδειγμα, ὡς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἐξεταζομένη οὐσία

See also Calc.339, Plot.Enn.2.9.3.5.

What kind of measurements does Philo have in mind? In many of the above-cited texts he describes measurement in a quite general sense, i.e. goodness and beneficence being channelled into order and structure by means of measurement (this is the intention in Opif.23). But in some texts (e.g. QG 4.23), he envisages, just like Albinus, the specific process of informing matter with number, ratio and proportion, i.e. the process described by Plato in his account of the geometrical shapes of the primary bodies (Tim.53c-57d). To this subject we shall return below at II 8.3.1.

3.1.4. God's will and the problem of theodicy

One of the features of the anthropomorphic (i.e. mythical) presentation of the demiurge in the Timaeus is that he is accredited with certain 'psychological' traits, not only thought but also volition and emotion (cf. Brisson 33-34). Three times in the account of the act of creation Plato emphasizes that the god *willed*, not (note well!) that the cosmos should or should not come into being, but that it be as good as possible (29e3,30a2,d3). In his commentary on the creational account Philo eagerly takes over the notion of God's will, but, in contrast to Plato, applies it to the actual decision to create the cosmos. God *willed* to create this visible cosmos (Opif.16 βουληθεὶς τὸν ὁρατὸν κόσμον τουτονὶ δημιουργῆσαι, cf. §19 ὡς ἄρα τὴν μεγαλόπολιν κτίζειν διανοηθεὶς, Conf.175 εἰ ἐθέλοι δημιουργῆσαι etc.). When affirming that God βούλεται μὲν ἀγαθὰ (Spec.4.187), Philo immediately follows with the illustration of the cosmos' γένεσις (and also its διοίκησις; see further below II 6.1.3.).

The assertion that God is good and wished to make the cosmos as good as possible raises the problem of theodicy. Can God be held responsible for the shortcomings of the cosmos and the evil things that undeniably occur in it? At Tim.29e-30a Plato certainly expects his reader to recall Rep.379b-c, where he had proven to his own satisfaction that the good (and thus also ὁ θεός) was

οὐκ ἄρα πάντων γε αὔτιον, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν εὖ ἐχόντων αὔτιον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀναίτιον (b15-16). For Philo too it is an axiomatic principle that God is the source of good things only, and that the cause of evil will have to be sought elsewhere. Characteristic is his comment on the words spoken to Cain by God in Gen.4:7, ὁρθῶς δὲ μὴ δολέης. To say that all things, both what is beautiful and its opposite, came into being through the agency of God is to fail to make clear-cut and necessary distinctions in one's thinking (Agr.128-129). That the words in Tim.29e2-3,30a2-3,6-7,d1-3 were read as reflecting this axiomatic principle can be seen in Philo's manner of formulation in passages such as Conf.180 ἐμπρεπέστατον δὲ τὰ οὐκεῖα τῇ ἐαυτοῦ φύσει δημιουργεῖν ἄριστα τῷ ἀρίστῳ, Abr.268 βουλομένῳ δὲ τὰ ἄριστα, Spec.4.187 (cited above). Note also the texts Congr.171 and QG 1.55, already discussed above in II 3.1.2., in which the affirmation of God's ἀφθονία has theodical intent. Other texts absolving God from all responsibility for evil are Plant.53, Fug.69, Praem.32, Prov.2.82 (here matter is designated the cause of evil), QG 1.89, fr.5 (FE 33.219). The theme of theodicy is particularly prominent in the treatises De Providentia (cf. Hadas-Lebel FE 35.92-114). It is a concern which Philo shares with Jewish Wisdom literature, though it is there expressed in terms less influenced by Plato and Greek philosophy (cf. J.Laporte 'Philo in the tradition of Biblical Wisdom literature' 109). Further aspects of the problem of theodicy which are relevant to the Timaeus will be discussed below at II 6.1.3. 6.2.1.

A much more speculative subject is the possible contingency of the cosmos. If God willed to create this cosmos, then it is theoretically possible that he may have willed not to create it. Philo nowhere addresses this problem, and to force it on him is to run the risk of anachronism. Nevertheless a statement such as we find in Spec.4.187, κακέινῳ (θεῷ) δύναμις μὲν ἐστὶ δοῦν ἐκάτερα (τό τε εὖ καὶ τὸ χεῖρον), βούλεται δὲ μόνα τάγαθὰ (cf. Abr.268 and the frequent formula τῷ θεῷ πάντα δυνατά in Opif.146, Abr.175 etc.), undeniably introduces an emphasis on divine omnipotence and conscious volition that is foreign to Plato's demiurge. Is the good good because God has determined it and does it, or does God do the good because it is good? Plato would certainly agree with the latter alternative (cf. Euthyph.6e-11a). It is far less easy to decide where Philo's sympathies lie.

The theme of God's will was to become an important subject in later Christian Platonism (cf. Dillon 284). The issues involved are already illustrated in a particularly interesting text found in Galen UP 11.14 (= 2.158 Helmreich, text and translation in Walzer Galen on Jews and Christians 11-13), where the subject of the unchanging length of the eyelashes leads to a discussion of the divine will. Galen has no qualms in identifying the Mosaic creator and Platonic demiurge. But the affirmation that 'all things are possible to God', which he attributes to Moses and which is, as we saw, often found in Philo, he declares to be quite unacceptable. It is absurd to think that God could make

a bull or a horse out of ashes should he wish to do so.

3.2. The act of creation (Tim.30a)

3.2.1. From disorder to order (30a)

Plato describes the 'act' or 'moment' of creation as taking place when the demiurge *led* (ἤγαγεν) all that was visible from disorder to order (30a5). The disordered state was inherent in the pre-existent realm of chaos, described as οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως (30a4-5). The choice of the verb ἤγαγεν is revealing. In its simplicity it suggests guidance and persuasion (cf.48a), not the peremptory commandeering of the Genesis account. The basic theme of 30a is recapitulated in 69b3-5; the god introduces ἀναλογία and συμμετρία (cf.31b-32c) into a primal chaos which is ἀτάκτως ἔχοντα.

The influence of Tim.30a is directly perceptible in a large number of Philonic passages: Opif.8-9,21-22,28, Plant.3,5, Her.133-134,140,157,160, Fug.8-10, Somn.1.76,241, 2.45 (cf. Mut.135), Mos.2.100, Spec.1.48,328-329, 4.187, Aet.40,106 (cf.75), Prov.1.7-8,22 (cf.2.48-50), QG 1.55,64, 2.13, De Deo 6-7. Before we proceed to analyse these texts, it is worth pointing out that the contrast between τάξις and ἀταξία is undoubtedly a Philonic stylistic mannerism. At Legat.147 he describes the Emperor Augustus in terms worthy of (and derived from!) the Platonic demiurge (the commentaries of Smallwood and Pelletier FE both miss these resonances):

οὗτος ὁ τὰς πόλεις ἀπάσας εἰς ἐλευθερίαν ἐξελόμενος, ὁ τὴν ἀταξίαν εἰς τάξιν ἀγαγών, ὁ τὰ ἄμικτα ἔθνη καὶ θηριώδη πάντα ἡμερώσας καὶ ἀρμολογούμενος, ... ὁ τὰς χάριτας ἀταμιεύτους εἰς μέσον προθεῖς (cf. Opif.23), ὁ μὴδὲν ἀποκρυφάμενος ἀγαθὸν ἢ καλὸν ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ.

The same contrast is used in §94, but now sarcastically, of another Emperor, the despised Gaius Caligula (other examples at Leisegang 762b-764a). The antithesis corresponds, one may surmise, to deep-seated metaphysical, psychological and political convictions, as expressed sententiously at Spec.4.210, (ὁ θεὸς) τάξιν ἐκ ἀταξίας εἰσηγούμενος· τάξει μὲν γὰρ συγγενὲς κόσμος, ἀταξίᾳ δὲ τὸ ἄκοσμον (word-play on ordered world-system and seemliness, as noted by Colson EE 8.138; cf. also Opif.28 καλὸν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐν ἀταξίᾳ).

We commence with Opif.21-22. This passage is the only part of the lengthy adaptation of Tim.29e-30a in §21-23 which so far has not been analysed (see further above II 3.1.1-3). God's goodness is unstintingly bestowed on an οὐσίᾳ μὴδὲν ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐχούσῃ καλόν, δυναμένη δὲ πάντα γίνεσθαι. Creation takes

place when that οὐσία receives (έδέχετο) τροπήν καὶ μεταβολήν τὴν εἰς τάναντία καὶ τὰ βέλτιστα. In order to illustrate the contrast between the situation before and after the creative act, Philo gives a list of seven opposed pairs of terms, the one term in each case adjectivally describing the qualities of the οὐσία, the other revealing by means of nouns the realized characteristics of the created product:

ἄτακτος	τάξις
ἄποιος	ποιότης
ἄψυχος	ἐμψυχία
<ἀνόμοιος>	ὁμοιότης
έτεροειδής -	ταυτότης
ἀναρμοστίας -	τὸ εὐάριστον
ἀσυμφωνίας μεστή	τὸ σύμφωνον
	πάν ὅσον τῆς κρείττονος ἰδέας.

First some attention must be paid to detail.

οὐσία: The term indicates neither Platonic 'being' nor Aristotelian 'substance', but is equivalent to ὕλη (cf. *Opif.* 171). This usage occurs under the influence of the Stoa (cf. *SVF* 1.85ff., Hahn 40, Weiss 28). Plutarch recognizes the term as Stoic (*Mor.* 1085EF), but also uses it of 'Platonic' ὕλη himself (430E, 720B, 1014B τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ ὕλην).

έδέχετο: The language of Plato's receptacle (*ὑποδοχή* 49a6); see further below II 8.2.1.

τροπήν καὶ μεταβολήν: Cf. *Pol.* 270b10-c2. The parallel is significant, for the *Politicus* myth was used to shed light on the *Timaeus* (cf. *Plut. Mor.* 1015A,C, 1026E-F, Witt 131). Plato is being explained via Plato!

τὰ βέλτιστα: The 'language of excellence'; cf. above II 2.3.2.

ἄτακτος/τάξις: The basic contrast, drawn from 30a5 (cf. 69b3).

ἄψυχος/ἐμψυχία: Cf. 30b2-5 and b8 ζῶον ἐμψυχον.

<ἀνόμοιος>/ὁμοιότης: The emendation, first suggested by a certain Markland, is required for the balance between the two sets of pairs. Moreover it aptly recalls not only ἀνομοιότατα in 53a4 (cf. also ἀνωμάλως 52e3), but also the famous image of the τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἀπειρος πόντος derived once again from the *Politicus* myth (273d6). ὁμοιότης is used by Plato esp. of the spherical shape of the cosmos; cf. 33b6-7 and below II 4.2.3.

έτεροειδής/ταυτότης: The usage here is quite different to that of Plato in *Tim.* 35-37 (and in the *Sophist*). See below II 5.2.1. on *Decal.* 102ff.

ἀναρμοστίας...μεστή: Cf. 30a4 πλημμελῶς and the harmony received by the cosmic soul (35a-c), on which see below II 5.1.1. Once again cf. the *Politicus* myth, 273c7 τὸ τῆς παλαιᾶς ἀναρμοστίας πάθος. Plutarch *Mor.* 1015D quotes both *Pol.* 273c7,d6 in connection with exegesis of *Tim.* 30a, but relates the disorder to the pre-cosmic soul. At *Prov.* 1.21 Philo defines the 'cosmos according to Plato' as a ἀρμονία or συμφωνία; see below II 5.4.3.

κρείττονος ἰδέας: I.e. the model, introduced previously in §16.

Despite one or two small differences the nominal expressions give an adequate impression of the structured organization received by the cosmos as created product in the *Timaeus*. But what about Philo's description of the pre-existent οὐσία? Although the verb έδέχετο recalls the receptacle, what is portrayed in this passage is not the 'realm of chaos' intended by Plato in the *Timaeus*, i.e. a 'plastic' spatial continuum in which random events take place and in which/out of which body is constructed.¹ Nor is matter meant to be conceived as an Aristotelian primal passive substrate or a Stoic passive principle,

representing an ever-present (and mentally abstracted) constituent of reality. The emphasis falls on *negativity* (as indicated by the sequence of alpha-privatives) and also on *potentiality* (δυναμένη πάντα γίνεσθαι – this *is* Aristotelian), but not on *total passivity*. Thus the 'positive' aspects of Plato's chaos (ὁρατόν, κινούμενον) are set aside, while its other characteristics (οὐκ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον, πλημμελῶς, ἀτάκτως, ἀνωμάλως, ἀνομοιότατα) supply the basis for the long list of negatives. The pre-existent matter is patently regarded as a kind of disordered and unformed 'stuff', lying ready to hand (we might imagine) as clay for the brickmaker or unhewn stone for the sculptor (cf. Prov.2.50-51).²

The description ἄψυχος is highly significant, because from it must be deduced that the disorderly movement (implied by epithets such as ἄτακτος, ἀναρμωστίας μεστή, and the absence of the epithet ἀκίνητος) is due not to the presence of an irrational soul, but to an inherent 'quality' of the matter itself. This is in marked contrast to the view of Middle Platonists such as Plutarch, Atticus and Numenius, who, placing much emphasis on the description in Tim.30a sought to explain the pre-cosmic irregular motions by postulating an irrational pre-cosmic soul which the demiurge converts to orderliness and rationality.³ But does not the epithet ἄποιος suggest the conception of a quality-less, ever-present material substrate (the term is frequently used of the Stoic passive principle, cf. SVF 2.301,304,309 etc.)? In the context it appears that ἄποιος refers to the lack of form (due to the absence of the ποιότητες or immanent forms, on which see above II 2.2.1.), and does not exclude the negative characteristics of the pre-existent disordered matter.

A few pages earlier in Opif.8-9 Philo also speaks of a μεταβολή from matter in an unordered state to the cosmos as τελεωτάτον ἔργον. But there are distinct differences between this text and §21-22. Moses, having reached the pinnacle of philosophy, perceived that in reality (ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς) there is τὸ δραστήριον αἴτιον (the divine Nous) and τὸ παθητόν (matter). Once again Philo gives a (this time shorter) sequence of contrasts, adjectivally describing the matter, participially the ordering activity of the Nous:

τὸ παθητόν			
ἄψυχον	} ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ	ψυχωθέν	} ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ
* *		σχηματισθέν	
ἀκίνητον		κίνηθέν	

Given Philo's fondness for compiling lists of contrasted pairs (we shall come across more examples soon), one might consider the possibility that an adjective <ἀσχημάτιστον> has fallen out. But unlike in the case of <ἀνόμοιος> in §22 no editor has included it in the text (the word is used of οὐσία in Fug. 8, Somn.2.45, cf. Spec.1.48). In contrast to §22 Philo includes here the opposition between ἀκίνητος and κίνηθέν. Matter appears to have no 'positive'

characteristics of its own, not even disorderly movement.⁴

As has been noted by many scholars (e.g. Zeller 435, Weiss 41, Früchtel 12), Philo's distinction between an active cause and a passive object is indebted, for its terminology at least, to the Stoic doctrine of two principles (cf. an excellent parallel at *Sex. Emp. Adv. Math.* 9.75 (= *SVF* 2.311), other texts at *SVF* 2.299-328). But it must not be thought that Stoic cosmology causes the *Timaeus* to recede into the background. The basic schema of the *Timaeus* is still being used to explain Mosaic doctrine, but with the aid of Stoic terms. Compare the following account of the *Timaeus* in the *Placita Platonis* at *Diog. Laert.* 3.69 (cf. 76-77):

δύο δὲ τῶν πάντων ἀπέφηνεν (ὁ Πλάτων) ἀρχάς, θεὸν καὶ ὕλην, ὃν καὶ νοῦν προσαγορεύει καὶ αἴτιον. εἶναι δὲ τὴν ὕλην ἀσχημάτιστον καὶ ἄπειρον, ἐξ ἧς γίνεσθαι τὰ συγκρίματα. ἀτάκτως δὲ ποτε αὐτὴν κινουμένην ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ φησὶν εἰς ἓνα συναχθῆναι τόπον τάξιν ἀταξίας κρείττονα ἡγησαμένου.

Here a rather unsatisfactory compromise is attempted between the Stoic doctrine of the passive principle and Plato's disorderly chaos in *Tim.* 30a. The ὕλη is ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἄπειρος, but is not called ἀκίνητος because of Plato's explicit words (κινουμένην → 30a4). Philo avoids such problems by retaining only the skeletal frame of Plato's text, namely the transition from lack of order to order resulting in the perfect product. How the orthodox Middle Platonist doctrine of *three* ἀρχαί could be altered to only *two* becomes clear in a text such as Hippolytus *Philos.* 19.2-3 (*Diels Dox. Gr.* 567). The παράδειγμα is the διάνοια θεοῦ, so that there remain two fundamental principles, God and matter (the same tendency is visible at times in Plutarch, e.g. *Mor.* 1014A-B).

As we observed above in II 2.2.1., Philo rejects the notion of a passive *principle* or *cause*, lest it be thought that God and matter were on the same level. Nevertheless in *Opif.* 8-9 matter is regarded as an ever-present constituent of reality (ἐν τοῖς οὐσι). It is the total *passivity* of matter that is stressed. The disorderly motion of *Tim.* 30a is lacking, and yet the context (the γένεσις τοῦ κόσμου) and the aorist verb μετέβαλεν *do* suggest a creative moment, when a change occurs from a pre-cosmic situation to the cosmos as we know it.

It is not so easy, therefore, to envisage precisely what Philo intends with his conception of unformed matter used by God in creation. On the one hand it is depicted with the *negativity* of a disorderly material, as suggested by the metaphor of the craftsman or artist. But matter can also be regarded as a wholly *passive*, quality-less substrate underlying corporeal reality and remaining present also after creation had taken place. The problems here are a legacy of the difficulties posed by the interpretation of the receptacle and the pre-cosmic chaos in the *Timaeus*, compounded by Aristotle's identification of the receptacle with his concept of ὕλη (cf. *Phys.* 209b12) and the influence of the Stoic doctrine of body as qualified matter. Another complicating factor which needs to be taken into consideration is that the view taken by an interpreter of the *Timaeus* on the controversial question of whether the cosmos was or was not created in a creational event was likely to have important consequences for his conception of matter.⁵ The problems found in Philo's account are matched by Middle Platonist uncertainties and disputes on the na-

ture of matter; see further below II 8.2.2. III 3.5.2a. The central question that must be asked of Philo's doctrine of matter is the extent to which he supports a *dualistic* view which attributes to matter an active maleficence; to this subject we return in II 8.1.1. 8.2.2. III 2.8.

It will not be possible to analyse to the same depth all the other passages in which the influence of Tim.30a is felt. These texts add little to our understanding of what Philo considers matter to be, but are of interest because the basic notion of a transition from disorder to order is combined with other, often non-Platonic ideas.

Plant.3,5: Tim.30a is adapted to the requirements of the 'phyto-cosmological excursus' given as exegesis of Gen.9:20. The pre-cosmic οὐσία which is ἀτακτος καὶ συγκεχυμένη ἐξ αὐτῆς, is led (ἄγων)

εἰς τάξιν ἐξ ἀταξίας
ἐκ συγχύσεως εἰς διακρίσιν.

The second contrasted pair, suggesting a process of discrimination and separation, has clear Biblical overtones (Gen.1:4,11:9, cf. Conf.187,191, Spec.2.151); but for σύγχυσις cf. SVF 2.317, διακρίσις Tim.52e6, Tim.Locr.7.

Her.133ff. (exeg. Gen.15:10): The change from disorder to order is adapted to the diaeretic activity of the Logos-cutter. The creator, having whetted his λόγος τομεύς, divides (διήρει) τὴν τε ἄμορφον καὶ ἄπολον τῶν ὄλων οὐσίαν, producing the four elements, and so on (§140). At §160 the primal matter is described in terms more reminiscent of the Timaeus and Opif.22: τὴν δημιουργηθεῖσαν ὕλην, τὴν ἄψυχον καὶ πλημμελῆ (cf.30a4) καὶ διαλυτὴν, ἔτι δὲ φθαρτὴν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς (see below II 6.1.2.) ἀνώμαλόν τε καὶ ἄνυσον (cf.52e2-3 μήτε ... ἰσορροπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀνωμάλως). A similar account is given at QC 1.64, this time as exegesis of Gen.4:7 (Cain's sacrifice).

Fug.8-10: Already analysed above at II 2.2.1. Laban represents those who deify τὴν ἄπολον καὶ ἀνελθεῖν καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον οὐσίαν, Jacob those who affirm that mind came and organized all things, τὴν ἐξ ὀχλοκρατίας ἐν τοῖς οὐσιν ἀταξίαν εἰς ἀρχῆς νομίμου, βασιλείας, τάξιν ἀγαγόντα. Here the contrast between disorder and order is reinforced by the 'political' image of kingship (opposed to mob-rule) with its manifold Biblical and metaphysical associations.

Somn.1.241: 'I am God', Moses writes (Gen.31:13), meaning that 'I alone am standing (cf. Ex.17:6) and established the nature of the universe, τὴν ἀταξίαν καὶ ἀκοσμίαν εἰς κόσμον καὶ τάξιν ἀγαγών, and giving it support so that it can rest securely on my viceroy (ὑπαρχος), the Logos'. God creates the cosmos and sustains it through the agency of the Logos.

Spec.1.48,328-329, Mut.135, Somn.2.45: In these texts (exeg. Ex.33:13ff., Deut.23:2, Gen.38:25,38:18 respectively) the role of the ideas or forms in imposing order on the chaotic state of matter is emphasized. The method of contrasting adjectives and participles in Spec.1.48 recalls Opif.9 (though both ideas and material (things) are put in the plural):

τὰ ἄτακτα	τάττουσαι
τὰ ἄπειρα	περατοῦσαι
ἀόριστα	περιορίζουσαι
ἀσχημάτιστα	σχηματίζουσαι.

At Somn.2.45 it is God who shapes by means of his σφραγίς, the Logos:

(τὴν οὐσίαν) ἀσχημάτιστον	(ὁ θεὸς) ἐσχημάτισε
καὶ ἀτύπτων	ἐτύπωσε
καὶ ἄπολον	ἐμόρφωσε...

Note, finally, that in Spec.1.328-329 matter is not only ἄμορφος καὶ ἄπολος but also ἄπειρος καὶ πεφυρμένη. Those philosophers who reject the doctrine of ideas reduce all things (in their theory at least) to ἀταξία and σύγχυσις (cf. the charge against Laban in Fug.8-10).

Spec.4.187 (exeg. Lev.19:16): Illustrating God's creative activity, Philo gives his longest list of contrasts:

τὰ μὴ ὄντα	ἐκάλεσεν	εἰς τὸ εἶναι
ἐξ ἀταξίας		τάξιν
καὶ ἐξ ἀποίων		ποιότητας
καὶ ἐξ ἀνομοίων		ὁμοιότητας
καὶ ἐξ ἑτεροιοτήτων		ταυτότητας
καὶ ἐξ ἀκοινωνήτων		κοινωνίας
καὶ ἀναρμόστων		ἁρμονίας
καὶ ἐκ...ἀνυσότητος		ἰσότητα
ἐκ...σκότους		φῶς (ἐργασάμενος).

The similarities with the list at Opif.22 are immediately apparent. The antithesis non-being/being will be discussed further below. The pair ἀκοινωνήτων/κοινωνίας are doubtless based on the Empedoclean φιλλία, also exploited by Plato at Tim.32c (cf. below II 4.1.1.). The final pair, as well as the verb ἐκάλεσεν (instead of ἤγαγεν), recall the Biblical account of creation at Gen.1:3-5 (cf. Her.163, Somn.1.76). The extensive list of contrasts suggests the Pythagorean doctrine of opposites (cf. Goodenough By Light, Light 66-67), but the lists of opposites given in treatises such as Ps.Archytas Περὶ ἀντικειμένων and Περὶ ἀρχῶν are intra-cosmic, not pre- and post-creational.

Aet.40,75,106: The assertion that God must bring about change from disorder to order (πρὸς τάξιν ἀταξίαν μεταβάλλειν §40) and not *vice versa* is part of Aristotle's famous argument in the De philosophia (fr.19c Ross), in which he uses the dialectics of Rep.378-379 to refute Plato's affirmation in the Timaeus that the cosmos is γενητός and potentially (though not actually) φθαρτός. Philo gives two versions of the argument (§40,106), in both of which the key words of Tim.30a, τάξις and ἀταξία, are prominent. It is probable that Aristotle was the source for the allusion in §40, for the Stagirite would have enjoyed using Plato's words against himself (see further below II 4.2.7.). On this argument, which had enormous influence in Hellenistic theology, see the remarks of Mansfeld Stud.Hell.Rel.142ff. In §75 the eternity of the cosmos is deduced by the Peripatetic Critolaus from its status as τὴν τάξιν τῶν ἀτάκτων, τὴν ἁρμονίαν τῶν ἀναρμόστων etc., i.e. Tim.30a makes way for the doctrine of an immanent concordia oppositorum (cf. Ps.Arist.De Mundo 5 396b22ff., J.P.Maguire YCS 6(1939)133-147). The use of Tim.30a here (if we can call it that) is quite different to the way that Philo employs it elsewhere, and he could not have found it convincing unless theologically qualified in the correct manner; cf. Runia 133.

Prov.1.7-8: On the references to Tim.30a in this difficult but important text see the following sub-section. In Prov.1.22, which discusses Plato's view of the γένεσις of the cosmos, the influence of Tim.30a can also be felt; see above II 2.3.3.

QG 1.55: Quoted above in II 3.1.2. Even through the Armenian translation the adaptation of Tim.30a is clearly perceptible.

As was observed above, Philo in Spec.4.187 sums up the whole process of reducing chaos to order as a transition from τὰ μὴ ὄντα εἰς τὸ εἶναι. Other texts which combine this formulation with Tim.30a (indicated especially by the choice of the verb) are:

Migr.183 τὰ μὴ ὄντα εἰς γένεσιν ἄγουσα (ἡ δύναμις ποιητικὴ)
Mos.2.100 μόνος γὰρ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ὢν καὶ ποιητὴς ἐστὶν ἀψευδῶς (ὁ θεός),
 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἤγαγεν εἰς τὸ εἶναι...

Cf. also Leg.3.10, Deus 119, Somn.1.76, Mos.2.267, QG 2.13. Such language of being and non-being finds no precedent in the Timaeus, where the opposition is between being and becoming (though at Soph.265c Plato does speak of ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ θεοῦ δημιουργοῦντος ὕστερον γίνεσθαι πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα). Philo's usage

of τὰ μὴ ὄντα and τὸ μὴ ὄν has been examined at some length by Weiss 60-68 (cf. also Baeumker op.cit.(n.5) 382-383, May 16-17). He points out that, in contrast to Plotinus (and Clement of Alexandria), Philo does not explicitly equate non-being and matter. He argues that τὰ μὴ ὄντα simply means 'das was noch nicht in die ihm zukommende Form gebraucht worden ist'(62), but that τὸ μὴ ὄν in Deus 119 and Mos.2.267 could be meant to refer to pre-existent matter. This view also appeals to Winston 8.

Reviewing the large number of passages analysed in this sub-section, we may conclude that Plato's account of the creative moment in Tim.30a attracted Philo for two main reasons: (1) the depiction of creation as a change from disorder to order; (2) the description of the primal chaos or, as Philo took it, the pre-existent matter. One is struck by the large supply of adjectives used by Philo to portray the nature of that matter. Only some, as we have noted, go back to Plato; many others are found in Middle Platonist authors, as indicated in the following list:⁶

ἀεὶδεις	<u>Aët.Plac</u> .1.9.4, <u>Alb.Did</u> .8.2
ἄκοσμος	<u>Plut.Mor</u> .1014B
ἄμορφος	<u>Diog.Laert</u> .3.69, <u>Plut.Mor</u> .1014B, <u>Alb.Did</u> .8.2
ἀνόμοιος	<u>Diog.Laert</u> .3.76
ἀόριστος	<u>Plut.Mor</u> .1003B, <u>Tim.Locr</u> .7, <u>Num.fr</u> .4
ἄπειρος	<u>Diog.Laert</u> .3.69, <u>Plut.Mor</u> .719C, <u>Num.fr</u> .4
ἄτοπος	<u>Plut.Mor</u> .1015A, <u>Alb.Did</u> .8.2
ἀσχημάτιστος	<u>Aët.Plac</u> .1.9.4, <u>Diog.Laert</u> .3.69, <u>Tim.Locr</u> .4
ἄτακτος	<u>Plut.Mor</u> .719E, <u>Num.fr</u> .4
πλημελής	cf. <u>Plut.Mor</u> .719D, <u>Alb.Did</u> .12.2.

The single most outstanding feature of Philo's adaptations of Tim.30a - it is found nowhere else to the same degree - is his predilection for enumerating pairs of contrasted terms in order to illustrate the difference between ἀταξία and τάξις. Naturally allowance must be made for Philo's rhetorical flair. But at the same time this feature gives eloquent expression to his deep-seated conviction that it is above all order in the broadest sense that characterizes the cosmos as the perfect masterpiece of its creator.

Two aspects of Philo's use of Tim.30a remain to be discussed. Firstly, it will be necessary to take a closer look at Prov.1.6-8, a passage which has wider implications for Philo's view of creation, but poses many problems for the interpreter. Secondly, more attention must be paid to the possible relation of Tim.30a to the letter of the Mosaic creational account. Does Moses in fact speak of a pre-existent disorderly material? Could Philo use Gen.1:2 to this end, as did the Church Fathers? These subjects will occupy us in the following two sub-sections.

3.2.2. De Providentia 1.6-8

Given the central importance of the doctrine of creation in Philo's thought and the controversial philosophical and exegetical problems associated with it, the Philonist can hardly afford to overlook a passage which specifically addresses the question of whether the cosmos is created or eternal. Unfortunately, on account of the Armenian transmission, the text and meaning of Prov.1.6-8 are decidedly problematic. After years of relative neglect – in the studies of Drummond, Bréhier and Wolfson it is ignored – three scholars have in recent years given independent interpretations of the passage. We shall commence with a review of these recent contributions, adding for the sake of completeness a brief report of some earlier attempts to solve the puzzles that the three paragraphs contain.

P.Wendland, Philos Schrift über die Vorsehung (Berlin 1892) 4-5 (relying chiefly on Aucher's translation, but aided also by the Hellenist and Armenologist F.C.Conybeare). The arguments in favour of the createdness of the cosmos in §6 and 9ff. stand in contradiction to the arguments in favour of a creatio aeterna in §7-8. But the unmistakably Philonic language makes it unlikely that these two paragraphs are interpolated. Wendland suggests that they could represent an earlier phase of Philo's thought.

W.Bousset, Jüdisch-christlicher Schulbetrieb (1915) 143-146 (based on Aucher), agrees that in §7-8 Philo is arguing in favour of the position that is attacked in §6. He suggests that the anomalous contents of §7-8 can be explained if we assume that Philo carelessly allowed some source-material to remain in a context which actually argues for the opposite point of view.

H.F.Weiss, (1966) 32,69-70 (based on Aucher), follows Wendland, but adds that §8, in arguing that on account of God's eternal activity matter can never exist in an unordered state, perhaps allows the possibility of a creatio ex nihilo.

M.Baltes, (1976) 88-93, is primarily interested in the passage because it could yield insights on how the cosmogony of the Timaeus was being interpreted in the time of Philo. Recognizing the inadequacies of Aucher's translation, he based his comments on a new and more literal translation supplied by his colleague C.Hannick (not including §8, which Baltes does not discuss). Baltes argues that the 3rd person plurals in §6-7 refer to Platonists who in their interpretation of the Timaeus use the Aristotelian doctrine that God as pure ἐνέργεια can never be inactive in support of the non-Aristotelian view of creatio aeterna. He thus follows Bousset in regarding §7 as setting out the viewpoint which Philo had attacked in §6. The real break in the argumentation occurs halfway through §7 (at the words at Creator jugiter istam intelligendo adornavit in Aucher's version), when Philo all of a sudden, instead of reporting a view to which he is opposed, now appears to put forward that viewpoint himself. Baltes appeals (90n.38) to the suggestion first made by Diels (Dox. Gr.1ff.) that Prov.I was originally a dialogue, but was converted into a treatise at some stage before the Armenian translation was made. In the process the continuity of the text may have been disturbed.

G.Reale, Paradoxos politeia (1979) 277-280, takes a quite different view, basing his interpretation solely on Aucher's Latin. In Prov.1.6-8 Philo gives no less than five different solutions to the problem of the origin of the cosmos: (1) the Aristotelian view that the cosmos is uncreated and eternal (§6); (2) the cosmos is created by God, but from eternity (§6); (3) the cosmos is created by God out of a matter which he did not create and which amounts to a

principle co-eternal with God (§7); (4) God produces and orders matter simultaneously by means of thought, i.e. thinking and creating coincide (§7); (5) God first creates matter and then proceeds to give it ordered structure (§8). It is the final solution, in which the doctrine of the Timaeus is modified in the light of scripture, that represents Philo's own view.

D.Winston, (1981) 16-18, basing his interpretation partially on a translation supplied by A.Terian, considers it possible to extract from the passage a 'consistent Philonic doctrine'(n.38). Philo's chief objection to the Platonists' view that God has created the cosmos from eternity is that matter is elevated to an autonomous principle co-eternal with God. But Philo is a resolute monist. God by thinking eternally brings matter into being and simultaneously orders it (cf. Reale no.4). There is thus no need to postulate a primordial formless state of matter. For Winston this passage, despite its 'stylistic gaucherie'(n.38) is a key witness to Philo's doctrine of eternal creation.

It goes without saying that the divergence of scholarly opinion which we have observed is as unsatisfactory as it is remarkable. It fully justifies our taking another look at the passage. The first desiderandum is an accurate translation, for without a secure philological basis it will not be possible to reach any worthwhile conclusions on the way the passage should be read and interpreted. The translation which I shall now give has been prepared in collaboration with Weitenberg (and with reference to Aucher's version and the incomplete translations of Conybeare and Hannick). Foregoing any claim to literary pretensions, it aims at a literal, almost slavish rendering of the difficult Armenian text. It will be followed by some notes relating to the text and its translation. (When my manuscript was already in its completed form I received a complete translation of the passage which Prof.A.Terian had been kind enough to prepare for me. This translation, on account of the author's wide experience in the Armenian Philo, must be taken very seriously. Unfortunately it was too late to take its contents into account in my translation and interpretative comments. I have added important divergences, where possible, to my notes.)

Translation

- §6. For often also he who wanders in superficial observation thinks that this cosmos exists and is constituted from an eternity without beginning,¹ as if it in no way had a beginning (ἀρχή) of genesis but always existed and is not at all to be destroyed by anyone.² When, however, these clear observations of mine are adduced, then at the same time that universal sophisticated argument which deceives with artificial words³ is disproved and rejected, (namely) that God did not begin the cosmos before the creation of the cosmos,⁴ but was always engaged in making this most beautiful cosmos.⁵ For it is unfitting, they said,⁶ for the Deity⁷ ever to be inactive — since this is indicative of laziness and inactivity — but they said that without beginning God made all things,⁸ not having previously realized the absurdity of such an hypothesis; for in wishing to clear God of a trivial accusation, they direct a very serious accusation against him.⁹
- §7. The contrary view comes, since there is no alternative, (namely) to say¹⁰ that matter, lacking adornment, form or shape,¹¹ was given form and shape by him, receiving forms that were not in it. For according to them¹²

- he did not begin to create. But if the intelligible creation¹³ (which is) from him made the beautiful form of the cosmos and matter received¹⁴ its lovely form, how¹⁵ then did God begin to create the cosmos? Matter being in a state of disorganized, unordered and erratic motion and the cosmos then receiving beauty together with adornment, he was taking matter as ἀρχή;¹⁶ but the creator adorned it by always thinking.¹⁷ For God did not first begin to think and then to create;¹⁸ nor was there ever a time when he did not create, the forms being with him from the beginning. The will of God does not happen later, but is always with him, for natural movements never cease. And so it will happen that he creates by always thinking and gives beginning (ἀρχή) of being¹⁹ to sense-perceptible things, so that both of them exist together, (namely) the always acting with divine counsel and the giving the beginning (ἀρχή) of being to sense-perceptible things.²⁰ For it is impossible that something should benefit from an act of goodness and that those benefits did not come from a benefactor;²¹ so that the one who gave is benefactor and the one who receives participates in the good.
- §8. But if someone refuses to concede this and declare that these (are) together, how was matter long ago, that which never exists²² in the cosmos unadorned?²³ But if there was a time when it was unadorned, the beginning (ἀρχή) of the cosmos would have been when it was adorned. For if we consider matter to be an unadorned substance destitute of all order,²⁴ how could matter not have received a beginning (ἀρχή) of adornment, (that matter) which now exists in this cosmos?²⁵

Notes

1. Literally 'from beginning-less ages (= ἐξ ἀνάρχων αἰώνων? - but Philo never uses αἰών in the plural). (Terian renders: 'For there are many who go about superficially thinking...')
2. Or 'by anything' (= ὑπό τινος).
3. Cf. Aet.14 (on the same subject!), τινες δὲ οὔονται σοφισμένοι...
4. Sic! Cf. Hannick, 'Gott hat die Welt vor der Weltschöpfung nicht angefangen'.
5. (Terian renders: '...the attempt to show that the creation of the world is not prior to God's giving the world a beginning and that He is constantly creating this most beautiful world...')
6. (Terian here and in the next line gives the present tense, 'they say'.)
7. No doubt rendering τὸ θεῶν.
8. (Terian renders: '...it is for God who is without beginning to create all things...')
9. The word for 'accusation' is a *plurale tantum*, so both a singular or a plural rendering is possible (Hannick and Terian give the plural). The theme of accusation (i.e. accusing God of not being providential) is very prominent in *De Providentia* I & II (cf. 1.2-3, 6, 66, 69, 2.24, 34, 102, 109). Note the same theme in Plotinus' *Περὶ προνοίας* (Enn. 3.2.3.10, 3.2.14.7, 3.3.3.6).
10. Meaning obscure. Cf. Aucher 'superest itaque ut dicant...', Hannick 'Es steht im Gegenteil, denn nichts bleibt (!): Sie sagten...' But the last verb is an infinitive, so that Hannick's 'Sie sagten' is doubtful. It is thus most likely not correct to suppose, as Baltes does, that the words that follow give the view of Philo's opponents. (Terian renders: 'It is conflicting, because it can no longer be said that...')
11. Probably rendering ὕλην ἀμορφον καὶ ἀμορφον καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον, the epithets of matter discussed above in II 3.2.1. In the following lines both syntax and meaning become desperately obscure.
12. I.e. the opponents attacked in §6.
13. Does this refer to the κόσμος νοητός (or even the Logos)? But the noetic world never itself *makes* the sense-perceptible cosmos. (Terian renders more freely: 'Now, the wise creation is by Him, He wrought the beautiful form of the world, conceiving the most beautiful idea of matter.')
14. Probably rendering ἐδέξατο, cf. Plato's receptacle and *Opif.* 22 ἐδέχετο.

15. According to Conybeare (at Wendland op.cit.42) one ms. reads 'when'.
16. Two absolute constructions followed by a main clause. All translators so far (also Terian) render the sentence as a question, but this is by no means certain. According to Conybeare (ibid.) matter is described as ἄτακτος καὶ ἄκοσμος καὶ συγκεχυμένη. The original might have been more reminiscent of Tim.30a4-5. The final words are most problematic. Conybeare translates them literally as ἀρχὴν τὴν ὕλην ἐλάμβανε (or λάβοι ἄν, he adds). ἀρχή could mean principle here, but it is also possible that the two Armenian words rendering ἀρχὴν λαμβάνειν simply mean 'initiate' (Terian renders 'taking first'). Baltes remarks (89n.35): 'Wahrscheinlich stand im griechischen Text ἀρχῆς γενομένης τῆς ὕλης, welches vom armenischen Übersetzer missverstanden wurde.'
17. 'Always' (ἀεί) can go with either the verb or the participle.
18. (Terian renders: 'Yet God did not begin to think first but to create.')
19. These words could render ἀρχή τοῦ εἶναι or ἀρχή τοῦ γίνεσθαι.
20. Probably two substantival infinitives joined together, e.g. τὸ ἀεὶ θεῶν λογισμῷ δρᾶν τε καὶ τὸ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀρχὴν διδόναι vel.sim. The implied subject is God. Cf. Hannick, 'dass Gott nach göttlichen Rat immer handelt und dass den wahrnehmbaren Dingen ein Beginn gegeben wird'.
21. No doubt the terminology of εὐεργετεῖν, εὐεργεσία; cf. Opif.23.
22. The Armenian could perhaps also mean ἐγένετο.
23. (Terian renders: '...how could primordial matter exist altogether distinct from the world and without adornment?')
24. Substance surely translates οὐσία (cf. above II 3.2.1. on Opif.21). Here again ὕλη is given the epithets common in Middle Platonism; 'destitute' in particular recalls Plut.Mor.1014F, τὴν ὕλην ἀεὶ ἄμορφον καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον καὶ πάσης ποιότητος καὶ δυνάμεως οἰκείας ἔρημον...
25. (Terian renders: 'If, however, we were to understand primordial matter as unadorned substance lacking every quality, how is it that the matter now existing in the world is not without a beginning of adornment?')

Much remains unclear in this passage, and the details could be endlessly discussed. Our comments will be confined to four observations.

1. The context in which the three paragraphs are situated sheds much light on their intention. Philo's theme is divine Providence, discussed both in relation to the wider dimension of cosmic order and design and in the more limited perspective of individual retribution. His chief method will be through observation of sense-perceptible reality (§5). §6-36 deal with the cosmic dimension, of which §6-23 concentrate on the subject of the createdness and potential destructibility of the cosmos. In §9-19 Stoicizing arguments are presented in favour of this view, arguing from part to whole. §9 is clearly a *continuation* of one or more earlier arguments on behalf of the cosmos' createdness, as indicated by the word 'furthermore'.¹ In §20-22 Philo appeals to the authority of Plato's Timaeus as support for the view of the γένεσις and potential φθορά (!) of the cosmos (see also II 2.1.2. 2.3.3. 5.3.1.). The integral place of the arguments for the cosmos' potential destruction in the treatise as a whole can be seen in the fact that Philo twice returns to an almost apocalyptic depiction of what will happen if man's mores do not improve (§34-36, 89-92). God's providential concern for the cosmos is thus double-edged. Note especially §90, in which the elements lose their fine appearance and matter 'hastens to cast aside its form', i.e. the reverse process to what

occurs in §7-8. The context alone shows that Winston's interpretation of §6-8 in terms of a doctrine of eternal creation cannot possibly be right. But we are left with a grave problem. How can this treatise be reconciled with the view of the *De aeternitate mundi*, in which God's πρόνοια ensures the cosmos' ἀφθαρσία (§13; see below II 6.1.1-5.)?

2. The interpretation of §6 does not give rise to insurmountable problems. As Baltes has shown, Philo argues (differently than in *Aet.*14) against thinkers who recognize God's creatorship but consider this creatorship to have been exercised from eternity.² According to these men the cosmos has had no ἀρχή γενέσεως (7.3; ἀρχή must mean 'beginning' here, cf. II 2.1.3.). The words 'not to be destroyed by anyone' (7.4) gain extra force in the light of the contextual aspects discussed above. But what then are the two accusations of which Philo speaks in 7.13? The 'trivial accusation' must be the reproach of divine inactivity put forward by the opponents. But the 'very serious charge' is left unspecified. At this point it becomes very tempting to adduce Philo's statement in *Opif.*7-10 (discussed above II 2.1.3.) that the doctrine of cosmic ἀγενησία means a false attribution of πολλή ἀπραξία to God and a denial of divine *Providence*. Hadas-Lebel FE 35.132n.2 rightly remarks (though without reference to *Opif.*7-10):³

Sous prétexte de rétablir l'activité éternelle de Dieu, ils remettent en cause cet aspect essentiel de la providence qu'est la création; car selon Philon, s'il n'y a pas eu de commencement, il n'y a pas eu à proprement parler de création.

To this must be added that, in Philo's view, if the cosmos were uncreated God would be truly inactive, because he is then not providentially concerned with its maintenance. But this argument is certainly not made explicit.⁴ It seems far less plausible that the 'very serious charge' consists in regarding matter as a principle co-eternal with God, as Winston argued.⁵

3. But the parallels with Philo's most extensive presentation of the doctrine of cosmic γένεσις, in *Opif.*7-28, are by no means exhausted.

(a) On four occasions in §7-8 Philo presents creation as a transition from disorder or unadorned matter to ordered or adorned cosmos (§7/7.2-3, 6-8, §8/7.3-4, 5-7), the same adaptation of *Tim.*30a so prominent in *Opif.*8-9, 21-22. These passages in *Prov.*1.7-8 can thus be added to the long list of texts discussed above in II 3.2.1. Moreover the same familiar epithets are used to describe matter (§7/7.6-8 is esp. reminiscent of *Opif.*22).

(b) The role of the κόσμος νοητός or the forms in creation, briefly mentioned in §7/7.4-6, 11, remains rather obscure. But it appears not inconsistent with the doctrine attributed to Plato's *Timaeus* in §21 and the role of the κόσμος νοητός as paradigm for the creation of the cosmos in *Opif.*16-20. The 'creation' of the intelligible world in *Opif.*16 does not preclude its eternity, for

already in Opif.12 Moses was declared to assign ἀιδιότης to τὸ δόρατον καὶ νοητόν (see above II 2.1.1.). At Prov.1.21 God is 'always maker of the intelligibles' (see above II 2.3.3.).

(c) The reciprocal relation between the creator as εὐεργέτης and the cosmos as εὐεργετούμενον (§7/1.17-20) is also stressed in Opif.23 (see above II 3.1.3.).⁶

Given these extensive correspondences between Prov.1.6-8 and Opif.7-28, can it be affirmed that the theory of the γένεσις τοῦ κόσμου in §7-8 is essentially the same as that put forward in the commentary on the Mosaic creational account? The statements in §7/1.1-9 pose no problems, but the stress on never-ceasing creation in 1.9-17 are certainly awkward and might easily be taken to indicate a creatio aeterna (note the quadruple use of 'always' in 1.9,12,13,15. Nevertheless I consider that, allowing for the obscurities of the transmission, §7 may be read as presenting a creatio continua consistent with Philo's usual thought. God eternally thinks the κόσμος νοητός (situated in the Logos) and in his creative act simultaneously (ἅμα πάντα, Opif.13,28) creates the sense-perceptible cosmos out of a pre-existent disorderly matter, thereby initiating time.⁷ God's never-ceasing creative and providential activity is shown by his maintenance of the cosmos through the agency of the Logos and symbolized by his 'rest' on the seventh day (cf. Leg.1.5; but this providential concern is - perplexingly - given an extra dimension in the apocalypitics of Prov.1).⁸

I would tentatively suggest, therefore, that the hypothesis of Baltes that the views reported in §7 belong to Philo's opponents is unnecessary. Such a lengthy exposition of his opponents' arguments is also contrary to the literary methods used in the treatise.⁹ The manner of presentation is much more grossly ignored by Reale. Philo does not give five solutions but two, that of his opponents and his own. Moreover §8, though its precise meaning remains difficult to construe, certainly does not propound a double creation, first of matter and then of the cosmos.

4. The most important question that the passage under discussion raises is of a methodological nature, and can be formulated as follows. Even though allowance must be made for the possibility that Philo changed his mind on a particular issue or that he presented theories inconsistent with each other, is it legitimate to use a text which is as poorly preserved and as problematic as Prov.1.6-8 to make dogmatic pronouncements on technical aspects of Philo's theory of creation, especially when these conflict with well-preserved statements in treatises such as the De opificio mundi or De aeternitate mundi? My answer to this question is resolutely in the negative. The information supplied by Prov.1.6-8 is interesting and valuable; it finds its rightful place not in the main text but in the footnotes of Philonism.

3.2.3. Problems in the exegesis of Gen.1:1-2

The task of reading the first chapters of Genesis in terms of a cosmology that was wholly alien to the thought-world of its author(s) was by no means straightforward. In attempting to explain Moses by means of Plato's Timaeus Philo certainly did not solve all the exegetical problems involved. Greek cosmology could not discuss the process of creation without introducing the concept of matter. Consequently Philo introduces matter in Opif. 8-9, 21-22 and in numerous other texts. But where does Moses mention matter in his creatio-nal account? Early Christian thinkers also wrestled with this problem and attempted to locate a mention of matter in Gen.1:1-2.¹ Philo's chief solution to the interpretation of these verses, presented at length in Opif. (cf. also Somn. 1.75-76), is to take the whole of Gen.1:1-5 as referring to the intelligible world, leaving no room for mention of pre-existent matter.² Nevertheless in a few scattered passages he gives hints that this text can be read in other ways.

At Prov. 1.22 (translation above in II 2.3.3.) Philo affirms that the first cause which Plato calls matter is parallel to what the Jewish lawgiver described as water, darkness and the abyss. This must refer to Gen.1:2, καὶ σκότος ἐπάνω τῆς ἀβύσσου, καὶ πνεῦμα θεοῦ ἐπεφέρετο ἐπάνω τοῦ ὕδατος. Thus the verse is, in direct contradiction to Opif. 29, interpreted as depicting a kind of unformed disorderly matter. Philo's exegesis here is most puzzling. How could unformed matter have the attribute of a formed element such as water? Is he thinking of the ὕλη in Plato's receptacle (Tim. 53b2; see further below II 8.2.2.)? Or is Moses giving a symbolic description of matter (cf. perhaps Augustine at Conf. 12.4, but he refers to the more suitable 'invisible and unconstructed earth')? At Plant. 3 (ἐκ συγχύσεως εἰς δυνάμειν) Philo also appears to take 'day one' as indicating the creation of the *sense-perceptible* cosmos. Another exegetical variant is found at Gig. 22 (cf. QG 4.5), where the πνεῦμα θεοῦ moving above the water is understood as designating the elements of air and water, i.e. a physicalistic (perhaps Stoicizing) exegesis of Gen.1:2 (there is no hint that these elements are noetic). Finally we should note the invocation of Gen.1:1 at Aet. 19, where it is used to show that according to Moses the cosmos is γεννητός. No reader of this philosophical treatise could possibly suspect that this text actually refers to an οὐρανὸς ἀσώματος καὶ γῆ ἀόρατος (Opif. 29), as part of the *intelligible* cosmos.

How can we explain these alternative exegeses of the opening words of the Pentateuch? The possibilities cannot be excluded that he changes his mind on a particular point of interpretation, or that he is not entirely sure of himself and gives multiple exegeses. But I would wish to suggest that he may

well have considered that in the case of such a vital text as Gen.1:1-2 the Biblical record was from the interpretative point of view *polyvalent*, i.e. if looked at from different angles the same words could give equally valid meanings. Thus the text in question could refer to both the intelligible world and pre-existent matter. We may compare the efforts of a man who had carefully read Philo's works, Clement of Alexandria. At Str.5.90.1 he quotes part of Gen.1:2 in order to show that the Mosaic words had inspired Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics to postulate the ὕλη οὐσία. Two pages later (94.1) he quotes the very same verse to demonstrate that the γῆ ἀόρατος was part of the monadic archetypal world. But whether Philo would accept such an 'interpretative polyvalence' as hermeneutically possible or not, one thing is certain. He is wholly convinced that Gen.1 cannot be understood in the correct manner without the invocation of the notion of a pre-existent ὕλη.

3.3 The cosmos as ensouled intelligent living being (Tim.30b)

3.3.1. The cosmos as ζῶον

The doctrine that the cosmos is a ζῶον endowed with life, soul and reason is part of Philo's philosophical baggage, derived from Plato (Tim.30b8,32d1-34a1,92c6, cf. Pol.269d) and the Stoa (cf. SVF 1.110, 2.633-634 etc.). Sometimes it is seemingly accepted without much critical reflection, e.g. in Aet. where it is clearly taken over from source-books (26,74,94-95). At Her.154-155 the doctrine is implied in Philo's explicit use of the macrocosm/microcosm analogy: the cosmos is a 'great man', for both it and man have a σῶμα and a ψυχὴ λογική. The text in which the clearest reference is made to the notion that the cosmos is a living being is found at QG 4.188, in an edifying exegesis of Isaac and Rebecca's loveplay (Gen.26:8):

The virtuous...happily enjoy (this game)... So also (do) the divine beings (δαίμονες) which the sacred word of Moses is wont to call "angels", and the stars. For these are, as it were, intelligible, marvellous and divine natures, having acquired eternal joy unmixed with sorrow. Similar is the universal and whole heaven and world since *it is both a rational animal and a virtuous animal and philosophical by nature*. And for this reason it is without sorrow or fear, and full of joy. Moreover, it is said that even the Father and Creator of the universe continually rejoices in his life and plays and is joyful... (my emphasis)

In describing the cosmos as ζῶον λογικόν καὶ ζῶον σπουδαῖον διὰ φύσει φιλόσοφον (retranslation Marcus EES 1.472) Philo shows the influence of Stoic terminology (QG 4.188 is partly taken up by Von Arnim as SVF 2.635). Plato's careful distinction between νοῦς, σῶμα and ψυχὴ as intermediary is somewhat obscured (30b3-5; on this text see further below II 10.1.3.). In Her.200 Philo

speaks of the βίος of the cosmos, fittingly spent in continuously giving thanks to its creator. The symbolical interpretation of the sacrificial victim in Lev.1:6 in cosmic terms at Spec.1.210, already discussed above in II 2.3.2., is no doubt facilitated by the philosophical doctrine that the cosmos itself is a living animal with living parts that move and grow and die.

These texts having been noted, it must nevertheless be concluded that Philo makes surprisingly infrequent use of this common doctrine. Horowitz 76 surmises that it is not used in Opif. – despite that treatise's great debt to the Timaeus – because the Biblical text provided no opportunity. This consideration will certainly have contributed, but the reason for Philo's lack of enthusiasm may well lie deeper (cf. further below II 4.2.8. 5.1.2. III 3.2.). The doctrine of the cosmos as ζῷον was to some extent controversial in Hellenistic philosophy. The Stoic Boethus (Diog.Laert.7.143), the Peripatetic Straton (Plut.Mor.1115B) and the Epicureans (Cic.DND 1.18) rejected it. A remnant of such disputes is preserved in the final words of Prov.1.22: 'Except that certain other wise men think the cosmos is not a living being, but a harmoniously arranged composite whole.' The final two words almost certainly render σύστημα (cf. Aet.4, Ps.Arist.De Mundo 2 391b9, Diog.Laert.7.138 etc.). Aucher's version gives the impression that Philo rejects the doctrine that the cosmos is a living being. But the Armenian (though rather obscure) appears to indicate that Philo is merely appending an observation rather than making a critical comment (Weitenberg, cf. Hadas-Lebel FE 35.147). In Patristic thought too the topic of whether the cosmos is a ζῷον or not is a controversial subject (cf. Pease ad Cic.DND 1.18).

3.4. The model (Tim.30c-31a)

3.4.1. Philo and the Platonic νοητὸν ζῷον

No aspect of Philo's use of Plato's Timaeus is as complex and as surprising as his adaptation of the doctrine of the νοητὸν ζῷον used by the demiurge as a model for his creative work. In 1900 J.Horowitz devoted an entire dissertation, entitled Das platonische Νοητὸν Ζῷον und der philonische Κόσμος Νοητός, to the subject, which today still makes extremely worthwhile reading. In the briefer space at our disposal we will have to be more selective in the aspects of this fascinating and important theme which we choose to discuss.

It was already observed above at II 2.3.1. that Philo in Opif.16 takes over Plato's dialectical principle that the demiurge must look to an eternally unchanging model, but that he considers this principle as part of God's pre-cosmic reflection. According to Philo's account God 'struck out in advance' (προεξετύπου) the noetic cosmos,

ὧνα, χρόμενος ἀσμάτων καὶ θεοειδεστάτῳ παραδείγματι τὸν σωματικὸν ἀπεργάσθαι, πρεσβυτέρου νεώτερον ἀκελμόνισμα, τοσαῦτα περιέξοντα αἰσθητὰ γένη ὅσαπερ ἐν ἐκείνῳ νοητά.

In the little *Timaeus* compendium set out in *Aet.*15 (discussed above in II 2.1.3.) the cosmos is described as the ἀπ'ἀρχετύπου <καὶ> νοητοῦ παραδείγματος μύμημα αἰσθητόν, πάνθ' ὅσα ἐν ἐκείνῳ νοητὰ περιέχοντα αἰσθητὰ ἐν αὐτῷ. Although these two texts, expounding Mosaic and Platonic doctrine respectively, do not contain a literal citation from the *Timaeus*, they must have the effect of reminding every attentive reader of those places where Plato describes the contents of his model (30c7-d1,d3-31a1,4-8,39e7-9) or the contents of the cosmos as image of that model (33b2-3,69c2-3,92c6-7). Compare the following Platonic phrases:

- 30c5 οὗ δ' ἔστιν ἄλλα ζῷα καθ' ἐν καὶ κατὰ γένη μόρια
 30c7 τὰ γὰρ δὴ νοητὰ ζῷα πάντα ἐκεῖνο ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιλαβὼν ἔχει, καθάπερ ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ἡμᾶς ὅσα τε ἄλλα θρέμματα συνέστηκεν ὁρατὰ
 30d3 ζῷον ἐν ὁρατῶν, πανθ' ὅσα αὐτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν συγγενῇ ζῷα ἐντὸς ἔχον ἑαυτοῦ
 31a4 τὸ γὰρ περιέχον πάντα ὅποσα νοητὰ ζῷα
 33b2 τῷ δὲ τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ ζῷα περιέχουσιν μέλλοντι ζῷῳ
 69c2 ζῷον ἐν ζῷα ἔχον τὰ πάντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ θνητὰ ἀθάνατά τε
 92c6 ζῷον ὁρατῶν τὰ ὁρατὰ περιέχον.

The third and final Philonic passage which is directly reminiscent of Plato's description of the νοητὸν ζῷον is *Plant.*2, in which the creator is described as ὁ τῶν φυτουργῶν μέγιστος and the cosmos as φυτὸν δὲ αὖ περιέχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ ἐν μέρει φυτὰ ἅμα παμμυρία καθάπερ κληματίδας ἐκ μιᾶς ἀναβλαστάνοντα ῥύζης. The exemplaristic emphasis of Plato's account is deleted here, but the portrayal of the cosmos reveals the influence of the Timaeian phraseology. The title of φυτουργός given to God is directly inspired by the context of the 'phyto-cosmological excursus' (exeg. Gen.9:20). But, as Horovitz 77 notes, it may also recall the famous Platonic passage (*Rep.*597d) where the god who is said to make the idea of the bed is named φυτουργός (cf. also *Tim.*80e1, Num.fr.13), a passage which would have been known to Philo because it so lucidly legitimated the doctrine that God thinks the ideas as his thoughts.

Philo's debt to Plato is clear, both with regard to the doctrine of the noetic exemplar, and in his use of phraseology (note esp. the triple use of περιέχειν). But a striking difference is equally apparent. Philo does not take over Plato's talk of a ζῷον and ζῷα, both at the noetic and the visible level of being. To place this difference in perspective it will be necessary to examine the role of the Platonist κόσμος νοητός.

3.4.2. Philo and the Platonist κόσμος νοητός

It is fortunate that we have at our disposal quite a number of texts which show how Middle Platonist authors understood the role of the model (derived from the *Timaeus*) in the creative process. Of these texts the most valuable is

the only surviving fragment of Arius Didymus' account of Platonic doctrine in his Epitome of physical doctrines, a book that undoubtedly was available to Philo. This fragment is closely paralleled in a chapter of Albinus' Didaskalikos (both texts conveniently set out at Diels Dox.Gr.447). By way of introduction it will be instructive to make a comparison of the language and terminology used by Plato, Philo and Middle Platonists, as set out in the following table (the words are alphabetically ordered with regard to their root, i.e. prefixes are ignored).

Texts Plato: Timaeus

Philo: Opif.16-20,24-25, Aet.15

Middle Platonists: Arius Didymus Epit.phys.fr.1 Diels (= AD)
 Albinus Didaskalikos (= A)
 Timaeus Locrus (= TL)
 Diogenes Laertius Vita Platonis 3.69-76 (= DL)
 Hippolytus Philosophoumena, Diels Dox.Gr. (= H)
 Aëtius Placita, Diels Dox.Gr. (= Aë)
 Nichomachus Introductio arithmetica 1.4-6 (= N)
 Atticus (= Att.)

	Plato <u>Tim.</u>	Philo <u>Opif.</u>	Middle Platonists
ἀγαματοφορέω*	—	18	—
ἀρχέτυπος	—	16,25, <u>Aet.</u> 15	AD447.20 N4.2
ἀπο-βλέπω (towards the ideas)	cf.29a3, <u>Rep.</u> 484c9	18	A12.1
δημιουργέω	29a7...†	16...	AD447.25 A12.1 TL30 DL 71 N6.1
εἰκόν (= image)	29a7,92b7	25	A12.1 TL30 DL73
εἰκόν (= model)**	—	<u>Somn.</u> 2.45?	TL43
ἀπ-εὐκάζω	39e4	—	cf.A12.3 εὐκασμένον
ἀπ-εὐκόνισμα	—	16, <u>Mos.</u> 2.127...	cf.H567.13 εὐκόνισμα
ἀπ-εργάζομαι	28a8,29a1,39e3	16	AD447.25 A12.1 TL43
ἀπ-ερείδω	cf. <u>Rep.</u> 508d5!	—	N4.2
νοητὸν ζῷον	cf.30c7,39e8	—	DL74 cf.TL11
παντελὲς ζῷον	31b1	—	—
(νοητὴ) ἰδέα (singular = model)	— (but cf.28a7)	16	AD447.23 A12.1 TL10
ἰδέα τῶν ἰδεῶν	—	25	—
κατασκευάζω... (of the cosmos)	—	18,cf. <u>Aet.</u> 39...	A12.1 TL8 DL72
προ-κέντημα	—	—	N4.2
κόσμος νοητός	— (but cf. <u>Rep.</u> 509b2, <u>Phil.</u> 64b7)	16,19,24,25	A4.8 Aë1.7.31,2.6.4

ὁ ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν κόσμος	—	17,20 (cf. <u>Somn.</u> 1.186)	cf.TL30 τὸν ἰδανικὸν κόσμον
προ-λαμβάνω	—	16,cf.45	—
λόγος	—	20,24-25	cf.N4.2,6.1
ἐκ-μαγεῖτον (= im-print)	cf.50c2, <u>Tht.</u> 191c9	<u>Aet.</u> 15 (cf. <u>Fug.</u> 12)	AD447.10 A12.1
μύμημα	48e6, cf. 38a7	16,19,25, <u>Aet.</u> 15	—
νοέω	37e6,cf.30d2	—	Att.fr.9
δια-νοόμαι	39e9	19,24	—
ἐν-νοέω	cf. <u>Tht.</u> 191d5	19	—
ὁμοιότης, ὁμοιότης	30c3,6,38b8, 39e1	— (cf. <u>Praem.</u> 29)	Att.fr.9
ὁμοιόω	30d3	—	—
ἄφ-ομοιόω	31a8, cf. 50d1,51a2	—	AD447.25 A12.1
ἐξ-ομοιόω	(cf.90d4)	18 (cf.171)	Att.fr.13
καυ-οράω	39e9	—	cf.TL10 ἀφοράω
(νοητὴ) οὐσία (model)	—	cf. <u>Spec.</u> 1. 327, <u>QE</u> 2.122	AD447.23 TL10 Aë1.3.21 N6.1 cf.A1.2,7.4
οὐσία (matter)	—	21 (cf.18)	AD447.27 DL76
παράδειγμα	28a7,37c6, 48e5...	16, <u>Aet.</u> 15	AD447.23 A12.1 TL3,8,30 Aë 1.3.21 N4.2,6.1 Att.fr.9
πρόνοια	30c1	cf.9,171	AD447.26 A12.1 N6.1 cf. H567.8
συνίστημι (God, model)	cf.30d1, 31a1...	17,19...	—
σφραγίς	—	25 (cf. <u>Fug.</u> 12, <u>Somn.</u> 2.45)	AD447.9 A12.1
ἐν-σφραγίζω	—	18,20	—
τελειότατος (model, cosmos)	92c8,cf. 30d2...	<u>Aet.</u> 15...	AD447.23 cf.TL11
ἀπο-τελέω	28b1,37d2	17,19	N6.1 Att.fr.13
τύπος	cf. <u>Tht.</u> 192a4	18,19,cf.34	—
τυπόω	cf.50c5	cf.6,14, <u>Migr.</u> 103	—
ἀπο-τυπόω	39e7,cf. <u>Tht.</u> 191d6	—	—
δια-τυπόω	—	25	—
ἐκ-τύπωμα	(50d4)	cf. <u>QE</u> 2.122	—
ἐκ-τυπόω	(50d6)	—	—
προ-δια-τυπόω	—	20	—
προ-εκ-τυπόω	—	16	—
ὕλη	—	cf.171...	A12.2(cf.9.1) DL76 Aë 1.7.31 N4.2 cf.TL8

ὑπόδειγμα	-	-	DL71 Aë1.7.4
χαρακτήρ	- (cf. <u>Pol.</u> 289b4)	18 (cf. <u>Ebr.</u> 133)	N6.1 προχάραγμα

* On this word see below II 10.1.4.

** On the double meaning of εἰκὼν see below n.2

† Three dots indicate many more examples.

Although there are considerable stylistic differences between Plato's compressed and didactic prose, Philo's fluent and rhetorically embellished account and the crabbed doxographical or isagogic reports found in the other sources, the general uniformity of language and terminology is quite remarkable. The table shows that Philo's debt to Plato goes far beyond the mere concept of a noetic model and the description of its contents. Indubitably the whole process of creation, regarded as taking place when the creator looks to or employs a noetic design, is described in terms ultimately derived from the Timaeus. This applies not only to Philo's account in Opif. (and elsewhere), but also to the Middle Platonist reports. Nevertheless there are a number of philosophically pregnant issues in which unmistakable signs of reinterpretation can be detected. On these issues Philo, as might be expected, stands closer to his contemporaries than to the original source.

1. The noetic cosmos. Philo is not alone in disregarding the 'animality' of the Platonic model. The table shows that, except for a fossilized reference to the νοητὸν ζῷον and νοητὰ ζῷα in Diogenes Laertius and Timaeus Locrus respectively, the Middle Platonists prefer, like Philo, to talk of the model as the ἰδέα or οὐσία or the ἀρχέτυπον παράδειγμα or the κόσμος νοητός. The last-named term – it becomes the standard description in Middle and Neoplatonism – is in fact recorded for the first time in Philo, who uses it not only in Opif. but on numerous occasions elsewhere (cf. Leisegang 464b-465a, also frequently in QG & QE). Horowitz asserts rather dogmatically (73-77) that this innovation was made by Philo himself, because there was nothing to correspond to the expression νοητὸν ζῷον in the Biblical account of creation (he finds a supporter in Wolfson 1.228). But the presence of the term in Aëtius and the use of the similar ἰδανικὸς κόσμος in Timaeus Locrus, works which are themselves early or use early sources, argue against his thesis, which would involve a gross overestimation of the influence that Philo could have possibly had on the development of Platonist thought. It is more plausible to argue that Philo found the availability of the concept of the κόσμος νοητός agreeable because it allowed a better integration into the Mosaic creational account than the original Platonic term.

What does Philo have in mind when he speaks of the κόσμος νοητός which God the creator composed before the creation of the visible universe?¹ Here

we must again take issue with Horowitz, who argues (79ff.) for limited conception of the κόσμος νοητός in the sense of a 'Planwelt' parallel to the schematic plan of the city in the architect's mind. But the νοητὴ πόλις only represents an (recognizably imperfect) image or comparison drawn from sensible reality. It is more persuasive to view the κόσμος νοητός as equivalent to the entire structured world of ideas, the meaning found regularly elsewhere in Philo's works usually in terms of an opposition between the κόσμος νοητός and the κόσμος αἰσθητός (cf. Dillon 159; the description τὸν ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν συνεστώτα κόσμον at Opif.17 (cf.20, Conf.172 etc.) supports this view). This is wholly in line with developments in the ancient interpretation of Plato's thought. The heart of the Middle Platonic system is the doctrine of the three principles - θεός, ἰδέα, ὕλη - in which the world of ideas is subsumed into fulfilling the function of perfect pattern for the creation of the cosmos, while other philosophically charged aspects of Plato's theory of ideas tend to suffer neglect (cf. Dillon 48).

2. A shift in imagery. When describing the demiurge's use of the model, Plato's imagery is chiefly *visual* (παράδειγμα, εἰκόν, ὁμοίω, verbs of seeing). Our table showed that this imagery is extensively employed by Philo² and the Middle Platonists, but that it has been supplemented (not supplanted) by the more *physical* imagery of seal and imprint (τύπος and compounds, ἐκμαγεῖον, σφραγίς, χαρακτήρ, προχάραγμα). The ideas are regarded as seals which can have their form stamped on unformed matter an infinite number of times without undergoing any change or deterioration; cf. also Plut.Mor.373A-B, 1024C, Apul.De Plat.193. The model, containing the forms of the cosmos in its entirety, is thus the ἀρχέτυπος ἰδέα or σφραγίς imprinted on the pre-existent ὕλη to form the κόσμος αἰσθητός. Philo, who regards the Logos as the archetypal seal, uses this imagery on frequent occasions; cf. Ebr.133, Migr.103, Fug.12, Somn.2.45, Spec.3.207, QG 4.138 etc. It must be said that the Platonic text encouraged the development of seal/imprint imagery (cf. esp. 39e7 ἀποτυπούμενος and the receptacle at 50d-e). But the description of the ideas as seals and the model as the archetypal seal is quite unPlatonic, and is to be attributed to Middle Platonist interpretation.³

Philo's use of τύπος imagery, however, proceeds beyond what has so far been discussed. In the account of creation at Opif.16 he describes God as 'striking out in advance' (προεξετύπου) the noetic cosmos (cf. §19 ἐνενόησε πρότερον τοὺς τύπους). Noteworthy too is his portrayal of the architect who plans the noetic city by receiving its impressions (τύπους) in his soul as in wax (§18, cf. §20 ἡ ἐν τῷ ἀρχιτεκτονικῷ προδιατυπωθεῖσα πόλις... ἐνεσφράγιστο τῇ τοῦ τεχνύτου ψυχῇ). The reference to the receiving of impressions in wax makes it certain that the use of the τύπος imagery here is inspired by the

well-known passage in Plato's Theatetus 191c-192a, in which the mind that perceives or recalls is compared to a block of wax which receives imprints from a seal (Philo refers to the passage at Her.181; cf. also Plut.Mor.373A and Dillon 200). It would appear that Philo, in exploiting the Middle Platonist doctrine of the ideas as God's thoughts, is applying Plato's psychological theory to the workings of the divine mind in the creation of the cosmos. I am not certain whether this coalescence of demiurgic creationism and Platonic psychology is derived from Middle Platonism or not (certainly the method is characteristic, for Plato is being explained via Plato!). The only hint that I can find is when Nichomachus describes the model as a προχάραγμα and a προκέντημα in the mind of the κοσμοποιὸς θεός (Intro.arith.1.4.2, 6.1).⁴

Two interesting consequences of Philo's double use of the τύπος imagery should be noted. (1) It is implied that, if God strikes out the κόσμος νοητός, he must have, somehow or other, a higher seal in order to make the impression. This sheds light on Philo's remarkable double paradigm theory, which he reads into Gen.1:27, namely that the Logos as κόσμος νοητός is both image of God and paradigm of the sense-perceptible cosmos (cf. Opif.25, Leg.3.96, Somn.1.75 etc.). At Her.231 he even speaks of man's mind as a τρίτος τύπος from the maker. (2) Furthermore the theory of the 'striking out' of the noetic world in Opif.16 implies the concept of intelligible matter, since the τύπος must be struck *in* something. At QE 2.122, in an exegesis of Ex.28:36 καὶ ἐκτυπώσεις ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκτύπωμα σφραγίδος ἀγίασμα κυρίου, Philo writes: 'It pleases him that the incorporeal and intelligible substance (νοητὴν οὐσίαν) should be unimpressed by itself and without shape but be formed and shaped like a seal-impression by the Logos of the eternally Existent One.' In Opif., however, there is no mention of νοητὴ οὐσία at all. Philo prefers to speak of the *place* of the ideas, namely in the divine Logos (§20,36).

3. The model as pre-creational reflection. It is well-known that, whereas Plato left the relation between the demiurge and the model undefined, the Middle Platonists regarded the ideas as God's thought (see above I 4. & n.102), the doctrine being expressed sometimes rather naively (e.g. at Hippolytus Philos.19.2 (567.12-14 Diels), τὸ δὲ παράδειγμα τὴν δυνάμιν τοῦ θεοῦ εἶναι, ὃ καὶ ἰδέαν καλεῖ (ὁ Πλάτων) ὅσον εἰκόνισμά τι, ᾧ προσέχων ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ θεὸς τὰ πάντα ἐδημιούργει), at other times in a more sophisticated manner (e.g. at Albinus Did.9.1 quoted above in II 3.1.1.). As we have already noted, Philo's exploitation of this doctrine is basic to his account of creation in the De opificio mundi.

When Philo's usage is compared with that of the Middle Platonist authors, it is particularly his presentation of God's formation of the noetic cosmos as the result of *pre-creational reflection* that strikes the eye. Note the verbs used of God's (and the architect's) activity: προλαβών, προεξετύπου (§16), ἐν-ενόησε πρότερον (§19), προδιατυπωθεῖσα (§20). The quasi-temporal aspect thus introduced underlines the fact that God *creates* the noetic cosmos. Compare texts such as Abr.88, Virt.214, Prov.1.21, where God is called ποιητής, ἡγεμών, πατήρ of the intelligible realm. Although this emphasis on creation goes be-

yond anything we find in the accounts of contemporaries, one might compare the statement of the Neopythagorean Nichomachus that number (as the model) pre-existed in the mind of the creator (προυποσάντα; cf. προκέντημα, προχάραγμα, but noetic number is not said to be 'created'). Atticus too declares (fr.9.5) that God first thought (πρότερον νοῆσαι) what he was going to create and that God's thoughts are older than the (created) things; but he does not explicitly state that these thoughts constitute the ideas as model (contrast fr.28; there has been much dispute on this point, cf. E.Des Places, Atticus (Paris 1977) 86, Dillon 254). As we shall see below in II 3.4.4. and III 2.6., Philo's insistence on the pre-cosmic creation of the κόσμος νοητός is the result of his exegesis of Gen.1, but at the same time makes an important philosophical point.⁵

3.4.3. The extended image in Opif.17-18

It is time to look more closely at the manner in which Philo makes use of the κόσμος νοητός as cosmic model in his explanation of Moses' creation account. It should not be thought, he says at Opif.17, that the noetic world is located in a place (ἐν τόπῳ τινί) in the way that the sense-perceptible cosmos is. Why is this problem raised? In the Timaeus Plato had not spoken of the location of the model (though note 52b-d, where true being is declared not to subsist in any medium or space), but expressions found elsewhere in his dialogues for the place of the ideas, such as the ὑπερουράνιος τόπος (Phdr.247c) or the νοητός τόπος (Rep.508c), might have given rise to erroneous ideas.¹ In order to explain where the κόσμος νοητός is situated, Philo resorts to an image (§18-19).

Although Philo himself calls the comparison which he makes between the creation of the cosmos and the founding of a city an εἰκὼν τῶν παρ' ἡμῶν, the word 'image' is hardly an adequate description. It is more like an extended analogy or metaphor, devised in such a way as to correspond as closely as possible to the philosophical problematics requiring elucidation. Its task is thus not only to indicate the location of the model, but also to shed light on the way that the entire process of creation must be understood.

The basic contents of the image can be summarized as follows. When a city is being founded, as the result of the great ambition and magnificence of a king (βασιλεύς), an architect (ἀνὴρ ἀρχιτεκτονικός) comes along and, taking topographical and geographical factors into consideration, conceives a design containing the diverse characteristics of the future city. Having impressed this design on his mind and carrying it around as a 'noetic city', he looks to this model and, like a good craftsman (δημιουργός), executes the plan by making

the materials he has at his disposal correspond to the immaterial forms of his mental blueprint.

Let us examine the most important features of this image. In the process of founding the city three professions or functions are involved: the *king*, whose magnificence supplies the conditions that make the city's establishment possible; the *architect*, whose knowledge enables the city to be well-designed; the *craftsman*, whose skill ensures that the design is properly executed. The relation between the architect and the craftsman is made clear enough. Philo combines them in the one person, but emphasizes that the activity of the architect precedes that of the craftsman-builder. What about the relation between the king and the architect? These are clearly *not* combined in the one person. The decision to found the city is not taken by the architect, but presumably by the king (though, note well, Philo does not tell us this!). It is only then that the architect comes forward (παρελθὼν ἔστιν ὅτε).

At §19 Philo proceeds to explain what he means by applying the image to the actual creation of the universe. Two points must be observed. Firstly the answer is given to the problem of the location of the κόσμος νοητός. It has its place in the Logos of the creator, just as the design of the city was located in the mind or soul of the architect (§20; note that the κόσμος νοητός is not placed in God's *mind* or *soul*, but in his *Logos*). A few paragraphs later Philo amplifies this statement by demonstrating, in a formal argument that is not easy to follow on a first reading,² that the κόσμος νοητός *is* nothing else than the Logos of God as he is actually engaged in the act of creation (§24-25). Secondly, when describing how God creates the cosmos as megalopolis (§19), Philo attributes to the creator *all three functions* in the image. The creator decides to found the city (κτίσειν διανοηθείς), composes the κόσμος νοητός as cosmic design in his Logos (ἐνενόησε πρότερον...), and finally, using that design as model, completes the visible cosmos (ἀποτέλει καὶ τὸν αἰσθητόν). It is also worth observing that the unlimited beneficence of God emphasized in §23 is better correlated with the magnificence of the king than with the limited scientific expertise of the architect.

If our analysis of Philo's extended image is correct, it must be concluded that two opposite tendencies, of *separation* and *coalescence*, are at work. When the process of creation is explained the three functions of benefactor, designer and executor are carefully separated, but in the image and even more so in its explanation they are assigned, as much as possible, to the same 'creator'. The reason for such a presentation is, I think, straightforward. Following the *Timaeus* and Platonist accounts of creation, Philo recognized the different stages or levels involved, as expressed above all in the relation between model and copy. But at the same time he is also aware of the danger

that a multiplicity of functions and stages might give rise to the serious error of thinking that there was more than one creator involved in creating the cosmos, or that it involved a temporal process. God had no one to assist him (for who else was there? §23), and all things were done simultaneously (§13, 28). This perhaps explains too the curious fact that Philo, though elsewhere strongly emphasizing that God does not come into direct contact with matter (Spec.1.329), does not dwell on this aspect in Opif. and also does not utilize the doctrine of the Logos as *instrument* of creation (i.e. equivalent to the δημιουργός ἀγαθός in §18, cf. below II 3.4.5.; the only hint of 'intermediation' is found in the brief reference to the δύναμις ἡ κοσμοποιητικὴ in §21). One last question remains. In the extended image Philo declines to say that the king *decides* to found the city or that he *appoints* an architect to do the task for him.³ Why does he so carefully dissociate the king from direct participation in the founding of the city? Is he not aiming to convey that God's creatorship, which is so central to the whole passage, does not exhaust the fulness of his Being, that his Being is transcendent and remains beyond the grasp of theoretical circumscription?

Among the many skills which Plato's demiurge possesses is the art of building (cf. 28c6, 30b5, 36e1, 68e5, Brisson 42-44). In Philo's image the function of δημιουργός is emphatically retained, but at the same time the creating God has been promoted to an architect, or in more modern terms, a town planner.⁴ This promotion is of course closely related to the philosophical problems that have so far been extensively discussed. A builder-craftsman must follow the blueprint he is given, an architect designs the blueprint himself and then executes it (or has someone execute it for him). But also other aspects of Hellenistic philosophy should be taken into consideration when Philo's adaptation of the Platonic craftsman metaphor is analysed.

An extensive list of examples of the images of house and city applied to the structure of the cosmos is given by Wendland Vorsehung 10. Historically the most important are unquestionably the examples (found mostly in Philo, cf. Leg.3.98, Spec.1.33, Praem.41) derived from Aristotle's De philosophia. If one enters a well-designed and well-organized house or city, one cannot avoid coming to the conclusion that a god exists who is responsible for its design (cf. Festugière Révélation 2.229ff., Chroust AC 44(1975)565; Effe Studien 93 rejects these fragments on insufficient grounds (cf. also fr.18 Ross = Philo Aet.10-11). The Stoa encouraged the use of the image of the city with its emphasis on the cosmos as a super-city ruled by the single law of the logos. The Epicureans, in contrast, used the image of the architect to make Plato look ridiculous (Cic.DND 1.19): 'How could Plato in his mind's eye have comprehended so vast a piece of architecture as the building of the Universe? What tools, what machines did he use? How were the four elements able to obey and carry out the will of the architect?...' Middle Platonist texts describing God as builder or architect are Att.fr.4,12,13, Apul.De Plat.194, Calc. 137,337,343 (cf. also Cher.126, on which see II 3.4.5.). Another important antecedent for Philo's image is the distinction between τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη made

by Aristotle in Met.A 1 981b26ff. The ἀρχιτέκτων is superior to the χειροτέχνης, the theoretical sciences are superior to the productive sciences. If we add the perfect νόησις of the highest God (Met.A 7) we gain a triad which seems on the way to Philo's image, even if the Alexandrian does not fully work out the epistemological aspect. And so we come to the image of the king.

The monarchic emphasis of Aristotle's theology (cf. Met.A 10 1076a4) is taken over in the Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise De Mundo (which Philo may have known, cf. below III 2.11.n.2 & 4), where it is illustrated with the famous image of the Great king (6 398a11-b6). Invisible to all in his mighty palace, he does not administer his kingdom personally, but uses his satraps to do the 'dirty work' (αὐτοῦργεῖν). There is no room for an architect here, for the cosmos does not have to be created, only administered. The Platonists had Plato's own references to the 'king of all' and kingship to reflect upon: esp. Ep. 2 312e, also Rep. 509d, 597e, Laws 904a. Cf. Att.fr. 4.12 (who does not distinguish between the παμβασιλεύς and ἀριστοτέχνης), Num.fr. 12 (βασιλεύς as ἀργὸς ἔργων), Max.Tyr.Or. 11, 12, Plot. 4.8.2, 5.5.3. The image of the (Great) king is particularly common in Philo; cf. Opif. 71, Cher. 99, Conf. 170, Decal. 61, 178, Spec. 1.18-19, QG 3.34, QE 2.44 etc.

It is abundantly clear that Philo's extended image in Opif. 17-18, with its complex reworking of the basic demiurgic metaphor of the Timaeus,⁵ proceeds along well-trodden paths. Nevertheless I am sure it would be mistaken to conclude that he has merely lifted it from a Platonist treatise or commentary. The image is tailor-made to fit the requirements of Philo's own exegetical and philosophical concerns. I am prepared to credit him with a considerable measure of originality and philosophical competence in its conception and composition.

3.4.4. Aspects of exegetical application

The reason for the prominence of the conception of the model in the opening part of Opif. is that Plato's theory supplies Philo with a brilliant solution to the formidable problems involved in the exegesis of the first verses of Genesis (problems that were to be repeatedly discussed in the Patristic period; on the Nachleben of Philo's solution cf. J. Pépin, 'Recherches sur le sens et les origines de l'expression "caelum caeli" dans le livre XII des "Confessions" de s. Augustin' ALMA 23 (1953) 185-274 and esp. 244ff.). Gen. 1:1-5 is taken to describe the creation not - as the naive reader might think - of the world as we know it, but of the intelligible cosmos which served as a model for the creator in the act of creation. Moses shows that the κόσμος νοητός, though eternal and unchanging, must be considered dependent for its existence on God (see also above II 2.1.1. on Opif. 12). The heaven and earth mentioned in the opening verse are not the same as the heaven and earth created on the second and third days of creation, but are in fact their intelligible prototypes.

Philo is keen to show that the radical interpretation which he suggests and which gives the Mosaic account such philosophical depth can be persuasively derived from the Biblical text. His chief trump-card is the Hebraism *ἡμέρα μία* (§15, i.e. 'day one' instead of 'first day'), which indicates (for those in the know) the monadic and thus non-sensible nature of the things created on that day. Also the clause *ὡς ὁ περὶ αὐτῆς λόγος μηνύει* in §15 most likely draws attention to the exegetical background of Philo's explanation in §16-25.

The words are decidedly ambiguous and various interpretations can be proposed. (1) If the alternative reading *μηνύσει* is accepted they will mean 'as our account (i.e. in §16-25) concerning it (either the monad or 'day one') will show'. Horowitz 70 persuasively argues against this view, put forward by Müller and Wendland. The version of the Loeb translators (EE 1.15), 'as is shown in the treatise dealing with the "One"', is quite improbable. (2) 'As the account (of the Bible or Moses) concerning it ('day one') shows'; cf. Horowitz 70, J. Cohn GT 1.32, Arnaldez FE 1.151). (3) The parallel use of the phrase *ὁ περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγος* at Spec.1.209 might suggest 'as our reasoning concerning it shows'. In my view the second alternative is the most likely candidate. If this is accepted, it is remarkable that Philo does not make more of the second hint of noetic status in these verses, the description of the earth as *ἀόρατος* in Gen. 1:2 (contrast Clement cited above in II 3.2.3.).

It is important to observe that the whole section §16-25 is intended to provide background philosophical comments prior to the exegesis of Gen.1:1-5 in §26-35. These comments proceed to a depth of philosophical penetration far beyond the requirements of direct exegesis. But if the words of Moses were for Philo no more than a springboard for independent philosophical reflection, §16-25 would certainly not have been followed by §29-35 (on which see below II 8.2.2.).

Three other exegetical aspects of Philo's account in *Opif.* 16-25 require a brief mention.

1. Philo's choice of the image of a city to illustrate the *κόσμος νοητός* is also influenced by the fact that he commences *Opif.* by comparing Moses' Law with the laws of other philosophers and city-founders. The opening chapters of the Mosaic legislation contain a *κοσμοποιία*, showing that the cosmos and the Law are in harmony with each other and that the man who lives according to the Law is a world-citizen. There is an undeniable resemblance to the notion of the pre-existent Torah developed in Palestinian Judaism, even though the *κόσμος νοητός* is definitely not meant to represent a noetic Law and is above all heavily influenced by Greek philosophy (cf. Nikiprowetzky 154-155).

2. Aside from the Greek philosophical precedents outlined in the previous sub-section, the images of architect and craftsman have an important Biblical background. As already noted above in II 2.3.1., Moses is recorded as being shown the *παράδειγμα* of the tabernacle on the mountain (Ex.25:9). Philo quite logically connects up this text with Ex.31:2-4, 35:30-35, in which Bezalel the master-craftsman is summoned by God to construct the tabernacle

and its furnishings. Moses and Bezalel are therefore seen in the same ἀρχι-τέκτων/δημιουργός relation as is found in the image in Opif.17-18 (cf. Leg.3.95-102, Plant.26-27, Somn.1.206, Mos.2.74-76). Note how extensively the language of the image is recalled at Mos.2.76 (a number of terms are relevant to the table above in II 3.4.2.):

ὁ μὲν οὖν τύπος τοῦ παραδείγματος ἐνεσφραγίζετο τῇ διανοίᾳ τοῦ προφήτου διασωγραφούμενος καὶ προδιαπλαττόμενος ἀφανῶς ἀνευ ὕλης ἀοράτοις εἶδεσι· τὸ δ' ἀποτέλεσμα πρὸς τὸν τύπον ἐδημιουργεῖτο, ἐναποματτομένου τὰς σφραγίδας τοῦ τεχνίτου ταῖς προσφόροις ἐκάστων ὑλικαῖς οὐσίαις.

Unfortunately for Philo the language used by the LXX does not integrate very well with his interpretation, for Bezalel is said to be filled by God with σοφία and ἐπιστήμη and to function as an 'architect' (i.e. master-builder) in carrying out his task (cf. Ex.35:32 ἀρχιτεκτονεῖν κατὰ πάντα τὰ ἔργα τῆς ἀρχιτεκτονίας...).

3. The aspect of Philo's exposition in Opif.16-25 that deviates most from both Plato and the Platonists is the important place assigned to the doctrine of the Logos as the place of the ideas. L.Cohn, 'Zur Lehre vom Logos bei Philo' Judaica 324-325, is surely too precipitate in denying that the doctrine of the Logos here has anything to do with the 'and God said' of Gen.1. On this point the only other text in Philo which specifically refers to the exegesis of 'day one' in terms of the noetic world, Somn.1.75-76, is most illuminating. We cite part of §75, accepting Colson's conjecture:

ὁ θεὸς φῶς ἐστὶ... καὶ οὐ μόνον φῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ παντὸς ἑτέρου φωτὸς ἀρχέ-τυπον, μᾶλλον δὲ παντὸς ἀρχετύπου πρεσβύτερον καὶ ἀνώτερον, λόγον ἔχον παραδείγματος <παραδείγματος>. τὸ μὲν γὰρ παράδειγμα ὁ πληρέστατος ἦν αὐτοῦ λόγος, φῶς - "εἶπε" γὰρ φησὶν "ὁ θεός· γενέσθω φῶς" -, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν γεγονότων ὁμοῖος.

The juxtaposition of λόγος and εἶπε is clearly deliberate. Note how Philo associates λόγος and ῥῆμα (which unambiguously denotes the spoken word) at Sacr.8 (here the Logos is instrument). On the Logos as God speaking (ὁ λέγων) cf. Fug.95,101, QE 2.68 (all exeg. Ex.25:22).

3.4.5. Prepositional metaphysics

In his important study Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus Theiler gave the apt title 'metaphysics of prepositions' to the practice, frequently found in both Middle and Neoplatonism, of using prepositional phrases to express the causes required for an object (and especially the cosmos) to come into being (19ff.). Central to Middle Platonist usage are three phrases corresponding to the three ἀρχαί - by which (ὅφ' οὗ, efficient cause), towards which (πρὸς ὃ, formal cause), out of which (ἐξ οὗ, material cause). A lucid example

of the simplest schema is Aëtius Plac.1.11.2. When other phrases are added – a fourth at Albinus Did.12.1-2 (implied, see below), two more at Seneca Ep.65. 7-10 – the neat correspondence between ἀρχαί, causes and prepositional phrases is spoilt. Thus we find that the final cause (δὲ ὁ or οὗ ἐνεκα) is the goodness of the demiurge. In another significant contribution H.Dörrie, 'Präpositionen und Metaphysik: Wechselwirkung zweier Prinzipienreihen' MH 26(1969)217-228, postulates a rival schema which on account of its origin and main place of circulation he calls the 'Stoic-Gnostic series'. Consisting primarily of the phrases ἐξ οὗ, ἐν ᾧ or δὲ οὗ and εἰς ὃν, this schema reacts against a multiplicity of ἀρχαί and attributes the various causes to one chief principle. It is of this series, he proposes, that variants are found in the New Testament (Rom.11.36, Col.1.16-17, John 1.1-4). Dörrie argues that considerable interchanges took place between the two series, of which the one had a philosophical-didactic basis, the other a more religious orientation.

In Philo's writings there are three texts which are among the earliest witnesses to the prepositional metaphysics sketched above.

Cher.124-127. Cain goes astray when he declares "I have gained a man through God (δὲ τοῦ Θεοῦ)" (Gen.4:1), for God is not the instrument but the (efficient) cause of creation. In order to explain this exegesis Philo must fill in the philosophical background. He does so in a rather didactic fashion, setting out the basic schema, then giving a limited example and finally applying it to the γένεσις of the cosmos. We can succinctly present it in the following table:

phrase	τὸ ὑφ' οὗ	τὸ ἐξ οὗ	τὸ δὲ οὗ	τὸ δὲ ὁ
identification	τὸ αἵτιον (cause)	ἡ ὕλη (matter)	τὸ ἐργαλεῖον (instrument)	ἡ αἰτία (motive)
example (house or city)	demiurge	stones and wood	instruments	shelter and safety
application (to the cosmos)	God the creator	four ele- ments	Logos of God	goodness of the creator

Cain's grievous error is that he thinks that God is the instrument and that he or the human mind is the cause.

QG 1.58 (cf. Greek fragment at FE 33.56). Giving exegesis of the same text, this passage is wholly parallel to the previous one and adds no new material.

Prov.1.23. Philo concludes his brief survey of Plato's views on the creation and possible destruction of the cosmos with a rather bald recital of the causes of the cosmos' genesis. Apparently the schema is so well-known that it scarcely requires explanation. Aucher's translation is inaccurate here and partly misses the point.¹ The text reads:

By whom: God. Out of which: matter. Through whom: the instrument. The instrument is the Logos of God. And towards what was it made: the model. Once again four causes are given, but when we compare the list with Cher.126 we find that the final cause has been deleted and replaced by the formal cause, i.e. the model towards which the creator looks when creating the cosmos (prominent in the discussion in §21; see II 2.3.3.). Noteworthy is that here too the instrumental cause is included (in the other two texts the exegesis demanded its presence). It fits least well into the Platonist series and Philo feels obliged to explain what he is referring to.

It is not my intention to make a detailed investigation into Philo's use of the metaphysics of prepositions, although the subject has by no means been exhaustively researched; see the accounts at Pépin 348-355, Weiss 269-272, Farandos 267-271. The aspect which concerns us in this study is the intimate connection between the prepositional schemas presented by Philo and the interpretation of the Timaeus. This is made pellucidly clear in the brief exposition in Cher.126-127. The use of the image of a house or city and the application to the cosmos demonstrate that it is the conception of a craftsman making an artefact which provides the foundation for the prepositional metaphysics, and that that conception is derived from the Timaeus. If proof be required, one can note further how the final cause (αἰτία) is the ἀγαθότης τοῦ δημιουργοῦ, taken directly from Tim.29d7-e2 (esp. 29d7 δὲ ἦντινα αἰτίαν; Seneca Ep.65.10 quotes the Platonic passage). When Albinus Did.12.1-2, following Arius Didymus Epit.phys.fr.1 Diels, recounts Plato's doctrine of the γένεσις τοῦ κόσμου, he formulates it in such a way as to make the relation to the metaphysics of prepositions particularly obvious:

ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸ κάλλιστον κατασκευάσμα τὸν κόσμον ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ δεδημιουργῆσθαι πρὸς τινα ἰδέαν κόσμου ἀποβλέποντος... διότι ἀγαθὸς ἦν. ἐκ τῆς πάσης οὖν ὕλης αὐτὸν ἐδημιούργει...

It was observed above in II 3.4.2. how Albinus' account shares a number of features in common with the passage that has been at the centre of our attention in this chapter, Opif.16-25. In order to explain the role of the κόσμος νοητός as model created on 'day one', Philo has clearly made use of a Platonist explanation of creation which has the same interpretative basis as that possessed by the schema of the prepositional metaphysics. This emerges clearly when we note its main constituent elements:

ὕψ' οὗ	God the creator
πρὸς ὃ	κόσμος νοητός as model
ἐξ οὗ	pre-existent matter
δὲ ὃ	God's goodness (note §21 αἰτίαν ἧς ἔνεκα).

The Platonist schema offers at least a partial explanation for the fact that Philo includes the themes of God's goodness and pre-existent matter, even

though these are neither required to explain the function of the model nor suggested by the Biblical text.

At the same time it cannot be denied that Philo adapts the Platonist schema to his own requirements, as becomes especially apparent in the role of the divine Logos. In all three accounts of the prepositional metaphysics the Logos was identified with the instrument of creation. But as we observed in II 3.4.3. the instrumental role of the Logos is not emphasized in Opif.16-25, and instead the Logos is presented as coinciding with the model as κόσμος νοητός.

The following texts in Philo portray the Logos as the instrument through which (δὲ οὐ) or with which (ᾧ) God creates: Leg.3.96, Cher.28, Sacr.8, Deus 57, Conf.62, Migr.6, Fug.12,95, Somn.2.45, Spec.1.81. The doctrine of the λόγος τομεύς also presumes that the Logos is instrumental; God sharpens his cutting word and divides the unformed οὐσία of the universe (Her.160). The same instrumental function is assigned to Σοφία (Det.54, Fug.109) and the powers (QG 1.54). Dillon considers the depiction of the Logos as instrument of creation to be 'orthodox Middle Platonist doctrine'. I am not so sure of this, for the examples that I can find are scarce; cf. Plut.Mor.373C,720C, Att.fr.4.7 (δύναμις δὲ ἥς). On the other hand the use of the instrumental cause in order to 'liberate' God from the manual labour of creation was a concern for most Middle Platonists and led to the doctrine of a first and second god (cf. also Procl.in Tim.1.4.26ff., who speaks of a δημιουργικὸν αὐτίον which works with δημιουργικᾷ τομαί in shaping matter, i.e. highly reminiscent of the λόγος τομεύς). Theiler Vorbereitung 27ff. (and, following him, Weiss 269) argues that Philo sees a connection between the paradigmatic and the instrumental cause, which allows him to associate the Logos with the model, a connection that was taken over from the Platonist tradition. Certainly in three texts, Leg.3.96, Fug.12 and Somn.2.45, the Logos is both paradigm or seal and instrument. In the last two the seal *is* the instrument with which (ᾧ) the cosmos is formed. The greater (and unplatonic) use of seal-imagery in Middle Platonism (pointed out above in II 3.4.2.) has, according to these scholars, encouraged Philo to assign the Logos a double function. In a later article (Parousia 215) Theiler revises his opinion and concludes that Philo himself is responsible for the change from the model (and Logos) as paradigmatic cause to the Logos as instrumental cause. This is surely more probable, given Philo's inclination to attribute a number of diverse functions to the divine Logos. See further below III 2.7.

3.5 The unicity of the cosmos (Tim.31a-b)

3.5.1. God is One, the cosmos is one

Whether there is one cosmos or many or an infinite number was one of the classic questions of Greek philosophy. As the doxographical report in Aëtius Plac.2.1.2-3 shows, it was recognized by Philo's time that most of the big names (Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Zeno) supported the doctrine of the unicity of the cosmos, while only a few, notably Democritus and Epicurus, affirmed that there were an infinite number of worlds (on

the entire question see Pépin 72-78).

On this issue Philo has no qualms in following the majority view put forward in Greek philosophy. In the concluding paragraphs of the De opificio mundi (170-172) he rather surprisingly (for the theme had not so far been touched upon) includes the doctrine of the unicity of the cosmos among the five Mosaic dogmata which he claims will, if accepted and imprinted on the soul, give man a blessed and blissful life. When the reasons for subscribing to the doctrine are given (§171), the influence of the Timaeus is pronounced.

1. The cosmos is one because its creator (δημιουργός) is one, ἐξομοίωσας αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν τὸ ἔργον. The phrase κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν is taken directly from Plato's discussion on the unicity of the cosmos (31b1), while ἐξομοίωσας reflects ἀφωμοιωμένον (31a8; cf. also 29e3, where the demiurge wants to make all things παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ; see further II 2.3.3. 10.1.6.(ὁμοίωσις, and esp. Opif. 151), 10.3.1.(εὐκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ, v.l. ποιητοῦ). But Plato's dialectical argument that the cosmos is one because the model must be unique (31a3-b1) has been revised and made compatible with the theory that the κόσμος νοητός is equivalent to God's thoughts or his Logos. The model and demiurge are identified and thus one can now speak of an ἐξομοίωσις relation between the cosmos and God the creator (cf. the same reinterpretation, the same terminology at Plut.Mor1014B,1015B, Att.fr.13).

This is not to say, of course, that for Philo God's oneness (another of the five dogmata) is derived from the Timaeus. It is a fundamental conviction of Judaism, insisted upon by Moses in the very first commandment of the Decalogue (cf. Decal.64). Pythagorean doctrine on the nature of the monad is also often used to emphasize God's oneness (cf. Harl FE 15.101). At Opif.35 the unicity of the κόσμος νοητός is associated with its creation on 'day one', but the unicity of the sensible cosmos is not deduced from it.

2. God used up all the ὕλη in the process of creation. Plato's statement at 33a1-2 has been modernized in terms of the conception of a primal matter *out of which* the cosmos was made. See also below II 4.2.1. on Prov.2.50-51.
3. The cosmos is complete because it is made of complete parts; cf. 32d1-33a1, a7 and below II 4.2.1.
4. The wordplay on ἀπειροὶ worlds and ἀπειροὶ thinkers also finds its origin in the Timaeus, namely 55d1-2 where Plato returns to the problem of the unicity of the world in connection with the five regular solids.

Other Philonic texts which reveal his conviction of the unicity of the cosmos are Migr.180 (where it is attributed directly to Moses) and Spec.3.189. In Aet.8 he commends the Stoics for teaching that the cosmos is one (in contrast to the Atomists and Epicurus), but rejects their conception of its cyclical destruction and regeneration. At Conf.170 he takes a different course and argues from the unicity of the cosmos to the oneness of the 'maker and father' (quoting Iliad 2.204-205, the same text used by Aristotle as the final

words of Met.A). In none of these passages is Biblical evidence given in support of the doctrine that the cosmos is unique, for the good reason that there is no evidence to give. Rabbinic Judaism, as pointed out by Wolfson 1.181, took a quite different view. Augustine reflected on a supposed clash between divine omnipotence and cosmic unity, but refrained from contesting the traditional view of Greek philosophy that there is but a single cosmos (DCD 11.5).

CHAPTER FOUR

TIMAEUS 31B-34B: THE BODY OF THE COSMOS

4.0. Introductory

4.1. The elements bound together in geometrical proportion (Tim.31b-32c)

4.1.1. The bonding of the elements (31b-32c)

4.2. The features of the body of the cosmos (Tim.32c-34b)

4.2.1. Completeness and perfection (32c-33a)

4.2.2. Unassailability (33a)

4.2.3. Sphericity (33b-c)

4.2.4. Self-sufficiency (33c-d)

4.2.5. Circular motion (34a)

4.2.6. Divinity (34b)

4.2.7. Aristotle, Plato and Philo in Aet.20-44

4.2.8. Cosmos or body of the cosmos?

4.0. Introductory

The demiurge now sets out to create the cosmos in its corporeal, sense-perceptible aspect. In order that it may possess its chief properties of visibility and solidity, it must be made out of the elements fire and earth. But if the cosmos is to be bound together with the geometrical proportion (ἀναλογία 31c3) required for three-dimensional bodies, there is need for two more elements in between, namely air and water. By means of this geometrical proportion the body of the cosmos obtains the state of friendship (φιλία 32c2), and can only be dissolved by him who bound it together. Plato proceeds to enumerate the various characteristics of the sense-perceptible cosmos. (1) It is complete and all-inclusive, containing within it the entire amount of all four elements. (2) It is unageing, not prone to disease, unassailable from without and within. (3) It has been given the most perfect shape possible, the sphere. (4) It is totally self-sufficient, containing its nourishment within it and needing no arms, feet or orifices.¹ (5) Its motion is circular, because, of the seven motions, that motion is the most appropriate to reason and intelligence. (6) To sum up, the demiurge brought into being a blessed god (εὐδαίμονα θεόν 34b8).

Plato does not make clear what the numbers or quantities of the geometri-

cal proportion between the four elements actually represent. Cornford 51 suggests the total volumes of the four elements present in the cosmos. Brisson 367-368 more persuasively proposes the relation between the respective volumes of the perfect geometric shapes of the four primary bodies outlined later in Tim.53c-55c.² Whatever the answer may be, it is evident that geometric configuration is seen by Plato as the characteristic manner in which order is introduced into the corporeal realm. Plutarch perceived this well in his instructive little essay on the question why God is said always to geometrize (Mor. 718B-720C).

4.1. The elements bound together in geometrical proportion (Tim.31b-32c)

4.1.1. The bonding of the elements (31b-32c)

Although Philo nowhere makes a direct use of this Platonic passage, on a number of occasions its influence can be detected. These passages will be briefly reviewed.

Opif.36-37. Philo gives here a surprisingly brief explanation of the second day of creation (Gen.1:6-8). The chief aspect of this day which he wishes to emphasize is the transition from the creation of the incorporeal noetic world to the creation of the corporeal visible cosmos. The Mosaic account speaks of the fashioning of the στερέωμα (Gen.1:6). This word would have seemed strange to the Greek reader, for the Biblical conception of the firmament is not found outside Judaeo-Christian literature (cf. TDNT 7.612). But for Philo a solution is within reach. He associates the word with three-dimensionality, and hence with the solidity of body (cf. Opif.98, Decal.25 etc.). God calls the στερέωμα which he has created οὐρανός (Gen.1:8), which Philo considers from the etymological point of view a most appropriate name, either because the οὐρανός is the ὅρος of all things, or because it is first of the ὀρατά.

On the following points the influence of Tim.31b-32c can be detected: (1) structurally, in the transition from the noetic world (Plato's model) to the cosmos which is σωματοειδές καὶ ὁρατὸν ἀπτόν τε 31b4; (2) the emphasis on solidity and three-dimensionality at 31b4, 32b1-3, where Plato associates these characteristics with the element earth and geometrical ἀναλογία; (3) the phrase at 32b7 συνεστήσατο οὐρανὸν ὁρατὸν καὶ ἀπτόν, where the play on words οὐρανός/ὁρατός is implicit (cf. Rep.509d). Philo remains true to the Biblical account in regarding the οὐρανός as part of the cosmos, whereas Plato is describing the cosmos as a whole. For this reason he makes no use at all of Plato's idea

of the proportionality of the elements in Opif. On the other hand, the Biblical conception of the στερέωμα arising ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ ὕδατος and causing a division ἀνὰ μέσον ὕδατος καὶ ὕδατος (Gen.1:6) is only comprehensible in terms of Jewish cosmology (cf. for example Ps.103:2ff.), and is quite impossible to rhyme with the Greek cosmology of the Timaeus. Philo saves himself a lot of trouble by simply deleting this aspect.

Her.144-146,152. In the lengthy excursus on the dividing activity of the Logos tomeus, Philo affirms that there are different forms of equality, as applied to numbers, size and force (i.e. weight or content) (§144). Proportional equality (ἡ διὰ ἀναλογίας ἰσότης) receives a special mention (§145) and is illustrated with an example from the political realm (similar procedure at Plut. Mor.719B). In illustrating these forms of equality as seen in the process of creation, Philo twice turns to the example of the elements. They reveal numerical equality, because the two heavy elements are opposed to the two light ones (§146). This statement conflicts with the Timaeus, for Plato does not accept the notion of weight in absolute terms (cf. Tim.63a-e).¹ At §152 he further writes that 'those who have most accurately examined the facts of nature' assert that the four elements are proportionately equal, and that the cosmos, having its parts proportionately distributed, will endure forever. Plato too associates ἀναλογία with cosmic indissolubility (32b8-c4). At the very least he must be included among the above-mentioned scientists. It is not impossible that the Timaeus is the chief source, since the Hellenistic works which stress cosmic ἰσονομία (e.g. the De Mundo, Ocellus Lucanus) do not mention the analogic equality of the elements.² Philo is not interested in working out the actual mathematical details of ἀναλογία, though at Spec.4.168 his acquaintance with geometric proportion and the use of the term δεσμός to indicate a proportional bond (cf. Tim.31c1-2) is revealed.

In other texts Philo shows a more pronounced tendency to *theologize* the theme of the bonding of the elements. At Plant.10 he confronts the problem of what it is that keeps the elements apart yet linked together, so that the hottest element (fire) is the neighbour of the coldest (air), and the earth is not washed away and dissolved by the water in its hollows. The answer is that the divine Logos is stationed in the middle like a vowel in between consonants, acting as a mediator and persuasively reconciling the threats of the opposites. Thus here the Logos itself functions as a kind of bond, whereas in Her. it divides the elements on the principle of geometric proportion. In two similar passages on the philosophical symbolism of the tabernacle and the high-priestly robes, QE 2.90 (exeg. Ex.26:28-30), 2.118 (exeg. Ex.28:28), the Logos is described as 'the strongest and most stable bond (δεσμός) of all things', who 'binds the elements with all-wise and most perfect adaptation' (cf. Marcus'

suggested retranslation (EES 2.140) συνδέοντος...πανσόφῃ τέχνῃ καὶ τελεωτάτῃ ἁρμονίᾳ vel sim.). It is likely that the notion of geometric proportion is implicit here, but also other factors must be taken into consideration, as will become clear when we return to the subject below in II 5.1.3. 6.1.4. The passages at Aet.108-116, which posit a *natural* ἰσονομία of the elements and so attempt to prove the indestructibility of the cosmos, must therefore be regarded by Philo as theologically defective. See Runia 135-137 and esp. n.154. At Prov.2.60 Alexander, arguing from the viewpoint of a mechanistic cosmology, sharply criticizes his uncle for attributing the position and distribution of the elements to the workings of divine Providence, but in his reply (§62) Philo is not in the least deterred.

In unravelling the philosophical symbolism of the ark at QE 2.68 (exeg. Ex.25:22) Philo describes the Logos as follows (Greek text at EES 2.255):

ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος μέσος ὧν οὐδὲν ἐν τῇ φύσει καταλείπει κενόν, τὰ ὅλα πληρῶν καὶ μεσεύει καὶ διαιτᾷ τοὺς παρ' ἑκατέρω διεστάναι δοκοῦσι, φυλλᾶν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν ἐργαζόμενος· ἀεὶ γὰρ κοινωνίας αἴτιος καὶ δημιουργὸς εἰρήνης.

The theme of cosmic φυλλά, taken over by Plato in Tim.32c2 from Empedocles and the Pythagoreans (cf. Gorg.508a), is transferred to the activity of the Logos. The same theme is found in the text cited earlier, QE 2.118:

...in order that it [the divine Logos] might bind and weave together the parts of the universe and their contraries, and by the use of force bring into unity and communion and loving embrace those things which have many irreconcilable differences by their natures.

4.2. The features of the body of the cosmos (Tim.32c-34b)

4.2.1. Completeness and perfection (32c-33a)

Philo is wholly in agreement with the Platonic viewpoint that the demiurge uses up the entire amount of the four elements in his creative work, that no elemental fragment or physical power is left remaining outside the cosmos, and that the cosmos is complete in its consisting of complete parts (note that the adjective τέλειος used in 33d1 means both complete and perfect). Already above in II 3.5.1. we saw that Philo, following Tim.33a1, uses these ideas as proof of the cosmos' unicity. Three other Philonic passages are manifestly indebted to this section of the Timaeus for ideas and phraseology, in each case in different contexts and with a different purpose in mind.

Det.153-155. Philo is explaining Cain's words to God in Gen.4:14, εἰ ἐκβάλλεις με σήμερον ἀπὸ προσώπου τῆς γῆς, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ προσώπου σου κρυβήσομαι. Cain is the man of false opinion and devious arguments (Sacr.5, Post.52, cf. Earp EE 10.295). All his statements must be carefully examined for their de-

violation from the truth (cf. above II 3.4.5. on Cher.124-127). Does he really mean to say that a man, or any created being, can hide himself from God (§153)? Even if God had decided to create a being that could dwell in all the regions of the cosmos (cf. below II 5.4.3.), it would still have to remain within the cosmos (§154),

ἐπειδὴ τοῦ παντὸς ἔξω δραμεῖν ἦν ἀδύνατον, πρὸς τῷ μηδὲ ἐκτὸς ὑπολελεῖφ-
θαί τι τὸν δημιουργὸν ὅλας δι' ὅλων τὰς τέτταρας ἀρχὰς εἰς τὴν τοῦ κόσμου
σύστασιν ἀναλώσαντα, ὥνα ἐκ μερῶν τελείων τελειότατον ἀπεργήσῃται τὸ πᾶν.

If one cannot escape the cosmos, it is entirely impossible that one could flee from its maker and ruler (§155). The words in §154 quoted above can almost be regarded as a loose paraphrase of Tim.32c8-33a1. We note especially: ἔξω cf. 32c8; ὑπολελεῖφθαι cf. 32c8, 33a1; ὅλας δι' ὅλων cf. 33a5; σύστασιν cf. 32c6, 7; ἐκ μερῶν τελείων τελειότατον cf. 33d1. The Timaeus functions here as a standard textbook on cosmological matters, to which the exegete can appeal when elucidating the Biblical text.

Plant.5-9. Here we return to Philo's 'phyto-cosmological' excursus.

Though the passage is not without its difficulties, the role that Tim.32c-33a plays in the argument is straightforward. In what does God cause the roots of the cosmic plant to strike (§5)? In cosmological terms this means - does the universe have a base, like the pedestal of a statue, to prevent it from falling? Calling in the evidence of the Timaeus for support, Philo shows that the notion of a physical extra-cosmic prop is quite absurd, since there is no elemental material left outside which could be used for such a purpose (§6). The restatement of Tim.32c5-33a1 is similar to that in Det.154 but a little freer. It should be observed that the correlation of the perfection of the cosmos with the greatness of the creator extends beyond the actual Platonic text, in a manner similar to the argument on μόνως discussed above at II 3.5.1.

But now Philo's argumentation takes a surprising turn. If there is no matter outside the cosmos, there can only be a void or nothing whatsoever. If there is a void, the cosmos would surely sink on account of its great weight. The mind, searching for a corporeal support, seems to encounter only a phantom (§7). The embarrassing problem can only be resolved if the Logos of God is regarded as the firmest and securest prop of the entire universe (§8-9).

The train of thought here is only comprehensible when viewed against the background of a Stoic cosmological problem, namely what keeps the cosmos in the centre of the void and stops it from sinking at horrendous speed. The problem had not troubled Plato and Aristotle for the simple reason that they denied an extra-cosmic void (cf. Tim.33d5, De Caelo 1.9). The Stoa did accept the void as a consequence of their ἐκπύρωσις doctrine and certain changes in their logic.¹ In a penetrating study Hahn 103-126 (cf. also 166-168) elucidates the arguments, both cosmological (centripetal motion, balance of the elements) and cosmo-biological (pneumatic tension), which the Stoa put forward in response to the problem. Such arguments overlap with their cosmo-theological statements on the same problem; cf. Cic.DND 2.115 and our further remarks below at

II 6.1.4. In this passage Philo brings forward the Logos as solution to the problem more theologico, without giving the reader much insight into the cosmological issues involved.

The passage as a whole thus has a hybrid character. Tim.32c-33a is used to prove that nothing exists outside the cosmos, but there follows a question which in Platonic cosmology is wholly unnecessary. Is the train of thought to be ascribed to Philo, or is it the result of his following a source? The former seems to me more likely. The question of the cosmos' support is raised in the first place because Philo wants to draw out the implications of his plant image. The introduction of the Stoic problem allows him to stress the crucial role played by the Logos in the cosmos' preservation. It is certainly not likely that a Stoic source (e.g. Posidonius, suggested by Früchtel 60)² would appeal to Tim.32c-33a. The Stoic cosmos after the process of διακόσμησις is virtually identical to the Platonic universe. But in the cosmo-biological cycle great changes occur in the relative quantities of the elements (cf. Diog. Laert.7.136,142), so that the cosmos could not be described as τελειότατον on account of its τέλεια μέρη.³

Prov.2.50-51. The context now shifts to Philo's contest of wits with the sceptically minded Alexander. Refusing to accept any form of teleological argument, the latter asks why the cosmos is the size it is and not smaller or larger (§46). In his reply Philo returns to the craftsman metaphor. If the τεχνῖται of limited objects, such as sculptors (§48), know how to measure out precisely the right amount of material, surely God did the same in constructing the cosmos. Philo declares (§50, Greek text (preserved by Eusebius) at FE 35.278):

λέξω δὴ μετὰ παρησίας ὅτι οὐτ' ἐλάττονος οὔτε πλείονος οὐσίας ἔδει τῷ κόσμῳ πρὸς κατασκευὴν, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐγεγένητο τέλειος οὐδ' ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς μέρεσι ὁλόκληρος, εἴ δὲ δεδημιουργημένος ἐκ τελείας οὐσίας ἀπετελέσθη.

Plato's words at Tim.32c-33a can still hazily be discerned in this sentence, but a considerable shift in terminology has taken place. Not found in Plato, for example, are the words κατασκευή, ὁλόκληρος, (τέλεια) οὐσία. Unmistakable also in the whole passage is the emphasis on the non-Timaeian concept of ὕλη; note αὐταρκεστάτης ὕλης, τὸ ἐν ὕλας αὐταρκες σταθμῆσθαι, τὴν ἰκανὴν ἰδεῖν ὕλην. It is apparent that the interpretation of the process of creation in the Timaeus as involving a pre-existent matter *out of which* the cosmos is formed has encouraged a view of matter in terms of its *quantity*, and so it must be granted that Alexander's question is entirely logical. Philo's assertion that God 'aimed at a precisely sufficient amount required for the cosmos' creation', if combined with the assumption that there is no matter outside the cosmos, might give rise to the supposition that God was responsible for creating that matter in an earlier stage of the creative process, i.e. a creatio

ex nihilo. See the further discussion below at II 8.2.2. The entire passage Prov.2.50-51 is a splendid example of the way in which the basic creationistic metaphor of the Timaeus was discussed and reworked in the Hellenistic period, to the point of becoming almost unrecognizable.

At Spec.2.59, in describing the hebdomad as the birthday of the universe (cf. Gen.2:1-3), Philo describes the cosmos completed on that day as τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἔργον τέλειον ἐκ τελείων μερῶν (cf.32d1). The casual manner in which the phrase is used reveals, even better than the passages discussed above, how Plato's doctrine of the completeness and perfection of the cosmos in Tim.32c-33a was an entirely non-controversial aspect of Philo's cosmological ideas.

4.2.2. Unassailability (33a)

The assertion that the cosmos is free from old age and disease (ἀγήρων καὶ ἀνοσον 33a2,7) flows directly from the arguments showing its completeness and perfection. The two aspects of cosmic completeness and unassailability are found intertwined in the passage Aet.20-27, in which Philo presents the first of his long list of arguments in favour of the indestructibility of the universe. For reasons that soon will be apparent, this is one of the passages in Philo best known to students of ancient philosophy.

The argument is rigorously structured in the form of a dilemma. There are two forms of destruction, from without and from within. After some examples (§20), these two forms are applied to the hypothetical destruction of the cosmos (§21). Destruction from without is impossible, since there is nothing outside the cosmos which could attack it. This section of the argument is reinforced by a somewhat expanded *paraphrase* of Tim.32d1-33a6, which, though heavily dependent on Plato and using many of the same words and terms, manages to use just sufficient *variatio* to avoid actually citing the Timaeus at any stage, as is made clear in the following comparison:

<u>Tim.</u> 33a3 ὡς συστάτω σώματι θερμὰ καὶ ψυχρὰ καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα δυνάμεις ἰσχυρὰς ἔχει περι- τάμενα ἔξωθεν καὶ προσπίπτον- τα ἀκαίρως λύει...	<u>Aet.</u> 21 ἐπειδὴ τὰ νόσους καὶ γήρα σώματα ἄλωτὰ θερμότησι καὶ ψύχεσι καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐναντιότησι προσεπιπτούσας ἔξωθεν ἰσχυ- ρῶς ἀνατρέπεται, ὧν οὐδεμία δύναμις ἀπο- δρᾷσα κυκλοῦται...

We note that three relatively slight alterations or additions are made: (1) instead of a second cosmos being impossible (33a1-2) a duplicative cosmos made out of hypothetically remaining parts of material is envisaged (perhaps under the influence of Tim.31a); (2) the cosmos is ὅλος not because its parts are complete but because all its οὐσία has been used up; (3) the possibility of an external void is left open. The final two alterations recall what was observed in the passages analysed above in the previous sub-section.

In §22 the second horn of the dilemma is tackled. Also destruction from with-

in is out of the question, for in that case the part would be more powerful than the whole. Moreover internal and external destruction are always coupled together, so that if a thing is not subject to the one, it is also free from the other (§23-24).

The formal argument has been brought to a conclusion, and now Philo calls as witness (μαρτύρια καὶ τὰ ἐν Τιμαίῳ) the very same section of the Timaeus which had been paraphrased in §21. The entire passage Tim.32c5-33b1 is *quoted verbatim* (§25-26), with only the following differences between Philo's version and the received Platonic text (leaving aside a few trivial differences in spelling):

	<u>Plato</u>	<u>Philo</u>
33a2	ἓν' ἀγῆρων	ἓνα ἀγῆρων
33a3	συστάτῳ	mss. τὰ τῷ (or τὰ τῷ) emended to συστάτῳ by Bernays
33a5	λύει	λυπεῖ
	γῆρας τε	καὶ γῆρας
33a6	οὐδ' ἀδὴ τήν	οὐδ' αὖ τήν
33a7	τόνδε ἓνα ὅλον	τόνδε θεὸς ὅλον
	ὅλων ἐξ πάντων	ἐξ ὅλων πάντων

On these differences see the comments of J. Bernays Abh. Berl. Akad. 1883 66, Colson EE 9.527.¹ The emendation to συστάτῳ would seem to be justified. Colson is incorrect when he says that the word in the Platonic text is a modern correction, since it is supported by a reading in Proclus. I do not see how it is possible with any certainty to determine whether λυπεῖ and θεός are Philonic alterations, or were already present in his text, or are scribal changes. Certainly, even allowing for the resources of a formidable memory, the passage as a whole would seem too long and the transcription too accurate to be achieved without reference to a copy of the dialogue.

Philo concludes the entire section by saying that this is Plato's witness to the ἀφθαρσία of the cosmos (already affirmed at Aet.13 where Tim.41a7-b6 is quoted), while proof of the fact that the cosmos is ἀγέννητος follows ἐκ φυσικῆς ἀκολουθίας (§27).

In 1886 V. Rose, Aristotelis fragmenta 33 (= fr.19), declared Aet.20-24 to be a fragment of Aristotle's lost dialogue, the De Philosophia. The attribution has never been seriously cast in doubt, and is today generally accepted (= Walzer fr.19a, Ross fr.19a, Untersteiner fr.29). It is proven by close parallels such as Cicero Acad.2.119 and Oc.Luc.13. In Aet.74,78,106 Critolaus and Boethus are recorded as having recast and rephrased the same argument. This illustrates its great popularity in the Hellenistic period (cf. R. Harder 'Ocellus Lucanus' (Berlin 1926, repr.1966) 69), during which the De Philosophia rivalled the Timaeus in influence. But the fact that Philo is presenting a widely disseminated philosophical argument, together with the complicating factor of the double usage - paraphrase and quotation - of the Timaeus, makes it necessary to reflect on what his purposes were in recording it and what his own contribution may have been. We shall accordingly return to this passage

below at II 4.2.7.

Even if the passage in Aet. is disregarded, it is not likely that Philo would wish to quarrel with the Platonic doctrine that the cosmos is not subject to old age and disease. At Spec.2.5 there is a revealing remark in the context of a discussion of the third commandment. If one should wish to add to one's Yes or No, let not the highest cause be added but the earth, sun, stars, heaven, the whole cosmos; ἀξιολογώτατα γὰρ ταῦτα ἄτε καὶ πρεσβύτερα τῆς ἡμετέρας γενέσεως καὶ προσέτι ἀγήρω διαίωνοντα τῇ τοῦ πεποιηκότος γνώμῃ. It is not doubted that the cosmos and its most important parts will continue to live free from old age. But the final four words, 'according to the purpose of him who made them', are a typically Philonic addition of great significance; see further below II 6.1.1.²

4.2.3. Sphericity (33b-c)

Nowhere in Philo's works is the sphericity of the cosmos, or of its heavenly region the οὐρανός, a bone of contention. Philo is happy to accept the Greek cosmological doctrine, presented in all its metaphysical grandeur by Plato in the Timaeus, but also espoused by philosophers of a wholly different stamp, such as the Atomists and Epicurus (Aët.Plac.2.2). Heaven may have sent no sure indication of its nature (Somn.1.21), but its sphericity is not called into question (*ibid.*).

In the physical allegory employed by Philo to unveil the deeper meaning - in terms of accepted Greek cosmological ideas - of Pentateuchal passages which describe the making and furnishing of the tabernacle, the sphericity of the cosmos and heaven is not surprisingly brought into play. But it does cause us some surprise to observe that even in the case of this doctrinal commonplace Philo perceives a subtle connection between the actual words of Moses and those of Plato's Timaeus.

Her.227-229. Why does Moses say nothing about the measurements of the lampstand in Ex.25:31-39? Perhaps *inter alia* because it symbolizes heaven which is κυκλωτερῆς καὶ ἄκρως εἰς σφαῖραν ἀποτετορνευμένος and has no length or breadth (§229). The description is taken from Tim.33b5 κυκλωτερές αὐτὸ ἐτορνεύσατο. As we shall see, Philo is reminded of these words by the Biblical text itself, though in Her. the connection is not made clear.

QE 2.73. In the LXX in Ex.25 the adjective τορνευτός (meaning 'chased' 'embossed') occurs three times (v.18,31,36). From Her.216 and QE 2.63 (Greek text EES 2.254) it is certain that in the first and third of these verses Philo did read τορνευτός in his text. But in QE 2.73 (exeg. Ex.25:31) he apparently reads τορνευτός (meaning 'turned' 'lathed'), a *varia lectio* found only in one cursive ms., in Cyril and also in the Armenian, Ethiopian, Old Latin and Syriac translation of the LXX (cf. A.E.Brooke and N.McLean, The Old Testament in Greek (London 1902) 2.238). The Armenian equivalent for the root τορνευ- is found four times in our passage (Weitenberg). There is no need to

assume that the Armenian translator imposed the reading of *his* LXX text on Philo, for his Biblical quotations often remain faithful to Philo rather than follow the Armenian Bible (cf. Lewy *De Jona* 10n.39). The words 'illuminated' (or 'adorned') and 'described' in Philo's text might seem more suited to the process of embossing, but the parallel (in quite a different context) at *Post.* 104, ἡ φύσις...τὸ οὐς ἡμῶν κύκλους γράφουσα σφαιρικὸν ἐτόρνευε, removes this objection. Marcus *ad loc.* is thus correct in suggesting that Philo read τορνευτός in this text. Now Philo is not averse to manipulating a Biblical text if it suits his exegetical purposes, paradoxical as that may seem (cf. for example the problems at *Sobr.* 51-58 and Colson's notes *ad loc.*). One is thus inclined to conclude that, because Philo regards the lampstand as a symbol of heaven, his choice of variants in the Biblical text has been influenced by Plato's association of the process of lathing with the creation of the spherical cosmos.

QE 2.81. In the exegesis of Ex.25:39 the lampstand is once more regarded as symbolizing heaven. The way heaven is described is clearly indebted to the *Timaeus*: 'But heaven moves not in a straight line but in a circle, having a figure that is equal on all sides and most perfect.' Cf. *Tim.* 33b3-6, σχῆμα...ἐκ μέσου πάντῃ πρὸς τὰς τελευτὰς ἕσον ἀπέχον...τελειότατον.¹ Note also QE 2.76 (exeg. Ex.25:33 σφαιρωτήρ): 'whatever is in heaven is wholly spherical, being given a perfect form just as is the cosmos'.

It is clear from these texts that Philo, when giving exegesis of Ex.25, was struck by certain words which caused him to recollect descriptions found in the Platonic dialogue which he knew so well. Hence the allusions to the *Timaeus* which we have found.

Only at *Prov.* 2.53-56 is the sphericity of the cosmos a subject of controversy. Alexander does not deny that the cosmos is spherical, but refuses to attribute that perfect shape to the workings of divine Providence. He argues that the void, being in the strictest sense nothing, is not dependent on Providence for its existence. The void is prerequisite for space, shape and surface. Thus 'if neither space nor surface owe their existence to Providence, then also the shape of the cosmos, polished into a perfect sphere, is not due to Providence' (§53).² Philo's reply is typical of his manner in this dialogue. He does not launch into a detailed discussion of the philosophical axioms and doctrines on which Alexander's arguments are based - the independence of the void in relation to God is granted - but immediately counters with teleological arguments of his own. The virtues of the cosmos' spherical shape are so great that it would be absurd not to attribute this design to Providence. The basic line of argumentation is taken from the Stoics (cf. Wendland *Vorsehung* 63),³ but for his clinching argument he appeals to the *Timaeus* (§56):

We encounter in the *Timaeus* of Plato an admirable encomium praising the perfect shape of the sphere and its utility, so that no additional praise is further required.

Here we can see very clearly the high rank that Philo has accorded Plato's dialogue. It is the highest philosophical authority in the realm of teleological reasoning.

4.2.4. Self-sufficiency (33c-d)

When Plato describes the cosmos as self-sufficient (33c1-34a1, esp. 33d2), he naturally does not wish to imply that the cosmos is not dependent on a higher cause. He means self-sufficient in terms of physical requirements, giving the examples of perception, respiration, nourishment, excretion, self-defence and bodily support. Although except in Aet. Philo never specifically accredits the cosmos with self-sufficiency, we may surmise that he would not object to the inclusion of this characteristic as part of the cosmos' perfection and completeness, provided full recognition was given to the cosmos' total dependence on its creator and providential maintainer.

In Aet. Philo on a number of occasions associates the self-sufficiency of the cosmos with its indestructibility. The most significant passage is §35-38, the third of his long sequence of arguments. It can be summarized as follows. The nature of individual things endeavours to preserve and immortalize them, but cannot wholly succeed because of the external agents of destruction to which they are exposed. The nature of the entire cosmos, being not inferior to the nature of the parts, also desires the preservation of the whole. Success is assured because its overwhelming strength prevails over all possible forms of injury and destruction. Thus the cosmos is indestructible. The argument is concluded with a verbatim quotation of Tim. 33c6-d3, which remains almost wholly faithful to the Platonic text.¹ The manner of ending with a quote from the Timaeus is similar to the earlier passage §20-27, but the connection with the details of the actual argument is not as clear. The quote says nothing about the *nature* of the whole. Nor have the examples of nourishment or excretion contained in the quote been used in the argument.

Unlike the two arguments that precede and the one that follows it, Aet. 35-38 has been declared by virtually all scholars *not* to be derived from the De Philosophia of Aristotle.² Nevertheless the question of its attribution and position in the context of Aet., as well as the question of the relevance of the Platonic citation, remain sufficiently problematical to warrant a separate discussion below in II 4.2.7. The theme of cosmic self-sufficiency is also found at Aet. 74, where Critolaus is reported to argue that the cosmos suffers no want:

αὐταρκέστατόν τε αὐτὸν αὐτῷ καὶ ἀνεπιδεᾶ παντὸς γεγονέναι, μηδενὸς τῶν εἰς διαμονὴν ὑστερίζοντα, τὰς κενώσεως καὶ πληρώσεως ἐν μέρει διαδοχὰς ἀπώσάμενον, αἷς διὰ τὴν ἄμουςον ἀπληστίαν τὰ ζῷα χρῆσθαι.

On the final phrase, which alludes to the Timaeus, see below II 9.3.1.

4.2.5. Circular motion (34a)

The circular motion of the cosmos, and in particular of its outermost region the heaven, is another of those cosmological doctrines found in the Timaeus and universally accepted in the Hellenistic period (cf. De Mundo 2 391b 15ff.). It is never for a moment questioned by Philo (cf. Decal. 57, QE 2.81 etc.). Further details will emerge when the movements of the heavenly beings are discussed below in II 5.2.1. Plato discloses at 34a1-3 for the first time in the dialogue his theory of the intrinsic relation between circular motion and intelligence and thought, an idea that will play an important role in the work (see further below II 7.2.4.).¹ Philo's words at Gig. 8, κύκλῳ κινουῦνται τὴν συγγενεστάτην νῦν κίνησιν, is perhaps a distant recollection of this text (συγγενεστάτην under the influence of 47b8,d2,90c8), though they refer to the circular motion of the stars rather than the heaven (on the context of this text see further II 5.4.3.).

The doctrine of the seven movements - six straight, the seventh circular - predictably appeals to Philo's numerological fancies (cf. Opif. 122, Leg. 1.4, 12, Staehle 34, 48, Nikiprowetzky REJ 124(1965)295). Other exegetical applications at Ebr. 111 (exeg. Ex. 14:7, Conf. 139 (exeg. Ex. 17:6). The description of the six straight movements as mechanical (ὀργανικαί Leg. 1.4, 12 (also Ebr. 111), cf. Ar.Nic.Eth. 3.1 1110a16) is an addition to the information supplied by the Timaeus (cf. also 43b2-5, with reference to the chaotic movements of the newborn baby).

4.2.6. Divinity (34b)

Plato's description in 34a8-b9 of the cosmos as a εὐδαίμων θεός in possession of a perfect body and wholly enveloped by a soul serves not only as a transition to the next section on the creation of the cosmos' soul, but also as a fitting climax to the section on the cosmos' body. The affirmation of the cosmos' divinity is repeated at 55d5, 68e4, 92c7. It is one of those doctrines that Plato didactically repeats at regular intervals. What is Philo's reaction to such an apotheosis? In his writings descriptions of the cosmos as θεός are decidedly infrequent.

The best-known examples are found in Aet. 10, 20 (cf. 78, 108), where the cosmos is described as a ὁπάρως θεός. Here Philo is almost certainly following a passage in Aristotle's dialogue, the De philosophia (fr. 18 Ross; cf. Festugière Révélation 2.239, Pépin 144, 257-263). In both passages he is voicing the opinion of the Stagirite, not expressing his own views (cf. Runia 125, 129 & n. 102). The divinity of the cosmos was also a prominent theme in the Stoa (cf. Cic. DND 2.30, 45). The attack on the Chaldeans who regard the cosmos

as god and not as the ἔργον or δημιουργημα of God will have been made with the Stoics in mind (Migr.181,194, Her.79, Congr.49, Abr.69,75,88; cf, Wolfson 1. 176, Dillon 114). In a number of these texts the complaint is that the cosmos is designated as the πρῶτος θεός. This leaves open the possibility that the cosmos may be regarded as a δεύτερος or τρίτος θεός (cf. Num.fr.21).

But in other contexts Philo can be openly polemical when referring to those who worship the cosmos as a whole or various of its parts (Decal.53,66 (exeg. first and second commandment!), Spec.2.255 (exeg. Deut.17:2-5)). The only time that Philo uses the expression αἰσθητὸς θεός, directly reminiscent of Plato's striking doxology at 92c7, in order to describe the cosmos is at Congr.103 (exeg. Gen.16:3, Lev.6:20), and this is an highly illuminating text:

τούτους συνάδει καὶ ἡ τῶν ἱερέων ἐνδεδελεχῆς θυσία· τὸ γὰρ δέκατον τὸ τοῦ οἴφει σεμιδάλεως ἀεὶ δεικνύεται προσφέρειν αὐτοῦς. ἔμαθον γὰρ τὸν ἕνατον ὑπερβαίνοντες αἰσθητὸν δοκῆσει θεὸν τὸν δέκατον καὶ μόνον ὄντα ἀψευδῶς προσκυνεῖν.

If the cosmos is to be called a visible god, then it is wise to add a qualification in order to avoid misunderstanding.

Philo is in fact not at all strict or puritanical in his use of the word θεός.¹ If used of God, it is only one of his names. If the evidence presented below in II 5.4.2. 6.2.2. is added to the above observations, it is clear that Philo is more sensitive about using the word θεός to describe the cosmos as a whole than when it is used for certain of its parts. The universe in its entirety could be thought a 'rival' for God, but not stars and demons. The background of the Hellenistic 'religion cosmique', which has its roots in Plato's Timaeus and Aristotle's De philosophia, is responsible for this cautious attitude.

4.2.7. Aristotle, Plato and Philo in Aet.20-44

The difficulties encountered above in Aet.20-27 and 35-38 cannot be viewed in isolation from the problems raised by the entire section §20-44, and these in turn are inextricably related to an evaluation of the structure and purpose of the treatise as a whole. In §20-149 Philo presents twenty-four arguments in favour of the uncreatedness and indestructibility of the cosmos, which illustrate the position of Aristotle set out in the doxographical section at §10-11. The first four arguments (§20-44) stand apart on account of their tight, rigorously argued structure and the total absence of anti-Stoic polemic. For some mysterious reason Philo declines to name Aristotle as source of these arguments, although it can perhaps be inferred from the deliberate verbal similarity between §10 and the beginning of §20. The diverse problems

associated with the arguments will be investigated in the following sequence:

- (1) To what extent must the first four arguments be seen as a group? Is the entire section §20-44 derived from the De philosophia?
- (2) Does the reportage of these arguments result from a direct reading of the De philosophia, or via an intermediate source (or sources)?
- (3) Who has been responsible for the insertion of the paraphrase and the two quotes from the Timaeus in §21,25-26,38?
- (4) What is Philo's own viewpoint with regard to these arguments?

Naturally the answers to the last two questions are the most closely related to our theme, but they are largely dependent on answers given to the first two.

In the discussion that follows I shall several times refer to three relatively recent studies which, though chiefly interested in Aristotelian material, do make some remarks on the Philonic transmission: J.Pépin, Théologie cosmique et théologie chrétienne; B.Effe, Studien zur Kosmologie und Theologie der Aristotelischen Schrift "Über die Philosophie", A.H.Chroust, 'Some comments on Philo of Alexandria, De aeternitate mundi' LThPh 31(1975)135-145 (these will in this subsection be referred to by the author's name only); cf. also the briefer remarks by J.Mansfeld, Stud.Hell.Rel.141-143, 'Bad world and demiurge: a 'Gnostic' motif from Parmenides and Empedocles to Lucretius and Philo' Stud.Gnos.Hell.Rel.299-303,308.

1. The standard view, shared by virtually all scholars, is that the essential part of Aet.20-44 goes back to Aristotle, but that the original chain of reasoning is broken at at least two points, §25-27 and 35-38. Hence Ross includes in his edition of Aristotle's fragments Aet.20-24,28-34,39-43 (also the last part of §43 and §44 is regarded as a Philonic addition). On the imputed interruption at §25-27 see below part (3) of our discussion. The rejection of §35-38 entails that one of the four arguments is unAristotelian and that it breaks up the sequence of thought of the other three. This is not what one would in the first instance expect — why should Philo or a hypothetical source wish to break up a closely connected group of Aristotelian arguments? — and good grounds must be given for it.

The first of such grounds is not an argument but an assumption. It is often assumed that Philo's sources and above all Philo himself were a team of 'botchers' and any twist in argumentation or literary structure which does not meet up to *our* expectations is due to their, or more particularly his, incompetence. To this question of source usage we shall return further below.

The following specific arguments are presented in favour of regarding the third argument as unAristotelian (cf. Effe 10-12, Chroust 141-143).

(a) Arguments 1, 2 and 4 all have the same method of argumentation, each of them showing the impossibility of a cause of destruction when applied to the cosmos. In the first argument the efficient cause,¹ in the second the material cause, in the fourth the final cause is dealt with. In the sequence the

third argument with its analogical deduction is a 'Fremdkörper'.

(b) The content of the third argument is not purely Aristotelian. The concept of nature shows Stoic (Effe 11, Chroust 142) or Platonizing (Arnaldez FE 30.98) tendencies.

(c) When later in Aet. revised versions of Aristotle's arguments are presented (§74,78-84,106), the third argument is not included.

The combined force of these considerations does not convince. Let us start with the method of argumentation. All four arguments use an a priori method of argumentation; all four use analogy between part and whole, in each case the part being inferior to the whole. The reason that the third argument differs somewhat from the others is that (i) the positive and negative poles of the analogy are reversed, and (ii) the logical method of the dilemma is not used. If Aristotle, as seems probable, is relating his arguments to the types of causes, it is strange to say the least that he should select three of his causes and delete the fourth. I consider it likely that the third argument is meant to prove the indestructibility of the cosmos from the point of view of the *formal* cause. The identification of the nature of a thing with its form (as well as its purpose) is a fundamental Aristotelian doctrine (cf. Phys.2.1 193a30-b21, 2.8 199a30-33. Met.Z 7 1032a16ff., W.D.Ross Aristotle (London 1923, 1974⁵) 68,74). It is the nature of a thing to desire to realize its own form, and if immortality is denied it, it can only fulfil this striving by means of reproduction, in which the material, formal and final causes coincide.

But is it Aristotelian to attribute to the nature of the cosmos not only dynamism but also finality and purpose, in an almost anthropomorphic way? The Stagirite indeed uses such language often (cf. De Vogel Gr.Phil. 498-501), especially, according to A.Mansion, in the exoteric works (ibid.501), without wishing to imply rational deliberation in the manner of the Platonic soul. The Stoa was decisively influenced by the two above-mentioned Aristotelian doctrines, the impersonal teleological dynamism of nature and the coincidence of material, formal and final causes in biological reproduction (cf. Hahm 45,205-206). That Aet.35-38 should resemble Stoic statements is thus hardly surprising, but it is perhaps sooner a confirmation of Aristotelian origin than a refutation of it.

A final, and very important, reason for the retention of the third argument as part of Aristotle's original sequence is the fact that it covers up a significant lacuna in the argumentation. In the first argument the cosmos has sufficient strength to overcome both external and internal causes of destruction, but the possibility must be left open that it lacks the strength to prevent its *own* deterioration and eventual destruction (cf. H.Von Arnim, Quellenstudien zu Philo von Alexandria (Berlin 1888) 7, Arnaldez FE 30.90). The

third argument, the close relation of which to the first is evident, excludes this possibility by appealing to nature's intrinsic desire to preserve its own form. To show this Aristotle could not, or did not wish to, use the dilemmatic method of the other arguments. But we may be confident that he found a hole in his argumentation more annoying than an interruption in the supposedly 'einheitliche Struktur' (Effe 11) of his arguments. It is true that the conception of nature endeavouring to preserve the cosmos is absent from *Aet.* 74, 78-84, 106. But it should be noted that the way in which the invincible strength of the cosmos is presented in §80 is much closer to §36-37 than to §21-22, and that also the language in §74 and 106 is reminiscent of the third argument.²

It should be concluded, therefore, that the probability that *Aet.* 35-38 is originally derived from Aristotle, and that the sequence of four arguments is complete, is considerably greater than that the sequence is interrupted by the arbitrary insertion of an unfortunate 'Fremdkörper'.

2. It is doubtful whether even the most skilful use of all the philological tools available can settle beyond dispute whether Philo has derived his Aristotelian arguments (as well as the material at *Aet.* 10-11, 15-16) directly from a reading of the *De philosophia*, or indirectly via the mediation of a Hellenistic source, e.g. a Peripatetic treatise directed against the Stoic doctrine of the cyclical regeneration of the cosmos. Norden – and we may accept the author of *Die antike Kunstprosa* as a sound guide on such matters – considered that Philo has so thoroughly converted the words of his source into his own idiom that one only seldom gets a verbal clue to the identity of the original author. A rare example he found at the beginning of §28, which in his view could only be written by a Peripatetic (*Jahrb.kl.Philol.* Supplbd.19(1893) 440). Effe (17n.55) has pointed out non-Aristotelian vocabulary in fr.19a Ross, and examples of typically Philonic language could easily be multiplied (cf. also Cumont's edition). Most scholars consider it unlikely that Philo consulted the original dialogue at first hand (cf. Pépin 432, Baltes 34; Effe 9,21 remains agnostic). Chroust's opinion, however, is quite different (143): 'in view of the high esteem Philo has for Aristotle, it is reasonable to surmise that he quotes the Stagirite *verbatim* or almost *verbatim*'

Now it can be considered certain that the *De philosophia* was available in such a centre of intellectual affairs as Alexandria, even though Philo lived at the time when the exoteric works were starting to yield ground to the recently rediscovered acroamatic corpus. The question before us is thus largely a matter of making a qualitative judgment. For a long time *Aet.* was regarded as a very poor effort indeed, an undigested compilation of one or two inferior source books (cf. Runia 107-112). But after a detailed analysis it was con-

cluded that, if its structure and intentions are understood, a more favourable judgment must be reached (ibid. 121-139).

It is thus eminently plausible, but at the same time quite unprovable, that Philo, in tackling the question of cosmic ἀφθαρσία, turned to the best possible source for Aristotle's position, just as he did for Plato.³ A possible indication of a direct relation between Aet. 20-44 and the De philosophia is suggested by the fact that it contains no less than five quotes or allusions to poetic works (§27, 30, 37, 41, 42). Such concessions to the tastes of a wider reading public are one of the chief stylistic features of the lost exoteric works. Further stylistic observations are risky due to the scarcity of comparative material. We may be certain that Philo, if making use of Aristotle's work, allowed himself the same freedom to rewrite, abbreviate and interpolate which he showed elsewhere in his use of source material (cf. Plant. 142-167, Ebr. 166-202, Somm. 1.21-24). The addition to the first argument of the possibility of an external void is exactly the kind of addition that Philo might have made (cf. above II 4.2.1. on Plant. 7).⁴ A merely mechanical transcription of source material, even if the author is Aristotle, is for a writer of Philo's literary pretensions strictly infra dignitatem.

3. Even if the paraphrase and the two quotes from the Timaeus are disregarded, the passage Aet. 20-44 is full of Platonic reminiscences and language (cf. Pépin 265). Jaeger concluded in his famous book on Aristotle's development (Aristoteles 127, 141 etc.) from this and other evidence that in the De philosophia he set out to show the great debt he owed to his master, but at the same time to disclose by means of penetrating criticism the new philosophical paths which he intended to pursue. Plato may have even been a participant in the dialogue, though the chief speaker we know to have been the author himself.

Is it likely, therefore, that Aristotle would include a paraphrase of the Timaeus in the first argument, or is it to be regarded as an 'Einschub in den Aristotelischen Gedankengang' (Effe 18)?⁵ The change of literary method which Aristotle introduced in his dialogues certainly allowed such an inclusion.⁶ Moreover his attempt in the De philosophia to improve on the Timaeus would gain credence if he could show that Plato had given sound *physical* reasons for asserting the ἀφθαρσία of the cosmos, and that the dependence of that ἀφθαρσία on the will or pronoia of the demiurge (Tim. 32c, 41a-b) was mythologizing nonsense.⁷

The quotation from the Timaeus is naturally a different matter. That Aristotle should wish to cite the words of Plato as a kind of proof-text at the end of his argument seems to me from both the literary and the philosophi-

cal point of view doubtful. The paraphrase has already made the reference to the Timaeus so obvious that a further citation of Tim.32c-33a would be entirely superfluous. On the other hand Philo, for whom in Aet. the relation between Plato and Aristotle is of central importance, may well have had good reasons for insisting on Aristotelian dependence, as will become apparent in the final part of this discussion. I am inclined to agree, therefore, with Pépin 265, Effe 10,18 and Mansfeld Stud.Hell.Rel.141, that he has recognized the Platonic element in the argument and appended the first Platonic quotation himself.

The concluding words of the first argument (§27) provide an additional complication. All four arguments are directed against the suggestion that the cosmos is subject to destruction, but here ἀφθαρσία is coupled with ἀγέννησία as the result of φυσική ἀκολουθία. For Philo the fact that Aristotle denies the γένεσις as well as the φθορά of the cosmos constitutes the essential difference between him and Plato (cf. Aet.10-16). The coupling of uncreatedness and indestructibility is demonstrated by Aristotle in De Caelo 1.10 (note esp. 280a29-31 on the Timaeus and 280a32 φυσικῶς...ἐξήρηται), a chapter thought by many scholars to contain material from the De philosophia (e.g. Bignone L'Aristotele perduto... 2.487, Effe 20; cf. also 1.9 279a31 and fr.16 Ross). It would appear, then, that §27 is not merely a Philonic addition, but is drawn from authentically Aristotelian material (note the poetic quote), though the possibility must be left open that Philo has to some extent broken up Aristotle's chain of reasoning (cf. Effe 21).

The second quote from the Timaeus at §38 remains to be examined. As was noted above in II 4.2.4. this quotation is more problematic because its direct relation to what precedes is less obvious. Indeed at first sight it would seem to illustrate the first argument much better than the third, since it does not even mention the conception of an all-powerful φύσις responsible for the cosmos' preservation. And the mention of a divine composer (ὁ συνθεὶς cf. 33d2) is closer to the fourth argument than the third. As it stands the quote can only illustrate the strength possessed by the nature of the cosmos as the result of the cosmos' self-sufficiency.

But at this point three passages which are also probably dependent on the De philosophia may provide a clue: Aet.74(Critolaus), the cosmos is αὐταρκέστατον τε αὐτὸν αὐτῷ καὶ ἀνεπιδεῖ παντός; Oc.Luc.10, the parts of the cosmos have τὴν φύσιν (!) οὐκ αὐτοτελή, but the cosmos has τὴν συναρμογήν...πρὸς οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἀλλ' αὐτὸς πρὸς αὐτόν; Aët.Plac.2.5.1, 'Αριστοτέλης· εἰ τρέφεται ὁ κόσμος, καὶ φθαρήσεται· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιδεῖται τροφῆς· διὰ τοῦτο καὶ αἰδώς (probably from the De philosophia, cf. Pépin 266). The first two passages clearly echo Plato's αὐτό...ἑαυτῷ...ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ in the passage

quoted at Aet.38. The argument of the third is also indebted to the same passage. It would thus appear that Aristotle did discuss the subject of the cosmos' self-sufficiency, but that Philo deleted this part and that only the Timaeian quote remains to remind us of its presence. Since I regard it as unlikely that Aristotle would quote Plato verbatim in a polished literary dialogue, I incline to the view that Philo has again recognized Aristotelian dependence on the Timaeus and inserted the Platonic quote (cf. Pépin 266n.4). Any further investigation of this subject would transport us into the realm of pure speculation.

4. But from the point of view of the Philonist the most important fact is that the quotations from the Timaeus are indeed located in arguments putting forward the Aristotelian position. Even if a writer is closely following a source, he has the free choice of including or discarding what he wishes in accordance with his own perception and presentation of the problem under discussion. The obvious question thus presents itself. Has Philo already forgotten that he presented Aristotle and Plato as the chief philosophical representatives of rival viewpoints in his doxographical section Aet.8-19? Or must we conclude that he is here trying to resolve the differences between the two as a foreshadowing of later Middle and Neoplatonist efforts in the same direction?

If our interpretation of the incomplete and somewhat enigmatic treatise is correct, neither conclusion is warranted. Philo is keen to point out that the sound aspects of Aristotle's defence of cosmic ἀφθαρσία are derived from Plato, but at the same time he is convinced that the Stagirite's defence of the complete autonomy of the cosmos, as expressed in the fact that it is uncreated as well as indestructible, shows an unfortunate lack of theological insight (cf. Runia 136-139). God is the creator of the cosmos. The ultimate reason for its indestructibility lies in his will, which finds expression in the binding activity of the divine Logos. This position, foreshadowed in the doxography, would have been elucidated, somehow or other, in the missing second half of the treatise.

4.2.8. Cosmos or body of the cosmos?

In the analysis of Philo's use of that section of the Timaeus which is devoted to the body of the cosmos it has become apparent that the cosmological doctrines found there are regularly echoed in Philo's works. It is therefore all the more remarkable how rarely Philo actually speaks of the 'body of the

cosmos' or uses expressions that imply that phrase. I have located only three instances: Aet.51 (in the report of a purely Stoic argument (= SVF 2.397)); Her.155 (the macro/microcosm idea is attributed to bold spirits, i.e. that both the cosmos and man consist of a body and a rational soul); QE 2.120 (a rather puzzling exegesis of Ex.28:34, in which Philo appears to concede more to Stoic physics than is his wont). Thus, where Plato speaks of the body of the cosmos, Philo prefers to refer simply to the cosmos. Naturally this does not mean that he wishes to play down the aspect of cosmic corporeality, as a glance at texts such as Opif.36, Plant.7 will show. The avoidance of the notion of the body of the cosmos would seem quite deliberate. It is an observation worth bearing in mind as we pass on now to the subject of the Platonic cosmic soul.

CHAPTER FIVE

TIMAEUS 34B-41A: THE COSMIC SOUL AND THE HEAVENLY BODIES

- 5.0. Introductory
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  - 5.1.1. A notoriously difficult text scarcely used
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  - 5.4.3. The genera of animals (39c-40a)

5.0. Introductory

So far Plato's cosmos, for all the perfection of its body, lacks the soul and mind which was promised in 30b3-5. It has yet to receive life, a source of movement and the ability to think rationally. Accordingly the demiurge completely envelops and permeates the body of the cosmos with soul. The cosmic soul is mixed together from three ingredients - being, sameness, difference - each of which is in an intermediate state between the indivisibility of the noetic world and divisibility of perceptible phenomena. In this way Plato indicates soul's intermediate ontological status. The primal soul-substance is mathematically and harmonically structured by the demiurge, and then divided into the circles of the same and the different, which enable the cosmic soul to carry out its kinetic and cognitive functions. Because these circles run perfectly true, it possesses both rational understanding (νοῦς ἐπιστήμη τε 37c2) concerning the noetic world and true opinion (δόξα καὶ πίστις βέβαιου καὶ ἀληθεύς 37b8) with regard to sensible things. Consequently the cosmos

leads a perfectly ordered and rational life for ever and ever.

True eternity, however, could not be conferred on the cosmos, for that can only belong to the model. The demiurge conceived instead a 'moving image of eternity' which we call time. Time is indicated by the circular motion of the heavenly bodies which the demiurge placed in the circuits of the cosmic soul. In describing the locations and movements of the stars and planets Plato's aim is not to write an astronomical textbook. He presents just enough evidence to show, to his own satisfaction, that it is possible to 'save the phenomena' of the movements of the heavenly bodies, that in fact the heavens provide man with the most splendid demonstration of the rationality bequeathed to the cosmos by its rationally thinking maker.

5.1. The creation of the cosmic soul (Tim.34b-36b)

5.1.1. A notoriously difficult text scarcely used

Sextus Empiricus, endeavouring to show that grammarians, despite their skills in linguistic matters, are unable to comprehend difficult philosophical texts, gives as examples of these the sayings of Heraclitus and the words of Plato on the creation of the soul (Adv.Math.1.301). He quotes Tim.35a1-5 and affirms that on these words and their context the interpreters of Plato are reduced to silence. That his final remark, though indicative of the difficulties encountered in interpreting the passage, should not be taken too literally is shown by the copious evidence supplied by Plutarch on this very subject. The Platonist from Chaeronea writes his treatise *Περὶ τῆς ἐν Τιμαίῳ ψυχογονίας* – formally an exegesis of Tim.35a1-36b5 – partly on account of the unusual views he holds on the passage (1012B) and partly on account of the dissension among Platonic exegetes (1012D). He records the interpretations of Xenocrates and Crantor, members of the Old Academy, and also of exegetes who lived only one or two generations before Philo, Posidonius and Eudorus of Alexandria. He himself had discussed the passage so often that his sons urged him to set his opinions down in writing.

Against this background of disputatious efforts at interpretation in the circles of professional philosophers, it is all the more noteworthy that Philo *never* makes any direct reference to Plato's description of the creation and composition of the cosmic soul [but now see my appended comment at the end of this sub-section]. Only the relation between the structure given to the cosmic soul and the nature of the heavenly movements finds a place in his writings, as we shall observe below in II 5.2.1-2. In addition there are three aspects

of the Platonic text which leave marginal traces and need to be briefly mentioned.

1. The contingent account. Plato recognizes that his account, which describes the γένεσις of the cosmos' body before that of its soul, whereas the order of ontological propriety is the reverse, retains a contingent and random element (34b10-35a1). Philo is confronted with a similar problem in his exegesis of the third and fourth day of creation (Opif.45-46). Why did God create the earth and vegetation before the heavenly bodies, whose regular movements cause the things on earth to grow and develop? The answer is that God's motive in bypassing the expected order was *paedeutic*, in order to teach men of future ages not to rely on plausibilities, but on sheer truth (τῶν εἰκότων καὶ πιθανῶν/τῆς ἀπραϋνοῦς ἀληθείας). Not the heavenly bodies are the ultimate cause of the growth but God, to whom all things are possible (on the formula cf. above II 3.1.4.). Plato thought his account was contingent, but did not realize that there was a real danger that his own estimation of ontological priority placed too great a reliance on the probable.

2. Older/younger. The antithesis πρεσβύτερος/νεώτερος used by Plato to describe the relation between soul and body (34c2) is also one of Philo's favourites. Some of its exegetical applications were already noted above at II 1.2.1. In Post.62 the ontological priority of soul over body is perceived, by means of the gymnastics of the allegorical method, behind an innocuous historical aside at Num.13:22. Hebron, treasure-house of wisdom and knowledge, is older than Zoan and the whole of Egypt:

πρεσβυτέραν ἢ φύσις ψυχὴν μὲν σώματος, Αἰγύπτου, ἀρετὴν δὲ κακίας, Τάνεως... εἰργάζετο, τὸ πρεσβύτερον ἀξιώματι μᾶλλον ἢ χρόνου μήκει δοκιμάσασα.

Soul's priority with regard to body is general Platonic doctrine (cf. also the important text Laws 896c). It is difficult to assess to what extent the influence of Tim.34c can be specifically felt in Philo's constant use of the formula. What, for example, should we think of Wolfson's attempt to use this text to give decisive support for a systematizing interpretation of Opif.16 (1.205; cf. also Horovitz 72)?

Philo speaks of the intelligible world as older in comparison with the visible world of which he speaks as younger. This description quite obviously reflects Plato's description of the universal soul as not being younger than the world but rather older. Now in Plato the description of the soul and the world respectively as older and younger means a comparison between two things both of which were created, for the soul, according to Plato, was created. Consequently, we have reason to believe that Philo's description of the intelligible world and the visible world respectively as older and younger also means a comparison between two things each of which was created.

In other words, Philo makes it quite clear, by means of an allusion to the Ti-maeus, that 'the intelligible world of ideas was created by God as something

real outside his mind'. Bormann 15 is without doubt too hasty in dismissing the allusion out of hand, for the notion of sequential creation presented in the Timaeus is of fundamental importance for Philo's interpretation of the Genesis account. It is important that the κόσμος νοητός is created before the κόσμος αἰσθητός. Yet Wolfson does, in my view, give the allusion a greater specific weight than it can carry. The comparison in Plato is between soul and body, not between cosmic plan and cosmic product. We note too that Philo is quite capable of using πρεσβύτερος/νεώτερος to describe the relation between creator and created, as Spec.2.166 proves.

3. Arithmology. The Plutarchean treatise mentioned above also shows us that the numbers and ratios set out by Plato in Tim.35b-36a were incorporated in the extensive arithmological literature composed in the late Hellenistic period. Plato's numbers (1,2,3,4,8,9,27) are not just meant to indicate ratios, but also have value and interest of their own, giving rise to 'speculation that has a charm not unphilosophical', i.e. arithmology (1027E). On a number of occasions Philo gives arithmological information that can be associated with speculation on Plato's numbers:

Spec.2.40, QE 2.87 (exeg. Ex.26:2; measurements of the tabernacle): the relation between the numbers 4 and 7; cf. Plut.1027E.

QC 3.49 (exeg. Gen.17:12, circumcision on the eighth day): the Pythagorean tetraktys (36); cf. Plut.1027F.

QC 1.91 (EES 1.58, exeg. Gen.6:3), QC 3.38 (exeg. Gen.16:16)(cf. Opif.107-110): the double scale of arithmetic and geometric progression, i.e. $8+27$ or $6+8+9+12=35$; cf. Plut.1017E-F.

Opif.91 (cf.106,48): κατὰ τοὺς δευλασίους ἢ τριπλασίους recalls 35b5-6,36a1, though Philo takes the numbers to the seventh term (not the fourth as in Plato); cf. Plut.1028B.

The last-named Philonic text is of interest because it is included in a long excursus on the arithmological qualities of the hebdomad, which was certainly derived from an arithmological source (cf. Robbins CPh 16(1921)99). The number seven can be associated with Plato's account in two ways: there are seven numbers used for the soul's harmonic structure; the circle of the different is divided into seven. As Robbins points out, Philo's account, though the longest and most detailed that has survived, deletes the reference to Tim. 35aff. found in other authors who draw on the same tradition (cf. Theon Expos. math.103.16 Hiller, [Iambl.] Theol.arith.55-11 De Falco, Anatolius 36.23 Heiberg, Lydus De mensibus 35.17 Wünsch). It must be inferred that Philo has *deliberately omitted* a reference to Plato's doctrine of the creation of the cosmic soul in his enumeration of the qualities of the hebdomad, the reason no doubt being that the doctrine does not harmonize with the Mosaic cosmogony being commented on, which nowhere speaks of a cosmic soul.

Having reached the above conclusions on the basis of the evidence in the

Philonic corpus hitherto available, I now find they have to be modified in the light of some new information. In a recent letter Prof. A. Terian has communicated to me his discovery of an unknown fragment of Philo preserved only in an Armenian translation. It had been published in the 1892 edition of the Armenian translations of Philonic works still preserved in the Greek (p. 222-223), but was not translated and thus remained wholly unnoticed. In Terian's translation the part of the fragment that is relevant to our inquiry here reads:

The number generated by the sum of the decad is 55, which of itself is beautiful. First of all, it is constituted of the sum of doubles and triples taken successively, in the following manner: the doubles 1, 2, 4, 8 make 15; the triples, by 3, 1, 3, 9, 27 make 40, and when added these make 55, which Plato mentions in the *Timaeus* with reference to the construction of the soul, beginning thus: 'First he took one portion from the whole,' and what follows this.

In order to illustrate the beauty of the number fifty-five Philo refers to the numerical composition of the cosmic soul in the *Timaeus* and makes the reference doubly clear by actually quoting the words *μίαν ἀφεῖλεν τὸ πρῶτον ἀπὸ παντὸς μοῦραν* (35b4-5).

Once again the context is an arithmological passage, but instead of the connection with Plato's account remaining concealed as in the texts cited above, it is now made entirely explicit. We can be absolutely certain that Philo drew this information from a source, for an almost identical version of this arithmological observation is found in Anatolius' account of the decad (39.21-40.3 Heiberg, cf. also *Theol.arith.* 86.10-17 De Falco):

ἔτι ἡ δεκάς ἀριθμὸν γεννᾷ τὸν ε' καὶ ν' θαυμαστὰ περιέχοντα καλλῆ· πρῶτον μὲν σγνέστηκεν ἐκ τοῦ διπλασίου καὶ τοῦ τριπλασίου τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἐξῆς συντιθεμένων, <διπλασίων μὲν> α' β' δ' η'· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ λε'· τριπλασίων δὲ α' γ' θ' κζ', ἅπερ ἐστὶ μ'· ταῦτα συντιθέμενα <πολεῖ τὸν> νε'. ὧν καὶ Πλάτων ἐν Τιμαίῳ μέμνηται τῆς ψυχογονίας ἀρχόμενος οὕτως· μίαν ἀφεῖλεν ἀπὸ παντὸς μοῦραν καὶ τὸ ἐξῆς.

I have restituted the verb in the Platonic quote to the text (it is found in *Theol.arith.*, whose anonymous author is quoting Anatolius; Heiberg does not note the difference, so perhaps the omission is an oversight on the part of the editor). Note that both Anatolius and *Theol.arith.* in the Platonic quote do omit the two words *τὸ πρῶτον*, which Philo retains.

Once again this particular piece of arithmological information is used by Plutarch in his comments on *Tim.* 35b-36a; cf. *Mor.* 1018E-1019A. The fact that Philo includes the reference to Plato's psychogony in this fragment makes the omission in *Opif.* noted above all the more striking.

Where in Philo's oeuvre was this fragment located? Terian is convinced that it is derived from the lost treatise *Περὶ ἀριθμῶν*, to which Philo refers at *Opif.* 52, *Mos.* 2.115, *QG.* 4.110. I think it more likely that it is a remnant of a missing part of the *Quaestiones*, in the surviving parts of which we find a number of similar arithmological catalogues. On the fragment see also further below II 8.3.1.

5.1.2. Cosmic soul in Philo

The expression 'soul of the cosmos' (ἡ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχή, ἡ τῶν ὅλων ψυχή) occurs so infrequently in Philo that it must be concluded that he deliberately avoided it. In the texts Aet.47,50,73,84, Somm.2.2, Prov.1.33,40,45, he is either talking in the accepted terms of his opponents (note κατὰ τοὺς ἀντιδοξοῦντας at Aet.84) or patently taking over the language of his source material. Revealing is the self-correction at Mut.223. Man's reason (λογισμός) is not so much a fragment (ἀπόσπασμα) of the cosmic soul, but rather, for those who follow Moses in their philosophizing, an imprint of the divine image (ἐκμαγεῶν εἰκόνας, i.e. the Logos; but cf. also Det.90, on which see below II 10.1.2.). At Leg.1.91 we read: ἡ γὰρ τῶν ὅλων ψυχή ὁ θεός ἐστι κατὰ ἔννοιαν. As Colson EE 1.478 remarks, the restrictive force of the last two words is illuminated by the train of thought at Migr.179-181, where Philo takes exception to the Chaldean viewpoint that the cosmos *or its soul* is the primal god. In all these passages Philo has above all the Stoic conception of the cosmic soul in mind. He objects to the fact that in its theology the Stoa makes no essential distinctions between all the following: God, Logos, cosmic νοῦς, cosmic ψυχή, providence, fate, πνεῦμα (cf. SVF 1.102,160 etc.). Philo's avoidance of the notion of the cosmic soul must be set beside his avoidance of the parallel notion of the cosmos' body, as noted above in II 4.2.8. Instead he gives a much greater prominence to the figure of the divine Logos. This preference must now be placed in a wider perspective.

5.1.3. Cosmic soul and the Logos

In a number of passages Philo describes the nature and activity of the divine Logos in terms which are reminiscent of the way in which Plato speaks of the cosmic soul being 'stretched' by the demiurge so that it completely envelops the cosmos' body and at the same time wholly permeates it (34b3-4,36d9-e3).

Plant.8-10: The λόγος ἀλόωτος θεοῦ τοῦ αἰωνίου is described in no less than seven ways (prop, permeator, controller of nature's course, compactor, bond, separator, reconciler), of which the second and fourth interest us here. The words ἀπὸ τῶν μέσων ἐπὶ τὰ πέρατα καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄκρων ἐπὶ τὰ μέσα ταθεῖς are evidently an elaboration of Tim.34b3-4,36e2 (cf. Van Winden VChr 32(1978)209; Albinus' paraphrase at Did.14.4 is similar, τῆς ψυχῆς ταθείσης ἐκ τοῦ μέσου ἐπὶ τὰ πέρατα). ταθεῖς recalls ἔτεινεν (34b4), but also the Stoic conception of τόπος (cf. Sacr.68). συνάγων τὰ μέρη πάντα καὶ σφίγγων in turn recalls Tim.58a7 (where περίστροφος τοῦ παντός could be related to the functioning of the cosmic soul), probably via the Stoa (cf. SVF 2.447, Hahn 143).

Fug.110-112 (exeg. Lev.21:10): In an elaborate symbolic exegesis of the

High priest's robes in terms of the physical elements of the universe (cf. Mos. 2.117-130, Spec. 1.84-96), but also a symbol of the relation between the cosmos and the Logos (cf. Wolfson 1.332). Plato's description of the fitting of cosmic soul to cosmic body is well suited to clothing metaphors (note esp. περι-καλύπτειν 34b4, 36e3), though he himself had the craft of tent-making in mind. At Fug. 112 the Logos is described in the same way as at Plant. 9 (συνέχευ...καὶ σφύγγει).

Conf. 136 (exeg. Gen. 11:5), Migr. 181: Similar language, but now used of God's powers which he extends (τείνας, ἀπέτεινε) throughout the entire cosmos (cf. also De Deo 9) and by which he holds the universe together (συναγάγων (cf. 36e1) ἔσφινξε, συνέχεσθαι).

Her. 188, QE fr.1 (text FE 33.281) (cf. Sacr. 67): The Logos completely permeates and fills the universe, in the way that a body completely occupies its place or space. On the metaphor of bond or glue used in Her. 188 and other above-cited texts see below II 6.1.4.

We note also in passing two rather abstruse texts in the Quaestiones which speak of the divine Logos in terms of musical harmony, reminiscent of the manner in which Plato gives the cosmic soul an arithmetical structure forming the notes of a musical scale: QG 4.110 (exeg. Gen. 24:22), QE 2.120 (exeg. Ex. 28:30).

Before we evaluate the relation between Plato's cosmic soul and the Philonic Logos, three other factors of historical interpretation must be taken into account.

1. The Stoa. It has been observed by many scholars that Philo's conception of the Logos has been strongly influenced by the Stoa, even when allowance is made for the fact that he emphatically strips it of materialistic characteristics (cf. Bréhier 82-89, Billings 35-37,¹ Weiss 257-265 etc.). The founders of the Stoa were clearly indebted to the concept of the cosmic soul such as Plato had developed it (cf. J. Moreau, L'âme du monde de Platon aux Stoiciens (Paris 1939), Hahn 42-43, 137ff.). The parallelism between cosmic soul and Logos was further encouraged by later Stoics such as Panaetius, Posidonius and Antiochus, who retained the basic doctrines of Stoic physics, but were also avid readers of Plato (cf. esp. Posid. fr. F85 E-K, 395a Theiler, Antiochus apud Cic. Acad. 1.29, Dillon 82-83). Not only the use of the term 'logos', but also features of Philo's Logos such as its tension, permeation and identification with the workings of φύσις are stimulated by Stoic developments of Plato's original idea.

2. Middle Platonism. In a passage polemicizing against the fact that Aristotle dispenses with the conception of a cosmic soul Atticus writes (fr.8):

ἔτι τοῦ Πλάτωνος λέγοντος τὴν ψυχὴν διακοσμεῖν τὰ πάντα 'διήκουσαν διὰ πάντων', καὶ ταύτην ὑφ' ἧς καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ διοικεῖσθαι συγχωροῦεν ἂν ἕκαστα, καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλ' εἶναι τὴν φύσιν ἢ ψυχὴν καὶ δηλονότι ψυχὴν οὐκ ἄλογον, καὶ ἐκ τούτων συνάγοντος ὅτι πάντα κατὰ πρόνοιαν γίνεται, εἴ γε καὶ κατὰ φύσιν... εἰ γὰρ μὴ μᾶλλον τις εἴη δύναμις ἑμψυχος 'διήκουσα διὰ τοῦ παντός' καὶ πάντα 'συνδοῦσα καὶ συνέχουσα', οὐτ' ἂν εὐλόγως τὸ πᾶν οὔτε καλῶς διοικούμενον εἶναι δύναιτο...

The phrase διήκουσα διὰ πάντων is Stoicizing (Des Places ad loc. cites SVF 2. 1029; cf. also Plut. Mor. 1026C and Cherniss' note ad loc.). For συνδοῦσα καὶ

συνέχουσα cf. Pl.Phd.99c6, and also Fug.112, Migr.181, Alb.Did.14.4).

As Dillon 252 points out, the cosmic soul here is described in terms which deliberately evoke the doctrine of the Stoic Logos and are indicative of the way Middle Platonism absorbed certain aspects of Stoic thought into their reading of the Timaeus. The passage also strongly reminds us of Philo's language (note esp. the description δύναμις). Certain Middle Platonists even speak of God's Logos without reference to the cosmic soul (Plut.Mor.369C, 371A-B, 377F, Celsus apud Or.c.Cels.5.14, Max.Tyr.Or.11.5, cf. Corp.Herm.1.6, 10), but this remains relatively uncommon (cf. also Andresen ZNW 44(1952-53)188ff. on Justin Apol.1.60.1, where the Chi of the structure of Plato's cosmic soul is related to the cross of Christ the *Logos*!).²

3. Jewish Sophia/Logos speculation. The parallels between the LXX translation of Prov.8:22-31 and the Timaeus (esp. v.30 ἀρμόζουσα and the joy in creation (εὐφραυνόμην, cf. 37c7) have led Hengel Judaism and Hellenism 162-163 to raise the intriguing question of a possible connection between Plato's account of the cosmic soul and Jewish speculation on the figure of Sophia, created or begotten as the beginning of God's works (cf. Gen.1:1) and assisting him in the task of creation. Before Philo's time the attributes of Sophia had already been associated with God's word or Logos. Thus the same (Platonic/Stoic) language used by Philo of the Logos or Sophia is also found in other documents of Alexandrian Hellenistic Judaism. Cf. Aristobulus fr.4 (= Eus.PE 13.12.4) φωνῆς θεοῦ... καὶ συνεχομένην ἀδιαλείπτως; Sap.Sal.8:1 διατείνει δὲ (ἡ σοφία) ἀπὸ πέρας ἐπὶ πέρας εὐρώστως καὶ διοικεῖ τὰ πάντα χρηστῶς (on this text see Winston Wisdom 189-190); Siracides 43:26 καὶ ἐν λόγῳ σύγκειται τὰ πάντα etc. On the relation of Philo's conception of the divine Logos and Sophia to Jewish Sophia/Logos speculation and Greek philosophy see above all the detailed account of Weiss 181-282 (but no mention is made of a possible relation to Plato's presentation of the cosmic soul).³

It must be agreed with Wolfson 1.327-328 that, though Philo avoids the expression 'soul of the cosmos' and shows almost no interest in Plato's description of the creation of the cosmic soul, he nevertheless gives the Logos, situated at the intra-cosmic level, certain characteristics of that soul. Indeed we can safely say that the immanent Logos takes over the role given by Plato to the cosmic soul. It cannot, however, simply be identified with that Platonic cosmic soul.

For Plato soul has an intermediate status, acting as a bridge between noetic and sense-perceptible reality. The cosmic soul is the ἀρτίστη γενομένη τῶν γεννηθέντων (37a2), the highest being in the created order, brought forth by the demiurge, who belongs to the noetic realm and from whom it derives its

λογισμός and ἀρμονία (cf. 36e6-37a2). Philo too gives the Logos an intermediate or mediating role. It is ὑπεράνω παντός τοῦ κόσμου καὶ πρεσβύτατος καὶ γενικώτατος τῶν ὅσα γέγονε (Leg. 3.175, exeg. Deut. 8:3 (manna as God's 'most generic' word)). As God's archangel it stands midway between the uncreated and the created, οὔτε ἀγέννητος ὡς ὁ θεὸς ᾧν οὔτε γεννητὸς ὡς ὑμεῖς (ἄνθρωποι) (Her. 206, exeg. Deut. 5:5 (symbolized by Moses)).

But Philo does not give the Logos a carefully worked out intermediate structure, such as Plato attributed to his cosmic soul. Consequently it always remains difficult to determine the extent to which the Logos becomes a *hypostasis*, i.e. an entity having a real existence separate from God himself. Further difficulties arise when one recalls the role of the Logos as place of the κόσμος νοητός or as archetypal paradigm itself (ἰδέα τῶν ἰδεῶν Opif. 25). At Migr. 6 (exeg. Gen. 28:17) the Logos is πρεσβύτερος τῶν γένεσιν εἰληφότων, a status higher than that given to the cosmic soul by Plato (cf. the pre-cosmic creation in the Jewish Sophia/Logos speculation). At Fug. 101 the Logos is εἰκὼν θεοῦ, τῶν νοητῶν ἀπαξ ἀπάντων ὁ πρεσβύτατος (exeg. Ex. 25:22). In terms of the Timaeus the Logos is equated with both the model and the cosmic soul. Is Philo not opening up the possibility of confusion by speaking of God's Logos at more than one level and in more than one function?

5.2. The heavenly revolutions (Tim. 36b-37c)

5.2.1. The circles of the same and different (36c-d)

It is not surprising, in the light of the foregoing, that Philo remains silent on the close correlation which Plato makes between the constitution of the cosmic soul and the nature of the heavenly motions which take place in it (36b, 38c-d). But when he has occasion to expatiate on the structure of the heavens, he does, without mentioning the role of the cosmic soul, refer to basic features of Plato's astronomy, notably the circles of the same and the different. The manner in which he makes use of the Timaeus in the following four passages is more than usually instructive.

Cher. 21-25: The motivation for Philo's turning to the Timaeus here lies in his exegesis of Gen. 3:24, in which the two Cherubim and the flaming sword are posted to guard the entrance to paradise. Philo suggests that the two Cherubim symbolize the revolution of the entire heaven. The passage is divided into two sections: §21-22 give a summary of the relevant astronomical information from the Timaeus; §23-25 apply this information to the exegetical theme.

First we must pay attention to a large number of points of detail.

§21. αὐτὸ κατ' οὐρανὸν σφαῖραι: Plato does not speak of spheres but revolutions. Philo reduces Plato's cosmic psychology to pure astronomy, as do Albinus Did. 14.7, Apuleius De Plat. 203

ταῦτο κατὰ δεξιὰ, θατέρου κατ' εὐώνυμα: Cf. 36c5-6, but the technical phrases used by Plato, κατὰ πλευράν and κατὰ διάμετρον are left out. κατ' εὐώνυμα replaces Plato's ἐπ' ἀριστερά in line with Philo's regular word usage. He only uses the 'unlucky' word for 'left' when exegetically constrained in connection with Num. 20:17 (Post. 101-102, Deus 163).

§22. ἀπὸ τῶν ἑῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐσπέρια: An interpretative addition to Plato's text (which only says ἐπὶ δεξιὰ), found also at Tim. Locr. 25, Alb. Did. 14.5. Compare QG 1.7 (exeg. Gen. 2:8), where the statement that the cosmos moves from East to West is complemented by another saying that the region of the East is right and the region of the West left. This is incompatible with Plato's account, and the Homeric verse called in for support by Philo (Il. 12.239) is criticized in Calcidius' commentary (§93).

ἐθελούσιόν τε καὶ βεβιασμένην ὑπεναντίους ἄμα καὶ δουτὰς κινήσεις... ἡ μὲν ἀκούσιος... ἡ δὲ οὐκ ἐκείνη: The double nature of planetary motion is here set out much more clearly than in the Timaeus itself (cf. Cornford 78, who cites the commentators Dercylides and Adrastus). But the description of the planets' motions as both voluntary and under compulsion is a definite (and unwarranted) extrapolation from Plato's text, found in none of the extant Platonic handbooks or commentaries. Compare Cleomedes De motu 1.3 28.24 Ziegler, τὰ δὲ (i.e. the planets) κινεῖται μὲν καὶ σὺν τῷ κόσμῳ κίνησιν ἀναγκάως... κινεῖται δὲ καὶ ἐτέραν προαιρετικὴν. Possibly Aristotle's statement in the De philosophia (fr. 21b Ross = Cic. DND 2.44), restat igitur ut motus astrorum sit voluntarius, helped give rise to this extrapolation. Wolfson's reference (1.314) to Arist. Met. A 8 1074a1ff. is not cogent.

τὰς μὲν ἰσοδρόμους...: The names of the three planets are filled in from 38a 1-3. The 'modern' name for Mercury, ὁ Στίλβων, has replaced τὸν ἱερὸν Ἑρμοῦ λεγόμενον. In the light of Philo's polemic against mythological names at Decal. 54-55, it is likely that we have here a Philonic modification. ἰσοδρόμους, cf. 38d3. ἀναλογίαν δ' ἔχοντα, cf. 36d6-7.

§23. τὴν κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν θέαν ὡς ἀληθῶς χορείαν: Unmistakably Philonic language (cf. Opif. 54, Leg. 1.8, 3.99, Her. 87), though of course ultimately derived from Plato (κατὰ ταῦτα 40a8, χορεία 40c3). ἔταξεν, τάξιν (twice) suggest that Philo has the text under exegesis (Gen. 3:24) in mind, and that Cohn's deletion (C-W 1.170.2) of καὶ ἔταξε in Cher. 1 is not justified. ἡ ἐξαχῆ σχίσας ἐπὶ κύκλους ἀναλογοῦντας ἑαυτοῦς: Cf. 36d2-3.

§24. καὶ καθάπερ ἔποχον ἐν ὀχήματι: The imagery used for the human soul at 41e2 (Platonic self-remembrance of the Phdr. myth) is here applied to the heavenly bodies.

πλημμελῆ δέϊσας ἐπιστασίαν, ἀπάσας δ' ἐξήγησεν ἑαυτοῦ: Thought and language closer to Aristotle (cf. De Caelo 1.9 279a29, Met. A 7 1072b14, 10 1076a4) than Plato. See A.P. Bos Phil. Inquiry 1 (1979) 150-151 on De Mundo 6 379b25ff. and the image of the golden chain; cf. also Agr. 49, Conf. 170.

§25. στρεφομένην: This description of the flaming sword in the Biblical text (Gen. 3:24) may well have suggested the allegory, since the verb is frequently used by Plato of the cosmic and celestial motions; cf. 34a4, b5, 36e3, 39a6, 40b6. The κυμάτια στρεπτά χρυσᾷ κύκλῳ at Ex. 25:11 evoke this association, for they are allegorically explained in terms of the movement of the heavens and the celestial bodies (QE 2.55, Gr. frag. at FE 33.273).

The detailed examination of Philo's passage has shown that there are connections between the Biblical text and the Timaeus (ἔταξε, στρεφομένην) which could give rise to the exegetical explanation put forward. The entire passage remains closely tied to the Platonic text which is adstrued. Especially the mention of the motions of the same and the different will only be compre-

hensible to readers acquainted with the Timaeus. As was observed in detail, Philo has (without being exegetically constrained) both added to and subtracted from Plato's text. This fact, combined with the inclusion of some technical astronomical terms and doctrines, leads one to suspect that he has based his account not only on his own reading of the Timaeus, but also on the information supplied by a Platonic handbook of the type of Albinus' Didaskalikos or Theon's Expositio (see further below II 5.4.2.).

Of great interest is the fact that Philo gives in Cher.21-30 *three* symbolic exegeses of the Cherubim and the flaming sword. Our passage is the first. The second (§25-26) takes the Cherubim to symbolize the two hemispheres. The third (§27-30) is theological rather than physicalistic (the powers and the Logos), and Philo regards it as more inspired than the other two. Although Philo does not allude to exegetical predecessors, Bousset Schulbetrieb 29 argued that in this multiple exegesis he records traditional interpretations. If he is right the use of the Timaeus must be attributed to earlier exegetes. At Mos.2.98-100 (exeg. Ex.25:22, a different text!) there is a parallel passage which might be thought to support this view. The first explanation of Cher.21-30 is not mentioned there, the second is accredited to anonymous interpreters, while the third is again preferred. Nevertheless, given Philo's love for the Timaeus (not to mention the fact that one would have to know it pretty well to make the exegetical connection) and the further parallel passages below, I consider it probable that §21-25 represents a possibility thought up by Philo himself, and that the substance of §21-30 as a whole must be Philonic, even if a previous symbolic exegesis is included in §25-26.¹

Decal.102-104: This passage is not inspired by a particular Biblical text, but results from a discussion of the fourth commandment, in which a day of rest is ordained on the seventh day. The hebdomad is honoured for many reasons, not least because the number of planets is seven. The complementarity, or even identity, of the hebdomad and monad was particularly significant for Philo in relation to the Mosaic account of creation (cf. Nikiprowetzky FE 23. 153; arithmological parallels for the relation monad/hebdomad and the illustration of the planets in Philo and other sources at Staehle 35-37, 41-42 (cf. also Moehring 205-209); on the Pythagorean background cf. Boyancé REG 76(1963) 90ff.). What better way to illustrate it than by means of Plato's theory of circles of the same and the different?

Philo does not name the two circles as such in this text, but speaks of the ἀμέριστος and μεριστή φύσις. As Colson EE 7.59 observes, ἀμέριστος and μεριστή have been imported from 35a1-6 to replace ἀσχιστος and σχίσας ἐξαχῆ at 36d1-2. Now this is not at all what Plato meant by the terms indivisible and divisible, which allude to the worlds of noetic and sensible reality respec-

tively, and are predicated of *both* the same and the different rather than identified with them (cf. Cornford 60-64 on the crucial exegesis of *Tim.*35a1-b1). Presumably Philo's memory is playing tricks on him, but at the same time he demonstrates in a particularly blatant fashion the almost universal tendency among ancient commentators to simplify Plato's account of the composition of the soul. Misreading *Tim.*35a, they allowed for only two stages of mixing instead of four, and so were inclined to divide the components of soul into two groups and make certain identifications which Plato did not intend:

indivisibility	divisibility
same	different
monad/unity	dyad/plurality
rest	motion
form or model	matter
rationality	irrationality

This tendency goes right back to the Old Academy and particularly Xenocrates (indivisible = monad, divisible = dyad, same = principle of rest, different = principle of motion (fr.68 Heinze = *Plut.Mor*1012D-E); cf. Brisson 275-313 (who stresses the pernicious influence of *Arist.De anima* 404b18-30), Baltes *Timaios Lokros* 70-73. For Philo's application of ἀμέριστος and μεριστή to the celestial motions I have found no exact parallel, but it is perhaps implied by the description of ἃ τῷ ἐτέρῳ πορὰ μεμερισμένα in *Tim.Locr.*26. ἥ τις ἐξαχῇ διανεμηθεῖσα (§103) is based on 36d2 (cf. *Alb.Did.*14.4, where ἐξ ἀρχῆς νεμηθεῖσα should be emended to ἐξαχῇ νεμηθεῖσα). Philo's comment that the word πλάνητες is misleading (§104) is derived from Plato *Laws* 821c-d, as Colson notes. But the English scholar confuses matters by suggesting that ταυτότητα (§104) is a reminiscence of the motion of the same, for it refers primarily to the planets which, though moving in the revolution of the different, nevertheless adhere to the *same* course for all eternity.

*Her.*230-236: Another Biblical text, *Gen.*15:10 τὰ δ' ὄρνεα οὐ διετέλεον, sets this passage in movement. The birds, being winged and soaring above, symbolize two *logoi* or minds, the one the mind of man, the other its paradigm, God's Logos (§230-231). In order to explain why the birds were not divided, i.e. the mind's indivisibility, Philo turns to the analogy between man's soul and the heavens, for, as he succinctly affirms, ὃ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ ψυχὴ, τοῦτο οὐρανὸς ἐν κόσμῳ (§233). The analogy is worked out as follows:

<u>man</u>		<u>cosmos</u>	
soul {	irrational part	heaven {	inner sphere
	divided into 7 parts		divided into 7 circles
	- - - - -		- - - - -
	rational part		outer sphere
	undivided		undivided

Philo introduces the reference to Plato's description of the two spheres by an anonymous λόγος ἔχει, but the words ἀσχυστον (36d1) and τὴν δ' ἐν τὸς ἐξαχῇ τμηθεῖσαν ἐπὶ κύκλους (cf.36d2) disclose his source.

The analogy is, of course, based on the macrocosm/microcosm relation, which is one of the fundamental doctrines in the *Timaeus*. But is Philo's particular application of it here also in the spirit of Plato's dialogue? The

sevenfold division of the irrational soul is purely Stoic (to call it irrational is post-Chrysippean), but Philo considers the doctrine in fundamental agreement with Plato (see below II 9.2.2.). But in what way can one speak of an analogy between the seven parts of the irrational soul and the seven circles of the inner sphere of heaven? Such an analogy is not Stoic, for they regard the ἡγεμονικόν of the cosmos as the οὐρανός in its entirety or (in the minority view of Cleanthes) as the sun (cf. Diog.Laert.7.139), not making a distinction between the sphere of the fixed stars and the planetary spheres. The analogy could receive support from Platonist quarters if the *Timaeus* is interpreted in the way suggested by Plutarch in *Mor.*441D-442B (cf.1024Dff.), namely that both the soul of the cosmos and the soul of man have a rational and an irrational component, and that the circle of the different represents the beginning of differentiation and change (and, by implication, of irrationality). This interpretation results from the same identifications which we tabulated above with regard to *Decal.*102. It is in fact untenable because the cosmic soul is wholly rational and, unlike man, possesses no irrational parts (cf.36e4 and the comments of Vlastos *CQ* 33(1939)78, Brisson 500 on Cornford 76, 208). Moreover the analogy, as suggested by Philo and Plutarch, endangers the doctrine that the planetary movements are ordered and wholly rational, which we saw Philo confidently affirm in *Decal.*104 (cf. *Gig.*8, *Somn.*1.135) and the denial of which would encourage astrology and Gnostic deprecation of the cosmos.

Philo's use of the analogy between the seven circles of the planets and the seven parts of the irrational soul can be explained in two ways. *Either* we must conclude that we are pressing Philo's text too hard. His primary aim is to show that man's νοῦς is indivisible. The analogy with the outer sphere of heaven suits him nicely, and the numerical equivalence of the parts of the irrational soul and the planetary circles is too neat to resist, philosophical systematics not being his concern at the moment. Compare a parallel text such as *QG* 4.110, where he also juggles with numbers in seeing an analogy between the structure of man and the cosmos.² *Or* the possibility can be entertained that Philo is following a current interpretation of the doctrine of soul in the *Timaeus* similar to Plutarch's, without wishing to put any emphasis on a possible implication that there is an irrational element in the movement of the circle of the different. In the arithmological accounts of the hebdomad the two doctrines of the seven planetary circles and the seven parts of the irrational soul are often mentioned together, but to my knowledge never placed in an analogical relation (cf. Staehle 41,47, an example at *Leg.*1.8,11). Such a procedure would be foreign to the cataloguing methods of such accounts. If it is necessary to decide between the two alternatives put forward, my preference would lie with the former.³ To the subject of the relation between man's

mind, the outer sphere of heaven and the divine Logos we shall return in the next sub-section of our Commentary. On Her.230-236 see further the excellent remarks of Harl FE 15.92-97,331-332.

QG 3.3 (EES 1.180): The same text, Gen.15:10, is discussed as in Her.230-236, but the results are not entirely the same, the discrepancies being caused by the fact that in Her. the sacrificial animals are allegorized in terms of human and divine cognition (cf. also §125-126), but in QG in terms of cosmic parts. So in the former passage the pigeon and the turtle-dove symbolize human logos and divine Logos, in the latter the spheres of the planets and the fixed stars. The latter exegesis has the advantage of not doing injustice to the rationality of the planetary motions, but lacks the anthropological and ethical relevance of the former. It is somewhat disconcerting to witness the same characteristics of the birds, tameness and solitariness, being confidently used to demonstrate the validity of both interpretations. The reason for the divergence must be attributed to the tentative, provisional nature of Philo's exegetical endeavours, but in this case the method seems particularly arbitrary.

5.2.2. The rationality of the heavenly circuits

In Her.230-236 the physicalistic allegory of the two birds in Gen.15:9-10 leads Philo to delineate an analogy between man and the cosmos:

man's soul	heaven
man's mind	outer sphere of heaven

The identification of the 'mind above us' (§236) with a part of heaven and not the whole, is, as we have seen, somewhat surprising, and we suggested above that it was primarily motivated by the desire to see a parallel between the seven planetary circuits and the seven parts of the irrational soul. More representative for Philo's thinking on this subject is, I would argue, his remark at QG 4.215 (exeg. Gen.27:28): 'In man the mind is like heaven, for they are both rational parts, the one of the world, the other of the soul.'

The analogy between man and the cosmos is important in relation to the way that Philo deals with Plato's cosmic soul. The fact that Plato places the celestial bodies in the revolutions of the cosmic soul (cf.38c7) is meant to indicate that the rationality of the cosmic soul is especially localized in the heavens, just as the soul pervades the whole of man's body but its rational part is especially localized in the head (see below II 7.2.1.). This idea, which provides the foundation for the philosophical 'Religion cosmique' in the Hellenistic period, has left its mark on Philo. The heavens represent a realm

of unswerving, purely rational movement, sharing in none of the disorder and malignancy of earthly things (cf. Ios.145 etc.). In the cosmos heaven is the palace of highest sanctity, whereas earth, which appears to be at the centre, should actually be called the outermost region of the divine kingdom (Mos.2.194). It is entirely fitting that a part of the High priest's robes, the Reason-seat (λογεῖον), should contain twelve stones symbolizing the twelve signs of the Zodiac, for the whole of heaven is framed on rational principles (κατὰ τὸν ἐν ἀριθμοῦς ἀσάλευτον καὶ βεβαióτατον καὶ θεῖον ὄντως λόγον Mos.2.124 (exeg. Ex.28:15-21), cf. Spec.1.88). If the analogy between man's mind and heaven is to have any real significance, it must be man's task to conform his mental processes and his behaviour to the rationality and unswerving constancy of the celestial world above him. Here we arrive at the theme of the contemplation of the heavens (Tim.47a-c); it will be analysed in detail below in II 7.2.3-4., where we shall find that one of the texts to which Philo relates the theme is God's address to Abraham in Gen.15:5. Abraham's double migration is a particularly pregnant symbol for the soul's quest (cf. Harl FE 15.103-129 on Her.), though his story also emphasizes the danger of looking *only* to the heavens and not recognizing the handiwork of God the creator.

In Her.230-236 Philo goes further and identifies the λογικὴ φύσις τοῦ παντός with the λόγος of God (§230,234). It is symbolized by the turtle-dove, the lover of solitude, because it spends its time in attendance on the One (§234). At the same time, as λόγος τομεύς, it has separated and distributed everything in nature (§235). Now it would seem logical, if the immanent Logos takes over some of the characteristics of Plato's cosmic soul, that it be especially associated with that part of the cosmos which Plato places in the circuits of the cosmic soul, namely heaven. A straight-out identification of heaven and the Logos in the literal sense is surely problematic, because the Logos permeates and holds together the entire cosmos. Heaven is rather the highest and chief residence of the divine Logos in the cosmos. Philo likes to illustrate this with the image of the chariot, familiar to him from both the Platonic Phaedrus myth and Judaic tradition (cf. Harl FE 15.122-127). 'Heaven is a flying chariot (cf. Phdr.246e) because of its very swift revolution, which surpasses in speed even the birds in their course' (QG 3.3 EES 1.181). Of this chariot the Logos is the reinsman (ἡνίοχος) and God its charioteer (ἑπιοχος). The charioteer passes on to the reinsman the directions necessary for the correct guidance of the universe (Fug.101, cf. Her.301, Somn.1.157, QG 4.51 etc.). Here the Logos is without doubt fulfilling precisely the task of Plato's cosmic soul (Zeus in the Phaedrus myth), seated on the chariot of the heavens, or, in the precise reversal of that image found in the Timaeus, carrying the heavenly bodies in the embrace of its own revolutions.

5.3. The creation of time (Tim.37c-38b)

5.3.1. Time and the cosmos

In his account of the γένεσις of time Plato enunciates two fundamental doctrines. Firstly, the concept of time is directly related to the movement of the cosmos and, in particular, to the ordered movement of the heavenly bodies who are the guardians (cf.38a6) or instruments (42d5) of time. Consequently time came into being with the cosmos and will only cease if the universe undergoes dissolution. Secondly, the temporal aspect of the cosmos causes it to fall short, also in this respect, of its model, the world of ideas. The demiurge could not confer completely the eternity of the cosmic paradigm on the created product. Time is thus 'a moving image (εἰκών) of eternity (αἰών) proceeding according to number' (37d5-7). After Plato other conceptions of time were developed in ancient thought (cf. J.F.Callahan, Four views of time in ancient philosophy (Cambr.Mass. 1948), Rist Stoic philosophy 273-288). Nevertheless the two doctrines outlined above continued to exercise an extraordinary influence. Our task in this and the following sub-section is to determine the extent to which Philo too came under their spell.

In a number of passages scattered throughout both his exegetical and philosophical treatises, Philo makes it absolutely clear that in his view time is dependent for its existence on the ordered movement of the cosmos, as indicated by the movement of heaven and the celestial bodies. What else, he asks in Spec.1.90, showed (ἀνέδειξεν) nights, days, months and years, and time in general than the harmonious revolutions of the moon and sun and the other stars? At Leg.1:2 (exeg. Gen.2:2), in discussing the way that the seven days of the Mosaic cosmogony should be interpreted with regard to the creation of the cosmos, Philo proceeds step by step in an almost syllogistic fashion:

1. every period of time is a collection (σύστημα) of days and nights;
2. these are necessarily brought about by the movement of the sun above and below the earth;
3. the sun is part of heaven;
4. thus time is more recent (νεώτερος) than the cosmos;
5. thus the cosmos cannot have been created in time.

Summing up, he states that time was constituted by means of the cosmos, for the movement of heaven revealed (ἔδειξε) the nature of time. A similar argument is given in the exegesis of the words ἐν ἀρχῇ (Gen.1:1) at Opif.26. Time did not exist before the cosmos, but came into being either with the cosmos or after it, so that it is necessarily either as old as or younger than the cosmos. To dare to say that time is older than the cosmos is to show oneself

lacking in philosophical sense. At Deus 31 the cosmos is called the father of time, for the creator brought the cosmos into movement and that movement caused the γένεσις of time (on this text see further II 5.3.2.).

The Platonic source of this conception of time is explicitly stated at Aet.52, where Philo declares:

...ὅτι, ἥ φησιν ὁ μέγας Πλάτων, ἡμέραι καὶ νύκτες μῆνες τε καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν περίοδοι χρόνον ἔδειξαν. ἀμήχανον δέ τι τούτων συστήναι δίχα ἡλλίου κινήσεως καὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς οὐρανοῦ περιφορᾶς...

The word φησὶν introduces not a literal quote but rather a loose paraphrase of Tim.37e1-2,38b2-c5. The series of measures of time - days and nights and months and years - is meant to recall the identical series at 37e1 and 39c1-5 (the same 'Platonic' series also at Plant.118, Spec.1.90, Prov.2.53; on Opif. 60 and the 'Mosaic' series in Gen.1:14 see below II 5.4.1.). Despite the Platonic invocation, however, other parts of the argument at Aet.52-54 are less faithful to the Platonic doctrine, and we shall return to this problematic passage below.

A noteworthy feature of the passages so far discussed is the triple occurrence of the expression 'show time' or 'show the nature of time', involving the verb δεικνύναι or ἀναδεικνύναι (Leg.1.2, Spec.1.90, Aet.52). Cf. also Aet. 19 οὗ χρόνον μετρήσεως φύσιν ἔδειξαν,¹ Plant.118 and Opif.60 (both of number, but in direct association with time), also Siracides 43:6 ἀνάδειξεν χρόνων. This expression is not derived directly from the Timaeus (though cf.38c6,47a 6-7), nor have I found it in the surviving Middle Platonist handbooks. But Philo's repeated use suggests that it may have a scholastic background. The significance of the phrase lies in the fact that it makes quite clear that time is not simply *equivalent* to the movement of the heavens, but is indicated by the *measurement* of that movement (cf. Plotinus' criticism of those who fail to make this distinction at Enn.3.7.7,12.25ff.). At Spec.1.88-90 Philo can exploit the expression for exegetical purposes. Fastened to the reason-seat of the high-priestly robes are two pieces of cloth, one of which the LXX describes as δῆλωσις (Ex.28:30). Using the method of physicalistic symbolism, Philo sees here an obvious reference to the task of the heavenly beings to *reveal* to us those things which otherwise would remain unknown, including the nature of time.²

On a number of occasions Philo presents the Stoic definition of time, according to which time is the extension (δυστήμα) of the movement of the cosmos. At Aet.4 it is specifically attributed to the Stoa, but at Opif.26 and Aet.52 he appears to support the definition himself. Does the espousal of this definition entail a departure from the Platonic conception of time? It should be observed that the Stoic school was not unanimous in its definition

of time. Zeno defined it as the δῶστημα τῆς κινήσεως tout court, but Chrysippus insisted that the motion involved was the motion of the cosmos (cf. SVF 1.93, 2.509-519, Rist op.cit.273-282). It is the latter definition, much closer to Plato's view, which Philo propounds. At the same time Philo declares at Aet.54 that the definition must be refused if the motion of the universe includes the period of conflagration and regeneration, when the cosmos departs from its present order and the relation between time and the heavenly bodies is necessarily severed, if only temporarily. Wolfson is therefore entirely correct in concluding (1.319) that for Philo the Stoic definition was merely a restatement in formal language of the Platonic (and Mosaic) conception of time. He did not add, however, that in so doing Philo was following the practice of doxographers and Middle Platonists, as the examples at Aëtius Plac.1.21.2 and Albinus Did.14.6 show.³

An entirely different situation is encountered when we look at the argument in Aet.52-54 as a whole. Plato's authority is invoked and the Stoicizing definition of time is given in order to show that time is dependent for its existence on the movement of the cosmos and that the cosmos and time are co-eval (§52). But in §53 the argument receives an Aristotelian turn. The cosmos is in fact uncreated (and indestructible) because time has no beginning (and no end). It is the height of absurdity to suppose that there was ever a time that time did not exist,⁴ for the very words 'was' and 'ever' indicate time. The view that time is ἀναρχος καὶ ἀτελεύτητος is derived, whether directly or indirectly, from Aristotle (cf. Phys.8 1 251b19-28). Nowhere in the extant works does the Stagirite present the actual proof given by Philo (it is perhaps implied in Met.A 6 1071b7-10), but it is not unlikely that it was put forward as an argument against the Timaeus in the dialogue De philosophia, the source of other arguments in Aet. (cf. above II 4.2.7. on §20-44). Note the parallel at Sex.Emp.Adv.math.10.189 (who also drew on the De philosophia, witness fr.9,12ab Ross). If the citation of the Timaeus in §52 is the work of Aristotle or a Peripatetic, then Plato's words are being used against his own view of the γένεσις τοῦ κόσμου (if taken literally). Baltes 88 tentatively suggests, however, that, because Plato's Timaeus is invoked, the argument as a whole in §52-54 could be a Platonist reply to the literal interpretation of the Platonic cosmogony, using Aristotle's own conception of time to refute his criticism of the Timaeus.

A more important question for us is whether Philo finds the argument which he records here plausible. The assertion that time is dependent on the movement of the heaven poses no problems, but what about the denial of the γένεσις of the cosmos and of time with it? Nowhere else does Philo affirm that time is without beginning and end (in Fug.57 and QG 1.1 the context and his

intentions are quite different). I have argued elsewhere (Runia 134) that Philo does not in fact subscribe to the argument at Aet.52-54. But a full discussion of this question can only be undertaken if it is associated with the problem of how Philo interprets the Platonic and Mosaic accounts of creation. See further below III 2.4.

The question of the nature of time is also raised in the dispute between Alexander and Philo in Prov.II, but the exchange is too brief to be very enlightening. Alexander argues that, since time is infinite, it is not the work of providence, and the same must be said for the units of time's measurement (§53). Philo replies that God in no way created infinite and incorporeal time (doubtless ἀπειρος καὶ ἀσώματος χρόνος), but rather days, months and years, as measured by the revolutions of the heavenly bodies (§57). This statement can be interpreted as leaving room for an infinite pre-cosmic time uncreated by God. Hadas-Lebel FE 35.79 thinks of the Platonic distinction between time and eternity. Another possibility is the distinction put forward at Cicero DND 1. 21 between measured time (i.e. by the motion of heaven) and time as pure extension. But Philo's words can also be interpreted in a way consistent with the Platonic view of time to which he subscribes elsewhere, i.e. that there is no room for a notion of time separated from the bodily motion of the celestial realm. As so often in this dialogue, the brevity of the exchange precludes any depth of philosophical discussion. Wendland's conclusion (Vorsehung 64) that Philo's views here differ from elsewhere in his writings is surely premature.

A final text gives the question of the relation between the cosmos and time a different slant. Time's intrinsic inseparability from cosmic movement entails, according to Plato, that it not only came into being with the heaven but also can only come to an end together with its dissolution (38b6-7). Philo quotes these two lines at Prov.1.20, introducing them with the words: 'Furthermore on the subject of the dissolution of the cosmos and the condition of its creatures the Greek sage Plato himself speaks in the Timaeus thus'.

According to Conbeare JPhilol 21(1893)71 the quote deviates from the received Platonic text in three not very important respects: (1) it reads οὐχὶ instead of οὖν (so that the sentence becomes a question); (2) γεννηθέντες instead of γεννηθέντες; (3) αὐτῶν λύσις τις instead of λύσις τις αὐτῶν. Conbeare assumes, on account of the slavishness of the Armenian rendering, that these changes were present in Philo's text, but of this we cannot be certain (γεννηθέντες at Philop.Aet.15.2 555.21 Rabe).

Philo cites these lines as a proof-text not because he is concerned about the intimate relation between time and the cosmos (contrast the use of the text by Plut.Mor.1007D, Apul.De Plat.201), but because it indicates more clearly than any other text in the Timaeus that Plato makes allowance for the possible dissolution of the cosmos. The potential character of the text is of

course all-important. It is Platonically heretical to say that the cosmos actually *will* come to an end (see below II 6.1.1.). Philo's intentions in quoting these words can only be gauged in relation to his intention in Prov.I as a whole. Plato's text was taken up with enthusiasm in Christian apologetics (cf. Eus.PE 11.32.3).

5.3.2. Time and eternity

In three passages Philo makes reference to the paradigmatic relation between time and eternity which is fundamental to Plato's account in Tim.37d-38c.

Mut.267: Exegesis of Gen.17:21, in which it is written that Isaac will be born ἐν τῷ ἐνιαυτῷ τῷ ἐτέρῳ. This signifies not the normal extension of time (τοῦ χρόνου δόξασημα) measured by monthly and yearly revolutions, but a truly mysterious year, dissociated (ἕτερον) from visible and sense-perceptible things. It has its place in the incorporeal realm and has received the παράδειγμα καὶ ἀρχέτυπον of time, namely αἰών. The word αἰών Philo explains as signifying the βίος of the κόσμος νοητός, just as χρόνος represents the βίος of the κόσμος αἰσθητός. (In the parallel passage QG 3.60 the eternal nature of the 'other year' is not mentioned.)

Deus 31-32: Reflecting on the apparent repentance of God in Gen.6:5-7, Philo declares that there is no need for God ever to change his mind, for the course of future events is perfectly clear to him (Deus 29-30). A brief comment on God's relation to the phenomenon of time is then appended (§31-32). God has, as it were, two sons – the noetic cosmos, which as older son he keeps to himself, and the younger son, our visible cosmos. Since the cosmos is the father of time, God can be said to be its grandfather. With God there is no future, since he has marked out the limits of time. God's life (βίος) is not time but αἰών, τὸ ἀρχέτυπον τοῦ χρόνου καὶ παράδειγμα. Philo does not tell us here whether αἰών is also characteristic of the noetic cosmos, as affirmed in Mut.267. The fact that the noetic cosmos is explicitly said to remain with God and also the strong influence of the Timaeus renders such a conclusion probable. In the final sentence Philo expatiates on what he means by the eternity which characterizes God's life: ἐν αἰῶνι δὲ οὔτε παρελήλυθεν οὐδὲν οὔτε μέλλει, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὑφέστηκεν. A literal translation reads: 'and in eternity nothing has passed away or is still to occur, but it is only in a state of present existence'. J.Whittaker, God Time Being: two studies in the transcendental tradition in Greek philosophy (Oslo 1971) 38-39 has shown that ὑφέστηκεν is taken from Stoic terminology on the subject of time (cf. SVF 2.509). The remark must also strongly remind us, however, of Plato's assertion in 37e4-

38b5 that only the present (ἔστι, εἶναι) can be legitimately predicated of the αἰδολος οὐσία, the hallmark of which is αἰών.

Her.165: In discussing the activity of the Logos tomeus Philo demonstrates that also Moses is a great eulogist of equality (§161ff.). An illustration is provided by the six days of God's creative act, as outlined in the Mosaic cosmogony. There were three days before the sun's creation and three days after. Thus three days must be assigned to αἰών and three days to χρόνος, the μέλημα αἰώνος. Exegetically the thought is neatly contrived, but philosophically it is not very informative, especially if we recall that for Philo the days are meant only didactically, not literally. Once again, however, we see how firmly Philo associates time with the heavenly bodies, following the lead of both Moses and Plato.

αἰών is thus the βίος of both God and noetic cosmos. Such a formulation does not issue directly from Tim.37c-38c. Plato, in describing the model in terms such as ἡ τοῦ ζῶντος φύσις αἰώνιος (37d3, cf. 37e5, 38b8), has clearly laid the foundation for it. But the demiurge is never called αἰώνιος, only ὡν δεῖ (34a8, cf. 37a1). Between Plato and Philo important interpretative developments have taken place. A text such as Soph.248e-249a stimulated the idea that (spiritual) life and motion and intelligence must be attributed to the world of ideas.¹ Moreover Aristotle's lyrical description of his highest god was influential: φαινέμεν δὲ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῶντα αἰδίου ἄριστον, ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰών συνεχῆς καὶ αἰδίου ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός (Met.A 7 1072b29-31, cf. De Caelo 1.9 279a23-30). Thus, when in early Middle Platonism the world of ideas was presented as thoughts in God's mind, it was only logical to regard the αἰών which Plato had attributed to the model as the measure of God's existence. See Tim.Locr.24,30 and Baltes' comments ad loc., Plut.Mor.1007C-D,392E-393B. The last-named passage speaks of God's transcendence above time with a sublimity and awe that would have done Philo proud. It is against this background of developments in the interpretation of Tim.37c-38c that Philo's brief remarks on the relation between αἰών and χρόνος, made in exegetical contexts, can be seen in full clarity.

It must not be overlooked that those Philonic texts which speak of αἰών as describing God's life or that of the κόσμος νοητός are much less frequent than those in which the word refers to an unspecified long or endless period of (cosmic) time, a usage closer to that of the LXX (cf. esp. Leg.3.25 (exeg. Gen.35:4), Fug.57 (exeg. Deut.4:4) and the comments of Whittaker op.cit.33-35; other exx. of a temporal use of αἰών at Wolfson 1.321). Philo in this follows the example of Plato, who refused to pin himself down to a rigid terminology with regard to expressions of time, sometimes to the perplexity of his interpreters (cf. Cornford 98 on 37d6). Thus when Philo speaks at Plant.8 of λόγος ὁ αἰδολος θεοῦ αἰωνίου, and at Conf.41 of the Logos as ἀθάνατον ἄνθρωπον θεοῦ ὅς τοῦ αἰδίου λόγος ὡν ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ αὐτός ἐστιν ἀφθαρτος, we may be certain

that he is attempting to distinguish between the temporality which can be assigned to God and to his intra-cosmic Logos, but that he uses different sets of terms to do so. Wolfson 1.234-235 & n.53 has difficulty systematizing these passages.

Twice already we have referred to the exemplary monograph of Whittaker, the bulk of which consists of a chapter devoted to 'God and time in Philo of Alexandria'. His particular interest lies in what Philo precisely means by the eternity of God and the noetic cosmos. Basic to the study is the distinction between eternity as infinite, non-temporal duration, which is regarded as characteristic of the Platonic forms and Aristotle's Unmoved mover, and non-durational eternity, as conceived in the *ὄλον ἄμα* of the Neoplatonists (cf. Procl. El. Theol. 53) and the *semper praesens aeternitas* of Augustine (Conf. 11. 13). His thesis is that the second conception was developed as the result of equating conscious deity with Platonic reality, as seen for example at Plut. Mor. 393A (12-13). Tim. 37c-38c provided the inspiration and terminology for the change, though itself not expressing the conception of non-durational eternity (48). Is this conception found in Philo, as one might expect on the basis of the above thesis? Whittaker reviews the texts we have cited so far and finds no grounds for such an assertion. But the words of another text, *Sacr.* 76 (on which see above II 1.2.1.) *μηδέν...παρ'αὐτῷ (θεῷ) παλαιὸν ἢ παρελθὺς, ἀλλὰ γυνόμενον τε ἀχρόνως καὶ ὑφαισθηκός*, seem to him to constitute 'a somewhat clumsily expressed version of the Neoplatonic doctrine of non-durational eternity' (45). The same can be said in my view, *pace* Whittaker 35, of the *ἐν τῷ πρὸ αἰῶνος* at *Mut.* 11-12 (exeg. Ex. 3:14-15, cf. *Mut.* 27-29). It cannot be the task of this commentary to pass judgment on the validity of Whittaker's main thesis, for such a judgment will depend more on one's interpretation of the relation between time and eternity in Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle than on the analysis of scattered passages in Philo.

5.3.3. Philo on time

Philo has firmly-held and generally consistent views on the subject of time, for which he is greatly, if not exclusively, indebted to the *Timaeus*. His conception of time has a strong objective emphasis (in this following Plato). It is considered inseparable from, though not identical with, the movement of the heavenly bodies. Man gains a sense of time because God has enabled him to contemplate these movements. From our analysis it can be seen that these views have to be gathered together from passages scattered throughout his works, most of which have a Biblical text as starting point. There are no substantial and penetrating discussions on the nature of time, nothing even remotely resembling Augustine's reflections in book XI of the *Confessions*. On the other hand, it is unwarranted to conclude that Philo has never taken the trouble to think through the question of what time is, for in that case the consistent views which emerged in our analysis could not be explained. The subject of time is above all important because of its implications for the understanding of what it means to affirm that the cosmos is created. For an understanding of what *γένεσις* means Plato's great work can serve as a guide. But the parallels between the two creation accounts with regard to the subject of time extend further, as we shall see in the following sub-section.

5.4. The creation of the heavenly bodies (Tim.38b-41a)

5.4.1. The Timaeus and the fourth day of creation

Nowhere, it might be argued, are the points of resemblance between Plato's cosmogony and the creation account of Moses so apparent as in the creation of the heavenly bodies, which according to Moses takes place on the fourth day and according to Plato after the creation of the cosmic soul. Surely no educated Greek who happened to read the words ἔστωσαν...εἰς ἡμέρας καὶ εἰς ἐνιαυτούς at Gen.1:14 could fail to be reminded of Tim.37e1,39c1-5. Conversely every devout Jew who was confronted with the statement that the heavenly bodies obeyed the demiurge's command (τὸ προσταχθὲν ἔμαθεν 38e6) must have immediately thought of the commands that God the creator issues on the various days of creation account.¹

If we look at Gen.1:14-19 and Tim.38-40d through the eyes of a contemporary of Philo, the similarities can be summarized as follows:

1. The heavenly bodies are created by God/the demiurge as part of an ordered sequence.
2. They are created to serve a purpose, i.e. overt teleology.
3. The function of the heavenly bodies is related to the measurement of time (Gen.1:14 τῆς ἡμέρας, τῆς νυκτός, εἰς ἡμέρας καὶ εἰς ἐνιαυτούς, though the word χρόνος is not used).
4. The heavenly bodies light up the heavens (cf.39b6 φαίνου, Gen.1:15,17 φαίνεν) and divide the day into day and night.
5. The sun has a special task (cf.39b4-c1, Gen.1:16).
6. The heavenly bodies exercise rulership (Gen.1:16,18, 42e2, cf. below II 6.2.2.).

But if our fictional reader was at all observant, he might also notice the following differences:

1. The greater part of the language referring to the heavenly bodies in the LXX - φωστῆρες, στερέωμα, φαῦς τῆς γῆς etc. - is not found in the Timaeus.
2. In the Genesis account the heavenly bodies do not teach man number.
3. Moses shows no interest in the science of astronomy. The names of the sun and the moon are not given, the other planets are not mentioned. That which for Plato is most important of all, the perfection and pure rationality of the heavenly motions, is of no concern to Moses.
4. Moses resolutely declines to deify the heavenly bodies (cf. Deut.4:19), whereas to Plato they are θεοὶ ὁρατοὶ (40d4).

Philo discusses Gen.1:14-19 on only two occasions, in Opif.45-61 as part of his commentary on the Mosaic creation account, and briefly at Plant.118 when discussing the Biblical virtues of the number four. Against the background of the affinities and disparities between Moses and Plato which we have just outlined, the former passage can serve as an excellent testcase for the adjudication of the extent to which Philo allows his knowledge of the Timaeus to influence the way he interprets the Biblical account.

\$45-46: Philo's comments on the seemingly illogical and unphilosophical sequence of the creation account (earth and its vegetation created before the heavenly bodies) have already been discussed above in II 5.1.1.

\$47-52: The discussion of the arithmological characteristics of the number four naturally has no equivalent in the Timaeus.

\$53-54: The mention of the illuminatory task of the heavenly bodies (εὐς φαῦσεν τῆς γῆς Gen.1:14) encourages Philo to make a digression on the benefits of light. Light is particularly beneficial to man in that, being the prerequisite for sight, it starts man on the path to philosophy (a topos derived from Tim.47a-c and discussed below at II 7.2.3.). It is a digression here because it clearly extrapolates beyond the Biblical text. Moreover its logical place in the commentary must be *after* the creation of man, as in Plato's account (cf. Opif.77-78,147).

\$55: Philo commences his direct paraphrase/explanation of the Mosaic text, beginning here with v.14. The creator looks to the form of intelligible light belonging to the ἀσώματος κόσμος and creates the visible heavenly bodies. We are meant to recall, of course, the interpretation of Gen.1:4 at Opif.31 in terms of the noetic model of the Timaeus. But the reason that Philo reiterates it precisely here has more to do with the structure of the Mosaic account than the Platonic dialogue. Gen.1:14 strongly recollects the language of Gen. 1:4-5 and Philo infers a deliberate reference to the paradigmatic light created on 'day one'. The Mosaic description φωστῆρες ἐν τῷ στερεώματι τοῦ οὐρανοῦ is converted to τοὺς αἰσθητοὺς ἀστέρας, ἀγάλματα θεῶν καὶ περικαλλέστατα, οὓς ὥσπερ ἐν ἱερῷ καθαρῳτάτῳ τῆς σωματικῆς οὐσίας ἔδρυν τῷ οὐρανῷ. The temple imagery here is inspired by Tim.37c6, Aristotle De phil.fr.14,18 Ross, and a long line of Hellenistic imitators (cf. Festugière Révélation 2.233ff., Boyancé REG 76(1963)105f.; other examples of temple imagery used for the heaven or the cosmos at Plant.50, Her.75, Spec.1.66, Aet.73, QE 2.85 etc., on which see Früchtel 69ff.; the first of these texts, exegesis of Ex.15:17, reminds us that Philo's conception of the cosmos or the heaven as a temple also has significant Biblical and Judaic roots, e.g. Ps.10:4). At the same time it must be noted that Philo makes no attempt to avoid the deification of the heavenly bodies (cf. the description θεοὶ αἰσθητοὶ at Opif.27, Spec.1.19-20 (note the context!) etc.). The functions of the heavenly bodies are derived directly from Gen.1:14 and are four in number: τὸ φωσφορεῖν, to be σημεῖα, to fix the καιροί, to indicate the μέτρα χρόνου and the ἀριθμοὺ φύσιν. In the paragraphs that follow Philo deals with these one by one.

\$56-57: The light-bearing heavenly bodies are divided into two groups. On its own the sun rules the day like a great king (cf. Gen.1:16, the comparison is a typically Philonic addition), while the night is entrusted to the moon and the stars. Philo is paraphrasing Gen.1.16-18.

\$58-59: Brief description of the function of the heavenly bodies as providing σημεῖα. Philo interprets σημεῖα as referring to meteorological phenomena, not astrological information (of such doctrines he is frequently critical, cf. Prov.1.77-88 and below II 6.2.2.). Compare Plato's critical remark on φόβους καὶ σημεῖα τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα γενησομένων at 40c9-d1, which is directed at both superstitious beliefs and astrological practices. Philo ends by alluding directly to the Biblical text, ὡς ἀφευδέστατα λελέχθαι ὅτι γεγονάσιν "εἰς σημεῖα" οὐ ἀστέρες (v.14). Only the words εἰς σημεῖα are Mosaic (C-W's place-

ment of γεγονόσιν εἰς σημεῖα in quotation marks is incorrect). We suddenly realize that he is quietly avoiding the crude vocabulary of the LXX, such as φωστῆρες and the phrase ἔστωσαν εἰς σημεῖα. The use of φωστῆρες to denote the stars would seem as uncultivated in the educated ears of Philo as the words 'twinkler' or 'beamer' would to us. The word is replaced by the conventional (and Platonic) ἀστέρες (also found in v.16).

§59: Even briefer description of the function of the heavenly bodies to indicate καιροῦ. Once again Philo lifts the inoffensive phrase εἰς καιρούς from the Biblical text (v.14).

§60: Philo's treatment of the function of the heavenly bodies as indicating the measurement of time and number is also very brief. Here the influence of the *Timaeus* returns. The expression ἡμέραι καὶ μῆνες καὶ ἐνιαυτοῦ is actually a 'cross' between the Mosaic εἰς ἡμέρας καὶ εἰς ἐνιαυτούς (v.14) and the Platonic ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας καὶ μῆνας καὶ ἐνιαυτούς (37e1, cf.39c1-5). For μέτρα χρόνου cf.39b2, for ἡ ἀριθμοῦ φύσις cf.39b6,47a6. The LXX speaks of day and night, days and years, but not, as we noted above, of time and number. Philo as commentator introduces these concepts – the Greek cosmological background is assumed, cf. esp. τεταγμένους περιόδους – but decides not to digress into the related philosophical thematics.

§61: Concluding summary. Not all the functions of the heavenly bodies can be comprehended by man's limited understanding, but we may be sure that they all contribute to the preservation of the whole, operating according to God's immutable ordinances.

Plant.118 paraphrases Gen.1:14-19 in a manner very similar to Opif.55,60. Mosaic language is wholly avoided (note ἐρώτατον χρόνον τῶν ἀστέρων).

On the basis of the above analysis we must conclude that Philo, though quite well aware of the similarities between Moses' and Plato's accounts, chooses to adhere rather closely to the text on which he is commenting. To be sure, the language of the LXX is deliberately avoided and the familiar terms and phrases from the *Timaeus* and later Hellenistic writings take its place. But when expounding the functions and general significance of the heavenly beings Philo retains the demarcations of the Biblical account. The abstract conceptions of time and number are briefly introduced, but they are not used as a springboard for penetrating discussions or speculation on astronomical or philosophical subjects. And so the reader who turns to these comments on the fourth day of creation in the hope that he will discover there Philo's answers to the problem of the relation of time to the creational process, for example, will find his expectations disappointed.

5.4.2. The astronomy of the *Timaeus*

Plato did not write the *Timaeus* with the intention of presenting an astronomical text-book. His aim is strictly philosophical. In order to demonstrate the perfection and rationality of the movements of the heavenly bodies, he crams a considerable amount of astronomical information into the space of a few pages. Much of this information was technically difficult. In later

antiquity it was the task of commentaries and handbooks to make these doctrines accessible to readers less well versed in the technicalities of Greek astronomical science. The best example of such works still extant is the work of Theon of Smyrna, whose title clearly indicates its purpose: Τὰ κατὰ τὸ μαθηματικὸν χρῆσιμα εἰς τὴν Πλάτωνος ἀνάγνωσιν (the commentary of Cornford fills the same need today).

Philo calls astronomy 'the queen of the sciences', because it is concerned with the study of the heavens, 'the best and greatest of created things' (Congr.50, from the etymology of Milcah Gen.22:23). His knowledge of astronomy, as indicated by scattered references in his writings, is more than adequate, and no doubt is typical of the knowledge of the well-educated gentleman of his time.

See the informative remarks of Alexandre PAL 121-123. Festugière underrates his competence in the comments at Révélation 2.530-533. Translators too are sometimes unable to appreciate Philo's acquaintance with technical astronomical expressions. An example at Spec.3.188, where Mangey, Heinemann and Colson have overlooked the fact that κατὰ πλάτος is a technical term for the latitudinal movement of the sun (and other planets) along the circle of the ecliptic between the tropics of Cancer and Capricorn (cf. Theon Expos.math.134.18,135.12,19 Hiller); the translation of Mosès FE 25.179 is correct. Another example is Whitaker's translation (EE 1.41) of Opif.54 τῶν δ' ἀνομοίως τε καὶ ὑπεναντίως διτταῖς περιόδοις χρωμένων as 'sped round in two revolutions out of harmony with each other', which is *very* wrong when one realizes that the following words speak of 'the rhythmic dances of all these...'. Arnaldez' version (FE 1.175 is to be preferred: 'les autres dissemblablement et en sens contraire avec une double révolution'). ἀνομοίως is used here slightly differently than at 36d6; for ὑπεναντίως as technical term cf. Theon 163.18 Hiller etc. (derived from 38d4,39b1, but the aspect of retrogradation is ignored).

This knowledge would seem to have been sufficient to allow him to follow the details of Plato's hypothesis that the movements of the heavenly bodies are perfectly regular and mathematically determinable. Occasionally in a fragment of exegesis we glimpse a term or phrase that Philo may have drawn from Plato's account. At QE 2.75, in giving an explanation of the construction of the candlestick, he is reminded by the phrase ἐκ πλαγίων (Ex.25:32) of the *obliquity* of the Zodiacal ecliptic in relation to the tropics. We recall that Plato describes the motion of the circle of the different (in the plane of the ecliptic) as oblique (πλαγίαν 39a1) to the motion of the circle of the same (in the same plane as the tropics and the equator). Cf. also the exegesis of στρέφομαι and στρεπτός noted above in II 5.2.1. on Cher.25.

But the Timaeus is clearly not Philo's only or even main source of information on astronomical matters. This is well illustrated by the names and the order which he gives the planetary bodies. Plato adopts the Pythagorean order and gives them the mythological names (38d1-6). Philo prefers the Chaldean order (it suits the symbolism of the candlestick much better, cf. Her.224 and Harl FE 15.274n.3) and the scientific names introduced after Plato's death (cf.

on Cher.22 above at II 5.2.1.; also used at QE 2.75, on which Festugière Révélation 2.533 is misled by Aucher's translation). Philo is following the general consensus of opinion in the astronomical science of his day (cf. P. Boyancé, Études sur le songe de Scipion (Bordeaux 1936) 59-65, 97-100, Alexandre PAL 122). At the same time he also had religious reasons for preferring the scientific names.

5.4.3. The genera of animals (39e-40a)

The cosmos must have, according to Plato, just as many genera of animals as the noetic model possesses, namely four: μία μὲν οὐράνιον θεῶν γένος, ἄλλη δὲ πῆλιν καὶ ἀεροπόρον, τρίτη δὲ ἑνυδρίον εἶδος, πεζὸν δὲ καὶ χερσαῖον τέταρτον (39e6-40a2). That Plato has in mind the correspondence of the γένη ζώων with the four elements, and by implication the four regions of the cosmos, is clear not only from the way he describes them, but also from the fact that he directly goes on to say that the divine genus was made for the most part from fire. Plato's schematic presentation of the correspondence between animal genera, elements and cosmic regions thus has a pleasing simplicity. In Philo's writings a more complex situation is encountered.

From the texts Det.151-154 (exeg. Gen.4:14), Her.139-140 (exeg. Gen.15:10), 238 (exeg. Gen.15:11), Spec.3.8, 4.118 (Lev.11:13ff.) it is apparent that Philo too sees a correspondence between the elemental regions of the cosmos and the animal genera that inhabit them. In these texts the genera, in as far as they are mentioned, agree with Plato's quartet.

Of greater interest and importance is the way that Philo deals with the creation of the γένη ζώων as recounted in the Mosaic account of creation. Aside from the heavenly bodies made on the fourth day (which Moses does not regard as ζῷα), these are created on the fifth and sixth days (Gen.1:20-31). Once again the parallels between Moses and Plato must have struck Philo. Just like Moses Plato discusses the various genera of animals just after the coming into being of the celestial bodies (39e-40a), even though their actual creation is left to 91d-92c (and then only in reference to the doctrine of metempsychosis). Moreover he appears to have taken Moses' repeated use of the phrase κατὰ γένος or κατὰ γένη as at least partially parallel to Plato's reference to the various γένη or εἶδη of animals at 39e10 (§62 τὰ θνητὰ γένη etc.; cf. Alb. Did.16.1 τρία τὰ λοιπὰ γένη ζώων... ἅπερ ἔμελλε θνητὰ ἔσεσθαι).¹ Thus in Opif. 62-68 eager use is made of Plato's theory of a correspondence between the genera of animals and the elements and regions of the cosmos. It provides a

theoretical framework, in which the exegete can insert further information relevant to the Biblical account (and mostly drawn from other sources than the Timaeus). The following points are of interest for our inquiry.

1. When Philo describes the creation of the ζῷα in §62-64 the generic names he uses are virtually the same as those found in the Timaeus (cf. 39b10-40a2 quoted above): §62 τὰ ἔνυδρα, §63 τὰ γένη τῶν πτηνῶν, τῶν ἀεροπόρων, §64 τὰ χερσαῖα. Once again we note the tendency to avoid the exotic and crude language of the LXX. Only twice does Philo make any reference to the terminology and nomenclature of the Mosaic text: the reference to γένη κτηνῶν in §63, cf. v.21 (but ἰχθύων γένη not found there, cf. Tim.92b6); the paraphrase of v. 24-25 in §64, ἐξαγαγέτω ἡ γῆ κτήνη καὶ θηρία καὶ ἑρπετὰ κατ'ἕλαστον γένος (the strange expression ψυχὴν ζῶσαν is omitted; in Leg.2.11 the verse is more accurately quoted). Also in §65-68 the Platonic generic names continue to be used.

2. It is appropriate, says Philo, that the mortal genera of animals should be created on the fifth day (§62). There is a strong συγγένεια between animals and the number five, for it symbolizes αἰσθησις and the five senses. But Moses records the animals as being created on both the fifth and sixth days. This is awkward, on account of the numerical symbolism and on account of the (Platonic) schema of the three mortal genera grouped together. Consequently Philo makes *no reference at all* to the fact that the land animals and man were created on the sixth day.

3. In §65-68 Philo makes much of the beautiful 'chain of sequence' which Moses used in describing the creation of the animals. Man is the climax of creation (cf. also §77-88), and before him the animals are created in an *ascending* sequence of increasing elaboration and sophistication - fishes, birds, land animals. In Plato's account the creation of man is the climax from the literary and philosophical point of view, but the actual creational sequence is clearly *descending* - cosmic soul, heavenly bodies, lesser gods, man, woman, birds, beasts, reptiles, fishes; see further below II 10.2.1-3.

There are, however, in Philo's writings three other passages which, proceeding from the same schematic correspondence between elements, cosmic regions and animal genera, reach results quite different from the Timaeus.

Fig.6-11 (exeg. Gen.6:2): The cosmos must be wholly filled with life (ἐψυχῶσθαι) and each part must have its appropriate ζῷα - earth τὰ χερσαῖα, water τὰ ἔνυδρα, fire τὰ πυρίγονα, heaven the stars. The air, as the only region not yet mentioned, cannot be deserted, and in fact contains the invisible souls which philosophers call demons and Moses angels (hence the exegesis, for Philo reads ἄγγελου, not υἱοῦ in the LXX text; on the entire passage see now V.Nikiprowetzky, 'Sur une lecture démonologique de Philon d'Alexandrie, De

gigantibus 6-18' Hommage à Georges Vadjá (Louvain 1980) 43-71). The basis of this schema is the Aristotelian universe with five elements and as many cosmic regions. The semi-divine δαίμονες replace Plato's winged creatures (i.e. birds).

Somn.1.134-141 (exeg. Gen.28:12, Jacob's ladder): This passage is almost entirely parallel to the first (it is perhaps derived from the same source), except that the fire-dwellers are left out, i.e. the universe here has only four elements and as many τμήματα (§135). The air is the abode of incorporeal souls, invisible to the eye, of which some are disembodied human souls, other demons or angels (§138-141).

Plant.12-14: The final passage, part of the 'phytological excursus', differs only marginally from the earlier two, and once again could come from the same or a similar source. Philo reverts to a five element/cosmic region schema and the πνεύματα make a reappearance. But this time the air has two kinds of inhabitants, visible winged creatures and invisible incorporeal souls. Cf. also Aet.45 where five types of ζῷα are mentioned.

It is apparent that the direct inspiration of these three passages is not the Timaeus. Certainly Plato supplied the basic principles. But it must have been felt that the Timaeus did not assign a sufficiently distinctive place to the demons, whose existence is virtually ignored in the work (brief mention only at 40d4). Yet demonology had received Plato's imprimatur, for in Symp. 202e he had attached much importance to the mediating function of demons. Thus soon after Plato's death modifications were made to his schema, making room for demons and also allowing the possibility of a five-element universe: cf. Epinomis 984a-985b (Philip of Opus?), Aristotle (De phil.fr.21 Ross, cf. fr.21-22 Untersteiner), Xenocrates (see above I 4. & n.27). There resulted a long and complex tradition of development which has proved extremely difficult to unravel. The resultant confusion is well illustrated by Albinus Did.15.1, 16.1 and Apuleius De Plat.204-205, De Deo Socr.137-140, both of whom are Platonists professing to adhere to the doctrines of Plato. The similarities between Philo and Apuleius suggest that Philo's source could have been a Middle Platonist work, but the lines of development are so obscure that this cannot be considered certain.

On the tradition of development see further: Bousset Schulbetrieb 14-22; Jaeger Aristoteles 146-149; K.Reinhardt, Kosmos und Sympathie (Munich 1926) 61-86; W.Lameere, 'Sur un passage de Philon d'Alexandrie (De plantatione 1-6)' Mnemosyne 4.4(1951)73-80; J.Beaudeau, Apulée: Opuscules philosophiques et fragments (Paris 1973) 219-222; L.Tarán Academica 43-47, 159-163; J.Den Boeft, Calcidius on demons (Commentarius ch.127-136) Philosophia antiqua 33 (Leiden 1977).

We conclude, therefore, that in Philo's use of the doctrine of the correspondence between animal genera, elements and cosmic regions, the Timaeus makes its influence felt in two ways. In Opif. the influence can be direct,

because Moses makes no mention of the creation of angels (or demons) in his creational account. In other texts the influence is felt primarily via an interpretative tradition, just as in the case of the Platonists mentioned above. Exegetical constraint plays a decisive role here. In the exegesis of the passages in Gig. and Somn.I it is crucial that the place of the angels in the universe be indicated, so Philo reproduces the schema which gives them their own cosmic region. On the subject of the γένη ζώων in Philo see also the useful discussion at Schmidt 17-28 (with references to many texts).

A basic philosophical principle involved in Plato's doctrine is lucidly expressed at Prov.2.110, where Philo replies to Alexander's accusation that the purposeless extravagance of nature forms an invitation to the (unphilosophical) desires of the palate (Greek preserved by Eusebius):²

ἀναγκαῖον μὲν γὰρ ἦν εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου συμπλήρωσιν, ἵνα γενήται κόσμος, ἐν ἐκάστῳ μέρει φῦναι ζώων ἰδέας ἀπάντων.

Here is a testimony to what A.O.Lovejoy in his celebrated study, The great chain of being (52), called the *principle of plenitude*, initiated by the Timaeus (39e-40a, 41b, 92c) and destined to have a long and brilliant career in the history of ideas. The cosmos, as image of the model, manifests as many genera of living beings as exhaust the possibilities available with the limitations of the cosmos' structure. Philo's words cited above echo at a distance Tim.92c 5-6, θνητὰ γὰρ καὶ ἀθάνατα ζῶα λαβὼν καὶ συμπληρωθεὶς ὁδε ὁ κόσμος οὕτω. See also Gig.7, Conf.179 (here cf. also Tim.41b), Somn.1.135, 2.116, Abr.2 τελεῖ - ὁτατον καὶ πληρέστατον ὁ κόσμος. The Jewish doctrine of the fulness of God's creation (e.g. Ps.23:1, 49:12, 103:24-25) is also relevant here. It is reflected in the copious lyricism of Philo's descriptions of the cosmos and its parts (e.g. Spec.3.185-188). But his conviction that the perfection and completeness of the cosmos is the reflection of its *rational* structure - as seen *inter alia* in the correspondence of elements, cosmic regions and genera of animals - is peculiarly Greek, and is ultimately derived from the Timaeus.

A final text which is of interest in this context is the definition of the cosmos attributed to Plato in Prov.1.21. We give an English translation and a Greek retranslation (aided by Weitenberg), followed by some notes.

And the cosmos according to Plato is a concord¹ of heaven and earth and the natures in it,² consisting of fire and of earth and of water and of air,³ and of gods and of demons and of men and of animals and of plants and of matter.⁴

κόσμος μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ κατὰ Πλάτωνα ὁμόνοιά τις ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἐκ γῆς καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ (or αὐτῇ) φύσεων, συνεσθηκυῖα ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ ἐκ γῆς καὶ ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ ἐξ ἀέρος, καὶ ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἐκ δαιμόνων καὶ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἐκ θρεμμάτων καὶ ἐκ φυτῶν καὶ ἐξ ὕλης.

Notes

1. All parallel definitions use the word σύστημα (cf. Aet.4, Diog.Laert.7.138, Ps.Arist.De mundo 2 391b9). Aucher cites an Armenian version of the last text

which translates σύστημα with a different word than that used in Prov.1.21. That word indicates the unity and coherence of the cosmos, representing ὁμόνοια, ὁμολογία, συμφωνία *vel sim.*

2. Literally 'in it' (gender indistinct, so it can refer to cosmos, heaven or earth); but the parallel passages have ἐν αὐτοῖς or ἐν τούτοις, so the emendation 'in them' is probable.

3. As Baltes 36 notes, this is the Platonic sequence; cf. Tim.32b3.

4. Aucher's text gives the word for 'and' in italics, i.e. it is his own conjecture. It is quite unexpected to find ὅλη concluding the list of contents (presumably in the meaning of 'inanimate material'). Should we conjecture 'and plants, <made> out of ὅλη'? The use of ἐκ or ἐξ thirteen times and καὶ ten or eleven times in one sentence is not fluent, and seems hardly Philonic.

Hadas-Lebel FE 35.144 comments on this text:

'Bien qu'une semblable définition de l'univers se retrouve chez Chrysippe et Posidonios, on ne peut dire que son attribution à Platon soit le fruit d'une inadvertance ou d'un anachronisme, car elle est tout à fait dans l'esprit du Timée.'

This remark is basically correct, but two aspects make the description 'tout à fait' exaggerated: (1) the mention of the demons shows the interposition of the interpretative tradition; (2) no attempt is made to locate a correspondence between the elements out of which the cosmos is made and the genera of animals located in them, as Plato had done in the Timaeus.

CHAPTER SIX

TIMAEUS 41A-42E: THE DEMIURGE'S SPEECH AND FINAL CREATIVE ACT

6.0. Introductory

6.1. The demiurge addresses the assembled gods (Tim.41a-d)

6.1.1. The cosmos will not be destroyed (41a-b)

6.1.2. γένεσις and φθορά

6.1.3. βούλησις

6.1.4. δεσμός

6.1.5. πρόνοια

6.2. The young gods (Tim.41c-d,42d-e)

6.2.1. The creator's assistants

6.2.2. The heavenly bodies as ἄρχοντες (42e)

6.2.3. Parents as subordinate creators

6.3. The demiurge's final act and retirement (Tim.41d-42e)

6.3.1. Some use of imagery

6.3.2. The seventh day of creation

6.0. Introductory

The demiurge addresses the assembled visible and invisible gods which he has created in a solemn and stately speech. True immortality cannot be conferred on them, he declares, but nevertheless they will not die, for his will is a stronger bond than the forces of dissolution. Their task is now to complete the demiurge's work. They are commanded to create the mortal genera of animals, which the demiurge cannot create (for in that case these would become equal to the gods). The demiurge's final task is to create man's divine part (θεῖον 41c7), the rational part or νοῦς (made from the same ingredients as the cosmic soul, but in an impurer mix). Plato describes the creation of the rational soul and its pre-incarnate education in highly mythical terms, deliberately reminiscent of the eschatological myths in the Republic and Phaedrus and containing the same emphasis on theodicy (41e4,42d3). Having carried out the creative tasks appropriate to him, the demiurge retires and continues to abide in his accustomed state.

At this point we should remind the reader that the primary aim of this study is to examine the influence on Philo of the Timaeus as an account of the

creation and structural organization of the cosmos and man (see above I 5.1.c). My intention is not to dwell at length on the eschatological or ethical aspects of Plato's doctrine of man, for there he mainly recapitulates what he had written in the Phaedo, Republic and Phaedrus. In these areas Philo has learnt more from those dialogues than from the Timaeus, as the study of Billings has amply shown.

6.1. The demiurge addresses the assembled gods (Tim.41a-d)

6.1.1. The cosmos will not be destroyed (41a-d)

The first part of the demiurge's speech – in which he affirms that what has been bound together cannot be indissoluble, but assures the gods that they will not taste death, because his will (βούλησις) is a stronger bond (δεσμός) than the bonds with which they were bound at birth (ὅτ' ἐγένεσθε 41b6) – is one of the texts of the Timaeus to which Philo most frequently alludes. In analysing this usage our procedure will be as follows. We shall commence by examining the one text where Philo actually quotes Tim.41a-b verbatim. This passage can show us the major themes which are extracted from Plato's words. Having given a list of other passages which allude to Tim.41a-b, we shall proceed to investigate these themes one by one in the sub-sections that follow.

At Aet.13 the words of Tim.41a7-b6 are quoted as part of the doxography presented in the introductory section of that philosophical treatise. Philo seems anxious to give chapter and verse, for he not only introduces the citation with Plato's name (required in the doxographical sequence), but also adds the locations ἐν Τιμαίῳ and δὲ τῆς θεοκρεποῦς ἐκκλησίας.

For the second of these references I have not been able to find any direct parallels. In later antiquity the scene was generally referred to as the δημιουργία (Cl.Alex.Str.5.102.3, Procl.in Tim.3.199.11). Here is undoubtedly present the tendency to Homicize the setting of Plato's myth (cf. esp. the discourse of Zeus in Il.8.5-27). The notion of the divine assembly is also not foreign to the LXX, e.g. at Ps.81:1 ὁ θεὸς ἔστη ἐν συναγωγῇ θεῶν, ἐν μέσῳ δὲ θεοῦ διακρίνει (cf. Job 1:6,2:1, Or.c.Cels.8.3). We shall see below in II 6.2.1. that Philo regards the plurals at Gen.1:26,3:22,11:7 as indicating that God is conversing with a team of assistants. The word he uses to describe this activity (διαλέγεσθαι, Conf.168, Fug.69) is also used by Neoplatonists to describe the Platonic discourse (cf. Boyancé cited on Fug.69).

If we take the text given in C-W Philo's quotation differs from the received Platonic text in four respects:

<u>Plato</u>	<u>Philo</u>
41a7 οὐ ἐμοῦ γινόμενα ἅλута	ἅλута
41a8 ἐθέλοντος	θέλοντος

41b3 οὕτω μὲν δὴ
41b5 ὅτ' ἐγγίνεσθε

οὕτω γε μὴν
ὅτε ἐγγίνεσθε

Of these differences only the first is important. Burnet's reading is supported by all the Platonic mss., but the majority of ancient citations share Philo's omission of $\delta\upsilon'$ ἐμοῦ γενόμενα. The third change no doubt occurred under the influence of 41b1. If, however, we take a closer look at the first few lines of Philo's quote, it becomes apparent that Philonic editors have tended to correct the mss. readings by introducing readings taken from the Platonic text. We cite these lines as given in C-W:

θεοὺ θεῶν, <ῶν> ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων, ἅλυστα ἐμοῦ γε μὴ θέλοντος. τὸ μὲν οὖν δὴ δεθέν πᾶν λυτόν, τό γε μὴν καλῶς ἀρμοσθέν...

θεοὺ θεῶν: All mss. have θεὸς θεῶν.

<ῶν>: Added by Turnebus from Plato.

ἅλυστα: Colson EE 9.526 conjectures <ᾶ> ἅλυστα, together with the punctuation θεοῦ, θεῶν... and the deletion of <ῶν>.

ἐμοῦ γε μὴ θέλοντος: This reading, given by Cohn on the basis of the Platonic text, is in fact found in none of the mss.; MHP (and also Bernays and Cumont) read ἐμοῦ μὴ θέλοντος, U (and Mangey) ἐμοῦ γε θέλοντος. The Platonic mss. are divided between ἐμοῦ γε μὴ θέλοντος and ἐμοῦ γε ἐθέλοντος. Burnet wrongly cites Philo in favour of the former reading. Curiously the Philonic text is corrected on the basis of the Platonic text, but an edition of that text cites the corrected Philonic text for support.

δὴ δεθέν: All mss. have μὴ δεθέν, corrected by Turnebus.

The first two changes are certainly defensible, but not compelling. The word ῶν could have easily dropped out by accident. It is eminently likely that Christian scribes changed θεοῦ to the singular (the same has happened to the same quote at Hippolytus Philos. 19.7-8 (Diels Dox.Gr. 568.2,7 twice emends to θεοῦ); cf. the unreliability of Patristic citations of Philo noted by Harl FE 15.158-159). At Ebr. 150 a quote from Hesiod has been altered in three ways in order to convert θεοῦ to θεός. It is very difficult to determine whether this was done by Philo or by the mss. tradition. In the text now being discussed Philo is certainly endeavouring to reproduce Plato's words. But the opening sentence of the quote is notoriously difficult to construe (cf. Cornford 367-370). It is not impossible that Philo may have been inclined to make a small change to make the meaning clear. I tentatively suggest that he read θεός θεῶν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων, <ᾶ> ἅλυστα... (partially following Colson; Plato's statement would then become somewhat similar to well-known Pentateuchal texts such as Deut. 5:6, 10:17). Cf. Spec. 1.20, ὅς οὐ μόνον θεός θεῶν ἐστὶ νοητῶν καὶ αἰσθητῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντων δημιουργός. With regard to the third change I would prefer to follow the majority of the mss., as Bernays and Cumont did. The fourth correction is evidently necessary.

The reason that Philo quotes this Platonic text is to prove that according to Plato the cosmos is created (γενητός) but not to be destroyed (ἀφθαρτός). The words of the demiurge are thus applied not only to the created gods but to the cosmos as a whole, an entirely justifiable extrapolation in the light of the parallel statement at 32c3-4, ὥστε εἰς ταῦτόν αὐτῷ συνελθὼν ἅλυστον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἄλλου πλὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ συνδήσαντος γενέσθαι. It is moreover clear that there is no difference of view between Plato and Moses on this issue, for also Moses affirms (Gen. 1:1, 8:22) that the cosmos is γενητός καὶ ἀφθαρτός (§19). Indeed Philo's explanation of Gen. 8:22, in which he locates Moses' doctrine of the ἀφθαρσία τοῦ κόσμου, contains an echo of Plato's words (μοίρας ἀθανάτου λόγοντες. cf. 41b2.4).

The only comment given on the Platonic quotation by Philo is that he refuses to accept a didactic or hypothetical interpretation of Plato's doctrine of genesis (§14; see above II 2.1.3.). But analysis of the doxography and of other Philonic passages shows that he has chosen these particular words with deliberate care, because to his mind they contain no less than five doctrines within the space of a few lines, all of which are relevant to the problematics of the De aeternitate mundi (cf. Runia 126): (1) the cosmos as a whole, if not all its contents, is created by God as δημιουργός and πατήρ (cf. also 28c3); (2) all that has been created and bound together is fundamentally perishable; (3) the indestructibility of the cosmos as a whole and of some of its parts is nevertheless guaranteed by the βούλησις of the creator; (4) the creator is (or possesses) a δεσμός which binds the cosmos together and holds the forces of dissolution at bay; (5) the indestructibility of the cosmos is the result of God's providential activity. The first of these doctrines we have already dealt with at some length in relation to Tim.28b-c,29e-30a. The other four themes will be examined in more detail in II 6.1.2-5.

The remaining Philonic texts in which these themes are mentioned and in which the influence of Tim.41a-b is perceptible can be divided into two groups: (1) passages which verbally allude to Plato - Conf.166 (exeg. Gen.4:13 τοῦ ἀφ'ἐξῆνα), Migr.181, Her.23 (etymology δεσπότης, Gen.15:2), 246, Decal.58, Aet.19; (2) passages which do not refer directly to the Platonic text but utilize the themes found there - Sacr.40, Her.188, Fug.112, Somn.1.158, Mos.2.61, Spec.2.5, Prov.1.19, QG 2.15 (exeg. Gen.7:4), QE 2.106 (cf.89-90). It is interesting to observe that, although the majority of the above passages are located in the exegetical treatises and are found in exegetical contexts, they are on the whole not called forth in order to explain specific Biblical texts or words (exceptions Conf.166, Her.23, QG 2.15) but to place Biblical passages in the perspective of the doctrine of the indestructibility of the cosmos, which at Aet.19 is specifically ascribed to Moses on the basis of Gen.8:22.

A final aspect of Aet.13 must not escape our notice, namely that the Platonic doxographicum is introduced by an anonymous φασί. Without doubt Philo is indicating the traditional nature of his doxographical material (cf. §12 ἔνιοι λέγουσι, §17 ἔνιοι νομίζουσιν; see above II 2.1.3.). We shall not go astray, however, if we see in this little word also a reference to the popularity of the text Tim.41a-b in demonstrating Plato's doctrine of the ἀφθαρσία of the cosmos. The same can be deduced from Her.246, where Philo does not report his own opinion or that of Plato, but the endless wranglings of the sophists who cannot settle among themselves whether the cosmos is uncreated or created, destructible or eternal. Philo's words - φθαρτὸν...φύσει, μηδέποτε

δὲ φθαρσόμενον διὰ τὸ κραταιότερῳ δεσμῷ, τῇ τοῦ πεποιηκότος βουλήσει, συνέχεσθαι – are very similar to the manner in which the doxographer Aëtius records Plato's view on the topic εἰ ἄφθαρτος ὁ κόσμος (Plac.2.4.2), except that in the latter πρόνοια has replaced δεσμῷ and βουλήσει (cf. Tim.Locr.9). Here too the emphasis has shifted from the heavenly bodies to the cosmos as a whole.

The doctrine of cosmic ἀφθαρσία and the use of Tim.41a-b occur together frequently in Middle Platonist writings; cf. Seneca Ep.58:27-29 (citing a Platonist source), Diog.Laert.3.72 (on which see Baltes 70f.), Plut.Mor.393F, 927E, 1002C, Alb.Did.15.2, Apul.De Plat.198 (referring to the parallel text Tim.32c), Iuncus apud Stob.Ecl.5.1107.19ff, Att.fr.4(\$5,14), 25,32. It must be agreed with Baltes 37 that Philo in his use of Tim.41a-b is reflecting Middle Platonist 'Schuldogma', which formulated the results of discussions that go back to Aristotle and the Old Academy. 'Schuldogma' should not, however, be taken to mean that the subject was no longer a matter for discussion or controversy, as the violent polemic of Atticus against Aristotle and his followers shows. Also in Patristic literature Tim.41a-b was copiously used; cf. Justin Dial.5.4, Or.c.Cels.6.10, Geffcken Zwei griechischen Apologeten 175.

6.1.2. γένεσις and φθορά

Axiomatic in Greek philosophy since the time of Parmenides of Elea are the two fundamental principles: (1) γένεσις entails φθορά; (2) σύνθεσις/σύνδεσις entails δολύσις. The latter principle Plato explicitly declares at 41a8-b1 (τὸ δὴ δεθὲν πᾶν λυτόν), the former is not stated in as many words but may be recognized in the words ἐκείνων (sc. δεσμῶν) οἷς ὅτ' ἐγένεσθε συνδεῖσθε at 41b5-6 (cf. 28a3 γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον).

Philo is not one to quarrel with such venerable principles, and both are indicated with reference to the Platonic passage: (1) Decal.58 γένεσις δὲ φθορᾶς ἀρχή, ἅν... (cf. Fug.161, Spec.2.166, QG 1.10); (2) Her.23 δολαυτὰ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν (cf. Her.188 χαῦνα ἐξ ἑαυτῶν). A third related principle, of the same remote antiquity, cannot be directly associated with Tim.41a-b, but is implicit there and is no less important for the nature of Plato's cosmological account. Philo states it with warm approval at Aet.5, ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν γίνεται, οὐδ' εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν φθείρεται (cf. Spec.1.266). The cosmos, if created, can only be created from a pre-existent chaos, and, if destroyed, can only be reduced to a post-existent chaos. As we saw above in II 3.2.2., Philo remains true to this principle when he envisages the possibility of the destruction of the cosmos at Prov.1.90. See further below II 8.2.2.

6.1.3. βούλησις

In a number of texts Philo associates God's will or purpose with the fact that the cosmos will not be destroyed. How terrible it is for the soul to be abandoned by God (cf. Gen.4:13), who binds all things with the chains of his powers, αἷς τὰ πάντα σφίγγας ἅλυστα εἶναι βεβούληται (Conf.166, σφίγγας cf. Tim. 58a7, ἅλυστα 41a8). The earth, heavenly bodies and whole universe will remain forever untouched by age, being preserved according to the purpose (γνώμη) of their creator (Spec.2.5). See also Mos.2.61, QG 2.15 (both texts with regard to the flood!), and the view of cosmic ἀφθαρσία disputed by the sophists at Her.246 (quoted in II 6.1.1.).

That there are not more texts can be explained by the fact that Philo closely associates the theme of God's preserving will with the doctrine of providence. βούλησις and πρόνοια are really two ways of describing the same divine activity, both intimately connected with the creation and the preservation of the cosmos. The passage at Spec.4.187, already discussed above in II 3.1.4. in relation to God's will exercised in the creation of the cosmos, is most instructive:

τὸ γὰρ ἔπεσθαι θεῷ τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ κακείνῳ δύναντι μὲν ἐστὶ δρᾶν ἐκότερα, βούλεται δὲ μόνον ἀγαθὰ. μηνύει δὲ ἡ τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις τε καὶ διοίκησις· τὰ γὰρ μὴ ὄντα ἐκάλειπεν εἰς τὸ εἶναι τάξιν ἐξ ἀταξίας... ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐπιμελὲς αὐτῷ καὶ ταῖς εὐεργέτισιν αὐτοῦ δυνάμεσι τὸ πλημμελὲς τῆς χειρόνους οὐσίας μεταποιεῖν καὶ μεθαρμόζεσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἀμείνω.

God's will and goodness are shown in the creation of the cosmos and *continue unabated* in the providential administration of what he has made, being revealed in the perpetual process of converting the worse to the better. The perpetuity of God's works, inasmuch as they are not subject to the processes of genesis and decay in the sublunary world, is thus guaranteed, in full agreement with the words spoken by the demiurge in Tim.41a-b.

At the same time we cannot avoid the question of whether God's will to preserve the cosmos from decay and destruction is absolute and unconditional. Does God's goodness prevent him from exercising his full powers, for example in wishing to punish the cosmos for its wickedness, as in the days of Noah (Gen.6:3-7)? Such a limitation is indeed implied in the beginning of the passage just quoted, which seems to make a compromise between the Platonic doctrine of non-contingency and the Jewish conception of divine omnipotence (according to which God's people must supplicate God for mercy and the preservation of his works; cf. Ps.137:8, QG 2.13). This problem is particularly acute in relation to the treatise Prov.I. In §19 Philo writes: 'Since all created bodies (i.e. all the parts of the universe) are of this nature, they *easily* undergo the necessary change of corruption, when he who created them *wishes*

to bring destruction upon them.' Hadas-Lebel FE 35.142 correctly remarks: 'La corruption dépend donc, avant tout, du vouloir du Créateur. C'est un point sur lequel notre auteur s'écarter de la Stoa pour rejoindre Platon.' But if the threatened $\phi\theta\omicron\rho\acute{\alpha}$ is applicable also to the heavenly bodies and the cosmos as a whole (as is implicit), then Philo unquestionably departs from orthodox Platonism. The eschatological perspective of this treatise is difficult to rhyme with the doctrine of $\acute{\alpha}\phi\theta\alpha\rho\acute{\sigma}\iota\alpha$ accredited with great clarity and some force to Plato and Moses in Aet.13-19.

Some comparisons can elucidate Philo's position. The Middle Platonist Atticus, arguing against Aristotle and Aristotelianizing Platonists, twice cites Tim.41a-b and heavily emphasizes the importance of the notion of God's $\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ (fr.4). $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ and $\phi\theta\omicron\rho\acute{\alpha}$ certainly belong together, but if something has come into being, that does not mean it will perish, and if something does not perish, that does not mean that it is uncreated (§8). It is the will of the demiurgic creator that ensures that what is created does not perish. As a good Platonist he refuses to entertain the thought that the cosmos might ever undergo destruction, for to wish to destroy something that has been well created is a proof of evil (§14, based on 41b1-2). Atticus' thought is very close to what we find in Aet.13-19 and the majority of Philonic texts.

Certain early Christian writers, by way of contrast, are attracted to the Platonic doctrine that the cosmos' continuing existence is due to God's will, but, because of their belief in the end of the world which will take place on judgment day, they give Plato's words a reverse emphasis. Hippolytus Philos. 19.8 quotes Tim.41a with regard to the created gods and comments, $\acute{\omega}\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\ \lambda\upsilon\theta\eta\eta\text{-}\nu\alpha\iota\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota$, $\rho\acute{\alpha}\delta\acute{\iota}\omega\varsigma\ \lambda\upsilon\theta\eta\sigma\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha$. Minucius Felix Oct.34.4 remarks on the same text, ita nihil mirum est, si ista moles ab eo, quo exstructa est, destruat. These two texts strongly remind us of Prov.1.19 (note esp. $\rho\acute{\alpha}\delta\acute{\iota}\omega\varsigma$). But other Patristic authors - e.g. Clement of Alexandria (cf. Str.5.9), Irenaeus (Adv.haer.4.63.1), Origen (c.Cels.4.61) - adhere to the doctrine of cosmic $\acute{\alpha}\phi\theta\alpha\rho\acute{\sigma}\iota\alpha$ such as we find it in Aet.13-19.

6.1.4. δεσμός

Even if all that is bound together must dissolve, says Plato with reference to the heavenly bodies, the demiurge's will is a stronger δεσμός than those dissoluble bonds with which they were bound together ($\sigma\upsilon\nu\epsilon\delta\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\theta\epsilon$). The image of bond and binding is one of the most pervasive and significant in the Timaeus, as can be seen from the occurrences at diverse levels of the cosmos' structure:

the four elements of the cosmos' body 31c1-3,32b1,7,32c4
the harmonic structure of the cosmos' soul 36a7,37a4
the heavenly bodies 38e5,41b1,6
man's soul 43b6-7
man's body 43a2,74b5,d7,75d3,77e3,84a1,3
man's soul joined to its body 73b4-5,d6,81d7.

When speaking of binding in Tim.41b1-6 Plato is in all likelihood thinking primarily of the bond between soul and body (cf.38e5), an unnatural union greatly to the detriment of soul, but to which the cosmos as $\zeta\tilde{\omega}\nu\ \epsilon\mu\psi\upsilon\chi\omicron\nu$ and

the heavenly bodies must submit.¹ From our evidence it emerges, however, that Philo and the tradition of Platonist interpretation gave the statement τὸ δὴ δεθὲν πᾶν αὐτόν a wider scope. They understood it to include other types of δεσμός as well, notably that of the bodily elements and the composition of the soul itself. No doubt they took their cue from the fact that at 32c3 and 43d7 Plato also describes these two types of bonds as indissoluble except by their binder (who will not dissolve them). The opening words of the demiurge's speech can thus be taken to relate to the cosmos as a whole and its parts.

The notion of a δεσμός binding the cosmos and/or its parts together is very common in Philo. In almost all cases (but note QG 2.4 soul binding body, QE 2.106 weaker external bonds) the bond is theologized and attributed to the divine activity (cf. above II 4.1.1.), in accordance with and in frequent reference to Tim.41a-b. The dependence on Plato's text is strongest at Her.246, where the κραταιότερος δεσμός is the βούλησις of the creator. When Abraham addresses the Cause as δεσπότης (Her.23, exeg. Gen.15:2), he recognized the τῶν ὄλων δεσμός...συνέχων αὐτὰ ἅλυστα (41a8) καὶ σφύγγων (58a7) διαλυτὰ ὄντα ἐξ ἑαυτῶν. In the majority of texts the divine binding activity is attributed to the Logos or the divine powers. For the Logos see Her.188, Fug.112 (ὁ τοῦ ὄντος λόγος δεσμός ὢν τῶν ἀπάντων... καὶ συνέχει τὰ μέρη πάντα καὶ σφύγγει κωλύων αὐτὰ διαλύεσθαι καὶ διαρτᾶσθαι, followed by a comparison with the unifying power of the soul), and, the passages Plant.9, QE 2.89-90, 118 already discussed above at II 4.1.1. For the powers see Conf.166 (God embraces all things with his powers as δεσμοὶ ἄρρηκτου, cf. also 136), Migr.181 (the creator's δυνάμεις as δεσμοὶ ἄρρηκτου).

It will not have escaped the notice of the reader that a number of these passages were cited above in II 5.1.3., when we endeavoured to show that Philo assigns to the intra-cosmic Logos (or divine powers) the role which Plato had reserved for the cosmic soul. Philo's identification of the Logos with the Platonic δεσμός only serves to increase our confidence in this assertion, for it is surely legitimately Platonic to affirm that the cosmic soul is the *agent* through which the demiurge's will as cosmic δεσμός is exercised on the cosmos as composite of soul and body. Just as the soul is self-moved (Phdr.245a, Laws 896a), but its movement is mythically and ontologically initiated by the demiurge, so the soul is self-binding but its bonds are mythically and ontologically tied by its creator.

Although it is apparent that Philo, in his frequent use of the concept of a cosmic δεσμός, has recognized the importance of the image in the Timaeus, not all questions have herewith been answered. Parallels in Middle Platonist writings are not copious. Plutarch in Mor.393F asserts that God συνδεῖ τὴν

οὐσίαν, but remains deliberately vague on how it takes place (ὅσον ἀμωσγέπως ἐγγέγονε τῷ κόσμῳ; cf. also 927C, Num.fr.18). Atticus fr.4 (§15) merely paraphrases Plato.²

The combination of δεσμός with terms such as συνέχειν, σφύγγειν, κόλλα have led scholars to postulate that the thought is basically Stoic (cf. M. Heinze, *Die Lehre vom Logos in der griechischen Philosophie* (Oldenburg 1872) 235ff., Bréhier 85-86, Weiss 258). The closest parallel in a Stoic text is Cicero *DND* 2.115 (= *SVF* 2.549), where the coherence and permanence of the cosmos is explained:

Maxime autem corpora inter se iuncta permanent cum quasi quodam vinculo circumdato colligantur; quod facit ea natura quae per omnem mente et ratione conficiens funditur et ad medium rapit et convertit extrema.

The δεσμός image is here applied to the function of the Stoic active cause or Logos. The emphasis of the text on the stability and cohesion of the cosmos makes it significantly parallel to Philonic passages such as *Plant.* 8-10, *Conf.* 136, *Migr.* 220, *Fug.* 112, *Somn.* 1.158, 241. The permanence of which Cicero's text speaks, however, cannot be the same as Platonic ἀφθαρσία, for it does not preclude the periodic conflagration affirmed in orthodox Stoicism (§118). In other words the connection which we have observed Philo making between the theme of δεσμός, *Tim.* 41a-b and the doctrine of cosmic indestructibility cannot be ascribed to the influence of the Stoa. Moreover our fragmentary Stoic sources, when speaking of the cohesion of the cosmos, use the terms τόνος and ἔξις, not the image of binding (cf. *SVF* 2.439-462). On the other hand it must be observed that Philo three times describes the bond as a δεσμός ἄρρηκτος (*Plant.* 9, *Conf.* 166 (plural), *Migr.* 181 (plural), cf. *Det.* 158 of the human body). Harl FE 15.90, adducing Heraclitus *Alleg.Hom.* 40.14, plausibly suggests Stoic exegesis of the δεσμός χρύσεος ἄρρηκτος with which Zeus bound Hera (*Il.* 15.20).

We conclude, therefore, that neither the Middle Platonist use of *Tim.* 41a-b, nor the Stoic doctrine of cosmic cohesion, can fully explain Philo's frequent use of the image of the δεσμός in relation to the Logos and the powers of God. So it is difficult to determine whether we are dealing with a personal predilection (at least partly resulting from his reading of the *Timaeus*), or with one of the many gaps in our knowledge of Philo's philosophical reading material.³

There remain the references to the image of δεσμός in *Aet.* In §30,36 δεσμός is used of the binding force which holds *parts* of the cosmos together but sooner or later is shattered. Unshatterable, however, is the power of the cosmic δεσμός at §75: εἰ δ' ἡ τοῦ κόσμου φύσις ἀγέννητός τε καὶ ἄφθαρτος, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὁ κόσμος, αἰωνίῳ συνεχόμενος καὶ διακρατούμενος δεσμῷ. This passage, part of an argument attributed to Critolaus, is different to the ones we have so far discussed. It is affirmed that the cosmos is ἀγέννητος, and that view

must have consequences for the nature of its δεσμός (what it is is not made precisely clear). Could the theme of the δεσμός of the cosmos and the correct interpretation of Tim.41a-b (quoted, we recall, at §13) have been a topic of discussion in the missing second half?

6.1.5. πρόνοια

The final theme which Philo associates with Tim.41a-b is that of divine Providence. A maker must exercise responsibility for the product he has made. The cosmos as God's created product is so excellent that its creator would not wish it destroyed, and thus assures its indestructibility through his providential care. In two passages Philo relates the doctrine of divine Providence to Plato's words in Tim.41a-b.

Migr.181: τοῦ μὴ ἀνεθῆναι τὰ δεθέντα καλῶς προμηθεύμενος; this amounts to a loose rephrasing of 41b1-2.

Decal.58 (exeg. first commandment): The cosmos should not be thought the αὐτοκρατῆς θεός, for it has come into being (γένονε cf.28b7) and γένεσις is the beginning of φθορά, even if it is immortalized through the creator's πρόνοια.

For Philo the doctrine of providence - τὸ ὠφελιμώτατον καὶ ἀναγκαϊότατον τῶν εἰς εὐσέβειαν (Opif.9) - is intrinsically connected to both the doctrines of the creation and the indestructibility of the cosmos. Just as the refusal to regard the cosmos as created entails a denial of the doctrine of providence (see above II 2.1.3.), so also the view that the cosmos will be subject to destruction results from a failure to recognize the providential activity of the creator. Numerous other Philonic passages testify to the conviction that God providentially directs and maintains the cosmos, protecting it from decay and destruction: cf. Opif.171, Agr.51, Ebr.199, Conf.98, Abr.70, Spec.2.260, 3.189, Praem.32-34, QG 4.88, QE 2.64 etc. Though in the majority of these texts the providential activity is ascribed to God, we must certainly regard the Logos as the agent of divine Providence (cf. above II 5.2.2.). In Agr.51 the providential task is actually delegated to the Logos; in QE 2.64 it is the task of the two chief powers.

If Plato's words in Tim.41a-b are taken at their literal value, there is in fact no mention of divine Providence. πρόνοια is explicitly mentioned only a few times in the dialogue (30b8,44c7,73a1), each time in connection with the teleology of the universe's and man's design. But diverse Middle Platonist texts show that the doctrine of providence was regularly associated with the words of the demiurge's speech. Once again Seneca (i.e. his source) is instructive (Ep.58.28): manent enim cuncta, non quia aeterna sint, sed quia

defenduntur cura (= ἐπιμέλεια?) regentis (cf. Aët.Plac.2.4.1, οὐ μὴν φθαρησόμενόν γε προνοῖα καὶ συνοχῇ θεοῦ). Plutarch Mor.927A-C, directing his remarks against the Stoa, declares that, if they follow the (Aristotelian) doctrine of natural place and argue that elements naturally (κατὰ φύσιν) return to their position, *they eliminate the need for providence*. The Platonic position is that the τάξις τῶν ὄντων must be attributed to God and that the κατὰ λόγον δεσμός is stronger than the δεσμός κατὰ φύσιν. Apuleius De Plat.205-206 and Ps.Plut.De fato 573A-C also relate the doctrine of providence to the demiurge's speech, but are especially interested in establishing levels of providential activity (see further II 6.2.2.). The staunchest proponent of the doctrine of divine Providence is Atticus, in the anti-Aristotelian diatribe (fr.4, esp.§2, 13-15) to which we have referred several times already in this section. It is evident that to speak of the πρόνοια τοῦ πεποιηκότος, as Philo does in Decal. 58, was a short-hand method of alluding not to Plato's actual words, but to what was generally considered to be his meaning.

6.2. The young gods (Tim.41c-d,42d-e)

6.2.1. The creator's assistants

The traditional designation for the gods whom the demiurge addresses in Tim.41a-d was the 'young gods' (based on 42d6 τοὺς νέους θεοὺς). Introducing Plato's words in Aet.13, Philo calls them τοὺς νεωτέρους θεοὺς, wishing by means of the comparative to emphasize the difference in rank between them and the πρεσβύτατος καὶ ἡγεμών.¹ In the exegetical treatises there are no less than five passages which show Philo's interest in the way in which the demiurge is described as consigning part of the creative task to a team of assistants. The decisive influence which the Timaeus has exercised on these passages has long been recognized. The most thorough analysis was made by P.Boyancé in a paper entitled 'Dieu cosmique et dualisme: les archontes et Platon', which he presented at the celebrated colloquium of Messina held in the spring of 1966 (U.Bianchi (ed.), The origins of Gnosticism (Leiden 1967) 340-356). This paper, though containing many excellent remarks and observations on Philo, is more concerned with putting forward a general thesis on the history of ideas than with delineating what Philo's own precise intentions were. No apologies are required, I consider, for our undertaking to analyse the relevant passages once again.

Opif.72-75. The familiar quaestio method of exegesis is applied to the

words which Moses places in God's mouth at Gen.1:26, ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν. Why is it that only the creation of man is attributed to more than one creator, as indicated by the use of the plural verb? Philo stresses that his answer can only be considered probable (see above II 2.4.1.), presumably because he realizes that he is venturing on thin theological ice. Man - unlike the heavenly beings on the one hand and unreasoning creatures on the other - has a μικτὴ φύσις, being capable of both good and evil. God makes use of assistants so that man's good actions can be attributed to him, man's bad actions to them; ἔδει γὰρ ἀνάγκη εἶναι κακοῦ τὸν πατέρα τοῦς ἐγγόνους. These last words are a direct reminiscence of Tim.42d3. The identity of the assistants is left uncertain (ἐτέρων ὡς ἂν συνεργῶν, ἕτεροι τῶν ὑπηκόων §75). On the question of what part of man the assistants (help to) make Philo is also rather vague. Man's νοῦς and λόγος are like a κακίας καὶ ἀρετῆς οἶκος (§73). Do they help make man's rational part, or do they make the irrational part of the soul which causes the νοῦς to go astray? But there is no mention of an irrational soul here, so the former is more likely. Note that, when man as an object of sense-perception consisting of body and soul is created (§134-135), the shared task is not reintroduced (but in Gen.2:7 there are no troublesome plurals).

Fug.68-72. From Fug.53 onwards Philo is preoccupied with the problem of manslaughter, especially as dealt with in the law of Ex.21:12-14. God himself extends his benefits, but punishment is meted out through the agency of others (δὲ ἄλλων, i.e. including manslaughterers), though not without his permission. The general philosophical principle involved is illustrated by the creation of man in the Mosaic creation account. The word ποιήσωμεν at Gen.1:26 indicates a plurality (πληθος).

Philo's explanation of this text in §69 virtually amounts to a Platonic and Platonist medley:

διαλέγεται: Cf. Aet.13, Conf.168 and the remarks of Boyancé art.cit.349, who gives Neoplatonist parallels and suspects a Middle Platonist source.

τὸ θνητὸν ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος: Cf.69c7-8 (μέρος replaces εἶδος).

ἔδωκε διαπλάττειν: Cf.42d6 παρέδωκεν...πλάττειν.

μεινόμεναις: Cf.41c5,42e8.

τὸ λογικόν: Normal Middle Platonist terminology, cf. Tim.Locr.46 and Baltes Timaios Lokros 148.

τὸ ἡγεμονεύον: Cf.41c7 θεῶν λεγόμενον ἡγεμονοῦν.

ἡγεμόνος: Cf. our remark above (n.1) on Phdr.246e4.

τὸ ὑπήκοον: The word seems arbitrarily chosen, but at Rep.441e6 (cf.440d6) it is used of the spirited part of the soul (cf. also 70b7).

ὑπηκόων: Cf. the obedience of the young gods at 42e7.

In the Timaeus the 'young gods' create both man's body (42d6,e8ff.) and the irrational part of the soul required so that body and soul can have a temporary association (42e7, more clearly at 69c7ff.). Philo is only interested in the creation of the soul and systematizes Plato's account, neatly corre-

lating the parts of the soul with their respective makers. The soul of man alone was to have understanding of good and evil (cf. Gen.2:9,3:22). Therefore God, as source of the good only, creates the rational part of the soul, the irrational part being left to others (§70). Philo finds his exegesis confirmed by the fact that in Gen.1:27 (singular verb, i.e. God only) Moses uses the article when speaking of man's creation (*the* man as his λογισμός), whereas in the previous verse (where the plurality of creators is indicated) it is deleted (man as composite of the rational and irrational) (§71-72). In this passage God's assistants are described as follows: ὡς ἂν μετὰ συνεργῶν ἑτέρων, πλήθους (§68), ταῦς ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεσιν, ὑπηκόων (§69), ταῦς μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεσιν, ἑτέροις δημιουργοῦς (§70), πλήθος (§71, twice).

Mut.30-32. This passage adds little to what has been said in the previous two (much less use is made of language from the *Timaeus*). God's words to Abraham in Gen.17:1, ἐγὼ εἰμι θεὸς σός (i.e. indicating his creative power), are a great compliment to the person addressed. God is not the maker of evil, so the soul of the worthless man is not his product (contrast *Deus* 70), and the intermediate soul was a joint venture between him and others, as Gen.1:26 shows. But the σπουδαῖος was entirely made by God without the assistance of others. We observe that in this passage no mention is made of different *parts* of the soul, only of different *types*. The assistants are only described twice in the vaguest terms as ἑτεροί.

Conf.168-183. The longest of the five passages immediately strikes the reader on account of the coherence of its thought and its carefully planned structure. Every step is clearly marked out.

§168: The exegetical quaestio is introduced. What is implied by the words in Gen.11:7, δεῦτε καὶ καταβάντες συγχέωμεν ἐκεῖ αὐτῶν τὴν γλῶτταν, in which God is apparently conversing with fellow-workers?

§169: Two parallel passages in which plurals occur are given, Gen.1.26,3:22.

§170: A preliminary consideration. God is one, the supreme creator and ruler.

§171: First sequence of premisses. God is surrounded by countless powers, both salutary and punitive. God's army has various ranks – the powers through whom the worlds of noetic and sensible reality were formed, the heavenly bodies, the incorporeal angels – and they all have the task of serving him. It is fitting that he should converse with his powers and use them in tasks which he should not do alone, though they are kept under supervision and are not given autonomous knowledge or authority.

§176: Second sequence of premisses. Of the various types of ζῷα – irrational, rational and mortal, rational and immortal – only man has knowledge of good and evil, and can be convicted of premeditated sin.

§179: Return to Gen.1:26 and first conclusion. Appropriately God assigns part of the creation of man to his lieutenants, namely the ἐπὶ κακίαν ὁδὸς ἐν ψυχῇ λογικῇ; for the cosmos can only be complete (cf. above II 5.4.3.) if a voluntary part is created as a counterbalance to the involuntary.

§180: Return to the theme of punishment. An additional explanatory point must be made. God is the cause of beneficial things only. Destruction and punishment are assigned to his angels, though they too are not autonomous.

§182: Return to Gen.11:7 and final explanation.

The influence of the thought and language of the Timaeus is somewhat reduced here, the reason being that the passage is set in motion by Gen.11:7 and, even though Gen.1:26 is called in as a parallel, the emphasis is on the theme of *punishment* throughout. Hence also the stress on man's free will (§178-179), for only voluntary wrong-doing must be punished (in contrast to the Fug. passage, which is concerned with men who are the *involuntary* agents of divine retribution). God's assistants are described in this passage as τισὶν ὡς ἂν συνεργοῦς αὐτοῦ (§168), πλεῖονες (§169), ταῦς ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεσιν, ἕτεροι, ταῦς ὑπηκόους δυνάμεσιν (§175), τοῦς ὑπάρχους αὐτοῦ (§179).

QC 1.54. In an exegesis of Gen.3:22 (the same verse cited at Conf.169), ἰδοὺ Ἀδάμ γέγονεν ὡς εἷς ἐξ ἡμῶν τοῦ γινώσκειν καλὸν καὶ πονηρόν, Philo writes:

"One of us" indicates plurality, unless he happens to be speaking with his powers, which he used as instruments in making the whole universe.

Philo keeps his explanation of the awkward plural very brief. His words imply that if God converses with his powers, no real plurality is involved. The Biblical text here does not constrain him to dwell on the assistance called in by God elsewhere for the creation of man (which is pointless if there is no plurality).

The first common feature of these five passages is that they all address the exegetical problem raised by the plurals in three Genesis texts (1:26, 3:22, 11:7). It is the Mosaic text which provides the starting point for the discussions. Moreover the preliminary analysis carried out so far reveals a common line of thought, with two Leitmotifs: (a) God uses helpers only in the creation of man; (b) God has no share in evil. Under the magnifying glass, however, a complex situation is encountered. This complexity is only increased if we adduce the passage of the Timaeus which has been Philo's source of inspiration.

1. A vital difference between Plato and the Mosaic account as explained by Philo is that in the former the demiurge *delegates* a large part of the creative task (all the mortal genera, including man's irrational soul and body) to the 'young gods', whereas in the latter God only *calls in assistance* for the limited task of creating man.² Philo leaves us in no doubt in Opif. that Moses is his guide. God himself creates the other mortal genera (cf. §62-68). Nowhere does Philo deny that God creates man's body, on which the Biblical text (Gen.2:7) is quite unambiguous.³

2. God's helpers do not assist in creating the whole of man, but only that part which is responsible for wrong-doing. Which part is this? Philo's various discussions do not achieve consistency on this point. Certainly the helpers do not create the body. In three texts (Opif. Conf. Mut.) it appears that they assist in creating the rational part of the soul, which possesses a

free will and thus has a choice for good or evil.⁴ In the other text (Fug., cf. Leg. 1.41) their assistance is utilized for the creation of the irrational part of the soul. Philo is in fact caught between loyalty to the Biblical account, which is silent concerning the irrational soul and so encourages the first position, and attraction to the Timaeus which supplies the basic idea. In Fug. he presents an exposition more closely aligned to Plato's views (cf. 42d, 69c), but the solution for the ποῦ ῥωμεν/ἐποίησε of Gen. 1.26-27 differs from the exegesis in Opif. (see further below II 10.1.5.).

3. A consistent feature of the passages is that they use the theme of God's helpers to show that God is in no way responsible for evil, i.e. in an attempt at theodicy. Does such a theodical interpretation rhyme with Plato's intentions as portrayed in the words of the demiurge's speech? Horowitz 108, Boyancé REG 76(1963)107 and Nikiprowetzky REJ 124(1965)294 think it does, but a careful reading of both Plato and Philo reveals that this opinion must be qualified. The reason that Plato gives for entrusting a part of the creative task to the 'young gods' is that, if the demiurge were to create all things, there could be no mortal genera of animals and the universe would lack the completeness of its model (41b7-c4, cf. 39e). Mortality is certainly an evil, and the creation of mortal beings is a work unworthy of the demiurgic creator. But it is a weak 'structural' evil, quite different to the active 'volitional' evil perpetrated by man which is Philo's concern.

As the reminiscence in Opif. 75 shows, Philo has derived the theme of theodicy from Plato's words in 42d3-4. The demiurge gives ordinances to the newly created rational souls, so that he will be absolved from any blame for the evil that might result from wrong choices (ὅνα τῆς ἔπειτα εἴη κακίας ἐκάστων ἀναίτιος). This is entirely parallel to Philo's stress on the double tendency of the soul in Opif. and Conf. But, note well, Plato does not relate his theodical statement to the delegation of the creative task to the 'young gods' (the mythical choice between good and evil is made by the souls *before* the 'young gods' start their work).⁵ Philo's use of the theme of theodicy with regard to the activity of God's helpers in creating man thus involves a (very understandable) extrapolation of Plato's text.

4. But who, according to Philo, are the beings whom God calls in to help him in the creation of man? From the list given at Conf. 171-174 it would seem that there are three contenders - the divine supra-cosmic powers, the celestial bodies, the incorporeal angels. Dillon 172 argues that Philo has in mind the planetary gods, appealing to Opif. 46 and suggesting that the fact that at Fug. 69 he calls them his powers is not a contradiction but an indication of where he was inclined to rank the planets (cf. Boyancé's hesitation, art.cit. 351). Horowitz 112-114 and Wolfson 1.273, 387 identify the helpers with God's

subordinate powers (though the former refuses to accept a rigorous distinction between 'impersonal' powers and angels).

In our preliminary analysis we carefully listed all Philo's references to God's assistants. Twice they are called his powers (Fug.69, Conf.175 cf. QG 1.54), once the powers associated with him (Fug.70). All the other descriptions are less definite. Our conviction is that Philo *deliberately avoids* making a concrete identification of God's helpers, thus preserving to a certain extent the reticence of the Biblical text. Most clearly this can be seen at Conf.179, where the πολύσωμεν of Gen.1:26 is taken to include God's ὑπαρχου, with no attempt being made to identify these with any of the various types of subordinates listed in Conf.171-174. Also Philo's silence on the subject in the cosmogonic context of Opif.72-75 is an indication that he does not wish to be drawn into unwarranted speculation. Without doubt he was aware that the νέου θεοί were generally identified with the planetary gods in the Platonist tradition. To assign these a role in the creational process would have seemed in his view to involve the risk that their importance in the cosmos might be grossly overestimated (but see further below II 6.2.2.).

5. Philo's preoccupation with the plurals in Gen.1:26 and other texts was shared by the Rabbis in their exegetical labours (useful summaries of the Rabbinic tradition at Kahn FE 13.183, Starobinski-Safran FE 17.273, M.A.Kasher, Encyclopedia of Biblical interpretation (New York 1953-) 1.58-59, R.McL.Wilson 'The early history of the exegesis of Gen.1:26' Studia Patristica I (Berlin 1957) 421ff.). Among the diverse Rabbinic explanations there is no parallel for the heavy theodical emphasis which marks the Philonic passages.⁶ The real influence of Greek philosophy on Philo is evident, not so much in the theme of the collaboration involved in the work of creation (also found in some Rabbinic texts, though they show a greater concern with the threat to God's aloneness, cf. Weiss 327ff.), but in the fact that this conception is brought in relation to a *philosophical problem* which had taxed Greek minds ever since Plato had affirmed the unconditional goodness of the gods and God in Rep.379b, Phdr.247a, Tim.29e,42d and other texts.

6. The Biblical text at Gen.1:26 also exercised a great fascination on Gnostic thinkers (cf. Iren.Adv.Haer.1.24.1-2, Nag.Hamm.Cod.1.5.105,112,2.4.87, Pearson SPh 6(1979-80)217). Philo's remarks in Opif.72-75 and the other texts have often been used to show in him a *proto-Gnostic* tendency (e.g. C.H.Dodd The Bible and the Greeks (London 1954²) 155, Chadwick 145, Weiss 321, M.Simon 'Elements gnostiques chez Philon' in U.Bianchi op.cit.359-376 (esp.366ff.)). This is in our view unjustified. It could be argued that Philo is less 'Gnostic' than Plato, for he consigns a much smaller part of the creative task to subordinate creators. These are not described as malevolent, and the state-

ment that they are not given any form of autonomy (Fug.175, cf.181) refutes any proto-Gnostic imputations in advance. The essential goodness of the creation is not infringed by the manner in which man is created. On Philo's relation to Gnostic thinking see the judicious remarks of R.McL.Wilson, 'Philo of Alexandria and Gnosticism' Kairos 14(1972)213-219, Sandmel 134-139.

6.2.2. The heavenly bodies as ἄρχοντες (42e)

Whereas Albinus Did.16-18 follows Plato's text in assigning the secondary creative tasks to the ἔκγονοι θεοῦ, Timaeus Locrus records the demiurge as handing over part of his work to the ἀλλοιωτικὰ φύσις (44, cf. Plut.Mor.550D, Baltes Timaïos Lokros 137-140). It is apparent that these two accounts deal with the theme of the 'young gods' in contrasting ways. Albinus, adhering to a literal reading of the Timaeus, regards the theme from a *protological* viewpoint, i.e. as an account of the primordial creational event (even though in fact he does not take the myth literally, cf.§14.3). This is also Philo's manner in the passages discussed in the previous sub-section. Timaeus Locrus, on the other hand, adopts a non-literal reading and views the division of labour between the demiurge and his subordinates as an attempt at *analysis* of the causative and generative factors present in the cosmos as we know it. φύσις is thus the creative power responsible for the process of birth and decay in the sublunary world. But it is also possible – and here we come to understand why Plato introduced the added complication of the delegation of creative activity to the 'young gods' – to assign this secondary task to the heavenly bodies. The cyclical process of generation and destruction on earth cannot take place without the motions of the planets and especially of the sun. Moreover Plato himself gives a solid hint that the 'young gods' have a continuing directive function when he says that, when they have fashioned the parts of man allotted to them, they must *rule* (ἄρχεσθαι) over the mortal creature and guide it in the best way that lies within their power, 'except inasmuch as it would be the cause of evils to itself'(42e1-4).

In two Philonic texts this interpretation of the role of the heavenly bodies can be discerned.

Praem.1 (text and comments already given above at II 1.3.1.). The contrast between immortals (ἀθάνατα) and mortals (θνητά), a single genesis (γενόμενα) and perpetual genesis (γενησόμενα), rulers (ἡγεμονικά) and subjects (ὑπηκοα), is obviously based on Tim.41-42. Unlike the Platonic demiurge God creates both immortal and mortal living beings, but the ruler/subject relation between them is derived from Tim.42e2-4 and not from the Genesis account

(where the sun and moon do rule (1:16), but over the day and night).

Spec.1.13-14. The cosmos is compared to a megalopolis which has rulers and subjects. The ἄρχοντες are the stars and planets, the ὑπήκοοι the creatures who dwell beneath the moon. This is a significant passage in the history of ideas, for it is the first known example of the description of the heavenly bodies as ἄρχοντες, which was to become one of the most characteristic doctrines of Gnostic thought (cf. Boyancé 'Dieu cosmique' 352, citing Gundel RE 20.2 2122). The description is in the first place inspired by the commonplace image of the cosmos as a super-city or kingdom, but it is clear that Tim.41-42 was also in Philo's mind. The subordinates (ὑπαρχοῦ) of the father of the universe imitate (μιμουμένους, cf. 41c5, 42e8) him in his government of all created beings κατὰ δόξαν καὶ νόμον (cf. 41c8). The μύησις of the heavenly beings lies in their government and direction of the sub-lunary realm, through which they contribute to the preservation of the whole (cf. §16). As if foreseeing the perversion of the doctrine of the celestial ἄρχοντες that would later take place, Philo immediately adds that they are not θεοὶ αὐτοκράτορες or αὐτεξούσιοι or αὐτουργοί, for their directive task is performed under the supervision of the supreme charioteer (§14; cf. the virtually identical remark on God's κατ'οὐρανὸν ἔκγονοι in the exegesis of the *fourth* day of creation at Opif.46).¹ The division into the supra- and sub-lunary realms recalls the interpretation of Tim.41-42 in Tim.Locr.44 noted above (but there no mention is made of the activity of the heavenly bodies). The context of the Philonic passage is crucially important. Philo is explaining the first commandment and appeals to Moses' words at Deut.4:19 (quoted in §15). He concedes the important task of the heavenly beings in the functioning of the universe and does not object to their being called θεοί (as in the Timaeus). But he is adamant that these heavenly bodies must not be *objects of worship*, which is the sole prerogative of God the creator and θεὸς θεῶν (§20; cf. 41a7 and above II 6.1.1.). See the perceptive remarks of Goodenough Introduction 80-83, who discerns in this passage the decisive interposition of Jewish monotheism.

Plato never doubts for a moment, when he speaks of the ἀρχή of the heavenly bodies, that their influence on earthly affairs is benign and beneficent. This attitude was continued and strengthened in the Hellenistic 'Religion cosmique'. But by Philo's time developments were taking place which placed that assumption in jeopardy. The widespread popularity of astrology (imported from Babylonia and Egypt) and the belief in the inexorable causal nexus of fate (a misunderstanding of Stoic doctrine?) caused people to regard the power attributed to the stars and planets as a sinister and potentially terrifying force (Prov.1.79 'violently dragged along by the *tyrannical* power of the heavenly

bodies', Plot.Enn.2.9.13; see H.Dörrie, 'Der Begriff "Pronoia" in Stoa und Platonismus' FZPhTh 24(1977)60-87, esp. 65-69; one cannot help comparing public opinion on nuclear armament and nuclear energy in our own time). The planets thus become the malevolent guardians of Gnosticism (cf. Corp.Herm. 1.24-26).

Against this background it becomes comprehensible that, when Philo speaks of the heavenly bodies, he accords them power and influence, but always strongly emphasizes that such powers are secondary and subordinate (against the Chaldeans (!) at Migr.179, Her.97-99, Mut.16, Abr.69, Virt.212, QG 3.1; in defence of providence against an unknown opponent at Prov.1.77-88). He thus finds in Plato's views on the 'rule' of the heavenly bodies much with which he can concur. But his own presentation has an added polemical focus, directed at the two erroneous attitudes of worship and fear.²

6.2.3. Parents as subordinate creators

Nikiprowetzky FE 23.154-155, in a note of great perspicacity on Decal.106, observes that the manner in which Philo describes the procreative activity of parents is deliberately reminiscent of the instructions which the demiurge gives to the 'young gods' in the Timaeus. The relevant passages in Philo are Decal.106-107, 111, 119-120, Spec.2.224-225, Her.171-172 (cf. also Her.115 (exeg. Ex.25:1-2), Spec.2.2, QG 3.48 (EES 1.246, exeg. Gen.17:12)). In these three texts he is engaged in explaining the fifth commandment, in which children are enjoined to honour their parents. Just as this commandment is on the borderline between the first five dealing with εὐσεβεία and the second five dealing with φιλανθρωπία, so the nature of parents is on the border-line between immortal and mortal being. They are mortal because of their corporeality and subjection to the process of birth and death, immortal because they imitate God in creating what was not there before, thereby ensuring the immortality of the human race. In so doing they become assimilated to God (Decal.107 ἐξομοῦσιν; on this theme see further below II 10.1.6.).

Philo's remarks on the privileged role of parents and the high deference owed to them by their children draw on both Judaic and Greek antecedents (cf. Heinemann 253ff., Nikiprowetzky loc.cit.; both refer inter alia to Plato Laws 717,931). In the Timaeus the process of reproduction is only briefly touched on at 91a-d and the relation between parents and children falls outside the dialogue's subject matter. But Philo has observed that the role of parents in procreation is analogous to that of the 'young gods'. The latter receive the souls sown (41c9,e4,42d4) by the demiurge, and as his agents create the addi-

tional parts required for man's mortal existence. Similarly human parents receive man's divine part 'from outside' (cf. Opif.67, Her.184), and as agents of God or nature¹ complete the task by 'moulding the living being' (ζωοπλαστεῖν Decal.120) in the womb. Especially the repeated emphasis on the division between mortal and immortal (Decal.107, Spec.2.225, Her.172) and on the imitatory nature of the parents (Decal.111,120, Spec.2.225 (μοιούμενου...τὴν ἐκείνου δύναμιν, cf.41c5 μοιούμενοι τὴν ἐμὴν δύναμιν!), Her.172) indicate beyond all reasonable doubt that Philo has Tim.41-42 in mind. As Nikiprowetzky suggests, it is likely that he saw a parallel between God's exhortatory words on the subject of reproduction at Gen.1:11-13,20-23,28-30 and the demiurge's instructions at 41c4-5,d2-3.

At Decal.120 Philo declares that certain bolder persons, wishing to honour the name of parenthood, affirm that a father and a mother are in fact gods revealed to sight (ἐμφανεῖς θεοί). The assimilation of parents to Plato's secondary creators is virtually complete, for they too are visible gods (cf.41a 3-4). Philo voices no criticism here. But from other passages we discern that, in a typically Philonic manner, the claim that parents are divine is thought to require qualification. God is the true creator, parents are his helpers in the creative work. God is the true cause of the immortality of man's genus, parents are the accessory causes (Her.115)² or the instruments of generation (Her.171). At this point Philo's symbolic explanation of the Jewish custom of circumcision is directly relevant. Certain persons, regarding themselves as ἀγαθοὶ ζωοπλάσται, boasted that they were responsible for creating the finest of living beings (i.e. man) and were so puffed up with their own importance that they thought themselves to be gods (ἐαυτοὺς ἐξεθείωσαν). Thus they concealed the fact that God is the true cause (Spec.1.10, cf. QG 3.48, Migr.92). Because of this real danger of self-overestimation man should be circumcised, and so bear on his sexual organ the symbol of his recognition that not he but God is the true cause of immortality through procreation.

In the passages cited in the preceding paragraph Philo twice makes an anonymous reference to groups of thinkers, the first time without criticism (Decal.120), the second time in a critical vein (Spec.1.10). We can only speculate on whom these groups represent. The second might well include Greek philosophers who speak of man's self-generation and the immortality of the species without taking God into account (e.g. Aristotle Met.A 3 1070a8, 5 1071a14ff., De anima 2.4 415b1ff.). The first group could refer to Greek sources as well (e.g. Plato Laws 931a), but also possibly to earlier exegetes who had discussed the fifth commandment. I see little reason, however, to cast doubt on our assumption that the connection between Plato's secondary creation and parenthood was made by Philo.

6.3. The demiurge's final act and retirement (Tim.41d-42e)

6.3.1. Some use of imagery

When Plato describes the demiurge's final creative act, the creation of man's immortal rational soul, the veil of myth becomes thicker (cf. Cornford 143) and not all the details should be pressed with equal rigour. Philo is above all attracted to the diversity of imagery, as can be seen from the following instances.

1. The mixing bowl (41d4). In the exegesis of Ex.24:6 at Her.182-185 and QE 2.33 Philo gives the Mosaic κρατήρες anthropological significance. Plato's image of the mixing bowl of the soul is echoed, but exegetical concerns have the upper hand. The contrast between the unmixed (νοῦς) and mixed (αἰσθησις) parts of the soul departs from Plato's presentation. At Opif.74 (note the context) man's rational soul is described as a mixture (ἀνακεκραμένης) of the better ἰδέα and the opposite and inferior ἰδέα (is Philo thinking of the ingredients indivisible/divisible? - cf. above II 5.2.1-2.). Cf. also Somn.2.248.

2. Equal in number to the stars (41d8). Harl FE 15.209 rightly suspects that τοὺς ἄστρους ἰσάριθμον at Her.86 is an allusion to the Timaeus. Philo cannot read a text such as Gen.15:5 without immediately thinking of Plato's dialogue. But the allusion to 41d8 is no more than verbal, for he wishes to give a psychological explanation of the text (cf. Leg.3.40), and so interprets it in terms of Tim.47b-c (see further below II 7.2.4.). At Somn.1.137 the phrase ἰσάριθμους ἄστρους again occurs, but here the context is quite different. Philo is drawing on cosmological doctrines (originally based on the Timaeus, but considerably modified; see above II 5.4.3.) to elucidate the symbol of Jacob's ladder (Gen.28:12). The air is like a flourishing city, populated with immortal souls equal in number to the stars. This is an obvious attempt to systematize the doctrine of the Timaeus in relation to further data on demons and incorporeal souls in the Symposium, Republic, Phaedrus and Epinomis. The souls created by the demiurge are sown onto the planets and the earth (41e4-5, 42d4-5), so that it is natural to deduce that in the process of reincarnation there must be a continual procession of incorporeal souls in the air. But, as we shall see below in II 10.2.2., Philo is not so keen on the doctrine of metempsychosis. The entire section Somn.1.134-141 is clearly derived from an intermediate source, and so there is a good chance that the allusion was also located there and that Philo simply took it over.

3. Sowing. Plato four times describes the demiurge as 'sowing' the rational souls (41c8, e4, 42d4, 6), a natural extension of the image of the demiurge

as father and progenitor. The prominence of the image will have aided Philo in reaching the conclusion that parents imitate God in their procreative activity (see above II 6.2.3.), but that the real cause of procreation is God (Her. 171-172, Decal. 119, cf. Leg. 3.180, Det. 147). The image of sowing is most often used in Philo to describe the impregnation of the virtuous soul by God or his Wisdom (cf. Baer 55-64).

4. The demiurge as magistrate and lawgiver. As Brisson has pointed out, the word δημιουργός, though primarily used to denote the humble craftsman, was also used as the title of a magistrate in many Greek city-states (cf. LSJ 386a II; Philo's acquaintance with this meaning is shown at Somn. 2.187, cf. Colson EE 5.529). Plato has exploited the double meaning. The demiurge is not only craftsman and builder, but also colonizer and lawgiver. He gives legislation to the newly created souls before they are incarnated (42d2 δραθεσμοθετήσας). In Albinus' paraphrase of this passage in Did. 16.2 the demiurge is unambiguously compared to a νομοθέτης (cf. Num.fr.13, Baltes VChr 29(1975)262, also De Mundo 6 400b8). The appeal of such a presentation to Philo is immediately apparent. The fact that the Mosaic legislation commences with the account of creation demonstrates that the πατήρ καὶ ποιητής of the cosmos is at the same time truly its νομοθέτης (Mos. 2.48). God, by means of his νομοθετικὴ δύναμις, is the lawgiver par excellence (cf. Sacr. 131, Fug. 66, 95ff.). At Her. 167 (exeg. Ex.32:16) he is called the θεσμοθέτης (cf. 42d2). Legislation is seen as taking place on two levels - at the cosmic level in the creational structure of the cosmos (i.e. the νόμος τῆς φύσεως) and at the level of the race or community in the Law of the divine prophet Moses. The parallel with the diptych of Plato's old age, the Timaeus and the Laws, would not have escaped Philo. But the Law of Moses, which actually recognizes the cosmic perspective at its beginning, is far superior to what other legislators have produced (cf. Opif. 1-3, Mos. 2.48-52). On the more precise equivalent of the instructions of the demiurge to the newly created souls which Philo detects in the creation account in Gen.1-3, i.e. the planting of paradise in Gen.2:8, see further below II 7.1.3.

5. Weaving. The use of the image of weaving to denote the conjunction of body and soul or rational and irrational soul at Ebr. 101, Fug. 72, Praem. 1, is based on the demiurge's instructions to the 'young gods' at Tim. 41d1. Philo also applies the image of weaving to the intricate structure of the cosmos, chiefly inspired by the Biblical symbolism of the speckled sheep (Gen.31:10, cf. Fug. 10, Somn. 1.200ff.), the curtains of the tabernacle (Ex.26:1-14, cf. Mos. 2.84-88, QE 2.86) and the high-priestly robes (Ex.28:4-9, cf. Mos. 2.109-121, Spec. 1.84ff., QE 2.118). In particular we should not overlook Philo's emphasis on the art of variegation or embroidery (ἡ ποικιλιτικὴ τέχνη Somn. 1.203), which is not just concerned with the lowly craft of weavers, but must

be imagistically extended to this cosmos as the *καμπόκυκλον ὕψος* (*ibid.*). The theme of *ποικιλύα*, limited in the *Timaeus* to the heavens (39d2,40a7, cf. *Rep.* 592c-d, *Opif.* 45) or the elements (57d5,61c4), indicates in Philo's writings above all the astounding diversity and decorative splendour of the entire cosmos as God's creation (cf. *Plot.Enn.* 3.2.11.7,13.23,15.32).

6.3.2. The seventh day of creation

In a note on Plato's words at *Tim.* 42e5-6, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἅπαντα ταῦτα διατάξας ἔμενεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ τρόπον ἦθει, Cornford writes (147):

ἔμενεν is hard to render. The word does not mean rest or cessation of activity (*contrast* Gen.ii,1 [my emphasis; the reference should be Gen.2:2], κατέπαυσε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῇ ἐβδόμῃ ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ): 40B the stars στρεφόμενα μένει. The meaning seems to be that the Demiurge left these further operations to the created gods, confining himself to his own proper activity.

ἔμενεν appears to be an inchoative imperfect (cf. Festugière *ad* *Procl.in Tim.* 3.315.8), so, though it does not indicate a total cessation of activity, it does imply a retirement on the part of the demiurge from the tasks on which he had been engaged, and this fits perfectly into the *Timaeus*' mythical framework. The point which we wish to make in this sub-section is that the contrast between Plato and the LXX text which Cornford points out is effaced by Philo when he comments on the very same words of Moses.

This would not necessarily be our conclusion if we only took Philo's exegesis of the seventh day at *Decal.* 96-101 into consideration (explained in relation to the fourth commandment, cf. also *QG* 2.41, *Opif.* 128). Man should 'follow God', who is the archetype of the best way of life and sets man an example in his creational activity. Six days were devoted by God to *πράξις*, the seventh to *θεωρία*. Likewise man should work for six days, and on the seventh devote himself to contemplation and the pursuit of wisdom.¹ But, Philo appends in §101, the precise way we must understand the creation of the cosmos in six days has been expounded elsewhere with use of the allegorical method.

The cross-reference in *Decal.* 101 refers the reader to *Leg.* 1.2-4, where Philo declares that no time was involved in the creative process, but that the numbers of the days have a symbolic significance (see above II 2.1.3. 5.3.1.). In §5-7 (cf. 16) an exegesis is then given of the Mosaic words in Gen.2:2 cited by Cornford above. The passage is rather difficult to follow because Philo combines two separate ideas in his explanation. Firstly he observes that there is an important arithmological relation between the monad and the hebdomad (cf. above II 5.2.1.), and that in the words that follow at Gen.2:4 Moses reverts to the creation of heaven and earth which took place on the first day (cf. *Post.*

64-65). Thus God, having finished the creation of θνητά, turns to the formation of θεϊότερα, for it is his nature (ἔδον) to be ever active (§5, cf. 16).² Secondly Philo points out that Moses does not say ἐπαύσατο (middle voice), which would indicate true cessation of activity, but κατέπαυσεν ὧν ἤρξατο (active voice), which means 'he caused to rest those (creatures) which he had begun'. God's products once created do not stand still but begin to move. By putting these to rest God can begin with the creation of other (more divine) things, for in the endless process of γένεσις and φθορά the end of one thing is the beginning of the other (§6-7, cf. also §18). Both ideas converge in emphasizing the *continuity* of creation and God's *never-ceasing activity*.³ The latter theme is also heavily stressed in an exegesis of the σάββατον (the fourth commandment again) at Cher.87-90 (cf. Migr.91, Her.170). Only God truly rests; his rest, however, is not ἀπραξία, but an eternal and effortless ἐνέργεια. And in this unwearying activity he remains ever ἀτρεπτος καὶ ἀμετάβλητος (§90).

The extent to which Philo has Tim.42e in mind in the above passages is difficult to determine. Such hesitation is not required, however, with regard to the remark at Mut.46 (cf. 27, Somn.2.221).

τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν, ὅτι καὶ πρὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως ἱκανὸς ἦν αὐτὸς
ἑαυτῷ ὁ θεὸς καὶ μετὰ τὴν τοῦ κόσμου γένεσιν ὁ αὐτὸς ἔμενεν, οὐ μεταβαλὼν;

The last three words disclose the discreet presence of Plato's words in the background. A proper understanding of the creational account leads to the conclusion that in Moses' view there can be no talk of a demiurgic retirement in the manner suggested by Plato (even if it should be mythically intended). God's self-sufficient transcendence entails that his creatorship does not pose a threat to his immutability.

CHAPTER SEVEN

TIMAEUS 42E-47E: MAN'S DESCENT INTO THE BODY

7.0. Introductory

7.1. The incarnation of the soul (Tim.42e-44c)

7.1.1. The borrowing of the elements (42e-43a)

7.1.2. The soul is engulfed (43a-d)

7.1.3. The Allegory of the soul

7.2. The teleology of sight (Tim.44d-47e)

7.2.1. The head and face (44d-45b)

7.2.2. The mechanism of vision (45b-d)

7.2.3. The encomium of sight (47a-c)

7.2.4. The revolutions of the heavens and the circuits of the mind (47b-c)

7.0. Introductory

In obedience to the demiurge's command his assistants commence their allotted task. Man's body is put together out of small portions of the four elements and riveted into a whole. Into this mortal body the immortal rational soul, already created by the demiurge, must be placed. In a description of great imaginative power Plato presents the conjunction of soul and body in terms of the motions and sensations of a new-born baby. The soul is plunged into the turbulent streams of the body and is overwhelmed by the multitude of sensations to which it is exposed. The circular revolutions of the mind are dented and deformed, with the result that the body cannot be kept under control and becomes convulsed by irregular and violent movements. Only when the current of growth and nourishment diminishes in strength can the circuits of the rational soul be restored to their natural state. Nurtured by sound educative principles man can proceed to lead a life in which his movements and actions are directed by reason.

The actual details of the body's construction are not described until later, at 69e-81e. At this point Plato is chiefly concerned with what happens to man's rational part. The mind is placed in a spherical enclosure, the head, which in turn is given an elongated body with limbs. Of all the bodily instruments which the soul receives through the reasoning foresight of the

gods, Plato selects the sense of sight for special treatment. It is by means of sight that man can contemplate the orderly and rational movements of the heavens and, by imitating them, set his own mental circuits in good order. Contemplation of the cosmos leads to knowledge of number and time, also to rational enquiry concerning the nature of the universe. The sense of sight is thus instrumental in producing the god's greatest gift to man, philosophy. Also hearing is a serviceable gift, being necessary for speech and an appreciation of harmony.

7.1. The incarnation of the soul (Tim.42e-44c)

7.1.1. The borrowing of the elements (42e-43a)

Man's body is but a temporary construct. The young gods borrow small amounts (δανειζόμενα 42e9) from each of the four elements in order to construct it, but it is a loan that man must repay at death (ἀποδοθησόμενα 43a1). There is a direct parallel between macrocosm and microcosm in that both have a body composed out of the four elements (cf. Opif.146 and in a slightly different version Her.152-153). The great difference is that the combination of elements of the microcosm is not permanent. As was observed above in II 6.2.1., Philo does not attribute the creation of the body to God's subordinates, Gen. 2:7 being quite unambiguous on this score. The theme of borrowing, however, he finds appealing, as emerges from the following texts.

Post.5: Cain cannot 'go out' (Gen.4:16) from the cosmos, for all created things are constricted (περυσφύγξας, cf. Tim.58a7) by the circle of the οὐρανός. The particles of those who die are redistributed to the powers of the universe (Philo sometimes gives the elements the description δυνάμεις, which goes back to Presocratic times; cf. Det.154, Her.281), each man paying his loan back after a longer or shorter period.

Her.281-283: Who are Abraham's fathers alluded to in Gen.15:5? Philo reviews several suggestions of other exegetes, including one that proposes that the four ἀρχαὶ καὶ δυνάμεις of the cosmos are meant. Man borrows μικρὰ μόρια (cf. 43a1) from the οὐσία of each, a debt which he must repay καθ' ὅρισμένους περιόδους καιρῶν. In this exegesis the body is equated with the four elements, the soul with the Aristotelian quintessence. Philo makes no direct comment, but appears to find this additional doctrine sufficient to escape the charge of a materialist psychology. Contrast QG 3.11, however, where he rejects the exegesis of the fathers as the four elements. Bréhier 163 regards as a significant parallel Marc.Aurel.10.7.2 and especially the phrase κατὰ περίοδον ἐκπυρουμένου. But Philo's inspiration is Platonic rather than Stoic. A better parallel is located in Albinus' paraphrase of the Timaeus at Did.16.1, αὐτοὶ δὲ δανεισάμενοι ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ὕλης μόρια ἅττα πρὸς ὀρισμένους χρόνους, ὡς εἰς αὐτὸ πάλιν ἀποδοθησόμενα, ἐδημιουργοῦν τὰ θνητὰ ζῷα (cf. also 17.1, where the four elements are enumerated instead of the πρώτη ὕλη).

Decal.31: As part of an encomium of the decal prompted by exegesis of the Decalogue, Philo lists the ten (Aristotelian) categories, which he illustrates

with the standard example, man. Man participates in substance, because he has borrowed what he needs for his own composition from the four elements. On this text see further Dillon 178-180 and below III 3.1.

Aet.29: The borrowing of the elements is here located in an Aristotelian argument in favour of the indestructibility of the cosmos, based on the (non-Platonic) doctrine of natural place and again using man as an example. Here too the problem occurs which we have encountered already on a number of occasions. Who has included the Platonic allusion, Philo or his source (Arist.De phil.fr.19b Ross)? The fact that four elements are listed and the fifth element ignored speaks in favour of Philo, but the argument is not decisive (cf. Effe Studien 19-20).

On occasion Philo, in subservience to the Biblical text, gives the body other constituents, e.g. earth (Opif.135, Her.57, exeg. Gen.2:7), or earth and water (Spec.1.263-266, exeg. Num.19:17); see further Gross 10-13, Schmidt 31. What he considers important are the twin doctrines that the body is *corporeal* in nature, and has only a *temporary duration*. Man's mind is related to the divine Logos, but his body is compounded from the elements of the cosmos, each of which makes its contribution (Opif.146). Cf. also QG 2.61: 'For the body is dissolved into those (parts) out of which it was mixed and compounded, and is again resolved into its original elements.' Plato's image of the loan of the elements is attractive precisely because it illustrates these two doctrines in a succinct manner.

7.1.2. The soul is engulfed (43a-d)

In order to describe the disturbances which take place when the soul enters the body, Plato makes extensive use of the image of rapidly flowing water (43a6 river, b6 billow, d1 channel). This Platonic image is one of Philo's favourites, and is used in a large number of different contexts and configurations (often, for example, the river becomes a swirling eddying torrent for heightened rhetorical effect). At Gig.13, in a passage saturated with Platonic language (cf. Billings 42-43), the river is identified with the *body*, into which souls descend (also at Somn.1.147; cf. 43a5-6). Elsewhere the raging current symbolizes the *objects of perception* which flood in on the mind or rational soul and threaten to overwhelm it (Det.199, Ebr.70, Fug.91, Mut.107; cf. 43c5-7, 44a5). Most often Philo employs this imagery to represent the continual stream of the *passions* which inundate the soul so that it can hardly keep its head above water (cf. Deus 181, Agr.89, Ebr.22, Conf.23, Mut.186, Somn.2.13, QG 2.9, 75 etc.; cf. 44a8).

Rather than pile up examples of Philo's copious use of the image (a by no means exhaustive list is given at Billings 70), it will be more instructive for us to examine this usage in relation to (1) his exegetical labours, and

(2) other influential imagery drawn from the philosophical tradition.

Given the high incidence of references to rivers, flooding and so forth in the narrative sections of the Pentateuch, it is only to be expected that Philo should find Plato's imagery most helpful for his allegorical exegesis. We give some of the more significant examples.

1. Noah's flood. Noah (the soul) is buffeted in the ark (the body) by the flood (of the passions). Cf. Det.170, Conf.23-25,105, Fug.191-192, QG 2.1-55, esp.9,18,25. A complicating factor for a Platonizing allegory is that the water of the flood is brought forth by both the fountains of the deep and the cataracts of heaven (Gen.7:11). Heaven and earth symbolize νοῦς and αἰσθησις respectively. Thus the flooding is caused by the wickedness of the mind and the passions induced by the senses (Conf.25, Fug.192, QG 2.18). Moreover at Det.170 a purifying effect is attributed to the flood (cf.22d7 and above II 1.2.2.). The parallels between Gen.6-8 and Tim.43a-d are thus far from perfect, but Philo nevertheless finds them useful.
2. Jacob goes to (Gen.28:2) and Balaam comes from (Num.23:7) Mesopotamia, the land of the rivers; cf. Fug.49, Conf.66.
3. Jacob crosses the river Jordan (Leg.2.89, exeg. Gen.32:10). Jordan means 'descent' (κατάβασις, cf. Gig.13 ὥσπερ εἰς ποταμὸν τὸ σῶμα καταβάσαι), i.e. down to the world of wickedness and passion which the practising soul must overcome or cross. Plato's river image is implicit here.
4. Egypt and its mighty river are Philo's most constant Biblical symbols for the body and its passions (cf. Earp EE 10.303). The allegorical exegesis of Ex.13:19 at Somm.2.109 is more than usually close to the Platonic passage: ...παχάλεπον ἡγούμενος (Μωυσῆς), εἴ τι ἤνθησεν ἡ ψυχὴ καλόν, τοῦτ' ἔδσαι μαρνανθῆναι καὶ κατακλυσθὲν ἀφανισθῆναι πλημμύραις, ἃς ὁ τῶν παθῶν Αἰγύπτιος ποταμός, τὸ σῶμα, διὰ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων ῥέων ἐνδελεχῶς ἐκδύωσιν (cf.43c5-d1, esp. τοῦ ῥέοντος ἐνδελεχῶς ὀχετοῦ). Cf. also Conf.29-30, Somm.2.278 (both exeg. Ex.7:15), Her.315, Somm.2.255 (both exeg. Gen.15:18). In the last two passages the Biblical text constrains Philo to present rivers of virtue (Euphrates) as well as rivers of bodily passions (Nile).
5. The Egyptians, lovers of body, are drowned in the Red sea, the stream of the passions. Cf. Conf.70 (exeg. Ex.14:27); the same scene is implicit at Mut. 186.

Secondly it must be observed that Philo often combines the river image of Tim.43a-d with other well-known images which had been exploited in the philosophical tradition.

1. The descent or fall of the soul (κατάβασις, cf. Gig.13, Leg.2.89) and its submergence so that it can no longer look around (cf. Det.100, QG 4.234 etc.) show the influence of the flight imagery of the Phaedrus myth (esp. 248a-d).
2. In a number of passages Philo's imagery is more appropriate to sailing on the unpredictable seas than to swimming in a turbulent river (Sacr.90, Agr.89, Mut.215 etc.). Particularly vivid is the description of his own experience at Spec.3.3-6. The 'golden twined wavelets (κυμάτια)' around the ark (Ex.25:11) symbolize both the running stream of the body and the billowing storms of the course of human life (QE 2.55). Dillon SPH 6(1979-80)37 has plausibly suggested that Philo in these texts is a witness to the Hellenistic allegorization of Odysseus' nautical adventures, and in particular his shipwreck off the island Phaeacia, in terms of the struggle to survive the storms and shipwrecks of material existence. Note how Numenius fr.33 combines this Homeric theme with the 'sea of dissimilitude' (Pol.273d) which represents the realm of matter.
3. The river also symbolizes for Philo the Heraclitan flux, the restless flow of sensible existence (cf. Ios.140-142, Conf.105, Somm.1.192,2.258 etc.). The connection which he perceives between this doctrine and Tim.43a-d is appropriate, for it was the Heraclitan background of the river image (fr.B12,49 DK)

which inspired Plato to use it in his dialogue (cf. also Crat.402a).

At Tim.43c5-7 Plato hints at an etymology for αἰσθησις based on its rapid, assailing motion, but does not say what verbal root he has in mind. Proclus' suggestion (in Tim.3.332.6) that he derives it from ἀΐσσειν (to dart, rush) is likely to be correct. In his exegesis of Gen.15:9 at Her.126 Philo refers to this etymology, connecting it with the she-goat (αἴγα) of the Biblical text, which is naturally seen as a symbol of αἰσθησις. It is possible that the etymology is once again exploited at QG 3.3 (EES 1.183), where the same symbolism is extracted from the same text.¹ At Deus 42 a different (and less persuasive) etymology is given for αἰσθησις, namely from ἐΐσθεσις (emplacement). It is claimed for the Stoa by Von Arnim at SVF 2.458.

Completely opposite to the swirling of the body and battering of the senses is the state of calmness and tranquillity reached by the mature soul (γαλήνη Tim.44b3). The metaphor of calmness and clear weather (γαλήνη, νηνεμία, εὐδία etc.), used to portray the disposition of the man who has brought his passions under control, is almost as common in Philo as the images of turbulent torrents and stormy seas discussed above. Cf. Sacr.16,90, Deus 26, Conf. 32,43, Congr.92-93, Somm.2.229, Abr.30,207 etc. The specific influence of the Timaeus should not be overestimated, since the image had become a commonplace in philosophical literature (a fine collection of examples in Plutarch's treatise Περὶ εὐθυμίας, Mor.464E-477F; tranquillitas animi is one of the chief attributes of the Stoic sage, cf. SVF 3.570,632, Marc.Aurel.8.28,12.22; see also Völker 320).

7.1.3. The Allegory of the soul

The duality of body and soul is one of the cornerstones of Philo's thought. The body is a prison or tomb for the soul (Plato's Phaedo, Phdr.250c, Gorg. 493a (σῶμα/σῆμα), cf. Leg.1.108, Somm.1.139, QG 2.69, 4.153 etc.). The soul must spend its life tied to a corpse (Aristotle's Eudemus or Protrepticus). The body as corpse which the soul must carry (νεκροφορεῖν) is symbolized by Er (exeg. Gen.38:7), meaning 'leathern', whom God puts to death without bringing an open charge against him (Leg.3.69-74, cf. Agr.25, Somm.2.237 etc.). The passivity of the body entails that the real conflict in man takes place between the rational and irrational parts of the soul, the latter part being required so that the soul can accommodate itself to the demands necessarily made on it by the body. Through the functioning of the irrational part of the soul the rational part is exposed to the onslaught of the senses and the raging of

the passions. Warfare is the most suitable metaphor for this mighty conflict in man's soul. Now the one side prevails, now the other, as symbolized by the raising and lowering of Moses' arms in the battle between Israel and Amalek (Leg.3.186, exeg. Ex.17:11).

The predominant influence of Platonic philosophy in Philo's formulation of the above doctrines is immediately obvious (cf. Völker 74-76, Wolfson 1.424-427). He is following the intellectual trends of his time. Already the Middle Stoa had come under Plato's spell and had rejected the unitarian psychology of their school's founders. In Middle Platonism the bipartite division of the soul into a rational and an irrational part was standard dogma; see further below II 9.2.1-2. Wolfson 1.427 accredits the Timaeus with a great deal of influence on the forming of Philo's views on psychology:

Philo's description of the two souls in man, the rational and the irrational, and the conflict between them, though containing elements from other dialogues of Plato as well as from other non-Platonic sources, is essentially based upon Plato's description in the Timaeus of the rational and irrational souls (42eff.; 69c), of the conflict between them (42e-44d), and of the possible victory of the rational soul over the irrational soul by the strength which it may gain through knowledge acquired by means of training (86b-87b).

The contribution of the Timaeus is, in my view, somewhat exaggerated here. On the subject of the soul's quest to achieve ἀρετή, δικαιοσύνη and εὐδαιμονία other Platonic writings, such as the Phaedo, Republic and Phaedrus, have as much, if not more, to say. The chief contribution of the Timaeus is twofold: (1) it attempts to relate the struggle of the soul to man's psychological and physiological structure; (2) it places the structure of the microcosm in a cosmic perspective.

The problem, therefore, is to determine whether there is any evidence that the Timaeus has had an influence on Philo's psychology *more specific* than in his use of images and motifs examined in the previous two sub-sections, but *less general* than in Wolfson's statement quoted above. The most prominent example of such influence is to be found, I submit, in the 'Allegory of the soul' which Philo works out in astonishing detail in the first three (and to a lesser extent in the next four) treatises of his Allegorical Commentary. It must be emphasized at the outset that Philo is not engaged on a systematic treatise of psychology, nor on a spiritual and mystical itinerary of the soul (cf. the criticism of Massebieau and Bréhier at Nikiprowetzky 168), but a scriptural commentary which gives a verse-for-verse exegesis of Gen.2-4. We consider it certain, however, that he has attempted to place the variegated tapestry of his exegesis in the framework of a coherent doctrine of the soul, and in this attempt he is significantly indebted to the account at Tim.41d-44c. By means of the allegorical method Philo can show that the story of Adam and Eve and their

sons is applicable to the development of each individual human soul.

Let us now review Philo's allegory of the soul in the perspective of its relation to the doctrines of Tim.41d-44c, bearing in mind that in this part of his account Plato already anticipates the effects of the irrational soul (i.e. the senses and the passions), the creation of which is not recounted until 45b-47e, 64a-65b, 69c-72d.

1. Leg.1.1. The νοῦς, the heavenly man, has been created (Gen.1:26-28), but is not yet embodied. Compare the creation of the rational soul in Tim.41d-e.

2. Leg.1.31. The νοῦς becomes incarnated as earthly man by being given a body moulded out of clay. God's breath makes the νοῦς into a living soul (Gen.2:7). Compare the creation of man's body by the young gods at 42eff. As noted earlier, Philo follows the Biblical text in having God himself create the body of man. It is clear from the development of the allegory that man's body is so far 'unfeatured', i.e. its parts and their characteristics must still be explained.

3. Leg.1.43. God plants the garden of Eden (Gen.2:8), earthly σοφία or ἀρετή, 'to bring succour and aid to the diseases of the soul' (Leg.1.45). Eden is symbolically equivalent to the law-giving of the demiurge at 42d, but that takes place before incarnation, not after it as in the allegory. The tree of life is generic virtue (Leg.1.59), but the tree of knowledge represents man's inclination to evil (Leg.1.60-62, 100ff., cf. Tim.42b2).

4. Leg.1.63. The four rivers that flow from Eden (Gen.2:10-14) are the cardinal virtues which will ward off the diverse passions. Compare the πρώτη καὶ ἀρίστη ἔξις of 42d2, the γαλήνη of 44b3. ἀρετή is the necessary concomitant of a well-regulated νοῦς.

5. Leg.1.100. On the day that the man eats of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, he will 'die the death' (Gen.2:17). The death must be interpreted symbolically as the death of the soul, for the protagonists evidently keep on living (Leg.1.105). Plato achieves the same result with his doctrine of metempsychosis (42b5-d2, cf. also 44c3 ἀτελής καὶ ἀνόητος εἰς Ἄλδου πάλιν ἔρχεται; see further below II 10.2.2.). Philo's dualism in Leg.1.100-108 is more extreme than that which the Timaeus portrays. But in the very next verse of scripture a modification of such radical dualism is introduced.

6. Leg.2.1. It is not good that man should be alone. He needs a helper (Gen.2:18). But there are in fact two species of helper. In the first place the wild beasts are created, representing the passions (Leg.2.9-11). Compare Tim.42a6-8, 42c3 (metempsychosis), 70d-e and our comments below at II 9.2.3. Secondly God creates Eve, the symbol of αἰσθησις (Leg.2.24). Compare Tim.42a5, 43c6, 44a5. Philo's description of αἰσθησις and πάθη as helpers is naturally de-

terminated by the Biblical word, and he has his doubts about its appropriateness (Leg.2.10 οὐ κυρίως...ἀλλὰ καταχρηστικῶς). But it does effectively convey the Platonic viewpoint that, when the soul descends into the body, it requires αἵσθησις and a moderate dose of παθήματα, so that the συναμφοτέρων (87e5) can live out its allotted period. In neither account is the female sex given a very flattering role. Which is preferable – to be the symbol of αἵσθησις, or to represent the first stage on the downward ladder of metempsychosis?

7. As the allegory unfolds Philo attempts, where the Biblical text will allow, to relate his psychology to the physiology of the human body: Leg.1.28, the face as place of the senses (exeg. Gen.2:6, cf. II 7.2.1.); Leg.1.70, the location of the soul in three parts of the body (exeg. Gen.2:10-14, cf. also Leg.3.115 and II 9.2.2.); Leg.2.35-39, the change from αἵσθησις καθ' ἑξῆς to αἵσθησις κατ' ἐνέργειαν (exeg. Gen.2:21); Leg.3.56, the dependence of the mind on the bodily senses (exeg. Gen.3:12). But it is clear that physiology plays a wholly subordinate part in the allegory, in contrast to Plato's intentions in the Timaeus, where, after describing the descent of the soul into the body, he devotes more than a quarter of the entire dialogue to the structure and possible malfunctions of the body (44d-46e, 64a-86a).

8. The main participants have been introduced. The remainder of the allegory of the soul is concerned with man's moral struggle, which takes place in the garden of Eden and later outside it, and in which a special role is assigned to the seductiveness of pleasure, symbolized by the serpent (Leg.2.71; cf. 42a6, 90b2 and below II 10.2.2. on 92a7). Adam the νοῦς is neutral. He can incline to either virtue or vice, depending on how he reacts to the assaults of sense-perception and the pernicious influences of the passions (Leg.2.53, 64). This moral contest is precisely parallel to what Plato envisages at 42b2 – ὧν (αἵσθησις and πάθη) εἰ μὲν κρατήσοιεν δόκη βιώσουντο, κρατηθέντες δὲ ἀδύκῃ – and which is briefly alluded to at 44a5-c4, 86b-87b, 90a-d without being worked out in full detail. The two poles of the contest, ἀρετή and ἀδύκῃα, are represented, after Adam's capitulation and exile, by his descendants, Abel and Seth on the one side, Cain and his progeny on the other. The birth of Seth is the turning point (Post.124-125, 170-174, exeg. Gen.4:25). The long journey of the improvement and ascent of the soul begins, proceeding via the two patriarchal triads to its culmination in the example of Moses (cf. Praem. 10-66).

9. Finally it should be noted that the thematics of the 'Allegory of the soul' are repeated in a concise form in another important Philonic text. Using the image of the cosmos as a giant plant in Plant.1-27 (exeg. Gen.9:20), Philo skilfully indicates man's place in the structure of the universe (see below II 10.1.2. on §17-27). But he goes directly on to add that the plant

imagery is also applicable to man the microcosm (§28). The trees of paradise (Gen.2:8-9) symbolize the growths of the virtuous soul (§37). The planting of the neutral νοῦς in the garden shows how man's life can go in two opposite directions. It can choose for the better and gain immortality, or it can choose for the worse and receive dishonourable death (i.e. expulsion from the garden) as its lot (§45).

The points of congruence between the Timaeus and the 'Allegory of the soul' are sufficient, I consider, to justify the assertion that Philo's grand allegorical scheme has received a structural foundation from the details of Plato's mythical anthropogony. For a much more detailed attempt to trace the influence of the Timaeus on the structure of the De opificio mundi and Legum allegoriae the reader is referred to the article of V.Nikiprowetzky, 'Problèmes du "Récit de la création" chez Philon d'Alexandrie', REJ 124(1965)271-306, esp. 289-302. We shall return to this subject below in III 1.4.a-c, where in n.22 a detailed critique will be given of this rich and highly stimulating article.

7.2. The teleology of sight (Tim.44d-47e)

7.2.1. The head and face (44d-45b)

When Philo calls the face τὸ τοῦ σώματος ἡγεμονικώτατον at Spec.4.123, he is referring to an idea that ultimately goes back to Plato. The head, and in particular the face, is the most principal part of the body because it is the location of the rational soul and of the senses which serve the mind. Cf. Tim.44d5 (κεφαλὴ αὖς θεϊότατον...καὶ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν πάντων δεσποτοῦν), 45b2 (ἡγεμονίας). Philo utilizes this theme in connection with the exegesis of a number of Biblical texts which in each case have to do with the face:

Gen.2:6 (a spring waters the face of the earth): Leg.1.28, Post.127, Fug.182, QG 1.3.

Gen.2:7 (God breathes into man's face): Leg.1.39, Spec.4.123, QG 1.5.

Ex.28:38 (the leaf placed on the High priest's forehead): QE 2.124.

The passage at Leg.1.28 is interesting on account of Philo's assertion that the senses were assigned to the face because nature, exercising *forethought*, considered this place, out of all the locations of the body, most suitable for their special activities. The teleology of Plato, which is extremely overt in Tim.44c-45b (cf.44c7 προνοίας...θεῶν, 44d8 θεοὶ κατανοήσαντες, 45a4 νομίζοντες θεοῖ) is taken over. The same providential role is assigned to nature in Cicero DND 2.140, as part of a long section extolling the teleology of the cosmos and man (§115-153) placed in the mouth of the Stoic Balbus. The possibility must be entertained that Philo obtained this commonplace idea via an inter-

mediate source rather than directly from Plato, especially when we consider that the theory of vision outlined in Leg.1.28-30 (and also in Fug.182) is Stoic rather than Platonic (see below II 7.2.2.). Cf. also the detailed discussion on the metaphor of the head as the body's citadel (70a6) below at II 9.2.3.

The chief term in most of the texts cited above is the word ἡγεμονικόν. This way of referring to the ruling faculty in man's soul is Stoic (but the Stoics almost certainly derived it from the Timaeus, cf.41c7,70c1). Zeno and Chrysippus disagreed with Plato on the location of the ἡγεμονικόν, declaring it to be not in the head but in the heart (SVF 1.148,2.885). Posidonius agreed with Plato against the Old Stoa that the soul is not unitary, but refused to speak of *parts* of the soul as Plato does (in this following Arist.De anima 1.5, 3.9). The soul has various *faculties*, which have their source in the heart (fr.F146 E-K). Cicero, on the other hand, affirms that the place of the soul is the head (TD 1.70).

A number of texts in Philo indicate that the location of the ruling part of the soul was a controversial topic in philosophical circles (Det.90, Post. 137, Somn.1.32). Philo himself tends to follow Plato and the Middle Platonists in locating man's dominant part in the head, or more specifically in the brain (cf. Schmidt 51 and further below II 9.2.2.). At Leg.1.59 he reports other exegetes who regard the tree of life in Gen.2:9 as symbol of the heart, since it is the source of life and the ruling principle. In a passage such as Fug.182 it is not said expressis verbis that the ruling faculty is located in the heart, but the image of the spring and the theory of perception presented there assume it (the text is taken up at SVF 2.861).

A different light is thrown on the question, however, by two other texts, Sacr.136 and Spec.1.213, both of which give an exegesis of Lev.3:3. It appears that the lawgiver Moses locates the ἡγεμονικόν in *either* the head or the heart, i.e. that he does not take sides in the above-mentioned philosophical controversy. Such problems of physiology are not to be given a high priority, and can safely be left to controversialists. Moses', and thus Philo's, concern is with the ethical consequences of what that ruling part is and does. As was outlined in the Allegory of the soul (see above II 7.1.3.), the νοῦς or ἡγεμονικόν can incline to good or evil. On account of this ambivalence it is not included among the parts of the sacrificial victim placed on the altar of God in the preservation offering.

7.2.2. The mechanism of vision (45b-d)

There are two reasons why in the *Timaeus* a detailed description of the mechanism of vision is given so early in the account of man's creation, long before the other aspects of his physiology are discussed. Firstly Plato is convinced of the great importance of sight for man's intellectual development, and so gives it a place among the works of teleological reasoning. Secondly the mechanism of sight and associated phenomena provide a fine illustration of the distinction between true rational causes (αἴτια) and accessory physical causes (συναίτια). Plato has refined the viewpoint set out in that memorable passage, *Phd.*96-99, but not essentially changed it. Though it is useful to give explanations of the physical workings of bodily phenomena, such explanations will not reveal what is most important, namely their purpose. On the importance and excellence of sight Philo is in hearty agreement with Plato, as we shall see in the following sub-section. The distinction between αἴτια and συναίτια is not exploited (one instance at *Her.*115, on which see above II 6.2.3.n.2). But he does follow Plato in his abhorrence for the mechanistic doctrines of a materialistic philosophy, symbolized by Laban, from whom Jacob the practiser was wise to flee... (cf. *Fug.*7-13 analysed above at II 2.2.1.).

Only on one occasion does Philo give an account of the mechanism of vision which is clearly based on *Tim.*45b-d, at *Deus* 79 in an exegesis of Gen.6:7-8. God condemns sinful mankind, but Noah finds grace with him (§74). The fact that mercy is mingled with his judgment leads Philo to give a brief reflection on the subject of mixture (§77-85). God's powers are unmixed in respect to himself, but mixed in relation to created beings (illustrated by Ps. 74:8), for mortal nature cannot receive them unmixed (§77). By introducing the example of sunlight (§78) Philo arrives at the subject of human vision (§79). This paragraph will repay closer examination.

We commence with some points of detail.

ἀνακεράσαστο: The theme of mingling which is the main concern of the passage. The brilliance of the sun's rays is mitigated by the mixture of cool air. τὸ αὐγοειδές...τὴν μέν...τὴν δέ: Cf. *Tim.*45b4 τοῦ πυρός ὅσον τὸ μὲν κάειν οὐκ ἔσχε, τὸ δὲ παρέχειν φῶς ἡμερον. From 58e we learn that Plato recognizes three main varieties of fire - flame, light, and the glow from coals etc. He affirms that light does not burn, but nowhere attributes this property to the tempering effect of air.

ταμεινομένη: A favourite metaphor of Philo (cf. Leisegang 762a), but its usage precisely here is almost certainly inspired by *Rep.*508b6, τὴν δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει (τὸ ὄμμα) ἐκ τούτου (τοῦ ἡλίου) ταμεινομένην.

συγγενεῖ αὐτοῦ καὶ φίλῳ: Cf. 45b6 τὸ γὰρ ἐντὸς ἡμῶν ἀδελφὸν ὄν τούτου πῦρ, 45d4 τοῦ συγγενοῦς πυρός. *Plut.Mor.*390B speaks of συγγένεια.

σύννοδος τε καὶ δεξιῶσις: Plato's scientific vocabulary is converted into the quasi-metaphorical language of the meeting and greeting of friends (cf. also *Abr.*157 ἐνομιλεῖ), in contrast to the more technical approach of Plutarch, who

regularly speaks of σύμψηξις and ὁμοιοπαθῆς κρᾶσις (Mor.390B,433D,626C,921E) derived from 45b4,7.

ἀντίληψις: Post-platonic usage, cf. Baltes Timaios Lokros on Tim.Locr.48. Very common in the meaning of apprehension, perception in Philo (cf. use in a similar context at Opif.53, Abr.157, Aet.86).

It is apparent that Philo has preserved the main point of Plato's explanation, namely that sight is caused by the coalescence of two kinds of light, sunlight and a kindred visual current in the pupil of the eye. His account contains virtually no direct verbal allusions to the Timaeus text. Either he is recounting the theory from memory, or he is utilizing a loosely worded paraphrase in a handbook (much looser, for example, than at Albinus Did.18.1). If we compare Plutarch's paraphrase of the theory at Mor.626C, we may reasonably conclude that the second possibility is the right one:

ἡμεῖς δὲ τὴν Πλατωνικὴν φυλάττοντες ἀρχὴν ἐλέγομεν ὅτι πνεῦμα τῶν ὁμμάτων αὐγοειδὲς ἐκπίπτον ἀνακίρνεται τῷ περὶ τὰ σώματα φωτὶ καὶ λαμβάνει σύμψηξιν, ὥσθ' ἐν ἐξ ἀμφοῦν σῶμα δι' ὅλου συμπαθὲς γενέσθαι, κεράννυται δ' ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ συμμετρίας λόγῳ τε καὶ ποσότητος...

Indeed in all five cases where Plutarch refers to Plato's theory he speaks of a *mixture* of the two kinds of light (cf. also 390B,433D,436D,921E). The fact that Plato's theory was explained in terms of mixture (as such not actually found in the Timaeus) caused Philo to recall it when that theme occurred in his exegesis.

But there remains a significant difference between Plutarch's version of the theory and the Philonic adaptation. The Platonist speaks of mixture in relation to the coalescence of the two sorts of light, but Philo applies the theme of mixture to the tempering of the sunlight by the cold air.¹ It appears that the 'Platonic mixture' was not so appropriate for illustrating the tempering of God's powers.² Philo, we conclude, has in all probability introduced an alteration into the Platonic and Platonist theory of vision to make it more suitable for the (theological) thematics of his discussion. At Deus 84 another example of mixture is found in the mechanism of hearing; see below II 9.1.1.

Philo frequently affirms that the eyes need the cooperation of light (συνεργῶ φωτὶ Mut.4) in order to carry out their function; cf. also Opif.53, Sacr.36, Ebr.190, Migr.60, Abr.157, QC 2.34 etc. As we saw above in the comments on Deus 79 (ταμνευομένῳ) the theme of Rep.507c-508d is combined with the more scientific explanation at Tim.45b-d (cf. also Arist.De anima 2.7, 3.4). Plato's striking phrase φωσφόρα ὄμματα (45b3) is found once in Philo, at Plant. 169, where it is used in the singular of the mind's eye.

Billings 63-64 in a lucid exposition shows that there are also a number of passages in which Philo presents a Stoic theory of the mechanism of vision. The most essential difference between it and the Platonic view is that the

Stoa gives the mind or ἡγεμονικόν a more important role in the process of sensation. From the ἡγεμονικόν a visual πνεῦμα is extended in the fashion of an inverted cone through the air as medium to the objects of vision. Sight occurs when the mind imparts a movement of tension to the visual πνεῦμα (SVF 2.863-871). Notable is that the Stoics in this theory accord much less significance to the role of light, stressing instead the importance of the mind as activator and of the air as medium. Philo utilizes the Stoic theory of vision in the following passages: Leg.1.28-30 (exeg. Gen.2:6), Leg.2.35-39 (exeg. Gen.2:21-23), Post.126-127 (exeg. Gen.4:25, 2:6), Fug.182 (exeg. Gen.2:6) (note the overlap with passages discussed above in II 7.2.1.). Billings is correct in concluding: 'Where Philo uses the Stoic theory... it is in the interest of the exultation of the mind as the only active power.' But he fails to add that in each case Philo uses the theory with reference to the Allegory of the soul which he extracts from Gen.2-4. Since the entire allegory is built on the relation between νοῦς and αἰσθησις, the Stoic theory has distinct and obvious advantages, especially when we observe that Philo does not speak of the relation between sight and mind at Tim.45b-d.

It cannot be denied that Philo, in his exegetical use of the theories concerning the mechanism of vision, has shown himself somewhat of an opportunist.

7.2.3. The encomium of sight (47a-c)

In spite of the harsh attitude which Philo often displays towards sense-perception in general, there are numerous passages where he singles out the sense of sight for praise (useful selections at Billings 65, Schmidt 75-78). Sight and hearing are the philosophical senses. Together with the other senses they make life (ζῆν) possible; on their own they supply the excellent life (εὖ ζῆν), the life really worth living (cf. Abr.150, Spec.1.339, QG 1.32, 2.5 (EES 1.187)). But also between the two highest senses one must discriminate. Swift sight is far superior to sluggish hearing (Sacr.78, Abr.150 etc.). The evidence which sight furnishes is more trustworthy than that given by hearing (Ebr.82, Conf.140, Spec.4.60). Ishmael means ἀνοήθειον (Gen.16:11), Israel is translated ὁπῶνθειον (cf. Gen.32:29). The qualitative difference between hearing and sight indicates the difference between the man of moderate achievements and the man who reaches perfection (Fug.208, Mut.201-205, QG 3.32, cf. 3.59, 4.245). For Philo praise of sight is Biblically founded.

In Tim.47a-c the sense of sight receives a particularly lavish encomium. Without sight the cosmological account of the Timaeus itself could not have been written (47a2-4). Through sight man received from the gods his greatest

gift and highest calling, philosophy (47b1-2). By means of sight man can contemplate the unswerving circuits of the heavenly bodies and, by emulating them, set his own mind in order (47b7-c4). The encomium of sight is a fitting climax to the first part of Timaeus' discourse, in which the works of reason (τὰ δὲ νοῦ δεδημιουργημένα 47e4) are outlined.

Plato's celebrated passage did not fail to impress Philo, as can be gauged from the fact that it has left its imprint on at least a dozen passages scattered through his oeuvre. At the same time it must be recognized at the outset that we are dealing with themes that had become commonplace in Hellenistic literature of both the philosophical and non-philosophical variety. By Philo's day the themes of the praise of sight and the blessing of philosophy had lost all pretence to originality, even of the derivative kind when alluding to the words of the ἀρχαῖου.

The role of the Timaeus in the development of the doctrine of the θεωρία τοῦ κόσμου after Plato was briefly commented on above in I 4.bc, with particular reference to Festugière's classic study *Le dieu cosmique* (ibid.n.51). For Posidonius' debt to the themes of Tim.47a-c see the remarks on fr.F186 E-K at Nock JRS 49(1959)12. Cicero describes philosophy as the gods' greatest gift to man on at least seven occasions (cf. P.Boyancé, 'Le platonisme à Rome: Platon et Cicéron' *Assoc. G.Budé Actes du Congrès de Tours et Poitiers* (Paris 1954) 195-221, esp.215). It is no coincidence that his translation of the Timaeus ends precisely at 47b2. The passage is naturally also referred to in Middle Platonist writings; e.g. Plut.*Mor.*550D (cf.958E), Apul.*De Plat.*211, cf. Justin *Dial.*2.1). Yet it is possible to detect a decline in its popularity in the period after Philo. The reason, if I am not mistaken, is the new awareness that the θεωρία τοῦ κόσμου was less important than the θεωρία τῶν νοητῶν and the concomitant theology. Albinus' preference for Rep.529-531 above Tim.47 in *Did.*7.4 is very revealing in this context.

Philo's use of this passage was one of the examples that led Festugière to conclude that he was a conscientious student unable to do more than repeat *topoi* and edifying banalities (*Révélation* 2.519). But the French scholar overlooks the fact that it is advisable to examine the use of well-known themes critically. Small changes of emphasis and nuances of meaning may disclose important points of reorientation. The use of *topoi* does not automatically reveal a poverty of thought. In the following brief remarks on the passages in which Philo utilizes the themes of Tim.47a-c we shall concentrate especially on examining the extent to which Philo adds to or subtracts from the thematics of the Platonic text.

*Opif.*53-54: The context is the exegesis of the fourth day of creation (Gen.1:14-19), which explains the fact that the encomium of sight is subordinated to the encomium of light. Just as the eye needs light to see the αἰσθητά, the νοῦς needs ἐπιστήμη to see the νοητά. Light is the cause of many blessings to mankind, but especially of the greatest blessing of all, philosophy. Clearly the themes of Rep.507-509 and Tim.47a-c have been fused together. In describing how philosophy originates due credit is given to sight, which contemplates the ordered heavenly movements (καταδοῦσα cf.47b7, χορεύας cf.40c3,

μουσικῆς τελείας cf.47d2). But the ἀπληστία τοῦ θεωρεῖν and the image of banqueting are imported from the Phaedrus myth and the Symposium (the latter image also having a strong Judaic undertone, cf. Nikiprowetzky 22). The progress of man's thought towards philosophy is indicated by a sequence of philosophical questions, giving the passage a less abstract character than Plato's brief words at 47a6-7. The final words, ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ζητήσεως τὸ φιλοσοφίας συνέστη γένος, οὗ τελειότερον ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἦλθεν εἰς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον, amount to a loose paraphrase of 47a7-b2.

Opif.77-78: One of the reasons that man comes last in the creation of the cosmos is that God, like the organizer of a banquet or an athletics festival, wished to have all things in readiness for the creature to whom he had given the best of gifts, kinship to himself. Two Platonic themes, the gift of the gods (47a1,b2 etc.) and the συγγένεια of man's mind with the heavenly bodies (47b8,d2) have been adapted to suit the Biblical anthropology of Gen.1:26 as Philo interprets it. The θεωρία of the heavenly bodies gives the mind ἔρως and πόθος for knowledge of them, ὅθεν τὸ φιλοσοφίας ἀνεβλάστησε γένος, ὅφ' οὗ καλῶς θνητὸς ὢν ἄνθρωπος ἀπαθανατίζεται (again cf.47a7-b2, ἀπαθανατίζεται cf.90c3). In §78 the language used to describe the wonders of the cosmos becomes exceedingly baroque, even for Philo. The conclusion, in which the παραδειγματικὴ μουσικὴ is located in the harmony of the heavenly movements and imitated by man in the discovery of the art of music is partly adapted from 47d.

Abr.156-164: The longest of the passages on the excellence of sight is set in motion by the apparently trivial exegetical question of why one of the five cities in the land of Sodom was not destroyed in the conflagration (Gen. 14:2,19:20-25). The five cities symbolize the five senses, of which sight is superior to the rest. In describing the most essential benefit (ὠφέλεια, cf. 46e8,47a2) gained from sight Philo again emphasizes the indispensability of light (§156-158). By using light, the best of gifts, man can contemplate the beauties of the cosmos and especially the θεῶν ἀγάλματα of heaven (§159). Sight brings the understanding into action. A series of philosophical questions are posed (§161-163), culminating in the question - if the cosmos is created who is its creator and what is his way of life? Thus σοφία and φιλοσοφία have their origin in the sense of sight (§164). The thematics of the entire passage are obviously inspired by Tim.47a-c, but verbal reminiscences are almost entirely lacking and there is much rhetorical expansion of the main ideas.

Spec.3.184-192: Exegesis of a law commanding a master, if he knocks out his servant's eye, to set him free (Ex.21:26). Once more the Mosaic Law draws attention to the excellence of sight. The greatest benefit that it gives is that it enables the mind to accept the philosophy which heaven showers down on it (§185; on the metaphor see below on Her.78-79). By means of sight the mind contemplates the cosmos, described here in Philo's most lyrical vein (§187-188), and comes to the probable conclusion (λογισμὸν εἰκότα) that such splendid order is not the result of random and irrational forces, but must be attributed to the δυνάμει of the πατήρ καὶ ποιητής (§189, cf.28c3). Other questions on God, the noetic world, the cosmos and its contents follow (§189-190). Such investigation is the work of philosophy and reveals a φιλομαθῆ καὶ φιλοθεάμονα καὶ τῷ ὄντι φιλόσοφον διδάσκειν (§191, cf.90b6). The final words, μέγιστον μὲν δὲ τοῦτο τῷ βίῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθὸν ὅφιν παρέχεται (§192) are once more a loosely worded reminiscence of Plato's central theme. In this passage the familiar thematics of Tim.47a-c are combined with the 'cosmological argument', in which the existence of a supreme being is deduced from the ordered design of the universe (other examples in Philo at Leg.3.97-99, Spec.1.33-35, Praem.41-43, Prov.1.33,42-45; an exhaustive list of ancient examples is compiled by A.S.Pease, 'Caeli enarrant' *HThR* 34(1941)163-200).

QG 2.34 (almost entirely preserved in Greek, cf. FE 33.106-107): Exegesis of the window of the ark which ὁ δίκαιος (Noah) opened (Gen.8:6). The ark symbolizes the body (QG 2.1-7), so the window, in the language of allegory, could hardly represent anything else but the sense of sight. Sight is related to soul and akin to light. It cut the first path to philosophy. Once again

Philo combines the theme of Tim.47a-c with the cosmological argument, climaxing in recognition of τὰ ἀνωτέρω καὶ παραδειγματικά εἶδη καὶ τῶν ἀπάντων αἰτιον, the ποιητὴς καὶ πατήρ. Most surprising is that Philo should write that sight *sees* τὸν τοῦ κόσμου μόνον ἀφευδέστατον κοσμοποιόν, a privilege in fact accessible only to the eye of the soul. Has our author made a slip here? (Note that, although the Greek fragment and the Armenian transmission in broad lines confirm each other, the entire passage shows a remarkably excessive use of parataxis quite foreign to Philo's usual style (καὶ used twenty times to join nouns or verbs in apposition). Has something gone wrong early on in the mss. tradition?)

The remaining passages reveal a less expansive usage of Tim.47a-c.

Plant.118: Exegesis of the fourth day of creation, i.e. a shortened version of Opif.53-54. In the phrase οἷς τὸ μέγιστον ψυχῆς ἀγαθὸν ἀνάκειται (cf.47b1) ἀγαθὸν is Turnebus' conjecture for the mss.' ἀπάτη (the wilful emendation of a Christian scribe?). Wendland's additional suggestion (C-W 2.157) ἀγαθὸν <φιλοσοφία> is plausible (cf. Opif.53, Spec.1.336).

Her.78-79 (exeg. Gen.15:5): Just as the prophets of old were seers (1 Sam.9:9), so Israel is the man who sees God. The soul which looks up to the περίοδοι τοῦ οὐρανοῦ is educated and receives the manna of the divine Logos (on this important theme based on Ex.16:4 see below II 10.1.6.).

Congr.21 (etymology of Hagar, cf. Gen.16:1-2): Hagar is Egyptian by race, so the man who spends time on the encyclical studies must necessarily be involved with the body (i.e. Egypt). αἰσθησις, which makes possible the knowledge of the sensible world that forms the chief part of philosophy, is the bodily part of the soul. The sense which Philo is mainly thinking of here is sight (i.e. from Tim.47a-c).

Abr.57-58: Israel means ὁρῶν θεόν. Sight is the best of the senses, for by it the contemplation of the heavens takes place. But the eye of the soul allows the mind to see the πατήρ καὶ ποιητὴς (28c3), which is the peak of εὐδαιμονία (cf.90d6). Cf. also Abr.60-61.

Spec.1.322: Rightly Moses bans occult rites and mysteries from the holy congregation (Deut.23:18). These are works of darkness, not light. Compare how nature conceals nothing, displaying the whole of heaven εἰς τε τὴν δι' ὅψεως τέρφιν καὶ πρὸς φιλοσοφίας ἕμερον.

Spec.1.336,339: The champions of the mind and the senses are also excluded from the holy congregation (cf. Deut.23:4), but Philo certainly gives them a fair hearing. The unmistakable allusions to Tim.47a-c serve to underline the seductiveness of their position, in which man relies on the autonomy of his own faculties (φιλαυτία §333). Cf. also QG 3.43 (EES 1.237).

On the basis of the above collection of passages a comparison can now be made between the Platonic source and the Philonic adaptation.

A. Three themes are repeatedly taken from Plato. One or more is found in every passage and thus effectuates the reminiscence.

1. The encomium of the sense of sight.
  2. The contemplation of the heavenly beings by means of sight (but Plato does not use the term θεωρία favoured by Philo).
  3. The origin of philosophy, the μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν given to man.
- Noteworthy is that Philo's descriptions of the splendour of the heavens and the heavenly beings are much more elaborate and rhetorical than in Plato's account which, though protreptic in character, remains relatively abstract and 'scientific'.

B. A number of themes and additions, drawn from elsewhere, are super-

imposed on the above-outlined Platonic ideas.

1. The encomium of light, required so that sight can function properly. This motif is imported from Rep.507-509.
2. The sight of the eye of the body is regarded as preparatory to the vision of the eye of the soul, i.e. the mind, which concerns itself with the νοητά. The influence of the Phaedrus myth (esp. 247c-e) and Rep.533a-e is felt here.
3. On three occasions the origin of philosophy is not described in purely abstract terms but illustrated with examples of philosophical questions. This is not merely a rhetorical expansion, for the questions tend in a definite direction – what is the nature of the cosmos, and what is its relation to the highest cause, God the creator?
4. The theme of the contemplation of the heavens is given an extra dimension by the addition of the 'cosmological argument'. Plato nowhere suggests in Tim. 47a-c that sight ultimately leads to knowledge of the demiurge.
5. It is no coincidence that in three passages the climax is reached in the recognition of God as πατήρ καὶ ποιητής (cf. also Abr.164 τίς ὁ δημιουργός;). As Philo reads it, the goal of philosophy instituted in Tim.47a-c is given in the difficult task set in 28c.
6. Philo shows an unashamedly anthropocentric tendency which goes further than Plato would allow (cf. Laws 903c). The heavenly bodies have been created for the specific purpose of providing light and ministering to sight (Abr.158, cf. Opif.77).
7. In addition to the all-important exegetical contexts, Philo also merges Tim. 47a-c with Biblical themes, e.g. the name Israel, the showering of manna etc.

C. Two themes prominent in the Platonic text are downplayed or disregarded by Philo.

1. Although Philo emphasizes the order and harmony of the heavenly movements, there is no mention of the *kinship* between the heavens and man's mind, nor is it suggested that man should become rational by *imitating* the perfect motions of the celestial bodies. In Opif.77 Philo follows Gen.1:26 in speaking of the συγγένεια between the creator and man. But see also II 5.2.2. 7.2.4. 10.1.6.
2. Plato describes sight, philosophy, hearing etc. as the *gift* of the creating gods on no less than seven occasions (47a1,b2,6,c6,d1,7,e2). With the partial exception of Opif.77-78 Philo surprisingly ignores this theme, although the idea of God's beneficence is one of the most pervasive in his thought.

It is time to make up a balance. Some of the alterations and additions delineated in our analysis are more important than others. A number of related themes have been brought in from other 'purple passages' in Plato's writings. The most significant change, in my view, is that Philo repeats the

familiar themes initiated by Tim.47a-c with the emphasis that these must be orientated towards a search for God as the highest cause. Tim.47a-c is joined up with Tim.28c, a significant coupling which Plato had declined to make. Yet the difference between the two thinkers must be seen in the right perspective. In Rep.529-531 Plato had made it quite clear that study of the heavens should be no more than a stepping-stone to higher knowledge. Philo agrees. $\theta\epsilon\omega\rho\acute{\alpha}$ is pointless or even potentially idolatrous if not directed towards knowledge and experience of the Source of all being. What is new is the overt theocentrism, an approach which Philo shares with contemporary Platonists.¹

But the question remains. How important actually are these themes for Philo? Völker's answer to the question is resolute (188):

Philo bedient sich dieser Anschauungen, aber mehr als Bilder und literarische Reminiszenzen sind sie für ihn m.E. nicht gewesen, innerlich hat er ihnen fern gestanden.

Philo's repeated use of the themes might indeed be explained as motivated by apologetic aims or resulting from the weakness of the 'inveterate rambler' (Colson). It is equally possible to reach the opposite conclusion. The fact that Philo chooses to attach such long excursus to unimportant exegetical subjects as the fifth city and the servant's eye is an indication of how much significance he is prepared to attribute to the themes of sight and light, contemplation and the origin of philosophy. We in fact find ourselves in agreement with the view of Nikiprowetzky that the repetition of these themes drawn from Tim.47a-c form a kind of Leitmotiv giving expression to his respect for the achievements and value of Greek philosophy (98-99). But, the French scholar adds some pages later (107), it would be a mistake to think that these passages are on the same level as those describing the form of contemplation practised by the Israelites, Essenians or Therapeutae. Their character is *historical* and *abstract*, not addressed to the immediate concerns of Philo's exegesis focussed on the hidden depths of the Law. Clearly Nikiprowetzky here at least partially returns to the viewpoint of Völker quoted above. The impact of the study of nature and Greek philosophy in general on Philo is regarded as real but strictly limited. But could it not be equally argued that the kind of idealized contemplation ascribed by Philo to his heroes is profoundly influenced by the ideals propagated in Greek philosophy? It will be important to bear in mind the problems encountered here, first as we study the influence of the Timaeus on Philo's doctrine of man in II 10.1.1-6., and later in the more evaluative part of our study (see esp. below III 2.12 IV 2.2.).

7.2.4. The revolutions of the heavens and the circuits of the mind (47b-c)

As Guthrie 5.297 has remarked, the association of circular motion with the processes of thought is perhaps the strangest feature of Plato's psychology. Under the influence of Aristotle's trenchant criticisms (cf. De anima 1.3) it recedes in the psychology of the Stoa and the later Academy. The doctrine is missing in the Middle Platonist handbooks of Albinus and Apuleius (and also in Timaeus Locrus), but does appear in certain passages in Plutarch and Atticus (cf. Cherniss' note ad Mor. 1004C). It is thus a little surprising to observe that Philo alludes on a number of occasions to the circuits of the mind and to the parallel between heavenly motions and man's mental processes. We may be confident that this is due to the direct influence of the Timaeus.

In the treatise Quis heres the theme is particularly prominent. God's words to Abraham in Gen.15:5, cited at §86 (see also above II 6.3.1.), are the starting point: ἀνάβλεψον εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ ἀρίθμησον τοὺς ἀστέρας, εἰ δυνήσῃ ἐξαριθμῆσαι αὐτούς. καὶ εἶπεν οὕτως ἔσται τὸ σπέρμα σου. Philo's description of the sage (§88) clearly recalls the terminology of the Timaeus.

βούλεται γὰρ ἀντίμικτον οὐρανοῦ, εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ προσυπερβάλλοντα εἰπεῖν, οὐρανὸν ἐπίγειον ἀποφῆναι τὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ ψυχὴν ἔχουσαν <ἐν ἑαυτῇ καθάπερ> ἐν αἰθέρι καθαρὰς φύσεις, τεταγμένας κινήσεις, χορείας ἐμμελεῦς, θείας περιόδους, ἀρετῶν ἀστεροειδεστάτας καὶ περιλαμπεστάτας αὐγάς.

τεταγμένας κινήσεις: Cf. 90c8, possibly also a distorted recollection of 47c1 τεταραγμένας.

χορείας ἐμμελεῦς: Cf. 40c3 and the harmony of 47d.

θείας περιόδους: Cf. 47b7, c3.

ἀρετῶν...: A typical rhetorical expansion by Philo.

A similar exegesis of the same text is given at Leg. 3.40, though the reminiscence of the Timaeus is less clear (note also QG 4.181, exeg. Gen.26:4, a parallel text to Gen.15:5). At §185 (exeg. Ex.24:6, cf. II 6.3.1.) the mss. read:

ὁ ἱερὸς λόγος τοῦ αἵματος ἀξιῶν τὸ ἄλογον ἡμῶν μέρος ψυχωθῆναι καὶ τρόπον τινὰ λογικὸν γενέσθαι, ταῦς μὲν νουθεσίαις περιόδους ἀκολουθήσαν...

Wendland's conjecture νοῦ θείας is convincing and has been accepted by Colson EE 4.374, Harl FE 15.256. At §233 once again a parallel is drawn between man's ψυχὴ and the οὐρανός, this time with deviant features discussed above in II 5.2.1-2. Three separate references to the relation between the mind and the heavenly revolutions in the one treatise is unexpected. The presence of the text Gen.15:5 in the pericope dealt with in the treatise is primarily responsible.

Other texts that compare man's mind to heaven and the heavenly revolutions are: Opif. 82 (on which see also above II 1.3.1.), man is a βραχὺν οὐρανὸν πολλὰς ἐν αὐτῷ φύσεις ἀστεροειδεῖς ἀγαματοφοροῦντα τέχναις καὶ ἐπιστήμας καὶ τοὺς καθ' ἐκάστην ἀρετὴν ἀολόβιμους θεωρήμασιν (cf. Leg. 3.40 and the note of J.Cohn at GT 1.57); Virt. 12, the mind of man is itself an ἀστήρ... καὶ σχέδον

τι τῶν ἐπουρανίων ἀπεικόνισμα καὶ μύημα, for unlike the eye it does not need the aid of light; Det.85, the mind is located in the body in such a way as to have maximum contact with the immortal circuits of the air (!) and the heaven (closer here to Tim.90a-d, see further below II 10.1.2.).

With his customary perceptiveness Nikiprowetzky FE 23.137 observes that in Decal.49 the Platonic motif of the circuits of the mind is adapted to Judaic realities:

οἱ μὲν τοὺς χρησιμοὺς ἀξιοῦντες εἶναι καταπειθεῖς ὡς ἐν ἀσκήῳ φωτὶ τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον βιάσονται τοὺς νόμους αὐτοὺς ἀστέρας ἔχοντες ἐν ψυχῇ φωσφοροῦντας.

The rational circuits have been replaced by the laws which illuminate the soul like stars (cf. also Legat.210, Mos.2.11). As Nikiprowetzky remarks, 'il y a ainsi une équation entre ciel-raison-Loi de Moïse, dont le "pouvoirs" partiels, astres, idées, commandements, fournissent des symboles interchangeables'.

Somewhat similar is Philo's explanation of the High priest's breastpiece (λογεῖον), which has twelve stones containing the names of the twelve patriarchs engraved upon them. QE 2.114 gives exegesis of Ex.25:21:

...the twelve stones are representations of the twelve phylarchs, whose names he cuts and engraves in them, wishing to make them stars and, in a certain sense (to make) each patriarch himself become a constellation (and) heavenly image in order that the tribal leaders and patriarchs may not go about on the earth like mortals but become heavenly plants and move about in the ether, being firmly established there.

The final words of this passage are dependent on Plato's further development of the theme in Tim.90a-d; see below II 10.1.1.

The combination with two other adjacent themes or motifs, often found in Philo should be briefly observed here. The one, drawn in the first place from the Phaedrus myth and immensely popular in Hellenistic times, is that the mind leaves the body and on soaring wing actually joins the harmonious revolutions of the celestial beings (expressed with characteristic verbs such as συμπεριπολεῖν, συγχορεύειν, μεταωροπολεῖν, ἀθεροβατεῖν). Examples at Opif.70, Spec.1.207, 3.1, QG 3.3 (EES 1.184), cf. Völker 181, Festugière Révélation 2.558-561, Boyancé REG 76(1963)101-104, Harl 96-97. The second theme has a more direct philosophical background, namely the Aristotelian fifth element. If both the heavenly bodies and man's soul are made of the quasi-element which naturally moves in a circle, the affinity between them is readily explained. Examples at Her.283, Decal.134; cf. Billings 56, Harl 90-92, Dillon 171. Both these themes fall outside the scope of the present study.

The reason, in conclusion, that Philo refers to the circuits of the mind when this idea was doctrinally not very fashionable is not far to seek. It illustrates man's place in the cosmos, his affinity as microcosm to the unswerving and awesomely impressive motions of the heavens in the macrocosm. Philo's description of man's mental circuits is thus primarily imagistic. It tells us more about man's status in the cosmos than about the actual nature of the processes of cognition and thought in his mind.

CHAPTER EIGHT

TIMAEUS 48A-61C: THE RECEPTACLE AND THE PRIMARY BODIES

8.0. Introductory

8.1. νοῦς and ἀνάγκη (Tim.48a)

8.1.1. The two opposed cosmic and psychic powers

8.2. The receptacle (Tim.48e-53c)

8.2.1. Philo's references to the receptacle

8.2.2. Wolfson and other scholars on Philo's adaptation of the Platonic receptacle

8.3. The physics of the corporeal world (Tim.53c-61c)

8.3.1. The primary bodies (53c-57d)

8.3.2. Varia

8.0. Introductory

Now that Plato has begun to describe aspects of man's body, it becomes clear that another factor must be included in his analysis. The *rational purpose* for which the gods created the eyes is so that man is introduced to the concepts of number and time and can embark on philosophy. But in the actual functioning of the eyes *mechanistic forces* come into play (cf.46c-e). In Plato's account τὰ διὰ νοῦ δεδημιουργημένα must be complemented by τὰ δι' ἀνάγκης γυγνόμενα (47e4-5). The γένεσις of the cosmos takes place as the mixed result of the conjunction of *mind* and *necessity* (the 'wandering cause' 48a7), a process in which mind persuades necessity to guide most of the things that come to be towards the best. The introduction of this new causative factor means that the account must make a fresh start.

The two ontological genera introduced in 27d-28a are insufficient. To them is now added a τρίτον ἄλλο γένος, generally known today as Plato's receptacle (ὑποδοχή 49a6), but that is only one of the names which he gives it. Plato warns us that it is a 'dim and difficult conception'(49a3), and this difficulty is made abundantly clear in the large number of names and images he needs to describe it (conveniently listed at Guthrie 5.263). The nature and function of the receptacle are essentially related to the theory of ideas. If the world of sensible reality is an image or reflection of the transcendent ideas, there must be a third entity in which that image or reflection can take

place, but which has no qualities of its own to impede the image's expression. Thus the description of the receptacle as space (52a8) might seem the most suitable, except that it could easily encourage one to disregard the constitutive aspect of the receptacle which Plato also emphasizes (e.g. in the sexual imagery; cf. above I 4.n.15).

The receptacle must not, however, be identified with the primal chaos confronted by the demiurge in the act of creation (30a), for it has no qualities, ordered or disordered, of its own. The primal chaos consists of the receptacle and the disordered events and motions that take place in it. It symbolizes the realm of necessity, wholly deprived of the intervention of ordering mind. The fact that it is described as having vestiges ($\epsilon\chi\upsilon\nu$ 53b2) of the primary elements is Plato's furthest concession to the mechanistic theory of Democritus. If chance or necessity were responsible for the genesis of the cosmos, we might expect the slightest traces of order, but *never* the ordered perfection of the cosmos as we know it.

Also in his theory of the primary bodies Plato's aim is to demonstrate the deficiencies of the theory of the Atomists. Each of the elements is assigned the shape of one of the perfect geometric solids, formed by marking out surfaces consisting of triangles on the continuum of the receptacle. Each of these triangles possesses sides of rational and irrational length ($1, 2, \sqrt{3}$; $1, 1, \sqrt{2}$; see the excellent analysis in G. Vlastos, Plato's universe (Oxford 1975) 66-97). Plato is indicating that irrationality is located in the very structure of corporeal reality. The further subject of the $\alpha\rho\chi\alpha\acute{\iota}$ of the lines is deliberately excluded from the Timaeus (48c, 53d, referring to the doctrine of the ultimate principia developed by Plato in his later years).

8.1. $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ and $\alpha\nu\acute{\alpha}\gamma\eta$ (Tim.48a)

8.1.1. The two opposed cosmic and psychic powers

The opposition between $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ and $\alpha\nu\acute{\alpha}\gamma\eta$ which Plato gives a central place in the Timaeus and which many modern exegetes regard as providing the vital clue to the understanding of the dialogue's interpretation (cf. Cherniss Selected papers 255-259, Tarán 'Creation myth' 385, Brisson 467-513) is not found in Philo. The reason for this lies not in the causation attributed to $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, but in Philo's dissatisfaction with the term $\alpha\nu\acute{\alpha}\gamma\eta$. He often associates $\alpha\nu\acute{\alpha}\gamma\eta$ with the physical necessities caused by man's corporeal nature (e.g. Leg. 2.28, Spec.2.124, QG 2.45 (EES 1.124) etc.; see further below II 9.2.1.). But he does not use the term to denote a principle of causation. At Somn.2.253

God is called true peace and a *ἐκούσιον*, while matter (*ἡ οὐσία*) is equated with war, *ἀνάγκη*, *γένεσις* καὶ *φθορά*. This, however, is an isolated passage (cf. Völker 74). Sometimes *ἀνάγκη* is regarded as parallel to *εὐμαρμένη*, i.e. representing the inexorable sequence of cause and effect (cf. *Migr.* 179, *Her.* 300, *Somn.* 2.44, *QG* 1.21 etc.), a Stoicizing doctrine which he explicitly rejects. Because of these connotations – significantly different to those intended by Plato¹ – the concept of necessity is not used in opposition to *νοῦς*. Instead the contrast proposed by Plato is translated into the opposition between *νοῦς* as active cause and matter as passive object (*Opif.* 8; see above II 2.2.1. 3.2.1.).

There is one highly controversial text in which a distant echo of *Tim.* 48a is perceptible and which should not be overlooked in the present context. At *QE* 1.23 Philo gives a complex allegorical exegesis of the words in *Ex.* 12:23, καὶ οὐκ ἀφήσει (ὁ κύριος) τὸν ὀλεθρεύοντα εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὰς οἰκίας ὑμῶν πατάξαι.

But as for the deeper meaning this must be said. Into every soul at its birth there enter two powers (*δυνάμεις*), the salutary (*σωτηρία*) and the destructive (*φθοροποιός*)... Through these powers the cosmos too was created. People call them by other names: the salutary power they call powerful (*δυνατός*?) and beneficent (*εὐεργέτης*) and the opposite one (*ἐναντία*) they call unbounded (*ἄπειρος*) and destructive (same word as above). Thus the sun and moon and the appropriate positions of the other stars and their ordered functions and the whole heaven together come into being and exist through the two powers. And they are created in accordance with the better part of these, namely when the salutary and beneficent power brings to an end (*ἐτελείωσε*?) the unbounded and destructive nature. Wherefore also to those who have attained such a state and a nature similar to this is immortality given. But the race (*γένος*, i.e. the human race) is a mixture (*μεμειγμένη*?) of both these powers, from whom the heavens and the whole cosmos have received this mixture... (translation Marcus *EES* 2.32-33, slightly altered; retranslations Marcus, Weitenberg).

Although this striking passage was ignored by some of Philo's more systematizing interpreters (e.g. Drummond, Bréhier, Wolfson), more recently it has received a great deal of attention; cf. Goodenough *By Light, Light* 205, Daniélou 53-57, Boyancé *REG* 72(1959)378, Harl *FE* 15.108, Hengel *Judaism and Hellenism* 229-230, Nikiprowetzky 255-259, Dillon 173-174, Winston 335-336. Our point of departure is the penetrating discussion of Nikiprowetzky, who affirms that the dualistic emphasis of the passage has nothing to do with Persian (or Essenic) ideas, but must be seen in the light of Platonic and Platonist doctrines.

The Biblical text requiring explanation encourages Philo to interpret the 'destroyer' on the level of the soul, for the 'houses' in the text are taken to refer allegorically to souls (cf. *QE* 1.22, *Leg.* 2.34). No unsurmountable problems are encountered here. In terms of the Platonist psychology which Philo employs, the destroying power that enters the soul is the force of irrationality located in or represented by the irrational part of the soul. The dualism involved is indisputably Platonic (cf. II 7.2.1. on *Tim.* 43a-d, 9.2.1-2 on *Tim.* 69aff.). As Nikiprowetzky 257 observes, the chief rescuer is *νοῦς*, the chief destroyer *αἰσθησις*. But, ever conscious of the parallel between micro-

cosm and macrocosm, Philo also endeavours to explain the presence of the two powers on the cosmic level. They cannot be equated with his customary doctrine of the two divine powers, for those form a polarity, not an opposition as in the case of the salutary and the destructive power.

An important clue to what Philo might mean by the cosmic destructive power is given in the description 'unbounded' (ἄπειρος). As was observed above in II 3.2.1., both Philo and the Platonists use this term to depict the formlessness and unordered state of matter (*Spec.*1.48,329, *QC* 2.12 (EES 1.85), *Plut.Mor.*719C, *Num.fr.*4 etc.). The dualism which Philo has in mind is that between disordered and deregulating matter and the creative ordering force of the divine presence in the cosmos (i.e. at the level of the Logos). Matter is not entirely banished from heaven, but its indeterminacy is wholly reduced to the ordered movements of the heavens. The same heavenly immortality can be gained by the man in whom the unbounded destructiveness of irrationality is constrained and countered by the salutary beneficence of reason.

It thus emerges that the basic opposition between order and disorder, God and matter, which Philo reads into the *Timaeus* (and especially *Tim.*30a) is applied to the structure of both the macrocosm and the microcosm. A glance at Middle Platonist authors shows that other Platonic texts were brought into relation to this basic opposition:

- (1) The good and bad (cosmic) soul of *Laws* 896d; cf. *Plut.Mor.*370F,1014E, *Num.ap.* *Calc.*297, *Att.fr.*11,23, *Alb.Did.*14.3.
- (2) The two opposed revolutions of the *Politicus* myth; cf. *Plut.Mor.*1015A.
- (3) The opposition between the One and the Dyad (basically Neopythagorean, but going back to the late Plato and the Old Academy); Cf. *Plut.Mor.*370D, *Num.ap.* *Calc.*295.
- (4) The statement in *Th.*176a that not all evil can be eradicated; cf. *Plut.Mor.*371A.
- (5) The opposition between νοῦς and ἀνάγκη in *Tim.*48a, cf. *Tim.Locr.*1, *Diog.Laert.*3.75-76, *Num.ap.* *Calc.*299.

As was anticipated above, it is possible to detect a faint trace of the last-mentioned doctrine in Philo's text, when he speaks of the entire cosmos receiving a *mixture* of both the powers. At 48a Plato describes the γένεσις τοῦ κόσμου as having been mixed (μεμειγμένη) from the combination of νοῦς and ἀνάγκη.² The passage in Plutarch *Mor.*371A-B which begins with an adaptation of Plato's words is in fact the closest parallel we have to Philo's text:

μεμειγμένη γὰρ ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις καὶ σύστασις ἐξ ἐναντίων οὐ μὴν ἰσοσθενῶν δυνάμεων, ἀλλὰ τῆς βελτίονος τὸ κράτος ἐστίν· ἀπολέσθαι δὲ τὴν φαύλην παντάπασιν ἀδύνατον, πολλὴν μὲν ἐμπεφυκυῖαν τῷ σώματι, πολλὴν δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ παντός καὶ πρὸς τὴν βελτίονα ἀεὶ δυσμαχοῦσαν.

Just like Philo Plutarch speaks of *powers*, whose influence is exercised on the soul and body of the cosmos.³

The decisive question that must be posed in evaluating this controversial passage is as follows. Is the destructive power actively maleficent, or is

the nature of its 'activity' confined to recalcitrant passivity? In the case of the former option, which might well be suggested by the retranslation φθοροποιὸς δύναντος,⁴ we have a more extreme dualism than is found elsewhere in Philo. But the Platonic and Platonist background which we have sketched leads us to agree with Nikiprowetzky that this conclusion is premature. The uniqueness of the passage is caused by Philo's desire to combine the 'destroyer' of the Biblical text with the allegorical symbolism of the 'house' as soul and cosmos, while remaining within the bounds of a Platonism which is at least partly derived from the Timaeus.

8.2. The receptacle (Tim.48e-53c)

8.2.1. Philo's references to the receptacle

The task before us is to determine whether Philo makes any references to or shows utilization of Plato's difficult and detailed discussion on the nature of the receptacle. This is the method we must first use in deciding whether that discussion had any impact on his thinking.

1. Female nature. In calling his τρίτον γένος receptacle, mother and nurse Plato was making use of familiar Greek ideas on procreation. The father was regarded as the sole cause of generation, while the mother was thought to supply only a place for the embryo to grow in and obtain nourishment (cf. Cornford 187, Guthrie 5.264; Philo alludes to these ideas at QG 3.47). Guthrie adds that there is a distinct trace of the theory of the Pythagoreans, in which the unlimited was associated with the female and the unit as principle of limit and order with sperma. The Timaeus will thus have encouraged Philo to associate matter with femaleness, as occurs especially in a number of texts in the Quaestiones (QG 2.12, 3.3 (EES 1.183), 3.47, 4.160, QE 1.8, cf. De Deo 3).¹ If we add a text such as QE 2.33 (where the femaleness of matter is implied), it emerges that Philo is thinking chiefly in terms of a whole series of opposites centred around the conception of the monad and the dyad:

<u>monad</u>	<u>dyad</u>
God	matter
father	mother
first cause	passive object
virtue	passions
soul-mind	body
γεννᾶν	τίκτειν
male	female
intelligibility	sense-perceptibility
immortality	mortality
ἀστέρος	φάυλος.

The femaleness of matter is closely associated with its dyadic nature. The predominant influence here is without doubt that of the Old Academic and Neopythagorean doctrine of the two principles. Strictly speaking, however, Philo does not regard matter and the dyad as identical. The number two is an image of or symbolizes matter as passive object of creation (cf. Spec.3.180, Staehle 22, Krämer 273). Compare further Baltes Timaios Lokros 43-44 on Tim.Locr.5, Eudorus ap. Simpl.in Phys.181.10-30, Dillon 199,204 on Plut.Mor.373C,428E-429A. But there are also Philonic texts in which the femaleness of matter is more directly related to images drawn from the Timaeus.

2. Mother and nurse. Plato describes the receptacle as μήτηρ (50d3 contrasted to the model as father, 51a4), τεθήνη (49a6,52d5,88d6), τροφός (88d6). All three words are used to describe ὅλη αἰσθητή at Ebr.61 in a discussion of Sarah's, i.e. the virtue-loving mind's, masculinity (exeg. Gen.19:11,20:12). The descriptions are attributed to anonymi (ἔφασαν, οἷς πρώτους σοφίας ἀνεβλάστησεν ἔρνος), but it can hardly be doubted that Philo has Plato specifically in mind (note how Plato is thus associated with the venerable sages of old). Similarly at QG 4.160, in an explanation of why Esau in Gen.25:25 is called πρωτότοκος and not πρωτόγονος, Philo writes that 'passive matter... gives birth like a mother' and that 'sense-perceptible things are completed by matter, which not ineptly might be said to be the mother of created things'.

But Philo does not reserve the epithets 'nurse and mother' for matter alone. At Her.52 αἰσθησις is called τροφός καὶ τεθήνη of the human race, at Plant.14, QG 2.7 (EES 1.80) it is the turn of the earth to be described thus, while in Det.115, Ebr.31, Conf.49 the images are applied to σοφία. Of these passages Ebr.30-31 is by far the most interesting. Philo, expounding the text Deut.21:18-21 in which parents accuse their son of disobedience and drunkenness, briefly dwells on the father and mother of the universe. The father of the cosmos is God the δημιουργός, the mother is the maker's ἐπιστήμη, which receives (παράδεξαμένη) the divine seed and gives birth to the only beloved sense-perceptible son, this cosmos (the other son is the κόσμος νοητός). This ἐπιστήμη is the σοφία spoken of by a member of the divine chorus (of prophets), namely in Prov.8:22 which Philo quotes with a textual reading deviating from the LXX (ἐκτίσται instead of ἔκτισε). As was noted above in II 5.1.3., the passage in Prov.8:22-31 is the best-known text of the Jewish Sophia speculation. The Philonic passage at Ebr.30-31 is another that has recently been much discussed: cf. Bréhier 118-120, Wolfson 1.256-258,267-269, Weiss 206-211, Früchtel 173-174, Nikiprowetzky 72-73, Dillon 164.

The question that is relevant to our study is the following. Why does Philo apply the epithets μήτηρ καὶ τεθήνη, which he knows were used by Plato for the receptacle, to σοφία? Diverse answers have been given.

(i) Wolfson, contrary to his usual approach, gives a *philological* answer. Philo is engaged in a kind of Midrashic speculation on a Hebrew word describing σοφία in Prov.8:30, which with different vocalization can mean 'nurse' and 'mother'. Nikiprowetzky, in examining the problem of whether Philo knew Hebrew, is highly critical of this argument, describing it as 'véritablement sophistique' (75).

(ii) Nikiprowetzky himself argues that to regard it as problematic that Philo should use the same images for matter and its virtual opposite, σοφία in the guise of the νόστος νοητός, is to fail to take into account the *plasticity of the symbols and images* which he uses. Many examples are given of the application of these images to all manner of concepts in Philo's writings.² According to the French scholar there is no point in *reifying* these symbols and coming to drastic mystical, mythological or philosophical conclusions. The images of mother, daughter, nurse etc. merely record abstract relations - in the case of matter the relation between substrate and sensible reality, in the case of Wisdom the relation between cause and effect.

(iii) Bréhier and Weiss find their answer in the interposition of certain *mythological and religious ideas* current in the Hellenistic cults, with as key example Plutarch's description of Isis in terms of the Platonic receptacle at Mor.372E.

(iv) The same parallel intrigues Dillon, who wonders if doctrines of Alexandrian *philosophy* are involved. Isis, he points out (204), is also equated with Wisdom (Plut. Mor.351Eff.):

On the whole, it seems true to say that in Philo's thought there is present the recognition of a female life-principle assisting the supreme God in his work of creation and administration, but also somehow fulfilling the role of mother to all creation (cf. also Ebr.30). If this concept reveals contradictions, that is perhaps because Philo himself was not quite sure what to do with it. From our point of view, this rather enhances its value, as indicating that Philo found the concept already established, presumably in contemporary Pythagoreanism.

At 204 he adds a possible correlation with the Pythagorean/Old Academic Dyad. But the material which Dillon can muster is not really sufficient to prove his case. In a footnote he concedes: 'Plainly we are in a marshy area of Philo's thought.'

The conclusion must be that there is insufficient evidence to prove a philosophical rationale behind the similar description of ὕλη and σοφία. If one inclines, as I do, to the view that the mythological parallels adduced are not relevant to Philo's intentions, then Nikiprowetzky's solution remains behind as the most recommendable.

3. Receptivity. Plato's description of the τρίτον γένος as receptacle (ὑποδοχή 49a6, πανδεχές 51a7) or in terms of receptivity (the verb δέχομαι 50b6, 8,d3 etc.) is reflected in a few Philonic texts. As noted above in II 3.2.1., the language used to describe the transformation of disorderly matter in Opif. 22 (τροπὴν καὶ μεταβολὴν ἐδέχετο) recalls Plato's account, even if the disorder of Philo's pre-existent matter shows more affinity with the disorderly motions of 30a,52d-53a than the quality-less medium of 49a,50b-e (cf. also Prov.1.7, 'receiving forms that were not in it', 'receiving beauty together with adornment' (text above II 3.2.2.)). In Ebr.30 σοφία is portrayed as παραδεξαμένη τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ σπέρματα. The words δέχομαι, παραδέχομαι, ὑποδέχομαι are regularly used by Philo for the impregnation of the female (cf. Leisegang ad locc.).

4. ἐκμαγεῖτον. Philo uses the word ἐκμαγεῖτον on two occasions to describe the sense-perceptible cosmos, Fug.12 and Aet.15 (cf. also Spec.1.147). Although Colson is undoubtedly justified in remarking (EE 9.195) that, in the context of the Timaeus compendium at Aet.15 (cf. above II 2.1.3.), ἐκμαγεῖτον recalls Plato's use of the word at 50c2, the meaning given to it is quite different. It does not indicate the quality-less recipient of form, but the impress or imprint made by a seal or mould (cf. σφραγίς Fug.12). Hence Philo uses it of the cosmos (Plato's ἔκγονον 50d4), not the receptacle (Plato's μήτηρ 50d3). The change of meaning involved (found also in Arius Didymus and Albinus) was discussed above in II 3.4.2.

5. Vocabulary. It so happens that Plato describes the receptacle as ἀνόρατον at 51a7 (v.1. ἀόρατον in some mss.), while at 52a3 the γένος of the forms is called ἀόρατον καὶ ἄλλως ἀναύσθητον. Both descriptions could have been influential in Philo's multiple interpretation of the words in Gen.1:2 analysed above in II 2.1.1. 3.2.3. The word ὀνειρώξεις in the meaning of 'dreaming', 'hallucination' (cf. LSJ ad loc.) is so rare that we can be sure that Plato's use of it at 52b7 induced Philo to follow at Somm.2.298, Prob.10 (cf. Petit FE 28.142), even though the contexts are wholly different.

8.2.2. Wolfson and other scholars on Philo's adaptation of the Platonic receptacle

Having done our best in the previous sub-section to ferret out Philo's allusions to Tim.48-53, we can conclude that he was indeed conversant with this part of the dialogue, but that on the whole he makes remarkably little use of the section in which Plato fills in and clarifies what was left unsaid concerning the pre-existent chaos at 30a. But a possible objection could be raised at this point. Just because Philo virtually never refers to Tim.48-53, that need not mean that he has not analysed and taken the passage into account. What about, for example, Wolfson's well-known argument (1.300-310), in which he undertakes to prove that Philo propounds the creation of matter ex nihilo by showing how he reinterprets Plato's doctrine of the receptacle?

Wolfson's argument is of special interest for our study because of the way it approaches Philo's use of the Timaeus. It will be worth our while to examine it closely. After reviewing all the texts quoted by scholars in favour of or against Philo's espousal of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, Wolfson concluded that in this manner the question could not be resolved. What was required was a passage in which Philo definitely and unambiguously states that the pre-existent matter out of which the cosmos was created was

itself created by God. He continues (1.303-304):

Such a passage, we believe, is to be found in his revision of the creation story of the Timaeus. In that passage, either as an interpretation of Plato or as a departure from him, Philo, we shall try to show, has *explicitly stated* his view of the creation of matter. If students of Philo have failed to see it, it is because they have failed to see Plato through the eyes of Philo (my italics).

Wolfson's argument is thus particularly subtle because it bypasses the ambiguities of what Philo actually says on the origin and nature of the pre-existent matter and asserts that Philo's true views are evident in the way that he interprets the Mosaic creational account in terms of Plato's Timaeus.

The argument can be briefly summarized as follows. (1) In the Timaeus both the ideas and the limited void (Wolfson's way of describing the receptacle¹) are eternal. In the limited void there are copies or traces of the ideas of the four elements in a state of disorder. From these copies the four elements are created, and from them the cosmos. (2) Philo, in contrast, regards the intelligible world as created on 'day one'. The chief contents of this world are extracted from Gen.1:1-3:

ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν. ἡ δὲ γῆ ἦν ἄορατος καὶ ἀτασκαεύστος, καὶ σκότος ἐπάνω τῆς ἀβύσσου, καὶ πνεῦμα θεοῦ ἐπεφέρετο ἐπάνω τοῦ ὕδατος. καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεὸς Γενηθήτω φῶς. καὶ ἐγένετο φῶς.

Philo located in these words the ideas of the four elements, the ideas of mind and soul, the idea of the void and the idea of the celestial bodies (cf. Opif. 29-31). (3) Since the idea of the void and the ideas of the four elements are created by God, it must follow that the limited void or receptacle and also the copies or traces of the ideal four elements in it are created by him (cf. also Conf. 136). (4) Therefore Philo considers that the matter in which the cosmos was created and the matter from which the cosmos was created are both themselves created by God.

In response to this argument we must begin by agreeing that in the first chapters of the De opificio mundi Philo is engaged in presenting an exegesis of the Mosaic cosmogony which is heavily dependent on the philosophical framework provided by Plato's Timaeus. Despite its ingenuity, however, Wolfson's argument fails to convince us for reasons both methodological and philosophical.

Firstly, the American scholar gives Philo's words a much more specific application than they can bear. The exegete's chief purpose is to show that in Gen.1:1-5 Moses describes the contents of the noetic cosmos. In so doing he retains much of the concreteness of the Mosaic account, so that the reader receives the distinct impression that heaven, earth, air and water refer *not to the elements* but to the cosmic regions in their intelligible form.² More importantly, the equivalence postulated between the void (κενόν §29), empty space (κενή χώρα §32), the Platonic receptacle and the 'in which' aspect of

matter is extremely problematic. Philo in fact never considers space to be an aspect of matter at all, but follows the Stoa in associating it with place and body (cf. Fug.75, Somn.1.62, SVF 2.503-505; here is the probable background to the passage in Conf.136 which Wolfson adduces).

Secondly, Philo's reader can have absolutely no idea, when he reads the account of the contents of the intelligible world at §29-35, that it is written in such a way as to shed clarifying light on the nature of the pre-existent matter described in §21-22. If Philo were to formulate the doctrine that matter was created by God out of nothing - a doctrine that takes issue with one of the most basic axioms of Greek philosophy (affirmed with some force at Aet.5, see above II 6.1.2.) and that also would represent a new development in Jewish thought - we must expect him to announce such a decisive innovation. Far from giving the 'explicit statement' sought by Wolfson, Philo in fact preserves a prudent silence on the subject of the origin of the pre-existent matter. Moses does not discuss the subject in his account (that is, if Gen.1:1-5 is taken to refer to the intelligible world), and so Philo confines his comments to the relatively brief mention of the pre-existent matter at §9 and §21, passages which go no further than reflecting the Platonic doctrine from the Timaeus required to give the creational account a philosophical coherence.

Thirdly, even if we were to grant Wolfson's assumptions concerning the limited void and the traces of the ideas of the four elements in it, it is still necessary to point out that the thesis that God created both these runs directly counter to basic presuppositions of Philo's thought. God is the source of order, not disorder. Why should he then first create a disorderly matter before proceeding to order it? It would be more logical that he create his finished products straight away, rather than pass through the intermediate stage of a disorderly chaos. In fact, however, Philo is not prepared to make such a radical break from the Timaeus and the entire tradition of Greek philosophy. Moreover the recalcitrant passivity of matter is the source of the evil and imperfection inherent in corporeal reality (see above II 8.1.1.). If God created matter he would be directly or indirectly responsible for evil, a doctrine which Philo repeatedly rejects.

Further critical discussions of Wolfson's thesis can be found at Bormann 42-44, Lilla 195, May 9, Winston 10-13. In contrast Reale Paradoxos politeis 247-287 relies heavily on Wolfson's argument (cf. esp. 273-277) in his attempt to show that Philo sets out, both in the De opificio mundi and in the De Providentia, a doctrine of creation involving two stages, i.e. first the creation of matter and then the ordering of the matter in order to form the cosmos. The additional arguments which he claims can confirm Wolfson's thesis are not strong. The mixture of earth and water at Opif.38 is based on Gen.1:9. If Philo had thought it relevant to the subject of the nature of the pre-existent chaos, he would have informed his readers of the fact. Prov.1.22 certainly shows a correspondence between the Mosaic pre-existent chaos and Platonic matter, but does *not* affirm that the pre-elemental chaos was created by God (see

further below). The doctrine of grace which Reale invokes (282-283) is particularly susceptible to the third objection raised against Wolfson's thesis above. Only the text at Prov.2.48-50 gives Reale's arguments a measure of support. It might well be argued that, if the demiurgic creator calculates the precise amount of matter required for the creation of the cosmos, he must have brought that matter into being himself. Yet even here Philo, in following the customary craftsman metaphor, places no emphasis on radical philosophical consequences of the doctrine of the direct creation of matter by God (cf. Weiss 71-72). Reale fails to take into account the subsidiary nature of much of the argumentation in Prov.II. The emphasis is on demonstrating the doctrine of providence, not on giving new insights into the doctrine of creation derived from the Mosaic account of γένεσις.

We have not yet dealt with one aspect of Wolfson's argument, namely his view that Philo follows Plato in postulating that the disordered state of the pre-existent chaos is caused by the copies (μυμήματα 50c5) or traces (ἔχνη 53 b2) of the forms of the four elements which move chaotically and haphazardly in the receptacle or space. Winston 10-11, though arguing strongly against Wolfson on the question of creatio ex nihilo, does agree with him that Philo's description of the primordial matter implies such a conception, even if it is not explicitly mentioned. He speaks of 'automatic reflection' or 'shadow-reflexes of the Forms' in the receptacle (these would be indirectly caused by God, for he is the one who thinks the forms). If these two scholars are right, we must assume a profounder use of Tim.48-53 than was discovered in the previous sub-section by the method of detecting citations and allusions.

It is certainly true that the nature of the pre-existent matter derived from Tim.30a raises important questions. What causes it to be disordered and full of disharmony, and not merely possessing the receptivity of the receptacle? Some Middle Platonist handbooks follow Plato's account in the Timaeus so closely that they mention that the forms are somehow present in the pre-cosmic ὕλη (cf. Tim.Locr.4-7, Diog.Laert.3.76, Alb.Did.12.2,13.3).³ A text which might be used (though the two scholars do not do so) to show that Philo supported this view is Prov.1.22 (on which see above II 2.3.3. 3.2.3.). The water and air (denoted by σκότος in Gen.1:2, cf. Opif.29) that are present before the cosmos came into being might be identified with the traces of the elements in the primordial chaos.

In spite of these considerations I consider the view of Wolfson and Winston to be excessively speculative. Unlike the above-mentioned Platonists Philo is not obliged to adhere rigidly to Plato's account. Even more than they he stresses the material (ἐξ οὗ) aspect of the Platonic receptacle at the expense of the spatial (ἐν ᾧ) aspect. He thinks of the act of creation primarily in terms of the image of a builder constructing a house or city or a sculptor shaping a statue or a cutter dividing material (cf. Opif.16-20, Cher.125-127, Prov.2.50-51, Her.133-140,158-160 etc.). In such a demiurgic conception of creation there is no need for ideal shapes to be already present in

the material. It is preferable to import the Aristotelian doctrine of potentiality/actuality and declare that the forms are *potentially* present in the unformed matter (cf. Opif.21 δυναμένη δὲ πάντα εἶναι). The disorder and disharmony of the primordial chaos results from the absence of the ordering hand of the creator. See further below III 2.8.

8.3. The physics of the corporeal world (Tim.53c-61c)

8.3.1. The primary bodies (53c-57d)

The act of creation, involving as it does the measuring out of God's goodness and beneficence (see above II 3.1.3.), cannot take place without the use of number. Number plays a significant role at all levels of reality, not only in the intelligible realm and the psychic part of the sense-perceptible realm, but also in the process of bringing corporeal being to the greatest possible order. Philo follows Plato, who explains the transition from disorder to order outlined in Tim.30a in more detail at 53a-b by affirming that the primal chaos was without proportion or measure (εἶχεν ἀλόγως καὶ ἀμέτρως 53a8), when the demiurge undertook to give it form by means of shapes and numbers (δυσεχηματίσατο εἰδὲσσί τε καὶ ἀριθμοῖς 53b5). He is referring of course to the shapes and numbers of the elementary triangles and primary bodies which he is about to expound at some length in the following pages. Accordingly Philo informs his readers at Her.156-157 that God uses every number and every form tending to perfection when generating and shaping each thing (γεννῶν καὶ σχηματίζων ἕκαστα, cf. Somn.2.45 <ὁ θεὸς> ἀσχημάτιστον...τὴν οὐσίαν ἐσχημάτισε, Spec.1.48 etc.). In a discussion on the quantity of matter at Prov.2.50 Philo declares in response to Alexander's questions that *the inventor of number and measurement* can be expected to work out the precise amount of material required for his creative task. One of the 'three measures' in Gen.18:6 represents the way that the things in the sublunary realm were made out of the four elements, admitting γένεσις and φθορά (QG 4.8 (EES 1.280)).

If, therefore, creation involves the bequeathal of shape and number on corporeal being, does Philo also follow Plato in his speculative theory (an εἰκὼς λόγος 53d5) of the primary bodies? In answering this question we shall deal separately with the two aspects of the theory, the elementary triangles and the regular geometric solids.

On five occasions Philo speaks of the special characteristics of the right-angled triangle:

Opif.97: The hebdomad produces the right angle, for in the triangle with sides of 3, 4 and 5 units the right angle is formed between the sides of 3 and 4 units. With its great stability the right-angled triangle is the ἀρχή of all the shapes and qualities.

Contempl.65: The great feast (probably Pentecost) is marked by fifty, the ἀγνῶτατος καὶ φυσικώτατος ἀριθμῶν, because it is formed from the square of the right-angled triangle ($3^2 + 4^2 + 5^2 = 50$), which is the ἀρχὴ τῆς τῶν ὅλων γενέσεως.

Mos.2.80: Similar formulation prompted by the 50 pillars visible in the tabernacle (Ex.26:18-25).

Spec.2.177: Another encomium of the number 50 (the feast of Weeks fifty days after the feast of the Sheaf, Lev.23:15-16, Deut.16:9-16). One of the reasons that this number rouses so much admiration is that it is formed by the right-angled triangle, which mathematicians call τὸ στοιχειωδέστατον καὶ πρεσβύτατον τῶν ἐν οὐσίαις περιλαμβανομένων.

QG 4.8 (Greek fragment FE 33.148): The Pythagoreans suppose the triad among numbers and right-angled triangle among shapes to be στοιχεῖον τῆς τῶν ὅλων γενέσεως. Cf. also QG 2.5 (EES 1.76), 4.27, QE 2.93.

The two types of triangle out of which Plato forms his primary bodies are both right-angled. Thus, when Philo describes the right-angle as ἀρχή, στοιχεῖον τῆς τῶν ὅλων γενέσεως and so on, it seems beyond reasonable doubt that the Platonic theory is hovering in the background. But the actual triangle which he in each case invokes has sides of length 3, 4 and 5 units. Not only is this triangle quite incompatible with the details of Plato's theory, but it would in fact destroy its philosophical significance (for irrationality would no longer be present in the very structure of the ultimate building-blocks of matter). One might be inclined to conclude that Philo has misunderstood Plato's theory. But this conclusion should be resisted, for Philo here places Pythagoras before Plato. In expounding the symbolism present in the Biblical texts which he is dealing with, he makes use of the special right-angled triangle to which the Pythagoreans attributed universal significance. They called it the κοσμικὸν τρίγωνον because it contained the principles of all things (cf. Proclus in Rep.2.45.18ff. on Rep.546b; note how he relates its virtues directly to Plato's theory of the primary bodies).

To the Platonic theory that each of the elements has received the shape of one of the regular geometric solids Philo refers only once in his writings [but now see the appended comment at the end of this section], at QG 3.49 (EES 1.250), in the middle of a lengthy encomium of the ogdoad (exeg. Gen.17:12):¹

In the fourth place, since there are four elements, the form of earth, water, air and fire, fire has received as shape the homonym 'pyramid', while air is eight-sided, and water is twenty-sided, and the earth is a cube. It was therefore thought necessary that the earth, which was destined to be the (home) of the worthy and virtuous human race, should have as its share a cubic number, in accordance with which the whole earth was formed equally, and that it should share in the parts of generation...

The word-play on πῦρ and πυραμῖς is also found at Tim.56b5. The entire passage, of course, only becomes intelligible with reference to Plato's theory. Since the source is not given, Philo must expect his reader to be acquainted

with it. It should be noted that Philo gives no indication of being aware of the restriction which Plato's theory imposes on the total interchangeability of the elements (i.e. earth cannot be transmuted into the other elements, cf. 56d). Texts such as Aet.109-110, QE 2.81,88 show that he accepts without qualms the Peripatetic and Stoic doctrine that *all* the elements can be transmuted into each other.²

Thus we find that the references made by Philo to the elementary triangles and the primary bodies occur *without exception* in arithmological contexts. There are limited parallels for the Philonic references in other writers who draw on the same body of arithmological doctrine as he does; see further Staehle 25-26,39,52. Plutarch too gives an exposition of the Platonic theory in the context of a discussion of the virtues of the number five (Mor.426Eff.). The word-play on $\pi\upsilon\rho/\pi\upsilon\rho\alpha\mu\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$ is found at Ps.Iambl.Theol.arith.23.13 in relation to the tetrad. So it is eminently likely that Philo's very limited interest in Plato's theory was stimulated by the reading of arithmological literature rather than through a detailed study of the Timaeus itself. In two ways Philo's usage differs from the arithmological sources and parallels. Firstly it is repeatedly called forth by explanation of Biblical numerical symbolism. Secondly the parallels listed by Staehle are not so close that they exclude Philonic adaptation. Three examples lie ready to hand:

- (1) The arithmological works (and also Plutarch) recall Plato's theory of the primary bodies in relation to the pentad, because there are five of them. Philo uses it in relation to the ogdoad and concentrates on the properties of the cube. There is no parallel for this.
- (2) The arithmologists do not mention that the right-angled triangle is associated with the $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ of the cosmos.
- (3) The arithmological tradition is for the most part not interested in numbers beyond the primary decad (cf. Robbins CPh 26(1931)359, Staehle 9), and so Philo's remarks on the significance of the number fifty are also without parallel.

In presenting Philo's thought on the creation and structure of the cosmos Wolfson (1.310) declares: 'As in Plato, the elements are described by him [i.e. Philo] as having certain geometrical figures.' This statement, based on the passage in QG 3.49 alone, is formulated in an excessively 'doctrinal' manner. Philo is convinced that the ordered structure of the cosmos is achieved by means of number, also at the elemental level. But he is not very interested in Plato's subtle theory of the primary bodies.

The Philonic fragment recently rediscovered by A.Terian (see above II 5.1.1.) again constrains us to alter the conclusions so far reached in this sub-section, though not in a significant manner. Expatriating further on the qualities of the number 55, Philo writes (translation Terian):

Taken successively, 5 triangular numbers generate 55; likewise, 5 quad-

angular numbers, taken successively, generate 55. Of [the triangulars] 3, 6, 10, 15, 21 is derived 55; so also the 5 quadrangular numbers generate 55, as follows: 1, 4, 9, 16, 25 make 55. Out of the triangles is everything generated. Out of the parallel equilateral triangles three elements are contrived: fire, moisture, and the octahedron; for there is a figure for fire, a figure for air, and a figure for water. Whereas out of the quadrangle, which is the cube, is the figure for earth.

As in the case of the earlier part of the fragment quoted above in II 5.1.1., an almost identical version of this piece of arithmological information is found at Anatolius 40.12-19 Heiberg (cf. also *Theol.arith.* 87.4-11 De Falco). By comparing this version we can easily observe how the Armenian transmission has been responsible for a number of mistakes in the last five lines. Anatolius reads:

ἐκ δὲ τριγώνου καὶ τετραγώνου ἡ τοῦ ὅλου γένεσις κατὰ Πλάτωνα· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ ἰσοπλευρῶν τριγώνων τρία σχήματα* συνίσταται, πυραμῖς, ὀκτάεδρον, εἰκοσάεδρον, τὸ μὲν πυρὸς σχῆμα, τὸ δὲ ἀέρος, τὸ δὲ ὕδατος, ἐκ <δὲ> τετραγώνων ὁ κύβος, τοῦτο δὲ τὸ σχῆμα γῆς ἐστίν.

* σχήματα was restored by Heiberg from the excerpt found in *Theol.arith.* His own ms. had σημειον, while Valla (who had used another unidentified ms.) had translated *elementa*. So Heiberg adds in his apparatus that the correct reading might be στοιχεῖα, and he translates 'solides réguliers'. But the reading σχήματα, meaning 'shapes', is to be preferred.

Firstly, the third last sentence of the fragment should read: 'Out of the triangles <and the quadrangle(s)> is everything generated.' This change is confirmed by the flow of Philo's text. Secondly, the translator took σχήματα to mean 'elements' (or perhaps had στοιχεῖα in his text), and so found difficulty in rendering the three geometrical shapes. The word πυραμῖς was thus split into πῦρ and ἀτμός, which accounts for the unexpected 'moisture' in the translation. The word ὀκτάεδρον was retained, but because three 'elements' had now been found the word εἰκοσάεδρον was left untranslated. Clearly the Armenian translator (or earlier copyists) had insufficient knowledge of Plato's theory to be able to help themselves.

But also the original arithmological source showed little respect for Plato's theory. The association of the cubically shaped primary body of earth with the square is patently a matter of arithmological convenience, for Plato (*Tim.* 53c-54c) composes it out of triangles, just as in the case of the other primary bodies. Finally we note that the conclusion reached above, namely that Philo's references to Plato's elemental theory occur only in arithmological contexts, remains unaltered.

8.3.2. Varia

Philo's remaining references to Plato's account of the physics of the corporeal world are rather scanty.

1. At QG 4.164 Philo, commenting on Isaac's age of 60 years in Gen.25:26, writes: 'The number sixty is the measure which holds in itself those things which in this cosmos belong to the zodiac when the twelve pentagons are added together.' The Armenian transmission casts a veil over what Philo is actually trying to say here (unfortunately the Old Latin version cannot help us out because it bowdlerizes the astrological reference, cf. Petit L'ancienne version Latine 2.21). But Marcus (EES 1.449) is almost certainly correct in suggesting that he alludes to Plato's mysterious words at Tim.55c4-6, ἐν δὲ οὐσῃ συστάσει μιᾷ πέμπτῃ, ἐπὶ τὸ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς αὐτῇ κατεχρήσατο ἐκεῖνο διαζωγραφῶν. These words were subjected to considerable speculation in Middle Platonist Timaeus exegesis (cf. Tim.Locr.35, Alb.Did.13.2, Plut.Mor.428D,430B (note the arithmological context), 1003C-D, and see the remarks of Baltes Timaios Lokros 123f.). Plato indicates that the dodecahedron is the regular geometrical solid best suited for the cosmos as a whole (compare an inflated leather soccer ball, and note Phd.110b). But does διαζωγραφῶν, besides meaning 'paint in diverse colours', also hint at the zodiac? Both Albinus and Plutarch think so. As Cherniss observes (note ad Mor.1003D), they have in mind the *numerical* similarity between the twelve sides of the dodecahedron and the twelve divisions of the zodiacal circle. Philo in our passage recalls the same correspondence, but his concern with the number sixty leads him to emphasize the number of angles contained in the faces of the dodecahedron.

At QE 2.81, in discussing the lampstand of Ex.25:39 allegorically in terms of the οὐρανός, Philo makes a similar reference to the sixty parts of the heaven (both Aucher and Marcus erroneously translate 'of the earth' (Weitenberg)). 'Heaven' can replace 'cosmos' here because at the circumference their shapes coincide. κατὰ τοὺς τῇ μαθηματικῇ σχολάζοντας (retranslation Marcus) is doubtless an indirect reference to the Timaeus, as Marcus (EES 2.131) suggests.

2. On Philo's imitation of the word-play ἀπείρους/ἄπειρον δόγμα (Tim.55 d1) at Opif.171 see above II 3.5.1.

3. The influence of Plato's words at Tim.58a4-7, ἡ τοῦ παντὸς περίοδος... κυκλοτερὴς οὐσα... σφύγγει πάντα καὶ κενὴν χώραν οὐδεμίαν ἐξ̄ λείπεσθαι, can be detected at Plant.9 (see above II 5.1.3.) and Post.5 (see above II 7.1.1.). The possibility of an intra-cosmic void is denied at Prov.2.55.

CHAPTER NINE

TIMAEUS 61C-89C: THE PHYSIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF MAN

- 9.0. Introductory
- 9.1. The processes of sensation (Tim.61c-68d)
  - 9.1.1. The dyad of hearing (67a-c,80a-b)
- 9.2. The mortal part of the soul (Tim.69c-72d)
  - 9.2.1. The passions of the irrational soul (69c-d)
  - 9.2.2. The trilocation of the soul (69e-71a)
  - 9.2.3. The imagery associated with the soul's trilocation
  - 9.2.4. The liver and prophecy (71a-72b)
- 9.3. The body (Tim.72d-81e)
  - 9.3.1. Providence and the structure of the body (73a)
  - 9.3.2. A literary allusion to Tim.75d-e
  - 9.3.3. Advances in medical science
  - 9.3.4. The creation of the plant world (77a-c)
- 9.4. Disease, health, and the equilibrium between soul and body (Tim.82a-89c)
  - 9.4.1. The themes of disease and health
  - 9.4.2. Evaluations of the body

9.0. Introductory

Now that the nature of the elementary building-blocks and the basic principles of physics have been established, Plato can return to his account of the structure of man the microcosm. He begins with a description of the processes of sensation (61c-68d). After a brief recapitulation of 29e-42a an account is given of the two mortal parts of the soul, their location in the body and their relation to the functioning of the body's main organs (69d-72d). Plato then embarks on a rather technical and difficult discussion of the parts and physiological mechanisms of the body (72d-81e), in which he retains the basic principles of his physics, but also draws heavily on the theories of the Italian, Sicilian and Coan medical schools. There follows a survey of the diseases of the body (82a-86a) and the diseases of the soul caused by the defective constitution and nurture of the body (86b-87b). The recommendation is that man should seek an equilibrium between body and soul, to be gained by

regular exercise and a healthy mode of life (87c-89c).

All-pervasive in Plato's account of man's physiology is his use of the principle of teleology, i.e. that the parts of the body are consciously designed to be able to carry out their purposeful functions. The gap which the reader, even if he knows very little about the subject, senses between modern medical science and Plato's account is perhaps caused as much by this overt use of teleological explanation as by the presence of all manner of (in our eyes) curious theories to which Plato - in his ignorance of basic features such as the muscles, nerves, circulatory system, glands, genes and so on - had to resort.

In diverse places right throughout Timaeus' speech Plato shows his eagerness that there should be a close correlation between the structure of the account and its systematic contents, even though he is well aware that it is not in all cases possible (cf. 34b-c, 61c-d). Cornford came to the conclusion that the expository part of the dialogue was divided into three main sections, each of which commences with an introductory or recapitulative passage:

27d-47e the work of Reason

47e-69a the work of Necessity

69a-92c the cooperation of Reason and Necessity

Guthrie 5.320 has shown that a misinterpretation of 68e1-3 is involved here, for also in the section in which necessary causes are discussed reason is still most definitely at work, e.g. in the construction of the elemental shapes. His own suggestion is that this section describes the limitations imposed on the work of reason by necessity. It is apparent that, if one follows Philo in reading the Timaeus without paying much attention to the distinction between rational and necessary causation (cf. the conclusion above in 8.1.1.), the above-mentioned structural niceties will not be considered very important. I have therefore lumped together the entire section dealing with the physiology and psychology of man in one part of this Commentary, even though that means that the structural role of the recapitulative section at 68e-69c is ignored.

9.1. The processes of sensation (Tim. 61c-68d)

9.1.1. The dyad of hearing (67a-c, 80a-b)

Except the mechanism of vision, already explained as part of the works of reason in 45b-d, the processes of sensation are described by Plato in 61c-68d. The mechanism of hearing cannot be fully set out in 67a-c because the theory of the circular thrust, required to explain how the consonance of high and low

tones occurs, has not yet been dealt with, and so Plato briefly returns to the subject in 80b-d. None of these discussions have left much trace on Philo's writings.

Philo discusses the theory of hearing on a number of occasions (Gig.52, Deus 84, Migr.52, Decal.33-35, QE 2.34). The most detailed account is found in Deus 84. Continuing the theme of mixture (cf. §77-81), he quotes Ps.61:12, ἄπαξ κύριος ἐλάλησε, δύο ταῦτα ἤκουσα.¹ God's speaking is monadic, but man's hearing involves a dyad. The theory of hearing which Philo presents here uses Stoic terminology (πνεῦμα, ἡγεμονικόν, πλῆξιν ἀέρος) and is closer to the little we know of the Stoic theory (cf. SVF 2.836,872) than Plato's account. The dyad is formed by the mixture of articulated πνεῦμα and the air which acts as a medium (for ἀέρι συγγενεῖ cf. Deus 79 and the comments above at 7.2.2.). But Philo also reports another kind of dyad, caused by the harmony of high and low tones. Colson is most likely correct (EE 3.487) when he suspects that Philo has Tim.80b in mind, where Plato does indeed speak of κρᾶσις (80b5). But the actual problem which Plato was trying to solve, namely that high and low sounds travel at different speeds, is not mentioned in Philo's text. Among the Stoic fragments there is no trace of their theory of consonance.

It has been suggested that at Leg.2.67 Philo is thinking of Plato's description of black as κατακορές (68c5) when he allegorically portrays the Ethiopian (i.e. black) woman whom Moses marries (Num.12:1) as τὴν ἀμετάβλητον καὶ κατακορῇ γνῶμην. Cf. C.Siegfried, Philo von Alexandria (Jena 1875) 197, Heinemann GT 3.73, Colson EE 1.481. If true, the allusion is particularly subtle.

9.2. The mortal part of the soul (Tim.69c-72d)

9.2.1. The passions of the irrational soul (69c-d)

In 69c-d Plato deliberately recalls the brief sketch of the soul's passions given in 42a. There he presented six παθήματα of the soul – first αἷσις, followed by ἡδονή, λύπη, ἔρως, φόβος, θυμός. These six are repeated here, two others (θάρος, ἐλπίς) are added, and the list is enlivened by the additions of some colourful descriptive epithets. As was observed above in 7.1.3., the theme of the conflict between the rational and irrational parts of the soul is one of the most central in Philo's allegorical system. The long sentence at 69c7-d6 adds nothing new to what he could learn in 42a-b. From an examination of his usage it appears that it appealed to him chiefly on account of the vividness of its descriptions.

This emerges clearly as we now give some comments on the Platonic sentence from the viewpoint of the manner in which *Philo* read and utilized it.

69c7 ὁχημά τε πᾶν τὸ σῶμα: It is natural to connect up this image with the celebrated passage of the driver and the two horses in the Phaedrus myth; cf. Agr.77,88-89 and the remarks of Waszink *ap. Tert.De anima* 53.3.

69c8 δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα παθήματα: Philo will have read παθήματα as meaning the πάθη of the soul caused by its contact with the body (he himself does not use πάθημα in this sense). The theme of bodily *necessity* is prominent in this section (also 70e5,72e6,73a5,cf.42a5). Because the soul is joined to the body it cannot avoid feeling the desires etc. associated with the body's requirements, and so allowance has been made for this in the design of the body's structure. Philo fully agrees. How can it be possible, he exclaims at Leg.3.151, that we, tied as we are to the body, should not comply with bodily necessities! Allegorical exegesis of texts such as Deut.23:12-14 and Ex.12:11 teach us how the passions can be controlled by reason (Leg.3.151-159). Cf. Leg.1.86, 2.28,57, Her.45,272-274, Somn.1.110, QC 2.20,45 etc.

69d1 ἡδονήν, μέγιστον κακοῦ δέλεαρ: The image of pleasure as a lure or bait is very common in Philo; cf. Post.72, Deus 168, Agr.103, Ebr.165, Sobr.23, Migr.29, Fug.39, Mut.172, Mos.1.295. Note how the image is expanded at Agr.103, ἐν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔστιν ὃ μὴ πρὸς ἡδονῆς δελεασθὲν εἴλκυσται καὶ ἐμφέρεται τοῖς πολυπλοκωτάτοις δικτύοις αὐτῆς, ἃ πολλὸς διεκδύναται πόνοσ. In Agr.16 reminiscences from Tim.69d1 & d4 are combined: τὸ λογικὸν μέρος φιλοσοφίας... τὴν εὐπαράγωγον ἀπάτην, μέγιστον ψυχῆς δέλεαρ καὶ ἐπιζημίον, ἀναερῇ... The allusion, which is primarily literary, is overlooked in all editions.

69d2 θάρρος καὶ φόβον, ἄφρονε συμβούλω: Fear is described as an ἄφρων σύμβουλος at Decal.177, κακὸς σύμβουλος at Opif.79, Abr.14 (note also Wendland's conjecture at Agr.97). In QE 2.100 (exeg. Ex.27:1) θυμός, the spirited part of the soul, appears to be called a κακὸς σύμβουλος; the πάθος of anger incites man to ignore the restraining influence of his rational part (Weitenberg; the two words for 'counsellor' in the Armenian probably represent one Greek word; Marcus' translation (EES 2.147) 'counsellor of evil' is incorrect).

69d3 θυμὸν δὲ δυσπαραμύθητον: The adjective is not found in Philo, in spite of his fondness for δυσ- words.

69d3 ἐλπίδα δ'εὐπαράγωγον: εὐπαράγωγος (found only here in the Platonic corpus) is a popular word in Philo (Gig.39,59, Agr.16,96, Ebr.46, Fug.22, Spec.1.28, Contempl.63), doubtlessly derived from his reading of the Timaeus. It is not used to describe hope (though at Gig.39 ἐλπίς is in the immediate vicinity).

A good example (it is but one of many) of the way Plato's doctrine of the passions of the soul in 42a and 69d filters through to Philo's works is located at Opif.79. Philo here confronts the exegetical *quaestio* of why man was created last in the account of creation. Although so far only man's νοῦς has been mentioned (§69-71), in order to answer the *quaestio* Philo assumes that he already has a body (compare Plato's procedure at 42a, where the παθήματα are indicated before the formation of the body has been described). As soon as man's γένεσις took place he found around him a lavish supply of the necessities of life. A moral lesson can be learnt from this. The same abundance enjoyed by the first man can still be man's today if he controls the passions and repulses the multitude of vices that attacks him. The Platonic character of the passage is reinforced by the choice of vocabulary (ὁ κακὸς σύμβουλος φόβος 69d2, γαστριμαργία 73a6, κράτος 42b2). Although Philo's list of passions seems reminiscent of 69d, the actual πάθη described here are the quartet regarded by the Stoa as the primary passions (ἡδονή, ἐπιθυμία, λύπη, φόβος, cf. SVF 3.386ff.). On Philo's views on the πάθη see further Schmidt 88-90, Völker

80-81, Wolfson 2.231ff., Dillon 151-152.

Philo's mixture of Platonism and Stoicism on the subject of the πάθη accurately reflects developments in the history of philosophy. It is well-known that Posidonius explicitly rejected the doctrine of the Old Stoa that the soul is unitary and the πάθη are mistaken judgments on the part of the ἡγεμονικόν (cf. Rist Stoic Philosophy 212). Posidonius argued that the rational faculty is distinct from the faculty of the soul which is the source of the passions, and so effectively returned to the Platonic tripartition of the soul (which, as we shall see, amounts to a division between the rational and irrational part).¹ This development facilitated the assimilation of Stoic and Platonic doctrines of the πάθη in Middle Platonism (cf. Lilla 84-92). The harsh criticism of Plutarch Mor.441C-E is directed against the Chrysippean, not the Posidonian, doctrine. His view that man has a double duality - soul and body, rational and irrational soul - is the same as Philo's. For an example of the four Stoic passions in a Platonic context (i.e. reminiscent of Opif.79) see Tim.Locr.72 (cf. Baltes Timaios Lokros 204).²

It would not be remunerative in this context to analyse all the exegetical themes in which Philo's echoes of the παθήματα ψυχῆς of Tim.69d occur. Nearly all of them are found in the Allegorical Commentary and refer to the struggle of the soul between virtue and vice, as frequently related to anti-thetic pairs of Biblical characters or peoples, e.g. Jacob and Esau, Leah and Rachel, Moses and Balaam, Israel and Edom, and so on. Compare above II 7.1.3., where it was shown that Philo's allegory of the soul is significantly indebted to the structure of Plato's account at Tim.41c-44c, of which Tim.69c-d is essentially a recapitulation.

9.2.2. The trilocation of the soul (69e-71a)

On three occasions in his oeuvre Plato expounds his theory of the three parts of the soul, each account having distinctive features which cause it to remain vivid in the memory of the reader. In Rep.434e-444d a subtle psychological analysis renders the tripartition plausible, and it is related to the three divisions of the ideal state and the four cardinal virtues. In Phdr. 246b-249d the powerful image of the charioteer and the two horses endows the theory with great dramatic force. In Tim.69c-71a it is given a physiological foundation through the location of the soul's parts in separate areas of the body. Philo was thoroughly acquainted both with the three Platonic passages and the doctrinal distillations in scholastic Platonism based on them. In this section we shall review four Philonic passages in which the trilocation of the soul is prominent, followed by some remarks on divisions of the soul in the philosophical tradition and Philo. A discussion of the extensive use made by Philo of Plato's imagery in this part of the Timaeus will be left to the following section.

Leg.1.70. The entire section Leg.1.63-73 is an elaborate allegorical exegesis of Gen.2:10-14. Out of Eden (generic virtue) flow the four rivers which symbolize the particular virtues. The names and descriptions given by Moses to the four rivers reveal the correspondence of the cardinal virtues with the parts of the soul and their location in the body. The basic source here is the account in the Republic, but Philo uses details from the Timaeus to increase the persuasiveness of the allegorical explanation. Thus in §68 the river Geon is said to symbolize courage. The name Geon means 'chest' (στῆθος) or 'butting'. Courage is associated with the spirited part of the soul (cf. Rep.442b8), which is located in the chest (cf. Tim.69e2-4), where also the heart is (cf.70a8-c2). Two paragraphs later Philo poses the exegetical quaestio of why the virtues are presented in the sequence φρόνησις, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη. The order is determined, he replies, by the correspondence of the virtues with the trilocation of the soul in the head, chest and abdomen. In §72-73 the image of the charioteer and the two horses is used at some length, so that in this one exegetical pericope all three Platonic passages on the soul's tripartition are put to use.

In §70 Philo presents the theory of tripartition with doxographic simplicity: νοητέον οὖν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡμῶν τριμερὴς ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἔχει μέρος τὸ μὲν λογικόν, τὸ δὲ θυμικόν, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικόν. Of the four terms underlined only the last is found in Plato (70d7 etc.). But one is not surprised to find all four terms in the section περὶ μέρων τῆς ψυχῆς at Aëtius Plac.4.4.1, where the tripartition is attributed to both Pythagoras and Plato, but the trilocation is not mentioned. The same terms are found in Albinus Did.17.4,24.1 (except that λογιστικόν from Rep.439d5 replaces λογικόν). The correspondence of the cardinal virtues and the parts of the soul is presented in the driest scholastic fashion at Did.29.1. Like Philo (§72) Albinus describes δικαιοσύνη as achieved when the three parts of the soul are in a state of συμφωνία, whereas Plato speaks of ἁρμονία (Rep.443d5-6; συμφωνία he consistently uses of σωφροσύνη - 430e3,432a8,442c10). Albinus does not, however, use the Phaedrus myth to explain δικαιοσύνη, and in other respects his presentation of the trilocation of the soul shows no particular affinity to Philo's (except that both place τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν in the ἥτρον, which differs from Tim.70e1).

A parallel, but much briefer, allegory, utilizing the doctrine of tripartition but not of trilocation, is found at QG 1.13 (exeg. Gen.2:14).

Leg.3.114-116. Philo here gives an exegesis of the words spoken by God to the serpent at Gen.3:14, ἐπὶ τῷ στήθει καὶ τῇ κοιλίᾳ πορεύσῃ. Passion lurks in these two parts of the body, and so pleasure, symbolized by the serpent, finds there its place of operation - preferably in the belly, but if need be in the chest. The soul is tripartite, says Philo as if propounding a universally accepted fact. He then adds that some philosophers distinguish these parts not only in terms of their function (δυνάμει) but also by means of their location (τόποις).¹ It is clear from the remainder of the passage that Philo is primarily thinking of the Timaeus, and with justification, since στῆθος in the Biblical text recalls 69e2-3 and κοιλία 73a3.²

In expounding Plato's theory Philo alludes to diverse images used in the Timaeus, a detailed account of which we leave to the next sub-section. He associates not only the ἐπιθυμητικόν with pleasure but also the θυμικόν (lovers of pleasure become angry when deprived of it). It could thus be argued that he is losing sight of the intermediate status of the spirited part between the rational and the appetitive parts, for this part is presented by Plato as often assisting rather than opposing the rational part (cf. 70a5, Rep.440e). Naturally the exegetical context encourages, or even constrains, such an interpretation. But, as we shall see, Philo is also influenced by the tendency in Middle Platonism to regard Plato's doctrine of the soul as essentially bipartite, i.e. divided into a rational and an irrational part.

The fact that the serpent must proceed on its breast and belly in the Biblical lemma invites Philo to embark on a long exposition on the control or extirpation of the passions, in which a large number of Pentateuchal texts dealing with these and other parts of the body are strung together. Philo's espousal of the Platonic trilocution of the soul thus controls and coordinates the allegory right up to Leg.3.160.

Spec.1.146,148. Exegesis of Lev.7:31-34 as part of a discussion on the offerings given to the priests. From every sacrificial victim they receive the right shoulder and the fat around the chest. The description of the chest as location of the spirited element of the soul is verbally very similar to Leg.3.115 and is only partly derived from the Timaeus, although that dialogue remains the source of the basic idea of the soul's trilocution (see further below II 9.2.3.). In the Timaeus the tendency of the spirited element to throb and seethe via the heart is checked by the proximity of the soft and receptive lungs (70c-d). The same function Philo, impelled by the Biblical text, attributes to the fat around the chest. Two paragraphs later (§148) he returns briefly to Plato's account (70e) to explain another offering to the priests, the maw or fourth stomach (Deut.18:3). The allegorical method is present in this passage, but it is very restrained. 'La véritable victime, c'est l'ame de l'offrant (Daniel FE 24.lxiv).'

Spec.4.92-94. As part of a diatribe against desire (ἐπιθυμία) inspired by the tenth commandment οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις..., Philo recollects what has been said by philosophers who have enquired into the nature of the soul. Of his four accounts of the soul's trilocution this one is anatomically the most detailed. It is also the one closest to the source: θώρακα 69e6, πλῆσιον τοῦ νοῦ cf.70a3-5, περὶ τὸν ὀμφαλὸν 70e1, τὸ καλούμενον διάφραγμα cf.70a2, πορρωτάτω τῶν βασιλείων cf.70e6. The spirited part is placed next to the rational part so that the φρόνησις of the latter can calm it down and keep it gentle (§93; contrast 70a4-7, where the θυμός is obedient to the λόγος, so that they

can *together* keep the appetitive part under strict control). The ἐπιθυμητικόν resides in the lower regions so that, being devoid of λογισμός, it is as far distant as possible from the kingly νοῦς (§94, cf. 70e6-71a2). In spite of all these general similarities, however, a great number of details diverge from Plato's original account. It is hardly justified to describe it as a paraphrase of the Timaeus.

Other texts which make use of the Platonic theory of the soul's trilocatation are Migr.66-67 (also exeg. Gen.3:14), QE 2.100 (exeg. Gen.27:1), 115 (exeg. Ex.28:30, parallel to Leg.3.118ff.). The soul's tripartition is further mentioned at Conf.21, Her.64 (note θυμούς ζέοντας, cf. Tim.70b3), Virt.13, QE 1.12, QG 4.195⁷ (text EES 2.271, exeg. Gen.26:26). It would be premature to conclude that Philo regards the soul as fundamentally tripartite. Other types of division are scattered through his writings, e.g. an Aristotelianizing tripartition at Opif.67, QG 2.59 (Greek text FE 33.115), Spec.4.123, extended to five-fold at QG 4.186, the Stoic eightfold division at Her.232, Mut.111, QG 1.75, reduced to seven-fold at Abr.28-30. Billings 52, Schmidt 50, Wolfson 1.385-389, Dillon 174 are certainly correct when they affirm that Philo regards the soul as essentially bipartite, consisting of an indivisible rational part and a divisible irrational part (cf. Her.167,232, Congr.26, QE 2.33 (EES 2.75) etc.). This is the view of the soul which dominates the long Allegory of the soul at the start of the Allegorical Commentary (cf. above II 7.1.3.). It can indeed be argued that this view is faithful to the spirit of the Timaeus, for on a number of occasions Plato talks of the immortal (or divine) and the mortal part of the soul (61c7,65a5,69c7,d5,e1,72d4,cf.41d1).

A tendency towards bipartition is unmistakably present in the late Plato and becomes the standard doctrine in the Old Academy (cf. Arist.MM 1.1 1182a23; D.A.Rees, 'Bipartition of the soul in the Early Academy' JHS 77(1957)112-118). Posidonius' revision of orthodox Stoic doctrine mentioned above in II 9.2.1. also amounts to a division of λογικόν and ἄλογον in the soul. Aëtius Plac. 4.4.1 combines the same division with the tripartition in reporting Plato's δόξα (cf. also Tert.De anima 14.2).³ The Middle Platonists, when discussing the nature of the soul, faithfully report the trilocatation of the Timaeus (Alb. Did.17,23, Apul.De Plat.207-208, Tim.Locr.46, Galen Plac.Hipp.Plat. passim). It is clear, however, that they regard the division into rational and irrational as more basic. Albinus Did.24.1 divides the soul into the λογιστικόν and παθητικόν. Cf. also Tim.Locr.46, Plut.Mor.441F-442A, Dillon 194,290, Baltes Timaios Lokros 147. The division of the soul into two parts facilitates a comparison with the macrocosm, the rational part being equivalent to heaven, the irrational part to the sublunary region. See further above II 5.2.2.

9.2.3. The imagery associated with the soul's trilocation

No one will wish to deny that parts of the Timaeon account of man's psychology and physiology are rather tough going. Plato has made a concerted attempt to enliven the descriptions and enhance their literary quality by means of a pervasive use of imagery. Also in antiquity this did not go unnoticed. In a chapter on metaphor the anonymous author of the treatise *Περὶ Ὑφους* uses a large number of images drawn from *Tim.* 65c-85c to illustrate that the multiplication of images is a legitimate device to confer distinction on commonplaces and descriptive passages (32.5; examples conveniently set out in D.A. Russell, 'Longinus' *On the Sublime* (Oxford 1964) 153-154).

This use of the *Timaeus* for purposes of illustration is of particular interest for our study because it is generally agreed that that author is approximately a contemporary of Philo and may have moved in Greek literary and philosophical circles similar to those with which Philo was acquainted. His brief but eulogistic reference to the τῶν Ἰουδαίων θεομοθέτης and the quotation from the first chapter of Genesis (§9.9) could have been penned by Philo himself. The ties connecting the two authors should not be exaggerated.¹ It remains noteworthy, however, that the concept of sublimity is paralleled in Philo (*Det.* 79, *Her.* 4), and that there are other similarities of style, diction and thought between the two authors (cf. Russell *op.cit.* xl-xli, 72, 188, 191).

It is time to turn now to an investigation of Philo's references to the imagery which Plato utilizes to describe his theory of the soul's trilocation.

1. The acropolis. The head, as residence of the νοῦς or rational part of the soul (introduced already at 44d5), is now presented as the acropolis from which commands are despatched to the rest of the body (70a6). The image of the head as citadel occurs at *Leg.* 2.91, 3.115, *Agr.* 46, *Somn.* 1.32, *Spec.* 4.92, *QG* 2.5 (EES 1.73), *Abr.* 150, *Spec.* 3.184. In the first text it is neatly adapted to the metaphor of warfare in the soul, one of Philo's principal metaphors for the allegory of the soul's progress. In *Agr.* 46 this adaptation receives a surprising twist. The θηρωδέστατος νοῦς turns its ἀκρόπολις into a fortress from which to attack soul and body! In the last two texts the image is combined with the encomium of sight derived from *Tim.* 47a-c (see above II 7.2.3.). The long list of examples given by Pease *ad Cic.DND* 2.140 shows how Plato's image became a fixed *topos* in later Greek philosophical literature. Philo's awareness that the source of the image is the theory of trilocation in the *Timaeus* is made clear in the texts *Leg.* 3.115, *Spec.* 4.92.

2. The guardhouse (and the bodyguards). Plato describes the chest as the guardhouse (70b2 τὴν δορυφορικὴν οἰκῆσιν), reinforcing the military metaphor implied in the mention of the θώραξ at 69e6. The image of the king's bodyguard (δορυφόρου) is a favourite of Philo (cf. Leisegang 200-201, Billings 94-95,² Goodenough *By Light, Light* 39-43). But when those passages where

Philo relates this image to the trilocution of the soul are examined, a surprising fact emerges, which will justify our dealing with the image in more than usual detail. It appears that Philo consistently uses the image to portray the function and station of *the senses disposed around the sovereign mind*.

So at Leg.3.115 we find that he writes: εἴτα ἔννευμαν (ἐννοιῶν τῶν φιλοσόφων) τῶ μὲν λογιστικῶ τὸν περὶ κεφαλῆν χώρον εἰπόντες, ὅπου ὁ βασιλεὺς, ἐκεῖ καὶ οἱ δορυφόροι, δορυφόροι δὲ αἱ αἰσθήσεις τοῦ νοῦ περὶ κεφαλῆν οὔσαι, ὥστε καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς εἴη ἂν ἐκεῖ, ὥσπερ ἄκρον ἐν πόλει λαχὼν οἰκεῖν... At Spec.4.92 the wording is very similar: λόγῳ μὲν ὡς ἡγεμόνι τὴν ἄκραν ἀπένευμαν (οἱ μὴ χεῖλε-σιν ἄκρους γευσάμενοι φιλοσοφίας) οἰκειότατον ἐνδιαίτημα κεφαλῆν, ἔνθα καὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων αἱ τοῦ νοῦ καθάπερ βασιλέως δορυφόροι τάξεις παρίδρυνται... Cf. also Opif.139*, Det.33,85, Conf.19, Somn.1.27,32*, Spec.3.111*, 4.123*. In all these texts the δορυφόροι are the senses. In the texts marked by an asterisk the image of the (Great) king is used to describe the mind or rational part of the soul which the senses serve.

The situation becomes even more interesting when other non-Philonian texts are adduced, which reveal the same realignment of Plato's imagery; Cicero Leg. 1.26 ipsum autem hominem eadem natura non solum celeritate mentis ornavit, sed et sensus tamquam satellites adtribuit ac nuntios...; Albinus Did.17.4 ἐργασάμενοι δὲ οἱ θεοὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἐνδύσαντες τῷ σώματι αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν δεσπότουσαν αὐτοῦ, ταύτης τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν κατὰ λόγον περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν καθίδρυσαν... περικειμένων καὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων τῇ κεφαλῇ, ὥσπερ δορυφορουσῶν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν; Galen Plac.Hipp.Plat.2.4.17 οὐδὲ γὰρ ὅτι καθάπερ ἐν ἀκροπόλει τῇ κεφαλῇ δικτὴν μεγάλου βασιλέως ὁ ἐγκέφαλος ὑδρυται, διὰ τοῦτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρχὴ κατ' αὐτόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ ὅτι καθάπερ τινὰς δορυφόρους ἔχει τὰς αἰσθήσεις περιωκισμένας..., UP 8.2 1.445.14 Helmreich ἡ δὲ δὴ κεφαλὴ τοῦ μὲν πλείστοις ἔδοξε διὰ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον γεγενῆσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀπάσας ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῇ, καθάπερ τινὰς ὑπέρτατας τε καὶ δορυφόρους μεγάλου βασιλέως (cited by Boyancé REG 76(1963)110, where the reference should be to Tim.70a-b and the realignment of imagery is overlooked); Calcidius 231 rationabili velut arx corporis et regia, utpote virtuti quae regali quadam eminentia praestet, id est domicilium capitis, in quo habitet animae principale... in quo quidem domicilio sensus quoque habitent, qui sunt tamquam comites rationis et signi<feri>; Gregory of Nyssa De hom.opif.12 τὸν νοῦν οὖν τισιν ἀγγελιαφόρους ἢ ὑπασπιστάς τοις αἰσθητηρίοις ἐν κύκλῳ δορυφορούμενον (cited by Waszink ad Calc.231). Proclus, however, follows Plato, e.g. in Tim.1.33.31 τὸ θυμικόν, ὃ πᾶν τὸ τοῦ ζῴου λυμαντικὸν ἀναστέλλειν τέτακται, δορυφοροῦν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἄρχον, καὶ τὸ λογικόν, ὃ φιλόσοφόν τέ ἐστι κατ' οὐσίαν καὶ βασιλικὸν τῆς ὅλης ἡμῶν ζωῆς... (cf. also the Ps.Pythagorean fragment of Metopius at 119.18 Thesleff, συντέτακται γὰρ καὶ ὁ θυμὸς καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία ποτὶ τὸ πρᾶτον μέρος τῆς ψυχᾶς, τὸ μὲν ὥσπερ δορυφόρος τις καὶ σωματοφύλαξ, τὸ δ' ὡς οἰκονόμος καὶ οἰκουρὸς τῶν ἀναγκαίων· ὁ δὲ νόος ἐπ' ἄκρας τῆς κορυφᾶς τοῦ σώματος ὑδρυμένος...).

Now from Cicero, just as in the case of Philo, we need expect no special loyalty to Platonic doctrine, but in the case of professed Platonists such as Albinus and Galen and a commentator such as Calcidius the recasting of the Platonic imagery is most intriguing. Jaeger (Nemesius von Emesa 22-26) considers that the image has been transmitted via the Timaeus commentary of Posidonius, but the evidence he presents is negligible and he strides over the complexities of the situation with seven-league boots. It would appear that the celebrated and rather fashionable image of the Great king in his mighty palace, invisible to all but surrounded by courtiers and bodyguards who supply him with information and execute his orders (cf. Ps.Arist.De Mundo 6 398a10-25

(note a20 δορυφόρος), Max.Tyr.Or.11.12 etc.), has been superimposed on Plato's account, which contains no reference to a king and in fact does not use imagery to describe the inhabitants of the acropolis and the guardhouse.³ The frequently used analogy between man's νοῦς and the νοῦς of the cosmos (cf. De Mundo 6 399a14, Cicero Leg.2.15-16, DND 2.18 etc.) must have encouraged the application of the image of the Great king and his courtiers to the mind and the senses. But it is possible that another Platonic passage was also influential in the redirection of the imagery. In Laws 964e-965a Plato compares his ideal city to the mental processes of a wise man. The junior guardians, situated on the summit (ἐν ἄκρῃ κορυφῇ 964e2), store up in their memory the αἰσθήσεις they perceive and pass them on to their older colleagues. The senior guardians of the nocturnal council are explicitly compared to the functioning of the νοῦς (965a1).⁴

It must be concluded, therefore, that, in spite of Philo's predilection for the image of the Great king surrounded by satraps and bodyguards (used also of God and his powers at Legat.6, QE 2.67 etc.), his application of the image to the mind and senses is by no means an original adaptation, but shows dependence on the way the Timaeus was traditionally read.

3. The thorax. In describing the residence of the spirited part of the soul as the thorax (69e4), Plato undoubtedly intended a play on words. The word θώραξ means both a corslet or breast-plate and also that part of the body which the armour covers, i.e. the chest or trunk. The former meaning is suited to the martial metaphors used to describe the spirited element, the latter to the soul's bodily trilocation. In the three main passages in which Philo recounts the soul's trilocation in terms of the Timaeus, this word-play is expanded at some length. Because of the parallel nature of the three passages, they are best set out alongside each other.

Leg.3.115: τῷ δὲ θυμικῷ τὰ στέρνα, παρὸ καὶ τὴν φύσιν ὀχυρῶσαι τὸ μέρος πυκνότητι καὶ κραταιότητι συνεχῶν ὁστέων ὥσπερ στρατιώτην ἀγαθὸν καθοπλίσασαν θώρακι καὶ ἀσπίδι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἐναντιουμένων ἀμυναν...

Spec.1.146: ἐπειδὴ χωρίον οὐκ ἐλαττωτάτον ἢ φύσις ἀπένειμε τὰ στέρνα θυμῷ πρὸς ἐνδιαύτησιν, ὥς καθάπερ στρατιώτῃ περιέβαλεν εἰς τὸ δυσάλωτον ἔρκος ὀχυρώτατον, τὸν ἐπικαλούμενον θώρακα, ὃν ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ συνεχῶν καὶ κραταιοτάτων ὁστέων ἀπειργάσατο σφίγγας αὐτὸν εὖ μάλα νεύροις ἀρράγεσιν.

Spec.4.93: θυμῷ δὲ τὰ στέρνα, τῇ μὲν ὥς στρατιώτου τρόπον θώρακα ἀμπεχόμενος, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀπαθὴς ἐν πάσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ δυσάλωτος ἦ...

In the first two passages the word-play on the thorax is reinforced by the observation that the structure of the rib-cage has been given the strength and resilience of a soldier's armour. In all three passages the comparison with the στρατιώτης is explicitly mentioned.⁵

It is probable that the military metaphor is stimulated by the analogy between the structure of the body and the intermediate position of the soldier-

guardians in the Platonic state (cf. Rep.415dff., Crit.112b,117c).⁶ But I have not found any parallels for the extrapolation of the Platonic imagery in terms of the protective gear of the individual soldier.

Moses in a note on Spec.4.93 (FE 25.255) adduces a passage in the fragment Περὶ ἀρετῆς of Metopius, καὶ τούτου (τῷ ἀλόγῳ) τὸ μὲν οἶον ἀμυντικὸν καὶ ὑπερμαχατικὸν ποτιτοῦς πλάσιον θυμοειδὲς ὀνομάζεται (Stob.Ecl.3.69.6 = Thesleff 118.4; Praechter Philol.50(1891)49-57 postulates the influence of Antiochus and Arius Didymus (cf. Stob.Ecl.2.117.16) in this fragment). ἀμυντικὸν recalls πρὸς τὴν ἐναντιουμένων ἀμυναν at Leg.3.115 and the whole phrase illustrates the military metaphor in general, but for the rest the parallel is not as close as one would like. In the long account of the teleology of man's structure at Cicero DND 2.134-153 the fortress-like nature of the rib-cage is not mentioned (cf. esp. §139 on the skeletal frame).

4. The men's and women's quarters. At QG 4.15 in an allegorical exegesis of Gen.18:11, ἐξέλειπεν δὲ Σαρρα γίνεσθαι τὰ γυναικεῖα, Philo writes:

The soul has, as it were, a dwelling, partly men's quarters, partly women's quarters. Now for the men there is a place where properly dwell the masculine thoughts (that are) wise, sound, just, prudent, pious, filled with freedom and boldness, and akin to wisdom. And the women's quarters are a place where womanly opinions go about and dwell, being followers of the female sex. And the female sex is irrational and akin to bestial passions, fear, sorrow, pleasure, and desire, from which ensue incurable weaknesses and indescribable diseases.

Plato's description (70a1) of the midriff as the separation between the men's quarters (i.e. the spirited part) and the women's quarters (i.e. the concupiscent part) lurks in the background of the exegesis and encourages the application to the soul. The parallel is but partial, however, since Philo here conceives the soul as bipartite, the rational part being male and the irrational part female (a description ubiquitous in his writings, cf. Baer 40-44). Cf. also Cher.50, Det.28, Ebr.59 (all exegesis of the same text), Sacr.103 (exeg. Ex.13:12), Somn.2.9.

5. The manger and the wild beast. In Philo's accounts of the Platonic trilocation of the soul these images drawn from 70e2-4 are prominent: Spec.1.148 κοιλλίαν δὲ φάτνην ἀλόγου θρέμματος; Spec.4.94 καὶ πάντων ἀπληστότατον καὶ ἀκολάστατον οὖσαν (ἐπιθυμίαν) θρεμμάτων ἐμβόσκεισθαι τόποις, ἐν οἷς τροφαί τε καὶ ὀχεῖται; cf. also Leg.1.69, where the third river flowing from Eden (Gen. 2:14) is suitably called the Tigris, τίγριδι δὲ τῷ ἀτιθασωτάτῳ ζῷῳ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν εἵκασε (ὁ Μωυσῆς). The image of the manger is further used at Abr.160, QE 1.19.

The description of the desires (or passions or senses) of the irrational soul in terms of wild, untamed, insatiable beasts occurs so often in Philo that it virtually loses all imagistic colour. It is, of course, particularly suited to allegorical exegesis of the book Genesis with its many pastoral themes: e.g. Det.25 (Gen.37:16, Joseph and his brothers' flocks), QG 2.27 (Gen. 8:1, the wild beasts in the ark), QG 2.82 (Gen.10:9, Nimrod the hunter), Agr.

27 (the difference between ποιμήν and κτηνοτρόφος); compare further Leg.2.9-11, Gig.35, Agr.48, Plant.43, Conf.24, Somn.2.152f., Abr.32 etc. A passage such as QE 1.19 (Greek frag. at FE 33.237, exeg. Ex.12:11), οὐκ ἀπὸ δὲ σκοποῦ προσέθηκε τὸ δεῦν ζώνυσσθαι κατὰ τὴν ὁσφύν· ὁ γὰρ τόπος ἐκεῖνος εἰς φάτιν ἀποκέκρται πολυκεφάλῳ θρέμματι τῶν ἐν ἡμῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, shows how Philo tends to combine the image from the Timaeus with the equally well-known Platonic image of the many-headed wild beast of Rep.588c (cf. also QE 2.100, Billings 98).⁷

This section on Philo's use of Plato's imagery in Tim.69d-70e is brought to an end with a pair of concluding observations.

Firstly, it is noteworthy that of the eight separate images which the author of Περὶ ὕψους extracts from 69d-70e Philo employs four (bait, acropolis, guardhouse, men's and women's quarters). The procedure of the two writers, however, is quite different. Ps.Longinus' purpose is literary. In his endeavour to show the boldness and sublimity of Plato's sweeping rush of metaphors he selects a goodly number of examples and strings them together in a few long sentences. The images of the manger and the wild beast are deleted, presumably because they are too banal.⁸ The images used by Philo, on the other hand, are precisely those which have a philosophical or edificatory value and are appropriate to the primarily ethical emphasis of his allegorical themes.

Secondly, it has already struck our attention that there are certain unmistakable parallels between Philo's various accounts of the soul's trilocation (especially between Leg.3.115, Spec.1.146, 4.92-94, to a lesser extent Leg.1.70) in the descriptions of the head and chest as locations of the rational and spirited parts of the soul respectively. Other parallels are the 'doxographical' introductions and certain verbal expressions (e.g. Leg.3.115 ἐνεῖμαν...τὸν περὶ κεφαλὴν χώρον, Spec.1.146 χώριον οἰκειότατον ἢ φύσις ἀπένειμε...πρὸς ἐνδοαίτησιν, Spec.4.92 ἀπένειμαν οἰκειότατον ἐνδοαίτημα κεφαλὴν, Leg.1.70 χώριον εἶναι καὶ ἐνδοαίτημα τὴν κεφαλὴν; Leg.1.70, 3.115 τὸ ἥτρον). The names given to the three parts of the soul, however, show some variation:

<u>Leg.</u> 1.70	λογικόν	θυμικόν	ἐπιθυμητικόν
<u>Leg.</u> 3.115	λογιστικόν	θυμικόν	ἐπιθυμητικόν
<u>Spec.</u> 4.92-94	λόγος	θυμός	ἐπιθυμία
<u>Spec.</u> 1.146, 148	—	θυμός	ἐπιθυμία

On the basis of these parallels it is highly probable that Philo made use of a source in which a resumé of Plato's doctrine of the trilocation of the soul was given. One thinks of a summary of Plato's doctrine such as the Epitome of Arius Didymus, which contained a section on the 'physical' doctrines of Plato and the Academy (see above I 4.d & n.71). But as we could not find any sound parallels for the most distinctive aspect of the above passages, the comparison of the rib-cage with a soldier's armour, we are left wholly in the dark on

the identity of this presumed source. Certainly the relation to Albinus, who is generally thought to have made good use of Arius Didymus (cf. Witt 95-103, Dillon 269), is not particularly close. Another possibility should not be overlooked. Philo, whose tendency to repetition is notorious, may have been so well satisfied with his formulation of Plato's doctrine that he elsewhere used the same ideas and wording. It would at any rate be going too far to conclude that, because an intermediate doxographical account or compendium may have been consulted, Philo's acquaintance with this part of the Timaeus was only at second hand.

9.2.4. The liver and prophecy (71a-72b)

In his lengthy and detailed account of the various sacrifices prescribed in the Law of Moses Philo turns at Spec.1.212 to the preservation offering. The Law ordains that three parts of the sacrificial victim are to be set aside and dedicated to God, namely the fat, the lobe of the liver and the two kidneys (Lev.3:3-4). The exegete must give an appropriate reason (λόγος προσήκων) for the choice of these parts. The liver is discussed in §216-219.

Philo first explains its vital contribution to the physiological processes of the body's nourishment. The liver has a double function. It filters out impurities in the food-mixture which reaches it from the stomach and converts it to blood, which it thrusts up to the heart and so ensures that the entire body is nourished. Philo records here the results of medical science which were current coin in the educated circles of his day (cf. Galen UP 4.2ff.). They represent a considerable advance on the theories of Plato, who in his account of digestion and nourishment (Tim.80d-e) wholly ignores the role of the liver and the heart. And yet for Philo Plato's theories on the liver (71a-e) are also welcome, for they provide him with an *extra* reason why the liver should be chosen out in the preservation offering. One of the peculiarities of Plato's account of the body's design is that he relates the placement and functioning of a number of the body's main organs (heart, lungs, liver, spleen) not to the physiological but to the psychological processes of the body (70a-72d; cf. Cornford 282). Philo can thus show in §219 that the liver also makes an important contribution to man's psychic and mental life.

There can be no doubt that in this paragraph Philo is directly inspired by the Timaeus. The basic idea is the same as in Plato. The exceedingly smooth and shiny texture of the liver serves the purpose of reflecting thoughts from the mind as in a mirror. These reflections give rise to dreams or visions, by means of which divination or prophecy of future events takes place.

When we turn to matters of detail, however, great differences between the two accounts become visible. Plato's concern is to present a kind of cognition suitable to the appetitive part of the soul, which unlike the other two parts is not able and moreover disinclined to respond to the λόγος of the νοῦς (71a). The νοῦς does not see *itself* reflected in the mirror but an influence (δύναμις) from the νοῦς gives off reflections of the mind's thoughts and these are perceived as εἶδωλα by the lowest part of the soul. Thus dreams, visions and ecstatic trances are a kind of knowledge manqué, devised by the god for human lack of wisdom (71e2). Plato concedes that information on the past, present and future can be gained in this way. But the limitations of this type of cognition are shown by the fact that the dreamer or visionary cannot himself interpret what he has seen. This is a task for a man of sound mind (ἔμφορος 71e6), i.e. by use of the rational part of the soul.

Philo, on the other hand, pays no attention to the connection of the liver with the appetitive or irrational part of the soul. The mind, relaxing from its day-time cares and released from the assaults of the senses and the cares of the body, begins to turn upon itself and regard its own thoughts, which are lucidly reflected as εἶδωλα in the liver. In this process of examining its own thoughts the mind can avoid what is bad and select what is good, and so prophesies future events by means of dreams. No mention is made of an interpreter. The prophecies proceed from the mind, hence they are presumably intelligible as they are.

A passage at Migr.190 is almost entirely parallel to Spec.1.219. The mind begins to converse with itself and, gazing on truth as if in a mirror, utters inspired prophecies through dreams. In this context, lacking the exegetical stimulus, Philo passes over the role of the liver which functions as the mirror. Cf. also Contempl.27, QG 4.195³ (text EES 2.270), QE fr.20 (text FE 33.298). It is apparent that Philo adopts a more positive attitude towards dreams and the resultant prophecies than Plato. The claim that the mind sees truth in a mirror is quite different than Plato's grudging acceptance of mantic as a form of cognition necessary for the irrational soul. There are other texts in the Greek tradition, however, that place a higher value on dreams and mantic. Plato himself at Rep.572a describes the soul as 'touching the truth' in dreams (this passage may have influenced Philo); cf. also Arist.De phil.fr. 12a Ross, Posid.fr.F108,110 E-K (= Cic.Div.1.64,129-130) etc. Philo's chief concern is with the many dreams and prophecies found in the Pentateuch, which he analyses in the De somniis. The classification of dreams given in Somn.1.2, 2.1-2, cannot be correlated with the theory on dreams given at Spec.1.219 and Migr.190, because it is based on the extent to which God (or his powers or angels) are involved in the sending of dreams, an aspect which is ignored in the

scientific explanation drawn from the Timaeus.

A final observation is that at Spec.1.219 Philo suppresses any reference to divination (μαντεία) and speaks of prophecy (προφητεία), whereas Plato speaks of μαντεία right throughout 71d-72d and describes the liver as the seat of the μαντεῖον (71e2). A specific explanation can be found for this change. A little earlier in the same treatise (§60-65), in an exegesis of the injunctions at Deut.18:9-22, Philo had vigorously polemicized against the race of diviners and soothsayers who practise an ἀνοδία μαντική, and favourably contrasted the inspiration of the God-sent prophet (note that at Migr.190 μαντεία is used).

It is no criticism of Philo to point out that he has made certain alterations to Plato's theory, nor does it necessarily mean that he has misunderstood Plato's intention. The basic idea (which incidentally provides a teleological reason for the liver's glistening smoothness, not so well explained by the liver's role in the process of nutrition) has been taken over, but Philo is free to accommodate Plato's theory of divination to a more 'modern' presentation which involves a different and more dynamic view of the activity of the νοῦς. Plato only claims to present an εὐκλῶς λόγος in the realm of the αἰσθητά. What is lost in the process of Philo's alteration is the wonderful systematics of Plato's discourse.¹

9.3. The body (Tim.72d-81e)

9.3.1. Providence and the structure of the body (73a)

Man is a συνамφότερον of soul and body, and so needs a supply of food and drink in order to survive. But if he were to expend all his energy on satisfying his craving for food and drink and allow the wild beast of the appetitive part of the soul to run amuck, there would be no time left for the rational activity which, according to Plato, constitutes man's true end. Thus the 'young gods' showed foresight (ταῦτα προορώμενοι 73a1) in designing the coils of the bowels so that food would not pass too quickly through the body. This idea appeals to Philo. The 'young gods' foresee what he himself has seen take place in the debauched manners of contemporary society. Thus the words τὴν ἄμουσον καὶ ἀφιλόσοφον καὶ ἀνδραποδεστάτην τῶν αἰσθήσεων in a tirade against luxury and intemperance at Spec.1.174 are a literary allusion to Tim.73a6.¹ Compare also his use of the vox Platonica γαστρομαργία (73a6, also Phd.81e5, Phdr.238b1) at Opif.79 (discussed above in II 9.2.1.), 158, Agr.37, Abr.149 etc.

Another interesting adaptation of Tim.73a is found at Aet.74. It too is

primarily literary, but is not without philosophical relevance. Philo describes the cosmos here as follows:

αὐταρκέστατόν τε αὐτὸν αὐτῷ καὶ ἀνεπιδεᾶ παντὸς γεγονέναι (cf. above II 4.2.4.), μηδενὸς τῶν εἰς διαμονὴν ὑστερίζοντα, τὰς κενώσεως καὶ πληρώσεως ἐν μέρει διαδοχὰς ἀπώσάμενον, αἷς διὰ τὴν ἄμουσον ἀπληστίαν τὰ ζῶα χρῆσθαι, θάνατον ἀντὶ ζωῆς μνόμενα...

Colson EE 9.236 describes the adaptation as 'not very happy', without giving a reason for his dissatisfaction. Perhaps he is critical of the fact that Philo attributes to the intra-cosmic ζῶα (including man) precisely that ἄμουσος ἀπληστία against which, according to Plato, counter-measures are taken in the providential design of the bowels. On the other hand, it must be recognized that Philo here shows a sharp awareness of the difference between the macrocosm and the microcosm which is philosophically and structurally so important in the *Timaeus*. Given the context the words τὰς κενώσεως καὶ πληρώσεως διαδοχὰς surely represent a subtle Philonic dig in the ribs of Stoic cosmobiology. Note that Philo appears to construe the Platonic text differently than modern editors and translators: the words ἀφιλόσοφον καὶ ἄμουσον are taken to qualify γαστριμαργίαν (or even ἀπληστίαν), while presumably the adjective ἀνυπήκοον is read proleptically with the verb ἀποτελοῦ.²

Only the limitless possibilities of the allegorical method and the almost perverse resourcefulness of the allegorizer could lead to the following application of Plato's idea at *Tim.* 73a to the Biblical description of Noah's ark at Gen. 6:16, κατάγαια, δώροφα καὶ τριώροφα ποιήσεις αὐτήν (τὴν κιβωτόν), located in *QG* 2.7:

But the intestines have been made second-storey and third-storey chambers by the providence of the Creator (τῇ τοῦ ζῳοπλάστου προνοίᾳ) for the preservation of created things. For if he had made straight receptacles of food from the stomach to the buttocks, something terrible might have happened... Second, a certain insatiable desire (ἀπληστία) (would have resulted). For when the receptacles have been emptied, hunger and thirst must of necessity immediately follow, as in the case of pregnant matrons, and the pleasant desire of food must become insatiable desire (ἀπληστία) and something unphilosophical (ἀφιλόσοφον). For nothing is more uncultured (ἄμουςότερον) than to give oneself wholly to the belly (cf. γαστριμαργία). And third, death lies in wait at the entrance, for they must be subject to an early death who, when they eat, are immediately hungry, and when they drink, are immediately thirsty, and before they are filled, are emptied and feel hunger. But by the windings and twistings of the intestines we are saved from all hunger and insatiable desire and from being subject to an early death.

The three translators of this passage, Aucher, Marcus and Mercier, do not indicate its dependence on the *Timaeus*, but the retranslations (supplied by Marcus) put the issue beyond all doubt. Philo has rhetorically expanded the original idea at some length, making a number of additions of his own (pregnant women, early death, filling and emptying (cf. *Aet.* 74)). It is noteworthy that Philo should follow Plato (73a1) in explicitly referring to divine providence

(τῇ τοῦ ζωοπλάστου προνοίᾳ), for, although this notion is central to the Timaeus as a whole, Plato only mentions it explicitly three times (30b8, 44c7, 73a1; see also above II 7.2.1. on Leg. 1.28). It is a small but precious indication that Philo read the Timaeus carefully himself.³ ζωοπλάστης is a typically Philonic word, perhaps coined by him and elsewhere not found until in fourth century Patristic authors (cf. Her. 106, Leisegang 337, PGL 597).

The passage which we have just discussed is part of a larger whole, QC 2. 1-7. In a series of seven quaestiones a complex allegory of Noah's ark in terms of the physical structure of the human body is given (the same symbolism at Det. 170, Conf. 105). The way that the first quaestio is formulated – what is the κατασκευή of Noah's ark? – is quite deliberate, for κατασκευάζω and κατασκευή are used both of the construction of ships etc. and of the construction or structure of the human body (cf. BAG 418). In the seven quaestiones all manner of physiological and numerological information is used to demonstrate the persuasiveness of the allegory, but this information is very much 'controlled' by the nature of the questions extracted from the Biblical account. An obvious example is the description of the body in terms of nests and nestling (§3, exeg. Gen. 6:14) which is a veritable tour de force. Only in §7 can the direct influence of the Timaeus be detected.

Interestingly Philo twice refers to remarks of Socrates on aspects of the body's teleological design (§3 the tongue as the articulator (cf. also Somn. 1. 29), §6 orifices turned to the rear for the sake of decency). Naturally the Timaeus cannot be the source. It is the only occasion in his writings that Philo explicitly alludes to another account of the teleology of the body, located in the Memorabilia of Xenophon (1.4), which in popularity rivalled the Timaeus in the Hellenistic world (the author of Περὶ ὕψους mentions them together in 32.5). Both ideas were routine commonplaces in Philo's time (cf. Pease's notes ad Cic. DND 2.141, 149). Philo shows his learning by making clear that he knows their literary origin (orifices Mem. 1.4.6, tongue 1.4.12)."

9.3.2. A literary allusion to Tim. 75d-e

At Opif. 119 Philo decorates yet another example of the ubiquity of the hebdomad in nature with an allusion, amounting to a loose paraphrase, to Tim. 75d5-e2. The head makes use of seven essential parts:

ἐβδόμῳ στόματι, δι' οὗ γίνεται θνητῶν μὲν, ὡς ἔφη Πλάτων, εἴσοδος, ἔξοδος
δ' ἀφθάρτων· ἐπευσέρχεται μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ σιτία καὶ ποτά, φθαρτοῦ σώματος
φθαρταὶ τροφαί, λόγου δ' ἐξέλασιν ἀθανάτου ψυχῆς ἀθάνατοι νόμοι, δι' ὧν ὁ
λογικὸς βίος κυβερνᾶται.

As Colson EE 1.95 points out, Plato's contrast is between ἀναγκαῖα and ἄριστα, not θνητά/φθαρτά and ἀφθαρτα. Also Philo's further explanation of the bon mot bears little resemblance to the original Platonic passage. On his use of the phrase τὸ λόγων νῆμα drawn from Tim. 75e3 see Petit's note at FE 28.146-147 (to

her list add also Sacr.61).

Mansfeld, in a discussion of the arithmological tradition (Pseudo-Hippocratic tract 192,201), sees in the reference to the Timaeus an indication that at least part of that tradition can be traced back to Posidonius 'Comments on the Timaeus' (see above I 4.n.57). Since no less than eight other authors (listed at Staehle 48) recount the septet of facial openings and none of them mention the Platonic allusion, this conclusion is surely precipitate. Moreover it needs to be taken into consideration that Philo repeats the allusion in a passage that has nothing to do with arithmology, QE 2.118. It is summoned forth by an exegesis of Ex.28:32 and in particular of the word περιστόμῳ found in that text. As in Opif.119 the contrast is between 'mortal' and 'immortal things', not Plato's ἀναγκάα and ἄρυστα.

The two passages above furnish an excellent example of how an allusion to the Timaeus can be used for purposes of purely literary embellishment. The allusion gives the respective accounts a splash of colour. In both cases Philo specifically names Plato as source of the expression. If a reason is sought for the change which Philo has introduced, I would suggest that he has related the entry of food and the exit of speech to the two chief parts of the soul, which Plato on a number of occasions describes as immortal and mortal respectively (cf.69c6,72d4 and esp. 90b1-c6). Plato's ἀναγκάα and ἄρυστα recall the antithesis between ἀναγκή and νοῦς (48a1-2), which as we saw above in II 8.1.1. Philo virtually ignores.

9.3.3. Advances in medical science

The remainder of Plato's account of man's physiology, including his explanation of the circular thrust and the process of natural death, appears to have made little or no impact on Philo. At no stage in his extensive body of writings is there an occasion for a full explanatory account of man's physiology. In Opif.145 he praises the beauty of the first man in body and soul, but does not consider it necessary to explain this beauty in terms of physical and anatomical details. On the infrequent occasions that Philo incorporates an item of information on the functioning of the human body in his exegesis, it is apparent that he is at least superficially acquainted with developments in medical science which had taken place since the days of Plato, also in his own city (Hierophilus, Erasistratus; cf. Fraser Ptolemaic Alexandria 336-339, E.D.Phillips, Greek Medicine (London 1973) 139-160). It would not surprise, therefore, if Philo regarded certain parts of the science of the Timaeus as somewhat archaic and outdated. Let us give one example.

At QG 2.59 he is led by an exegesis of Gen.9:4 to discuss the conveyance of pneuma and blood through the body:

The pneuma...does not occupy any place by itself alone without the blood, but is carried along and mixed together with the blood. For the arteries, the vessels of breath, contain not only air by itself, unmixed and pure, but also blood, though perhaps a small amount. For there are two kinds of vessels, veins and arteries; the veins have more blood than pneuma, whereas the arteries have more pneuma than blood, but the mixture in both kinds of vessels is differentiated by a greater or lesser amount (translation Marcus, slightly altered).

The distinction between veins which chiefly carry blood (i.e. for nutrition) and arteries which chiefly convey pneuma (i.e. for respiration) is not found in Plato (who combines the two processes rather unsatisfactorily) and virtually never occurs in the Hippocratic writers (cf. Phillips op.cit.70,137). Philo's account here appears to be based on the physiological theories of Praxagoras of Cos, which in respect of the role of the pneuma were not greatly modified by his Alexandrian successors, Hierophilus and Erasistratus (cf. Phillips op.cit.137,143,150, F.Stecker1, The fragments of Praxagoras of Cos and his school Philosophia Antiqua 8 (Leiden 1958) 17-22,35; the assertion that there is some blood in the arteries brings Philo's account closest to the views of Hierophilus). These developments in medical science, which also led to important modifications in Stoic philosophy (cf. Hahn 160-161), rendered Plato's account of nutrition and respiration in Tim.78a-79e obsolete, especially with regard to the role of the body's innate heat.

Because Philo shows so little interest in Plato's account of the body's structure and functioning, it is not surprising that none of the five images which the author of the Περὶ ὕψους extracts from Tim.73b-85e are found in his writings.

9.3.4. The creation of the plant world (77a-c)

Ever conscious of the logical sequence of his narrative, Plato recognizes that he cannot describe the nutritive process in man if nothing has been created for man to eat (cf. Cornford 302). So he introduces a brief digression (77a-c) on the plant world, devised by the gods as a help (βοήθεια) for man (note once again the anthropocentrism). Plants have a nature akin (συγγενῆ) to man's (so that he can feed on them), but possess a different form and different processes of sensation. They live and are living creatures (οὐχ ἕτερον ζῶον 77c3), though rooted to the ground and deprived of self-motion.

In the Mosaic cosmogony the plant world is created, together with the earth, on the third day (Gen.1:9-13), long before the creation of animals and

man. God made sure that the trees he created had fruits ripe and 'ready for the immediate use and enjoyment of the animals that were about to come into being' (Opif.42). Thus the problem of Plato's creational sequence does not occur (instead another problem arises, that the plants should be created before the heavenly bodies, on which see above II 5.1.1.). Everything is in readiness, including the plant world (cf. Gen.1:29), for man when he is created as climax of the creation (Opif.77-81).

Philo fittingly alludes to the Platonic account of the creation of plants in the 'phyto(!)-cosmological excursus' at Plant.15-16. The earth, as mother and nurse (cf.40b9, also above II 8.3.1.), is provided with all kinds (ἰδέας, cf.77a4) of plants, so that the animals which are born can have the right food (συγγένεσσι καὶ μὴ ὁθνεύουσιν τροφαῖς, cf.77a4). The plants are created with their heads facing downwards and fixed in the fertile soil of the earth (πῆξας cf.77c4). On the remainder of this passage, which is heavily indebted to the Timaeus, see below II 10.1.2. In Deus 37-40 the plant world is given a (noticeably less anthropocentric) place in the cosmic hierarchy by being introduced as second in the ascending sequence ἔξυς, φύσος, ψυχὴ, νοῦς (inspired by Stoic physics and partly cited as SVF 2.458).

9.4. Disease, health, and the equilibrium between soul and body (Tim.82a-89c)

9.4.1. The themes of disease and health

The themes of the disease and health of both body and soul are found on virtually every second page of Philo's considerable oeuvre, so that a discussion in the context of this study must remain modest (a large number of texts collected by Schmidt 31-48; cf. also Gross 50-70). In comparing and contrasting disease of the body and disease of the soul, Philo is following a long tradition, initiated by Plato (and before him Socrates) and made even more popular by the Stoa. One example out of many is found in the Platonically tinted proemium to the treatise Quod omnis probus liber sit. Those who seek for truth should not allow themselves to be outdone by the sick in body. Just as these people in their desire for health entrust themselves to doctors, so those who suffer from the sickness of the soul, namely lack of proper training or education (ἀπαίδευσις, cf. Tim.86e2), should become disciples of wise men who can help them throw off their ignorance (ἀμαθία, cf. Tim.86b4) and gain knowledge (§12; other texts which describe ἀμαθία or ἀπαίδευσις as νόσος ψυχῆς are Leg.3.76, Ebr.14, Virt.4).

Such ideas on health and disease can be culled from many places in Plato's works (e.g. Rep.444c,591b-c). The Timaeus, with its analysis of the types of diseases of the body (four) and of the soul (two, the passions and ignorance) and its insistence on the συμμετρία between body and soul, cannot be said to have had much specific influence on Philo's development of the theme. Compare Billings 93-95, who gives a useful analysis with many references.¹

One text which specifically recalls the Timaeus is Virt.13-14:

νόσου γε μὴν σωμάτων ὑγίαινούσης ψυχῆς ἥμισυ βλάπτουσιν· ὑγεία δὲ ψυχῆς εὐκράσια δυνάμεων ἐστὶ τῆς τε κατὰ τὸν θυμὸν καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον, ἐπικρατοῦσης τῆς λογικῆς καὶ ὥσπερ ἀφηνιαστὰς ὕπνου ἡνιοχούσης ἐκαστέρας.

The doctrine that the health of the soul results from an εὐκράσια δυνάμεων (i.e. the three parts of the soul) is ultimately derived from Tim.87a3-7, but has a closer parallel at Tim.Locr.71 (cf. Baltes Timaios Lokros 200).² The assertion that a healthy soul is virtually safe from bodily disease, implying that bodily disease ultimately has a psychic origin, is not found in the Timaeus, which keeps separate diseases of the body and diseases of the soul caused by contact with the body. Again there is an excellent Platonist parallel for Philo's remark, this time at Apuleius De Plat.216: eiusmodi ad aequalitatem partibus animae temperatis (cf. εὐκράσια above), corpus nulla turbatione frangitur. The association of ὑγεία with σωφροσύνη is derived from a doctrine in which the four cardinal virtues of the soul are each made parallel to a bodily virtue. Cf. Baltes op.cit.219 on Tim.Locr.79, who points to impulses given by Platonic passages such as Laws 631c,743eff., but considers the systematization to be the work of the Stoa, further developed by Antiochus (other traces of this doctrine at Leg.3.86, Sobr.61, Abr.263, Praem.119 etc.).

Thus this one Philonic passage not only combines the Timaeus with two other Platonic dialogues, but three times reinterprets Plato's doctrines in a manner parallel to Middle Platonist authors (and with assistance from the Stoa).

An essential difference between Plato and Philo on the subject of disease and health is that in Plato's account the religious dimension of the gift of health and recovery from illness is entirely neglected, whereas for Philo it is of the utmost importance. An exegesis of Gen.48:15-16 at Leg.3.177-178 is a typical example of Philo's attitude. God gives health of the body in the proper sense of the word, but health which comes to us by way of recovery from disease he delegates to doctors and medical expertise. In the same way the good things of the soul come direct from God, while deliverance from evils happens through the agency of angels. Compare also the experience of Jacob the practiser at Haran. He encounters God's λόγος, and these act as physicians of the soul, healing all its weaknesses (Somn.1.69, exeg. Gen.28:12).

9.4.2. Evaluations of the body

In Plato, as is well-known, a double attitude – both negative and positive – towards the body can be discerned. In the Timaeus, as if realizing

that his extremely pessimistic view of the body in the Phaedo was open to misinterpretation, he stresses the relative perfection of man's body and the need for a sound equilibrium between body and soul. The Juvenalian adage mens sana in corpore sano – much used and much abused in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of the Public school – expresses Plato's intentions perfectly.

Philo recognized that man's body was created by God as a holy temple for his rational soul (Opif.137 (exeg. Gen.2:7), cf. Decal.133; same image at Laws 869b, also I Cor.6:19). Among the blessings given by God to those who follow him is health of the body and freedom from disease, so that the mind may be at peace and feast on God's doctrines (Praem.119-122, exeg. Deut.7:16). True self-control does not consist of mortification of the flesh and neglect of the body (Det.19, cf. Winston 30). Gymnastics are part of a sound education at Spec.2.230 (and note Philo's expert knowledge of sport, on which see above I 3.n.19), but significantly in the ideal education enjoyed by Moses (Mos.1.20-29) it is missing. Compare the following Philonic texts with Plato's advocacy of bodily exercise and his ideal of συμμετρία between body and soul.

Leg.3.72: ὁ δὲ φιλόσοφος ἐραστής ὢν τοῦ καλοῦ τοῦ ζῶντος ἐν ἑαυτῷ κήδεται ψυχῆς, τοῦ δὲ νεκροῦ ὄντως σώματος ἀλογεῖ μόνον στοχαζόμενος, ἵνα μὴ ὑπὸ κακοῦ καὶ νεκροῦ συνδέτου (allusion to the famous image from Aristotle's Protrepticus or Eudemus, cf. above II 7.1.3.) πλημελῇται τὸ ἄριστον ἢ ψυχὴ.

Abr.48: the second trinity of those yearning for virtue may be compared τοῖς ἀνδρῶν ἀθλητικῶν γυμνάσμασιν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἱεροὺς ὄντως ἀλειφομένων ἀγῶνας, οἱ σωμασκήας καταφρονοῦντες τὴν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κατασκευάζουσιν εὐεξίαν ἐφιέμενοι τῆς κατὰ τῶν ἀντιπάλων παθῶν νίκης.

Agr.119: εἰς τοῦτον τὸν ἀγῶνα (the true Olympic games) οἱ ἀσθενέστατοι τὰ σώματα ἐρρωμενέστατοι δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐγγράφονται πάντες... (contrast Tim.87d-e!).

On the basis of these texts Philo's attitude to the body would be more negative than that found in the Timaeus.

But is it unwise to attach too much significance to these scattered passages? What are we, for example, to make of the following remark at QG 4.200 (exeg. Gen.27:8-10)? Isaac, even as an old man, manages to eat two kids, 'for it was fitting that he who was so great in virtue and the founder of so great a nation should have a formidable and wonderful greatness of body'. The double attitude towards the body is thus just as markedly present in Philo as it is in Plato. It is tendentious to assert, as Völker 85 does, that in Philo Jewish creationism stands opposed to Platonic dualism, for the same ambiguity Philo already discovered in Plato himself.

CHAPTER TEN

TIMAEUS 89D-92C: FINAL REMARKS ON MAN AND THE LOWER ANIMALS

10.0. Introductory

10.1. Man's true end (Tim.90a-d)

- 10.1.1. Man as a heavenly plant (90a)
- 10.1.2. Two passages on Mosaic and Platonic anthropology
- 10.1.3. Man's νοῦς as his δαίμων (90a,c)
- 10.1.4. Man – divine, god-like, statue-bearer
- 10.1.5. The double account of man's creation
- 10.1.6. Six important themes

10.2. Woman and the lower animals (Tim.90e-92c)

- 10.2.1. Woman, posterior and inferior to man (90e-91a)
- 10.2.2. Men as animals (91d-92c)
- 10.2.3. The place of animals in the cosmic order

10.3. Conclusion (Tim.92c)

- 10.3.1. Doxology to the cosmos (92c)

10.0 Introductory

Man, the composite being (συναμφότερον 87e5) of body and soul, has now been described. For all his mitigation of a radical anthropological dualism in the Timaeus, Plato remains unshakable in his conviction that man's true end consists in exercising the rational part of his soul and leading a truly rational life. He now returns to the themes with which he had concluded the first part of the cosmological account (47a-e), and uses them to bring the dialogue to its climax (90a-d). The theory of the soul's three parts that has in the meantime been introduced enables him to prescribe man's ideal way of life (ἀρίστου βίου 90d6), and present a more explicitly worked out doctrine of man. The god has given man mind as a δαίμων which he must cherish and keep in as excellent order as he possibly can. The man who is entirely preoccupied in satisfying bodily desires (ἐπιθυμία) or ambitions (φιλονικία) must of necessity think mortal thoughts and become virtually wholly mortal himself. The man who directs his whole being to love of learning or knowledge (φιλομαθία) and truth will necessarily think immortal and divine thoughts and so will attain the measure of immortality (ἀθανασία) that his human nature will admit.

In this way man can be deemed truly blessed and worthy of congratulation (δολα-
 φερώντως εὐδαίμονα εἶναι 90c5).

The long monologue of Timaeus the Locrian is nearing its end. The section on the creation of woman and the other genera of animals is added as a kind of appendix. Only the account of human sexuality and the process of reproduction (91a-c) adds a new element. Plato leaves it so late not only because the female sex is needed as participant, but also because he wishes to indicate that physical love is an *inferior* form of *eros* (cf. Cornford 292,355). The description of the formation of woman and the animal genera is presented entirely in terms of the doctrine of metempsychosis. They are degraded types of men who are given remedial punishment for their wicked or foolish lives. Is Plato being fully serious here? Yes and no. Obviously he declines to present an adequate zoology, as being outside the scope of the dialogue's chosen subject (cf. 27a). On the other hand, his anthropocentrism is deliberate and quite unobvious. The parallel between macrocosm and microcosm which dominates the entire work is fundamentally man-centred.

The dialogue ends with a compact doxology to the cosmos (92c), lavish in its superlatives. The cosmos is a visible god, image of the noetic model, most perfect in its completeness, absolutely unique in its sort.

10.1. Man's true end (Tim.90a-d)

10.1.1. Man as a heavenly plant (90a)

According to Plato man can be compared to a plant that is upside down. A plant draws the food it needs through its roots. Man's root is his head (90a8) which draws food from the heavenly regions by means of sight and learning (cf. 47a-c, 90c7). The Platonic image of man as a heavenly plant (οὐράνιον φυτὸν 90a6) appeals to Philo. On two occasions he incorporates it in significant analyses of the Mosaic doctrine of man (Det.85, Plant.17; see further II 10.1.1.). Other passages that unquestionably allude to Plato's image are:

Deus 181 (exeg. Num.22:31): Balaam is a γῆς θρέμμα, not an οὐράνιον βλάστημα (as is Israel). A recasting of Plato's motif in combination with Tim.91e. Prov.2.109: Barbarian lands may be fertile, but only Greece truly gives birth to a φυτὸν οὐράνιον καὶ βλάστημα θεῶν. The arid climate of Greece is not a hindrance but a help in the case of man's birth, for man has his roots in heaven. QE 2.114 (exeg. Ex.28:21): The phylarchs do 'not go about on the earth like mortals but become heavenly plants and move about in the ether, being firmly established there'. The point of Plato's comparison, here combined with a motif from the *Phaedrus* myth, is largely lost. Cf. also our remarks below at II 10.2.2-3. on Tim.91e.

As Alexandre FE 16.239-240 and Harl FE 15.39 have pertinently pointed out,

the image of the plant, offshoot, branch and so on occurs with abundant frequency in Biblical and Jewish literature. This abundance is reflected in Philo's copious use of such imagery, which is more often incited by Biblical texts than Greek illustratory material (a more detailed investigation of this subject would be remunerative). Nevertheless the two above-mentioned authors appear to be a little hasty in not recognizing the topos of the heavenly plant at Congr.56 (τὴν...ὁρατικὴν αὐτοῦ φιλόθεον ὄντως διάνοιαν, κληματίδα εὐγενῆ, καταφυτεύει ῥίζας ἀποτείνων πρὸς ἀιδιότητα...) and Her.34 (καὶ ἄνω πρὸς οὐρανὸν τὸ στέλεχος ἀνεγείρον μετεωρίσαι). Also at Somn.1.54 Philo plays with Plato's idea when he criticizes the Chaldean astronomers for trying to grasp hold of the etherial region (again the divine flight imagery of the Phaedrus myth) while themselves rooted to the ground.

A corollary of the image of man as a heavenly plant is that he stands erect (90a8-b1) and is able to direct his vision towards the celestial realm, in contrast to the beasts who have their heads bowed to the ground (91e-92a). Philo draws attention to this feature of man's construction at Opif.147, Det.85, Plant.17, Ebr.156 (ἀνωρθύσεται, cf.90b1 ὀρθοῦ), Abr.164 (in conjunction with the encomium of sight based on Tim.47a-b), Anim.11 (see below II 10.2.3.). Once again we are dealing with a widely disseminated topos (for an extensive list of examples cf. Pease ad Cic.DND 2.140), so that it is hardly necessary to conclude that Philo is directly thinking of Tim.90a every time he uses it. At Det.85 and Plant.17, however, the context indicates the direct influence of the Platonic passage.

A reminiscence of Plato's text is also found at Abr.59, ὅταν ἐκ τῶν αὐτοῦ δυνάμεων ἀνακρεμάσας τὴν ψυχὴν ὁ θεὸς ὅλκῃ δυνατωτέρῳ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπισπάσῃται (cf. Nock VChr 16(1962)82). Philo only uses the verb ἀνακρεμάννυμι twice in all his works (once more at Ios.156), so a direct recollection of Plato's vocabulary (90b1) is more than probable. By speaking here of God's powers he has transformed the theme in terms of his own theology. Modern translators are divided on whether τὸ θεῖον (90b8) refers to man's divine part (Cornford) or the demiurge (Rivaud). On the basis of this passage it is clear that Philo opts for the 'theocentric' interpretation.

But a mere list of references to passages in which Philo uses a theme gives little idea of what the theme meant to him. Hence we turn now to a more detailed analysis of two passages where Mosaic and Platonic anthropology merge together into a Philonic whole.

10.1.2. Two passages on Mosaic and Platonic anthropology

The first passage under discussion, Det.79-90, is summoned forth by the exegesis of Cain's words at Gen.4:10, φωνὴ αἵματος τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ σου βοᾷ πρὸς με ἐκ τῆς γῆς. The sublimity of Moses' words is patent to all, but they do lead

to the following problem. Right throughout the Law he calls blood the οὐσία τῆς ψυχῆς, e.g. at Lev.17:11, but in the cosmogony he affirms (Gen.2:7) that πνεῦμα is the essence of soul (§80). Since it is Moses' practice to make his statements consistent with each other (a noteworthy assumption!), a solution must be found for this apparent inconsistency (§81). Philo's reply is to make a distinction between a life-force (ζωτικὴ δύναμις) effectuated through the blood and shared by all animals, and a rational force (λογικὴ δύναμις) effectuated through the πνεῦμα, of which man partakes but not the lower animals (§82; on this division see the further remarks at the end of the sub-section). Philo is careful to indicate that he does not mean a materialistic conception of πνεῦμα. It is not moving air (the Stoa!), but an imprint of the divine power, to which Moses gives the appropriate name εἰκὼν (i.e. in Gen.1:26-27). God is the archetype, man the image, 'man' meaning here not τὸ διφυσὲς ζῷον but τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄριστον εἶδος (cf.90a2-3)(§83).¹

In order to explain what he means by man's rational part or νοῦς or λόγος Philo now turns to the Platonic anthropology given in Tim.90a-d, though presenting it in Moses' name. This section (§84-85) must be read in closer detail.

σύγκριμα: Not in Plato (but cf. συναμφοτέρων 87e5, Alc.I 130a9); found in SVF 1.145, common in Philo (cf. Leisegang 730).

τὸ θεοειδὲς δημιουργήμα: I.e. the νοῦς or rational part of the soul. Philo is thinking both of Plato's description of the νοῦς as τὸ θεῖον (90c4,8) and the Mosaic doctrine of Gen.1:26-27. See further below II 10.1.4.

τὰς ῥίζας εἰς οὐρανὸν ἔτεινε: Cf.90a8, where the head is the root.

ἀψύδος ἐξῆψε: The motif from the Timaeus is clearly combined with the Phaedrus myth (esp. 247b1).

φῦτον οὐράνιον: Cf.90a6, the 'tag' that gives away the actual source.

τὰς κεφαλὰς πηξάμενος ἐν χέρσῳ: A free rendering of Plato's description of the terrestrial animals in 91e-92a.

κατώκαρα: A rare poetic word, used elsewhere by Philo only once, in exactly the same context (though of plants) in Plant.16.

τὰς τροφὰς ὀλυμπίους καὶ ἀφθάρτους: Once again the Timaeus (90c7) and the Phaedrus myth (246d-247e, esp. 247e6) are combined. See below II 10.1.6.(4).

τὰς νοῦ δορυφόρους αἰσθήσεις: Cf. the remarks above at II 9.2.3.(2).

ἐξώκισε: The building metaphor so frequent in the Timaeus (see II 3.4.3. and note the examples in relation to man in 69e1,e6,70a3,a6,e2,e3,e6).

ταῖς δὲ ἀέρος καὶ οὐρανοῦ περιόδοις ἀφθάρτοις οὖσαις: Cf.90c8-d4 which recalls 47a-c. The reference to the circuits of air seems out of place, for these (belonging to the sublunary realm) can hardly be described as immortal. I would tentatively suggest that αἰθέρος has been corrupted to ἀέρος under the influence of the notion of πνεῦμα prominent in the passage (cf. Opif.70).

For disciples of Moses it is no longer a problem to understand how man gains a conception of the invisible God. Man's maker breathed into him (ἐνε-πνεῦ) from above of his own divinity. Man as image is moulded or struck (τυπωθεῖσα) in accordance with the divine paradigm, and so in his mind receives immortal thoughts (§86-87). In the eulogy of the human νοῦς that concludes the passage (§87-90) the influence of the Phaedrus myth becomes paramount. The mind in its upward flight apprehends the ἐπίγεια, μετάρσια, οὐράνια, and

finally the ἀκατάληπτος θεοῦ φύσις (equivalent to τὰ ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ in the myth, 247c2).

Such remarkable powers call for an explanation. The human mind, so small that it is located in the brain or heart (on the uncertainty see above II 7.2.1.), could not contain the vast extent of the heavens unless it was an inseparable fragment (ἀπόσπασμα οὐ διαιρετόν) of 'that divine and blessed soul' (§90). This statement introduces a difficulty. The term ἀπόσπασμα (of Stoic origin, cf. *SVF* 2.633, *Posid.fr.*F99a E-K) is used elsewhere to explain Gen.2:7 (cf. *Opif.*135,146, *Leg.*3.161, *Somn.*1.34). It thus leads the discussion back to the Biblical text which played an important role at the beginning of the passage. But what is the 'divine and blessed soul' which is described as 'partaking of the perfection in the universe'? We are reminded of the language of the Platonic and Stoic cosmic soul. As was noted above in II 5.1.2-3., however, Philo prefers to replace this concept with that of the immanent divine Logos. Here too he surely means the divine Logos, of which man's rational soul is portrayed as a fragment (cf. Winston 26).

The second passage, *Plant.*16-22, shows many similarities to the first, but its context is quite different. It is part of the 'phyto-cosmological excursus' to which we have already referred so often. The entire cosmos is described in terms of a plant (*Plant.*2), and its animals are described as plants on a lesser scale (§11). It is no wonder, therefore, that Plato's image of man as the heavenly plant springs to Philo's associative mind. To the earth the creator assigned two kinds of living beings, plants and animals (§15-16). Plants, with their heads fixed downwards in the earth, are given to mother earth so that she can feed her progeny (cf. *Opif.*38-44,133).² The irrational animals have their head lifted from the ground, but the front feet are still needed for support and the eyes are kept lowered (§16-17; see further below II 10.2.2. on 91e-92a). Man, however, receives a construction (κατασκευή) which distinguishes him from all other animals. In Philo's description the allusion to *Tim.*90a5-b1 is clear and rather precise (§17):

τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων τὰς ὀφείας περιήγαγε κάτω κάμψας, διὸ νένευκε πρὸς χέρσον, ἀνθρώπου δὲ ἔμπαλιν ἀνώρθωσεν, ἵνα τὸν οὐρανὸν καταθεῖται, φυτὸν οὐκ ἐπίγειον ἀλλ' οὐράνιον, ὡς ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ὑπάρχων.

ἀνώρθωσεν: Cf. 90b1 ὀρθοῦ (note also *Ebr.*156).

φυτὸν οὐκ ἐπίγειον ἀλλ' οὐράνιον: Cf. 90a6 φυτὸν οὐκ ἔγγειον ἀλλὰ οὐράνιον. Philo's rendering is so close to Plato's actual text that we must conclude that he wishes to quote it *verbatim* (but as usual relies on his memory). Philonic editors have thus erred in not placing the phrase in quotation marks.

ἵνα τὸν οὐρανὸν καταθεῖται: The element of vision is not actually mentioned in 90a, but the entire section must clearly be connected up with the encomium of sight in 47a-c.

ὡς ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος: Also used of a Platonic reference at *Ebr.*8 (to *Phd.*60b). The image is of respectable antiquity and so to be held in high respect.

But, our author continues (§18), the description of man as a heavenly plant could give rise to misunderstanding. Some philosophers have affirmed that man's νοῦς is a part of the etherial φύσις and that there is συγγένεια between man and the αἰθήρ (i.e. the doctrine of the Aristotelian quintessence). The great Moses had a clearer grasp of these matters. The form of man's rational soul cannot be likened to anything in the realm of γένεσις. The true state of affairs is disclosed in the two primary anthropological texts, Gen.1:26-27 and 2:7, both of which are interpreted in terms of a paradeigma relation between the divine Logos and man. The εἶδος of the rational soul is a genuine coin, marked and stamped by God's seal, the archetypal Logos of the (first) cause (§18-20). Accordingly the body too is raised up towards heaven, the purest part of the universe. The creator made the eyes of the body as a clear likeness of the invisible eye of the soul. Just as they can extend to the limits of heaven, so the eyes of the soul are impelled by the desire to gaze on Being (τὸ ὄν), ascending not only to the limits of the ether but even beyond to the Uncreated (§21-22). Philo thus returns at the end of the passage to the familiar themes from the Phaedrus myth. Instead of developing these themes, as he did in the previous passage, he conflates them with the Biblical theme of being 'called above', exemplified by Moses (Lev.1:1) and Bezalel (Ex.31:2), who represent two levels of the hierarchy of recipients of knowledge (see above II 2.4.1. 3.4.4.).

The two passages which we have analysed show Philo at the peak of his powers. The role which Plato's doctrine of man, as presented in the Timaeus, plays in Philo's thought is revealed with more than usual clarity. In order to show man's exceptional place in the structure of the cosmos, Philo *centres his account* around the two primary anthropological passages of the Mosaic creation story. But in his endeavour to *explain what these texts actually tell us* about man's nature he resorts to the two Platonic accounts of man which he knew best, the Timaeus and the Phaedrus myth. Man is separated from the other earth-bound animals because he possesses a rational soul. It is in the possession of reason that man shows a likeness to God his creator. Man's possession of reason orientates him towards the heavens, and beyond them to God himself. The object of man's existence is to set eyes on God and become like him, and this can only be done with the (mental) eye of the soul.

The message is straightforward and at the same time of great significance in the history of ideas. The reading of Gen.1:26-27 and 2:7 in terms of Greek intellectualism was to have a distinguished career. But, it must be observed, in order to extract this message from the two Mosaic texts Philo has to engage in some smart footwork. He has to explain why Moses gives a double

account of man's creation. Moreover there are difficulties of a more technical, philosophical nature. In both texts man is brought in direct relation to God his maker, but the nature of the relation (in Philo's reading) is not the same. Gen.1:26-27 introduces a (double) *paradeigma relation* between God, the Logos and man. The 'in-breathing' of Gen.2:7 is closer to a *part-whole relation*, for man receives a share of the divine πνεῦμα. In the two passages just analysed these two kinds of relation are not kept clearly apart (note esp. Det. 85,90, Plant.18-19), which results in a certain lack of clarity. We shall return to Philo's interpretation of the Mosaic double account of man's creation below in II 10.1.5.

The distinction made between the blood-soul and the rational soul at Det. 80-82 is also found at Her.54-57 (exeg. Gen.15:2), Spec.4.123 (exeg. Lev.3:17), QG 2.59 (Greek text FE 33.114, exeg. Gen.9:4). These four texts are all very similar. In each case a contrast is made between the description of blood as the 'soul of all flesh' (Lev.17:11) and the two primary anthropological texts Gen.1:26-27 and 2:7. On the conception of the blood-soul, which goes back to Presocratic ideas see Heinemann's note at GT 3.301. Philo is searching for a Biblical precedent for the irrational part of the soul which man shares with the animals, and thus for a precedent for the division of the soul into rational and irrational which is so vital to his ideas on man.³

10.1.3. Man's νοῦς as his δαίμων (90a,c)

The god has given man τὸ κυριώτατον ψυχῆς εἶδος as a δαίμων ('guiding genius' in Cornford's translation), Plato writes at Tim.90a2-4. If we keep our δαίμων in good order (εὖ κεκοσμημένον), we shall become happy or fortunate (εὐδαίμων) to a special degree (90c5-6). Only once does Philo reproduce this verbal play in a clear way, at Prov.2.16. The worthless man (φασῖλος), even if he is rich as Croesus, can never become εὐδαίμων if he makes his δαίμων, that is his own νοῦς, the slave of innumerable passions. Other texts in Philo which possibly contain an allusion to the word-play are Opif.144, Mut.216, Flacc.168, Prov.1.64-65.

It may perhaps be doubted whether the passage described above is a direct result of the reading of Tim.90a-c. Plato's words at Rep.617e1, οὐκ ὕμῶς δαίμων λήξεται, ἀλλ' ὅμεῖς δαίμονα αἰρήσεσθε (cf. Heraclitus fr.B119 DK) could also have been influential. Xenocrates fr.81 repeats Plato's pun, affirming that man's δαίμων is his soul (εἴη ἂν εὐδαίμων ὁ εὖ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχων, cf. also Epin.992d). In later times the etymological explanation of εὐδαιμονία was exceedingly popular. To the list of references given by Witt 88 can be added: Tim.Locr.83, Sex.Emp.Adv.Phys.1.47, Plut.Mor.591E, Apul.De deo Socr.150, Clem.Alex.Str.2.131.4, Plot.Enn.3.4.5.23. Another possibility is, of course, that the allusion was carried over from a source. In writing the De Providentia

Philo has clearly made an abundant use of source material. But, unless one has access to these sources, such secondary transmission is quite impossible to prove, because the writer does not merely write out his source material word for word, but embellishes it with his own ideas.

The assertion that man's νοῦς or the rational part of his soul can be called a δαίμων concurs neatly with the views that Philo has on demons. There are three classes of souls, demons or, as Moses is wont to call them, angels (cf. Gig.12-16, Somn.1.138-141): immortal souls who have never descended into the body, souls who have descended and have been overwhelmed in the torrent of bodily passions, other incarnated souls who have devoted themselves to philosophy and have escaped the dungeon of the body (this demonology goes back to Plato and Xenocrates, and is essentially borrowed from Middle Platonism, cf. Dillon 31-33, 46-47, 172-174, and see above II 5.4.3.). In his analysis of Gig. 6-18 Nikiprowetzky shows that Philo endeavours to eliminate the conception of a superstitious demonology by demonstrating that maleficent demons are none other than evil souls (Hommages à Georges Vadja 43-71, esp. 68 on §16). In another article the same scholar draws attention to the close relation of the Philonic doctrine of the ἑλεγχος or conscience as monitor or cross-examiner of the soul (which has both Greek and Jewish antecedents) to the conception of the νοῦς as man's guardian genius ('La doctrine de l'ἐλέγχος chez Philon, ses résonances philosophiques et sa portée religieuse' PAL 255-273, esp. 263). The connection with Tim.90a,c is most clearly visible in Decal.87 (συννοεῖν, cf. 90c5).

A difference between Philo's allusion to Tim.90a,c at Prov.2.16 and the Platonic original introduces a topic with broader implications. Plato speaks of τοῦ κυριωτάτου παρ' ἡμῶν ψυχῆς εἶδους in 90a2, whereas Philo describes the δαίμων in us as τὸν ἐαυτοῦ νοῦν. The relation between ψυχή and νοῦς is one of the more difficult problems in Greek philosophy. The development of the problematics involved from Plato to Plotinus has by no means been exhaustively researched. Two texts from the Timaeus played an important role in later antiquity because they were read as giving support to the view that νοῦς is an ontologically separate and higher level of being than ψυχή, 30b3-8 (νοῦν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ψυχὴν ἐν σώματι), 90a2-3, c4-5 (where the δαίμων was taken to be the νοῦς and considered separate from ψυχή); cf. Dillon 213, Cherniss ad Plut.Mor.943A, Boyancé Miscellanea Rostagni 51. Philo certainly has the former text in mind at Abr.272 (ψυχῇ μὲν ἐν σώματι, νοῦς δ' ἐν ψυχῇ), QE 2.11 ('as the mind is in the soul, so the soul is in the body'). Compare also Opif.66, where the mind is the soul of the soul like the pupil is the eye of the eye (cf. Leg.3.171, Her.55, Congr.97, going back to Pl.Alc.I 133a-c). On the basis of these texts we may be inclined to attribute to Philo a sharp distinction between νοῦς and ψυχή.

But on the basis of an analysis of a much larger number of texts we have come to the conclusion that Philo in his use of the two concepts essentially follows the approach which is predominant in the Platonic corpus (with the addition of Aristotelian and Stoic terminology). Very often νοῦς indicates a *function or capacity* of the rational part of the soul, equivalent to the role of αἰσθησις in the irrational part (cf. esp. the allegory of Adam and Eve). On other occasions νοῦς represents an *entity* rather than a function, and then it is in effect equivalent to the rational part of the soul. When soul is incarnated it must have irrational parts or powers which allow it to adapt to its corporeal residence and exercise control over the body. Its rational part, i.e. the νοῦς, is thus not equivalent to the soul as a whole, but is its guiding or leading part (ἡγεμών, ἡγεμονικόν). Only when the soul is discarnate is it legitimate to speak of an equivalence between soul and mind. In Philo's case, therefore, one may regard mind or rational part of the soul or rational soul (discarnate) as equivalents, as we have done throughout this study.

In order to give the reader the chance to draw his own conclusions on this subject, we have compiled a list of texts which, if not exhaustive, certainly gives an all-round picture of Philo's usage: Opif.69, Leg.1.1ff.,39-41, 3.24,28-29, Cher.57,71ff., Det.22-23, Post.175, Gig.15 (τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, ψυχὴν ἢ νοῦν!), Deus 46, Agr.46,65-66, Plant.18, Ebr.100, Migr.5,186, Her.64,84,89,109-110,232-234, Congr.97, Fug.71, Mut.3,208-209, Somm.1.30-32, Abr.57-58,99, Mos.1.27-29, 2.288, Decal.134, Spec.1.17,201, 3.188,207, Virt.12, Praem.120-123, QG 1.11,79, 2.59,62, 4.1 (EES 1.266), QE 2.29,39,46,115. Cf. also the useful remarks at Schmidt 49-50.

There are two reasons for the tendency to place man's νοῦς and ψυχὴ at separate ontological levels in later Platonism. Firstly, it furnished a solution to the problem of whether the irrational part of the soul is immortal, or at least survives for some time after death (a controversy raised *inter alia* by the image of the two horses (i.e. the two irrational parts of the soul) in the Phaedrus myth; cf. Guthrie 4.421-425). In response the theory of the double death was developed, i.e. one death in which soul is separated from body, the other in which mind is separated from soul (put to highly effective use by Plutarch in the myth of De facie quae in orbe lunae apparet (Mor.943Aff.)). There is no trace of this theory in Philo. He often describes the ψυχὴ as ἀθάνατος *tout court* (e.g. Spec.1.81), but it is clear that he regards only the rational part as possessing immortality. Cf. for example Opif.135 (θυνητόν μὲν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, κατὰ δὲ τὴν δόξαν αἰώνιον ἀθάνατον), Mos.2.288 (Moses' δυνάς of σῶμα and ψυχὴ becomes νοῦς ἡλυοδέστατος; νοῦς here means rational soul, cf. Gig.14, Somm.1.139).

Secondly, the differentiation of νοῦς and ψυχὴ was used to emphasize mind's association with the noetic world and the measure of transcendence that could consequently be attributed to it. Engaged in contemplation of the ideal world the mind is wholly disengaged from contact with the material realm. There are a few texts in Philo which tend in this direction. Using the language of the Phaedrus myth, Philo affirms that the mind leaves the realm of sense-perceptible reality entirely and joins the incorporeal world of ideas; cf. Gig.61, Her.280 (exeg. Gen.15:15, cf. above II 7.1.1.), QG 4.138 (note also a text such as Her.263-265). I take this to mean that the human mind is so completely divorced from association with the material realm that it becomes one with the divine Logos (who is the place of the κόσμος νοητός). Are these texts in disagreement with Philo's usual view that man's ultimate felicity is to gain immortality as a discarnate mind or rational soul or ἀσώματος φύσις,

in which condition he is able to contemplate divine things unhindered by corporeal necessities? A solution can be attempted in terms of the imagery of the Phaedrus myth which these texts employ. If the discarnate soul stands on the vault of heaven and contemplates the noetic beauties 'outside', it casts aside all contact with corporeal reality and can be said to be 'translated' to or 'enrolled' in the noetic world as result of its rational (i.e. mental) activity. But the Gnostic vision contained in the Hermetic treatise, the Poi-mandres, that the νοῦς progresses beyond the eighth and outer sphere and actually becomes a δούναμις ἐν θεῷ (§26) would, in my view, be rejected by Philo as overstepping the boundary between created reality and the wholly transcendent first cause.

10.1.4. Man - divine, god-like, statue-bearer

The axiomatic principle of Platonic philosophy that the gods, and in particular, the creating god, do not and cannot adopt an envious attitude towards the cosmos and its inhabitants is also of great significance for the doctrine of man. Because man possesses a divine (θεῖος) component, namely the rational part of the soul or the νοῦς, he is potentially himself able to become a god, if he engages in the rational contemplative activity which is the prerogative of the gods. In the Timaeus, where the eschatological perspective is kept subordinate, man's potential apotheosis is given less emphasis than in the myths of the Phaedo, Republic and Phaedrus. But by continually describing man's rational part as τὸ θεῖον or θεϊότατον Plato retains the theme in the background; cf. 41c7, 44d3, 5, 45a1, 69d6, 72d4, 76b2, 88b2, 90c8. Especially striking is the injunction to man that, if he is to reach the state of εὐδαιμονία, he should always *worship* the divine part (90c4 ἀεὶ θεραπεύοντα τὸ θεῖον).

We have already had occasion to note above in II 4.2.6. that Philo's loyalty to Judaic tradition does not preclude him from a liberal-minded attitude to the use of the word θεός. Does he feel free to follow in Plato's footsteps here? In Opif. 69 man's mind is described as τρόπον τινα θεός ὢν τοῦ φέροντος καὶ ἀγαματοφοροῦντος αὐτόν (note the qualification). No less than eight times Philo cites or alludes to the text in Ex.7:1, Ἰδοὺ δέδωκά σε θεὸν φαραῶ, in order to show that Moses, the σοφός par excellence, can be described as a god; cf. Leg. 1.40, Sacr. 9, Det. 161-162, Migr. 84, Mut. 128-129, Somm. 2.189, Mos. 1.158, Prob. 43 (note also Mos. 1.27, QE 2.29, 40). Some of these texts are rather effusive, but Det. 161-162 shows that the divinity of Moses must be conceived in relative terms, i.e. relative to the foolish man to whom he is being 'given' by the true God. When we look for descriptions of man's rational part as θεῖος or τὸ θεῖον, they can be located only at surprisingly infrequent intervals, as emerges in the following list:

Leg. 2.95: The soul's two kinds of offspring, τὸ θεῖον or τὸ φθαρτόν.

Det. 29: Man's δυνάμεις is τὸ θεϊότατον τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν.

Ebr.70: We must sever τὸ θεῖον (soul) from τὸ φθαρτόν (body).

Her.84: Man's νοῦς, if serving God in purity, is not ἀνθρώπινος but θεῖος.

Mut.184: God is not a σύγκριμα, but we are a mixture of divine and mortal.

Somn.1.34: Man's νοῦς is an ἀπόσπασμα θεῖον.

Compared with Plato's usage this list is so short that we must conclude a certain reticence on Philo's part. On the other hand, we find a number of examples where man or his rational soul or mind is described as *god-like* (θεοειδής; not in Tim. but cf. Phd.95c5, Rep.501b7, Epin.980d8). Man's body was constructed as a house or holy temple for the rational soul, ἥν (ψυχὴν λογικὴν) ἐμελλεν (ὁ ἄνθρωπος) ἀγαματοφορήσειν ἀγαμάτων τὸ θεοειδέστατον (Opif.137). Cf. also Opif.69, Det.84, Her.65, Mos.1.158, Spec.3.83,207.

In two of the texts cited above Philo's use of the composite verb ἀγαματοφορέω is prominent. As Stephanus TGL 1.177 observes, the word is *peculiare et proprium* to Philo. He uses it no less than 16 times, while the only other recorded instances are found in Patristic authors who were well acquainted with Philo's writings (cf. PGL 6b). Two aspects of Philo's use of the word are relevant to our discussion. (1) The mind or rational part of the soul is carried by the body as an image; in addition to Opif.69,137 already cited cf. Mut.21, Mos.1.27 (note also Decal.60). (2) The mind carries its thoughts (νοητά or, as alternative, God's Laws) as statues within itself; cf. Opif.18.82, Somn.1.208 (here of the cosmos, not man), Mos.2.11, Virt.188, Legat.210 (note also Sobr.3,38, Somn.2.233, Spec.4.238 etc.).

How can this idiosyncratic usage of philosophical terminology be explained? Looking to the philosophical tradition, we find a fine parallel at Cicero Leg.1.59, *nam qui se ipse norit primum aliquid se habere sentiet divinum ingeniumque in se suum sicut simulacrum aliquod dicatum putabit* (cf. Boyancé REG 76(1963)109). The motif is based on a combination of Tim.90a,c (i.e. the δαίμων) and the ἐνδοθεν ἀγάλματα at Symp.215b3. Another Platonic text may also have contributed, Tim.37c6-7, in which the cosmos or the heavens are called a κληθέν καὶ ζῶν τῶν αὐδίων θεῶν ἄγαλμα, i.e. a shrine for the heavenly bodies (cf. Cornford 99-102). Since man is a βραχὺς κόσμος (Mos.2.135) or an βραχὺς οὐρανός (Opif.82), he can be considered to carry an ἄγαλμα in his head or ἀγάλματα in his mind, just like the heavens contain the celestial bodies (stars are called ἀγάλματα at Opif.53, Abr.159, QG 4.87). We recall the theme of the circuits of the mind (cf. Tim.47a-c and see above II 7.2.4.), in which the thoughts in the mind are seen as analogous to the stars in the heavens.

The antecedents and parallels so far discussed are a necessary but hardly a sufficient explanation for Philo's predilection for the metaphor of image-bearer or statue-bearer. My conviction is that the metaphor's appeal is primarily due to the connection which Philo perceives with the foundation of his anthropology, the Mosaic doctrine that man is made according to the image of God (Gen.1:26-27). Just as some people represent their gods by means of lifeless statues, so man or his rational part can be described as a living image of the divine Logos. We shall return to this theme in the following sub-section.

10.1.5. The double account of man's creation

Philo's loyalty to the *ipsissima verba* of the Mosaic cosmogony, expressly announced in Opif.4-6, entails that he also must come to terms with the double account of the creation of man given in Gen.1:26-31 and 2:4-7. Already more

than eighty years ago Horovitz suggested that a monograph be devoted to the treatment of this problem (95). More recently Nikiprowetzky renewed the call (REJ 124(1965)298). Such a study would encounter severe difficulties; it is not surprising that it has as yet not been undertaken. In the meantime an ever-growing pile of more limited scholarly discussions can be consulted.

Short bibliography on the problem: Horovitz 95-103; Bréhier 121-126; Billings 39; Schmidt 3-10; K.Steur, *Poimandres en Philo* (diss. Nijmegen, Purmerend 1935) 100-162; Wolfson 1.307,389-395; H.Merki, 'Ὁμοίωσις θεῷ: von der platonischen Angleichung an Gott zur Gottähnlichkeit bei Gregor von Nyssa (Freiburg in der Schweiz 1952) 75-83; Bormann 22-26; R.McL.Wilson *Studia Patristica* 424, *The Gnostic problem* 42 & n.129; J.Jervell, *Imago Dei: Gen1,26f. im Spätjudentum, in der Gnosis und in den paulinischen Briefen* (Göttingen 1960) 52-70; Nikiprowetzky REJ 124(1965)198; C.Kannengiesser, 'Philon et les Pères sur la double création de l'homme' *PAL* 277-297; Baer 14-35 (much indebted, he informs us, to B.A.Stegmann, *Christ, the 'Man from heaven'* (diss. Washington 1927)', *quid non vidi*); A.J.M.Wedderburn, 'Philo's 'Heavenly man' (Gen.1:26ff.)' *NT* 15(1973) 301-326; Terian 131.

Needless to say, the present discussion cannot take into consideration all relevant texts and secondary material, so its aims must remain very modest. Its primary intention is to examine the extent to which the anthropological doctrines of the *Timaeus* have aided Philo in resolving the interpretative problems posed by the double account of man's creation.

Our interpretation is based on the following observations.

1. As exegete Philo remains true to the Mosaic text. The difficulties of that text - such as the relation between divine image and divine breath, the meaning of genus and species, the division between what was created on the sixth and seventh days, and so on - are not avoided. Philo assumes that these difficulties conceal a philosophical rationale, but does not claim that his interpretation has exclusive rights to the truth.
2. When not engaged in giving a detailed running commentary on the double account of man's creation, he prefers to present a relatively straightforward interpretation. On the sixth day both the 'true man' (pure mind) and man as σύνθετον (mixture of rational and irrational) are created (cf. *Fug.* 71-72, also implied in *Opif.* 69). The two primary anthropological texts, Gen.1:26-27 and 2:7, are *reconciled* to a large degree. The man κατ'εἰκόνα θεοῦ and the in-breathing of the divine πνεῦμα both refer to man's god-like part, the νοῦς or rational soul (cf. *Det.* 80-86, *Plant.* 18-20, *Her.* 56).
3. But in the running commentaries found in *Opif.*, *Leg.* I-II and *QG* I Philo undertakes to explain every detail of the Biblical account, and so tends to keep the man of Gen.1:27 separate from the man created in Gen.2:7. At *Leg.* 1.31 he speaks of the οὐράνιος and the γήινος ἄνθρωπος. The attempt is *not* made to show that the mind created in Gen.1:27 is the same as the rational part that is inbreathed in Gen.1:27.

4. At no stage, however, does Philo import into his reading of the two texts in Opif. the conception of the Idea of man, whether this be identified with the Logos or considered separate from him. Here we agree with Baer 22 (cf. also Terian 131), but run counter to the opinion of most scholars.¹ Moreover the notion of a Gnostic pre-Adamite Urmensch is totally irrelevant to Philo's interpretation.

5. An important difference must be noted between the presentation in Opif. and that in Leg.I-II (and to a lesser extent in QG I). In Opif. man's structure is explained in a cosmological perspective; in Leg.I-II the dynamics of that structure are explored in an anthropological perspective (see also below III 1.4.a-b). Thus in Leg.I-II an allegorical exegesis of Gen.2 is given in terms of man and woman as νοῦς and αἰσθησις, with the result that the rules of the game are considerably changed. It is pointless to make acrobatic attempts to show that all the details of this exegesis are consistent with accounts in Opif. and elsewhere.²

The most important result of the above observations is that the man κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ whose creation is described in Gen.1.27 is man's mind or the rational part of his soul, not the paradeigmatic idea of man. A crucial touchstone for our contention is the passage at Opif.134-135, for this is the text which has most clearly suggested to commentators that Philo interprets the two accounts to denote the creation of Ideal and empirical man respectively. There is a vast difference, he says (§134), between the νῦν πλασθεὶς ἄνθρωπος (i.e. in 2:7) and the κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα θεοῦ γεγονώς πρότερον (i.e. in 1:27). The difference is made clear in a list of opposite features:

<u>ὁ πλασθεὶς</u>	<u>ὁ κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα</u>
αἰσθητός	νοητός
ἤδη μετέχων ποιότητος	ἰδέα τις ἢ γένος ἢ σφραγὶς
ἐκ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς συνεστώς	ἀσώματος
ἀνὴρ ἢ γυνή	οὔτ' ἄρρεν οὔτε θῆλυ
φύσει θνητός	ἄφθαρτος φύσει

In §135 a further explanation is given of what is meant by the perceptible man created in Gen.2:7. This man is a σύνθετον, consisting of earthly substance and divine πνεῦμα. The latter is a colony (ἀποικία) despatched from the μακροῖα καὶ εὐδαίμων φύσις (cf. Opif.146, Det.90 and above II 10.1.2.), through which man reaches immortality κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν, though he remains mortal κατὰ τὸ σῶμα. Clearly the divine πνεῦμα is, if not the rational part of the soul itself, the 'infusion' which makes that part rational and thus immortal. It is particularly the description of the 'man according to the image' as ἰδέα τις ἢ γένος ἢ σφραγὶς that could lead to the conclusion that Philo has in mind the Idea of man in the technical sense. We agree with Baer 30, however, that this conclusion is unnecessary. The opposed characteristic in the man νῦν

πλασθεύς is (perceptible) quality (ποιότης) or immanent form. But the νοῦς is incorporeal and so cannot possess such immanent form. It would seem that Philo applies terms often used of the paradeigmatic ideas here in a loose sense. (This is implied by the expression ἰδέα τῆς, as Baer points out.)

But a greater difficulty must be faced. What is Philo trying to achieve with the contrast between these two men? Baer's solution is that the 'moulded man' is the generic earthly man and the 'man according to the image' is the generic heavenly man (i.e. the rational νοῦς patterned after the image or Logos), while the man described in §135 is the first empirical or individual man. The clue to this view is that Philo in §134-135 uses the word ψυχή to represent two different things, the lower or irrational soul in §134, the (rational) soul that receives the divine πνεῦμα in §135. This interpretation is not convincing. I believe that the contrast that Philo has in mind is between the 'true man' and man in his corporeal existence, and that the man described in §135 is the same as the man νῦν πλασθεύς in §134 (i.e. there is no terminological ambiguity in the use of ψυχή). As we noted above, Philo, though elsewhere tending to reconcile Gen.1.26-27 and 2:7, in his more detailed exegesis does not regard the νοῦς created in the former text as the rational or divine part of the composite man created in the latter text. The reason for this, we must surmise, is the recognition that, when man's god-like part is stationed in the body, it is so distracted by its corporeal entanglements that it becomes a shadow of its true self. The 'man according to the image' is thus man as he really is, i.e. as he should and can be when the cares of the body have entirely fallen away.³ This man can be seen as an idealization, but *not* in the sense of being a paradeigmatic exemplar and part of the noetic world. He is said to be νοητός because his existence is intellectually apprehended, but also perhaps because he contemplates or even becomes enrolled himself in the noetic realm (see above II 10.1.3.).

Our conclusion, therefore, is that Philo's interpretation of the Mosaic double account of man's creation must be regarded as operating at a number of levels.

- (1) The two anthropological texts furnished by Moses, Gen.1:26-27 and 2:7, form the foundation on which Philo's doctrine of man is built.
- (2) The basic philosophical theory which supplies the clue to the interpretation of the above texts is Platonic. Man is a composite being, consisting of body and soul. Part of this soul is irrational and remains inextricably tied up with the functioning of the body. Only with regard to his rational soul or mind is man immortal and shows a resemblance to God his creator. While encumbered by its corporeal existence man's νοῦς cannot realize its true potential and man cannot become his true self.

(3) Superimposed on the texts and the basic Platonising interpretation are other issues which are dealt with as they come. These include the relation between genus and species (including the origin of the male and female sex), the theory of the Logos, the possibilities of the νοῦς and αἴσθησις allegory. These issues enrich (and sometimes obfuscate) the basic interpretation, but do not substantially modify it.

The Timaeus, which furnishes the clearest account of Plato's anthropology and moreover places it in a creationistic framework, played a role of major importance in Philo's resolution of the interpretative problems of the double account of man's creation, such as have been outlined above. The contrast between the man κατ'εἰκόνα θεοῦ and the man νῦν πλασθεὺς is essentially that between the divine and leading part created by the demiurge (41d) and man the συναμφοτέρων created when the 'young gods' place the divine part in the body which they have constructed (and also add the irrational part of the soul). In the two anthropological passages discussed above in II 10.1.2. Philo looks at man as he is in his earthly existence, i.e. parallel to Tim.90a-d. In these passages he prefers to reconcile the two Mosaic texts, considering that also in this existence man's 'true self' is present, albeit dimly.

As an appendix to the above discussion we must still point out a minor contribution of the Timaeus to Philo's explanation of Gen.1:26-27. We return briefly to the themes of divine image and statue already touched on in II 10.1.4.

A Greek, if confronted with the affirmation that man was created κατ'εἰκόνα θεοῦ, would surely think of the countless statues of the gods all around him in the polis in which he lived. If at all trained in philosophy, the problem of anthropomorphism and theomorphism might come to his mind. Cotta's reply to the Epicurean Velleius in Cicero DND 1.90 is representative. It is just as logical, he affirms, to say that gods are like men as that men are like gods, but the latter is more probable because the gods are eternal and immortal, and so existed before men were born. The likeness of man to God or the gods was a common theme in ancient philosophical literature, attributed inter alios to Pythagoras and Diogenes the Cynic. See the list of examples at Merki op.cit.65-72, Pease ad Cic.DND 1.90. It must be agreed with Merki 72, however, that these examples lack the depth and importance which the theme possesses in Judaeo-Christian thought.

In the gradual development of the use of the term εἰκών in a more technical sense, a number of texts from the Timaeus played a significant role (cf. Willms Εἰκὼν 22-24, Merki op.cit.65-66. These texts are: 29b2 τὸνδε τὸν κόσμον εἰκόνα τινός, 92c7 εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ (v.l. ποιητοῦ), and (to a lesser

extent) 37d5 εἰκὼ κλητὸν τινα αἰῶνος...χρόνον. In each case Plato is thinking of a model/image relation between the world of ideas (as model) and the sense-perceptible cosmos. As is observed in II 2.3.3. and 10.3.1., however, Philo shows the inclination to coalesce demiurge and model and regard the cosmos as image of its creator, in this following the example of certain Platonists (see also II 3.5.1. on 29e3 and 31a-b). Now given the crucial role of the macrocosm/microcosm relation in the Timaeus, of which Philo shows himself on more than one occasion perfectly aware, it is only a small step from saying that the macrocosm is an image of its creator to the conclusion that man the microcosm is the image of God (or of the Logos). Nowhere can we espy him actually taking this step. But in Opif. 24-25, when adducing Gen.1:27 to show that the κόσμος νοητός is nothing else than the θεοῦ λόγος ἥδη κοσμοποιούντος, he takes the step in reverse. If man, as part of the cosmos, is an image of the Logos as God's image, then the cosmos as the whole must also be an image of the Logos.

There is an obvious difficulty. For Plato the cosmos is a *visible* image of a noetic, i.e. *invisible*, paradigm. This is quite natural, for when one thinks of an image or statue, it is the external aspect that first comes to mind. But man's likeness to God is, according to Philo, not due to his visible part, but on account of his invisible mind (cf. the emphatic statement at Opif. 69). Merki op.cit. 65-72, in a fine analysis of the motif of man as εἰκὼν θεοῦ in non-Christian literature shows that by the time of Neoplatonism the motif had been extrapolated beyond its Platonic origins and given a spiritual dimension (cf. 69, 'im Neoplatonismus ist der Bildbegriff spiritualisiert und verinnerlicht'). See, for example, Plot. Enn. 1.2.8.27-31, 6.9.11.42-45 (both protreptic passages); examples in Middle Platonism are scarce (in Plut. Mor. 780E the ruler is image of God). Merki regards the Stoic-Posidonian συγγένεια motif and the Platonist development of the ὁμοίωσις theme as decisive in bringing about this change. It is evident that the greater the emphasis on the spiritual nature of deity and its incorporeal or even transcendent status, the more likely it became that man's likeness to the gods or God would be seen in his incorporeal and spiritual part, i.e. the νοῦς or rational soul.

10.1.6. Six important themes

As Plato brings the long section on the nature and structure of man to a close, he permits himself a brief protreptic flourish.¹ If man cultivates his rational part and devotes all his efforts to the pursuit of knowledge and truth, he will gain his true end, immortality and a blessed life similar to that

enjoyed by the gods. When the diverse themes of Tim.90a-d are listed - φιλομαθία (90b6,cf.d3), συγγένεια (90c8,cf.d3), ὁμολῶσις (90d4-5), τροφή (90c7), ἀθανασία (90c2,cf.d6-7), εὐδαιμονία (90c5,cf.d5-7), as well as the themes of νοῦς as δαίμων, man as οὐράνιον φυτόν, the contemplation of the heavens - one is struck by the seminal power of the passage and the creative impulses which it supplied to later philosophy and literature. To be sure, all these themes are dealt with, often at greater length, elsewhere in Plato's writings. It is their concentration in a small compass that gives this text its power and influence.

Philo's use of each of the above-mentioned themes could profitably be made the subject of a detailed piece of research. In this sub-section we shall confine ourselves to a brief indication of their importance for his thought, singling out the occurrences in the De opificio mundi for special attention.

1. φιλομαθία. In Philo's allegorical exegesis the man who has received instruction (μάθησις) plays an important role. The philosopher (Spec.3.191) and the man of heaven in pursuit of τὰ ἐγκύκλια and τὰ νοητά (Gig.60) are described as φιλομαθεὺς. In the latter case he is inferior to the man of God who is directly enrolled in the πολιτεία of the noetic world. Judah symbolizes the lover of learning who goes into Tamar, representing virtue (Congr.125, exeg. Gen.38:16). But the great embodiment of the quest for instruction in Philo's allegories is the patriarch Abraham (cf. Earp EE 10.277), who left his own land, the sensible realm, in search of God and the realm of intelligible being (Gen.12:1-9, cf. Abr.88). Compare Plato's view that μάθησις can take place through contemplation of the heavenly circuits, but that the real object of knowledge lies beyond (see above II 7.2.3.). On the theme of μάθησις in Philo see esp. Völker 158-198 (also Billings 85-86), who rightly emphasizes that for Philo God is the source of knowledge and he must lead the learner in the quest for truth (162ff.).

2. συγγένεια. The concept of συγγένεια represents in the most general sense the kinship or family relation that exists between man and the divine. The συγγένεια which the Timaeus emphasizes (cf. also 47b8) is that between man's rational soul and the heavenly beings (a direct result of the parallel creation by the demiurge of the cosmic soul and human soul out of similar ingredients in the mixing bowl; cf.35a,41d). Philo reports the opinion of the philosophers that man is related by kinship to the etherial substance of heaven (and implicitly also to its inhabitants), but immediately adds that Moses prefers to liken man's rational soul to God, for it has received the imprint of the eternal divine Logos (Plant.18, cf. Decal.134).² Man is akin to God because he has received the gift of the rational faculty (Opif.77), because the

divine spirit has been breathed into him (Opif.144, exeg. Gen.2:7), because he possesses δαύνοια (Opif.146). Other texts which stress the kinship between man and God or his Logos are Spec.4.14, Praem.163, QG 2.45,62, QE 2.29. On this theme in Philo see Alexandre's long note on Congr.177 at FE 16.228. In the monograph that E.Des Places has devoted to the study of the development of the theme, Syngeneia: la parenté de l'homme avec Dieu d'Homère à la Patristique (Paris 1964), he disregards the evidence found in Philo. This is a pity, not only for students of Philo, but also for Des Places' book, for Philo's contribution represents a vital bridge between Greek philosophical ideas and Patristic thought.

3. ὁμοίωσις. This concept is closely related to the previous one but represents, instead of a *state of affairs* based on birth or one's nature, the *dynamic process* of becoming like unto the divine or God. One might put it thus: because man shares a family relation with God (however distant), he is in a position to draw near to him and become like him. The development of this theme from its origins in Plato to the Greek Patristic authors has been thoroughly examined by H.Merki in his study 'Ὁμοίωσις θεῷ: von der platonischen Angleichung an Gott zur Gottähnlichkeit bei Gregor von Nyssa', in which the importance of Philo as the link between Greek philosophy and the Patres has been fully recognized. (See now also B.Belletti, 'La dottrina dell'assimilazione a Dio in Filone di Alessandria' Riv.Filos.Neo-scol.74(1982)419-440.)

The celebrated Platonic slogan ὁμοίωσις θεῷ is derived in the first place from Th.176a (cf. also Rep.613b). But to what divinity must ὁμοίωσις take place? In Rep.500c it is the eternal ideas, in Tim.90d it is the rational circuits of the heavenly bodies (i.e. in the cosmic soul). In the last-mentioned passage ὁμοίωσις is directly connected with the τέλος, man's aim in life or his true end (90d5). This must have encouraged later Platonists, starting with Eudorus, to see in the formula ὁμοίωσις θεῷ Plato's response to the question of man's τέλος, in contrast to the various τέλος-formulas of the Stoics. On ὁμοίωσις θεῷ as the τέλος for man's life in Middle Platonism (it occurs in virtually every author) see above I 4.n.108, Merki 1-2, Dörrie EH V 214ff., Moreschini 'Die Stellung...' 227-232, Lilla 106-112, Dillon 122, 192, 299.

Although Philo certainly does not use the formula ὁμοίωσις θεῷ exclusively for man's τέλος (he also employs the Stoic and Pythagorean versions, cf. Dillon 145-146), the theme is given an honoured place in his thinking on the relation between God and man (the source Th.176a is quoted verbatim at Fug. 63). The first man,³ freshly inbreathed with the divine spirit, could consort with the λογικὰ καὶ θεῖα φύσεις of heaven in a state of perfect felicity and follow God in the paths of virtue (the Pythagorean τέλος, ἔπου θεῷ), for only those souls can approach God who consider it their τέλος to become like their

begetter (Opif.144). ὁμοίωσις must therefore be directed towards God the creator, and not to the heavenly bodies (as in the Timaeus), although these can lead the way by showing man how to live a perfect and blissful life. In Opif. 151 we encounter a different accentuation of the theme. Before the creation of woman man was alone, ὡμοιοῦτο κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν κόσμῳ καὶ θεῷ... (cf. also Abr.87). Merki 40-41 is somewhat at a loss here, and suggests the influence of the Stoic-Cynic doctrine of αὐτάρκεια and of Neopythagoreanism. But the addition of καὶ κόσμῳ indicates that Philo has transferred the relation of ὁμοίωσις between model and cosmos in Tim.30c-31b (note c7 ὁμοιότατον, d3 ὁμοιωσαι, b1 κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν ὁμοιον) to the relation God/cosmos/man (see above II 3.5.1.).

For a further discussion of Philonic texts where the theme of ὁμοίωσις occurs the reader is referred to Merki 35-44. He concludes that Philo has not managed to integrate the theme very well into his thought, for, whereas in his εἰκῶν theory the Logos almost always functions as intermediary, the ὁμοίωσις motif is related directly to God himself. This conclusion is in two respects unsatisfactory. Firstly the fact that Merki did not consult the 'Armenian' Philo caused him to overlook the important passage in QG 2.62 (exeg.Gen.9:6, Greek frag. at FE 33.116):⁴

θυητὸν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀπεικονισθῆναι πρὸς τὸν ἀνωτάτω καὶ πατέρα τῶν ὅλων ἐδύνατο, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δεύτερον θεόν, ὃς ἐστὶν ἐκείνου λόγος. ἔδει γὰρ τὸν λογικὸν ἐν ἀνθρώπου ψυχῇ τύπον ὑπὸ θείου λόγου χαραχθῆναι, ἐπειδὴ ὁ πρὸ τοῦ λόγου θεὸς κρείσσω ἐστὶν ἢ πᾶσα λογικὴ φύσις· τῷ δὲ ὑπὲρ τὸν λόγον ἐν τῇ βελτίστῃ καὶ τινι ἐξαίρετῳ καθεστῶτι ἰδέειν οὐδὲν θέμις ἦν γενητὸν ἐξομοιωθῆναι.

This is an extremely problematic text (see below II 2.6.n.30), but it does show Philo's awareness of the problem that assimilation to God cannot proceed beyond a certain level of transcendence.⁵ In most cases, however, he prefers to repeat the accepted formula rather than delve into theological detail. In fact, and this is my second objection, Philo's theology is less straight-forward than Merki, with his distinction between transcendent God and intermediate Logos, appears to realize. θεός as one of God's names can represent the 'level' of the Logos. See further below III 2.5-7.

4. τροφή. When Plato affirms that the right θεραπεία for man's rational part is to give it the appropriate food, he naturally does not mean physical food, but rather the intellectual food supplied (for example) by contemplation of the heavens (cf. also Phdr.246e,247c-e). The contrast between earthly food and heavenly food is one of Philo's favourite themes (cf. Opif.158, Leg.3.161-168 (exeg. Gen.3:14) etc.), nearly always related to the showering of manna on the people of Israel (Ex.16:4,15). Manna symbolizes the divine Logos, through whom knowledge and wisdom is transmitted to man (cf. Her.79,191 etc.).⁶ The expression οὐράνια τροφή is found, in addition to the above-mentioned texts,

at Congr.100, Fug.137, Mos.2.266,270, QG 2.59, cf. also Sacr.86, Mut.259, QG 4.6, QE 2.39. That Philo is aware of the presence of the theme of heavenly food in the Timaeus is proven by his adaptation of Tim.90a-d in Det.85 (on which see further II 10.1.2.):

ὁ θεός... ἀνθρώπου δὲ (τὴν κεφαλὴν) εἰς τὸ ἄνω προαγαγών, ἵνα τὰς τροφὰς ὀλυμπίους καὶ ἀφθάρτους ἀλλὰ μὴ γεώδεις καὶ φθαρτὰς ἔχου.

On the theme of heavenly food in Philo see further P.Borgen, Bread from heaven: an exegetical study of the concept of Manna in the Gospel of John and the writings of Philo (Leiden 1965), esp. 127-130.

5. ἀθανασία. The firm conviction of man's immortality (i.e. of his rational part) is so ubiquitous in Philo (e.g. Opif.77,134-135,154 etc.) and is such an integral part of his thought that one is inclined to forget that the notion of ἀθανασία is wholly foreign to the Mosaic writings which he undertakes to expound (cf. Kittel TDNT 3.24, Wolfson 1.396-400). But with his Platonically tinted spectacles on Philo does not have the least difficulty in finding the doctrine of immortality of the soul in texts such Gen.3:3 (cf. Somn.2.70), Gen.15:15 (cf. QG 3.11), Gen.25:8 (cf. Her.275-283) and so on.

6. εὐδαιμονία. The remarks which have just been made on the notion of ἀθανασία can, *mutatis mutandis*, equally be applied to the theme of εὐδαιμονία. The words εὐδαίμων/εὐδαιμονία are wholly absent in the LXX (μακάριος is preferred), while according to Mayer's (incomplete) index εὐδαίμων and its derivatives occur 203 times in Philo's writings. εὐδαιμονία is for Philo virtually inseparable from the τέλος of man's life and the acquisition of immortality. In this he directly follows Tim.90c-d, where these themes are pregnantly clustered together (the words τέλος ἀρίστου βίου in d5-6 refer back to the εὐδαιμονία already introduced at c6). The difficulty with the notion of εὐδαιμονία is that, more so than in the case of ὁμοίωσις or ἀθανασία, it must be given its own content. Naturally this also applies within the Greek tradition itself. The felicity attributed by Solon to Cleobis and Biton (Herodotus 1.32) is quite different to what Plato has in mind.

A selection of the activities or conditions which Philo describes as constituting εὐδαιμονία can be listed as follows:

Opif.144: consorting with the celestial beings

Opif.172: subscribing to the five priceless doctrines

Det.86: gaining knowledge of God

Abr.157: practising ἀρετή

Mos.2.212: engaging in the pursuit of philosophy

Decal.100: worshipping God on the sabbath through contemplation and self-examination

QG 4.4: the presence of God

QG 4.147: ὁμοίωσις θεῷ

QE fr.12 (FE 33.291): τὸ ἀκλυῶς καὶ ἀρρεπῶς ἐν μόνῳ θεῷ στήναι.

On the basis of such evidence (and more) Völker 344 concludes:

So fließt die εὐδαιμονία schliesslich mit der ἀφθαρσία zusammen, und sie ist identisch mit dem στήναι, mit der χάρα, der εὐρήνη, der ἀνάπαυσις – alles nur Umschreibungen für eine Haltung des Frommen, der ganz Gott leben will. Mit der griechischen Fassung der εὐδαιμονία hat dies nichts mehr zu tun, es ist eine jüdische Einstellung, die hinter allem sichtbar wird: der Fromme, der im Dienste Gottes und in der Erfüllung der Gebote Aufgabe und Glück seines Daseins sieht, der ein Leben in Gott führen will. Um diesen Kern gruppieren sich eine Fülle von Theorien, Anschauungen, Termini, die der Philosophie entlehnt sind; sie geben der Konzeption etwas Schwankendes, schwer zu Fixierendes.

The sharp antithesis between Judaic core and Greek periphery which Völker depicts is one-sided and patently distorts the nature of Philo's thought.

No one will deny that Philo's conception of εὐδαιμονία is fundamentally God-orientated. In this he departs from Plato's presentation in the *Timaeus* (where it is *not* said that εὐδαιμονία consists in forming a relation to the demiurge), but agrees with important developments in the Platonist tradition (see further below III 3.3.). Völker himself observes (340) that Philo regards God as the epitome of εὐδαιμονία (*Opif.*135, *Cher.*86, *Det.*90, *Abr.*202 etc.). If εὐδαιμονία for Philo consisted only in taking one's refuge in God, fulfilling his commands and so on, it would be paradoxical to attribute εὐδαιμονία to God himself (for whom would he take refuge in?! – note that in the LXX God is never described as μακάριος, cf. Kittel *TDNT* 4.365). God is, according to Philo, supremely εὐδαίμων as the result of the nature of his being and activity, i.e. his oneness, transcendence, eternity, impassibility, goodness, wisdom and intellectual mode of existence. Man is εὐδαίμων inasmuch as he receives these divine attributes as gifts and draws himself nearer to God. In spite of changes of emphasis, the influence of Greek thought (and especially Plato) is evident.

Finally we note that Philo is sensitive to the protreptic force exercised by the call to εὐδαιμονία. Three of his treatises contain perorations which climax in the promise of a life of perfect felicity: *Contempl.*90 ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἀκρότητα φθάνον εὐδαιμονίας (the last words of the treatise), *Opif.*172, *Spec.*1.345 (combined with ἀθανασία). Philo's literary technique emulates the way that Plato climaxes his account of man's creation in *Tim.*90c-d.⁷

10.2. Woman and the lower animals (*Tim.*90e-92c)

10.2.1. Woman, posterior and inferior to man (90e-91a)

The inferior position of woman is indicated, according to Philo, by the fact that she is created posterior to man. The parallel between the Mosaic and the Platonic cosmogony in the place given to woman in the creational

sequence is immediately obvious, even if Eve is created out of Adam's side (Gen.2:21), in contrast to Plato's invocation of the doctrine of metempsychosis.¹ In the De opificio mundi Philo refrains from giving the details of woman's creation, saying no more than ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπλάσθη καὶ γυνή... (§151). In a manner wholly parallel to Plato's procedure in the Timaeus, and moreover consistent with Gen.2:24, Philo emphasizes that the creation of woman entails the beginning of human sexuality. The description of the process of ἔρως (§152) is clearly based on the playful speech of Aristophanes in the Symposium (cf. 191a, d, 192e-193a). In the Timaeus the same theory (derived from Empedocles) is set out in a less extravagant form in 91a-b. It is probable that a reading of the Timaeus prompted Philo to reproduce the theory of ἔρως from the Symposium straight after the creation of woman. Philo's extreme view in §152 that sexual desire is the ἀδολιχημάτων καὶ παρανοημάτων ἀρχή which converts man's life from immortality and bliss to mortality and misery finds support neither in the Timaeus (in 90e7 men are already δειλοὶ and ἄδικοι before woman is created) nor in Genesis.

Philo's deprecatory views on the female sex can only be understood if one recognizes that they are coupled to fundamental metaphysical, psychological and physiological assumptions (see above II 8.2.1.). Even so they do him little credit. See the competent analysis in Baer's monography (esp. 35-44, 87-88). Most commonly Philo allegorizes the relation between male and female into that between νοῦς and αἴσθησις. On the parallel between Plato's theory of metempsychosis and the results of Philo's allegorical method see the following sub-section.

Although the metaphor of the womb as fertile ploughland (ἄρουρα) is a commonplace in Greek literature (cf. LSJ ad loc.), Cumont 22 is correct in suggesting that the verbal resemblance between Aet.69 σπειρόντος μὲν εἰς μήτραν ἀνδρὸς ὡς εἰς ἄρουραν and Tim.91d2 ὡς εἰς ἄρουραν τὴν μήτραν ἀδρατα...ζῷα κατασπείραντες is sufficient to constitute an allusion (cf. also the use of Laws 838e at Spec.3.34, Contempl.62).

10.2.2. Men as animals (91d-92c)

The use of the theory of metempsychosis in his description of the creation of the lower animals enables Plato to emphasize strongly the difference between the ideal picture of human existence depicted in 90a-d and the mindless existence of the animals lower than man on the scale of being. A descending scale of ἄνοια is presented, beginning with the airborne and ending with the aquatic creatures. It is particularly Plato's description of the land animals which has struck Philo's attention, and in the following passages he exploits the deliberate contrast made by Plato in 90a and 91e.

Det.85: Man the οὐράνιον φυτὸν is compared with the other animals who were made with their heads fixed to the ground. Part of the passage analysed above in II 10.1.2.

Plant.16-17: As we saw above in the same sub-section, Philo describes the inhabitants of the earth in the Mosaic sequence plants→animals→man. Thus he must alter his adaptation of Tim.91e (and 90a) accordingly. Nonetheless a number of verbal parallels demonstrate his dependence on the Platonic passage:

τὰς κεφαλὰς ἀνεληκύσας ἀπὸ γῆς: Cf.91e7 τὰς κεφαλὰς εἰς γῆν ἐλκόμενα! The vocabulary is virtually identical, but Philo adapts it to the sequence plants→animals, instead of Plato's sequence man→animals.

ἐπὶ κεφαλὰς αὐχένος: Cf.91e8 προμήκεις...τὰς κορυφὰς.

ἐπὶ βᾶσιν: Cf.91e8 ἤρευσαν, also 92a3 βάσεις.

τοὺς ἐμπροσθίους πόδας: Cf.91e7 ἐμπρόσθια κῶλα. Plato's noun has no place in Philo's vocabulary, and so is altered.

In §17 the contrast between the other land animals and man is developed. The downwards directed vision of the beasts (τὰς ὄψεις κάτω κάμψας) is only implied in Plato. Philo makes it explicit in order to accentuate the contrast with man's upward vision.

Gig.31: Here Philo's use of Tim.91 is quite different, for he is concerned with the contrast between two types of men. Those who have received the divine spirit (exeg. Gen.6:3, cited in §19) are ἄσαρκοι καὶ ἀσώματος (cf. σάρκας in the Biblical lemma), and spend their days in contemplation in the theatre of the universe (Tim.90a translated in terms of the Phaedrus myth). Those who are weighed down by the flesh (cf. the text again) are unable to direct their vision to the οὐράνιοι περίοδοι (cf.90d2). Their necks are dragged downwards (κάτω δὲ ἐλκυσθεῖσαι τὸν αὐχένα, cf.91e7) and like four-footed beasts (δύκην τετραπόδων, cf.92a2) they stand rooted to the ground (i.e. in contrast to the way man's head should be rooted in the heavens, cf.90a8). Cf. also Her.78 where a similar contrast is made.

QG 4.111: (exeg. Gen.24:23, Abraham's servant asks Rebecca whether there is a place to stay in her father's house): 'Since he was embarrassed by modest shame lest he seem to boast too greatly and freely in believing that her lineage was heavenly and marvellous, he asks again immediately, "Is there indeed a place and space for us with the Father in the ether and heaven or, still higher, with their governor, the divine Logos? For being there, we should leave all mortal and corruptible things behind. Or shall we be altogether kept back and shut in, planted and rooted in the earth and with heads bent down as if we were trees on a cliff?"' Until the final phrase this passage is almost entirely parallel to the train of thought in Gig.31. The image at the end disturbs the Timaeus reminiscence, and may well be a gloss.

Anim.11: On this passage see below II 10.2.3.

In the first two of these texts the animals are given a place in the cosmic scale of being. We shall return to this theme in the following section. In the other two texts Plato's description of the earth-bound animals is transferred metaphorically to men who exercise no restraint over their irrational passions and appetites. Platonic metempsychosis is converted to Philonic allegory.

It is highly problematic whether Philo accepts the doctrine of metempsychosis in any form. Mostly he regards the soul as being created by God at man's birth (cf. Cher.114). But in a number of texts (Gig.12-13, Plant.14, Conf.77-82, Her.282-283, Somn.1.139) it is affirmed that incorporeal souls *descend* into bodies. Only once are we given the impression that it is a repeatable process (Somn.1.139 παλινδρομοῦσι). It would seem that these texts re-

present an aspect of Middle Platonist doctrine which Philo does not regard as entirely unacceptable, but which he has not bothered to integrate fully into his thought. See further the discussion at Baer 85-87. On the other hand, there is not a single text in Philo's writings which supports the theory of the transmigration of the human soul into the lower animals (cf. Wolfson 407-409; note also the explicit rejection by early Christian philosophers, e.g. at Justin Dial.4-5). In this Philo diverges from Middle Platonist tradition which continues to accept Plato's theory (cf. Tim.Locr.86, Alb.Did.26.5, Num.fr.49; after Plotinus the issue becomes controversial, see H.Dörrie, 'Kontroversen um die Seelenwanderung im kaiserzeitlichen Platonismus' Hermes 85(1957) 414-435). Presumably he sees it as an assault on the dignity of man, who as God's εὐκὼν has received a special place in the cosmic order.

But Philo is able, as we indicated, to achieve a similar effect through his method of allegorical exegesis. All references to beasts, birds and fish in the Biblical texts can be interpreted to represent the degrees of human wickedness and degradation which Plato punishes with transmigration into animals. In the context of Philo's use of Tim.91d-92c a particularly apposite example is found at QC 2.56. The quaestio is based on Gen.9:1-2, in which God blesses Noah and his sons and says, 'let the terror and fear of you be upon the beasts and the birds and the reptiles and the fish'. The four categories of animals - beasts, birds, reptiles and fishes - are allegorized in terms of the domination of the mind over the various passions and the bodily realm. The four categories are identical to those in the Timaeus, but Philo appears not to have used the thematic material which the dialogue offers. Moreover Plato speaks of descending degrees of ἀνοία and ἀμαθία of which the soul is capable (91d7,92a4-5,b1-2), not the relation between mind and the passions which must be brought under control. Nevertheless, when one considers that folly and ignorance automatically result in the loss of control over the irrational parts of the soul and the body, it is clear that the Platonic transmigration schema and the Philonic allegory achieve the same result.

Another interesting example of Philo's use of the idea of metempsychosis is found at Decal.80 (cf. Nikiprowetzky's note at FE 23.82). The Egyptians who worship animals deserve to be ridiculed and pitied. More wretched than the animals they honour, their souls have been transformed (μεταβεβληκότητας) into such animals and they wander about like wild beasts in human shape. μεταβάλλειν is the terminus technicus for the transformations that take place in the process of metempsychosis (cf. Tim.42c3,92c3). On the extremely common exegetical theme of the passions (or men who are controlled by the passions) as wild beasts, see above II 9.2.3.

Finally Plato's description of legless reptiles must be briefly noted. The more foolish the soul that has descended into animals, the greater the number of supports the animal is given to connect it to the earth. The legless reptiles have their whole body stretched on the ground, and so are lower on the scale of folly and ignorance than the four-footed and many-footed species (92a2-7). The applicability of Plato's description to the words which God speaks to the serpent in Gen.3:14, ἐπὶ τῷ στήθει σου καὶ τῇ κοιλίᾳ πορεύσῃ καὶ γῆν φάγῃ πάσας τὰς ἡμέρας τῆς ζωῆς σου, is evident. Philo allegorically interprets this verse according to his usual exegesis of the snake, i.e. not in terms of folly and ignorance, but to represent the enticements of pleasure which cause the soul to abase itself and grovel in the dirt (cf. the lengthy exegeses at Opif.157-166, Leg.3.65-199, Migr.66-69, QG 1.48). Two pieces of evidence indicate, however, that Philo was aware of the parallel between Moses and Plato.

(1) He takes over the rare verb ἔλυσπάζομαι which Plato uses (92a7) to describe the crawling or slithering motion of a worm or a snake, and applies it to the serpent or the pleasure which it symbolizes; cf. Agr.97 τὸν...τῆς γυναικὸς ὄφιν...ἡδονὴν εἶναί φασιν, ἔλυσπασμένην καὶ πολυπλοκωτάτην, ἀνεγερθῆναι μὴ δυναμένην, αἰεὶ καταβεβλημένην, ἐπὶ μόνα τὰ γῆς ἔρπουσαν ἀγαθὰ..., also Post.74, Spec.3.1, 4.113.

(2) Not only in Agr.97, but also in two other texts, Migr.64 and QG 2.69, Philo observes that reptiles cannot raise themselves up and contemplate the heavenly revolutions or taste the heavenly food (cf.90a,91e).

In Migr.64 Philo is engaged in giving exegesis of Lev.11:42, the prescription in the Mosaic dietary laws concerning reptiles, which in Migr.66-69 and Leg.3.139 is connected up with Gen.3:14 (cf. also Spec.4.113, QG 2.57 (exeg. Gen. 9:3)). For Greek and Roman intellectuals the Jewish dietary laws were an object of curiosity or ridicule (cf. Plur.Mor.669E-671C, Smallwood's note ad Legat.361). Already in the Letter of Aristeeas (§143-166) an allegorical explanation is put forward in their defence. It suits Philo's purpose well that he can demonstrate the reasonableness of one of these prescriptions by means of an implicit reference to Plato's placement of utterly foolish souls in the bodies of legless earth-bound reptiles. As Hecht SPh 6(1979-80)108-115 shows, Philo in his treatment of the dietary laws in Lev.11 is clearly dependent on earlier exegetical traditions. But, given the many other instances of Philo's use of Tim.90a-92c, we are entitled to conclude that the importation of ideas from the Timaeus is part of his own contribution.

10.2.3. The place of animals in the cosmic order

It was observed earlier in our Commentary that Philo finds support in Plato for a correlation between the elements/regions of the cosmos and the

various animal genera, for the conception of a fixed hierarchy of living beings in the cosmos, and also for the view that man is the climax of the creational account (II 1.3.1. 5.4.3.). In his explanation of the various types of animals and their relation to man in Opif.62-68, Philo can only draw on the Timaeus to a very limited extent, because the Platonic dialogue gives but a cursory account of the animal genera and the important questions on their place in the cosmos and their relation to man are answered only by implication. In Det.85 and Plant.16-17, as we saw above (II 10.1.2. 10.2.2.), Plato's scanty remarks in Tim.91d-92c are fully exploited.

The question which is of primary interest to Philo is whether animals can be said to possess reason (λόγος) or not, for the answer will determine the position of man in relation to the animals in the cosmic hierarchy. To this question he devoted an entire work, the De animalibus. This dialogue, one of the so-called philosophical treatises, has been until recently the least accessible of all Philo's writings to the modern reader, but now the excellent translation and commentary by Terian has cast a flood of light on it and shown what an interesting piece of work it actually is. In an introductory section (35-36) Terian demonstrates that the position defended by Philo against his nephew Alexander, namely that animals do not possess reason and have been placed under the dominance of man who alone possesses the rational spirit, is in line with Biblical and Judaic views, but in the dialogue is defended with arguments and examples drawn almost exclusively from the Stoics in their controversies with Academics and Sceptics.

Does the Timaeus, despite its brevity on the subject, make any contribution to the dispute? Alexander (or rather Philo who puts the words in his mouth) at any rate thinks so, for at the beginning of his speech he declares (§11):

Just as men ignore the weakness of women - as is common in every community whether in times of war or peace - and subjugate them only to themselves, considering the disadvantaged female sex unfit for state affairs, so, I think, when humans saw all the dumb animals bending downward to earth, whereas they themselves stood upright and erect upon the ground, they differentiated between their own good attributes and the condition of the dumb animals. And since their minds were elevated as well as their bodies, they held the earthly creatures in disdain. Reason is the best of things that exist, but they appropriated it to themselves as though they had received an irreversible reward from nature.

If these words have in more than one aspect a modern ring - they could almost be an extract from current literature of the women's or animals' liberation movement - one of the chief reasons is that they emphatically controvert the ontological/hierarchical/teleological picture of the universe established in the Timaeus.¹ The reference to the contempt held for animals who have their heads bent downward to the ground is a direct attack on Plato's representation

of man and the animals in Tim.90a,91e. Alexander implies that man creates his own hierarchies and abuses his own supremacy in order to do the animals injustice. His motto could be said to be the famous saying of Protagoras, 'man's mind is the measure of all things', quoted and attacked by Philo in Post.35 and elsewhere (see above II 3.1.3.n.2).

Thus we are not surprised to find that in the dialogue Philo corrects Alexander in a reprimanding tone (§100):

Let us now stop criticizing nature and committing sacrilege. To elevate animals to the level of the human race and to grant equality to unequals is the height of injustice. To ascribe serious self-restraint to indifferent and almost invisible creatures is to insult those whom nature has endowed with the best part.

Man is the only earthbound creature who has been made in God's image, or, in Platonic terms, possesses mind or rational soul (i.e. 'the best part'). Hence it is no less than sacrilege if one tries to *elevate* the animals to man's level (an obvious word-play, cf. Tim.90b1, Plant.17 ἀνῳρθωσεν, also used in §11 quoted above). Terian 49 cites some Platonic passages as antecedents for the views of Alexander. But he fails to mention how the overt anthropocentrism of the Timaeus gives powerful support for the opposite view and the detailed arguments provided by the Stoa.

10.3. Conclusion (Tim.92c)

10.3.1. Doxology to the cosmos (92c)

The eulogistic description of the cosmos which concludes Timaeus' speech (92c5-9) is a masterpiece of compression, picking up diverse themes and terms from earlier in the dialogue and welding them together into a final tribute to the cosmos' greatness. Especially imposing is the string of four superlatives, μέγιστος καὶ ἄριστος κάλλιστός τε καὶ τελεώτατος, of which only the first does not repeat earlier statements (cf. 29a5, 30b5-6, 68e2-3). The doxology to the cosmos thus forms a climax to the 'language of excellence' which Plato uses throughout the work, and which had such a strong influence on the way Philo depicts the cosmos both as a totality and as a sum of its parts (see above II 2.3.2.). Other aspects of these lines that have already been discussed are the language of the model (II 3.4.1.), the divinity attributed to the cosmos (II 4.2.6.), and the principle of plenitude (II 5.4.3.). Two points of detail remain yet to be discussed.

1. εὐκλῶν τοῦ νοητοῦ (92c7). As has already been noted above in II 2.3.3. 3.5.1. 10.1.5., a textual variant εὐκλῶν τοῦ ποιητοῦ is found in Stobaeus and

certain mss. Since this reading involves a total identification of the demiurge and his model which is nowhere else found in the Timaeus, it has been rejected by almost all editors (cf. A.E.Taylor, A commentary on Plato's Timaeus (Oxford 1928) 646-649, Brisson 155). It is not certain when the error crept into the manuscript tradition. Cherniss in a note on Plut.Mor.1007C-D, εἰκό-
νος δ' εἶσιν ἄμφω τοῦ θεοῦ, τῆς μὲν οὐσίας ὁ κόσμος τῆς δ' αἰδολότητος <ὁ> χρό-
νος..., suggests Plutarch may have read ποιητοῦ (he refers also to Aët.Plac.
1.7.4). Taylor op.cit.648 calls in Philo as support for the assertion that in
the first century A.D. the reading was still νοητοῦ. But the text which he
cites, Mos.2.65 (in which man is described as ἀντίμικτον γεγονὸς θεοῦ δυνάμει, εἰκὼν
τῆς ἀοράτου φύσεως ἐμφανής, αἰθέλου γενετή) is hardly to the point. A
more appropriate passage would have been Her.56, (ὁ ἄνθρωπος)... ἣ καὶ κατὰ τὴν
εἰκόνα τοῦ ποιητοῦ λόγος ἔχει τυπωθῆναι, the only place where Philo actually
uses the expression εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ/ποιητοῦ. Since in this passage, just as
in the one cited by Taylor, Philo is alluding to the double image theory which
he extracts from Gen.1:27, i.e. the εἰκὼν involved is not man or the cosmos
but the Logos, the specific reference must be considered doubtful. Thus we
cannot be sure which reading Philo found in his text. But we can be certain
that he would have been sympathetic to the reading εἰκὼν τοῦ ποιητοῦ, if he
was acquainted with it (cf. the other discussions in our Commentary referred
to above).

2. μονογένης (92c9). The word is ambiguous, for it can mean both 'unique
in its sort' or 'unique in its descent, only-begotten' (cf. Kittel TDNT 4.738
with many examples in Greek and Biblical literature). Philo never uses it,
perhaps because if taken in the second meaning he must reject it. According
to Deus 32 (cf. Spec.1.96) God has two sons, the elder the κόσμος νοητός, the
younger the κόσμος αἰσθητός (cf. above II 2.1.3. on Aët.15, Tim.50d4). More
often the Logos is God's (elder) son and is described as the πρωτόγονος (cf.
Agr.51, Conf.146, Somn.1.215 etc.). In Ebr.30 (exeg. Deut.21:18-21) Σοφία
gives birth to the cosmos as τὸν μόνον καὶ ἀγαπητὸν αἰσθητὸν υἱόν. This de-
scription assuredly recalls Tim.31b3, 50d4, 92c9. But the reader of Plato's dia-
logue will look in vain for a description of the relation between creator and
created product such as Philo conveys with the word ἀγαπητός.

APPENDIX TO PART TWO

PENTATEUCHAL TEXTS GIVEN EXEGESIS WITH REFERENCE TO THE TIMAEUS

As was already announced in the introductory chapter on method (I 5.1.), the way in which our Commentary has been structured according to the themes and sequence of the Timaeus has a serious disadvantage. It easily allows the exegetical basis of much of Philo's use of the Timaeus to be obscured. The ideal would be to present a second Commentary in the sequence of the books of Moses. But this is scarcely practicable. Instead we now give, by means of an Appendix, a list of all the Pentateuchal texts for the explanation of which Philo calls on ideas and texts from Plato's dialogue. The list is given in the accepted order of the books of Moses (chapter and verse numbered according to the Septuagint). After a brief description of the text and the aspect of the Timaeus relevant to it, two bracketed references are given. The first (sometimes not applicable and thus deleted) refers to the directly relevant Timaeus text. The second refers to the sub-section(s) of the Commentary where the exegesis of the text is discussed or cited. If Philo's use of this text is confined to one or two passages in his works this location is also given. In every case the reader is advised to consult the relevant sub-section of the Commentary for a more detailed discussion.

Genesis	The title of Moses' first book and the fundamental division of reality (28a)(2.1.1. on <u>Opif.</u> 12).
Gen.1-3	The Mosaic <u>κοσμογονία</u> and the 'programme' of the <u>Timaeus</u> (27a) (1.3.1. on <u>Opif.</u> 82, <u>Praem.</u> 1). The goodness of the creator (29e) and the use of the names <u>θεός</u> and <u>κύριος</u> (3.1.1.).
Gen.1-2:3	The seven days of the Mosaic creation account and the didactic explanation of the Timaeian cosmogony (2.1.3.). Three days of <u>αἰών</u> , three days of <u>χρόνος</u> (cf.37d)(5.3.2. on <u>Her.</u> 165).
Gen.1:1-5	The first day of creation. 'Day one' represents the <u>κόσμος νοητός</u> as model or plan for the creative act (3.4.1-4. on <u>Opif.</u> 16-25). The contents of the <u>κόσμος νοητός</u> extracted from Gen.1:1-2 (8.2.2. on <u>Opif.</u> 29-35).
Gen.1:1	<u>ἐν ἀρχῇ</u> and the problem of creation and time (2.1.4. 5.3.1.).
Gen.1:1-2	Alternative exegeses which allow room for pre-existent unformed matter (cf.30a)(3.2.3.).
Gen.1:3-5	Darkness/light and the change from disorder to order (cf.30a) (3.2.1. on <u>Spec.</u> 4.187).

- Gen.1:4 Separation and the change from disorder to order (30a)(3.2.1. 3.2.3. on Plant.3).
- Gen.1:6-8 The second day of creation.
The transition to three-dimensionality and corporeality in the creation of heaven (4.1.1. on Opif.36-37).
- Gen.1:9-13 The third day of creation.
Problems in the Platonic creational sequence avoided (cf.77a-c); everything in readiness for man (9.3.4.).
- Gen.1:14-19 The fourth day of creation.
A problem in the creational sequence not a matter of contingency (cf.34c) but for didactic reasons (5.1.1. on Opif.45-46).
The extensive parallels between Moses and Plato on the creation of the heavenly bodies (5.4.1.).
Reflection on the creation of the heavenly bodies leads to an encomium of light and sight (cf.47a-c)(7.2.3. on Opif.53-54, Plant.118).
- Gen.1:20-23 The fifth day of creation.
The creation of fishes and birds in the creational sequence (2.1.3. 5.4.3. 10.2.3. on Opif.62-68).
- Gen.1:24-31 The sixth day of creation.
The creation of land-animals and man in the creational sequence (2.1.3. 5.4.3. 10.2.3. on Opif.62-68).
Why was man created last? - encomium of sight (cf.47a-c), attack of the πᾶσι (7.2.3. 9.2.1. on Opif.77-79).
- Gen.1:26 Why is the creation of man attributed to more than one creator? (cf. the 'young gods' in 41aff.)(6.2.1.).
- Gen.1:27 The first of Moses' two most important anthropological texts - the double account of man's creation and the Platonic doctrine of man (10.1.2. 10.1.5.).
- Gen.1:31 The goodness of the creation and the goodness of the creator (cf.29e)(3.1.1.).
- Gen.2:1-3 The seventh day of creation.
What can God's rest mean? (cf. the retirement of the demiurge in 42e)(6.3.2.).
- Gen.2:2 The seven days of the creation account and the problem of time (5.3.1. on Leg.1.2).
- Gen.2-4 The dynamics of man's structure explored in the Allegory of the soul (7.1.3.).
- Gen.2:6 The symbolism of the spring watering the face of the earth in terms of mind, senses, face (cf.44c-45a)(7.2.1. cf.7.1.3.).
- Gen.2:7 The second of Moses' two most important anthropological texts - the double account of man's creation and the Platonic doctrine of man (10.1.2. 10.1.5.).
The incarnation of the νοῦς in the body as part of the Allegory of the soul (cf.42eff.)(7.1.3.).
Man formed from earth and the borrowing of the elements (cf. 43a)(7.1.1.).

- The symbolism of God's breathing into man's face (7.2.1.).
 God's inbreathing and the theme of συγγένεια (10.1.6.(2)).
- Gen.2:8 The creation of Paradise and the praise of creator and created product (cf.29a)(2.3.2. on QC 1.6).
 The garden of Eden and the law-giving of the demiurge (cf.42d) in the Allegory of the soul (7.1.3.).
- Gen.2:10-14 The four rivers of paradise and the cardinal virtues (cf.42d) in the Allegory of the soul (7.1.3.).
 The rivers as virtues and the parts of the soul (9.2.2. on Leg. 1.63-73, QC 1.13).
- Gen.2:14 The river Tigris and the wild beast of the irrational soul (9.2.3.(5) on Leg. 1.69).
- Gen.2:17 The death of the soul and Platonic metempsychosis (cf.42bff.) in the Allegory of the soul (7.1.3. on Leg. 1.100-108).
- Gen.2:18 Man's 'helpers' as αἰσθησις and πάθη in the Allegory of the soul (7.1.3. on Leg. 2.1ff.).
- Gen.2:21 Potential and actual αἰσθησις in the Allegory of the soul (7.1.3. 7.2.2.).
- Gen.3:12 The dependence of the mind on the senses in the Allegory of the soul (7.1.3.).
- Gen.3:14 The serpent as symbol of pleasure and the parts of the soul (9.2.2. on Leg. 3.114-116).
 The slithering motion of the serpent (cf.92a)(10.2.2.).
 The theme of earthly and heavenly food (cf.90c)(10.1.6.(4)).
- Gen.3:22 Divine plurality and the hierarchy of recipients of knowledge (2.4.1. on QC 1.54).
 Divine plurality and the creation of man (6.2.1.).
 God's lack of envy as seen in the creation of the cosmos (cf. 29e-30a)(3.1.2. 3.2.1. on QC 1.55).
- Gen.3:24 The Cherubim symbolizing the revolution of the heavens (cf.36 c-d)(5.2.1.).
 The 'turning' sword and the 'turning' of the celestial bodies (5.2.1. 5.4.2.).
 The Cherubim symbolizing the two powers and thus God's goodness (cf.29e)(3.1.1.).
- Gen.4:1 Cain's mistake in his use of prepositions (3.4.5.).
- Gen.4:3 Cain's sacrificial offering and the first fruits (1.2.1. on Sacr. 52ff.).
- Gen.4:7 Cain's failure to make clear-cut distinctions when he attributes evil to God (3.1.4. on Agr. 128-129).
 The theme of division in a creational context (3.2.1. on QC 1.64).
- Gen.4:10 Abel's blood and the implications for man's psychology (10.1.2. on Det. 79-90).
- Gen.4:13 Cain recognizes how calamitous it is when God loosens the bonds of the soul (6.1.1. on Conf. 166).

- Gen.4:14 Cain's thought that he might escape from God is cosmologically absurd (4.2.1. 5.4.3. on Det.153-155).
- Gen.4:16 When Cain 'goes out' it cannot mean that he leaves the cosmos (cf.58a)(7.1.1. 8.3.2.).
- Gen.4:25 The birth of Seth as the turning point in the Allegory of the soul (7.1.3.).
- Gen.6-8 Noah's flood, the theme of natural disasters (cf.22aff.) and the macro-structure of the Pentateuch (1.2.2.).
- Noah's flood and the allegory of the body, the soul and the passions (cf.43a-d)(7.1.2.).
- Gen.6:2 The 'angels of God' and the animal genera (5.4.3. on Gig.6-11).
- Gen.6:3 Man's '120 years' numerically discloses the double scale of arithmetic and geometric progression (cf.35a)(5.1.1. on QG 1.58).
- Men of the spirit and men of the flesh (like animals, cf.91e) (10.2.2. on Gig.31).
- Gen.6:5-7 God's apparent repentance and the nature of time and eternity (cf.37d)(5.3.2. on Deus 31-32).
- Gen.6:7-8 God's mercy and judgment, the theme of mixture, and the theory of vision (cf.45b-d) and hearing (80b)(7.2.2. 9.1.1.).
- Gen.6:8 The grace found by Noah and the goodness of the creator (cf. 29e)(3.1.1-2 on Leg.3.78, Deus 108).
- Gen.6:16 Noah's ark and the providential structure of the body (cf.73a) (9.3.1. on QG 2.7).
- Gen.7:4 The creator will not forget his own purpose (cf.41a-b)(6.1.1. on QG 2.15).
- Gen.8:1 The wild beasts in the ark and the wise man's passions (9.2.3. on QG 2.27).
- Gen.8:6 The window of the ark symbolizes the sense of sight which enables man to philosophize (cf.47a-c)(7.2.3. on QG 2.34).
- Gen.8:11 The leaf brought back by the dove symbolizes a small residue of antiquity (cf.23c)(1.2.2. on QG 2.43).
- Gen.8:22 God's words to Noah prove that the cosmos is indestructible (cf. 41a-b)(6.1.1. on Aet.19).
- Gen.9:1-2 Man's domination over animals symbolizes the domination of νοῦς over the passions (10.2.2. on QG 2.56).
- Gen.9:6 Man made in 'the image of God' and the theme of ὁμοίωσις (cf. 90d)(10.1.6.(3) on QG 2.62).
- Gen.9:20 Noah's planting of the vineyard impels the 'phyto-cosmological excursus', in which numerous references to the Timaeus are incorporated (3.2.1. 3.4.1. 4.2.1. 5.4.3. 10.1.2. etc.).
- Gen.10:9 Nimrod the hunter and the bestial passions (9.2.3. on QG 2.82).
- Gen.11:5 'The Lord comes down' must not be taken literally, for God fills all things (cf.34b,36e)(5.1.3. on Conf.136).
- Gen.11:7 The plural verb, man's creation, and the theme of punishment (6.2.1. on Conf.168-183).
- Gen.12:1-9 Abraham's quest, as φιλομαθής, for the promised land (10.1.6. (1)).

- Gen.14:2 The one city of the Pentapolis which was not destroyed in the conflagration symbolizes the sense of sight (cf.47a-c)(7.2.3. on Abr.156-164).
- Gen.15:2 Etymology of the word δεσπότης used by Abraham to address God in terms of cosmic δεσμός (6.1.1. 6.1.4. on Her.23).
Etymology of Damaskos leads to a problem concerning man's psychology (10.1.2. on Her.54-57).
- Gen.15:5 God's command to Abraham to count the stars leads Philo to recollect 41d,47a-c (5.2.2. 6.3.1. 7.2.4.).
- Gen.15:6 The epistemological implications of Abraham's 'trust in God' (cf.29b-d)(2.4.1. on Praem.28-30).
- Gen.15:9 The she-goat and the etymology of αἴσθησις (cf.43c)(7.1.2. on Her.126, QG 3.3).
- Gen.15:10 Abraham's division of the sacrificial victims impels Philo to a long excursus on the theme of division and the activity of the λόγος τομεύς, in which many ideas from the Timaeus are utilized (3.2.1. 4.1.1. 5.4.3. 8.3.1. etc.).
The fact that Abraham does not divide the birds symbolizes an important parallel between the structure of the macrocosm and the microcosm (5.2.1-2 on Her.230-236, QG 3.3).
- Gen.15:15 Abraham's fathers and the fate of the soul after death (7.1.1. 10.1.3. on Her.280-283, QG 3.11).
- Gen.15:18 The symbolism of the river (cf.43a)(7.1.2. on Her.315, Somm. 2.255).
- Gen.16:2 Hagar is Egyptian by race, meaning that encyclical studies involve the body and the sense of sight (7.2.3. on Congr.21).
- Gen.16:6 God is not an afflictor, for he has no share in envy (3.1.2. on Congr.171).
- Gen.16:11 Ishmael, meaning ἀκοή θεοῦ, indicates the lesser value of hearing relative to sight (cf.47a-e)(7.2.3.).
- Gen.16:16 Abraham is 86, and 80 contains the double scale of arithmetic and geometric progression (cf.35a)(5.1.1. on QG 3.38).
- Gen.17:1 God's statement that he is Abraham's God leads to reflection on the creation of man (6.2.1. on Mut.30-32).
- Gen.17:12 Circumcision and the role of parents in creation (6.2.3. on QG 3.48).
The arithmological symbolism of circumcision on the eighth day (5.1.1. 8.3.1. on QG 3.49).
- Gen.17:21 Isaac's birth 'in another year' indicates not χρόνος but αἰών (cf.37d)(5.3.2. on Mut.267).
- Gen.18:6 The three measures of wheat-flour and the theme of measurement (3.1.3. 8.3.1. on Sacr.59, QG 4.8).
- Gen.18:11 Sarah, the virtue-loving mind, is not born from the ὕλη αἰσθητή (8.2.1.(2) on Ebr.60-61).
The women's quarters (cf.70a)(9.2.3.(4) on QG 4.15).
- Gen.18:20 Gomorrah, meaning 'measure' and the divine Logos by whom all things are measured (3.1.3. on QG 4.23).
- Gen.19 The destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, the theme of natural disasters (cf.22aff.) and the macro-structure of the Pentateuch (1 2.2.).

- Gen.19:20-25 See above on Gen.14:2.
- Gen.20:12 See above on Gen.18:11.
- Gen.22:23 Etymology of Milcah and the science of astronomy (5.4.2. on Congr.50).
- Gen.24:3 The theological implications of Abraham's double invocation (2.2.1. on QG 4.87).
- Gen.24:22 Ten drachmas, the Logos and the harmony of the ennead (5.1.3. on QG 4.110).
- Gen.24:23 Rebecca's heavenly lineage (cf.90a,91c)(10.2.2. on QG 4.111).
- Gen.25:25 Esau is πρωτότοκος, not πρωτόγονος, because he is the offspring of female matter (cf.50d etc.)(8.2.1. on QG 4.160).
- Gen.25:26 Isaac's age of 60 years, the parts of the cosmos, and the Zodiac (cf.55c)(8.3.2. on QG 4.164).
- Gen.26:8 The loveplay of Isaac and Rebecca in cosmic perspective (3.3.1. on QG 4.188).
- Gen.26:26 Abimelech, Ochozath, Phicol and the three parts of the soul 9.2.2. on QG 4.195⁷).
- Gen.28:2 Jacob flees to Mesopotamia, the torrent of life's river (cf. 43a)(7.1.2. on Fug.49).
- Gen.28:12 The cosmological symbolism of Jacob's ladder (5.4.3. 6.1.3. on Somm.1.134-141).
- Gen.28:17 The house of God as the Logos, the gate of heaven as the transition from the sense-perceptible to the intelligible cosmos (2.3.3. on Somm.1.188, 5.1.3. on Migr.6).
- Gen.28:21 For Jacob the Lord will be God, i.e. the source of bounteous blessings (cf.29e)(3.1.2. on Plant.91).
- Gen.30:42 Jacob's marked or speckled sheep and the ordered structure of the cosmos (2.2.1. 3.2.1. 6.3.1.(5) on Fug.8-13).
- Gen.31:13 God who alone stands and established the cosmos (3.2.1. on Somm.1.241).
- Gen.32:10 Jacob crosses the river Jordan, which means 'descent' (cf.43a) (7.1.2. on Leg.2.89).
- Gen.32:29 Israel means 'seeing God', an etymology which underlines the importance of sight (cf.47a-c)(7.2.3.)
The ἀστεῦς should emulate the bountifulness of God (cf.29c) (3.1.1. on Mut.46).
- Gen.37:16 The flocks of Joseph's brothers and the senses and passions of the irrational soul (9.2.3. on Det.25).
- Gen.38:7 Er, meaning 'leathern', symbolizes the body as the corpse which the soul must bear (7.1.3. on Leg.3.69-74).
- Gen.38:16 Judah the φιλομαθής goes into Tamar symbolizing virtue (10.1.6 (1) on Congr.125).
- Gen.38:18,25 The symbolism of Tamar's seal points to the role of the model in creation (3.2.1. on Mut.135, Somm.2.45).
- Gen.48:15-16 The religious dimension of the gift of health (9.4.1. on Leg.3.177-178).

- Ex.3:14-15 God's name and the relation between time and eternity (cf.37d) (5.3.2. on Mut.11-12).
- Ex.5:2 Pharaoh necessarily recognizes the creator but not God as Lord (2.2.1. on QG 4.87).
- Ex.7:1 The (relative) divinity of Moses, given by God as a god to Pharaoh (10.1.4.).
- Ex.7:15 Pharaoh stands at the edge of the river which symbolizes the passions (cf.43a)(7.1.2. on Conf.29-30, Somm.2.278).
- Ex.12:11 The girdle symbolizes control of the passions and esp. the wild beast of desire (cf.70e)(9.2.1. 9.2.3.(5) on Leg.3.151-159, QE 1.19).
- Ex.12:23 The 'destroyer' and the opposed cosmic and psychic powers (8.1.1. on QE 1.23).
- Ex.13:9 The soul should not be flooded by the Nile, the Egyptian river of the passions (7.1.2. on Somm.2.109).
- Ex.13:12 The womb and women's quarters for ourselves, the males and men's quarters for the Lord (9.2.3.(4) on Sacr.103).
- Ex.14:7 Six hundred chariots of the Egyptians and the six movements of the body (4.2.5. on Ebr.111).
- Ex.14:27 The Egyptians, lovers of body, are drowned in the Red sea, the stream of the passions (cf.43a)(7.1.2. on Conf.70).
- Ex.15:17 The sense-perceptible cosmos as God's holy dwelling place (2.1.1. on Plant.50).
- Ex.16:4,15 Manna as heavenly food (cf.90c)(10.1.6.(4)).
- Ex.16:23 The institution of the sabbath in the desert and the loss of knowledge through natural disasters (cf.22aff.)(1.2.2. on Mos.2.263).
- Ex.17:6 God's 'standing' excludes the seven movements (cf.34a,43b)(4.2.5. on Conf.139).
- Ex.17:11 The raising and lowering of Moses' aims in the battle against Amalek symbolizes the conflict in the soul (7.1.3. on Leg.3.186).
- Ex.20 The Decalogue.
- Ex.20:3-6 First and second commandment.
Rejection of worship of the cosmos and the heavenly bodies (4.2.6. 6.2.2. cf.2.2.3.n.1).
- Ex.20:7 Third commandment.
Swear not by God but by the unageing cosmos (4.2.2. on Spec.2.5).
- Ex.20:8-11 Fourth commandment.
The sabbath, the hebdomad and the heavenly revolutions (cf.36 c-d)(5.2.1. on Decal.102-104).
The sabbath and God's $\theta\epsilon\omega\pi\acute{\iota}\alpha$ (cf.42e)(6.3.2. on Cher.87, Decal.96ff.).
- Ex.20:12 Fifth commandment.
Honour for parents as subordinate creators (6.2.3.).
- Ex.20:17 Tenth commandment.
Desire and the trilocution of the soul (cf.70e)(9.2.2. on Spec.4.92-94, cf.5.4.3.n.2).

- Ex.20:21 Moses enters the cloud, God's unknowability (cf.28c)(2.2.3.).
- Ex.21:12-14 The law on manslaughter, God's responsibility for evil and the creation of man (cf.41d-42d)(6.2.1. on Fug.68-72).
- Ex.21:26 The servant's eye and the excellence of sight (cf.47a-c)(7.2.3. on Spec.3.184-192).
- Ex.24:6 Moses and the mixing bowls (6.3.1.(1)).
- Ex.25:1-2 God's ἀπαρχαὶ and parents as accessory causes of creation (6.2.3. on Her.115).
- Ex.25:9 The παράδειγμα of the tabernacle shown to Moses and the model of creation (2.3.1. 3.4.4.).
- Ex.25:11 The golden twined wavelets and the turning of the heavenly bodies (5.2.1. on QE 2.55).
The wavelets and the running stream of the body and the tempest of life's course (7.1.2. on QE 2.55).
- Ex.25:22 God's speaking from between the Cherubim and the divine Logos (3.4.4. 4.1.1. 5.1.3.).
- Ex.25:31-39 The lampstand as symbol of heaven (4.2.3. 5.4.2. 8.3.2.).
- Ex.26:1-14 The curtains of the tabernacle and the image of weaving (6.3.1. (5)).
- Ex.26:18-25 50 pillars and the right-angled triangle (8.3.1. on Mos.2.80).
55 pillars and the numbers of Plato's cosmic soul (5.1.1. on a new fragment).
- Ex.26:28-30 The symbolism of the tabernacle and the Logos (4.1.1. on QE 2.90).
- Ex.27:1 The height of the altar and the location of anger as evil counsellor in the chest (9.2.1. on QE 2.100).
- Ex.28:21 The twelve stones of the High priest's breastpiece, and the phylarchs as constellations and heavenly plants (cf.90a)(7.2.4. 10.1.1. on QE 2.114).
- Ex.28:28 The high priestly robe and the Logos as δεσμός (4.1.1. on QE 2.118).
- Ex.28:30 The piece of cloth named δῆλωσις (attached to the reason-seat) and the nature of time (5.3.1. on Spec.1.88-90).
- Ex.28:32 The opening (περυστόμιον) in the high priestly robe and the role of the mouth (cf.75d-e)(9.3.2. on QE 2.118).
- Ex.28:34 The high priestly robe, the elements and the Logos (4.2.8. on QE 2.120).
- Ex.28:36 The seal-impression in the gold plate worn on the High priest's forehead and the νοητὴ οὐσία (3.4.2. on QE 2.122).
- Ex.28:38 The leaf on the High priest's forehead and the location of the ἡγεμονικόν (cf.45a)(7.2.1. on QE 2.124).
- Ex.31:2-4 Bezalel, the construction of the tabernacle, and the creation of the cosmos (3.4.4. cf.10.1.2.).
- Ex.32:16 God as θεσμοθέτης (cf.42d)(6.3.1.(4) on Her.167).
- Ex.33:13-23 Moses on the mountain and man's knowledge of God (cf.28c)(2.2.3. on Spec.1.32ff., cf.3.2.1. on Spec.1.48).
- Ex.35:30-35 See above on Ex.31:2-4.

- Lev.1:6 The sacrificial animal of the whole burnt-offering, the cosmos as animal, and thanksgiving to the creator (2.3.2. 3.3.1. on Spec.1.210).
- Lev.2:14 The offering of first fruits and the newness of learning (cf. 22b)(1.2.1. on Sacr.76-79).
- Lev.3:3-4 The preservation offering and the location of the ἡγεμονικόν (7.2.1. on Sacr.136, Spec.1.213).
The preservation offering and the role of the liver (cf.71a-e) (9.2.4. on Spec.1.216-219).
- Lev.3:17 Blood should not be eaten, an injunction based on Mosaic psychology (10.1.2. on Spec.4.123).
- Lev.6:20 The priestly offering of a tenth of the ephah of flour and the divinity of the cosmos and the Logos (4.2.6. on Congr.103).
- Lev.7:31-34 The part of the offering that accrues to the priests (the fat around the chest) and the trilocution of the soul (9.2.2. on Spec.1.146).
- Lev.11:42 The injunction in the dietary laws concerning reptiles and the lowly place of these animals in the cosmic hierarchy (10.2.2.).
- Lev.17:11 Blood as the soul of all flesh and Mosaic anthropology (10.1.2.).
- Lev.19:16 The ruler should imitate the beneficence shown by God in creation (3.1.1. 3.2.1. on Spec.4.186-188).
- Lev.19:23-25 The fruit that is ἀντίδοτος τῷ κυρίῳ and the praise that created things owe their creator (2.3.2. on Plant.126-131).
- Lev.19:32 The 'hoary' in relation to the elder and the new (1.2.1. on Sacr.77).
- Lev.21:10 The High priest 'puts on the garments', symbolizing the Logos's relation to the cosmos (5.1.3. on Fug.110-112).
- Lev.23:15-16 The feast of Weeks 50 days after the feast of the Sheaf and the right-angled triangle (8.3.1. on Spec.2.177).
- Lev.26:10 The old and the new (cf.22b)(1.2.2. on Sacr.79).
- Num.12:1 The Ethiopian woman and blackness (cf.68c)(9.1.1. on Leg.2.67).
- Num.13:22 Hebron and Zoan, soul and body (5.1.1. on Post.62).
- Num.22:31 Balaam an earthly beast, not a heavenly shoot (cf.90a,91e)(10.1.1. on Deus 181).
- Num.23:7 Balaam dwells in Mesopotamia, his understanding is submerged (cf.43a)(7.1.2. on Conf.66).
- Deut.4:19 The heavenly beings must not be worshipped (6.2.2. on Spec.1.15).
- Deut.4:39 'God' in heaven above and on the earth below', the doctrine of the powers, God's goodness (3.1.2. on Migr.182-183).
- Deut.5:5 Moses and the Logos as mediator (5.1.3. on Her.206).
- Deut.5:6-21 The Decalogue; see above on Ex.20.
- Deut.8:2-3 God not afflictor but benefactor (3.1.2. on Congr.171).
Manna and the Logos as God's most generic word (5.1.3. on Leg. 3.175).
- Deut.16:9-16 See above on Lev.23:15-16.

Deut.17:2-5	Polemic against those who worship the heavenly beings (4.2.6. on <u>Spec.2.255</u>).
Deut.18:3	The part of the offering that accrues to the priests (the maw) and the trilocution of the soul (9.2.2. on <u>Spec.1.148</u>).
Deut.21:18-21	Father and mother in a cosmic context (2.2.2. 10.3.1. on <u>Ebr.30</u>).
Deut.23:2	The expulsion of eunuchs from the holy congregation and a materialist philosophy (2.2.1. 3.2.1. on <u>Spec.1.327-329</u>).
Deut.23:4	The expulsion of Ammonites and Moabites from the holy congregation and the champions of the mind and the senses (cf.47a-c) (7.2.3. on <u>Spec.1.336,339</u>).
Deut.23:12-14	A place outside the camp, bodily necessities and control of the passions (9.2.1. on <u>Leg.3.151-159</u>).
Deut.23:18	No occult rites and mysteries in the holy congregation (7.2.3. on <u>Spec.1.322</u>).
Deut.25:13-15	God as the right and just measure (3.1.3.n.2 on <u>Somn.2.192-194</u>).
Deut.28:12	See above on Ex.16:4,15.
Deut.32:6	God as Father (cf.28c)(2.2.2. on <u>Conf.145</u>).
Deut.32:32-33	Gomorrhah, 'man the measure of all things', God the true measure (3.1.3.n.2 on <u>Somn.2.192-194</u>).

The list which we have compiled can be tabulated in order to give an impression of the frequency with which Philo calls on the Timaeus in order to explain the various parts of the Pentateuch. In the following table the first figure indicates the number of times the Timaeus is used, the second figure the average frequency per chapter of Biblical text (the symbol $\pm$ means 'approximately', the symbol $<$ 'less than').

Genesis	1-3	The account of creation	49	± 16
	4-11	From Adam to Abram	29	$\pm 3\frac{1}{2}$
	12-23	The story of Abraham	28	± 2
	24-27	The story of Isaac	6	$\pm 1\frac{1}{2}$
	28-36	The story of Jacob	9	± 1
	37-50	The story of Joseph	5	< 1
Exodus	1-12	The Israelites in Egypt	6	< 1
	13-18	From Egypt to Sinai	9	$\pm 1\frac{1}{2}$
	19-24	The giving of the Law	10	± 2
	25-40	The plan and construction of the tabernacle	23	$\pm 1\frac{1}{2}$
Leviticus		The prescriptions of the Law	15	< 1
Numbers		The wanderings of the Israelites	4	< 1
Deuteronomy		The Law and the Mosaic exhortations	18	< 1

It goes without saying that the statistical precision of the table is quite deceptive. No allowance is made for the relative weight of the Timaeus application (the crucial reading of Gen.1:1-5 in terms of the model is given the same statistical value of one unit as the distant reference to Tim.45a when Philo explains the leaf on the High priest's forehead in Ex.28:38). Moreover it must be taken into account that, partly due to the vagaries of textual transmission, Philo explains certain parts of the Pentateuch much more thoroughly than others (esp. Gen.1-28, the Decalogue and related laws, Ex.22-28). The results of the above table are analysed below in III 1.6.

PART THREE

SYNTHESIS

CHAPTER ONE

THE MANNER OF PHILO'S USE OF THE TIMAEUS

The task of collection, comparison and analysis has been completed. It is time now to make a synthesis of the results we have gained. Taking our cue from the demiurgic creator, we must reduce the chaos of hundreds of allusions and references to the Timaeus, whether detailed or fleeting, explicit or vague, to a semblance of order. It is possible to do this in a number of ways and from a number of angles. In this first chapter our approach will be primarily *philological*, concentrating on manner and method of usage. The task before us will be to reach some conclusions on the extent of Philo's acquaintance with the Timaeus, on the preferences he has for certain parts of the dialogue, on the distribution of the use of the Timaeus through his entire body of writings, and on the relation of that usage to the exegesis of Mosaic scripture. In the chapters that follow the aspects of philosophical content and historical context (of interpretation) will come to the fore.

1.1 The extent of Philo's acquaintance with the Timaeus

Scholars are divided on the extent to which Philo was familiar with the writings of Plato in general, and with the Timaeus in particular. The most favourable judgment which I have come across is that Philo knew Plato's writings 'almost by heart'. This view certainly entails that he must have had an intimate knowledge of the best-known of Plato's works, the Timaeus, and that he would have read and consulted it in the original.¹ At the other end of the spectrum is the opinion that Philo had no first-hand acquaintance with the Timaeus at all, but derived his knowledge of its contents either from more recent philosophers (e.g. Posidonius), or from handbooks and doxographies.² These two views represent the two extremes; intermediate positions are naturally also possible. What conclusions can be reached on the basis of the evidence

which we have accumulated?

It cannot be denied that the occasions on which Philo quotes, paraphrases or refers directly to the Timaeus are relatively infrequent. This can readily be seen in the following list which contains all the examples found in the Corpus Philonicum. First the location in the Commentary where the passage is discussed is given, followed by the Philonic reference, the Timaeus text cited and, finally, the words of introduction which precede (or occasionally follow) the quoted or paraphrased text. (The difference between quote and paraphrase we take to be that in the former the attempt is made to reproduce Plato's words verbatim, whereas in the latter this is not considered necessary.)

Quotes

1. 2.1.2. Prov.1.21 Tim.28b4-c2 'And a little earlier he indicated his opinion on the genesis (of the cosmos) as follows' (a continuation of the earlier quote in Prov.1.20).
2. 2.3.2. Plant.131 Tim.29a5 ὡς ἔφη τις.
3. 2.3.2. QG 1.6 Tim.29a5-6 'just as Plato said'.
4. 2.3.3. Prov.1.21 Tim.29b1-2 'And so he says' (follows the two earlier quotes).
5. 4.2.2. Aet.25-26 Tim.32c5-33b1 μαρτύρια δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν Τιμαίῳ περὶ τοῦ τὸν κόσμον ἄνοσον εἶναι καὶ μὴ φθαρησόμενον τάδε· ... τοῦτο μὲν δὴ παρὰ Πλάτωνος πρὸς τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν τοῦ κόσμου μαρτύριον εἰλήφθω.
6. 4.2.4. Aet.38 Tim.33c6-d3 δὲ καὶ Πλάτων εἶ... φησίν.
7. 5.1.1. New fragment Tim.35b4-5 '...which Plato mentions in the Timaeus with reference to the construction of the soul, beginning thus'.
8. 5.3.1. Prov.1.20 Tim.38b6-7 'Furthermore on the subject of the dissolution of the cosmos and the condition of its creatures the Greek sage Plato himself speaks in the Timaeus thus'.
9. 6.1.1. Aet.13 Tim.41a7-b6 γενητὸν δὲ καὶ ἀφθαρτὸν φασιν ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος ἐν Τιμαίῳ δηλοῦσθαι διὰ τῆς θεοπροποῦς ἐκκλησίας, ἐν ᾗ λέγεται πρὸς τοὺς νεωτέρους θεοὺς ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου καὶ ἡγεμόνος.
10. 10.1.2. Plant.17 Tim.90a6 ὡς ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος.

Paraphrases

11. 1.2.3. Aet.146 Tim.22c1-2 ...φασίν.
12. 1.2.4. Aet.141 Tim.24e6-7, 25c6-d6 ἡ φησιν ἐν Τιμαίῳ Πλάτων.
13. 3.1.1. Opif.21 Tim.28c3, 29e1 ὅπερ καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων εἰπέ τις.
14. 4.2.2. Aet.21 Tim.33a3-5 (not introduced).
15. 5.3.1. Aet.52 Tim.37e1-2 ἡ φησιν ὁ μέγας Πλάτων.
16. 7.2.3. Opif.54 Tim.47a7-b2 (not introduced).
17. 9.3.2. Opif.119 Tim.75d5-e2 ὡς ἔφη Πλάτων
18. 9.3.2. QE 2.118 Tim.75d5-e2 'As Plato says'.

Other direct references

19. 2.1.3. Aet.15 ...ὅτι διὰ παντὸς τοῦ συγγράμματος (i.e. the Timaeus mentioned at §13) ...καλεῖ.

20. 4.2.3. Prov.2.56 cf. Tim.33b-c 'We encounter in the Timaeus of Plato an admirable encomium praising the perfect shape of the sphere...'

The twenty instances of quotation, paraphrase and direct reference which have been located do not form a particularly high number when one takes into account the considerable bulk of the Philonic corpus.³

The first feature of the above list to which we wish to draw attention is that it reveals a difference of procedure between Philo's exegetical and philosophical treatises.⁴ If the quotation in the recently rediscovered fragment is left out of account,⁵ twelve examples are found in the philosophical treatises, De aeternitate mundi and De Providentia, and only seven in the exegetical treatises. Of the latter group three are located in the De opificio mundi, two in one of the treatises (De plantatione) of the Allegorical Commentary, two in the Quaestiones in Genesim et Exodum, and none at all in the Exposition of the Law. Moreover a further difference between these two groups can be observed. Whereas in the philosophical treatises Philo does not hesitate to mention Plato's name and discuss his views in a direct way, in his exegetical works he tends to avoid mentioning the philosopher's name. Only three exceptions have been found: Opif.119 (part of a long arithmological excursus), QE 2.118 (the same literary embellishment), QC 1.6. This conclusion is reinforced when the thirteen examples of quotations and paraphrases of Platonic works other than the Timaeus are added to the above list.⁶ In the exegetical treatises Philo shows a distinct preference for introducing direct references to Plato's writings by means of anonymous phrases such as $\omega\varsigma \epsilon\phi\eta \tau\upsilon\varsigma, \phi\alpha\sigma\acute{\iota}$ and so on. Also less direct allusions to the Timaeus are often introduced with impersonal phraseology.⁷ In the philosophical treatises Philo's manner is more direct. In all cases, however, whether references to the Timaeus are made anonymously or not, the appeal to Plato is made in a positive sense.⁸ He is the Greek sage, one of the ancients, in a word 'the great Plato'.

The ten occasions on which Philo directly quotes the Timaeus allow some observations on his manner of dealing with the text of the dialogue. There can be little doubt that his intention is to reproduce Plato's actual words - that is, he does not wish deliberately to emend them - but in our analysis we found that his quoted versions diverge quite often from the transmitted text of Plato, on the average a little less than once every one and a half lines of quoted text.⁹ Most of these differences are admittedly of a trivial nature. Moreover the text to which Philo had access, whether at first or second hand, certainly would have possessed readings which differ from the manuscript tradition as it has come down to us.¹⁰ It is probable, however, that most of these divergences are due to two concomitant causes. Firstly Philo, like all ancient authors, tends to rely on his memory when quoting Plato's words.¹¹

Only one of the quotations from the Timaeus (no.5) is of such a length that consultation of the text must be considered likely.¹² Secondly, when quoting Plato, he appears to adopt the same curiously casual attitude which can be seen in his references to the (in his eyes) far more authoritative Biblical text (a phenomenon which has caused scholars much concern).¹³ Indeed the result of such an attitude is that the entire distinction between quotation and paraphrase in practice becomes rather blurred. Two consequences follow for the constitution of the Philonic text. The practice of indicating quotations by means of quotation marks is on a number of occasions adopted with insufficient care.¹⁴ More importantly, the method of emending Philo's quotes on the basis of the Platonic textual tradition, begun by Turnebus and continued by Mangey and Cohn-Wendland, should be subjected to a careful re-evaluation.¹⁵

A final observation prompted by the list of quotes and paraphrases is the conventional, indeed almost predictable nature of its contents. All these references are to sections of the Timaeus that were exceedingly well-known and frequently cited by other authors (an exception could be made for the literary allusion to 75d-e, but that could easily be drawn from a collection of Platonic 'bon mots'). If our judgment was based on these passages alone, one might be inclined to conclude that Philo's direct acquaintance with the contents of Plato's dialogue was no more than superficial.¹⁶

But if the protracted length of our commentary has shown one thing, it is that the quotes and paraphrases so far discussed do not give an accurate picture of the extent of Philo's knowledge of the Timaeus. We discovered time and time again that Philo was in the habit of alluding to the Timaeus or utilizing its terminology, imagery or doctrines without giving his readers the slightest direct indication of their source. Such copious use compels the conclusion that Philo had read and continued to read the original text closely and attentively. Decisive philological proofs in such matters are always difficult to give. The clearest, in our view, are the various occasions on which we observed how certain Biblical texts 'trigger off' his memory and cause him to recollect passages from the Timaeus which can help him in his exegesis.¹⁷ The facility with which he uses the distinctive Platonic 'language of excellence' in praise of the 'creator and his handiwork' is another indication of his familiarity with the text of the dialogue.¹⁸ Also the fact that he should attribute to divine Providence precisely those aspects of the construction of the human body in which Plato too recognized the forethought of the demiurgic 'young gods' we considered to be no coincidence.¹⁹ Such points of detail help to alleviate the fear, already given expression in the introductory part,²⁰ that our search for the subtleties of Philonic usage might involve us in a methodological circularity.

It will be apparent by now that we are persuaded that we must side with those scholars who maximize Philo's knowledge of the Timaeus against those who tend to minimize it. The evidence at our disposal – and it is abundant enough – points to the conclusion that Philo had direct access to the actual text of the dialogue and was intimately acquainted with its contents. But two supplementary remarks must immediately be appended to this conclusion. It does not mean to suggest that Philo did not use secondary material of diverse kinds, which will have enriched his understanding of the work and certainly will have assisted him in recollecting its contents. Secondly, an unqualified assertion that Philo knew the Timaeus 'almost by heart' is not very helpful, because it overlooks the fact that some parts of the dialogue were more important, and thus also more familiar, to him than others.²¹ To this subject we now turn.

1.2. Priorities – which parts of the Timaeus are most used?

The evidence which we have gathered together in Part II of our study suggests that, if by chance Philo had had access only to that part of the Timaeus which Cicero translated as a preliminary exercise for his projected De Universo (27d6-47b2),¹ the influence of the work on Philo's thought need not have been greatly diminished. Virtually all the important ideas and doctrines which Philo draws from the dialogue are located in the approximately one-third of Timaeus' speech which introduces the fundamental philosophical principles (27d-29d) and describes the works of reason performed by the demiurge and his assistants up to and including the (partial) creation of man (29d-47e).² Two other passages outside this main section are also extensively used, the first elucidating man's psychological make-up (69a-72d), the second describing man's true end and his place in the cosmos and its hierarchy of living beings (89d-92c). For the main features of the dialogue's introductory part (17a-27d), the travels of Solon and the myth of Atlantis, Philo finds a number of applications, but these are unrelated to what he does with the rest of the work.³ The remainder of the Timaeus is put to less intensive use. Even with regard to the most influential part (27d-47e) we can observe certain points of concentration, notably the basic philosophical principles (27d-29d), the act of creation (29e-31b), the discussion on time (37c-38b), the address of the demiurge to the 'young gods' (41a-d), the creation and descent of man's leading part (41b-44c), the encomium of sight and philosophy (47a-e). The determinative thrust of Philo's theocentric and anthropocentric interest is easily recognized.

It is also possible to look at the same question from the opposite point

of view. Which parts of the Timaeus does Philo refer to comparatively infrequently or not at all? At 48b Plato announces with much emphasis that he needs to embark on a fresh start. But the distinction between νοῦς and ἀνάγκη, which is introduced at 48a and is primarily responsible for the break in the account at this point, has made little impact on Philo, with the result that these structural niceties remain untouched.⁴ The following section (48c-53c), in which Plato valiantly endeavours to explain what he means by his conception of the receptacle and applies the results to the cryptic description of the 'act of creation' at 30a, is remarkably little used by Philo.⁵ The philosophical subtleties of the geometric construction of the elements are, if perceived at all, certainly not exploited.⁶ Only occasionally does Philo refer to the many physical and physiological theories which Plato crams into the second half of the work.⁷ As we shall see, the Timaeus is for Philo primarily a philosophical textbook, not a handbook of natural science. In the parts which Philo uses more intensively there are also notable omissions, such as the celebrated remark on knowledge concerning the demiurge (28c), the creation of the cosmic soul (35a), the distinction between αἴτια and συναιτία (46c-d).⁸ But these omissions are in each case not absolute, and explanations for Philo's reticence can be found without difficulty. Indeed one of the more surprising results of our analysis is that there are pretty well no important aspects of the Timaeus to which Philo does not refer in some way or another, whether merely superficially or with greater penetration. It is, we consider, another proof of his direct acquaintance with the dialogue's contents. The argument of Wilson that Philo's knowledge of the Timaeus was limited in scope because there are themes in it which he would never have omitted had he known of them is entirely lacking in cogency.⁹

A word must be said about Philo's use of the Timaeus in comparison with his reading of other Platonic dialogues. The fact that Philo quotes and paraphrases the Timaeus more often than the rest of Plato's works put together is a clear indication of the dialogue's central role in his reading of Plato.¹⁰ The dominance can easily be explained. Philo's central interest is in theology, cosmology and the doctrine of man, banishing other aspects of Platonic philosophy such as dialectics, epistemology, logic, eristics and politics to the periphery.¹¹ In the questions concerning the creation and structure of the cosmos and of man no other Platonic work can add much, in Philo's view, to what the Timaeus has to say.¹² But naturally other facets of Platonic doctrine, especially in the areas of ethics and eschatology, impinge on its contents. Above all the Phaedrus myth, with its veiled description of the ascent of the soul and the contemplation of the noetic world, complements the Timaeus for Philo in an important way.¹³ If for the Neoplatonists the whole of Plato's

θεωρία was contained in the Timaeus and the Parmenides, for Philo we might change this to the Timaeus and the Phaedrus myth, and we would not be far from the mark.¹⁴ Only for the subject of higher theology are these works found wanting, and Philo turns to the doctrines found in the Republic.¹⁵ Other important passages in the Platonic corpus which supplement and shed more light on Philo's reading of the Timaeus are Phaedo 67-81 (duality of soul and body), 96-101 (Socrates' autobiography), Republic 379-381 (τύπου περὶ θεολογίας), 434-441 (psychology), books 6 & 7 (the images of the sun and the cave, the sciences and dialectic), Symposium 189-193 (Aristophanes' speech), Theatetus 176 (ὁμοίωσις), 191 (epistemology), Laws 821 (astronomy), 896 (the two souls).¹⁶

Two aspects of the intertwining of the Timaeus with other Platonic dialogues in Philo's usage can be briefly mentioned now, but a detailed discussion will be left to later.¹⁷ Often in interpretations of passages from the Timaeus parallel doctrines and terms from other dialogues are introduced. This is the result of the Middle Platonist hermeneutical method of interpreting Plato by means of Plato. Secondly, the passages of Plato which Philo considers important for philosophical purposes – with regard to literary usage the situation is less clear-cut – all belong to the limited part of Plato's oeuvre which supplied the pillars on which the edifice of Middle and Neoplatonism was built.

A large part of the Timaeus is concerned with what we describe today as the realm of natural science. Plato was eager not only to incorporate in his work the very latest results of scientific research, but also to advance these researches if possible.¹⁸ But much of what was up to date in 360 B.C. was well and truly superseded by the beginning of our era. Does Philo use the Timaeus as a sourcebook for scientific knowledge?¹⁹

Although his understanding of mathematics was certainly equal to the task,²⁰ Philo makes no effort to discuss at any length the mathematical aspects of natural science which play such a fundamental role in the Timaeus.²¹ Mathematics is converted into arithmology – a process which we shall discuss in the next paragraph. Astronomy is the area of science where Philo's debt to the Timaeus is the greatest (it was also the area in which Plato's science was the least out of date). He understands the technical terms used by Plato to describe the movements of the heavenly bodies and adds others not used by Plato, but no doubt found in handbooks which explained the details of his highly compressed and difficult account.²² Many aspects of the physiology and medical science which Plato presents in the Timaeus must have seemed archaic in the light of the great advances of Hellenistic science. Philo's policy is occasionally to recount Plato's theories when it suits him, but more often either

to update them or replace them with more modern views.²³ The Platonic theory of vision is used at Deus 79, but elsewhere the Stoic theory prevails.²⁴ For his information on nutrition and respiration Philo does not turn to the Timaeus.²⁵ When relating the purely physiological function of the liver Philo uses the results of current research, but what Plato has to say on this organ is helpful too, for it shows that the liver also has an important task in man's psychic and mental life.²⁶ As soon as the subject of psychology is broached, the authority of the Timaeus is welcome, not least because Plato relates the doctrine of the soul so clearly to both ethics and epistemology.²⁷ So our conclusion must be that Philo does not exploit the Timaeus as a scientific textbook. Its value to him is that it allows the results of natural science to be placed in a philosophical framework. The Timaeus has taught him to appreciate the rational and teleological design of both the macrocosm and the microcosm.²⁸ But far and away the most important lesson that the dialogue had to teach was that the results of natural science must be seen in a correct perspective. Being concerned with the world of sensible phenomena, natural science cannot pass beyond the probable, it will never gain access to the 'plain of truth'.²⁹ It must be kept properly in its place, but the implications of this relativizing of its pretensions are not the same for Philo as they are for Plato.³⁰

More difficult to evaluate is Philo's interpretation of the Timaeus in terms of arithmology.³¹ If mathematical doctrines from the Timaeus are found in Philo's writings, it is always in the context of an arithmological exposition.³² Also a number of its non-mathematical themes can be pressed into service.³³ In this way Platonic doctrines are used to shed light on numerical aspects of the Pentateuch and Jewish tradition. As Moehring makes quite clear, arithmology for Philo is primarily an 'exegetical tool'.³⁴ Thus, for example, the central role which is assigned by Moses to the hebdomad in the creation of the cosmos and the maintenance of cosmic order can be illustrated with reference to the work of one of the greatest Greek philosophers.³⁵ The Pythagorean tradition in which also the Timaeus has a place is not abandoned, but Philo discards mathematics in favour of arithmology. The change is less drastic than might at first appear, for arithmology, no less than mathematics, wants to demonstrate the ordered, *rational* nature of noetic and sensible reality in universal terms.³⁶ It cannot be denied, however, that the change involves a considerable loss in subtlety (not least because there is now no room for *irrationality*), as well as an open invitation to the kind of manipulative juggling which makes the whole procedure seem to the modern reader quite pseudo-scientific.³⁷

On a number of occasions in the Commentary we were confronted with the

question of sources.³⁸ Arithmological observations involving use of the Timaeus were found to be paralleled in other authors who drew on the considerable body of ancient arithmological literature.³⁹ Into this tradition a number of doctrines from the Timaeus had been absorbed for illustratory purposes.⁴⁰ Philo's references to the mathematical doctrines of the Timaeus are thus most likely prompted by his acquaintance with arithmological literature, rather than by a precise recollection of the original text.⁴¹ Interestingly, however, at Opif. 89-128 he *deletes* a reference to the Timaeus which his source certainly contained, because the reference to the cosmic soul does not rhyme with his exegesis of the seven days of creation.⁴² The interpretation of aspects of the Timaeus in terms of arithmology is also encountered in the learned Middle Platonist, Plutarch.⁴³ Clearly Philo's adoption of this procedure was not only exegetically useful, but followed intellectually respectable, perhaps even rather fashionable trends of his day.

1.3. Distribution - where is the Timaeus used?

In the analysis which kept us occupied in Part II of this study, passages were collected from right throughout the Corpus Philonicum and coerced into the artificial straightjacket of our Commentary. If we release them from their bondage, as it were, and allow them to return to their original location, what can be concluded about the distribution of Philo's overt and covert references to the Timaeus throughout his writings? Starting-point for this exercise must be the five-fold division which we judged the most convenient way of classifying Philo's long list of treatises, namely the three groups of exegetical treatises, the philosophical and the apologetic/historical writings.¹

The De opificio mundi holds the same special place in Philo's writings as the first chapters of Genesis do in the Pentateuch. It can be said to be the start of both the Allegorical Commentary and the Exposition of the Law.² Only here does Philo give a direct exegesis of Moses' account of the creation of the cosmos.³ It is hardly surprising that the most pervasive use of the Timaeus is to be found in this treatise. But also the opening treatises of the Allegorical Commentary, which deal with the creation and structure of man in the complex language of psychological allegory, lean heavily on Plato's account of the descent of the soul into the body. In the remainder of the Allegorical Commentary it is particularly the career of Abraham, who as symbol of μάθης journeys from astrology and cosmos-worship to recognition of the creator, that induces Philo to draw illustratory material from the Timaeus.⁴ Much depends on the nature of the Biblical themes discussed. The De gigantibus, for example,

has been described as a 'more than usually Platonic treatise',⁵ but its account of the soul's ascent to the spiritual dimension of being (derived from exegesis of Gen.6:1-4) results in the influence of other dialogues such as the Phaedo, Phaedrus and Republic being more perceptible than that of the Timaeus.⁶ The associative concatenation of Philo's exegetical method allows him to range far and wide.⁷ Utilization of the Timaeus is generally found when Philo introduces reflections on the structure of the cosmos and its parts and their relation to God the creator into the variegated tapestry of his exegesis. This can occur at the most unlikely places.⁸ On a number of occasions Philo likes to dwell on a theme and draw out its implications at such length that one can speak of an excursus (or even a digression). Three examples of this practice - Det.79-90, Plant.1-27, Her.133-214 - are of special interest because of the skilful way in which Philo has incorporated important material from the Timaeus in them.⁹

The Exposition of the Law concentrates, as its name indicates, on the nomothetic aspects of the Pentateuch, but the word law is taken in wider sense than that to which we are accustomed. First the βίαι of the Patriarchs and Moses, lived according to the ἄγραφος νόμος, are presented, followed by a discussion of the Decalogue as generic laws and the Special Laws as species.¹⁰ Our evidence has pointed to the conclusion that the influence of the Timaeus is somewhat diminished in this part of Philo's exegetical writings. Such diminution is not felt in the De Abrahamo because of the typology of the learner in search of God.¹¹ Moreover it is not surprising that the Timaeus is adduced to explain and illustrate aspects of the first and second, third, fourth, fifth and tenth commandments,¹² for the universal perspective of these generic laws are closely related to cosmological and anthropological structures. But in long sections of the Exposition of the Law Philo's Platonizing tendencies are set in a rather low relief. Heinemann in his study of the De specialibus legibus was struck by the fact that Philo's strong dependence on Plato comes so little to the fore in these treatises.¹³ We find ourselves in agreement with the German scholar, with the reservation that in his quest for legal interpretations he insufficiently emphasized the importance of allegorical *symbolism* in these works, which once more enables Philo to give particular Judaic customs and legal prescriptions a universal 'philosophical' connotation.¹⁴ Philo's exegetical procedures, when related to the texts he is commenting on, often appear to possess an element of caprice. One of his most lyrical passages, Spec.184-194, in which the thematics of Tim.47a-c are worked out in extravagant detail, is set in motion by the injunction in Ex.21:26 that a man who knocks out the eye of a male or female slave must let him or her go free.¹⁵ Clearly the philosophical excursus is an indication that the symbolic value of

the legal injunction is more important than its practical consequences. This attitude is perfectly defensible. Nevertheless one is left with the feeling that it would never be possible to predict when Philo's flights of philosophical inspiration will actually occur.¹⁶

Turning now to the Quaestiones in Genesim et Exodum, we are confronted with a quite different situation. These treatises can appropriately be described as the Cinderellas of Philonic scholarship. No doubt the indirect and faulty transmission of the works had discouraged scholars from taking their evidence into full account in studies of Philo's thought.¹⁷ But this is not the full reason. The reader who turns from the other exegetical writings to the Quaestiones encounters a change in style which is rather disconcerting, even if it should not be exaggerated. Though in recent times considerable advances have been made in the study of these works,¹⁸ on the major questions of Philo's intentions in writing them and their relation to his other works firm conclusions are still lacking.¹⁹ The results furnished by the evidence we have collected may help in this evaluatory task. In our Commentary we had occasion to refer to the Quaestiones on numerous occasions, comparatively at least as often as to the Exposition of the Law.²⁰ Philo's broad acquaintance with Greek culture, emphatically including its philosophical aspects, is displayed in the Quaestiones no less than in the other writings.²¹ But it was constantly experienced that the references to the Timaeus and its many themes lacked the resonance and clarity found in the other exegetical works. In large part this is the result of the method of the quaestio. Adhering strictly to the Biblical lemma which supplies the problem, it functions as an independent exegetical unit and is almost never complemented with references to other texts.²² Philo apparently feels less inclination to integrate the material he incorporates, so that themes and references enter and depart in a staccato fashion. The result is a curious kind of cataloguing effect.²³ Thus, for example, the passages in Genesis which discuss the destructions of the earth by water and fire are dealt with at great length, indeed almost verse for verse, but the correlation with Tim.22 which provides 'philosophical' integration at Abr.1-2, Mos.2.52-53 is not made.²⁴ The frequent occasions on which the Quaestiones in Genesim run parallel to the Allegorical Commentary also supply revealing comparative material.²⁵ We found at least seven examples where themes related to the Timaeus were used in a parallel way in both series.²⁶ It emerges that in the treatment given in the Quaestiones the relation of the exegetical application to the philosophical doctrines in the background is much less clearly delineated. On the other hand a number of important texts were found which have not been given the attention they deserve.²⁷ Of especial interest for our study was the section at QE 2.50-124, in which Philo gives a long and highly detailed

symbolic exegesis of Ex.25-28. The tabernacle and its furnishings symbolize the worlds of noetic and sensible reality and their component parts.²⁸ The influence of the cosmology of the Timaeus is perceptible surprisingly often,²⁹ and particularly in those cases when the exegeted scriptural lemma causes Philo to recall Plato's actual words.³⁰

If the Quaestiones were the Cinderellas, then the group of five philosophical treatises can with justification be described as the Pariahs of Philonic scholarship. Banished for a while from the domain of authentic works altogether, they were soon rehabilitated, but were only consigned a place on the very fringes of Philonic research.³¹ The evidence which they supply is only gradually being integrated into our picture of Philo as a many-sided writer and thinker.³² The essential difference (as far as we are here concerned) between these treatises and Philo's other works has already been indicated, namely that in the philosophical treatises Philo does not hesitate to refer to Plato and discuss his views in a direct fashion.³³ By this we do not mean to suggest, however, that these works are purely 'academic' exercises on Greek philosophy and the views of famous philosophers, as will become quite clear in our further discussions of the De aeternitate mundi and De Providentia I & II below. The use of the Timaeus in the philosophical treatises is closely related to the nature of the subject under discussion.³⁴ In the De aeternitate mundi it is pervasive, in the De Providentia important but rather sporadic, in the De animalibus infrequent,³⁵ in the Quod omnis probus sit virtually nonexistent.³⁶ Also in the apologetic/historical treatises the nature of the subjects discussed is determinative, with the result that the influence of the Timaeus is negligible.³⁷

Our conclusion on the distribution of utilization of the Timaeus in Philo's works must therefore be that, with all due allowance made for areas of special concentration, there remains a surprisingly uniform spread throughout the whole corpus. The reason for this relative regularity has been seen to lie in the nature of Philo's exegetical method of commenting on scripture. Accordingly the observations which we have made in this section will gain in depth when we proceed to examine more closely the various kinds of ways in which Philo puts his knowledge of Plato's dialogue to use. But first it will be worthwhile to look a little more closely at a number of treatises (or parts thereof) where use of the Timaeus has been particularly concentrated.

1.4. Treatises (or parts thereof) demanding special attention

(a) De opificio mundi

Philo's treatise 'On the creation of the cosmos according to Moses'¹ is without doubt the best-known and most frequently read of his writings. In his Introduction to Philo Judaeus Goodenough affirms that in his opinion the De opificio mundi is the most difficult of Philo's treatises. Its position at the beginning of all editions of Philo is unfortunate, he suspects, in that 'its difficulty has only too often made it the last as well as the first for a reader to attempt'.² I agree with the American scholar that the treatise is difficult. It is important, however, to circumscribe in precise terms what the nature of its difficulty is.

Certainly the structure of the work and the author's intentions in writing it do not cause the problems. Philo even helps his reader along with unusual explicitness in §4-6. No one can do justice to the beauties of thought contained in the creational account, but nevertheless he himself must try. He will say nothing of his own, and only a few things instead of the many contained in it, namely those to which the human understanding is likely to attain when possessed with love and desire for wisdom. Philo thus makes it abundantly clear that he intends to comment on the words of Moses and adhere closely to the Biblical account.

We find this intention wholly confirmed when the structure of the work is examined. In the following table the italicized words refer to structural features, while the parts in normal type recall those parts of the work which we saw to be under the influence of the Timaeus in our Commentary (to which the bracketed numbers refer).

§1-6	<i>introduction</i>	
§7-12	<i>preliminary comments</i>	
	§8 Moses as philosopher (1.1.2.)	
	§7-11 creation and divine Providence (2.1.3.)	
	§12 being and becoming, the two worlds (2.1.1.)	
§13-14	<i>the scheme of the seven days introduced</i>	
	§13-14 the notion of sequential creation (2.1.3.)	
§15-35	<i>'day one' (creation of the noetic cosmos)</i>	
	§15 introductory (3.4.4.)	
	§16-20 formation of the model (2.3.1. 3.4.1-4.)	
	§21-23 the goodness of the creator (3.1.1-3.)	
	§21-22 the act of creation (cf. §8-9) (3.2.1.)	
	§25 the εὐκὼν relation (10.1.5.)	
	§26-28 creation and time (2.1.3.)	
	§29-35 the contents of the noetic cosmos (8.2.2.)	
§36-37	<i>second day (creation of heaven)</i>	
	§36-37 transition to solidity and corporeality (4.1.1.)	

- §38-44 *third day (creation of earth and botanical world)*
 §38ff. Mosaic sequence superior to Plato's (9.3.4.)
- §45-61 *fourth day (creation of heavenly bodies, praise of tetrad)*
 §45-46 the implausibilities of the creational sequence (5.1.1.)
 §45-61 creation of the heavenly bodies and description of their function (5.4.1.)
 §53-54 encomium of light (7.2.3.)
- §62-63 *fifth day (creation of fish and birds)*
 §62-68 creation of the genera of animals (5.4.3.)
- §64-88 *sixth day (creation of land animals and man)*
 §62-68 creation of the genera of animals (5.4.3.)
 §69-71 creation of man - first account (10.1.5.)
 §72-75 *quaestio* - why does God use helpers? (6.2.1.)
 §77-88 *quaestio* - why was man created last?
 §77-81,82 creational sequence (1.3.1. 9.3.4.)
 §77-78 encomium of philosophy (7.2.3.)
 §79 beginning of the passions (9.2.1.)
- §89-128 *seventh day (in praise of the hebdomad)*
 (incidental references in the arithmological catalogue, cf. 5.1.1. 9.3.2.)
- §129-139 *concluding summary and recapitulation*
 §134-139 creation of man - second account (10.1.5.)
- §140-169 *'proto-history' - man's fall (also allegorized)*
 §144-151 συγγένεια, ὁμολῶς θεῷ (10.1.6.)
 §151 man's initial aloneness (3.5.1. 10.1.6.)
 §151-152 the creation of woman (10.2.1.)
- §170-172 *conclusion - Mosaic 'credo'*
 §171 unicity of the cosmos (3.5.1. cf.4.2.1.)
 divine πρόνοια (2.1.3.)
 §172 εὐδαίμονία (10.1.6.)

The table shows that the structure of the treatise is perfectly comprehensible if one perceives that Philo follows the narrative of Gen.1-3 and superimposes his own elucidatory comments. In these three themes predominate.

(1) The scheme of the six days of creation enables Philo to present an arithmological symbolic exegesis which does justice to the patent τάξις of the cosmos.³

(2) The correspondences between Moses' cosmogony and the *Timaeus* are heavily exploited in order to demonstrate not only that the cosmos was created as the result of God's goodness, but also that the creational sequence can tell us much about its hierarchical structure and about the nature and functioning of its parts.

(3) In the Biblical account the scheme of the seven days ends at Gen.2:4. The parallels with the *Timaeus* can be continued beyond this point.⁴ After making some use of them to expound Gen.2:7 (§134-139) Philo surprisingly chooses another course, namely the perspective of proto-history.⁵ The first man was

created good in every way, but soon decline set in, beginning after the creation of woman.⁶

It must be concluded, therefore, that the influence of the Timaeus is profound and pervasive, extending to almost every section of the De opificio mundi. If the arithmological sections are left out of consideration we can say that in the task of supplying background philosophical and scientific information the Timaeus and its interpretative tradition hold virtually a monopoly position.⁷ Also the interaction with the other two main themes is interesting. In certain respects the contribution of the Platonic dialogue runs parallel to the numerical symbolism. At §13-14 the two in fact converge, for the scheme of seven days is described in terms reminiscent of the *δουδασκαλίας* *χρόνου* interpretation of the Timaeus.⁸ Elsewhere they can conflict, as at §62-68, where the Platonic doctrine of the four *γέννη ζώων* causes Philo to cover with silence the separation between the works of the fifth and sixth day.⁹ The final part of the treatise is *mutatis mutandis* comparable with the way that Plato might have continued his trilogy, had he written it.¹⁰

In spite of these observations, however, it is pellucidly clear that it was never Philo's intention to write a cosmogonic/cosmological account in the way that Plato did. The character of the work is determined by its loyalty to the sequences of the Mosaic text.¹¹ In the detailed explanations of the various events described by Moses the account is easy to follow, but the overall framework remains elusive and uncertain from the philosophical point of view.¹² A highly significant indication in this respect is the fact that Philo does not follow the Timaeus in talking of the cosmos as a self-contained whole composed of body and soul. Indeed, after discussing the noetic exemplar created on 'day one', he turns straight to the creation of the heaven on the second day. The unicity of the cosmos is only briefly mentioned at the end of the treatise and its sphericity is not mentioned at all.¹³

The question thus remains. If the character and structure of the treatise are readily comprehensible, why did we find ourselves in agreement with Goodenough that it is a difficult work? The answer must be sought in the clearly perceptible tension between the detailed unfolding of the cosmogonic account and the possibility of finding in it integration and systematic coherence. To what extent is Philo attempting to suggest solutions to philosophical problems in the course of his explanations? Here judgment is required on the part of the reader, for on this aspect of his aims Philo leaves him wholly in the dark. We may be quite certain that the wider implications of his subject did not escape him. Witness the introductory remarks at §7-12, which place the doctrine of genesis in correct perspective, and the exposition and defence of noetic exemplarism in §16-25.¹⁴ But what about the contents of the

noetic world outlined in §29-35? Here we were not persuaded by the elaborate speculations of Wolfson, Winston and Reale based on this section.¹⁵ Also Philo's treatment of the double account of man's creation was found difficult. The anthropology of the Timaeus proved to be an integrating factor, but many problems, instigated by the Biblical text, remained.¹⁶ One is impelled to predict that this treatise will long be the subject of fruitful controversy.

(b) Legum allegoriae

The relation between the De opificio mundi and the treatises which follow it in all editions of Philo's works,¹⁷ the Legum allegoriae, is highly problematic and has long been the subject of scholarly debate.¹⁸ Clearly Philo regards the Mosaic account of creation as extending to the end of Gen.3. Otherwise he would not have included the story of Adam and Eve in paradise as part of the De opificio mundi. But the Legum allegoriae also deal with the story of Adam and Eve, beginning the commentary at Gen.2:1. The reason for this surprising overlap is, to our mind, straightforward. The prime focus of the Legum allegoriae is the allegory of the soul. It is logical that this allegory can only commence once man, the composite of body and soul, has been created on the sixth day.¹⁹ The resultant overlap between the two treatises therefore by no means results in needless repetition. It ensures that the influence of the Timaeus can extend in a most important way beyond the De opificio mundi into the Allegorical Commentary. In an important section of our Commentary it was shown that Philo's allegory of the soul is given philosophical relief by means of the significant parallels he finds between Gen.2-4 and Plato's account of the creation and subsequent career of the soul in Tim.41c-44d.²⁰ Not only is Philo able in the De opificio mundi to indicate man's place in the macrocosm and describe his *structure* as created composite of soul and body under the guidance of mind, but in the Legum allegoriae he can concentrate on the microcosm and expose the *dynamics* which are consequent upon man's structure, as the rational part of the soul is bombarded with the impressions furnished by the senses and must struggle against the passions that result from the conjunction with the body. The transition is, in short, from a cosmological to an anthropological/ethical perspective. Philo has perceived a parallel in the mythical elements which are undeniably present in both Plato's account of the soul's descent and the story of Adam and Eve.²¹ The creation account does not only refer to events which occurred in illo tempore, but can be shown to be directly relevant to the psychological and spiritual processes that take place in the life of every human being. We must admire, I think, the creative and elegant manner in which Philo, using all the resources of his allegorical method, is able to exploit the parallel and locate Platonic psychology and

even aspects of the physiology of the Timaeus in the various details of the Biblical narrative.²²

(c) De plantatione 1-45

At regular intervals in the Commentary our attention was drawn to the 'phyto-cosmological excursus' (our title) with which Philo commences the De plantatione, for the sound reason that it contains many themes ultimately derived from the Timaeus. Philo is inspired by the Mosaic word ἐφύτευσεν (Gen. 9:20) to embark on a lengthy description of the cosmos in terms of a giant plant. What sparked off this metaphorical tour de force cannot be considered certain, but it is in our view more likely to have been the resonance of Biblical and Platonic imagery than the appropriation of a Posidonian source.²³

In contrast to the De opificio mundi the cosmos is described in this passage as a whole. Philo uses language reminiscent of the model of the Timaeus to describe the whole and its parts, but the idea of a paradeigmatic exemplar in God's mind is set aside.²⁴ The emphasis is on a *description* of the cosmos rather than an account of creation. The language of creator and created product is, however, emphatically retained. The κοσμοπλάστης establishes order out of disorder and fixes the place of the four elements.²⁵ The cosmos can only be perfect if made of perfect parts, that is if all the elements are used up in its construction.²⁶ The question why the cosmos does not sink is from the viewpoint of the Timaeus unnecessary; it is prompted by developments in Stoic cosmology.²⁷ The four elements are kept in position not by the δεσμός of mathematical ἀναλογία as in the Timaeus, but by the δεσμός of the divine Logos which stations itself between the elements and, taking over also the functions of the Platonic cosmic soul, supervises their unending cycles of change.²⁸ Turning then, just as Plato did, to the animal genera which inhabit the elemental regions, Philo expands the simple scheme of Tim.39e, adding fire-born creatures to heaven (?) and demons or angels to the air. Platonic cosmology is updated and made more complete.²⁹ Last of all the life-forms belonging to the element earth are portrayed. In describing plants, land-animals and man, Philo skilfully adapts Plato's famous words at Tim.90a and 91e.³⁰ The climax of the excursus is thus a brief outline of a doctrine of man (§17-27).³¹ Adducing the primary anthropological texts, Gen.1:27 & 2:7, Philo emphasizes that man is related not to the ether, but to God the creator through the mediation of the Logos.³² Man's mind can speed away past the bounds of the cosmos to God as Uncreated Being (τὸ ἀγένητον, τὸ ὄν), as is indicated by the Biblical texts in which Bezalel and Moses are 'called up'.³³ Returning thus to the Planter-Creator with which he started, Philo brings his 'phyto-cosmological excursus' to a close.³⁴

At this point one might have thought that the plant metaphor was exhausted, but that is not at all the case. Philo immediately proceeds to a 'phyto-anthropological' section (§28-45). Also man the microcosm can be described as a plant, possessing growths and shoots capable of bearing fruit. Philo makes grateful use of the theme of the Garden of Eden, which can be suitably allegorized. The parallel with the Legum allegoriae is apparent, although the manner of organization is considerably altered.³⁵

The above outline cannot possibly do justice to the rich elaboration of this Philonic passage, but it does allow us to draw a number of important conclusions. Repeating as it does the basic division between the De opificio mundi and the Legum allegoriae, the passage strengthens the conclusion which we reached earlier, namely that the basic structure of the Timaeus encourages Philo to place man in a cosmological perspective, but also to go on from there to analyse the psychological and ethical development that takes place in the microcosm itself. More important than the individual doctrines that the 'phyto-cosmological excursus' derives from the Timaeus is the general framework and movement of thought which it takes from the great Platonic example. It is within that framework that Philo places a number of post-Platonic cosmological doctrines and problems. We find ourselves therefore in sharp disagreement with the analysis of Früchtel, who argues that in this passage the Platonic world-view recedes and is replaced, through the mediation of Posidonius, by a highly 'scientific' picture of the cosmos which partially reverts back to Presocratic thought.³⁶

Finally a word about the method and style of the passage. It seems to me that here Philo more than anywhere else approximates a Greek manner of cosmologizing and philosophizing. One might go even further and argue that Plant. 2-27 is as close to a 'mini-Timaeus' as Philo could come. To be sure, the Biblical text suggests the predominant image, but for the rest Philo has wholly unfettered himself from the constraint of direct exegesis.³⁷ Texts such as Gen. 1:27 and 2:7 are introduced for systematic purposes. Philo here anticipates the mélange of systematic doctrine and sporadic Biblical citation which will become the hallmark of much Patristic and Medieval philosophy. Especially §1-27 give an impression quite different from the continual (and often concatenated) exegesis which Philo usually practices.³⁸

(d) Quis rerum divinarum heres sit

Of all Philo's allegorical works this treatise is arguably the richest in thought. In a dazzling display of the possibilities of the allegorical method, he brings a multitude of philosophical themes in relation to the text of Gen. 15:2-18, in which God speaks to Abraham and promises him a great inheritance.³⁹

So easily are diverse and fruitful associations made with Greek philosophical doctrines that one gets the impression - quite unprovable, of course - that Philo, before writing the treatise, may have given himself a 'refresher course' in his reading of favourite philosophical works, among which the Timaeus will have claimed an important place.⁴⁰

Especially the lengthy account of the Logos-cutter used by God the creator to order and articulate the cosmos (§130-229, exeg. Gen.15:10 διετέλεν αὐτὰ μέτρα) has been the subject of much speculation.⁴¹ It is also the passage of greatest interest for our study. The λόγος τομεύς not only divides, but divides in equal sections, as is seen in the creation of the cosmos.⁴² In the description of 'creation by diaeresis' familiar motifs from the Timaeus tradition are encountered. The Logos cuts through the disordered and disharmonized pre-elemental matter.⁴³ In ordering matter God made use of number and perfect shapes.⁴⁴ All the forms of equality were used, among which was analogical proportion, used for the distribution of the elements and ensuring the cosmos' permanence.⁴⁵ The order of creation in §133-140 is by now familiar to us - cosmos, elements, animals, man.⁴⁶ The conception of 'creation by diaeresis' is thus basically reconcilable with the creation account of the Timaeus.⁴⁷ But by placing all the emphasis on division and equality Philo has shifted the centre of attention and relegated the creationism of the Timaeus to a background function.⁴⁸ It is not possible to dwell on the difficult question of sources here. Perhaps we may be permitted to suggest that the Logos-cutter is found in exactly this form nowhere else because it is Philo's own idea, the result of a creative synthesis between Biblical ideas (note especially Gen. 1:4) and Greek philosophical theories.⁴⁹ Hence too the subordinate but real presence of the Timaeus in the background.⁵⁰

(e) De aeternitate mundi

The results of our Commentary have shown that the Timaeus has been worked into the very woof and warp of that fascinating little treatise, the De aeternitate mundi.⁵¹ Plato had already demonstrated in his cosmological dialogue that the questions of the cosmos' createdness and indestructibility are intimately bound together. Philo makes this doctrine one of the pillars of his argument. The ἀφθαρσία of the cosmos can only be understood in the perspective of its γένεσις.⁵² It accounts for the prominent role that the Timaeus plays in the work.

At the very beginning of the treatise the reader gains an intimation of the importance of Plato's dialogue, for the brief proemium wholly consists of a creative adaptation of two Timaeian passages, 27c-d, 29c-d.⁵³ In the doxographical section (§7-19) Plato's view that the cosmos is γενητὸς καὶ ἀφθαρτος is

illustrated by the quotation of Tim. 41a-b, from which Philo extracts no less than five important doctrines.⁵⁴ The doxography is a carefully organized piece, giving the clue to the structure of the work.⁵⁵ It climaxes in the opinion of Moses, who long before Hesiod and Plato, had affirmed in the book Genesis that the cosmos was created, yet not to be destroyed.⁵⁶ It also makes quite clear that the twenty-four arguments presented in the second part (§20-149) on behalf of those who posit that the cosmos is uncreated and indestructible cannot be considered to represent Philo's own point of view.⁵⁷ In these arguments too considerable use of the Timaeus was discovered. It proved rather awkward to decide whether these references were derived from Philo's source material or were inserted by himself. For some, we concluded, Philo was probably responsible,⁵⁸ others he willingly transcribed.⁵⁹ But it cannot be concluded that Philo would wish in each case to accept the interpretation of the Timaeus put forward. For example, the Aristotelian view of time, for which the Timaeus is called in as partial witness, is nowhere else found in Philo's works.⁶⁰ It is highly likely that in the missing sequel, where we consider that a presentation of arguments supporting the position that the cosmos is γεννητός καὶ ἄφθαρτος would have been made, he would have shown the correct way to use the Timaeus in support of his thesis.⁶¹

The De aeternitate mundi takes in a special place in the Corpus Philonicum. It is unfortunate that its incomplete state of preservation makes its interpretation so problematic. Nowhere else does Philo present such a systematic exposition of Greek philosophical theories. But it would be very wrong to regard it as a mere academic exercise. The citation of Moses at a critical juncture of the treatise is a clear warning that for Philo a philosophical manner of presentation does not detract from the importance of scripture or from the need for an apologetic outlook.⁶²

(f) De Providentia I & II

The same apologetic motives are much more clearly visible in the two books which Philo devoted to the subject of divine Providence. These two treatises are the least accessible of all Philo's writings, not because their subject matter is so difficult, but chiefly on account of the defective transmission of the text.⁶³ De Providentia I has been given the well-organized structure of a Hellenistic σύγγραμμα, with an introduction, three main sections each dealing with a separate theme lucidly introduced (§6, §37, §77), and a lively conclusion. De Providentia II is presented in the form of a dialogue between the author and his nephew Alexander.⁶⁴ Diels' hypothesis that Book I too was originally a dialogue is unnecessary and should be rejected.⁶⁵ The importance of these two treatises for our subject precludes us from passing them over in

silence. But the shaky foundations of the text make it necessary to put forward our views with less certainty than elsewhere.

Approximately a third of book I deals with the problem of Providence in relation to the creation of the cosmos (§6-36). As in Opif.7-10 Philo argues that denial of the cosmos' createdness is tantamount to denial of divine Providence. In this part of the work the Timaeus is twice brought forward into the centre of attention. The extremely difficult opening paragraphs (§6-8) bear a close resemblance to Opif.7-28, but concentrate on refuting the doctrine of creatio aeterna rather than the view that the cosmos is uncreated. Creation is seen as the transition from a pre-existent disorderly matter to the ordered product of the cosmos, achieved by the providential creator.⁶⁶ A little further on Philo appeals to the Timaeus more directly, quoting two passages in order to prove Plato's affirmation of the γένεσις τοῦ κόσμου and appending some interpretative comments (§21).⁶⁷ Plato recognized two first causes, God as the eternal creator of the noetic cosmos, and matter which lacks order and is transformed by God into the ordered cosmos.⁶⁸ By way of illustration a definition of the cosmos as structured whole is attributed to Plato. Though not inconsistent with the Timaeus, it clearly reveals the interposition of the interpretative tradition.⁶⁹ But in this section (§20) Philo also quotes a text from the Timaeus to prove the potential destruction of the cosmos.⁷⁰ Here the idiosyncratic nature of the treatise comes to the fore. More than anywhere else in his oeuvre Philo stresses that the cosmos could well come to an end,⁷¹ and in eschatological passages almost without parallel in his writings he envisages the return to disordered matter as punishment inflicted by God the judge on man's wickedness (§34-36, §89-92).⁷² It thus seems quite impossible to bring the main thesis of De Providentia I into line with the systematic presentation of the same questions in the De aeternitate mundi. We note in particular that the Timaeian text which was so prominent in Aet. and was widely used to affirm God's providential maintenance of the cosmos, Tim.41 a-b, is glimpsed only once in Prov.I, and even then it is given an emphasis which deviates from Platonist orthodoxy.⁷³

A different situation is encountered in De Providentia II. The overriding aim of the dialogue is to make Alexander see the error of his free-thinking ways and convert him back to a belief in the workings of divine Providence. With every counter-argument Philo wishes to hammer another six-inch nail into the coffin of the Academicism and Epicureanism from which Alexander draws his store of arguments.⁷⁴ A wide range of topics are discussed. At §45-58 it is the subject of creation, at §59-84 diverse problems of cosmology. We discovered that the use made of the Timaeus in these sections is rather limited.⁷⁵ Its chief value is to give support to Philo's fundamental assumption of the

teleological design of the cosmos.⁷⁶ The reason for this limited use is not only the fact that most of Philo's replies are drawn from Stoic sources and especially their counter-attacks against Carneades.⁷⁷ In the construction of the dialogue he does not have (or give himself) enough time to present replies adequate to the important questions discussed. Indicative is the 'even if' techniques he uses on a number of occasions - 'even if the cosmos and matter were uncreated, even if there was an unlimited void... there is still no reason to deny the existence of divine Providence'. But elsewhere he rejects these doctrines.⁷⁸ The exchanges between the two opponents often have a 'shooting from the hip' quality, which is likely to disappoint readers who turn to the work in the expectation that they will find penetrating philosophical discussions on the nature and extent of the divine providential activity. But in all fairness we must add that that was not the purpose for which Philo composed the dialogue. Book II can, far more than its predecessor, be described as an apologetic work. If the providential activity of God is denied, then the foundation on which the edifice of Jewish religion is built must crumble into dust. The urgency which indubitably marks this work is public rather private.⁷⁹ It is poignant to realize that the dialogue's successful conclusion (§113-116) was merely an exercise in wishful thinking.⁸⁰

1.5. A taxonomy of usage

The stage has now been reached that encourages the attempt at an overview of the diverse ways in which Philo utilizes the Timaeus in the course of his interminable series of writings. We have decided to present this overview in the form of a taxonomy.¹ What are the minimum number of categories required to classify the hundreds of instances of Philonic usage of the Timaeus collected in the Commentary? Like in all taxonomies, there must be an element of arbitrariness in the classification. We have halted at the hebdomad, a fittingly Philonic number. One could subdivide further, but perhaps with less profit. A final point that needs emphasis before we begin is that the order of sequence has a logic of its own but is not meant to be hierarchical. It does not indicate an increasing order of importance.

1. Language. Philo's debt to the Timaeus for his choice of philosophical terminology and general vocabulary is very great. Scores of terms and phrases are so totally integrated into his mode of thinking and writing that one tends to forget not only that they originate in Plato, but also that they are nowhere to be found in the scriptural texts that are in the most cases

being explained.² Numerous examples can be given. The phrase ποιητῆς καὶ πατὴρ is so commonplace in Philo's writings that one may reasonably question whether he is conscious of the Platonic origin every time he uses it.³ But cases were also found where the respectable philosophical pedigree of the phrase is deliberately exploited.⁴ Exceedingly common in Philo, we found, was the distinctive 'language of excellence' used by Plato to denote praise of and admiration for the cosmos and (less often) its creator.⁵ Another interesting example is Philo's commentary on the fourth, fifth and sixth days of creation in the *De opificio mundi*. The crude and unsystematic Mosaic titlature for the stars and the types of animal genera are quietly but firmly removed and replaced with the more respectable and scientific Platonic counterparts.⁶ Certain rare words can in all likelihood only have entered Philo's vocabulary through a reading of the *Timaeus*.⁷

A lexical study of the correspondences between the vocabulary of the *Timaeus* and Philo's usage, as found for example in the *De opificio mundi*, would certainly be remunerative.⁸ The limited analysis that we made of the language and terminology utilized by Philo in connection with the model already yielded interesting results.⁹ The debt to Plato was revealed in full clarity. Particularly noticeable was Philo's fondness for compound words, to an extent that far exceeds Platonic usage.¹⁰ Some of the words which are especially apposite to the subject of the creation and structure of the cosmos and man are found virtually nowhere else.¹¹ But the above-mentioned analysis also showed that the lexical presence of the *Timaeus* in Philo's works was certainly not just the result of his acquaintance with the dialogue, but was constantly reinforced by his reading of works in the Platonist tradition.¹²

2. *Imagery*. A second category is furnished by Philo's use of the copious and elaborate imagery found in the *Timaeus*. Philo's love for all kinds of imagery and metaphor, whether original or totally hackneyed, is apparent on every page of his writings.¹³ Clearly his rhetorical training had given him a sharp eye for its presence in the works he consulted and he effortlessly re-collects diverse images from a wide range of sources. Indeed control is often a bigger problem for him than recollection and invention.

In the course of our Commentary we noted numerous examples of imagery from the *Timaeus* which left a mark on Philo's writings: frequently encountered examples concern the creative activity of the demiurge,¹⁴ the descent of the soul,¹⁵ the trilocution of the soul and its struggle against the passions.¹⁶ As these examples show, imagery is not just a matter of ornament and colour, but also plays a vital role in the presentation of philosophically significant themes. A fascinating subject is how such imagery relates to Biblical themes. With much skill Philo often manages to conflate Platonic metaphor and Biblical

thematics, as in the case of the beastly passions,¹⁷ the heavenly plant,¹⁸ the slithering snake.¹⁹ Imagery is thus given an important role in the allegorical process.²⁰ Allowance must often be made for the flexibility which Philo shows in using Platonic images. Just as Plato he describes the receptacle (or matter) as 'nurse and mother', but the same epithets are also applied to ἀΐσθησις and Σοφία.²¹ The most celebrated image in Philo is that of the divine architect in *De opificio mundi* 17-20. The ultimate source of inspiration for this passage is undoubtedly the *Timaeus*,²² but the simple images of the demiurge as craftsman, builder and magistrate have been, with the help of other philosophical imagistic material, recast into a complex network which point for point illustrates and illuminates the philosophical problem under discussion. Such 'systematic' use of imagery is not found in the *Timaeus*. It is a product of the post-Platonic tradition of philosophy.²³

3. Literary allusions. The embellishment of one's writings with quotations from and allusions to famous ancient authors was another practice which the product of the Hellenistic rhetorical schools engaged in as a matter of course.²⁴ Philo was no exception, and also the *Timaeus* could furnish material for this purpose. It was found, however, that in Philo's oeuvre examples of the use of the *Timaeus* purely for purposes of literary ornament are rather scarce.²⁵ The *Timaeus* is, of course, for a great part of its length pretty heavy going, not so likely to furnish material for literary gamesmanship. And it must not be forgotten that Philo's aims were not those of a rhetor or professional littérateur.

4. For purposes of exegetical illustration. It is now time to turn to the many passages in Philo which make use of the *Timaeus* in the process of giving a direct exegesis of a Biblical text.²⁶ Here too distinctions must be made. The first category encompasses the instances of what we have called exegetical *illustration*. On numerous occasions the *Timaeus* functions as a standard philosophical or (less often) scientific textbook which can be drawn upon to supply illustrative or background material. The given Biblical text determines the passage from the *Timaeus* which is chosen out. The selected passage can shed much light on the text being given exegesis, but its direct influence on the interpretation remains limited. In the process little attention is paid to the context and philosophical problematics of the *Timaeus*. Plato's doctrines and Philo's intentions are thus like two circles which intersect, but have only a small area in common.²⁷ Especially the many symbolic exegeses in the *Exposition of the Law* and *Quaestiones in Exodum* II follow this pattern. But also in the complex allegories of the *Allegorical Commentary* we discovered that much illustrative material is invoked.

Of the copious material found in our Commentary two particularly clear

examples will suffice. In the prescriptions for the preservation offering the liver is one of the organs set aside and dedicated to God (Lev.3:4). Plato's description of the nature and function of the liver can help to account for this signal honour.²⁸ But it is clear that the relevance of Platonic physiology and psychology is limited to an illustratory and referential role. It furnishes a λόγος προσήκων. The subject of the mind's nightly adventures remains tangential to the exegesis of the text as a whole. Moreover Philo is so little concerned with the precise function of Plato's account of the liver that he makes substantial alterations and disregards its physiological and philosophical systematics.²⁹ Cain, the man of false opinion, appears to be under the delusion that he, as a created being, can escape from God his maker (Gen.4:14). A quick look at the principles of Platonic cosmology will make him realize his error.³⁰ There is nothing outside the cosmos, since all the elements were used up in its construction. God fills the whole universe, so how can a man escape?³¹ The Timaeus functions here as a standard textbook on philosophical matters, providing background information that is exegetically useful.

In conclusion it should be noted that it is particularly in this category of usage that Philo shows an element of opportunism in his use of philosophical sources. When looking for material to illustrate a Biblical text, he selects the information that is most suitable or convenient for the point he wishes to make. A fine example was found in his references to the mechanism of human vision. For the illustration of the theme of mixture Plato's theory proved useful, but in order to allegorize the spring in Gen.2:6 the Stoic theory is preferred.³² Given this tendency towards 'opportunism', however, the fact that Philo so often turns to the Timaeus gains in significance.

5. For purposes of exegetical explanation. Also in this category Philo is engaged in the exegesis of scripture, but the role played by the Timaeus has gained in importance and depth. The Timaeus is adduced in order to *explain* the deeper, more 'philosophical' meaning of the text. Philo considers it necessary that the Biblical words not be read in isolation, but rather be placed in a wider philosophical context by means of the explanatory material that the Timaeus provides. It is much more likely than in the previous category that the context of the relevant Timaeus passage and its philosophical problematics will be taken into account. These influence, or can even determine, the direction of the exegetical passage, so that the more superficial meaning which one might first read into the Mosaic text recedes.

Clearly the difference between this category and the previous one is gradational rather than clear-cut, but a few examples will make clear what we have in mind. Once Philo decides that Gen.1:1-5, 'day one' of the creational

account, is properly explained with reference to the noetic model of the Timaeus, the implications for the understanding of the Mosaic text are far-reaching and must be expounded at some length (Opif.16-25).³³ On a number of occasions Philo uses the division of creative labour between the demiurge and the 'young gods' in the Timaeus as a parallel which helps to explain troublesome plurals in the Biblical text.³⁴ Not only does the Platonic dialogue provide the idea which supplies the answer to the exegetical quaestio, but it also furnishes the philosophical frame of reference which makes that answer plausible and worthwhile, namely the theme of theodicy. By way of contrast the Rabbis, who also pondered long over the same exegetical problem, did not adduce the Timaeus and so attached no importance to a theodical solution.³⁵ In a third example the influence of the Timaeus extends a step further.³⁶ In dealing with instances of flight Philo cites the text Gen.31:20, which recounts that Jacob fled from Laban. In order to account for the hatred between the two another verse is called in, Gen.30:42. The difference between the unmarked and speckled sheep only makes sense in this context if seen against the background of the Timaeus (or, more correctly, its interpretative tradition) and the doctrines of the ideas and immanent form. Thus the Timaeus not only explains the verse but is in a sense responsible for its selection in the first place, and so determines the movement of Philo's exegesis.³⁷ In one remarkable instance it appears that the recollection of the Timaeus has induced Philo to opt for a rare varia lectio in the LXX manuscripts. The Timaeus can thus even influence his reading of the actual text of inspired scripture.³⁸

6. For purposes of macro-exegetic structure. The terminology which we have chosen for the next category is clumsy and at a first glance scarcely comprehensible. But it is necessary to make room in the taxonomy for the insight that the Timaeus can influence the way that Philo structures a whole treatise, or even longer sections of exegetical commentary. I am thinking, of course, of the situation in the De opificio mundi and the Legum allegoriae, where the profound parallels which Philo sees between the opening chapters of Genesis and Plato's dialogue exert a strong influence on the way Philo organizes these works and unfolds his exegetical commentaries. The same process can be seen at work to a lesser degree in De plantatione and weakly in Quis rerum divinarum heres sit. These examples of the Timaeus in a macro-exegetic role have been discussed at sufficient length in the previous section.³⁹ Also deserving of inclusion in this category is the way that Philo uses the programme of Timaeus' speech (27a) and the theory of natural disasters (22a-23c) to give the macro-structure of the Pentateuch a philosophically attractive foundation.⁴⁰

7. Purely philosophical discussion. The hebdomad of categories is

brought to completion with the inclusion of those passages where the Timaeus is discussed for its own sake, without any reference being made to scripture. These passages are in fact wholly confined to the three philosophical treatises which were discussed in the previous section.⁴¹ Here there are a few paragraphs in which Platonic exegesis takes over from Biblical exegesis,⁴² though naturally the philosophical/religious/apologetic concerns that pervade all Philo's writings are still unmistakably present.⁴³ Here we find the one case where Philo attacks certain thinkers for presenting a wrong interpretation of Platonic doctrine.⁴⁴ Our seventh category is thus exceedingly rare. We do not wish to suggest that in the exegetical works the Timaeus is not used to give impetus to discussions of a philosophical nature. But in these Plato's views are not presented *for their own sake*. Not once in all Philo's exegetical writings will one find him saying, 'the words of Moses here give us the opportunity to examine in detail what other philosophers have said on the matter', followed by an account of Plato's views on the relevant subject.⁴⁵ We recall too how Plato's words and doctrines are often presented anonymously.⁴⁶

1.6. The Timaeus and exegesis of the Mosaic writings

The taxonomy which we have just presented is not a scientific tool of great precision. Its categories are kept to a minimum and cover a kaleidoscopic range of cases. Only an imprecise indication could be given of the relative distribution of the categories in relation to the complete list of examples found in our Commentary. But in spite of these inexactitudes one conclusion rang through loud and clear. In the vast majority of cases Philo's use of the Timaeus is summoned forth by the requirements of expounding the Biblical text. If his treatises are regarded from the formal point of view, it is apparent that the task of commenting on the inspired oracles of Moses is the driving force that controls the invocation and application of the doctrines of the Greek philosophers. The most extreme examples of the 'Mosaic-centredness' of Philo's use of the Timaeus are those passages where a Platonic doctrine or even a paraphrase of Plato's actual words are nonchalantly placed *in the mouth* of the Jewish lawgiver.¹ In most cases the link between Moses and Plato is less directly made, but still remains essential. Even when the Timaeus does no more than supply a distinctive phrase or a piece of background information, the reason for its presence can generally be traced back to the exigencies of the scriptural text being examined in the linked chains of exegetical commentary. Our final task in this 'philological' chapter must be to examine how the Timaeus is placed in service of Pentateuchal exegesis and what the impli-

cations of this are for the impact which the dialogue had on Philo's thought.

In the Appendix that was attached to the end of our Commentary an attempt was made to compensate for its 'Platonocentric' structure by means of the presentation of a list of all the Pentateuchal texts for the explanation of which Philo alludes to or utilizes the Timaeus.² We concluded the Appendix by tabulating all the examples contained in the list in order to give an indication of their distribution through the Pentateuch. The information which the table supplies is valuable, even if allowance must be made for its deceptive statistical precision. The high concentration of usage for the exegesis of the first three chapters of Genesis is wholly predictable. And one might also expect the cosmogonic dialogue to be (to a much lesser extent) relevant to the following chapters of the same book, when the world was still young and the relation to its origins (also in allegorical terms) was still keenly felt. But it is surprising to observe the regularity with which Philo turns to material in his exposition of the remainder of the Books Genesis and Exodus (for the last three books of Moses the frequency lessens considerably). How can this regularity (and diversity) of application be explained and what are the consequences for the Timaeus' value to Philo in his exegetical labour? In answering these questions the taxonomy of usage outlined in the previous section will prove an invaluable instrument.

The chief value of the Timaeus is, as we have already said, for the exegetical explanation of the Mosaic cosmogony. The schema of the seven days encourages arithmological exegesis,³ while the events that take place on the various days can for the most part be adequately explained by taking the cue from the philosophical doctrines of the Timaeus.⁴ One must hesitate to describe this exegesis as literal, for the deeper philosophical aspects of the scriptural account are certainly being explored. But there is no need to call on the special techniques of the allegorical method until the story of Adam and Eve is reached. Philo here proceeds to exploit the possibilities of psychological allegory, based on the division between the rational and irrational part of the soul and its trilocution in the body. There can be no doubt that Philo's usage of the Timaeus in the exegesis of the cosmogony occurs primarily at the fifth (and sixth) level of the taxonomy. The exegete adheres to the sequence of the Mosaic account, but the explanatory material furnished by the Timaeus strongly influences the way that account is read.

As the Pentateuchal narrative moves on to the historical and legislative parts,⁵ the situation alters and it becomes more important to take into account the level at which the Timaeus is used. In a large number of cases it does no more than supply language, imagery and illustrative material for the complex ethical and 'migrational' allegories⁶ read into the stories of the

Patriarchs and the detailed allegory and symbolism located in the prescriptions of the Law. Also prominent are the many instances of physical or cosmological allegory, in which features of Biblical text are expounded as symbols of the creation and structure of the universe (the Cherubim at the gate of paradise,⁷ the candlestick symbolizing the lathed sphere of heaven,⁸ the vestments of the High Priest⁹ and so on). The list of examples in the Appendix shows how often the Timaeus is called upon, but the importance of this background role should not be exaggerated. It goes no further than the fourth category of our taxonomy.

It would be wrong, however, to stop at this point. Philo more than once emphasizes how much philosophical insight Moses showed in commencing his legislation with an account of the creation of the cosmos.¹⁰ It lays the foundation for the deeper philosophical understanding of the remainder of the Pentateuch. Here once more the way is made clear for the Timaeus to make its presence felt. Only when the createdness and structure of the cosmos, man's place in that structure and the nature of man himself are taken into consideration, is the exegete in a position to show how the migratory journey of the soul is possible and how the prescriptions of the Law can aid the soul in its quest for a blessed life. Two examples, one from the Allegorical Commentary and one from the Exposition of the Law will make quite clear what we mean. When Abraham follows God's command and offers a sacrifice, he does not divide the two birds (Gen.15:10). They symbolize the undivided nature of man's rational soul and of the outer sphere in heaven, showing that the mind in us and the mind above us (i.e. heaven) are related to the divine Logos. The allegory reveals the cosmological foundation for man's ascent from the tumultuous and divided realm of created being to rest in God. Man can become like unto the heavens and like unto God.¹¹ The last of the ten great λόγια in the Decalogue is 'thou shalt not desire'. The Lawgiver (in this case God himself) gave this commandment because he knew the structure of the soul and was aware of the danger that the ἐπιθυμητικόν, which is (according to the Timaeus) located in the belly, could force man to become prey to the passions. If observed, the commandment leads to the perfection of a εὐδαίμων βίος. The exegete can thus show that an understanding of the structure of man's soul lays the foundation for a truly moral life.¹² Once again it is evident that in these cases the usage of the Timaeus must be placed in the fifth category of the taxonomy, that one can speak of significant influence on the way that the sacred text is read.

To what conclusion, therefore, must we come in the evaluation of the role that the Timaeus plays in Philo's exegesis of the Mosaic writings? Is it justified to describe the Platonic dialogue as an 'exegetical tool' used from time to time to prise open the locked treasures of scripture?¹³ The description is not, in our view, a happy one. A tool is taken to hand to carry out a parti-

cular task, but for the rest has little impact on the design and purpose of the work being undertaken. If the question is looked at in terms of our taxonomy, one might argue that the description would be apt if the usage of the Timaeus had been confined to the first four categories, i.e. language, imagery, literary embellishment and exegetical illustration. If for these purposes Philo had instead used the *Περὶ φύσεως* of Chrysippus or the *Περὶ κόσμου* of Posidonius, what would have been the loss? But when the last three categories are added, the description clearly falls short.¹⁴ It becomes apparent that, in Philo's eyes, the Timaeus is in the more important aspects of its exegetical applicability a kind of blueprint that offers partial guidance to the exegetic in the construction of his edifice of scriptural commentary. It exercises a direct influence on the way that Philo as philosophizing exegete reads the Pentateuchal text, both in its diverse parts and as a whole. Thus we are convinced that, even though it has been demonstrated that the Timaeus is chiefly used by Philo for purposes of direct exegesis, it will nevertheless be entirely legitimate to devote a chapter of this study to the influence of the dialogue on his thought, without our incurring the charge of 'philosophical reconstructivism' which can rightly be laid against scholars such as Wolfson and Winston.¹⁵

One final topic commands our attention. As was observed in the Introduction, much interest has recently been shown in the subject of Philo's relation to the tradition of Alexandrian exegesis.¹⁶ In his writings Philo often refers to views held by other exegetes. It can be considered certain that he was greatly indebted to and stimulated by predecessors and colleagues engaged in scriptural exegesis. The question that we must answer is this. Does Philo in his use of the Timaeus also show dependence on other exegetes? An immediate difficulty to be faced in answering this question is how we can establish when Philo is making use of traditional material. The only reliable criterion, in my view, is to depend on the indications that Philo himself gives, namely in his use of anonymous phrases referring to other exegetes.¹⁷ Fortunately we are now able to make grateful use of the study of Hay which contains a virtually complete list of Philo's references to other allegorists.¹⁸

The sources found outside Philo's writings bring forth Aristobulus as a possible predecessor. In spite of undeniable similarities with Philo, however, the Alexandrian pioneer discloses little use of Timaeian material.¹⁹ In the Philonic corpus the passage which gives most support to the view that Philo took over from predecessors exegeses which drew on the Timaeus is found in a fascinating case of multiple exegesis at Cher.21-30. A cosmological exegesis of the

Cherubim in Gen.3:24 in terms of Plato's circles of the same and the different is proposed and rejected. But no anonymous attribution is given and it can be plausibly argued that the alternative was thought up by Philo himself.²⁰ On two occasions allusions to the Timaeus were found in passages where traditional ideas were definitely being used. We considered it probable that here too it is Philo who has introduced these allusions.²¹ If Hay's list of references to other allegorists is compared with the results of the Commentary the conclusion must be that, although Platonizing exegetes are occasionally mentioned,²² there is no unequivocal evidence of other exegetes making use of Plato's cosmological dialogue.²³ On the contrary glimpses can now and then be gained of 'anti-Timaeon' doctrines.²⁴ Naturally the results of this enquiry can go no further than a robust argumentum e silentio.²⁵ Nevertheless, the suggestion is warranted that the large-scale use of the Timaeus for purposes of Biblical exegesis is an innovation of Philo, the result of his great love for the writings of the Athenian philosopher. Hay, following earlier scholars, is intrigued that many of the other allegorists referred to by Philo 'seem often to have found in scripture not religious but secular teaching'.²⁶ Is not one of the advantages offered to Philo through his use of the Timaeus that this gap between science and God-orientated reflection could be effectively bridged?

CHAPTER TWO

THE INFLUENCE OF THE TIMAEUS ON PHILO'S THOUGHT

Philo's use of the Timaeus is pervasive and profound. Not only has the Platonic dialogue rendered much assistance in the task of elucidating the words of Moses; it has also directly affected the way that scripture is read. We can say - if the reader will pardon the anachronism - that Philo reads the account of creation and many other parts of the Pentateuch through Platonically tinted spectacles. It is therefore a legitimate undertaking - this was our conclusion at the end of the previous chapter - to attempt to give an account in general terms of the influence of the Timaeus on Philo's thought. The scope of such an account must be carefully delimited. It will *not* be our aim, both for practical and theoretical reasons, to discuss the influence of the Timaeus in the perspective of a systematic presentation of Philo's thought in the manner of a Drummond or a Wolfson. The aim must be much more modest, namely to outline the way that doctrines from the Timaeus have contributed to the shaping of Philo's views on God and the cosmos, and thus volens nolens to his manner of interpreting the Biblical account. In particular our endeavour will be to pursue, to the extent relevant to Philo's thought, the philosophical problematics which are the inevitable consequences of the acceptance of these doctrines (bearing in mind, however, that he stands somewhere near the beginning of almost two millenia of philosophical and theological speculation on the same problems, a situation with obvious dangers for our interpretation). In this chapter the approach will be to keep 'doxographical' aspects of the subject to a minimum. The discussion of Philo's relation to the interpretative tradition of the Timaeus will be reserved for the final chapter of this part of our study.

2.1. Myth and truth

The Timaeus is a myth, but it is the least mythical of all Plato's myths. In the account of how the creator god ordered the cosmos the narrative element is deliberately restricted, resulting in a complex web of metaphor and imagery quite different from the richly braided fantasies of other Platonic myths. Truth is reserved in Plato's philosophy for the unchanging world of noetic reality; of the sensible world full of flux and commotion no more than a probable account can be attained.¹ One may therefore speak of the Timaeus as a 'probable' or even a 'scientific' myth.² Why does Plato adopt the language of myth

when speaking of the cosmos' genesis and structure? Three reasons, of which the first is most important, may be given. (1) Myth, which by its very nature is excluded from the realm of incontrovertible truth, underlines the probable nature of the account.³ In particular it enables Plato to depict in an accessible way the relation between the two worlds of noetic and sensible reality, how mind introduces purpose by looking to a model.⁴ (2) Myth can have a protreptic function. Plato had banished the immoral myths from his ideal state and outlined in his τύποι περὶ θεολογίας how one should speak about divinity.⁵ The *Timaeus* is an excellent test-case, its myth not misleading but encouraging the reader to delve further into the mysteries of philosophy. (3) A frequent, if not inevitable, corollary to protreptic is esotericism. Myth conceals the deeper implications of doctrines from those who are as yet unprepared to receive them. The nature of the demiurge cannot be disclosed to all and sundry.⁶ In the light of all the controversy which the dialogue caused, however, one might well wonder whether Plato overshot his mark. Even the initiated were perplexed...⁷

If Plato's attitude to myth is ambivalent and patronizing, Philo adopts for the most part a downright aggressive stand. Fully agreeing with Plato's strictures in the *Republic*, but also continuing the traditional exegetical and apologetic themes of Hellenistic Judaism, Philo repeatedly remonstrates against mythical fictions which seduce the ear and distract the listener from naked truth, from coming to know the one and true God.⁸ In the works of God no myth or fiction will be found. Moses has his eyes set on truth; myth-making is quite alien to him, a fact which sets him apart from other legislators.⁹ But before we can investigate to what extent this harsh attitude to myth affects Philo's reading of the *Timaeus* (and thus indirectly its influence on his thought), it must first be indicated how the distinction between probability and truth and the three reasons which induced Plato to cast his account in the form of a myth retain their importance in Philo's thought, though in each case in a significantly transmuted form.

Philo is as convinced as Plato of the futility of searching for truth in the world of sense-perceptible things.¹⁰ He is less convinced, however, that by turning to the world of immutable being truth will be directly within man's grasp.¹¹ God is the source of all knowledge and unstintingly bestows it on man to the extent that he is capable of receiving it.¹² No man has been more highly favoured than the prophet Moses, to whom the knowledge contained in the Law was granted. Plato's probabilism is given an important redirection. Not only is it applicable to the objects of the physical universe, but above all to the task of expounding the words of Moses. The riches of scripture are inexhaustible. The aim of the exegete can be hardly more than to present probable

explanations of the truth it contains. Moses himself guides his followers to those aspects of the visible universe which are worth studying, prime among which is the subject of the cosmos' genesis. Nature-study, just like dialectics and its degraded form, sophistic argument, can easily become a trap for the unwary, distracting the student from what is truly important. For Philo the notion of a hierarchy of recipients of knowledge is of fundamental significance.¹³ Some men gain more knowledge and insight than others, depending on how easily they are able to break the bond of their attachment to the body and the senses. The lawgiver wishes to benefit all his followers, so he speaks about God 'like a man' for his weaker readers, using, if mostly not myth, at least 'improper anthropomorphic expressions'.¹⁴ The reason is primarily paedeutical, but also assuredly protreptic. These souls are being exhorted to rise to a higher level of knowledge.¹⁵ At the same time Moses does not cast pearls before swine. The deeper meaning of scripture lies concealed under the surface of the words. It is the exegete's task to uncover it, employing the allegorical method and from time to time receiving the aid of divine inspiration. The sacred mysteries are not to be revealed to those unfit to receive them, but must be buried like Sarah's ash-cakes in secrecy and silence.¹⁶ One can speak of an esotericism here, even if the exclusiveness is significantly mitigated by the fact that the mysteries are clearly made available in the writings of the exegete which we ourselves can read.¹⁷

Returning once again to the Timaeus we commence by stating the obvious. Philo is not going to make his attitude to the mythical aspect of the dialogue clear by a direct comment. It must be deduced from the way he puts the Timaeus to use in his own works. Certainly he has no use for the more overt mythical features, which are found especially in the account of the soul's descent and man's successive reincarnations. Moses, by encouraging the use of allegory, achieves the same result in a more wholesome way.¹⁸ The remainder of the Timaeus he does not consider to be mythical in the overt way that rouses his polemical ire. Nowhere does it emerge that the description of a creator god shaping a cosmos out of formless matter or giving birth to the cosmos as his offspring is wrong, because such a presentation uses mythical language to seduce the mind and trap the unwary. I am convinced that Philo, if asked, would deny that the Timaeus was a μυθικὸν πλάσμα. But in using its doctrines to explain the Mosaic creational account, Philo cannot avoid problems which the exploitation of the dialogue necessarily brings along with it. What can be meant by a moment of creation, a 'time' when creation took place? What can be meant by the creational sequence, the fact that one act of creation happens before or after another? And how can one speak of God? What is being said in statements such as God willed, God spoke, God made? Is there a difference with the

anthropomorphic expressions referred to above? Philo's answers to these problems - the inevitable result, we repeat, of the taking over of ideas and language from the Timaeus - will have to come to the fore in our discussion in the remainder of this chapter.

One last observation. In the hierarchy of recipients of knowledge, the importance of which for Philo's thought has already been stressed, some people have advanced further along the path to truth than others. Aside from the lovers of body who have not even made a start, Philo distinguishes at least two stages, symbolized by Bezalel and Moses, Jacob and Israel, the men of heaven and the men of God, described sometimes in the terminology of the Greek mysteries, the βραχύτεραι καὶ μεγάλας τελεταί.¹⁹ The two stages will become crucial in discussing Philo's conception of the divine nature. It is important to observe that for the exegete they also relate to levels in the sacred text itself. In uncovering the layers of meaning the disciple of Moses guides his readers along the path of discovery. In the praxis of esotericism there is, however, a difficulty. How can the readers be sure that their guide is not holding back at the vital moment, that another esoteric layer is located behind the words of his commentaries?

2.2. The notion of sequential creation

When a carpenter builds a house, he cannot construct it all at once. He needs to follow a set sequence which allows only a minor amount of variation. First the foundations must be laid, then the structural framework built, followed by external walls, roof, internal walls, floors, ceilings and so on. Not only is the building sequence by no means arbitrary, it also tells us much about the nature of the house's structure. The walls cannot exist without the foundation, while the walls themselves are indispensable for the roof.

The notion of sequential creation is a central feature of the conceptual framework of the Timaeus. The demiurge and his assistants are depicted as creating the cosmos and its parts in a sequence, and that sequence provides valuable information on the cosmos' structure.¹ Philo does not merely perceive the parallel between this creational sequence and the Mosaic account of creation in six days, he positively delights in it. When the contents of the Mosaic κοσμογονία are outlined in general terms, the description is given in terms of the Platonic example.² And, as was observed in the previous chapter, Philo's commentary on Gen.1-3 in the De opificio mundi exploits to the fullest extent the parallels between the creational sequence of the Timaeus and the Mosaic cosmogony.³ The parallels undeniably have the purpose of giving Moses'

account a philosophical — nowadays one would say scientific or intellectual — respectability.

And indeed the parallels are impressive, above all in the general movement from the macrocosm, via the parts of the cosmos, to man the microcosm, whose creation is the climax of both accounts. But between the two accounts there are also important differences, which Philo recognizes and brings forward in his commentary with commendable clarity.

1. By speaking, metaphorically of course, of creation in six days Moses introduces the element of number. Number is intrinsic to order, and its presence deepens (in Philo's view) the symbolic connotations of the account.⁴

2. In explaining the seven days of the creational account Philo receives no opportunity to discuss in Plato's manner the creation of the cosmos as a whole, i.e. as composite of body and soul.⁵ Instead the special position assigned by Moses to 'day one' is recognized. The κόσμος νοητός, as paradigm of the visible cosmos about to be created, is itself created by God.⁶ In a sense 'day one' of the Mosaic cosmogony is equivalent to Plato's proemium.⁷ The exceptional and separate role of 'day one' is further indicated by the fact that twice Philo affirms that the creational account began with the making of heaven and ended with the making of man, in this way adhering closer to the actual Timaeus account.⁸

3. The sequence of the third and fourth days is problematic, for the earth and its vegetation are created before the heavenly bodies. The paradoxical order has a paedeutical purpose, exhorting man not to rely on probabilities but aim at sheer truth. Plato's warning that his creational sequence must contain a contingent element is in this way given a surprising twist.⁹ But the creation of the plants on the third day allows Moses to avoid another contingency in the Platonic sequence.¹⁰

4. Plato's sequence is entirely 'descending', from the cosmic soul to reptiles, fishes and shells. Moses chooses to 'descend' and then 'ascend' again, so that all is in readiness for man to exercise his task as ἡγεμών.¹¹

5. The Platonic demiurge retires half-way through the proceedings (the withdrawal perhaps hints at his mythical status).¹² Moses makes it clear that the rest spoken of on the seventh day is not literally to be applied to God, but is granted by God to his creatures.¹³ The seventh day, reverting back to the first through the arithmological relation of the monad and the hebdomad, emphasizes the continuity of creation. God's incessant activity ensures that creation is in fact a never-ending process.¹⁴

The differences between Moses and Plato are thus not to be explained away, but the main lines of agreement are more important. Philo chooses for Moses, as indeed he must.¹⁵ Could we ask him, he would indubitably affirm the superiority

of the older version.

The device of presenting the genesis of the cosmos as a sequence of creational events is valuable because it demonstrates in the clearest fashion the τάξις of created reality. The cosmos is an ordered whole, consisting of hierarchically organized parts and inhabitants.¹⁶ For its creation a blueprint is needed, the noetic cosmos as model. Heaven is created before the earth as an indication of its superiority.¹⁷ Also the hierarchy of living beings is indicated, if not wholly along the expected lines, by the order in which they are created.¹⁸ The importance of man's position in the cosmic order is indicated by his climactic position at the end of the sequence.¹⁹ Not only must man rule the earth, but, endowed with a rational soul, he can contemplate the rational movements of the heavens, discover his maker and attempt to become like him through the exercise of reason.²⁰ For Philo the incontrovertible anthropocentrism of the creational sequence is the consequence of its theocentrism.²¹ Above all the cosmic order leads to recognition of the creator. To deny the ordered state of the cosmos or regard it as the product of pure chance is in Philo's view impiety of the grossest kind, tantamount to atheism.²²

For all his appreciation of the sequential nature of the creation account, Philo firmly rejects the idea that the sequence itself has a temporal aspect. The fact that the cosmos was created in six days does not indicate that the creator needed a length of time to do his work, for it is probable that God does all things simultaneously (ἀμα πάντα ὁρᾶν), not only when he gives his commands (προσάττοντα) but also when he does his planning (δουνοούμενον).²³ Simultaneous creation does not preclude order, for the sequential nature of order is seen, if not in the finished products, certainly in the thinking processes of the builders.²⁴ The creational sequence is not temporal but *structural* (indicating order) or perhaps even *analytic* (analysing or reconstructing the indissociable).²⁵ It must *not*, however, be regarded as *hypothetical*. The creational sequence does not mean that, *if* the cosmos was created, it *would have been* put together in no other way than the way portrayed.²⁶ The Philonic passage on which this statement is based actually refers to the interpretation of the Timaeus. The fact that it is indubitably legitimate to transfer its purport to the interpretation of the Mosaic cosmogony²⁷ is eloquent testimony to the significance of the parallel which Philo perceives in the creational sequences of both accounts.

2.3. The two creational metaphors

Not many words are expended in the *Timaeus* on describing the nature of the demiurge. The creating god makes himself known primarily through his actions. But twice he is formally presented as ποιητής καὶ πατήρ, δημιουργὸς πατήρ τε.¹ Quite deliberately Plato juxtaposes the two kinds of creation, *demiurgic* and *procreative*, the one exploiting the *technological*, the other the *biological* metaphor.² A number of texts show in the clearest terms Philo's awareness of the parallelism of the two kinds of creation and the two metaphors, suggested or reinforced by his reading of the *Timaeus*.³ It will be instructive to gauge their respective influence on his thought.

Encouraged by the descriptions located in the sacred text,⁴ Philo makes extensive use of the conception of *demiurgic creation*. Terms such as δημιουργός, τεχνίτης, ποιητής and compounds with the root πλάσσω are among his most frequent appellations for God.⁵ A rich collection of metaphors describing the physical treatment of material can be assembled from the diverse passages where creation is discussed, such as dividing, separating, cutting, measurement, shaping and sculpting, lathing and building in general.⁶ A method of production noticeably more prevalent in Philo than Plato is the metaphor of moulding and stamping, for which not merely tools are required but also a die or a seal, i.e. an exemplar of the product to be made.⁷ What Philo wishes to emphasize above all in his use of the artisanal metaphor is the element of design and planning involved. Before making his product the craftsman must think it out in his mind, or he must look to a model.

The way is thus made clear for Philo's adaptation of Platonic exemplarism, i.e. the νοητὸν ζῆλον of the *Timaeus*, as seen most clearly in his image of the divine architect.⁸ Before the architect can build his city, he must conceive its plan in his mind, a mental 'blueprint' to serve as a model in the actual work of construction. The promotion from humble craftsman to sophisticated architect or town-planner is striking. Philo is underlining not only the complexity of the cosmic megalopolis, but also the superior status of the architect who does not merely copy an already existing model but designs the plan himself.⁹ The notions of creational sequence and demiurgic creation are clearly two sides of the same coin. Observation of the splendid structure of the cosmos must lead to recognition of the demiurgic creator, just as the sight of a well-constructed house gives one an idea of its builder.¹⁰ To describe God as δημιουργός is not merely the appropriation of a traditional epithet. It tells something important about the nature of his creative activity.

What consequences does the notion of demiurgic creation have for one's conception of matter? It is natural to compare matter to wood or stone or the

shapeless mass into which a seal is imprinted. Matter lies to hand unformed and awaiting the creative intervention of the demiurge. It is the ὕλη out of which (ἐξ οὗ) the cosmos is formed. This manner of presentation is exceedingly common in Philo.¹¹ He is even prepared to debate the question of how God calculated the exact amount of material required to create the cosmos.¹²

Also the conception of *procreative creation* recurs with regularity in Philo's writings. God's fatherhood, a well-known Biblical theme,¹³ has creational significance. God is the ἀγαθὸς γεννητὴς, and he can be said to have two sons, the first-born or elder as the Logos or noetic cosmos, the younger as the sense-perceptible cosmos.¹⁴ He has intercourse with his Wisdom and she, receiving the divine seeds, gives birth to the αἰσθητὸς κόσμος.¹⁵ Elsewhere Philo describes God's creativity with the images of sowing and planting also prominent in the *Timaeus*.¹⁶ Man makes a great mistake in thinking he is the cause of generation; parents are the instruments of creation, God the true procreator.¹⁷ The image of moulding can also convey procreative creation, significantly in the case of man's soul.¹⁸

It must be noted that, with regard to the planned nature of the process, there is an essential difference between procreative and demiurgic creation. The design of the final creature is not planned by discursive reasoning but is contained, embryonically so to speak, as a pattern in the seed of the procreator. The doctrine of the σπερματικὸς λόγος, extensively developed in the Stoa, is recognized by Philo in the processes of natural reproduction in the universe, but is not used to explain the creation of the cosmos itself by God.¹⁹

When the notion of procreative creation is used it also becomes necessary to view the material involved in the creative process in a different manner. One cannot speak of matter ἐξ οὗ but rather of a receptacle in which (ἐν ᾧ) the seed is placed and grows to maturity. Such a conception approximates Plato's presentation of the τρίτον γένος in the *Timaeus*, but Philo can do very little with it. He often depicts matter as female and passive, and describes it as *receiving* change, but goes no further.²⁰ The passage mentioned above, in which Σοφία functions as the womb giving birth to the cosmos is exceptional, and certainly does not imply an identification of the hypostasis with receptive matter.²¹

Given Philo's exploitation of both kinds of creation suggested by the *Timaeus* the question can now be posed. Which of the two does he regard as the more important and the more useful in explaining what creation means? Before a secure answer can be given a number of preliminary issues must be discounted. Firstly, Philo often uses terms such as δημιουργός and γεννητὴς without specific reflection on their content, and not too much should be made of such usage.

In the second place, he does not fail to recognize the metaphorical and conceptionally limited nature of both notions. How could images drawn from the world of sense-perceptible reality hope to circumscribe the divine creative activity which is properly speaking ἀπεργάφως?²² God's intercourse with his own knowledge takes place οὐχ ὡς ἄνθρωπος.²³ Concessions to the mythological thinking of the Greek cosmogonies is absolutely taboo.²⁴ The description of God as demiurge or maker is also implicitly qualified, as we shall see, by the affirmation that God himself does not touch chaotic matter, but leaves that to his instrumental Logos.²⁵ Thirdly a distinction must be made, as has already been hinted at, between creation on a cosmic scale and creation of individual parts of the cosmos. Especially for the creation of living beings, a process where the continuous nature of God's creative activity is apparent, the metaphor of procreative creation is the more suitable.

These points having been taken into consideration, there seems to me no doubt that with regard to his conception of creation in general Philo, here following the lead of Plato, regards the notion of demiurgic creation as the more important and illuminating of the two.²⁶ The technological metaphor is given precedence over the biological metaphor in order to describe God's creative activity. The explanation for the preference must lie in the fact that demiurgic creation gives more adequate expression to the deliberate and planned nature of creation. The teleological design of the cosmos, in which every part from the stars to the smallest insect has been given purpose, is the result of divine thought 'embodied' in the κόσμος νοητός as cosmic blueprint. For Philo Platonic *idealism* is essentially Platonic *exemplarism*. The construction of the tabernacle is a lucid symbol of the creation of the cosmos. The archetypal pattern is designed by Moses, who has God as his teacher. The visible copy is the work of the craftsman Bezalel, whose name signifies 'making in shadows'.²⁷ An obvious difficulty is presented by the non-material aspect of the cosmos, and especially the soul of man. Following the Mosaic anthropology Philo prefers to speak of inbreathing and moulding rather than Plato's bold image of a demiurgic metalworker mixing his 'soulstuff' like alloyed metal in a crater.²⁸ But, as we shall see, difficulties remain.²⁹

That Philo should choose to interpret scripture in such a way as to follow Plato in his predilection for the metaphor of demiurgic creation gains in significance if seen in the light of developments in Greek philosophy. Both Aristotle and the Stoa, in different ways, show a preference for the biological metaphor. Aristotle dissociates his highest god from involvement in the process of creation altogether and emphasizes the unconscious teleological striving of φύσις δημιουργοῦσα.³⁰ The Stoa in a sense reverts to Plato by ascribing to φύσις the conscious creativity of a τεχνίτης, but the φύσις is immanent and

the planned nature of creation is substantially undermined by the central place of cosmobiology in their system.³¹ Also in the Platonic tradition the distinction between the two kinds of creation gave rise to controversy. In Numenius the Platonic demiurge is split asunder, the first god being the πατήρ, the second the ποιητής.³² Plotinus sharply criticizes a reading of the Timaeus in terms of demiurgic creation. The cosmos cannot be the result of a kind of προόρασις or λογισμός θεοῦ, as if there was λόγος πρὸ ἔργου. It comes into being ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ οὐκ ἐκ λογισμοῦ, φύσεως ἀμείνωνος γεννώσης κατὰ φύσιν ὁμοιον ἑαυτῇ.³³ Plotinus, ever conscious of his use of images, does not accidentally speak of begetting here. Just as intellect emanates from the One, so the cosmos as composite of soul and body is a necessary excrescence from the world of higher reality.³⁴ No planning or choice or act of will is involved.³⁵

If, therefore, Philo shows a definite preference for the notion of demiurgic creation, how does he give expression to the actual process of creation itself? We discovered, both in the De opificio mundi and elsewhere in his oeuvre, a fondness on Philo's part for describing creation in terms of a change from disorder to order or, less often and less ambiguously, from non-being to being.³⁶ The model is patently Tim.30a, where Plato speaks of a pre-existent disharmonious 'realm of chaos' which the demiurge reduces to order and harmony. In terms of Plato's mythicizing narrative one can speak of an act or moment of creation, which through the notion of sequential creation is artificially divided up into diverse aspects. Philo too appears to indicate an act or moment of creation when he describes matter as undergoing a τροπή καὶ μεταβολή from ἀταξία to τάξις.³⁷ The Platonic realm of chaos is identified with pre-existent matter. The notion of demiurgic creation suggests the analogies of building materials, the sculptor's unhewn block, the smooth substance impressed by a seal. The analogies are recognizably imperfect and inevitably raise the question of the kind of existence that can be attributed to the pre-existent matter. What relation has that matter and the cosmos produced from it to God the creator? And what can be meant by an act or moment of creation, both in relation to the problem of time and to the nature of the divine activity? To these problems, the consequences of the notion of demiurgic activity, we must now turn.

2.4. The implications of genesis

To Philo's mind it must have been a particularly brilliant decision on the part of the Jewish lawgiver to give the opening book of his legislation the title Γένεσις and begin it with an account of the creation of the cosmos.¹ Moses did not beat about the bush. Right from the very start he resolves the

problem of whether the cosmos is eternal or created. This is one of the basic questions of philosophy, the result of reflection initiated by contemplation of the heavens.² Moses immediately shows himself superior to the philosophers and sophists, who, in their endless wranglings on this question, demonstrate the futility of their search for truth.³

Philo follows his master in declaring the createdness of the cosmos to be one of the pillars of his thought. An honoured place is reserved for it among the five δόγματα requisite for a blessed life.⁴ With fervour he attacks those thinkers who assert that the cosmos is uncreated (ἀγένητος) and eternal (ἀίδεος), without beginning or end. The Babel-builders, in towering their impious thoughts up to the sky, put forward views that are so extreme – there is no God or Providence, the cosmos is uncreated and indestructible or, if it has come into being, wholly subjected to chance – that they need not be taken too seriously.⁵ Much more insidious is the position of those who do not deny the existence of God (he might perhaps even be called creator), but persist in regarding the cosmos as uncreated and eternal.⁶ These men fail to perceive that their views imperil the doctrine of Providence and introduce an unseemly anarchy in the cosmic order. Philo's plurals are anonymous. He is not engaged in academic disputes or inter-school polemic. But among these men we can surely include Aristotle, Speusippus and Xenocrates. The debate on what cosmic γένεσις means in the Timaeus is never far away in the background.⁷

The cosmos is thus, according to Moses, γενητός. It has come into being and is subject to the processes of becoming. Although some parts of the sense-perceptible cosmos are more subject to the flux and tumult of corporeal existence than others, no part of it has the unchanging stable being of God and the noetic world. At the beginning of his commentary on the κοσμοποιία Philo attributes to Moses a virtual paraphrase of Tim.28a, the division between the realms of being and becoming with which Timaeus commences his account.⁸ The γένεσις is further underlined by a description of the process of creation as taking place in a sequence of six days. But Philo's clever solution to the interpretative problems of Gen.1, namely to regard the events of the first day as pertaining to the noetic cosmos, places him in an awkward situation. Moses describes the creation of the noetic cosmos as part of his creational narrative. Yet the difference between the worlds of sense-perceptible and intelligible reality must be preserved, unless the Platonizing basis of the interpretation is to collapse. The escape route is provided by the Mosaic description of the first day as ἡμέρα μία, 'day one'. To it none of the parts of the sense-perceptible cosmos are assigned.⁹ Its contents are invisible and noetic, so that to them the predication of ἀδολότης must be given.¹⁰ The distinction of the Timaeus between being and becoming is preserved, but at the same time

Philo can make a virtue out of exegetical necessity. The inclusion of the creation of the κόσμος νοητός is seen as an implicit attack against *Tim.* 52a, where Plato asserts that noetic reality is unrestrictedly ἀγέννητος καὶ ἀνώλεθρος.¹¹

The following question is what Philo takes the γένεσις or creation of the sense-perceptible cosmos to mean. Here it would not be too audacious to affirm that Philo's endeavour is to understand and explain the philosophical import of the Mosaic κοσμοποιία, but that the contours of his understanding are laid out by the insights supplied by the *Timaeus* and its interpretative tradition. The problems begin, not surprisingly, with the terms used to describe what creation is.¹² Just as the noun γένεσις can mean both 'the process of becoming' and 'coming into being, creation', so the corresponding adjective γεννητός denotes both 'subject to the process of becoming' and 'having come into being, having been created'. Later Platonists, incessantly fascinated with the question of whether the *Timaeus* should be interpreted in literal, i.e. temporal, terms or not, made detailed investigations of the various possible meanings of these words.¹³ The situation is exacerbated if the word ἀρχή is added in the phrase ἀρχὴ γενέσεως, for ἀρχή can mean both '(temporal) beginning' and '(ontologically higher) principle'.¹⁴

Because Philo unfortunately does not dwell on these terminological subtleties, it appears that his dogmatic pronouncement that the cosmos is γεννητός and not ἀγέννητος καὶ ἀίδεος can be read in two distinct ways: (1) in *protological* terms – the cosmos has come into being as result of a creative act on the part of its creator, described, however inadequately, in the Mosaic κοσμοποιία; (2) in *ontological* terms – the cosmos always has been and is continually coming into being or being created because it is dependent for its existence on a higher principle, its creator, i.e. γεννητός means οὐκ αὐτογέννητος¹⁵ and the Mosaic creational account is meant metaphorically. Other possible interpretations in symbolic or hypothetical terms are rejected outright.¹⁶

But a further aspect must be taken into consideration. If the protological interpretation is taken to mean a coming to be in time (*creatio temporalis*) it too must be rejected in Philo's view. Time is indicated, he affirms in sound Platonic fashion, by the movement of the heavenly bodies. There can be no such thing as pre-cosmic time, and an ἀρχὴ γενέσεως κατὰ χρόνον is philosophically impossible.¹⁷ But an alternative remains to rescue the protological view. If in the creative act God forms all things simultaneously and instantaneously, time is not involved in the creative process. Creation is *inceptively* temporal, not κατὰ χρόνον but σὺν χρόνῳ.¹⁸ As Philo says (rather glibly) at *Her.* 165, before the fourth day of creation there was αἰών, thereafter χρόνος.¹⁹ The two possible views on the cosmos' createdness are thus:²⁰

- (1) *protological* – *creatio simultanea*, ἀρχὴ γενέσεως (as beginning) οὐ

κατὰ χρόνον ἀλλὰ σὺν χρόνῳ

(2) *ontological* - *creatio aeterna*, ἀρχὴ γενέσεως as principle of becoming, cosmos created but temporally eternal.

A final observation, the importance of which should not be overlooked, is that the ontological interpretation *ipso facto* excludes the protological view, but the protological interpretation *is* able to incorporate the perpetual creation (*creatio continua*) which the ontological view emphasizes so strongly. If God created the cosmos in a creative act, it is likely that he will continue to care for the product he has made, ensuring the continuation of γένεσις through the cosmos' dependence on its source and origin.

Is it not unwise to dwell at such length on these properly philosophical problems, which may cause more turbulence in the minds of Philo's interpreters than they caused in the mind of Philo himself? Admittedly for the Alexandrian the recognition and acceptance of the createdness of the cosmos is much more important than philosophical speculation on what that createdness precisely connotes. Nevertheless he himself clearly shows his concern that that doctrine should not be imperilled by being understood in a philosophically illegitimate way. Moreover its connotations cannot be separated from the conception of God's nature and the evaluation of the nature of the cosmos, both issues close to Philo's heart.

It is no coincidence, therefore, that he returns to the doctrine in two of his philosophical treatises, the *De aeternitate mundi* and *De Providentia* I. In both cases the doctrine of the cosmos' createdness is brought in to shed clarificatory light on the main themes of the works. It is one of the most regrettable features of the Philonic legacy that both treatises remain enigmatic, the one being incomplete, the other imperfectly transmitted.²¹ In the former Philo, in overt dependence on the *Timaeus*, chooses for the viewpoint that the cosmos is created but will not be destroyed, being maintained by the will and providence of its creator. But the section of the treatise where Philo's own views would have emerged in full clarity is not available. A good indication of the difficulties involved is supplied by the argument on time at *Aet.* 52-54, which is presented to prove the Aristotelian position of the uncreatedness and eternity of the cosmos.²² If time is ἀγένητος, then the cosmos is also ἀγένητος. The nature of time is ἀναρχος καὶ ἀτελεύτητος; there could not ever have been a time when there was no time, since the expressions 'ever' and 'was' already indicate time. Thus both time and the cosmos must be ἀγένητος καὶ ἀύδους. We can be absolutely certain that the argument in this form was unacceptable for Philo, for it runs directly counter to his profound conviction that the cosmos is *not* ἀγένητος. Time is dependent on the cosmos, so if

the cosmos had a commencement in creation and/or is dependent on a higher cause, the same must apply to time.²³ But the problem of Philo's understanding of γένεσις is herewith not fully resolved. The situation in the De Providentia I is even more frustrating. The expectations are high when it appears in §6 that creatio aeterna is explicitly rejected. But the promised 'clear observations' in the following paragraphs are by no means clear to us,²⁴ and it is ill-advised to build doctrinal castles on such shaky foundations.²⁵

It seems the best course, therefore, to admit the difficulties which the Philonist faces on this issue and make a number of observations.

1. It can certainly not be assumed on a priori grounds that Philo as a Jew must necessarily believe in a real creational event.²⁶ It is instructive to compare the Medieval Jewish philosopher, Maimonides, who in his The Guide of the Perplexed affirms that belief in the eternity of the cosmos in no way invalidates the demonstration of God's existence, unity and incorporeality, and that those texts of the Torah which relate the creation of the cosmos in time could easily be given a figurative interpretation.²⁷ (Nevertheless he concludes that one should follow the prophet in asserting creation in time (properly understood, of course), since it is an open question which speculation cannot settle, and the notion of creation in time is 'less disgraceful' than that of the eternity of the cosmos.)²⁸
2. The wording used by Philo to describe creation definitely encourages the interpreter to opt for the protological interpretation. One should note: (a) the numerous times when he speaks in terms of 'when God created the cosmos...', without ever qualifying himself as he often does in the case of anthropomorphic and anthropopathic expressions concerning God;²⁹ (b) the use of the phrase ἀρχὴ γένεσεως, especially in conjunction with the aorist λαβεῖν;³⁰ (c) the praise of Aristotle's (literal) understanding of the Timaeus;³¹ (d) the evidence of De Providentia I (tentatively), especially the use of the proof texts from the Timaeus in §20-21.³²
3. Even though it may be helpful for the interpreter to look at Philo's wording, this evidence *will not be sufficient* to settle the issue. Since the interpretation of creatio aeterna was known to Philo — this at least the De Providentia I proves — he must have had grounds for rejecting it, if indeed he did reject it. Certainly Moses (and maybe also Plato) held views that he regarded as authoritative, but that does not exclude the possibility of various (and possibly non-literal) interpretations.
4. Two important texts, Opif. 7-11 and Aet. 15, which declare the cosmos to be γεννητός on account of the providential relation between maker and product, father and son, do not necessarily exclude the possibility of a doctrine of creatio aeterna, nor do they compel such an interpretation.³³ Other factors and

evidence need to be taken into account.³⁴

5. Finally the crucial aspect of the possibility of levels of interpretation must be examined.³⁵ For Winston and Nikiprowetzky it is the indispensable support on which their view of creatio aeterna rests.³⁶ It is true that when Philo declares that 'there was a time when the cosmos did not exist',³⁷ or when he uses expressions such as *πρὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως*,³⁸ he must be regarded as speaking with a lack of rigour. And also statements that the cosmos began at the vernal equinox should not be given much weight.³⁹ It is, however, quite a different matter to suggest that Philo regards Moses' description of creation as on the same level as what he says about God's anger or God's arms and legs. The De opificio mundi is, as all will agree, not written for beginners in the science of understanding scripture. It seems to me profoundly implausible that *on the same page* that Philo discloses highly intimate thoughts on the relation between God and his Logos in the creational process,⁴⁰ he should wish to exegete the *ἐν ἀρχῇ* of Gen. 1:1 by adducing the conception of an *ἀρχὴ οὐ κατὰ χρόνον*,⁴¹ when what he really holds in his deepest thoughts is an *ἀρχὴ κατ' οὐσίαν* (i.e. because *γεννητὸς ὁ κόσμος οὐ τῷ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν λαβεῖν, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὸν θεὸν ἀρχὴν ἀγέννητον ἔχειν ἐξ ἀεὶ εἰς ἀεὶ*⁴²). Doctrinal esotericism is one of the more important results of the influence of Platonism on Philo's thinking. It lies at the heart of the allegorical and symbolical method. But it is largely a *transparent* esotericism, into which readers possessing the right qualifications can be initiated by reading the exegete's books.⁴³ Naturally such readers must be on their toes, ever ready to pick up the subtle hint and connect up various explanations, but it is unnecessary to require that they must discern Philo to mean what he never says.⁴⁴ The notion of a 'double esotericism' in Philo's writings must be firmly rejected.⁴⁵

If as the reader will have surmised, our inclination is to favour the protological interpretation of creation, it is not yet time to draw conclusions. As observed above, there are other subjects that must be discussed first, foremost among which is Philo's theology.

2.5. The doctrine of God

Philo's doctrine of God is the coping stone of his thought. By this is not only meant that his thinking is theocentric. One could hardly imagine an alternative point of focal concern for a commentator of the Pentateuch. No, the image of the coping stone aptly suggests that an understanding of Philo's views on the nature and activity of God will ensure that the other aspects of his thinking will settle securely into place.

Starting point for Philo's doctrine of God is to be sought nowhere else than in the God of the Pentateuch, the God who tolerates no other gods beside him, the God of Israel who revealed himself to the Patriarchs and above all to the prophet and nomothete Moses. This God said to Abraham, ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ θεός σου (Gen.17:1).¹ To Moses his self-description was even more sublime, ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὢν; but so that mankind would not lack a title with which to address him he added an αἰώνιον ὄνομα, κύριος ὁ θεός τῶν πατέρων ὑμῶν θεός Αβραάμ καὶ θεός Ισαάκ καὶ θεός Ιακώβ (Ex.3:14-15).² But the fact that Philo is prepared to allegorize this God-given name is already a telling sign that he does not wish to be restricted in his theology by the perspective of national religion. In moments of apologetically directed optimism he declares that this God is acknowledged by Greeks and barbarians alike (even if the Jewish race alone knows how to worship him in a worthy manner), that the God propounded by the most highly reputed philosophy and made known through the Jewish Law is the same most ancient and highest cause.³ And when Philo wishes to reflect on God's nature and explain what can be thought and said about him, he turns – fateful decision! – to the impressive achievements of the philosophical theology of the Greeks.

In giving a thumb-nail sketch of Philo's ideas on God, it will be the most expedient and efficient course to begin with a brief summary of the doctrines which Philo, in explaining scripture, has derived from the various Greek philosophical authors and schools. The reader is warned, however, that this procedure risks giving the erroneous impression that his doctrine of God is no more than the sum of its sources.

1. The Stoa. God is not contained but contains. He fills the entire universe with his powers, so that he can be said to be everywhere (but also nowhere) present at the same time. How could Cain be so foolish as to think that he will be hidden from God (Gen.4:14)?⁴ But Stoic ideas on pantheism and God's corporeal nature are so obviously false that Philo hardly ever bothers to polemicize against them.⁵ Also the language of λόγος and φύσις for God's operation in the cosmos recalls Stoic theology.⁶

2. Aristotle and the Peripatetics. Diverse aspects of the Stagirite's theology,⁷ whether drawn from the exoteric works or filtered through from the scholastic writings, have left their trace in Philo: (a) God as first or highest αἰτίον;⁸ (b) God as wholly stable and immobile, but the source of movement for all other beings;⁹ (c) God as unceasingly active, achieving his purpose with absolute ease.¹⁰ The oracle communicated to the all-wise Moses, οὐ δὲ αὐτοῦ στήθε μετ' ἑμοῦ (Deut.5:31), reveals God's immutability, but also that the sage is granted the privilege of joining him in that perfect state.¹¹ Furthermore the distinction between God's οὐσία and δύναμις, so important in

Philo's theology, may have been derived from the Peripatetic tradition; witness the remarkable parallel in the De Mundo.¹²

3. Plato and the Platonist tradition (1). From Plato Philo gains support for the conception of God as maker and father, creator and providential maintainer of the cosmos. God, forming the noetic world in his mind and looking to it as model, stands in opposition to formless matter and, because he is good, transforms it into the most perfect of products, the cosmos. Here is the theology of the Timaeus, easily converted into the doctrine of the three ἀρχαί in Middle Platonism.¹³ Philo need look no further for the creator God of Gen.1.

4. Plato and the Platonist tradition (2). But the theology that can be read into Republic VI & VII is also critically important. God alone is true being (τὸ ὄντως ὄν), the source of being and knowledge for all other existents.¹⁴ Just as the sun illumines himself and is the source of light to all other visible objects, so God is his own brightness, by which light he alone can be seen.¹⁵ The visio dei is the ultimate quest, accessible only to the eye of the soul (Rep.533d). It was granted to the spiritual athlete Jacob, as indicated by the new name he received, Israel ὁ ὀρῶν τὸν θεόν (cf. Gen.32:29).¹⁶ Philo does *not*, however, grasp the opportunity presented by the ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας of Rep.509b in order to suggest that God is beyond being.¹⁷

5. The Old Academy and Neopythagoreanism. God is the One or the Monad,¹⁸ or, in an even loftier affirmation of divine transcendence and simplicity, καὶ ἑνός καὶ μονάδος πρεσβύτερον.¹⁹ When Abraham, sitting at the oaks of Mamre, receives three divine visitors but addresses God in the singular (cf. Gen.18), the allegorical interpretation discloses that God with his two chief powers can appear as a triad, but the mind initiated in the highest mysteries recognizes God as one.²⁰ But God's oneness does not exclude being; he is τὸ ἓν καὶ ἡ μονάς, τὸ ὄντως ὄν.²¹ In the combination of Platonism and Neopythagoreanism the way is made clear for the negative theology with its list of negative attributes which plays such an important role in Philo's theology.²²

It will be immediately apparent that it is going to be a formidable job to force all these doctrinal insights into the straightjacket of a systematic theology along Philonic lines. Our author never made the attempt himself - nothing could be further from his intentions - but modern scholars have not shrunk back from the task.²³ Indispensable for the endeavour are the doctrines of the Logos, powers and ideas, by which *levels* of speaking about God's nature or the element of *intermediation* are introduced, at the risk of imperilling the doctrine of God's unity. No less baffling is the question of the relation between the 'personal' God of scripture and the 'abstract' God of philosophy. It is clear that Philo sees no contradiction between the two. Less clear is how he thinks he can effectuate this 'concurrence' in a satisfying manner.²⁴

But it is time now to add some comments on the cognitive side of Philo's doctrine of God, an aspect certainly no less important than what has so far been discussed.

The obverse side of God's utter transcendence is man's limitation in the quest for knowledge of him, a limitation only greater for the exegete of the Law who is called on to work at second hand, not recording his own ideas and experiences but explaining the words of the divinely blessed prophet. Like a purple thread running through Philo's works is the oft-repeated distinction between God's existence (ὑπαρξίς) and his essence (οὐσία). The quest for knowledge is intrinsically laudable and should be passionately pursued, but man cannot proceed further than knowing *that God exists* (εἰ ἔστιν), not *what he is* (τί ἐστίν).²⁵ If man could know God's essence he would, according to the axiom that like is known unto like, be equal to God, the mere thought of which is sacrilegious.²⁶ Even the great Moses was rebuffed when he longingly supplicated God, 'reveal yourself to me', and received the reply, 'you shall see what is behind me, but my face you shall not see' (Ex.33:18-23).²⁷ How then does man gain that knowledge of God to which his own nature gives him access? Philo takes his cue from God's reply to Moses just cited. God's existence is made known through what follows after him, that is through his *relationality*.²⁸ God as τὸ ὄν is absolute (ὄν ἢ ὄν), but through his powers and Logos he stands in relation (πρός τι) to what has come into being.²⁹ God is thus known through what he achieves in the cosmos via his powers, as is well perceived in the cosmological argument mentioned earlier in this chapter.³⁰

A few texts (notably Praem.40-46 on Jacob ὁ ὀρῶν τὸν θεόν) indicate a higher way, when God reveals his existence through himself alone, φωτὶ φῶς.³¹ How this occurs Philo does not explain, except that knowledge of God's essence is precluded. Wolfson interprets the higher way as an act of revelation and prophecy, but Winston is right in protesting against the implication that in the process the powers of rationality are bypassed, even if God himself must initiate the breakthrough.³² I envisage Philo thinking of a process analagous to the mind's enrolment in the noetic world, in which the sense-perceptibility and multiplicity of the cosmos is stripped away, discursive reasoning is bypassed and God's existence is intuitively apprehended as a unity at the level of the Logos.³³ Also this knowledge, however, cannot and does not proceed *beyond* the relational. God in his absoluteness is unknowable. The interpreter of Philo's doctrine of God must exercise great care in not breaking the epistemic limits set by Philo himself.³⁴

A final aspect of Philo's theology which deserves more attention than it has received and in which the Alexandrian may well have been innovatory is his usage of the notion of κατὰχρησις.³⁵ The term κατὰχρησις refers to the *misuse*

of language and is usually contrasted to the proper (κύριος) or true (ἀληθής) use of a word.³⁶ Most of the instances in Philo are applied to our speaking of God.³⁷ God as τὸ ὄν is nameless, ἄρρητος καὶ ἀκατονόμαστος, but by licence of language (ἐν καταχρήσει) he may be spoken of and addressed by his diverse names, notably the Biblical κύριος and θεός. Especially the exchange between God and Moses at Ex.3:14-15 invites application of this idea. God as ὁ ὢν has as his nature τὸ εἶναι and not τὸ λέγεσθαι, but by κατάχρησις he makes himself known as κύριος ὁ θεός, i.e. by reference to his powers.³⁸ It is apparent that the notion of κατάχρησις, though specifically concerned with the naming and describing of God, cannot be seen apart from the more general principles of Philo's doctrine of God.

2.6. God the Creator

God as ποιητὴς καὶ πατήρ is the creator of the cosmos, but his creatorship constitutes but one aspect, and not the highest, of his divine nature. This was, for our purposes, the most important result of the brief sketch of Philo's doctrine of God. God, as absolute being, gives a share of his being to the cosmos and his parts, thereby granting his creatures existence but at the same time making his own existence known. The conception of God as creator is so important because it constitutes that aspect of God's being most immediately accessible to human observation and reasoning. Plato, whether in dependence on Moses or independently of him, had recognized the createdness of the cosmos and the creatorship of God. Here for Philo lies the essential message of the Timaeus.

'God, in his capacity as God, anticipated that a beautiful copy could never come into existence apart from a beautiful model... Wishing to create this visible cosmos, he first formed in relief the noetic cosmos, so that with the use of an incorporeal and wholly God-like model, he might produce the incorporeal universe...'¹ From the Timaeus Philo has learnt the correlation between a good model and a good product, but the uncertainty in the dialogue concerning the relation between demiurge and model has been trenchantly resolved. God is above the ideas and he 'creates' them as a plan for the visible cosmos.² Where else can they be located than in the divine mind, that is in the Logos, as product of God's thinking?³ The demiurge is up-graded by as much as the ideas are down-graded. Certainly the 'real' supra-cosmic existence of the latter is not questioned,⁴ but the being that is predicated of them is not absolute but relative, relative to the creator above them and, in a quite different sense, to the cosmos below. Thus, in a paradoxical way, eternity

can be predicated of the ideas, and yet by their 'creation' on 'day one' Moses indicates that the κόσμος νοητός does not possess the absolute being that can only be attributed to God.⁵

God's creative activity can be seen as an act of creation and as a process of creation, depending on the point of view. Philo's verdict is that the latter is not a contradiction but a continuation of the former. If creation should be conceived as an act of converting disorder into order, an act in which movement and time are initiated, that must not be taken to mean that the creator's creative involvement is of only momentary duration. Philo insists that creation is a never-ending process, for the creator himself is eternally and never-ceasingly active. The Jewish custom of circumcision symbolizes precisely that it is not man but God who truly creates, ensuring the preservation of the human race.⁶ The rest enjoined to man on the Sabbath does not indicate inactivity on God's part, but teaches the absolute antithesis between God's ἐνέργεια and man's ἀπραξία.⁷ The legacy of the *Timaeus* is at this point a little ambivalent. The talk of the demiurge's retirement and the handing over of creative tasks to the 'young gods' could possibly mislead. Philo must follow Moses, difficult though the interpretative task may be. Purposes of theodicy constrain Moses to recognize that God calls in assistance for the creation of man,⁸ and he is quite prepared to admit that the heavenly bodies have a ruling function in the cosmos.⁹ But God alone creates and does so unceasingly and untiringly. He alone must be worshipped.¹⁰ On the other hand, the doctrine of divine Providence which Philo locates in the *Timaeus*, i.e. that the never-ceasing activity of the creator finds expression in the maintenance of the cosmos' splendid διακόσμησις, is most welcome. Although the cosmos has come into being and is *ipso facto* subject to the processes of decay and destruction, it will in fact never be destroyed, being held together by the will and providential care of its creator.¹¹

In what way, then, must the nature of God's creative activity be conceived? Philo's reinterpretation of the creational account introduces a crucial new factor. To the Biblical language of *speaking* and *making* must be added the Platonic language of *thinking*.¹² Thought, the only activity wholly dissociated from corporeality and sense-perception, is in the tradition of Greek intellectualism the activity that must be attributed to God *par excellence*. The creator's first task is the 'thinking out' of the noetic cosmos as object of his thought. Planning is a prior form of activity than execution (even if both occur simultaneously),¹³ as is clearly shown in the architect image.¹⁴ Elsewhere, but not in *Opif.*, Philo entrusts the actual execution of the creative activity to the Logos as instrument of creation, direct contact between God and matter being regarded as out of the question.¹⁵ The demiurgic metaphor

which Philo borrows from the Timaeus is thus reformulated, but in a way that is hardly inconsistent with the fundamental principles of Platonism. The doctrinal development of the 'creation' of the ideas as the objects of thought of God as νοῦς is, to borrow a phrase from Dillon, a 'tidying-up' of Plato's thought.¹⁶ But the introverted self-ratiocination and self-contemplation of an Aristotelian νοῦς as highest God is far removed from Philo's conception of God's activity. Although Philo does not say in explicit terms how God's thinking is related to his providential activity of continuous creation,¹⁷ one might surmise that God, by continuously thinking the noetic cosmos in the Logos, enables the Logos continuously to effectuate that the visible cosmos corresponds κατὰ δύναμιν to its intelligible model. The intellectualistic conception of the divine activity is of central significance for Philo's anthropology, as will emerge in greater detail below.¹⁸

God's creative activity is not only noetic and never-ceasing, it is also beneficent to a supreme degree. The cosmos is good because its creator is good. Indeed the motive for the creative act – and here Philo unreservedly, if anonymously, acknowledges his debt to the Timaeus¹⁹ – lies in the intrinsic goodness of the divine nature.²⁰ In creation God allows his creatures to share in the goodness which in its fulness is his and his alone. Because of the overwhelming abundance of God's goodness his creatures are unable to receive the χάριτες unless they are measured out, a task consigned primarily to the Logos.²¹ Here for the first time, to our knowledge, the Platonic conception of the demiurge's goodness and the Judaeo-Christian conception of God the creator are brought together, an event of enormous implications for the history of ideas.²²

But immediately a delicate problem arises. The goodness that Plato has in mind and the goodness envisaged by Biblical writers resist simple identification. Platonic goodness is essentially *metaphysical*, signifying excellence of being, whereas the goodness of the God of the Bible is best described in terms of *grace*, the lovingkindness and forbearance shown by a father to his children. The contrast being drawn here is doubtless difficult to describe with sufficient nuance, but in my view it rests on a solid foundation.²³ To which of these two does Philo, who has brought them together, incline?²⁴ The fact that he twice introduces the theme of God's goodness as creator in relation to the *grace* that Noah found with the Lord God²⁵ may encourage the interpreter to conclude that Philo is taking over the language and thematics of the Timaeus without understanding it in the same way.²⁶ In fact the problem here is no more than an extension of the problem of the relation between the abstract and the personal conception of the divine nature raised above. Philo combines and refuses to see a contradiction. Inasmuch as Philo regards God as

pure Being (τὸ ὄν), the goodness that proceeds from him will have a 'metaphysical' flavour. It is indeed unmistakably present in the *De opificio mundi*, where, let it be noted, no Biblical text *compels* the introduction of the theme of God's goodness.²⁷ Also strongly influenced by Plato is the emphasis placed on theodicy.²⁸ God the creator is the cause of good only. The source of the evil that is undeniably present in the cosmos must be sought elsewhere. Even chastening and retributory punishment, which have a paedeutical purpose and are ultimately beneficial, are not administered directly by God but through the agency of his powers or ministering angels.

The themes relating to God's creatorship so far discussed, important though they are for our subject, are hardly very surprising or problematic once the nature of Philo's undertaking is understood. It is when one attempts to fill in the interstices between them and place them in the perspective of Philo's doctrine of God as a whole that numerous questions arise. The aim must be to zoom in on those problems that are likely to have preoccupied the Alexandrian himself. Three in particular may be suggested.

1. Transcendence and creation. Does the transcendence of God, on which Philo is so insistent, pose a threat to or even exclude him from creatorship? The question is not raised by the *Timaeus* on its own, but immediately comes into focus when the Idea of the Good of the *Republic* is introduced. The image in *Opif.* might induce the interpreter to think of a divine hierarchy in the Middle Platonist manner,²⁹ for a distinction is made between the munificent king and the designing and executing architect. One might judge on *a priori* grounds that Philo's Judaic heritage of monotheism would cause him to show great hesitation before agreeing with such a hierarchy, even if it is the logical outcome of his Platonizing sympathies. In fact Philo *does all he can* to avoid the consequence of a first and second God.³⁰ God the wholly transcendent One is also the creator. But must not immediately the riposte be expected that God's creatorship is palliated by the employment of intermediaries in the act and process of creation? Especially relevant is the doctrine of the powers, by which the creative and beneficent activity of God is located in one of his two chief powers, as signified in the divine name θεός.³¹ Wolfson speaks at this point of the 'fiction of intermediaries'. The phrase appeals to us, though not what the American scholar means by it.³² The doctrine that God makes use of intermediaries in order to create is a philosophical fiction, necessary to preserve the conviction of God's transcendence. But even if God employs his Logos and powers in the creative task, it is still *he who creates*. Herein lies the secret of the compressed formula that the νοητὸς κόσμος is nothing else than the θεοῦ λόγος ἤδη κοσμοποιούντος.³³ God and Logos are only

conceptually, not actually separable, as indeed are the king and the architect,³⁴ and the oneness of God is not endangered. How then must the fact that God is creator be seen in relation to his unqualified transcendence? An answer can only be given in paradoxical or negative terms. God both is and is not raised high above creatorship.³⁵ God's creative activity, as one aspect of his being, in no way circumscribes, let alone exhausts, his divine nature. Any attempt to proceed beyond this point is to attempt to map the contours of God's essence, a task beyond human capacity, even that of the great Moses. The doctrine of the powers has generally been regarded as Philo's attempt to *solve* the philosophical problem of God's transcendence and his creatorship. It might seem a daring thesis, but to our mind the doctrine appears designed | more to *draw attention* to the problem than actually to solve it.³⁶

2. Divine will and divine immutability. Creation, writes De Vogel,³⁷ is not merely the procession of the relative out of the absolute, but entails that this procession is the result of a conscious act of will on the part of the creator. Our concern here is not with the correctness of De Vogel's definition of creation. But it may help us to determine how Philo views this central problem. In his explanation of the Mosaic creational account he takes over the Timaeon notion of God's will and goes a step further, affirming that God *wished* (βουληθεύς) to create this visible cosmos.³⁸ Illustrating the thesis that God βούλεται μόνα τὰγαθὰ, his thoughts immediately turn to the creation and maintenance of the cosmos.³⁹ On the other hand, Philo is no less convinced that God is immutable, not subject to the processes of change. God as τὸ ὄν is ἀτρέπτον καὶ ἀμετάβλητον, completely self-sufficient and both πρὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως and μετὰ τὴν γένεσιν τοῦ παντός remaining ἐν ὁμοίῳ.⁴⁰ Also in exercising his care over created reality God does not change; hence the stability of the cosmos itself.⁴¹ The problem, first raised by Aristotle, of what God was doing before he created the universe (unemployment, sleep and so on) does not appear very troubling to Philo.⁴² Not ἀπραξία but ἐνέργεια must be predicated of the creator.⁴³ Philo's concern is rather, and here defence is turned into attack, that if the cosmos is *not created* God must be accused of ἀπραξία, for there would be no relationship between God and the cosmos requiring him to be providentially active.⁴⁴ Only God can authentically combine rest and labour, immutability and creative activity. But already the third problem area looms.

3. The objects of God's thought. For Plato the cosmos is unique because of the unicity of the model. Philo, having placed the ideas within God, declares the cosmos to be one because God its creator is one.⁴⁵ But then how does the κόσμος νοητός as model or exemplar of the cosmos relate to the fullness of God's thought? Wolfson emphatically asserts that the κόσμος νοητός

does not exhaust the divine thinking:⁴⁶

...inasmuch as the mind of God is always active, always thinking, and never devoid of objects of thought, it is to be assumed that in the mind of God from eternity there had existed an infinite variety of ideas, not patterns of things of our world, but rather patterns of things of an infinite variety of possible worlds, from among which God conceived the particular patterns of things which in His wisdom were the most suitable for this world of ours which He decided to create.

Winston appears to reach the opposite conclusion.⁴⁷ God, in eternally thinking the Forms, eternally creates the κόσμος νοητός and hence also its shadow reflection, the sensible cosmos. No act of will is involved and, since God cannot act against his own nature, the cosmos cannot be produced in any other way than it has eternally been made.

It may be objected that the problem is wholly speculative. Indeed not a word on it will be found in Philo. It is, however, the consequence of the creationism of the Timaeus read into the Mosaic account and is directly related to his explicit mention of God's will. The aim must be to penetrate to the assumptions which enable Philo to feel justified in importing the Platonic scheme, but not to supply solutions to problems that to him may not have appeared problematic. The Wolfsonian idea of infinite κόσμοι νοητοῦ with its stress on total divine omnipotence conflicts with the legacy of Platonic rationalism which Philo has inherited. Just as there is for every visible object in the class of τὰ κατὰ φύσιν a perfect exemplar, so there is only one best way to design and create the cosmos, the way the creator in his goodness actually created it. So far the view of Winston is to be preferred. But must it be concluded that the cosmos is the *necessary* result of the outflow of God's goodness?⁴⁸ Is the concept of an act of will on God's part merely a concession to human ways of describing God's creative activity? Taking the cue from De Vogel, I would hesitate to draw this conclusion. The fact that God in his thought conceived the best of possible worlds does not entail that he necessarily had to bring it into existence in its inferior enmattered form. His eternal activity and unchanging nature are guaranteed by the processes of his thought and the transcendence of his being.⁴⁹ God's decision to create the cosmos must be affirmed - Philo is eager to stress the will of the demiurgic creator - but can hardly be the subject of philosophical investigation, for in so doing one must overstep the bounds of 'that God is' and attempt to penetrate into 'what God is'.⁵⁰

Most important for Philo is that God, in having decided to create the cosmos, also undertakes a 'covenant' with his creatures, expressed by means of the unceasing activity of divine Providence or, in the language of the doctrine of the powers, by the polarity of his creatorship and rulership. The ark placed in the innermost sanctuary fittingly receives a cosmic interpretation,

the Cherubim symbolizing the two highest powers of him that is:⁵¹

μόνος γὰρ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ὢν καὶ ποιητὴς ἐστὶν ἀψευδῶς, ἐπειδὴ τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἤγαγεν εἰς τὸ εἶναι, καὶ βασιλεὺς φύσει, διότι τῶν γεγονότων οὐδεὶς ἂν ἄρχου δικαιότερον τοῦ πεποιηκότος (Mos.2.100).

2.7. The Logos

It is in the doctrine of the Logos that Philo, as commentator on the Mosaic account of creation, deviates the most from the Timaeus. The word λόγος, one of the key terms in Greek philosophy, of course occurs frequently in the dialogue. At one point Plato even speaks of the λόγος (καὶ δυνάμει) θεοῦ, signifying thereby divine 'reasoning' or 'calculation'.¹ But the notion of the divine λόγος as an established theological conception is not found. In Philo, on the other hand, it is one of the most important and pervasive features of his thought. It is also arguably the most difficult, not least because of the remarkably wide spectrum of functions and attributes which the Logos is given.² In our Analysis it emerged that a number of these were demonstrably related to Philo's reading of the cosmological dialogue.

1. The Logos as place of the noetic cosmos. The κόσμος νοητός as plan or model for the visible cosmos is to be located nowhere else than in the divine Logos,³ or can even be said to coincide with the Logos of God as he is actually engaged in the act of creation.⁴ The Logos is the ἀρχέτυπος σφραγὶς, τὸ παράδειγμα, ἀρχέτυπος ἰδέα τῶν ἰδεῶν.⁵ Clearly the divine Logos is very close to being identified with the Platonic model, i.e. as the thoughts of God structured in a unity to form the plan of the cosmos and at the same time representing the totality of the ideas.⁶ It would be more accurate, however, to describe the model as the noetic aspect of the Logos, for the Logos is also considered to contain the power(s) of God active in the creational process.⁷ At the same time the Logos must be regarded as the εἰκὼν of God, a designation which has received the imprimatur of Moses.⁸ The cosmos and man the microcosm are both image of an image. In spite of the Platonic terminology this idea is difficult to fit into the conceptuality of the Timaeus.⁹

2. The Logos as instrument of creation. In the image of Opif.17-18 the architect not only designs the city but also, like a δημιουργὸς ἀγαθός, executes his plan by constructing it out of stones and timber.¹⁰ The Logos is employed by God the creator as the instrument (ὄργανον) through or with which (δύ' οὗ or ᾧ) he creates the cosmos.¹¹ The creator does not enter into direct contact with matter,¹² but employs the Logos as cutter (τομεύς), which he whets like a sword so that it can perform its task with skill and precision.¹³ Not

dissimilar is the role given to the Logos as measurer of God's goodness, in which the noetic and the instrumental aspects are combined.¹⁴ It is apparent that the creational representation of the Timaeus has undergone modification, for the Platonic demiurge, as ποιητὴς καὶ πατήρ, does not hesitate to deal directly with the material at his disposal, as shown by the wealth of demiurgic imagery discussed above.¹⁵ The change is not peculiar to Philo. It is the result of developments in the interpretative tradition of the Timaeus and is given a particularly clear formulation in the doctrine of 'prepositional metaphysics'. The identification of the instrumental cause with the Logos is, however, less common.¹⁶

3. The Logos as replacement for the cosmic soul. In Philo the conception of a cosmic soul is deliberately avoided, in spite of the central role which it is given in the Timaeus.¹⁷ In its place the Logos is assigned the function of representing the immanent presence of the divine in the cosmos. From the manner in which Philo describes the presence and activity of the Logos it can be discerned that he is conscious of the Platonic cosmic soul in the background.¹⁸ It is particularly evident when Philo emphasizes the permeation of the Logos, extended or stretched from one limit of the cosmos to the other.¹⁹ The Logos is moreover considered to hold the cosmos together and prevent its dissolution. The ἀναλογία, ἁρμονία and δεσμός of the Timaeus are theologized and transferred to the Logos.²⁰ It may thus be regarded as the instrument of God's never-ceasing creative activity and maintenance of the cosmos.²¹ Why is the cosmic soul of the Timaeus replaced when so many of its tasks remained indispensable? The influence of philosophical fashions must be given its due. The Stoa had transmuted Plato's cosmic soul into their Logos and the 'modernized' concept passed into Middle Platonism.²² For Philo it is important that the idea of the divine Logos more easily and convincingly illuminates scriptural thought than the idea of a cosmic soul, for which in the Mosaic κοσμοποιία, for example, there is absolutely no place.²³ The conclusion, however, that the doctrine of the Logos represents a Stoicizing (and thus anti-Platonic) element in Philo's thought is unwarranted.²⁴ The Logos is *not* an immanent active and formative *principle*, but receives its instructions from 'higher up'. This is well illustrated by the use of imagery to describe the Logos' providential role. The Logos is God's viceroy (ὑπαρχος), the reinsman in service of God the charioteer, the rudder used by God the pilot.²⁵

4. The Logos and the microcosm. The relation of the Logos to man's mind or rational part of the soul will be discussed in the section dealing with the influence of the Timaeus on Philo's doctrine of man.²⁶

The Logos in Philo can be defined in the most general terms as that aspect

— or part of the divine that stands in relation to created reality. Whenever God is described as engaged in creative or providential activity, he does so in the guise or through the agency of the Logos. The Logos functions as a kind of divine Factotum, summoned whenever and wherever God comes into contact with the sense-perceptible cosmos (whether planned or actually created) and always entrusted with the 'dirty work' necessarily involved in creation. The role of the Logos is thus intimately connected with the problem of the relation between God's transcendence and creatorship discussed in the previous section. We consider that an important confirmation of our conclusions reached there is provided by the remarkable and insufficiently noticed fact that the divine Logos is *never* given the status of the ποιητής καὶ πατήρ or demiurgic creator.²⁷ It must not be thought that God in his transcendence hands over the task of creation to the Logos as δημιουργός, for this might lead to the dangerous conclusion that God is wholly remote from the cosmos and only related to it through the intermediation of someone or something else. It is God the ποιητής καὶ πατήρ who creates, but he does so *at the level* of his Logos as place of the noetic world or *in the guise* of his creative power and *through the agency* of the Logos as instrument of creation. It is possible to go a step further. Through the doctrine of the Logos God can be said to be *immanent* in the universe which he created without the affirmation of his transcendence being put at risk.

So far so good. If, however, the Philonic doctrine of the Logos is subjected to a closer and more critical examination, one cannot fail to notice difficulties, the chief of which emerges in full clarity if the three functions of the Logos most closely related to the Timaeus are surveyed. The first appears to be situated at a different, i.e. higher, level than the third, while the second can be viewed as a bridge between them. Let me explain. When the Logos is regarded as the 'embodiment' of God's thought focussed on the cosmos (i.e. place of the κόσμος νοητός) or as the 'embodiment' of God's creational activity (i.e. foremost of the powers), the difference between God and his Logos appears to be kept to a minimum, perhaps a matter of aspect rather than level.²⁸ But when the immanent presence of the Logos is stressed, Philo envisages a direct contact with and permeation through the cosmos which it holds together. The Logos is πρεσβύτατος τῶν ὅσα γέγονε and πρεσβύτατος καὶ πρωτόγονος, even God's archangel.²⁹ The Logos has to all appearances become a *hypostasis*, a level of God's being given real existence outside God himself.³⁰ When the Logos acts as God's instrument it moves between the two levels indicated, organizing and imparting to matter as best it can the form of the noetic cosmos. The conclusion must be, therefore, that the Logos, seen in relation to the Timaeus, functions at the levels of both the demiurge (and model)

and the cosmic soul. It is the active presence of the Logos in the sense-perceptible and corporeal cosmos that brings about an apparent separation from God the creator and the attribution of an intermediate status between God and the cosmos. Unlike in the case of the Platonic cosmic soul, however, Philo does not constitute the Logos in such a way that its intermediate status is the consequence of its constituents and the manner of its formation. To be sure, it is described as γενητός, but also the κόσμος νοητός placed in the Logos was in a sense γενητός. The immanent Logos is evidently regarded as a kind of 'extension' of the Logos on the level of the demiurge.³¹ In such a way Philo endeavours to preserve the unity of the Logos, in spite of the multiplicity of levels and functions. The result remains philosophically far from satisfying, certainly when compared with the Timaeus. In fairness to Philo, however, it should be added that philosophical systematics were not his primary aim.

The divergences that exist between the Philonic doctrine of the Logos and the thought of the Timaeus have been outlined. A number of factors must be called in to explain these changes. Partly Philo's philosophical source material can be held responsible; one thinks of Stoic adaptation of the Timaeus and Middle Platonist interpretative developments. Of central importance is Philo's debt to Jewish Wisdom speculation, inspired above all by the 'and God said' in Gen.1.³² Significant differences between the Biblical record of creation and the presentation of cosmic genesis in the Timaeus impel Philo to introduce changes. Nevertheless our discussion has shown that the doctrine of the Logos *by no means* causes the influence of the Timaeus to be eclipsed. Rather one might speak of a creative interaction. The Philonic conception of the Logos records the result of important modifications to the doctrines of the Timaeus, but at the same time the Platonic dialogue has left its indelible mark on the way that the role and functions of the divine Logos are conceived.

2.8. The negativity of matter

Creation is for Philo primarily a conversion of disorder to order, of non-being to being. As was observed earlier in this chapter,¹ the demiurgic metaphor of the Timaeus and especially Plato's classic description of the transition from chaos to order in Tim.30a have profoundly influenced Philo's conception of the creative act. Matter is the raw material out of which (ἐξ οὗ) God shaped and modelled the universe. It is apparently best described by long lists of adjectives (mostly containing α-privatives), while their antonyms indicate the nature of the resultant created product.² If these descrip-

tions are analysed it emerges that Philo alternates between ascribing to matter a disorderly negativity and conceiving it in terms of pure potentiality.³ In the former case matter is clearly identified with the pre-existent disorderly and disharmonious realm of chaos of which Plato speaks in the Timaeus. In the latter case matter becomes an ever-present constituent of reality, virtually a principle (ἀρχή). The influence can readily be detected of the Aristotelian conception of matter as substrate and the Stoic doctrine of the passive principle, both of which were read back into the Platonic presentation of the receptacle in the Timaeus.

The nature of the dialogue's influence on Philo's view of matter is thus somewhat curious. The role of matter in the creational schema of the Timaeus (i.e. especially Tim.30a) is very important and his general conception of ὕλη is moulded by the views read into that work above all by the Middle Platonists. When, however, we searched for evidence of a careful reading of Tim.49-53, the passage where Plato explains what precisely the receptacle is, very little direct usage could be found.⁴ Philo's reading of the Timaeus here is one-sided and incomplete, much influenced by the interpretative tradition.

The Biblical and exegetical background is once again crucially important. The opportunities given to Philo, as exegete of the Mosaic code, to expatiate on the nature and role of matter are in fact quite limited. Because he interprets 'day one' of the κοσμοποιΐα as recounting the formation and structure of the noetic cosmos, Philo is not exegetically impelled to discuss the role of ὕλη in the act of creation.⁵ The fact that he three times refers to it, albeit not at great length, indicates that in his (Platonically influenced) interpretation of the cosmogony its presence is indispensable.⁶ Also outside the account of creation detailed discussion of the nature of matter rarely occurs. It is symbolized by the dyad and the female element in nature.⁷ Laban and the eunuchs expelled from the sacred congregation represent those thinkers who, refusing to recognize the presence of form in the cosmos, go so far as to deify formless and unlimited matter.⁸ Philo's chief aim is to show that matter (as a constituent of reality) in itself possesses no power or structure, but is given form by God the creator through the Logos/ideas. The *passivity* and *negativity* of matter are what is important. Philo is not further encouraged by the Mosaic narrative to enter into a technical discussion of what the exact nature of ὕλη is.

How then does Philo envisage the inescapable problem of the relation between God and matter? What status does matter have as a constituent of reality and what nature can be attributed to matter in its pre-existent state? From the viewpoint of later developments in the history of philosophy the question of whether Philo propounded the doctrine of matter created ex nihilo by

✓ God is of great interest. Even though he appears to be aware of the possibility of this doctrine, it holds no attraction for him.⁹ The thesis of Wolfson that Philo demonstrates his espousal of creatio ex nihilo by means of a deliberate and subtle rewriting of Plato's Timaeus must be rejected.¹⁰ Indeed exactly the reverse is true. Because the manner of understanding creation which is initiated in the Timaeus, an ordering and shaping of matter lying ready to hand, is so attractive, Philo is disinclined to put forward an alternative, and especially one that conflicts with the axiom, almost as old as Greek philosophy itself, that ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν γίνεταί.¹¹ The problem of the nature of pre-existent matter, and the additional problem that matter, if not created, might seem eternal and even a principle of reality next to God, thus remain.

These difficulties might, however, vanish like mist before the sun if the alternative solution proposed by Winston is accepted. In the doctrine of creatio aeterna all talk of a pre-existent matter is reduced to metaphor. Philo's thought is monistic and monotheistic. Matter is a shadow reality that ultimately proceeds from God as indirect result of his creative activity, and is in no way an autonomous principle next to God.¹² But, even if the question of Philo's espousal of creatio aeterna is left aside, it must be objected that this view is in the final analysis a metaphysically refined variant of the creatio ex nihilo thesis. Although matter would be only indirectly created by God, it is still the result of divine activity. There must be postulated a higher prototype of matter, an indefinite dyad or νοητὴ ὕλη, for the existence of which God is directly responsible.¹³ Can the Philonic conviction that God is in no way responsible for the imperfect nature of material reality then still seriously be maintained?

The conclusion must be, therefore, that matter possesses for Philo the status of an eternal constituent of reality with an existence (if that word can be used) in some way independent of God. The influence of the two-principle doctrine of the Stoa and the three-principle doctrine of Middle Platonism can be felt. But Philo does not regard ὕλη as an ἀρχή of reality in the manner of these philosophers.¹⁴ From his theocentric viewpoint there can be no question of characterizing matter as a metaphysical entity somehow on a par with God. God is the ἀρχή of being, matter a passive quasi-existent object on which that being is conferred. There can be no question of an active opposition between God and ὕλη resulting in a true dualism.¹⁵ The chief characteristic of matter is not active maleficence but negativity and recalcitrance.¹⁶ On account of its inherent tendency to disorder matter resists, though only passively, the imposition of form by the creator. If God's creatio continua and providential care ceased it would immediately revert to its original state.¹⁷ Philo is thus not averse to adopting the Platonist view that matter is a source of

imperfection and evil in the cosmos, though it is emphatically not the primary cause of evil which is the consequence of the free will of the soul and the wrong choices it habitually makes.¹⁸ The descriptions of the pre-cosmic chaos are given in chiefly negative terms,¹⁹ a negativity wholly opposite to that used in predication of God as τὸ ὄν. It remains difficult to determine what Philo envisages as the attributes which account for its disorder, and also how he imagines its eternal co-quasi-existence with God.²⁰ The Mosaic commentator must, it appears, reserve his attention for more pressing subjects.²¹ The Philonist must, in contrast, conclude that this is the least satisfactorily developed and most obscure area of Philo's thought.

Matter is not to be confused with body and corporeality. Body, possessing solidity and three-dimensionality,²² is matter which has received form from God the creator through the instrumentality of the Logos. Created reality, sense-perceptible as it is on account of its corporeality, is ineluctably associated with matter and this fact is decisive for the way it must be evaluated. Philo has no quarrel with the Platonic axiomata that γένεσις entails φθορά and that σύνθεσις entails διάλυσις.²³ The κόσμος αἰσθητός is a σύστημα or compositum, carrying the seeds of destruction within it; it constitutes, moreover, the realm of γένεσις and φθορά, even if some of its parts are protected from the worst consequences by the creator's mastery and foresight. But the cosmos is *not* a battleground, scarred by the struggle between God and the forces of materiality.²⁴ That conflict was settled before it began, so to speak. For all its ontological vulnerability the cosmos is indestructible, its immortality ensured by the will and providence of the creator.

2.9. The creator and the cosmos

God is the creator; the cosmos, its parts and its inhabitants are his creatures. The relation of creator and cosmos is best described in terms of dualities ultimately derived from the Timaeus – maker and product, craftsman and artefact, father and offspring, being and becoming. The most fundamental duality is, in more abstract terms, the contrast between independence and dependence.¹ God is, incomprehensibly, not limited in the absolute transcendence of his being by the function of his creatorship. The cosmos, on the other hand, lacks even a semblance of autonomy, being wholly dependent for its existence on the providential dispensation of its creator.

The significance of the creationism of the Timaeus for Philo's understanding of the Mosaic doctrine of creation has been established beyond all reason-

able doubt. The points of concentration must be situated above all in the notion of a demiurgic creation of order out of disorder and in the recognition of the planned, purposeful and (paedeutically) sequential nature of the event. At the same time important elements of revision have come to the fore, among which the most far-reaching are:

- (a) the subordination of the ideas as cosmic paradigm to the creator;
- (b) the refusal to ascribe the actual demiurgic labour to God;
- (c) the minimalization of the assistance required by the creator.

Our theme has allowed the observation of a complex and fascinating interplay between the creational schema of the Platonic cosmogony on the one hand, and Philo's task as commentator of the Mosaic record ('day one', plural of Gen. 1:26), the influence of the interpretative tradition of the *Timaeus* (interiorization of the ideas, first and second god) and the loyalty shown by Philo to Judaic monotheism (no second god) on the other.

The problem of whether to understand γένεσις in protological or ontological terms has hung over our chapter like a threatening cloud. That it should be so difficult to uncover Philo's thinking on such a central and quite unavoidable subject is remarkable and revealing. The balance of the evidence, in our view, leads to the conclusion that Philo favours the protological interpretation of creation in terms of a creative act by God the creator. Four reasons can be given for the preference.

- (1) Creation can best be described in terms of the demiurgic metaphor, with special emphasis on planning and design.
- (2) Creation is the result of an act of will or decision on the part of God the creator; the same will prevents the cosmos' potential dissolution.
- (3) A sounder appreciation can be given of the fact that time is dependent on God for its existence, and is in no way coeval with God.
- (4) A correcter view of the status of the enmattered sense-perceptible cosmos as realm of γένεσις and φθορά is guaranteed.

It must be immediately admitted that none of these reasons are wholly free from ambiguities, none are based on a direct report of Philonic discussion. An element of reconstruction in penetrating to his assumptions on this central issue is unavoidable. A good deal of the difficulty lies also, I suspect, in the inability of the interpreter of Philo's thought to escape the legacy of philosophical doctrines developed in the centuries and millenia after him. In particular one senses retrospectively that two doctrines, creation of matter *ex nihilo* and the contingency of the cosmos, lie just around the corner.² It may be that the intuitions on which these doctrines are based are already embryonically present in Philo, but are as yet differently formulated. In any case the interpretation of Philo's thought in terms of a

Plotinian or Spinozaesque doctrine of non-contingency should be vigorously opposed. The task for him (and now for us in our interpretation) was to find a *ὁδὸς βασιλική* between the doctrine of divine omnipotence raised to the degree of unrestricted arbitrariness (cf. Wolfson) and the doctrine of non-contingency and consequent divine restriction (cf. Winston). Our thesis is that the conceptuality of the *Timaeus* was in Philo's view sufficient, if properly understood (and thus modified) in the light of scripture, to guarantee a sound and pious response to the problem that is his chief concern, the relation between God and created reality. Last but certainly not least, it has become clear that for Philo *creatio continua* is a direct consequence of (*not* an alternative for) God's creative act. The fundamental place of the doctrine of divine Providence in Philo's thought cannot be often enough or sufficiently stressed.

God as (Mosaically) *ὁ ὢν* and (Platonically) *τὸ ὄν* is supremely transcendent, in his essence and fulness unknowable. To call God creator and meditate on his creatorship is to indulge in *κατάχρησις*. But, Philo would immediately add, that *κατάχρησις* is necessary and noble. It constitutes the most important lesson that the *Timaeus* has to offer.

2.10. Admiration for the cosmos, praise for the creator

Lyricism is not one of the more overt features of the *Timaeus*. Conscious of the breadth and complexity of his theme, Plato for the most part favours the sober concision of scientific prose. Nevertheless Plotinus was undoubtedly correct when with his customary perspicuity he declared that the dialogue constitutes a hymn of praise to the cosmos.¹ With a sureness indicative of both profound conviction and literary craftsmanship, Plato intersperses throughout the work the language of perfection and excellence in order to describe the cosmos and the demiurge, reaching a climax in the trumpet tones of the concluding doxology.²

The same *admiration* for the beauty and perfection of the cosmos is echoed throughout the Philonic corpus. The cosmos is a perfect whole, consisting of perfect parts.³ This perfection is first and foremost the result of teleological design. Every part and inhabitant of the cosmos has received its own purposeful place and so, by acting according to its nature, contributes to the harmony and excellence of the cosmos as a whole. The cosmos is thus complete (principle of plenitude), perfectly shaped (spherical), self-sufficient (having no rivals), and so on.⁴ Philo is, however, much less interested than Plato in deducing the perfection of the cosmos from *a priori* or dialectical principles.⁵ He gives priority to the evidence of his senses, and especially the

sense of sight. In diverse passages he describes and extols the beauty of the cosmos in high-flown lyrical language.⁶ Although the theme of the contemplation of the cosmic splendour has its roots in the *Timaeus*,⁷ Philonic prolixity stands in marked contrast to Platonic restraint. The baroque of language has a clear purpose; it endeavours to convey something of variety (ποικιλύα) and vitality of the cosmos, aspects which in the *Timaeus* are underplayed.⁸ Philo is undoubtedly indebted, for both thought and language, to the 'consentment' of the Hellenistic 'religion cosmique',⁹ but also, one surmises, to the lyrical passages in praise of the cosmos found in Biblical and Judaic literature.¹⁰ It will not do, however, to conclude that the influence of the Platonic admiration for the cosmos only reaches Philo through the haze of an intervening tradition which had reduced the idea to a banal commonplace. It has been shown that Philo has *absorbed* the phraseology of perfection and excellence with which Plato describes the cosmos into his own language, and uses it time and time again to characterize the cosmos, the heavens and man the microcosm.¹¹ A particularly favoured phrase is Plato's portrayal of the cosmos and demiurge as ὁ μὲν κάλλιστος τῶν γεγονότων, ὁ δ' ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων. It is several times paraphrased or adapted, and is, in fact, the only passage in the *Timaeus* which Philo quotes on more than one occasion.¹²

Philo is thus sympathetic to the Platonic attitude of admiration for the cosmos. No less than Plotinus he would be prepared to defend the cosmos vigorously against the deprecations of the Gnostics. The cosmos is good because its creator is good. And compared with later Christian eschatology, Philo (like Plato) retains a certain element of *Diesseitigkeit* in his attitude towards created reality, even if he is sufficiently Platonist to recognize that it remains the corporeal image of a more perfect world and that the aim of the soul must be to escape (φυγή) and ascend to enrolment in the divine realm.¹³

But this sincere admiration for the cosmos on the part of Philo is likely to deceive unless we heed his warning that it must be seen in the right perspective. If the cosmos is regarded as a 'visible god', that appellation should be carefully qualified.¹⁴ It is a very serious mistake, indeed only slightly less asinine and impious than Egyptian idolatry, to regard the cosmos as the highest object of admiration and to offer it or its celestial parts worship.¹⁵ This was the capital error of the Chaldeans, perceived by Abraham when he obeyed the call to depart from their land.¹⁶ Admiration for the cosmos is legitimate and praiseworthy when accompanied by a recognition that it is God's handiwork. Because God the creator alone is autonomous and supreme, he alone is to be worshipped. The true philosopher therefore maintains an attitude of *absolute* admiration for God the creator and *relative* admiration for the created cosmos.¹⁷ We encounter here one of the fundamental principles of Philo's

thought, implicit in almost every utterance in the area of cosmology. It is used to refute the doctrine that the cosmos is uncreated and eternal.¹⁸ It forms the organizing idea behind the systematically structured doxography in the De aeternitate mundi.¹⁹ The cosmos must be regarded as indestructible, but only because it is preserved from destruction by its creator. Since in that passage the Timaeus is found to be in agreement with Moses, it may be assumed that the fundamental principle stated above is read into the creationism of Plato's myth.

Important though these ideas are, however, the Philonist must not stop. A further dimension needs to be added. For Philo recognition of the splendour of the cosmos and the supreme craftsmanship of the creator necessarily elicits a response in the pious soul, given expression in the acts of *praise* and *thanksgiving*. The fruit of *παῦδεῖα* is 'for praise' (*ἀλνετός*), symbolizing that we cannot adequately give thanks to God through oblations and sacrifices, but only in hymns of praise, as well told in the ancient tale of the birth of the Muses.²⁰ The sacrificial victim is divided into whole parts in order to teach us to give thanks to God for the creation of the universe, both for the whole and for the perfection of its individual parts.²¹ Once again it may be considered certain, from these two examples, that Philo reads this attitude of praise and thanksgiving into the Timaeus. The words at Tim.29a5-6 cited earlier are used as a concrete illustration of the encomiastic prose and verse to be written in honour and thanksgiving to the creator;²² the description of the symbolism of the sacrificial animal is deliberately reminiscent of Plato's depiction of the cosmos.²³

Whether such an importation is legitimate is another question. Although the interiorized attitude of reverence and thanksgiving can certainly be paralleled in Greek philosophical literature, it must be concluded that Philo's pronounced concentration of that attitude on God the creator, together with his fear lest excessive honour be paid to the cosmos, reflects the concerns of Judaic piety.²⁴ Certainly the Timaeus, despite the superlatives regularly used to portray the demiurgic creator, does not encourage the attitude of worship and thanksgiving towards him enjoined by Philo.

2.11. Cosmology

It is time now to turn to the more specific area of cosmology, which we may take to be philosophical reflection on the structure and characteristics of the cosmos, its parts and its inhabitants. The mythical, hence cosmogonic, framework of the Timaeus does not prevent Plato from dwelling on the subjects

of cosmology proper, above all in Tim. 31-40.¹ The amalgam of science and philosophical systematics found there differs from the more descriptive approach of the attractively composed De Mundo,² and is wholly dissimilar to the dry handbook style of, for example, Achilles' Introduction to Aratus' Phaenomena.³ It was our task in the Commentary to determine with some precision what ideas in the area of cosmology Philo drew from the Timaeus, in contrast to the more general cosmological doctrines known to every educated gentleman and easily acquired through a reading of introductory works similar to the two mentioned above.⁴

In the characteristics of the cosmos as a whole presented in the Timaeus - its completeness, unassailability, sphericity, self-sufficiency, circular motion - Philo shows little interest, partly because Moses does not speak in his cosmogony about the creation and features of the cosmos as a whole, partly because he finds little to discuss or contest in these doctrines which by now were generally accepted in Hellenistic cosmology.⁵ But when Alexander, drawing on the arguments of sceptical/academic controversialism, attempts to cast doubt on these doctrines, Philo is quick to reply, citing the Timaeus in support of the cosmos' sphericity as the highest authority in the realm of teleological reasoning.⁶

More interest is shown by Philo in the astronomy of Plato's dialogue. Specific aspects of Plato's account are put to use in exegetical contexts, such as the contrary motion of the circles of the same and the different,⁷ the hebdomadic aspect of the 'divisible nature' of the circle of the different,⁸ the close relation between the movement of the heavenly bodies and the nature of time.⁹ In a number of texts it is clear that Philo has difficulty in understanding the precise philosophical systematics of the Platonic account.¹⁰ There can be no doubt, however, that he is sympathetic to the chief thesis of Plato's astronomical section, namely that the seemingly irregular movements of the heavenly bodies are quite deceptive and that heaven is in fact the realm of wholly rational, unceasing and felicitous motion.¹¹ Contemplation of the celestial realm is not only an incentive for man to bring the circuits of his own mind to rational order, but also leads him to the recognition - and here Philo extrapolates beyond the actual words of the Timaeus - that its splendour and rationality cannot be the product of random forces, but rather must be attributed to the design of the creator.¹² It is furthermore interesting to observe that in many texts Philo distinguishes between the supra-lunary realm of unchanging order and the sub-lunary realm of change and decay, and that the heavens are often associated with the presence of the divine Logos.¹³ But here we start to leave behind the specifically Timaeian features of Philo's astronomical passages and return to almost universally accepted doctrines of Hellen-

istic cosmology. Indeed it is easy to forget, when reading Philo's exegesis, how thoroughly he has imposed the scientifically reputable doctrines of Greek cosmology on the Biblical texts which he interprets, as can be well illustrated by passages in the *De opificio mundi*.¹⁴

Nevertheless important differences remain between the approach to astronomical science found in Plato and Philo. Plato did not tackle the subject of the movements of the celestial bodies with the interests of a professional astronomer, but nonetheless felt constrained to 'save the phenomena' by postulating that the heavenly motions were mathematically explicable and wholly rational, adhering to the viewpoint he had earlier put forward that the mind can use astronomical mathematics as a means to gain insight into true noetic reality.¹⁵ The Alexandrian Jew, in contrast, regards the heavenly phenomena as already 'saved' on account of the very fact that they were created by God. Thus, although he is undoubtedly well-acquainted with the more technical aspects of astronomy,¹⁶ they do not really capture his interest. The chief importance of the heavenly bodies for him lies in the way that they display the grandeur and splendid order of the creation, and so can lead the observer, as said above, to recognition of the creator. A number of Philo's more 'astronomical' passages are found among the lyrical descriptions in admiration of the cosmos and praise of the creator discussed in the previous section.¹⁷ Once again the dispute with his nephew gives a penetrating insight into Philo's assumptions. To Alexander's accusation that the heavens are full of disorder and lacking a providential dispensation, he replies that much escapes the understanding of the human mind, but we can be certain that God in his wisdom organized the cosmos in the best way possible, since nothing impedes his designs.¹⁸ He does not endeavour to demonstrate the rational and teleological design of the celestial realm, but rather *assumes* it, on the basis of his theological convictions.

A second aspect of Plato's cosmological doctrines in the *Timaeus* which appeals to Philo is the organization of the living beings (ζῷα) which inhabit the cosmos. He has no qualms in accepting the four principles which form the basis of Plato's account: (1) the principle that the genera of living beings in the visible cosmos correspond to those in the noetic cosmos;¹⁹ (2) the principle that there is a correspondence between the elements, the regions of the cosmos and the number of animal genera;²⁰ (3) the principle of plenitude, namely that the cosmos contains the full number of animal genera required for perfection;²¹ (4) the principle that the living beings in the cosmos form a fixed hierarchy, as seen in their various characteristics and especially their capacity for rational thought.²² The obvious appeal of these doctrines for Philo lies in the way they emphasize and illustrate the rational and teleological design of the cosmos as created by God. In the interpretation of Moses'

account of creation the situation is reasonably straightforward. Philo can locate Plato's quartet of ζῶα in the various days of creation, and even replaces the Mosaic names with the more familiar Platonic generic titles.²³ In other texts, however, a more complex situation is encountered. Plato's simple scheme allows no place for the demons which inhabit the space between the earth and the moon. Philo equates these with the Mosaic angels, and for purposes of exegesis finds it useful to localize them in the perspective of the doctrines of Greek cosmology. He therefore turns to certain cosmological schemes, all inconsistent with each other and also found in various guises in Middle Platonism, which are based on the Platonic principles enumerated above but attempt to incorporate innovatory doctrines of Aristotle, Xenocrates and the *Epinomis*. In these texts the influence of the *Timaeus* is felt primarily via the interpretative tradition.²⁴

Thirdly attention must be drawn to Philo's presentation of man's place in the cosmos. There is no doubt that man has been assigned a very special place in the cosmic dispensation. He can be said to occupy the borderland between immortal soul or mind, sharing characteristics with living beings both above and below him in the cosmic hierarchy.²⁵ In one aspect man is unique. Of all the cosmic ζῶα he alone has a free will that can incline to both virtue and vice.²⁶ For this reason Philo, modifying the doctrine of the *Timaeus*, has God calling in assistants for the task of creating man.²⁷ The anthropocentrism which marks the design and structure of the *Timaeus* is taken over by Philo, and is exploited to the full in his exegesis of the Mosaic cosmogony.²⁸ It is in this structural application that his awareness of the crucial role of the macrocosm/microcosm relation in the *Timaeus* is most clearly seen. When at the end of the 'mini-*Timaeus*'²⁹ at Plant.2-27 Philo wants to transfer from a 'phyto-cosmological' to a 'phyto-anthropological' exegesis, he reminds his readers of the parallelism between the cosmos and man the microcosm.³⁰ In the practical explication of this idea, however, he most often emphasizes the parallelism between man's rational soul and the heavenly regions (which are considered to be the most ensouled and rational part of the cosmos). Man can be said to be a βραχὺς οὐρανός, his mind being equivalent to the Logos in the heavens.³¹ Also the doctrine, so prominent in the *Timaeus*, that man, by contemplating the heavenly revolutions, can set his own mind in order is found in Philo. But the heavily theocentric emphasis which we noted above somewhat alters the protreptic force of the Platonic invitation to θεωρεῖν. Contemplation of the heavens should lead primarily to recognition of the creator.³²

A final observation concerns an aspect of Philo's cosmological ideas that has been added to the cosmology of the *Timaeus*, namely the concept of *cosmic law*. The demiurge is indeed presented as a 'thesmothete' - the task is implicit

in his title – but for Plato the realms of φύσις and νόμος are still regarded as quite distinct.³³ The idea of a cosmic law is derived from Stoic philosophy, which postulated behind and above the particular laws of human communities the eternal, wholly rational Law of nature, understood and observed by the sage as κοσμοπολύτης. The idea is particularly prominent in the writings of Cicero.³⁴ It is easily read into the Timaeus, for the rational motions of the cosmos and the heavens can be thought to be following the ordinances of their demiurgic initiator. But when Philo introduces the idea right at the start of his commentary on the Mosaic creational account, it is clear that an extra dimension is involved. That Moses should begin his Law with a κοσμοποιῦα indicates that the Jewish Law is in direct accordance with the Law by which the cosmos is administered.³⁵ Thus the observance and study of the Mosaic code enables man not only to emulate the first man and the patriarchs, who lived according to the unwritten laws of nature, but also to fulfil the telos of human existence formulated in Greek philosophy – in Stoic terms 'to live in accordance with nature', in Pythagorean terms 'to follow God', and according to Plato 'to become like unto God'.³⁶

2.12. The doctrine of man

The Timaeus is generally regarded as Plato's cosmological dialogue.¹ More than half, however, of Timaeus the Locrian's speech is in fact concerned with a miniscule, though very influential part, of the cosmos, namely man. The climactic placement of man in the structure of Plato's cosmogonic account is indubitably seen by Philo as a most significant parallel to the creation of man on the sixth day in the Mosaic creational account.² The influence of Plato's anthropocentrism on Philo's views concerning man's place in the cosmos has already been discussed in the previous section. But this by no means exhausts his debt to Plato in the area of anthropology. Also in the doctrines on the nature of man and man's end in life he could find much to learn and take over.³ The key to these doctrines is that man is a composite being, consisting of body and soul, of a mortal and an immortal part. To start with, we observe the extent to which Philo utilizes doctrines from the Timaeus on the subject of physiology (the functioning of the body) and psychology (the disposition of the soul).

Of the many and complicated physiological theories that the Timaeus contains few traces are found in the writings of Philo. The reason is at least two-fold. Firstly, advances in medical science had made many of Plato's theories out of date.⁴ More importantly, the primarily exegetical focus of Philo's

treatises gives little opportunity for detailed investigation of the structure and functioning of the human body. In the De opificio mundi the beauty of the first man in soul and body is praised, but Philo sees no need for detailed illustration.⁵ The most extensive account of human physiology is found in a rather bizarre exegesis of Noah's ark in terms of the body, in which occasion is found to follow Plato in emphasizing the providential teleology of its design.⁶ Elsewhere the theories on the mechanism of vision and hearing and on the function of the liver are utilized.⁷ The last-mentioned case is interesting, because Plato's theory is recounted after a more modern, purely physiological explanation of the liver's function had already been given. Philo is attracted to the Platonic doctrine because it attempts to relate the functioning of several bodily organs to the activity of the soul.⁸

And indeed, in the area of psychology a quite different situation is encountered. Philo shows a good deal of interest in and makes extensive use of the doctrines on the nature of the soul which Plato presents in the Timaeus. In four passages he specifically recounts the theory of the *tripartition* of the soul and the location of these parts in three parts of the body, relating the doctrine in each case to Pentateuchal texts.⁹ Frequent allusions are made elsewhere to the rich imagery used by Plato to explain the soul's trilocation, a sound indication of Philo's familiarity with the text of Plato's account.¹⁰ A much larger body of evidence, however, supports the contention that Philo regarded the main thrust of Plato's psychology as tending towards a *bipartition* of the soul into a rational and an irrational part. Not only does the Timaeus give hints in this direction, but it had become standard doctrine in the Old Academy, Middle Stoa, and Middle Platonism.¹¹ The rational part of man's soul — it is often identified by Philo with the νοῦς¹² — is the part with which he thinks and reasons. It can be called, though Philo does this rather infrequently, man's divine part,¹³ for not only is it related to the heavens,¹⁴ but also it enables man to search for God and become like unto him.¹⁵ This part of man's soul is immortal and with it he can attain the blessed state of εὐδαιμονία.¹⁶ In this life, however, the soul is unable to float through the etherial regions in carefree felicity and eternal devotion to the true philosophy.¹⁷ It is constrained to carry the body about like a corpse-bearer, and so needs an irrational part in order to be adequately adapted to the necessities and contingencies of that body.¹⁸ The features of the irrational part of the soul in which Philo is most interested are two in number. Through the faculties of the senses the mind is informed about the qualities of the physical world around him, information which can be for it both a help and a hindrance.¹⁹ Secondly the irrational part of the soul experiences the passions which necessarily result from its association with the body. Among these the

most commonly mentioned are fear, desire (including hunger, thirst, sexual lust), cowardice, pain and pleasure. In order to lead a good life man's aim must be to moderate these πάθη, convert them to εὐπάθειαι, or perhaps even eliminate them altogether.²⁰

The conclusion so far must be that the influence of Platonism, and in particular its formulation in the Timaeus, on Philo's ideas concerning the nature of man's soul has been impressively great, indeed one might well say decisive. His debt to Platonism far outweighs that to the Stoa and the Peripatos.²¹ It is observed in major doctrines, but also in numerous points of detail, use of imagery, choice of terms, and so on. Nevertheless the interpreter of Philo's thought needs to exercise a good deal of care in drawing this conclusion. He must take into account not only the exegetical background of Philo's preoccupations with psychology, but also the general direction of interest that results therefrom. Philo is not really interested in constructing a consistent doctrine of the soul. The focal point of his interest lies rather in those aspects of psychology which are indispensable for his allegories, namely the struggle that takes place in the soul as the rational part strives to overcome the seductions of the senses and the tumult of the passions, while itself having to dispel the ignorance which may lead it to choose evil rather than good. Philo's concern for the structural aspects of man's nature relates primarily to the contribution these ideas can make to an understanding of the above-mentioned theme. Indicative of this limited concern is the way he remains undecided in certain texts as to whether the ἡγεμονικόν is situated in the brain or the heart. The same uncertainty is attributed to Moses.²² And when discussing the human body, it is much more important to recognize that it is a temporary construct, a microcosm made of the same four elements as the macrocosm, than to spend all one's time discussing complex physiological theories.²³

The Timaeus certainly aided Philo in describing the soul's struggle. He is particularly keen on the image of turbulent water used by Plato to describe the descent of the soul into the body.²⁴ But most importantly the anthropological doctrines of the Timaeus and the exegetical theme of the soul's progress are creatively merged together in what we have called the 'Allegory of the soul'. In the lengthy allegorical interpretation of the story of Adam and Eve and their progeny Philo shows the dynamics involved in man's composite nature, following the details of the mythical narrative but at the same time not concealing the inspiration which he has drawn from the structure and doctrines of the Timaeus.²⁵ Later on in the Allegorical Commentary the theme of the ascent of the soul becomes predominant, so that the direct contribution of the

Timaeus declines.²⁶ Nevertheless the doctrines on man's anthropological structure and his end in life retain an important foundational role. It is time that we relate them to what Philo regarded as their basis in the Biblical narrative.

The great nomothete Moses is a man of βραχυλογία, not wasting his words.²⁷ In two brief texts he manages to lay the foundation for a philosophically profound doctrine of man. Man is created 'according to the image of God' (Gen. 1:27). God formed man out of clay from the earth and breathed into him the breath of life (Gen. 2:7). In Philo's interpretation the essential message of the Mosaic anthropology comes through loud and clear. Both texts speak of man as possessing an intrinsic relation to God, in the one as εἰκών, in the other as recipient of the divine πνεῦμα. Philo is fully convinced that this relation pertains only to man's mind or rational part of his soul, the part with which he reasons and in virtue of which he attains immortality. The words κατ'εἰκόνα θεοῦ in the first text relate only to that part. The second text speaks of man as a σύνθετον, a composite of body and soul. It is infusion of the divine πνεῦμα that enables this soul to be rational and immortal.

But – and this qualification is most important – the reasonably straightforward doctrine so far outlined stands in a context. Philo, remaining true to the written words of the Mosaic text, finds himself confronted with all sorts of difficult exegetical problems. Why does Moses place the plural 'let us make' in God's mouth in Gen. 1:26? Why is there a double account of man's creation? What is the relation between the man κατ'εἰκόνα θεοῦ and the man of clay who receives the divine spirit? Why does Moses speak of man as genus and as species? The list of problems could be considerably extended, for it is to be assumed, says Philo, that Moses aims at consistency.²⁸ Philo's exegetical problems and the numerous difficulties faced by the reader in deciphering his interpretations have been discussed at some length in the Commentary.²⁹ The chief thesis of the discussion, which by no means claims to represent the last word on the subject, is that the basic anthropological doctrine which Philo thinks he can read into the Mosaic texts is Platonic (and especially indebted to the Timaeus), but that his fidelity to the text constrains the importance of other philosophical ideas.³⁰ The εἰκών relation is patently given a Platonic interpretation. Man is an εἰκών of the divine Logos (as place of the κόσμος νοητός), who in turn is the εἰκών of God. Despite certain appearances to the contrary there is no need to interpose an 'ideal man' between the man κατ'εἰκόνα (as νοῦς) and the Logos.³¹ On the other hand, Moses' mention of the divine πνεῦμα encourages reference to the Stoic doctrine that man shares in or is himself part of the all-pervading, divine spirit. Since a materialistic psychology is explicitly rejected,³² this idea does not clash in any serious

way with the basically Platonic anthropological framework.³³

It is moreover most interesting to observe that in a number of passages found outside the direct commentaries on Gen.1-3 Philo is able to offer a more systematic and philosophically more convincing Mosaic doctrine of man, built up around the two main texts.³⁴ In two of these passages he extensively adapts Plato's celebrated description of man's status as 'heavenly plant' in *Tim.* 90 a-d.³⁵ An attempt is also made to give the Mosaic evidence for the double aspect of man's soul, appealing to a text such as Lev.17:11, in which Moses speaks of the 'blood-soul'.³⁶ In these passages Philo adopts the method of basing philosophy on the Bible by collecting together suitable texts and welding them into a systematic whole. It is in marked contrast to the procedure in Gen.1-3, where the letter of the text is followed with unwearying attention to detail, with the result that the precise contours of Philo's Mosaic anthropology are exceedingly difficult to trace.

The central thrust of Philo's Platonizing anthropology, that man is related to God in virtue of his rational part and his capacity for reasoning, has consequences for his thought, the importance of which can hardly be overestimated. Philo takes over the ideal of contemplation propagated by Greek philosophy. Man has a special place in the cosmos not because of his dominance over the creation,³⁷ nor because of his cleverness in practical matters, but because he contemplates the worlds of thought and sense and so can reflect on his own nature and situation. The same capacity for thought enables him to set out on the quest to discover the Father and maker of created reality. The Therapeutae, living on a low hill above Lake Mareotis far away from the tumult and turmoil of city life, practice the βίος θεωρητικός in an exemplary way. All day and every day they search for wisdom, reading the sacred scriptures and extracting the deeper meaning by means of allegory. The passions of the soul and the needs of the body are almost entirely suppressed. On the sabbath they enjoy a sober feast, but most of the time they appear to feed on air like crickets...³⁸

The ideal of θεωρία also extended its influence on Philo's own life. Notoriously frugal with his autobiographical reminiscences, he on one famous occasion writes with unmistakable nostalgia:³⁹

There was a time when I devoted myself to philosophy and the contemplation of the cosmos and its contents, gathering the fruits of the noble, much beloved and truly blessed life. I was constantly engaged in studying divine subjects and doctrines, rejoicing with a joy that could not be satisfied or sated...

In the words that follow the superiority of intellectual pursuits over the hurly-burly of politics and the βίος πρακτικός is affirmed in language that for all its baroque pomposity gives voice to a genuine *cri de coeur*. We would

be doing Philo an injustice, of course, if we locked him up in an ivory tower. He recognizes that there is more to life than the pure joys of the mind. Moses devised a legislation that regulates the affairs of communal and civic life, and these laws must be observed.⁴⁰ Philo devotes to them lengthy and detailed commentaries.⁴¹ It is no use pretending, he rebukes over-zealous Jewish intellectuals, that we are ἀσώματοι φυλαί.⁴² The Essenes, as representatives of the βίος πρακτικός, form a pendant to the Therapeutae.⁴³ Nevertheless in Philo's interpretation of scripture I am convinced that Greek intellectualism triumphs in the fact of its imposition on the Mosaic narrative. The Leitmotiv that constantly recurs is the appeal to Plato's eulogy in Tim.47a-c of the sense of sight, which enabled man to discover philosophy and so initiate the quest for knowledge of God.⁴⁴ The triad of patriarchal sages allegorically illustrates the various stages in the search. As its name indicates Israel is the ὁρατικὸν γένος, gaining sight of the truly Existent with the eyes of the *mind* and reaching the pinnacle of εὐδαιμονία.⁴⁵

It is thus in the ideal of intellectual activity that several important lines of Philo's theological, cosmological and anthropological ideas meet together and achieve a conceptual consistency. God's ultimate nature and activity escapes the enquiry of the human mind. But in his act of creation the process of thought has pride of place.⁴⁶ The beauty and purposefulness of the cosmos is the result of a creator who thinks, plans and exercises πρόνοια.⁴⁷ Man's place in the cosmos is unique, for he is related to God and the celestial bodies in virtue of his intellect, but is also subject to the bodily necessities of the lower animals. A borderland creature, he can incline either way. The question of man's end in life is thus of crucial importance. Some of the telos formulas employed by Philo have already been mentioned. Man should live according to nature, follow God, become like unto God.⁴⁸ Another formulation, expressing more explicitly the intellectualism which we have attributed to Philo, is that the most excellent telos is the knowledge of the truly existent.⁴⁹ There is no contradiction with the Platonic telos, also found in the Timaeus,⁵⁰ that man should become like unto God. For not only is man, in gaining knowledge of God, better able to become like him, but also by being engaged in the very act of thinking he pursues the activity that most nearly characterizes the activity of the Deity and so *actually does become like him*. The telos that man should become pleasing to God is to be interpreted in the same fashion; it is in the exercise of man's mind that God is well pleased.⁵¹ The theocentrism of Philo's doctrine of man is given concrete expression in the conviction that intellectual activity is man's highest pursuit.

The ideas outlined in the previous paragraphs are naturally not drawn by

Philo exclusively from the Timaeus. Extending even beyond Platonism as a whole, they express the Grundhaltung of Greek philosophy. But at the same time we can be certain that Philo's reading of the celebrated Platonic dialogue and especially the protreptic passages on man's goal in life both inspired him and aided him in the task of giving an adequate formulation to what he regarded as the Mosaic doctrine of man.

CHAPTER THREE
PHILO AND THE INTERPRETATIVE TRADITION OF THE TIMAEUS

At the beginning of this study two statements were made that on their own are hardly contestable, but when juxtaposed stand in an uncomfortable relation to each other. It is highly improbable, it was stated, that Philo should have read the Timaeus without being affected by the interpretative traditions which had gradually been built up around the work and which were accessible to him in his intellectual environment.¹ But, it was added a little later, the problems of evidence are such that it is much easier to use Philo to cast light on his surroundings than to use his surroundings to cast light on him.² In this final chapter of the Synthesis an endeavour will be made to examine Philo's relation to the interpretative tradition of the Timaeus, in the hope that the evidence accumulated in the Commentary will be sufficient to overcome the problems of evidence referred to above. In the first three sections of the chapter Philo's diverse debts to the three main periods of Timaeus interpretation and adaptation will be outlined. In the fourth section a brief glance will be directed at Philo's use of sources. The fifth and final section will address the crucial problem of whether it is legitimate to describe Philo as a Middle Platonist. The reader will bear in mind that the perspective is limited by the confines of our subject, the interpretation of the Timaeus, and that, even when all the attention appears to be focussed on the exponents and doctrines of Greek philosophy, the central fact of Philo's Mosaic discipleship continues to reverberate like a fixed bass in the background.

3.1. Philo and the early period of interpretation

By the time that Philo first set eyes on the Timaeus more than three centuries had elapsed since its publication and the decisive period in which Plato's successors in the Academy grappled with the interpretation of the difficult work which the master had bequeathed them.¹ Among these early interpreters an important place must be assigned to Aristotle, even though he resigned his membership of the Academy after Plato's death. It is with the Stagirite that we commence.²

In an encomiastic report that has surprised many commentators, Philo praises Aristotle in Aet.16 as a trustworthy witness to his master's teachings and a thinker who earnestly endeavoured to add new discoveries to every part

of philosophy.³ The Platonic doctrine of which the disciple gives testimony is the *μικτὴ δόξα* that the cosmos is both created and indestructible.⁴ What Philo has in mind here is unmistakably the literal interpretation which Aristotle gave the cosmogony of the *Timaeus*.⁵ A little further on in the same treatise, the first four (and also perhaps the sixth) of its arguments in favour of the cosmos' ἀφθαρσία were found to contain extensive references to and adaptations of the *Timaeus*. These are to be attributed to Aristotle's once famous but now lost dialogue, the *De philosophia*.⁶ The same work is almost certainly also the source for the earlier mentioned literal reading of the cosmogonic process. The tools of philology do not enable us to determine with precision whether Philo had direct access to the Aristotelian dialogue. I have argued that arguments against such a conclusion are certainly no stronger than those in favour of it.⁷ Directly or indirectly, therefore, Philo was acquainted with an important aspect of the early interpretation of the *Timaeus*, which furthermore enabled him to establish to his own satisfaction a fundamental difference between the theology and cosmology of Plato and that of his most illustrious pupil. Two texts affirm in the clearest terms that Plato's doctrines approach more nearly the teachings of the man who μακροῦς χρόνους πρότερον had reached the pinnacle of philosophy, Moses.⁸

The debts incurred by Philo to the *De philosophia* do not end with the passages in the *De aeternitate mundi*. The dialogue contained an important presentation of the cosmological argument (or argument from design), which aided Philo in combining *Tim.* 28c and 47a-c as one of the central motifs in his reading of Plato's work.⁹ The image of a building or a city used by Aristotle to illustrate his argument was taken over and further adapted by Philo in the famous image of the divine architect in *Opif.* 17-18.¹⁰ But a significant difference is to be observed between this usage and that discussed in the previous paragraph. Philo is exploiting Aristotelian doctrines to enrich his interpretation of the *Timaeus*, not drawing on actual interpretations of that work by the Stagirite himself (who almost completely ignores the Platonic demiurge and speaks of demiurgic creation only *ex hypothesi*¹¹). Philo thus tends to reconcile certain aspects of his understanding of Aristotelian philosophy with the thought of Plato, a process that was to be carried out much more vigorously in the centuries that followed.

It is necessary to distinguish the process of conscious reconciliation from other examples, in which Aristotelian and Peripatetic doctrines were detected in Philo's interpretations as the result of his dependence on interpretative traditions which had already incorporated these doctrines into their reading of the *Timaeus*. The most significant case is the doctrine of ὕλη, in which Aristotelian and Stoic doctrines have been superimposed on the Platonic

receptacle and transformed it almost beyond recognition.¹² A curious example of such indirect Philonic use of Aristotle is found in a passage at Decal.31.¹³ In order to illustrate the first of the ten Aristotelian categories, οὐσία, he inappropriately adduces the concept of ὕλη (i.e. being as matter out of which something is formed), and in the process clearly alludes to a doctrine and an image from the Timaeus. Thus an Aristotelian doctrine is being interpreted via a modernized Plato (i.e. contaminated by Aristotelian and Stoic ideas)! To complicate matters even further, one might add that many (though not all) Middle Platonists considered the ten categories as already implicitly present in Plato's works, so that it could be considered an authentic Platonic doctrine...¹⁴

The κορυφαῖοι of the post-Platonic Academy, Speusippus and Xenocrates, are nowhere mentioned in the writings of Philo. Their names would have been familiar to him primarily from doxographical lists and philosophical compendia, and not from a direct acquaintance with their writings.¹⁵ Certainly no evidence was discovered which suggested that Philo's reading of the Timaeus was directly influenced by the important attempts at interpretation made in the early Academy. Indirect acquaintance is another matter. The criticism at Opif.7-10 and the accusation of sophistry at Aet.14 has rightly been taken to be directed, inter alios, at these early interpreters of the Timaeus.¹⁶ The manner in which Philo interprets Plato's theory of the circles of the same and the different shows a distant but definite affinity with the Xenocratean explanation of the psychogony in the Timaeus.¹⁷ The demonology which Philo adds to the simple schema of Tim.39e-40a is also ultimately derived from Xenocrates (and other members of the Academy), but has become part of a complex tradition.¹⁸ Much of the mathematicization of physics and metaphysics carried out by the Academy later found a place in Neopythagoreanism. Among Philo's numerous arithmological passages one or two hints are found of exegesis of Timaeian texts with special reference to their mathematical aspects.¹⁹ More important is the frequent correlation of the ἀρχαί with numerical entities, God with (or above) the monad, matter with the dyad.²⁰ These identifications encourage a dualistic reading of the Timaeus.²¹ In the account of the creation of the cosmos by the Logos tomeus Academic diaeresis is combined, though not entirely satisfactorily, with the creationistic schema of the Timaeus.²² But the actual relation to early Academic interpretation in all these cases is derivative and rather distant. In my view Krämer strongly exaggerates the importance of the 'inner-academic' tradition for an understanding of Philo's thought.²³ Indeed Philo's writings are evidence of the process that caused the works of Speusippus, Xenocrates and other members of the Old Academy to be consigned to an early and quite undeserved oblivion.²⁴

3.2. Philo and the Stoa

Turning now to the Stoa, we encounter a different situation. The Stoics did not so much interpret the Timaeus as enter into competition with it. The aim of the school's founders was to establish a system of thought which in its completeness and conceptual consistency would rival and supersede already existing philosophies. And so they were more interested in incorporating useful ideas from the Timaeus into their own system than in offering a new interpretation of that work.¹ Later Stoics, such as Panaetius, Posidonius and Antiochus,² instituted a revival of interest in Plato's writings, which resulted in further importation of doctrines from the Timaeus into their versions of the Stoic system. This renaissance of interest has often been thought to have been the necessary prelude to the rise of Middle Platonism.³ But the philosophy of Stoicism was certainly still an intellectual force to be reckoned with in Philo's day.⁴ Weiss, the scholar who in recent times has attached the most weight to the Stoic element in Philo's theological and cosmological ideas, affirms that it is basically only a matter of taste as to whether one represents Philo as a Platonizing Stoic or a Stoicizing Platonist.⁵ It is worth keeping this remark at the back of our mind as we proceed to review the Stoic doctrines which Philo brings in relation to his usage of the Timaeus. In deference to the 'competitive element' that existed between Platonism and Stoicism, it will also be useful to note those cases in which a Stoic theory is used by Philo when a doctrine from the Timaeus might have served just as well.

In the area of theology and the doctrine of the principia the passage in Philo which has been regarded as possessing the most pronounced Stoic traits is the famous text at the beginning of the De opificio mundi, where Philo states that Moses, having reached the very summit of philosophy, recognized ἐν τοῖς οὐκοῖς the active cause and the passive object.⁶ The interpretation of this passage is by no means straightforward. The terminology (τὸ δραστήριον αἴτιον, τὸ παθητόν) is certainly Stoic, but the way in which the two seemingly Stoic principles are explained is closer to the creational perspective of the Timaeus than the monism of the Stoa.⁷ The τῶν ὅλων νοῦς is clearly identical to the creator god who is the central figure in the Mosaic creational account. He is unambiguously presented as transcendent, superior to virtue and knowledge, superior even to the idea of the good and the idea of beauty.⁸ The passive object is opposed to the active cause and undergoes a conversion (note the aorist μετέβαλεν) resulting in the creation of the most perfect product, this cosmos. A few lines later Philo speaks, surely deliberately, of the 'father and maker' exercising pronoia over his creation.⁹ The gulf which separates this presentation from the basic conceptions of Stoic physics, in which

the creative immanent λόγος and the passive ὕλη are two aspects of the same corporeal οὐσία,¹⁰ is so great that it is pointless to speak of a Stoic influence in Philo's understanding of the creational process. The formulation at Opif.8 is in fact very similar to a rather naive Middle Platonist interpretation of Tim.30a found in Diogenes Laertius' summary of the Placita Platonis.¹¹ Inasmuch as the cosmic paradigm is situated in the mind of the creator, the three Middle Platonist ἀρχαί can be reduced to two. Philo's exposition in Opif.16-25, in which the role of the κόσμος νοητός is explained, must be seen as considerably elucidating the abbreviated summary in Opif.8-9. An important difference between the Platonists and Philo is that he deliberately avoids speaking of two ἀρχαί or αὐτὰ in Opif.8. In his 'monarchic dualism' there is room for only one cause, and that is God the creator.¹² On the other hand, the relative neglect that Philo shows towards Plato's complex and difficult account of the receptacle¹³ should be seen as the result of his preference for the more straightforward Stoic (and Aristotelian) ideas on matter, as reconciled with the creational scheme of the Timaeus and transmitted through to Middle Platonism.¹⁴

The conception of the divine Logos, so prominent in Philo's thought, appears to place us on firmer Stoic ground. Certain aspects of Stoic theology – especially its emphasis on divine omnipresence and the divine activity of nature (φύσις) in the cosmos – Philo finds deserving of incorporation in his own theological descriptions, provided they are understood as applying at the level of the divine Logos.¹⁵ But when the doctrine of the Logos was examined in greater detail a highly complex situation was encountered.¹⁶ The Logos carries out diverse functions and these take place at more than one level. One of these functions, that of representing the immanent presence of the divine in the cosmos, certainly corresponds to that of the cosmic soul in the Timaeus. As Dillon and others have pointed out, the Timaeus is here interpreted in terms of the 'modernized' concept popularized by the Stoa.¹⁷ This verdict is reinforced if we observe how the Timaeian notions of ἀναλογία, ἁρμονία and δεσμός are theologized and 'embodied' in the divine Logos.¹⁸ Other functions of the Logos, however, such as its role as the place of the noetic cosmos and its task as the instrument of creation, must be regarded as resulting from the influence of Middle Platonism rather than of Stoicism.¹⁹

I consider it probable that the consistent use of the conception of the Logos to represent ideas from the Timaeus is not an indication of Philo's dependence on a Stoic (e.g. Posidonian) interpretation of that dialogue, but results from a marked preference for the conception of the Logos itself.²⁰ The obverse of this preference is an antipathy towards the notion of the cosmic soul. Since the cosmic soul is no less prominent in Stoicism than in Platonism,²¹ this antipathy is once again not the result of Stoic influence. The

reason for it must lie deeper than the fact that there is no room for the cosmic soul in the interpretation of the Mosaic cosmogony. Philo prefers the conception of the divine Logos because it suggests an extension of the activity of God himself, not the existence of a cosmic entity separate from God.²² Moreover it allows the cosmo-theological ideas from the Timaeus and its interpretative tradition to be reconciled with the Jewish Logos-speculation based on the 'and God said' of Gen.1 and other Biblical texts.²³

In the remaining areas of cosmology there is little indication that Philo's reading of the Timaeus was greatly influenced by Stoic ideas. This is hardly surprising, since the Stoic cosmos, once its *δολακόμησος* is achieved, scarcely differs from the cosmos of Plato. The idea of an extra-cosmic void, which Philo imports into one or two discussions, is derived from Stoic cosmology and raises problems foreign to the Platonic account.²⁴ If, however, the void is postulated in order to accommodate the doctrine of cosmic conflagration, then Philo voices his opposition.²⁵ He firmly rejects all concessions to Stoic cosmo-biology, in which the cosmos, as a living being, is born and dies according to a cosmic cycle. The doctrine is not Mosaic.²⁶ Perhaps this is also the reason for the fact that the portrayal of the cosmos as a ζῷον is comparatively rare in Philo's writings.²⁷

The most significant point of difference between Plato and the Old Stoa in the realm of anthropology lay in the fact that the Stoics regarded the soul as unitary and the passions as the result of mistaken judgments on the part of the ἡγεμονικόν. Through the intervention of Posidonius, however, the doctrine of an irrational soul was accepted into Stoicism, thereby greatly facilitating the reconciliation of a great number of Stoic ethical ideas with the Platonic ideas found in the Timaeus and elsewhere.²⁸ Thus the pronounced Stoic flavour of Philo's ethics in no way clashes with his debts to Plato. It is entirely normal for Philo to describe the πάθη in language drawn from the Timaeus, but have the list of passions mentioned consisting of the four primary πάθη of the Stoa.²⁹ The soul, according to the Stoa, was composed of corporeally conceived πνεῦμα and its directive part (ἡγεμονικόν) was located in the heart. The materialistic aspect of the doctrine Philo explicitly rejects. But the conception of πνεῦμα is required to explain the anthropological connotations of Gen.2:7 and is reconciled with the Platonist ideas read into Gen.1:26.³⁰ On the question of the location of man's rational part Philo vacillates between the brain (Plato) and the heart (Stoa), as he also does between Platonic and Stoic theories on the mechanism of sight and hearing (the differences between which are closely related to the earlier question).³¹ They are not questions to which Moses attaches a great deal of importance, and in his exegetical use of such theories we found Philo showing a good deal of opportunism.³²

In these brief remarks on the Stoa's influence on Philo's reading of the Timaeus and on the Stoic doctrines which entered into competition with Platonic ideas in his thought it has become increasingly clear that the interpenetration of Platonism and Stoicism which we have observed cannot be adjudicated before Philo's relation to Middle Platonism has been examined. The verdict on the remark of Weiss which was cited at the beginning of this section will therefore have to be postponed until later in this chapter.

3.3. Philo and the Middle Platonist interpretation

On a priori grounds it is entirely probable that, in the interpretation of the Timaeus and of Plato's thought in general, Philo's greatest debt would have been to that ἀρεστος, which in his time professed loyalty to the Platonic tradition, and which modern scholarship, with its penchant for rather arbitrary (though highly useful) classifications, has given the title 'Middle Platonism'. The regrettable silence which enshrouds Philo's philosophical training and the preference he shows for using anonymous phrases when referring to Greek philosophers and their schools have as consequence that in his many writings there is not a single explicit reference to Platonists or students of philosophy who profess to follow the teachings of Plato.¹ At most we can point to one or two anonymous plurals that can hardly refer to anyone else except Platonists.² Once again it is the evidence of his writings that must be our guide. In this section we shall present in a positive and relatively uncritical manner the methods, doctrines and fundamental philosophical/theological assumptions which, according to the evidence we have assembled, Philo takes over from or shares with the Middle Platonists. In a later section these results will be approached more critically, in response to the contention of certain scholars that Philo is or virtually is a Middle Platonist himself. The complexity of the relevant material constrains a somewhat schematic and summary presentation.

1. Methods. It is best to begin with the parallels that can be discerned between the methods used by the Middle Platonists and Philo in their study of Plato, together with the application of those methods by Philo to his interpretation of the Mosaic record.

(i) Both the *scope* of Philo's acquaintance with the Platonic corpus and the *prominence* of the Timaeus in his reading of Plato resemble the manner and methods of the Middle Platonists. For not the entire body of Plato's dialogues, from the short aporetic works to the compendious Laws, was read and studied in that school, but a Plato dimidiatus consisting of a number of famous

dialogues and short sections from lesser-known writings. On the basis of this selection a coherent Platonic system was built, in which the Timaeus played a disproportionately great role, supplying the basic outline of the principia and almost all doctrines related to the cosmos and the structure of man.³ Philo's familiarity with Plato's writings would appear to be almost exactly circumscribed by the Platonist selection, with the only important difference a rather better knowledge of the Laws than one might expect.⁴ The great significance of the Timaeus in Philo's thought has been demonstrated by the ample length of our Commentary, the evidence of which furthermore suggests that the dominant role of the Timaeus in his borrowings from Plato runs parallel to the situation in Middle Platonism. The results reached in our study differ markedly from those of Billings, who, in comparing Philo directly with Plato, ignored the intermediation of the Platonist tradition and assigned to the Timaeus an erroneously subordinate role.⁵ The proper place of the dialogue has been better seen by scholars such as Horovitz, Wolfson,⁶ Weiss, Nikiprowetzky and Dillon.

(ii) The Middle Platonists concerned themselves with the *text* of Plato's writings which they attempted to interpret through a process of exegesis and systematization.⁷ Like Philo in his exegesis of Moses they had no time for an oral or esoteric tradition which by-passed the message (whether overt or covert) of the written word.⁸ Their hermeneutical principle that the manifestly elusive thought of Plato could be guided into a coherent system of δόγματα by interpreting one text in terms of another⁹ is found at a number of levels in Philo. A trivial but interesting example in Deus 79, where the surprising word ταμειουμένη is drawn from Rep. 508b to help explain the theory of vision in Tim. 45b-d, shows that Philo either practised the method on Plato's writings himself or, what is perhaps more likely, drew it from a source-book.¹⁰ The trilocution of the soul can be related to the cardinal virtues – it is for Philo exegetically very convenient – by coalescing the accounts in the Republic and the Timaeus.¹¹ Philo's acquaintance with another technique, the use of 'proof-texts' to demonstrate that an interpretation has a foundation in the Platonic text is shown in the philosophical treatises.¹² More significant, however, is his own use of the method in interpreting the Mosaic text. A famous example is the statement at Opif. 25, τὸ δὲ δόγμα τοῦτο Μωυσέως ἐστίν, οὐκ ἐμόν, followed by the citation of Gen. 1:27. The double εἰκὼν relation between God-Logos-man presented in that text not only confirms the doctrine of the cosmic paradigm read into Gen. 1:1-5, but also sheds extra light on the relation between the Logos and the κόσμος νοητός.¹³ Indeed the method of interpreting Moses via Moses is an essential aspect of Philo's interpretation of scripture. It is Moses' habit to recall the principles set out at the beginning and make

his later statements consistent with what he has said earlier.¹⁴ Philo's exegetical technique of explaining one Biblical text by adducing other relevant texts can be found on almost every page of his writings.¹⁵ The anthropological passage from which the statement on Mosaic consistency was drawn is a good example. The significance of the expression φωνὴ αἵματος in Gen.4:10 can be explained by adducing the texts Lev.17:11, Gen.2:7, 1:26.¹⁶

(iii) The Middle Platonist method of *integrating* doctrines from other philosophical schools – especially Stoic, but also Peripatetic and Pythagorean – into their presentation of Plato's δόγματα is also reflected in Philo's writings.¹⁷ Numerous examples of this practice were identified in the Commentary. Particularly striking was the reading of the creative process in terms of *two* principles under the influence of the Stoic active and passive cause.¹⁸ The definition of time given on several occasions by Philo is derived from Chrysippus, but he, just like Albinus, regards it as merely a restatement in formal language of the Platonic (and Mosaic) conception.¹⁹ A description of the pernicious influence of the passions appears to recollect Tim.42a and 69d, but the actual πάθη listed are the Stoic quartet of primary passions.²⁰ The description of God as wholly stable (ἐστώς) and the source of movement to all beings ontologically below him, drawn from Aristotelian theology, is found in Numenius.²¹ The Pythagoreanizing arithmology which Philo is so fond of is practised by Plutarch.²² The same author interprets the E on the Delphic temple to refer to God and to mean not only εἶ (thou art) but, as some of the ancients thought, εἶ ἓν (thou art One), i.e. with clear reference to Neopythagorean theology.²³

2. Doctrines. In the area of doctrine an entire catalogue of correspondence could be given between Philo's presentation of Mosaic philosophy and the views maintained by the Middle Platonists, ranging from points of fine detail to conceptions of fundamental philosophical significance.

(i) Often Philo's *manner of formulation, choice of terms, use of illustrations*, reveal an intimate acquaintance with detailed aspects of the exegesis of the Timaeus as practised by contemporary Platonists. One of the best-known examples is his use, as earliest extant witness, of the formulas of the so-called prepositional metaphysics, which were largely based on an analysis of the Timaeus.²⁴ The τύπος imagery which Philo, combining the Timaeus and the psychology of Th.191c-192a (Plato via Plato!), uses to describe the process of creation, is closely paralleled in Arius Didymus and Albinus.²⁵ The fact that both Philo and Neoplatonist commentators give the assembly of the gods in Tim.41a a Homeric setting and use the word διαλέγεσθαι to describe God conversing with his subordinates suggests a common tradition.²⁶ The Armenian

transmission at QG 4.164 obscures a certain parallel between arithmological explanation of the number 60 and Middle Platonist exegesis of the dodecahedron of Tim.55c.²⁷ The skilful adaptation of the invocation of the gods in Tim.27c to form the proemium of the De aeternitate mundi was matched with a long list of other examples in the Platonist tradition.²⁸

(ii) The *popularity enjoyed by certain texts* from the Timaeus in the writings of the Middle Platonists is also reflected in Philo's usage, as can be observed in the following list (the references in brackets refer to the Commentary where parallels are given):

- 28a the two worlds of noetic and sense-perceptible reality (2.1.1.)
- 28b the genesis of the cosmos (2.1.2.)
- 29a praise of demiurge and cosmos (2.3.2.)
- 29e the goodness of demiurge and cosmos (3.1.1.)
- 30a from disorder to order (3.2.1.)
- 41a-b the indestructibility of the cosmos (6.1.1.)
- 47a-c the gift of philosophy, θεωρία (7.2.3.)²⁹
- 92c the doxology (10.3.1. cf. 2.3.2. 4.2.6.).

Noteworthy absentees on the list are the texts 28c (the difficulty or impossibility of coming to know God) and 35a (the creation of soul), both of which Philo chooses virtually to ignore.³⁰ This same collection of Platonic texts are later also very popular with the Christian apologists and the Church fathers.³¹

(iii) Most important of all are the *large number of doctrines* which Philo derives from the Timaeus but presents in a manner that belies the influence of Middle Platonist interpretation of the dialogue. Once again a list gives an impression of the scope and importance of these doctrines (the references allude to the Commentary, where parallels can be found; some overlap with the previous list is of course unavoidable):

- 1.3.1. the structural rôle of the principia in Opif.
- 2.1.1. the two worlds of noetic and sense-perceptible reality
- 2.1.3. the problematics of the doctrine of the cosmos' γένεσις
- 2.2.1. God as αὐτοῦ
- 2.2.2. God as δημιουργός, ποιητής καὶ πατήρ.
- 2.3.2. the admiration for the cosmos
- 2.4.1. the limits of knowledge
- 3.1.1. the goodness of the creator
- 3.2.1. the moment of creation
- 3.4.2-3 the model, the ideas as God's thoughts
- 5.2.1. the circles of the same and different
- 5.3.1-2 the theory of time
- 5.4.3. the hierarchy of cosmic ζῶα

- 6.1.1-5 the ἀφθαρσία of the cosmos guaranteed by God
- 6.2.1-2 the division of the creational task
- 8.2.2. ὕλη as matter out of which (ἐξ οὗ) the cosmos is formed
- 9.2.1. the passions of the irrational soul
- 9.2.2. the division(s) of the soul
- 10.1.2. 10.1.5. the structure and place of man
- 10.1.6. ὁμολώσας, εὐδαίμοντα, intellectualism.

The collective weight of these doctrines in Philo's theology, cosmology and anthropology scarcely requires demonstration. It is immediately apparent that they form the backbone of the body of philosophical material which we saw in the previous chapter to have exercised such a profound influence on Philo's thought.

3. Fundamental philosophical/theological assumptions. Although the results of our catalogue of doctrinal correspondences are impressive, they are not yet sufficient to explain the congeniality which Philo felt towards the Middle Platonist presentation of Plato's thought. It will be necessary to penetrate further to a number of fundamental philosophical/theological assumptions which underlie that presentation.

(i) In starting with the most important of these assumptions, the pronounced *theocentrism* of Middle Platonism, I must confess to a certain hesitation, for this subject has proved prone to serious misconceptions and requires a nuanced approach. It has become a scholarly platitude to affirm that later Platonism bears the influence of a 'religious Zeitgeist'. In his study on Albinus Witt stated it in a black and white, but not unrepresentative, way.³²

It is therefore true to say that Platonism in the second century, if it had not become a religion, was characterized by its predominantly religious and theocentric world-view... This age was attracted not so much by Plato the ethical teacher or political reformer, as by Plato the hierophant... It is true that Albinus in the *Didaskalikos* does not exhibit the religious fervour of Apuleius, Maximus, or Numenius. But even Albinus, although he avoids *Schwärmerei*, holds that the end of human life is ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα, or ὁμολώσας θεῶν κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. Second-century Platonism is theological and otherworldly.

One senses here the contrast which for a long time was made between the lucid rational Hellenism of the Classical age (including Plato) and the orientaling mysticism of later antiquity (initiated by Posidonius?), a view which in such an extreme form no longer finds many adherents.³³ A less radical and still today often asserted view is that Middle Platonism as a whole showed a theological inclination, but that it contained in particular a 'religiöse Flügel'.³⁴ The finger is usually pointed at Plutarch and Atticus, with their emphasis on the doctrine of divine *pronoia*.³⁵

In an important article Dörrie has refined this approach in an attractive

way.³⁶ The strong religious characteristics of Platonism are emphasized. God is worshipped through recognition of Nous and Logos, and such recognition secures σωτηρία for the knowing soul. In the expression of these preoccupations, however, two opposed attitudes can be detected.³⁷ In the one the stress is laid on the disclosure of the divine in the cosmos, as seen in the presence of the Logos and leading to recognition of the goodness of the demiurge. Dörrie entitles this attitude 'Logos-Religion' and sees Plutarch as a typical representative. Opposed to it is the attitude of 'Nous-Theologie'. Here stress is laid on the distance between God and the cosmos. Knowledge of the highest God can only be reached through abstract theological reflection or a contemplative mysticism. Representatives of this attitude are Albinus and later Plotinus. The schematic antithesis proposed by Dörrie seems to me a profitable way of approaching the theocentrism of Middle Platonism, showing as it does that the quest for God or the divine was a characteristic of the entire philosophical movement.

The difference between Plato and his later followers obviously does not lie in their theological concern as such. Plato is passionately concerned with the subject of Divinity and proposes distastefully heavy punishments for atheists and those who deny the workings of divine Providence.³⁸ He does retain, however, an (admittedly tenuous) separation of abstract philosophical principles (the Ideas, the Good, the One) and theological entities (the demiurge, the cosmic soul, the gods of myth).³⁹ The Middle Platonists disregard this separation. Abstract principles and theological conceptions are brought into relation with each other and fused into θεολογία, the highest form of knowledge.⁴⁰ Plutarch, posing the question τί οὖν ὄντως ὃν ἐστὶ, starts off by talking of τὸ ἀίδειον καὶ ἀγέννητον καὶ ἄφθαρτον, but does not hesitate to switch over to ὁ θεός, who furthermore is One (εἷς ὢν).⁴¹ The less fervent Albinus describes the ideas as πρὸς θεὸν νόησις αὐτοῦ, i.e. God's thinking, not the object of his thought (as in Plato).⁴² The piety accompanying this attitude of theocentrism is of a preeminently intellectual kind. The aim of austere service in temples and shrines, says Plutarch, is ἡ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ κυρίου καὶ νοητοῦ γνῶσις.⁴³

There can be no doubt, we conclude, that the intense preoccupation with the divine, the pursuit of theology and the intellectual piety which we have located in Middle Platonism (and, not to forget, Neopythagoreanism), must have played a powerful role in attracting Philo to its doctrines and bringing him to the realization that they could prove useful in uncovering the deeper meaning of the Law of Moses.

(ii) The second assumption is closely related to the first and is, for slightly different reasons, hardly less prone to misunderstanding. I refer to

the prominence of the *doctrine of creation* in Middle Platonist writings. Naturally it is entirely erroneous to think here of the Judaeo-Christian conception of creation, in which God the creator creates the whole of reality out of nothing. Creation for the Platonists is 'Weltbildung', not 'Weltschöpfung'.⁴⁴ The importance of the doctrine in their works is directly associated with the prominence of the *Timaeus*, (i.e. the reasons for it are both historical and doctrinal).⁴⁵ Even when in the 2nd century A.D. the majority of Platonists rejected the conception of a literal cosmogony taking place in time, they without exception continue to report the 'moment of creation' in terms derived from *Tim.* 30a.⁴⁶ Not until Plotinus does an emancipation from the creationistic schema of the *Timaeus* take place.⁴⁷ When to this 'creationism' is added the notion of a demiurgic creating deity, the attractiveness of Middle Platonism – compared with all other philosophical schools – for Philo in his task of giving philosophical exegesis of the Pentateuch is apparent. If proof be required we need only recall that Philo's view of creation approximates a 'Weltbildung' and not the 'Weltschöpfung' that the opening words of Genesis might well have suggested to him.⁴⁸

(iii) Another aspect of Middle Platonism congenial to Philo was its concern with the *theme of divine Providence*. The doctrine of providence is the obverse of the doctrine of creation. All Middle Platonists hold to the view, derived from *Tim.* 41a-b, that the cosmos is indestructible through the agency of God's *pronoia* or will.⁴⁹ Some consider it necessary to safeguard the doctrine of providence by espousing a literal interpretation of the cosmogony.⁵⁰ Philo anticipates this argument, but may well have derived it from contemporary Platonists.⁵¹ But also Albinus, who believes in a non-literal cosmogony, describes the demiurge as producing the cosmos κατὰ θαυμασιωτάτην πρόνοιαν καὶ δόξαν.⁵² Another facet of the doctrine of Providence is theodicy. Philo shares with the Middle Platonists the unconditional conviction that God is in no way responsible for evil. In order to defend the doctrine of Providence against all manner of objections, however, he turns to the extensive repertoire of arguments supplied by the Stoa. So in the *De Providentia* the philosophy of Plato plays a relatively minor role, namely that of complementing the views of the Stoa.⁵³ There is no trace of the more sophisticated theory of levels of providence, developed by Middle Platonists in response to the determinism of the Stoa.⁵⁴

(iv) All Greek schools of philosophy (except the sceptics) sought to give man a place in the cosmos. The distinctiveness of the Middle Platonist attempt is largely inspired by the *Timaeus*. They stressed above all two things, the parallelism between man and the cosmos and man's relation to the divine. Like the cosmos man is composed of soul and body. Like the cosmos man has

been designed with purpose and providential skill. But in one regard man is unique; he alone of all creatures is created by *both* the demiurge and the 'young gods' who assist him. His aim and end in life is to exercise the rational (and divine) part created by the demiurge, thereby gaining knowledge of God and becoming like unto him, and at the same time to keep the irrational (and mortal) part created by the 'young gods' under control and free from disturbing passions. In this he has a choice; he can incline to good or evil, virtue or vice, a rational life or a life of sensual indulgence.⁵⁵

But, it might be interposed, could not Philo be equally attracted to the doctrines of Stoicism, which also stress the macrocosm/microcosm relation and regard man as a ζῷον λογικόν sharing in the immanent presence of the divine? As was observed in the previous section, Philo is certainly not averse to incorporating Stoic elements in his statements on man, notably when they are suggested by the Mosaic text. But it is the Platonist views on man's place in the cosmos which appeal to him more, and for the following reasons: (a) the stress on the duality of corporeal body and incorporeal soul; (b) the unabashed affirmation of human free will and responsibility; (c) the manner of relating man to a theological hierarchy, in which man participates in the divine and can even achieve a measure of transcendence, but falls short of the transcendence that must be attributed to the highest god.⁵⁶

(v) The final comment concerns what is perhaps better described as an attitude rather than an assumption, namely the *reverence* shown by the Middle Platonists for the source of their doctrines, the philosopher Plato himself. By this time the process of divinization, which was to reach a climax in Neoplatonism, was well under way. Apuleius, having given the anecdote on Plato's Apolline nature, affirms that he not only outstripped the heroes in excellence but also matched the deities in his powers.⁵⁷ According to Atticus, Plato was truly sent down from the gods so that through his efforts philosophy would be revealed in its completeness.⁵⁸ In addition, Plato's pronouncements were accredited with a calculated oracular obscurity. The master was considered to speak in ἀνύγματα. The derivation of five worlds from the five perfect geometrical solids is a matter at which the master enigmatically hinted (αὐτὸς ὑπηνύξατο), says Plutarch as he embarks on an exegesis of *Tim.*55d.⁵⁹ It is interesting to observe that in this passage, and also elsewhere when discussing Platonic ζητήματα, Plutarch gives multiple answers, considering that the precise nature of Plato's intentions cannot be considered certain.⁶⁰ According to Numenius Plato concealed his own ideas by expressing them in a manner midway between clarity and obscurity, keeping things safe for himself but initiating doctrinal dissension among his followers.⁶¹

The central question for the Platonists was indeed how they could penetrate

to the authentic thought of their heresiarch.⁶² In the light of the quasi-oracular, hieratic nature of Plato's pronouncements, the method of interpreting Plato via Plato virtually amounts to the hermeneutical principle *scriptura interpretes sui* (though the *perspicuitas* is lacking).⁶³ Albinus, always the most sober-minded in his approach, finds a solution based on *Tim.*29b-d: δογματίζει Πλάτων...ἢ ἐπιστημονικῶς ἢ εἰκοτολογικῶς.⁶⁴ Only concerning τὰ νοητά can Plato's thought be reduced to lucidity and incontrovertibility. But this does not mean direct access, for the way of preparatory study is long and arduous. The highest and greatest good is not easy to discover nor safe to pass on to everybody; it is a secret which Plato communicated to only a few of his intimates...⁶⁵ The temptation to digress further on the fascinating subject of Middle Platonist hermeneutics must be resisted. The important parallels with Philo's manner of interpreting the recorded testimony of Moses – one thinks of the ascription of a hieratic status, the practice of multiple exegesis, the assumption of a limited esotericism – is once again immediately apparent.

3.4. A question of sources

The extensive correspondences between Philo and the Middle Platonists in their interpretation and use of the *Timaeus*, summarized in the previous section, have given our enquiry a forward impetus. They encourage the taking of a further step. Although Philo was thoroughly acquainted with the *Timaeus* in the original, his presentation of its doctrines show the modifying influence of the interpretative tradition. Is it possible to pin down the source or sources of such influence? First of all we should take into account the *oral* teaching Philo may have enjoyed, whether by attending the lectures of Platonists or through oral tuition. But on this subject all information is lacking. The barrier of Philo's silence and the elusive nature of oral tradition in general is for us quite insurmountable.¹ Is it then possible to show that Philo made use of *written* sources in his study of the *Timaeus*? Here the results of research are more promising.

The evidence of certain passages indicates that Philo from time to time consulted handbooks of Platonic doctrine when he wished to outline the contents of the *Timaeus*. In the account of the astronomy of *Tim.*35-37 Philo both adds to and subtracts from the Platonic original with such sureness and knowledge of technical aspects that one must suspect the aid of a work such as Theon of Smyrna's τὰ κατὰ τὸ μαθηματικὸν χρῆσιμα εἰς τὴν Πλάτωνος ἀνάγνωσιν.² Through a comparison of Philo's four accounts of the trilocution of the soul it became apparent that a number of idiosyncratic aspects point to a source which

summarized the basic 'physical' doctrines of Plato (i.e. similar to Albinus' Didaskalikos), as indeed Philo's 'doxographical' way of introducing the doctrines suggests. But the source itself resisted identification.³ The passages which recount the correlation between the genera of living beings and the elements and regions of the cosmos point to derivation from Middle Platonist sources (the variations shown suggest more than one). The departures from the simple schema of the Timaeus reveal attempts to reconcile its cosmology with other philosophical doctrines (demonology, five-element universe).⁴ Another source of information for Philo will have been doxographical manuals like Aëtius' Placita. Though heavily dependent for Plato's δόξα on the Timaeus, they can have done no more than supply a skeletal framework of doctrine, to be clothed with further details from the work itself or other sources.⁵

Various anonymous plurals reveal that Philo was conversant with commentators on the Timaeus who discussed problems of its interpretation.⁶ It is not possible to determine, however, whether such information is drawn from a proper commentary on the entire work or from discussions of parts of its contents and the concomitant interpretative problems. The question of whether full-length commentaries on the Timaeus existed in the time of Philo remains controversial.⁷ Philo's evidence, it must be concluded, sheds no decisive light on this problem. The explanation of the process of vision in Deus 79 could have been derived from a commentary dealing with Tim. 45b-d, but also from a summary of Platonic doctrine such as those presented by Albinus and Apuleius.⁸ The Platonist doctrine of causes scholastically formulated in the 'metaphysics of prepositions' is presented in Philo with the succinctness reminiscent of a handbook or a treatise rather than a commentary.⁹ The explanation of the act of creation in Opif. 16-25, which shows unmistakable signs of dependence on the above-mentioned metaphysics, is much longer and detailed. But its integrative character, combining themes from 28a-31b, makes the derivation from a *running* commentary (such as found in Pap. 9782) not so likely.¹⁰ My tentative conclusion is that commentaries may well have aided Philo in reaching an understanding of the thematics and interpretative hazards of the Timaeus, but that their information has only filtered through indirectly to the Alexandrian's own commentaries on scripture.¹¹

But Quellenforschung lacks lustre if no hard facts are demonstrated and no proper names are persuasively brought forward. Philo stands close to the beginning of the Middle Platonist tradition, and there are only two names with which his evidence can reasonably be associated, the philosopher Eudorus and the doxographer Arius Didymus, both known to have been active in Alexandria. On the relation between these three a fragile consensus of scholarly opinion has been built up over the past twenty years. Boyancé, Theiler and Dillon

have argued that Philo's Platonist doctrines point to contact with Eudorus and his circle, but that certain important elements such as the doctrine of causes and the notion of the κόσμος νοητός probably go back to Eudorus' teacher, Antiochus of Ascalon. Arius Didymus drew on Eudorus in his account of the Platonic philosophy. The similarities that can be discerned between Philo and the little we know of Arius Didymus (and also Albinus who drew on Arius' account) are an independent witness to Philo's dependence on Eudorus.¹² It is moreover speculated that Eudorus' Commentary on the Timaeus may have played an important role in transmitting doctrines connected with that work to Philo.¹³

A setback for this theory is the convincing arguments put forward by Glucker that there is no direct connection between Antiochus and Alexandrian philosophy.¹⁴ It is also risky to attach so much weight to a Commentary on the Timaeus when its very existence is quite uncertain.¹⁵ Eudorus' sympathy for Pythagoreanizing theology is certainly reflected in Philo's works.¹⁶ It is not known, however, how the Alexandrian philosopher might have combined these theological views with an interpretation of the Timaeus. The derivation of both the ideas and matter from the One as highest causal principle (virtually a creatio ex nihilo) is not exploited by Philo.¹⁷ Eudorus appears also to have followed Xenocrates and Crantor in interpreting the cosmogony of the Timaeus in a non-literal manner.¹⁸ Philo does not follow him in this, and may well refer to him as one of the σοφιστεύοντες whose views are rejected in Aet.14. On the other hand Eudorus' account of the Pythagorean and Platonic telos, which has come down to us via Arius Didymus and Stobaeus, shows an impressive number of similarities to Philo's doctrines.¹⁹ The passage of Arius Didymus on the nature of the ideas and their function in the process of creation – the only part of his exposé of Plato's physical doctrines that has survived – reminds us strongly of the way Philo speaks of the ideas and the model throughout his writings and especially in Opif.16-25.²⁰ It lends credence to the suggestion that Seneca and Philo derive their prepositional metaphysics from Arius Didymus' handbook.²¹ But it cannot be considered certain that Arius Didymus was dependent on Eudorus for these ideas.

Three other authors are relevant to the question of sources. The treatise On the nature of the cosmos and the soul by Timaeus Locrus, which purports to be the source of Plato's dialogue but in fact shows numerous affinities with early Middle Platonism, offers many parallels to Philo's interpretations of the Timaeus.²² Plutarch not only read Eudorus but is also probably connected to Alexandrian Platonism through his teacher Ammonius.²³ When reading the passages in Plutarch's writings which utilize and interpret the Timaeus, one is forcibly struck by the similarities in vocabulary and terminology, and to a lesser extent in doctrine, to what we find in Philo.²⁴ The parallels

between Albinus' Didaskalikos and Philo, always suggestive but never very precise, are explicable through the use made by Albinus, whether directly or indirectly, of the Epitome of Arius Didymus.²⁵

The results of our enquiry into sources show certain patterns of convergence, but do not uncover the clear lines of influence and dependence which the Quellenforscher aims to find. The evidence of Philo's writings points to a solidly established body of Platonist doctrine, which was available in Alexandria and may be associated with the figure of Eudorus and his circle, though such an association should be recognized as no more than an educated guess. The direct connections between Philo and what we know of Eudorus are at any rate very limited in scope. Because these Alexandrian developments exercised an important, possibly decisive, influence on the course of Middle Platonism, the curious fact can be explained that Philo's interpretations of the Timaeus show affinities to those of authors who lived a century or more after he did. This is not to deny that there were important elements of doctrinal progress and development in Middle Platonism. In many aspects Philo's interpretations and usage show a lack of sophistication compared with the subtle scholasticism of later Platonism. Good examples are provided by his use of the term γενητός and the simplicity of his doctrine of providence.²⁶ A highly significant aspect of Philo's evidence is the sheer prominence of the contribution made by the Timaeus towards the understanding of Plato's thought. It gives support to Dörrie's theory that in the first century B.C. a break occurred with the earlier Academic tradition and that a renaissance of interest in the Timaeus initiated the mode of interpreting Plato that was to be dominant in later antiquity and beyond.²⁷

These conclusions go as far as Philo's evidence allows. If they seem rather tentative and lacking precise contours, the paucity of evidence must be held partly to blame. More important, however, is the difference in perspective and method between my study and the research carried out by the scholars mentioned above. Their aim was to establish various correspondences in points of detail between Philo and other sources, in order to extrapolate from them conclusions which contribute to our understanding of developments in the history of philosophy.²⁸ My perspective has been resolutely Philonocentric. And when Philo's understanding and use of the Timaeus is surveyed in its totality, we are above all struck by his independence of mind and the large number of peculiarities in his presentation.²⁹ For this reason, in spite of the plentiful material which they contain, Philo's writings are unable to provide the historian of philosophy with a clear picture of the characteristics of Platonism in Alexandria at the beginning the first century A.D.

A final remark on sources returns us to the subject of commentaries. Philo wrote extensive commentaries on the books of Moses. The Platonists composed commentaries on the dialogues, although it is not certain when they started doing this and what the earliest versions looked like. In spite of this lack of information, the possibility must be entertained that Philo in his commentaries was influenced and aided by the *formal* aspects of the Platonist commentary, just as in his philosophical treatises he utilized the formal characteristics of the Hellenistic discourse (θέσις, σύγγραμμα) and dialogue.³⁰ What correspondences can be discovered between Philo's writings and the remnants of Middle Platonist commentaries (also taking into account the more plentiful supply of Neoplatonist material)?³¹

That there are certain similarities cannot be denied. Both Philo and the Platonists undertake to give a running commentary on an authoritative written text. The method of the Platonists, namely to explain Plato via Plato but also with the aid of philosophical doctrines from other schools which they consider to be implicit in Plato's text, is applied by Philo to Moses.³² A number of organizational techniques used by the Neoplatonists to explain the text of Plato are prefigured in Philo.³³ The most important of these is the technique of raising ἀπορία found in the text under discussion and then putting forward λύσεις with or without reference to previous commentators.³⁴ The frequent reference to predecessors in the process of exegesis and interpretation is another striking parallel between Philo and Platonist commentaries.³⁵

Yet in my view the differences between the two are greater than the similarities. The Platonist commentaries, though certainly not dealing at equal length with every part of the text, are more controlled in their exposition. An attempt is made to follow the train of the argument and to gain a picture of the treatise as a whole. Philo's manner of exegesis in the Allegorical Commentary tends to be more episodic.³⁶ Each verse of scripture, indeed each phrase and word, contains so many riches of thought that Philo is frequently drawn into long explanations and digressions, accompanied by the citation and explication of numerous parallel texts. Moreover a number of the special interpretative techniques which Philo needs to call upon in order to give the Pentateuch a philosophical content are scarcely found in Platonist commentaries. To begin with a trivial example, Philo's technique of extracting deep spiritual thoughts from the crudities of the Septuagint translation is not used by the Platonists, for the simple reason that Plato did not write bad Greek.³⁷ More important is the absence of parallels in Platonist commentaries for the method of etymologizing which Philo uses to such marked effect.³⁸ Also the symbolical, psychological and ethical allegorization which is Philo's most fertile interpretative method in the Allegorical Commentary is rarely employed

by the Platonists. Proclus uses it extensively for the opening section of the Timaeus,³⁹ but such symbolical interpretation of the proemia of the Platonic dialogues was probably missing in the earlier Middle Platonist commentaries.⁴⁰ Again the difference between the texts interpreted accounts to a large extent for the difference in techniques employed.⁴¹ One special interpretative technique exploited by both Philo and the Platonists is the science of arithmology. Both Philo in the De opificio mundi and Calcidius in his commentary on the Timaeus give a lengthy encomium of the hebdomad, the former prompted by the seventh day of creation, the latter by the role of the number seven in the structure of the cosmic soul.⁴² Of all Philo's works the De opificio mundi must surely bear the most resemblance to a Platonist commentary on the Timaeus. But even here the exegesis of Gen.1-3 does not allow the methodical sentence-by-sentence, argument-by-argument analysis given by the Platonists. We may be quite certain that if Proclus had chanced on this work, he would have found it a perplexing and unsatisfactory document.

My conclusion is that the resemblance between Philonic and Platonist commentaries are disappointing and not particularly instructive from the historical point of view. Both undertake to give exegesis of an authoritative text, with the result that certain superficial resemblances are virtually inevitable. But the greater part of the interpretative techniques employed by Philo are adapted to the requirements of Biblical exegesis and have their origin in the traditions of the Hellenistic synagogue.⁴³ These Jewish traditions were initially much indebted to the innovatory techniques of allegory and etymology developed in the exegesis of Homer and Hesiod by Stoic philosophers and other scholars,⁴⁴ but soon (one surmises) proceeded to follow their own intuitions.

A final, most intriguing difference between Philonic and Platonist exegesis should not remain unobserved. Without exception Philo always refers to exegetical predecessors and colleagues in *anonymous* terms. This is in shrill contrast to Neoplatonist commentators who, when discussing an interpretative problem, like to refer to the opinions of a whole list of Platonist scholars, carefully named and usually placed in chronological order.⁴⁵ It also contrasts with the practices of the Rabbinic exegesis of the Law. The reason Dillon gives for Philo's deviation is forthright and radical. Properly speaking Philo has no exegetical predecessors whose work was comparable with his; so, in order not to be outdone by his Greek models, he sets up straw men in order to shoot them down.⁴⁶ This is a more drastic rejection of the theory of Philo's dependence on Alexandrian exegetical traditions than I consider to be plausible.⁴⁷ Possibly an explanation can be sought in the unquestionably greater deference shown by Philo (and his colleagues) towards the scriptural text, as compared with the attitude of the Platonists to Plato's words. Each of the

words of the Mosaic Law is divinely inspired. It is not the task of the interpreter to present his own ideas. Convinced of his οὐδένετα, he must attempt to uncover some of the treasures of Moses' thought.⁴⁸ The recollection of a διαδοχή of interpreters serves only to distract the reader from the immediate task at hand, namely to study and observe the Law.

3.5. Is Philo a Middle Platonist?

At a colloque held in 1969 on the subject of Neoplatonism (and its antecedents) a fascinating verbal exchange took place between two experienced scholars. A paper had just been presented by Prof. H. Dörrie on the renewal of Platonism in the first century B.C. In response to a participant, who asked whether the interest shown by Alexandrian Jews in Plato may have played a role in the evolution of Platonism, he replied:¹

M. DÖRRIE: Une recherche comme celle que je me suis imposée ne peut se passer du devoir d'étudier attentivement le platonisme de Philon. Il est vrai que grâce à Philon nous gagnons certains regards sur le platonisme de son temps. Mais Philon lui-même n'est aucunement platonicien: il empruntait et à la Stoa et au platonisme certaines formes de 'savoir s'exprimer'. Ce qu'il cherche, c'est une harmonie: on peut exprimer les mêmes résultats théologiques par le langage de Moïse, par celui des platoniciens et parfois, ce qui est plus rare, Philon les exprime en parlant stoïcien. Mais, quand même, ces formes, dont Philon se sert, nous font connaître que les études platoniciennes étaient bien en vigueur à Alexandrie pendant l'époque de Philon et à la génération qui précède. Voilà la génération d'Eudore et d'Arius Didyme, et c'est dans cette génération que Philon a puisé. Et je suis convaincu que l'on a développé, dans cette génération ... la possibilité d'exprimer toutes les réflexions philosophiques en langage platonicien. Évidemment, c'était un des résultats de cette concordance de Platon: on savait faire usage de son langage. Malheureusement, à côté de quelques citations que l'on peut trouver dans Philon, ce sont presque exclusivement les deux petits traités que nous a conservés Sénèque qui nous enseignent à quel degré le platonisme s'était développé dans cette manière que j'appelle scolaire ou scolastique. Philon nous enseigne beaucoup sur les extérieurs, mais malheureusement trop peu sur les intérieurs de ce renouveau platonicien. Parce que, naturellement, la théologie exprimée par Philon n'est jamais la théologie platonicienne, mais celle de Philon, monothéiste.

Mlle. DE VOGEL: N'est-ce pas trop dire que d'affirmer que Philon n'était aucunement platonicien? Il est vrai que la Stoa lui donne souvent des moyens de s'exprimer. Mais au fond j'y trouve assez de platonisme.

M. DÖRRIE: Philon n'est nullement platonicien de confession. Il peut se servir d'expressions platoniciennes, il peut harmoniser certains aspects de la théologie de Platon. Mais sa véritable théologie culmine dans un Dieu personnel et, de ce point de vue, il y aurait un conflit entre la théologie platonicienne incompatible avec celle de l'Ancien Testament et la théologie de Philon, professant un Dieu personnel, créateur de ce monde. Il faut toujours tenir compte de ces fondements théologiques qui sont tellement importants pour Philon.

Mlle. DE VOGEL: Il y a tout de même des choses essentiellement platoniciennes chez Philon. Et puis, que signifie l'expression: Dieu personnel?

M.DÖRRIE: J'aimerais poser la question inverse: si un théologien catholique moderne venait à se servir d'une démonstration qui remonte à Calvin, serait-il calviniste? Ne faut-il pas distinguer entre platonisme de 'confession' ou substantiel et platonisme accidentel, si nombreux soient, dans ce dernier cas, les emprunts.

I have quoted this exchange at such length because it illustrates with attractive clarity the complexity of the issues involved in reaching a verdict on the thesis of Dillon and Winston that Philo is an 'ardent Platonist' or, in the slightly weakened form of the same position, that he is the follower of Moses who is presented as a 'fully-fledged Middle Platonist'.² The results of our research are certainly impressive. In the areas of theology, cosmology and anthropology, i.e. that part of philosophy largely covered by the *Timaeus*, Philo's debts to the Middle Platonist manner of reading Plato are much greater than to Aristotle, the Old Academy, and the Stoa, while many of the Aristotelian and Stoic ideas which he does present had already been integrated by the Middle Platonists into their doctrinal system. In spite of the great array of correspondences and concordances which we have observed, however, I am convinced that an examination of four aspects of the aims, methods and content of Philo's writings must lead us to the conclusion that Philo is *not* a Middle Platonist and that, even if the primacy of his discipleship of Moses is recognized, he should not be given that title.

1. Although Philo speaks of the 'great Plato' and 'the sage Plato'³ and would certainly, if pressed, have described him as the philosopher among the Greeks who most nearly approached the truth, he does not actually demonstrate any particular *loyalty* towards the figure of Plato himself or the doctrines drawn from Plato's writings. The reverence and loyalty which the Middle Platonists showed towards Plato and the *scripta Platonis* Philo reserves for Moses and scripture. The value of Plato's doctrines lies precisely in the fact that they explain the hidden meaning of so many aspects of the scriptural record. It might be argued that Philo is deceiving himself, and, since Moses has chiefly Middle Platonist doctrines placed in his mouth, the question of loyalties is irrelevant. This position, which is effectively that of Dillon stated in a more polemical way,⁴ clearly cannot do justice to Philo's intentions. It also - and this is more important - fails to correspond with the phenomenon of his philosophical exegesis of the Mosaic writings.

Philo is evidently convinced that, when expounding Moses' views on the creation and structure of the cosmos and man, the writings of Plato, and in particular the *Timaeus*, can help him the most. But this marriage of convenience does not lead to the rejection of other suitable helpmates. If, in one of his most important anthropological texts Moses speaks of man being

'inbreathed' with the divine πνεῦμα, Philo feels no loyalty towards Platonism which would lead him to neglect or reject this term. The term is unreservedly accepted and integrated into a basically Platonic conception of man's dual structure in a manner which, from the viewpoint of Greek philosophy, gives rise to a number of intractable complications.⁵ At one stage in the course of this study Philo's attitude towards the doctrines of Greek philosophy was labelled as that of an opportunist.⁶ Opportunism is rendered possible through the absence of loyalty. In Philo's case it is compensated (and explained) by his overriding loyalty towards the letter and spirit of the books of Moses.

2. A second area in which Philo differs from Middle Platonist authors may be described as the *techniques* of philosophical explanation. Although both are attempting to expound and explain the doctrines of the 'philosopher' whose memory and writings they hold in high honour, when Philo's explanations are compared with those of his counterparts they are found lacking in clarity precisely on those issues where one who was familiar with the interpretative controversies in the philosophical schools would expect a clear answer. A number of examples drawn from Middle Platonist authors and compared with Philo on the basis of the results of our Commentary will suitably illustrate what we mean.

(a) In chapters 5-7 of his treatise De animae procreatione in Timaeo (1014A-1015F) Plutarch gives a detailed ἐξήγησις⁷ of what he regards to be the δόγματα of Plato in describing the cosmos as γενητός.⁸ This passage can profitably be compared with the opening part of the De opificio mundi (especially §7-12, 21-22, 26-28), which is so heavily reliant on the Timaeus. Numerous similarities between Plutarch and Philo immediately strike the eye: the probabilistic nature of the exegesis (1014A),⁹ the theistic emphasis (1014A, cf. 1013 E),¹⁰ the quotation of Tim. 29a5-6 in 1014A,¹¹ the use of the terms ὕλη and οὐσία,¹² the imagery in 1014B,¹³ and so on. Especially the language used by Plutarch to describe the transition from disorder to order, based on Tim. 30a, reminds us of Philo.¹⁴ But it is the differences between the two authors which must now be accentuated.

(i) Plutarch presents himself as a direct interpreter of Plato's words. He thus explicitly confronts the text of Timaeus and attempts to integrate it with a large number of other Platonic texts. He does not vouch for the absolute truth of his interpretation, but considers it probable. As a convinced Platonist he regards Plato's opinion (correctly interpreted) as his own opinion.¹⁵ In Philo, however, the triangular relation between Moses, Plato and the exegete is much less straightforward. To be sure, Moses' opinion is Philo's opinion, but he needs the help of Plato to establish it.

(ii) Plutarch makes it absolutely clear that the pre-existent matter is not

created by the demiurge but lies at his disposition. One cannot speak of coming into being ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος but ἐκ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς...ἔχοντος (1014B). Thus a creatio ex nihilo is *explicitly* rejected. Contrast Philo, who nowhere explains the origin of the οὐσία introduced in Opif.9,21.¹⁶

(iii) Plutarch is concerned about the philosophical problem of what causes the disharmonious motion of the pre-cosmic chaos and is led to postulate his theory of a pre-cosmic irrational soul. The ἀκοσμία of Tim.30a is οὐκ ἀσώματος οὐδ' ἄψυχος (1014B). Again Plutarch is explicit, whereas in Philo's case we are forced to *speculate* on whether he took these philosophical problematics into consideration.¹⁷

It cannot be denied that, in the direct confrontation with Plato's text, Plutarch reveals a greater lucidity and a greater facility in dealing with philosophical problems than is found in Philo's Mosaic exegesis. It is fascinating to observe, however, that on the question of the status of matter Plutarch shows a lack of clarity comparable to that found in Philo. Both alternate between conceiving matter as a primal qualityless substrate and as a disorderly pre-existent substance with certain (largely negative) qualities.¹⁸ The problem is caused by the confluence of Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic theories on 'matter', and the fact that one so well versed in the history of philosophy as Plutarch got himself tangled up on this issue points to fundamental difficulties in the Middle Platonist interpretation of Plato.

(b) It lies in the nature of Plutarch's solution to the problems raised by Tim.30a which we have just discussed that there can be no doubt that he conceives the process of creation as taking place as an actual event.¹⁹ Because Philo avoids the Platonic conception of the cosmic soul, and thus cannot entertain the possibility of that soul leading an irrational existence before creation occurs, the clarity of the Plutarchean interpretation is denied him.²⁰

It is also instructive to compare Philo's manner of dealing with this standard problem with that of Albinus in the Didaskalikos. The lengthy account of τὰ φυσικά of Plato (§12-26) is almost entirely based on the Timaeus, as is much of his presentation of the three ἀρχαί (§8-11). Thus, in describing the coming into being of the cosmos (§12.1-2), Albinus does not hesitate to follow the well-known formula of Tim.30a. A few pages further on, however, he makes sure that his reader understands what is meant by the fact that the cosmos is described as γενητός (§14.3, cf.10.3):

ὅταν δὲ εἴπῃ γενητὸν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, οὐχ οὕτως ἀκουστέον αὐτοῦ, ὥς ὄντος ποτὲ χρόνου, ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἦν κόσμος· ἀλλὰ διότι ἀεὶ ἐν γενέσει ἐστὶ καὶ ἐμφαίνει τῆς αὐτοῦ ὑποστάσεως ἀρχικώτερόν τι αἴτιον· καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν δὲ ἀεὶ οὔσαν τοῦ κόσμου οὐχὶ ποιεῖ ὁ θεός, ἀλλὰ κατακοσμεῖ...

Although an attempt is made to incorporate the doctrine of the ordering of the irrational cosmic soul, it is at the same time made clear that 'created' means

eternally subject to becoming and dependent on a higher cause, i.e. that the cosmogony is not meant as actually having taken place.²¹ Once again this clarity is precisely what we miss in Philo's commentary on the Mosaic cosmogony, both in his polemic against the proponents of the doctrine that the cosmos is ἀγέννητός τε καὶ ἀίδεος (§7-10) and his exegesis of the ἐν ἀρχῇ in Gen.1:1 (§26-28).²² But when Philo has to explain *Plato's* opinion on the γένεσις τοῦ κόσμου in the *philosophical* treatise *Aet.*13-16, the philosophical issues involved do come into clearer focus.²³

(c) For a third example we move on to the division of the creative task as introduced by Plato in *Tim.*41-42. Albinus, as usual following the *Timaeus* very closely, describes how the demiurge delegates part of the work of creation to his ἔκγονοι θεοῦ and how they create man's body and the mortal parts of the soul.²⁴ *Timaeus* Locrus is freer in his version of Plato's account. The lesser creative tasks are handed over to the φύσις ἀλλοιωτικά, which only creates man's body and the mortal genera. Man's soul is entirely created by God.²⁵ The straightforward clarity of these interpretations is quite different from the five passages in which Philo utilizes this Platonic motif, for he does not reveal precisely who the subordinates are and in three of the five passages does not make at all clear what part of the soul is not created by God (for Philo, in opposition to Plato, man's body *is* created by God, cf. Gen.2:7).²⁶

(d) In fairness to Philo these examples should not be brought to an end without the mention of a Platonic doctrine which Philo's methods allow him to deal with better than his Middle Platonist counterparts. In his Allegory of the soul Philo manages to exploit the possibilities of the allegorical method to such purpose that he is able to capture much of the tension which Plato so skilfully builds up in his accounts of the struggle of the soul in the *Phaedrus* myth and the *Republic*.²⁷ The Platonists would doubtless have found Philo's allegories intolerably exotic. Nevertheless it must be admitted that his allegorization of the Biblical stories is more effective in illustrating the soul's struggle than the quotations from Greek tragedy and Homer which Middle Platonist authors used in their dry scholastic manuals and academic treatises.²⁸

For students of ancient philosophy the lack of clarity shown by Philo in the first three examples above is perplexing, or even frustrating. This was the kind of experience that led scholars in the past to conclude that Philo was a confused thinker, a dabbler or dilettante who was unable to understand the philosophical issues discussed in the books he read.²⁹ Yet it seems quite beyond belief that someone, who possessed the intimate knowledge of the *Timaeus* which we have seen Philo to have had, should be stumped by the relatively straightforward philosophical problems raised in the examples that were discussed above. The only solution for this baffling state of affairs is to

recognize the fact that Philo sees it as his task to explain the words of Moses and that *he chooses to adhere rather closely* to the letter of the Mosaic text. The result is that certain systematic interpretative questions, which must be confronted by every reader of the *Timaeus*, do not receive a clear answer when Plato's doctrines are transposed into the context of scriptural exegesis. In *Opif.* 72-75 Philo does not talk of the irrational part of the soul, because it is mentioned by Moses neither in Gen.1:26-27 nor in Gen.2:7. Yet its existence is clearly implied by Philo's exegesis. Already in *Opif.* 79 the *πάθη* of the irrational soul are recounted, and in *Leg.* 1.70-73 the exegesis of Gen.2:10-14 leads to a detailed exposé of the Platonic tripartition of the soul...³⁰

3. It was observed earlier in this chapter that in the matter of *doctrine* the philosophical material which Philo derives from Plato, and in particular from the *Timaeus*, forms the backbone of the ideas which, via his probabilistic method of exegesis, are read into the words of Moses. It must not be thought, however, that Philo shows the tendency to follow slavishly the dictates of the Platonist sources and the interpretations they offered. Right throughout our discussions of Philo's thought we have come across instances of independence of mind and doctrinal divergence in relation to both Platonic text and Platonist interpretation. The following list gives examples that range from the highly consequential to the quite trivial (in brackets references are given to the detailed discussions).

- the refusal to accept the doctrine of two or three principia (II 2.3.3. III 2.8.)
- the association of the creator's goodness with the doctrine of grace (II 3.1.1. III 2.6.)
- the deliberate avoidance of the concept of the cosmic soul, and to a lesser extent of the body of the cosmos (II 4.2.8. 5.1.1-3. III 2.7.)
- the refusal to give mythological names to the planets (II 5.2.1.)
- the interpretation of the liver's role in dreams, prophecy and mantic (II 9.2.4.)
- the incorporation of the notions of *πνεῦμα* and blood-soul in the psychology of man (II 10.1.2. 10.1.5. III 2.12.)
- the hesitation with regard to the divinization of man's rational part (II 10.1.4. III 2.12.)
- the rejection of the theory of metempsychosis and its replacement with allegorical explanation (II 10.2.2.)

A more detailed example is required, however, to illustrate adequately the complexity of the relation between Philo's independence of mind and the great debts he incurred to the Platonist interpretation of the *Timaeus*. For the last time, therefore, we return to the very hub of Philo's thought, the doctrine of God and his creatorship of the cosmos. I propose to compare Philo's

philosophical excursus on the 'creation' of the κόσμος νοητός on 'day one' (Opif.16-25) with the most complete and systematic Middle Platonist exposition of the doctrine of God which we possess, that found in the Didaskalikos of Albinus.³¹

Albinus' account, though not without its difficulties and points of obscurity, can be summarized as follows. Superior to soul is nous, and superior to potential nous is nous in actuality. Higher than this nous (the νοῦς τοῦ συμπαντος οὐρανοῦ) is the first god, who is cause of the nous' actuality. The first god, as highest νοῦς, is unmoved, but moves the cosmic nous through being the object of desire (§10.2).³² Always in a state of actuality, the first god reflects on his own thoughts; his actuality is thus the Idea. He is eternal, ineffable, the summit of all perfections. Being good, he is the source of all goodness. He is Father inasmuch as he is the cause of all things. It being his wish (βούλησις) that all things should be filled with himself, he orders the cosmic mind and the cosmic soul by looking to himself and his own thoughts. The cosmic mind, ordered by the highest god, in turn brings to order (διακοσμεῖ) the whole of nature in the cosmos (§10.3). In §12 Albinus proceeds to recount the act of creation, adhering closely to the letter of the Timaeus. Where then must the figure of the Platonic demiurge be placed in the theological account just summarized? Plato must be reconciled with Aristotle, a difficult operation! From §14.3 it emerges, albeit not at all clearly, that Plato's demiurge is split in two. The highest god represents the demiurge as cause of creation and Father (and also, in the post-Platonic development, as thinker of the ideas). But his creative activity is limited to raising the cosmic soul from sleep and ordering its nous (i.e. the cosmic nous), so that the nous receives the ideas, by means of which the διακόσμησις of the cosmos can occur. Thus the demiurgic 'dirty work' of creation, performed in the Timaeus by the demiurge, is carried out by the cosmic nous in Albinus' interpretation. The transcendence of the first god, so strongly stressed in the theological section, is preserved. The non-literal reading of cosmogony, encouraging the doctrine of creatio aeterna, allows consistency with the affirmation of the first god's immutability in §10.7.³³

Let us now adduce the Philonic presentation, looking both at the image which Philo employs and its application to the act of creation. The king (God), who does not concern himself with the creative process but supplies the 'conditions' under which it can take place, clearly possesses the transcendence which Albinus so diligently attributes to his first god. The architect (also God) forms a plan of the city to be built in his mind (Logos). Transferred to the creation of the cosmos, that plan is the κόσμος νοητός, used as a model so that God can execute his plan and bring the κόσμος αἰσθητός to

completion (via the Logos as instrument of creation). Another way of describing the same process is to say that God's creative power, having the truly good (i.e. God) as its source, converts the disorder of pre-existent matter to the order and harmony characteristic of the model. Here correlation with Albinus' scheme is less straightforward.³⁴ The activity of the architect must be seen as taking place on the level of the cosmic nous and cosmic soul in Albinus. These entities, however, are quite foreign to Philo's account, which adheres much more closely to the scheme of the Timaeus (also followed by Albinus in §12). One might say that the 'formation' of the model by God and the execution of the creative act take place *on the level* (or levels³⁵) of the divine Logos or the divine powers, so that Albinus' cosmic nous and cosmic soul (who together amount to a second god³⁶) are loosely equivalent to the Philonic Logos.

A first result of the above comparison is that it reinforces the conclusion that Philo's understanding of the doctrine of creation, read into the Mosaic cosmogony via utilization of Plato's Timaeus, is strongly indebted to Middle Platonist philosophical systematization of that same dialogue. At the same time it has appeared that Philo does not unthinkingly take over all the features of the Middle Platonist doctrine. On at least three central issues he shows an independence of mind in relation to his source material.

(a) The postulation of *two gods*, a supra-cosmic nous and a cosmic nous, is not acceptable to Philo. God as king is God; God as architect is also God, though operating at the level of the Logos. It is God, not his Logos, who creates.

God and his Logos are conceptually, but not actually separable.³⁷ Albinus could rescue the Platonic demiurge by dividing him in two. Philo sees in Plato's demiurge an intimation of God's creatorship and accepts the paradox of the transcendence and immanence that must together be accorded to the *one* God.

(b) Philo's placement of the (transcendent) ideas as cosmic paradigm in God's Logos would have seemed strange to Albinus (who speaks of a cosmic nous), for the Middle Platonists, if they use the term logos at all, find it suitable for the immanent directive activity of the cosmic soul.³⁸ Philo does not introduce the divine Logos in his exegesis under the influence of the Stoa - why should he? - but as a response to the words 'and God said' of the Mosaic text and also (I suspect) as a concession to Jewish speculation on God's Wisdom.³⁹

(c) Philo is not prepared, like Albinus, to put forward the doctrine of creatio aeterna in order to safeguard God's immutability and transcendence, for this doctrine endangers the conviction of God's immeasurable superiority and of the need for his providential care.⁴⁰ On this issue Philo stands closer to Middle Platonists such as Plutarch and Atticus, but these men place less emphasis on God's transcendence than he does.⁴¹

The conclusion that must be drawn from the above comparison is an impor-

tant one. The independence of mind which Philo shows in regard to the doctrines of God and creation means that he cannot be identified with any particular group or main type of interpretation or system among the contemporary followers of Plato. A model which analyses Middle Platonism in terms of a polarity Nous(transcendent)-theology *or* Logos(immanent)-religion⁴² is certainly relevant to Philo, but he cannot be captured within its framework, for he declines the antithesis and insists on *both* God's transcendence and immanence at the same time. Another possible division of the doctrinal positions of the Middle Platonists is four-fold: (i) a naive Stoicizing reading of the *Timaeus* (apud Diogenes Laertius); (ii) a literal reading of the Timaeian cosmogony, in which the demiurge brings an irrational cosmic soul to order and reason (Plutarch, Atticus); (iii) a non-literal reading of the Timaeian cosmogony in terms of two gods (Albinus, Apuleius, Taurus?); (iv) a non-literal reading of the Timaeian cosmogony in relation to a divine hierarchy of three gods (Numenius, and later Plotinus).⁴³ It is by now clear that in spite of the manifold and manifest similarities between Philo's views and the various features of these positions, none of them correspond as a whole to the way that Philo interprets the Mosaic account of creation in terms of Plato's *Timaeus*.

4. The fourth and final aspect in which Philo differs from the Middle Platonists lies in the *direction of his interests*. His primary aim is to expound and explain the Mosaic scriptural record, and in plumbing its hidden depths of spiritual meaning he feels he cannot do without the assistance of the doctrines of Greek philosophy, and especially of Platonism. But this primary aim leads to a different set of priorities than we find among the Middle Platonists. Philo clearly shows little interest in the technical aspects of philosophy, which are present for example in the epistemology and logic incorporated by the Middle Platonists in their presentation of Platonic philosophy.⁴⁴ The results of this avoidance of technicality are visible in his use of the *Timaeus*. No attempt is made to explain or exploit the *technical* aspects of doctrines such as the ἀναλογία of the elements, the components and harmonics of the cosmic soul, the demonstration of the rationality of the heavenly movements, the nature of the receptacle and the kind of knowledge that we can have of it, the mathematical configurations of the elemental bodies.⁴⁵ A partial exception must be made for the arithmological passages, the only aspect of Philo's exegesis which encourages penetration into the above-mentioned technical details of the *Timaeus*.⁴⁶ The tendency of the Middle Platonists to test or demonstrate the logical validity of their doctrines (e.g. proofs of the existence of the ideas or of the immortality of the soul⁴⁷) is almost never found in Philo; he tends to accept these doctrines as proven inasmuch as Moses (and Plato) has affirmed them.⁴⁸

Another feature of the Middle Platonist treatment of Plato's thought is lacking in Philo, namely their efforts to compress the doctrines into a compact systematic framework based on the tripartition of Ethics-Physics-Logic.⁴⁹ Once Philo presents a 'creed' of the five Mosaic doctrines requisite for a blessed life.⁵⁰ But the attempt to delineate an Ἐπιτομή Μωυσσαϊκῶν δογμάτων lies far from his intentions, for it would only distract the reader from plumbing the depths of the scriptural *text*. Also entirely absent in Philo's writings is the inter-school discussion and polemic which marks the Middle Platonist scholastic writings.⁵¹ In his allegories he evokes opponents – such as the Chaldeans and the champions of the mind and senses – whose doctrines the disciple of Moses must oppose.⁵² But these opponents almost always remain anonymous and difficult to identify;⁵³ they do not represent specific philosophers or academic disputants, but generalized personifications of the tendencies of the wayward or ungodly human mind.

The protreptic element is strong in Philo, lying just under the surface of virtually every sentence he wrote. It is less obvious in the Middle Platonist writings, but even through their dry scholastic exterior the tug of the βίος φιλόσοφος can be keenly felt.⁵⁴ For both Philo and the Platonists the protreptic texts, *Tim.* 47a-c and 90a-d, play a role of central importance.⁵⁵ But the 'philosophy' to which Philo exhorts his readers has, if regarded from the Platonist viewpoint, a surplus element. It is based on recognition of the superiority of the nomothete Moses. It involves the continual study and observance of the Law, for which Philo claims universal significance, even though at present it is limited to the Jews.⁵⁶ Of this surplus element the Middle Platonist philosophers were entirely oblivious.⁵⁷

It is time now to reach a balanced judgment on the Platonism that can be attributed to Philo on the basis of his use of the *Timaeus*. The profound influence of Plato's writings and their interpretative tradition must be recognized for what it is, a pillar of Philo's thought which, if removed, would cause the whole edifice to totter and collapse. There can be no question of our supporting the view of Weiss that it is only a matter of taste whether one calls Philo a Stoicizing Platonist or a Platonizing Stoic.⁵⁸ In the areas of theology, cosmology and anthropology the light that shines forth from Plato casts Stoic doctrine into the shadows. No work of Zeno, Chrysippus or Posidonius can compete with the *Timaeus*.

Nevertheless it was necessary to proceed a step further. The four aspects of Philo's relation to Middle Platonist philosophers which we reviewed led to a confirmation of Dörrie's verdict, cited at the beginning of this section, that Philo was not a Platonist. Unfortunately the reasons the German

scholar gives for his opinion are less convincing than the opinion itself. It is unhelpful to juxtapose Philonic monotheism and Middle Platonist theology as if these are in Philo's case mutually exclusive. De Vogel was entirely correct in stressing Philo's debt to Platonism in his theology. Nor can we say with Dörrie that Philo is seeking a 'harmonization' between Moses, Plato, and to a much lesser extent the Stoa, as if the doctrines of these three are on the same level. The reason that Philo is not a Middle Platonist is, to use a modern idiom, because *he is doing his own thing*. He sees his task as giving a philosophically orientated exegesis of the words of Moses, and for this undertaking the doctrines of Plato, and in particular of the Timaeus, are an indispensable aid.

It ensues therefore that, though Dillon's thesis that Philo is a Middle Platonist is in the final analysis unconvincing, it is far less easy to reach a verdict on his view that Philo should *not* be considered an *eclectic* who picked up terminology, formulas and snippets of doctrine from the diverse philosophical schools.⁵⁹ Certainly, if we define eclecticism as the gathering of a bouquet of flowers, in accordance with the method of the mysterious Potamon of Alexandria,⁶⁰ then Philo should not be called an eclectic. There is clearly a consistent rationale behind his procedure. It resembles the procedure of the Middle Platonists, but is not wholly the same. For Philo is explaining the words of Moses and owes no particular loyalty to the teachings of Plato. If an Aristotelian or Stoic doctrine is useful in illuminating the intentions of Moses he will not reject it simply because it is not Platonic. The reason he turns so often to the doctrines of Plato as interpreted and presented by the Middle Platonists is, as we have emphasized earlier in this section, that he considers their doctrine to be the most 'Mosaic' of Greek philosophies and so the most congenial to his exegetical task. Thus whether one wishes to call Philo an 'eclectic' or not depends primarily on what one takes that (usually pejorative) epithet to mean. Philo's aim and procedure are certainly clear enough. We shall have occasion to devote a few more words to the subject in the final Part of this study.

PART FOUR

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER ONE

PHILO AND PLATO'S TIMAEUS

The Timaeus casts a long shadow over the writings of Philo. To trace the outline of this shadow has been the task of our study. In the process it has proved possible to elucidate diverse and important aspects of Philo's methods and thought. By way of conclusion I return now to two features of Philo's use of the Timaeus which in my view are particularly deserving of emphasis. These remarks serve as a prelude to the more general considerations on the nature of Philo's achievement which will occupy us in the remainder of this concluding part of the study.

A careful examination of the Corpus Philonicum - especially the De opificio mundi and Legum allegoriae, but also numerous passages in other works - has revealed how deeply fascinated Philo was by the parallels which, in virtue of his hermeneutical assumptions and exegetical methods, he could discover between the Platonic cosmogony and the Mosaic account of creation. The *title* of Moses' first book is already profoundly suggestive. The nomothete immediately draws attention in the most emphatic way to the chasm that separates God's eternal being from the realm of becoming to which created reality belongs. Just like Plato, Moses is concerned that the cosmos be recognized as γενητός.¹ For didactic purposes both Moses and Plato describe the creational process by means of a *sequence of creation*, which introduces the reader to the hierarchical structure of the cosmos and its inhabitants. The sublime lucidity of the Mosaic schema of the seven days of creation is not employed by Plato, but the remarkable parallels between the creational sequences are impressive enough.² Both reach their climax in the account of the creation of man. In both accounts one must distinguish between the *structure* that man receives and the *dynamics* that are consequent upon the composite nature of that structure.³ Allegorization of the story of Adam and Eve in paradise allows this theme of struggle in the soul - parallel to the descent of the soul into the body in the Timaeus - to be treated in exhaustive and exciting detail. Doctrinal

parallels between Moses and Plato Philo also saw with his keen interpreter's eye - the doctrine of a creator God as ποιητής καὶ πατήρ, the doctrine of the κόσμος νοητός as model for the creation, God's use of assistants in his creative task, and so on.

I am persuaded that the significance of this profound parallelism for Philo was not just confined to the exegetical exploitation which it invited. It surely gave him decisive support in his conviction that the attempt to give exegesis of Moses with the aid of categories and doctrines from the Greek philosophers was on the right track. The similarities between the Mosaic scriptural record and the 'Platonists' Bible'⁴ could not reasonably be ascribed to the realm of chance. As was also later the case in the writings of the Christian apologists and Church fathers,⁵ the *Timaeus* was a trump card for the view that scripture and Greek philosophy were not in irreconcilable conflict.

The second feature of Philo's use of the *Timaeus* that I wish to emphasize follows on from the first. Philo is very much struck by the fact that Moses *commences* his legislation with the account of the creation of the universe. The purpose of this 'most admirable beginning' is to demonstrate that God the father and maker of the cosmos is its true nomothete, and that the man who observes the Law lives in harmony with the disposition of the universe.⁶ What, then, are the implications of this commencement for the deeper spiritual meaning of scripture, the 'psychic' aspect of the sacred writings which the Therapeutae so earnestly sought to uncover and bring to view?⁷ This question should, I submit, be related to the increasing recognition by Philonic scholars that the focal point of Philo's interpretation of scripture is located in the theme of migration. Arguing against Völker's assertion that Philo's 'Gedankenwelt' lacks a 'beherrschende Mitte', Nikiprowetzky indicates the breadth and richness of this theme:⁸

Ce centre, la pensée de Philon nous paraît précisément en être pourvue. Cette constante est le thème, inspiré de Platon, de la Migration. La Migration est l'itinéraire spirituel qui conduit l'âme du sage individuel ou le peuple consacré, dans son ensemble, de la chair à l'esprit, du monde matériel, avec ses ténèbres et ses passions, à la lumière du monde intelligible, de l'esclavage en Egypte à la liberté en Canaan, terre de la vertu ou cité de Dieu. Le Pentateuque est "une école de prêtrise", c'est-à-dire que par l'intermédiaire de symboles divers, par l'intelligence et la pratique des Lois, il enseigne au progressant à suivre les pas de Moïse et à réaliser sous sa conduite l'Exode spirituel.

This deep insight can help place the centrality of the creation account for Philo's thought in the right perspective.

The importance of the κοσμοποιία with which Moses commences the Law is precisely to lay down the *structural foundation* (both in cosmological and anthropological terms) upon which the theme of migration is based.⁹ It is as result of the creational δόξαζυς that man is a sojourner in this earthly exist-

ence, that he is called to migrate (or ascend) to heavenly and intelligible realities. It is as result of the composite nature received by man in creation that he has the choice of continuing to dwell beside the fleshpots of Egypt or migrating to the life of the mind and the contemplation of true being. The intellectual or spiritual *exodus* which Philo locates in the words and example of Moses has as its indispensable pendant the ontological *genesis* with which the nomothete commences his Laws. The *Timaeus* aids Philo in establishing in a philosophically lucid fashion the structural foundation upon which the theme of migration, as key to the deeper meaning of scripture, is built. Here lies the ultimate significance of the dialogue for Philo's thought. He has recognized the *Timaeus-Phaedrus* myth diptych of Plato in the Genesis-Exodus diptych of Moses.¹⁰ Man the microcosm is, like the macrocosm, created by God. His task is to ascend and return to God, by gaining knowledge of him and contemplating his true Being. And so the τέλος for which man was created comes to fulfilment, to become like unto God. In his creative but unsystematic manner Philo thus anticipates crucial themes developed by later philosophers in their interpretation of Plato or the Bible (or both together), the Plotinian coupling of procession and return, the *circulatio* motif of Neoplatonism and Medieval Christian philosophy,¹¹ the 'mysteries of the beginning' and the 'mysteries of the chariot' in Jewish thought.

In more than one respect, therefore, the *De opificio mundi* and *Legum allegoriae* represent the portal through which one must enter the cathedralic edifice of Philo's scriptural commentaries. The exposition of the Mosaic κοσμογονία demonstrates that scripture more than adequately rivals the attempts of the philosophers to explain the origins and nature of the universe and man, and that the attempt to elucidate scripture with the aid of ideas found in Greek philosophy can be a profitable undertaking. Moreover the account of creation gives the student access to an understanding of the fundamental cosmological and anthropological structures which lay the foundation for the spiritual journey considered by Philo to constitute the deeper 'philosophical' meaning of scripture.

In this study of Philo's thought the perspective of the historian of philosophy has been given a deliberately subordinate place. Naturally it is important to localize Philo in the historical development of ideas. But even if we had access to all Philo's sources and all the writings (and oral traditions) of his predecessors and teachers, this would not be sufficient to 'explain' him; for the phenomenon of Philo is more than just the sum of its antecedents.¹² As it is, we are not at all well informed about the identity of Philo's predecessors and the doctrinal contents of his sources. Nevertheless, in spite of the

lack of information on the actual Middle Platonist authors and works which Philo drew on, our investigation of his relation to Middle Platonism has proved remunerative. Although the Alexandrian was well acquainted with the original text of the Timaeus, the Middle Platonist interpretation of the dialogue manifestly interposes itself between him and the Platonic words which he reads. Indeed one can go a step further. The manner in which the Middle Platonists read the Timaeus served as an essential praeparatio for Philo's use of the Platonic work in his exegetical task of expounding the Mosaic writings. By appropriating Plato's myth of a creating craftsman-god as the basis for a dogmatic system which was profoundly theocentric and gave the doctrines of creation (properly understood) and providence a central place, the Middle Platonists - without themselves being aware of it - prepared the way for the application of Platonic ideas to the Judaic (and later Christian) scriptural message. Philo saw the opportunity and, with an energy and innovative creativity which after two thousand years we are scarcely able to appreciate, exploited it to the full. Without the Middle Platonist reinterpretation of Plato, it would have been considerably more difficult for him to regard Plato as the Μωυσῆς ἀριστέων par excellence.

Even less is known concerning Philo's predecessors in the field of Jewish scriptural exegesis. The nature and importance of the exegetical traditions drawn on by Philo is a controversial question, which is at present being extensively studied.¹³ In the context of our study it was striking to observe how few of Philo's relatively numerous references to (anonymous) predecessors or colleagues in the field of exegesis refer to Platonizing interpretations and to usage of the Timaeus by other exegetes.¹⁴ I have suggested above that the exploitation of the Timaeus on a large scale may well have been a *personal innovation* on the part of Philo.¹⁵ Chronological considerations are certainly not irrelevant here. The Middle Platonism with which Philo was acquainted must be dated to close to the beginnings of the new movement.¹⁶ If he had undertaken his exegetical labours half a century earlier the Platonic option (strongly centred on the Timaeus) may not have been open to him, as it clearly was not to his predecessor Aristobulus.¹⁷ The fundamental role played by Platonist ideas and doctrines in Philo's philosophically orientated exegesis is not likely to have been bequeathed to him by a long-standing exegetical tradition gradually developed in the Hellenistic Alexandrian synagogue.¹⁸

CHAPTER TWO

PHILO'S ACHIEVEMENT

The perspective of the historian of ideas with which we terminated the last chapter is entirely different than the perception Philo had of his own activity. He certainly did not regard himself as 'exploiting the opportunity' to read the congenial (and not unfashionable) ideas of Middle Platonism into the unsophisticated utterances of Moses. He was convinced that these ideas were already present in scripture, and that they could be exposed to view by patient exegetical labour. And nothing was further from his concerns than the question of whether he was 'being innovative' or 'showing originality' in relation to the exegetical traditions developed by his predecessors. The task of the exegete is not to develop his own ideas but to uncover a little of the inexhaustible riches of the sacred text. This must be borne in mind as we turn now to a more general discussion of Philo's achievement, undertaken on the basis of the results that we have gathered in the course of this study. We commence with some more remarks on the foundation which Philo presumes to underlie the convergence of Mosaic and Platonic thought.

2.1. Reconstruction of a theoretical foundation

It is a remarkable fact that Philo never favours his reader with a theoretical discussion on the far-reaching parallelism which he discovers between the Mosaic account of creation and the Platonic cosmogony, and between scripture and Greek philosophy in general. The practical task of interpreting the sacred text occupies the precious time he has at his disposal. Presumably deep-going reflection on the hermeneutical assumptions of his exegetical methods would be regarded as an unremunerative distraction from the task at hand. From *our* vantage point, of course, this omission is a real weakness. But Philo stands at the beginning of a long tradition, and the formulation and elucidation of a theory of interpretation takes time and strenuous intellectual effort. And it must not be thought that Philo gives no indications whatsoever on how he would explain the parallels between Moses and Plato and so justify his placing of doctrines from the Timaeus in the mouth of the Jewish nomothete. His theory can be reconstructed for him, but the ideas involved remain implicit and lacking articulation. Two basic explanations are given which combine to account for the fact that many of the same ideas that are extracted

from scripture also have their place in Greek philosophy.¹

The first explanation holds that the famous Greek lawgivers and philosophers derived their doctrines somehow or other from the writings of Moses. This argument, as is well known, finds frequent employment in Jewish and early Christian literature, but its extreme form, that theft and plagiarism were involved,² occurs in Philo only once. Heraclitus, in declaring that "we live their death and die their life", had 'like a thief taken law and opinions from Moses'.³ In five other passages Philo describes Greek philosophers or legislators as 'receiving' their doctrines from Moses or 'drawing' from his Laws like from a fountain.⁴ It is often overlooked, however, how frequently he *implies* that the philosophers are dependent on Moses. The Jewish lawgiver lived before they did, and anticipation implies dependence. To give one example out of many: if Philo affirms that a Mosaic doctrine 'was praised by some of the philosophers who came afterwards' (i.e. Aristotle and the Peripatetics, Pythagoras), he is stating antecedence but strongly suggesting dependence.⁵ This procedure is highly important for an understanding of the philosophical treatises, in which a wealth of Greek philosophical doctrines are put forward but the primacy of Moses is by no means relinquished.⁶ But Philo does not want all his eggs in one basket. There are occasions when he appears to have less confidence in the thesis of Greek derivation. In the *De vita Moysis* he even includes Greeks (as well as Egyptians and Chaldeans) among Moses' teachers, though immediately adding that his gifted nature made their instruction as good as superfluous.⁷ In another passage he leaves open whether Socrates was 'taught by Moses or moved by the phenomena themselves'.⁸ This remark leads us straight on to Philo's second explanation.

Not all the doctrines of Greek philosophy that stand in a certain proximity to the truth are derived directly from the Jewish nomothete. God is the source of all knowledge; lacking all envy or jealousy, he generously bestows that knowledge on his creatures according to their capabilities.⁹ Man is created in such a way that he can become a recipient of the divine gift of knowledge, though not in its splendid fulness. The 'best' or 'most God-like' part of his composite make-up is the mind or rational part of the soul, with which he reasons and achieves immortality, through which he is related to the Logos and ultimately to the creator, by means of which he becomes like unto God.¹⁰ Also the cosmos is created in such a way as to give man the maximum of assistance in his quest for knowledge. Through the contemplation of the celestial realm man's mind could soar and the birth of philosophy took place.¹¹ Here is, once again, the theme of *Tim.*47a-c, so prominent in Philo's writings.¹² It is apparent that, on the basis of such cosmological and anthropological ideas, Philo is not going to deny that the philosophers, in response to the phenomena

of nature and through the reflective powers of the mind, were able to reach useful insights and even gain a glimpse of the truth, even if they are usually to be reproached for their never-ending dissensions, their passion for hair-splitting and searches for useless information. Some persons, entering the cosmos as into a well-ruled city, were struck with wonder and came to the conclusion that it was the work of the creator. Advancing from below upwards as if on a heavenly ladder, these men are indeed θεσπεσιού.¹³ Philo can have no one else in mind but the Greek philosophers with their 'natural theology', and in the front ranks of the θεσπεσιού is the great Plato. The second explanation for the parallels between scripture and Greek philosophy is, therefore, that the philosophers independently attained certain true doctrines through their use of God's gift of the powers of reason.

The modern reader, when confronted by these two explanations, is likely to conclude that the latter possesses a higher grade of plausibility. I am not at all confident that the reader of Philo's time would have agreed. The general presuppositions that lie behind the affirmation of Moses' anteriority and superiority are wholly in line with the dominant *Zeitgeist* of the early centuries of our era.¹⁴ Aristotle's adage τιμωτάτων τὸ πρεσβύτατον¹⁵ was expanded to τιμωτάτων καὶ ἀληθέστατον τὸ πρεσβύτατον and made the basis of a general theory concerning the origin and dissemination of doctrinal knowledge.¹⁶ The older a doctrine was the more deserving it was of assent and reverence.

Both from the philosophical and the cultural-historical point of view the theory was unitarian. There is but *one* truth, though it is found in many guises and has been unveiled with a greater or lesser degree of success. A widespread pessimism reigned with regard to the attainment of that truth through new and innovatory insights.¹⁷ The truth had to be reached by means of the *tradition*, i.e. the writings of the ancients. For Celsus the Platonist the παλαιὸς λόγος was the ἀληθὴς λόγος; hence the title of his attack on the Christian upstarts, who defied the tradition with their revolutionary ideas.¹⁸ The Platonists saw the tradition of truth embodied above all in the writings of Plato and their interpretation. But a Numenius finds it necessary to 'go back further', to the teachings of Pythagoras and then to the mysteries and doctrines of the ἔθνη εὐδοκμοῦντα (the Brahmins, Jews, Magi, Egyptians) which - and here the Platonist asserts himself - are in agreement with Plato.¹⁹

The same approach is found in the more general area of cultural achievement. A massive body of ethnographic and 'historical' writings - now almost completely lost - was based on the assumption that the οἰκουμένη possessed a common culture with a single source.²⁰ The central question was: what was that source? which nation could take the credit for discovery and authentic tradition? Addressing the Roman senate, Cicero no doubt found a willing ear for

his assertion that their ancestors were not the pupils but the teachers of the philosophers in the matter of religion.²¹ In the one and same treatise Plutarch states that Pythagoras based his precepts on secret teachings of the Egyptian priests and that the names of Egyptian gods are to be explained by means of Greek etymologies.²² In short, no one was going to argue with Philo's theoretical *assumptions* in affirming the antiquity and pre-eminence of the Jewish nomothete. It was the *content* of the laws and doctrines claimed for Moses that was the decisive factor.

Returning once again to the details of Philo's theoretical foundation, we find that Philo subscribes to the general principles of the 'philosophy of culture' just outlined, but understands and applies them in his own particular way. One is struck, first of all, by his total lack of interest in the 'historical' aspect.²³ His reflections on history have a predominantly abstract quality, similar to the timelessness of his allegories. The general lines of development are given. The first man was excellent in both body and soul, living according to the Law of nature, but since then a continual decline has set in.²⁴ The Jewish Patriarchs anticipated the Mosaic Law by themselves living as ensouled or unwritten laws. They needed no teachers in order to know what to do or say.²⁵ The transmission of knowledge from the earliest times could have been interrupted by the occurrence of natural disasters.²⁶ But once Moses enters on the scene and bequeaths the Law to his followers, Philo shows a marked disregard for details of transmission and tradition, also in relation to the (derivative) doctrines of the philosophers. There is no discussion of chronologies, no speculation on whether Plato might have met the prophet Jeremiah in the deserts of Judaea.²⁷

A second issue is of much greater importance for Philo's understanding of his enterprise. If the truth is one and single, if before Moses it was attained by the first man and the Patriarchs, if it was glimpsed by the philosophers, is it not possible then for the seeker after truth to gain a satisfactory insight into that truth by consulting the philosophers or even by his own unaided efforts? It is apparent that, if this possibility were conceded by Philo, the entire edifice of his undertaking would utterly collapse. The superiority of the great pre-Mosaic figures can readily be granted. But they left no writings, only their shining example as recorded by Moses for our instruction.²⁸ If, however, the writings of the Greek philosophers contain the ἀληθὴς λόγος in an accessible form, what is the point of spending a life-time writing commentaries which aim to uncover that λόγος in the Mosaic record? One might as well expend that effort in studying the works of Plato, using them, just as Numenius did, as a touchstone to test the truth of the more ancient and 'authentic' tradition. Unlike the other venerable sages from a distant past,

however, Moses left to posterity a *written record* available in a reliable Greek version.²⁹ It is the truth concealed like a precious pearl in the Jewish Laws that is the touchstone for valid insights that may have been gained by the philosophers, but need to be discerned among all their wranglings and misleading sophistries. And how futile it would be for later and less gifted generations to attempt to reach the truth independently of Moses, when he, who by divine dispensation came closer to it than anyone else after him, is leading the way for those who wish to follow!

The key to Philo's theoretical foundation - and after the above discussion it will come as no surprise - lies in the limitless admiration which he has for Moses and the Mosaic Law. The Jewish lawgiver is presented as many-sided in his greatness. He is the embodiment of the perfections, inasmuch as they can be attained by a mortal man. As king, legislator, high priest and prophet he possesses a unique and splendid conjunction of talents.³⁰ The question might be raised - why does Philo not include among these Moses' role as philosopher and sage? The answer is that Moses can only carry out the four above-mentioned offices *because* he is a φιλόσοφος and σοφός. Philo explicitly takes over from Plato the idea that states do not flourish unless kings philosophize or philosophers rule.³¹ Also for the other offices the possession of wisdom is prerequisite.³²

It cannot be the aim to discuss the Philonic presentation of the figure Moses in its entirety. It aims at the same diversity and comprehensiveness as ascribed to the Law itself, which leaves no aspect of life untouched. What I do want to point out is the enthusiasm and affection with which Philo speaks of Moses as guide and teacher in the things of the mind. Moses is not seen as a remote and rather exotic barbarian sage, but as one who understands the modern *Lebensgefühl*, man's desire to find orientation in the cosmos and a relation to God. 'The interpreter of the facts of nature has pity on our sluggishness and lack of practice, and teaches us in his excellent and unstinting manner', Philo says in introducing the Mosaic words which anticipate the Heraclitan doctrine that two opposites form a whole.³³ Moses is the true sage, the great teacher, the steward of the mysteries.³⁴ The mind is the highest and most god-like part in man. To the guidance of man's intellectual quest Moses must give top priority, disclosing his apperception of the truth for the most part through the veil of allegory.

Philo certainly shows a strong tendency to present Moses as a philosophizing sage in the Greek manner, a superior Pythagoras or Plato, even if such a depiction is not the exclusive key to his greatness.³⁵ It is by no means accidental that when Philo portrays Moses in his commentary on the creation account as 'having reached the summit of philosophy', he exploits the description

that Plato had given the Pythagorean philosopher Timaeus in the dialogue that bears his name.³⁶

2.2. Exegesis and philosophy

In Philo's philosophical economy the central place is occupied by the Law of Moses. Our study, through its examination of Philo's use of the Timaeus, has confirmed the view that he regards himself above all as an interpreter of scripture.¹ Philonic thought is Mosaic thought. The modern reader who wishes to penetrate to Philo's intentions and the fundamental assumptions underlying his works must force himself to undergo a mental readjustment which makes great demands on his imagination and credence, a kind of Copernican revolution in reverse. Philo's universe of thought does not have Greek philosophy at its centre but scripture, it is not Plato-centred but Moses-centred. The numerous ideas and motifs which we have seen Philo take over from the Timaeus are not, in his view, *read into* scripture or used to *illustrate* Mosaic ideas, but are *genuinely present* in the sacred word and must be brought to the light in the exegetical process.

The distinction which we today are inclined to make between *exegesis* as explanation of the contents of a text and *philosophy* as reflection and argument on the nature and meaning of reality is entirely foreign to Philo's way of thinking. The word φιλοσοφία has in his writings a wide semantic range.² Often it denotes the doctrines of the Greek philosophers or the means of reaching those doctrines, the study of nature, the quest for knowledge of the first cause. It can also have a wider sense, the sum total of knowledge, including the wisdom reputedly possessed by the ancients and the 'barbarian philosophers'. The third meaning is more specifically directed towards Jewish realities. Philosophy is the study and practice of the Law, or the study of nature and the quest for knowledge of the first cause by means of study of the Law. This is the authentic philosophy, the philosophy which Philo practises. The aim of this philosophy is described in the same (predominantly Platonic) terms used for Greek philosophy, but the means of achieving the aim differ. Philosophy *is* exegesis of the sacred text, both as activity and as embodied in the resultant thought and doctrine.

Philo's identification of exegesis and philosophy only becomes comprehensible if it is recognized that the Law of Moses is a faithful copy of the Law of nature.³ Through divine dispensation Moses, as interpreter (ἐρμηνεύς) of the facts of nature, encapsulates the logos of nature (and κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν of the noetic world) in his Laws, so that the interpreter of the Laws is at the

same time interpreting nature by following the instruction of the God-beloved guide. God is thus the great teacher, Moses both the interpreter of God's logos and the instructor of mankind.⁴ Philo's veneration for the Law and its author is peculiarly Jewish and particularly his own. The theory of interpretation involved, however, differs but little from that of a contemporary Platonist, who engages in the contemplation of the cosmos not by spending cold and lonely nights watching the movements of the stars but by poring over his text of the Timaeus and the commentaries on it produced by his predecessors.

It is, therefore, the interpretation of Philo's achievement put forward by Nikiprowetzky in his magisterial study⁵ that has been corroborated by the results of our particular area of research. Philo's extensive and idiosyncratic application of the doctrines and language of the Timaeus must be seen as resulting from the fact that he regards himself as an exegete of scripture, whose task is to search for the truth, the 'authentic philosophy' embodied in the Mosaic record. The French scholar would not disagree, I surmise, with the lucid formula put forward by Sandmel in his Introduction to Philo's writings and thought:⁶

Philo's basic religious ideas are Jewish, his intuitions Jewish, and his loyalties Jewish, but his explanations of ideas, intuitions, and devotions are invariably Greek. Scripture has its array of prophets, and Philo "believes" in prophecy; when Philo explains what prophecy is and how it works, his exposition comes from Plato.

Sandmel is trying to delimit the Jewish and Greek components in Philo. Nikiprowetzky strongly emphasizes that the Jewish and Greek poles are indissociable. Philo's 'culture philosophique' is a sine qua non in his exegetical system, supplying 'a language of reason' which allows the commentator to perceive and express the deeper 'philosophical' sense of scripture.⁷ The validity and fruitfulness of these views must be recognized, also as we now proceed to direct a number of critical remarks at them, concentrating especially on the role of Greek philosophy in Philo's thought.

1. What is the difference, according to Philo, between Greek philosophy and the 'authentic philosophy' of Moses? Nikiprowetzky, in this instance following Wolfson, makes much of the text at Congr.79, which affirms that 'just as the encyclical studies are the servant of philosophy, so also philosophy is the servant of wisdom'.⁸ Philosophy (in the scholastic manner of the Greeks) has an essentially propaedeutic role, supplying categories, concepts and ideas for the understanding of wisdom (the Mosaic Law in its deeper meaning). Certainly the equivalences which Philo attempts in his allegory here are not so clear. If, however, he had the contrast between Greek philosophy and Mosaic wisdom in mind, why is philosophy described as the *practice* of wisdom, teaching control of the appetites and the tongue? The contrast between philosophy

as love for wisdom and progress on the path thereto on the one hand and wisdom as possession of the highest knowledge on the other is common in the Stoa and Middle Platonism.⁹ Philo applies this distinction to Abraham (and every student of the true philosophy), who is married to Sarah both while progressing towards the attainment of wisdom and when he finally reaches it.¹⁰ The contrast is thus not between Greek philosophy and Mosaic wisdom, but between two stages in the acquisition of the true philosophy contained in the Mosaic Law. On this same text Winston writes:¹¹

It is therefore quite evident... that by wisdom he [Philo] means philosophy consummated, which in turn is identical in his scheme of things with the Torah, whose laws are in agreement with the eternal principles of nature. Far from subordinating philosophy to Scripture, Philo is rather identifying the Mosaic Law with the summit of philosophical achievement.

With this interpretation we find ourselves wholly in agreement, *provided* the identity of the Law with the highest philosophy is correctly understood. We are thus led directly on to our second remark.

2. The task of Greek philosophy for Philo is, according to Nikiprowetzky, to supply 'a language of reason' which allows the commentator to understand the wisdom contained in the Law and give it written expression. The doctrines of the philosophers thus function as an instrument or tool at the disposal of the exegete, employed when useful, discarded when not. This view has its attractions, because it can explain Philo's lack of loyalty towards any particular philosophical school.¹² Nevertheless I consider that it involves an underestimation of the impact that the fundamental assumption of Greek philosophical thought has had on Philo's thinking. Philosophy supplies not a language of reason but *the* language of reason. The change is required because Philo has taken over the doctrine, initiated by Parmenides and evangelized by Plato, that knowledge and truth in its absoluteness (i.e. the logos as the sum of τὰ κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα, identified by Plato's followers with the objects of God's thinking) is single and irrefragible.¹³

But how can philosophy supply *the* language of reason and yet remain subordinated to scripture? Philo, ever aware of man's οὐδένευα, is less confident than Plato that that logos is within his reach. Scripture supplies the criteria that allows the logos of philosophy to be tested for its truth. In the light of scripture the grandeur and the misère of Greek philosophy come fully into view. At its best philosophy is concerned with 'the knowledge of the highest and eldest cause of the whole of reality', the same instruction that the Jews receive from their Laws (Virt.65). At its worst philosophy is a viper's nest of sophistry and discordance (Conf.114, Her.246-248). Moses saw the logos to the extent that it is accessible to a mortal man and encoded it to the extent that it could be put into human language. His Law is not a

stepping stone to the highest (Greek) philosophy, which in the quest for truth can be left behind or even bypassed; it is rather the indispensable touchstone for determining what that highest philosophy is. Two examples, one from theology and one from cosmology, will illustrate how this works. If the philosophers Plato and Aristotle, through the independent use of reason (i.e. if they did not consult scripture), reach the conclusion that God is not subject to change, their attempt at reasoning only receives validation through the ad-struction of a Mosaic text such as Ex.17:6, ὁδε ἐγὼ ἔστηκα πρὸ τοῦ σε.¹⁴ On the question of the createdness and uncreatedness of the cosmos the same thinkers, both using their powers of reasoning, reach opposite conclusions. The disciple of Moses needs to recall no more than the title of the first book of the Law in order to be sure that in this case it is Plato who has stumbled on the truth.¹⁵

For Wolfson the subordination of philosophy to scripture, derived as we have seen from Congr.79-80, also means the subordination of reason to faith.¹⁶ This viewpoint is erroneous, for it suggests that Philo wants us to accept the truth only because it is revealed, and not also because it conforms to the dictates of reason. But nothing is further from his mind than to cry with Tertullian,¹⁷ credo quia absurdum est. Certainly he is convinced that God is the author of the truth contained in scripture,¹⁸ but all his efforts are directed towards demonstrating that this truth is not unreasonable, that it is in fact more rational and to the point than the doctrines of the philosophers.¹⁹ No less erroneous is the conclusion to which Winston inclines, namely that God's revelation in the Law of Moses is inferior to the Archetypal or Noetic Law which can be comprehended to a greater or lesser degree in an intuitive vision of the mind. Here revelation is effectively subordinated to reason, for it is only when the truth of the higher Law is intuitively seen that the concealed deeper meaning of scripture comes into view.²⁰ One might as well dispense with the written Law. The commentaries which Philo writes on it are, according to Winston, as much an exercise in concealment as an attempt at elucidation.²¹

In fact it has by now become clear that Philo denies any contrast or conflict between revelation and reason. *Reason and revelation are effectively identical*, as he never ceases to attempt to demonstrate in his long series of commentaries. This does not mean to say that Greek philosophy and scripture are identical, but that the truth which was glimpsed by certain philosophers is validated by revelation in scripture. Far from replacing Hellenic reason with barbarian unreason, Philo in fact makes great concessions to Greek rationalism, but subtly succeeds in turning this to his own profit by constantly

giving the priority to Moses. The logos which man, through his relation to the divine Logos, can attain lies concealed in the depths of scripture and can be perceived by the eyes of the mind through the exegetical process. The disciple of Moses is invited, not to attempt to climb Mount Sinai himself, but to meditate unceasingly on the Law written by Moses on the basis of his experiences in the mystic ascent. Meditation and contemplation take place through the use of man's rational faculty. And so we come to our third remark.

3. The piety of Essenians and above all the Therapeutae in many respects represents an idealization of Philo's own attitudes, affirms Nikiprowetzky, even though his 'expérience' was infinitely richer and more varied.²² One can hardly disagree with this viewpoint. Indeed, given the idealizing encomiastic conventions of Hellenistic rhetoric, the Essenians and Therapeutae, no matter what their historical background might have been, are a projection of what Philo himself admired. The focal point of their piety is the study of the scriptures, pointing the way to love of God, religious observance, virtuous living. But Philo goes a step further in regarding the study of scripture as the authentic and highest philosophy. The question is whether we have here the clever appropriation of philosophical terminology for apologetic purposes, as so vigorously argued by Völker, or whether Philo betrays the influence of the potent forces of Greek intellectualism. I am convinced that Philo's 'expérience', his extensive acquaintance with the Hellenistic paideia and the doctrines of Greek philosophy, has led to a decisive reinterpretation of what is meant by 'study of the scriptures'.

In Philo study of the Law has become the worship of God by means of the exercise of man's highest faculty, the intellect. His advocacy of the θεωρία τοῦ κόσμου should not be misunderstood. Philo was himself no stargazer,²³ but the training he received in Greek philosophy has fundamentally altered his perspective on the kind of study that should be made of scripture and the way that scripture should be understood. I have argued in this study that the Timaeus of Plato has made an important contribution to the redirection of Jewish piety which Philo effectuates. The doctrine of man, much stimulated by Tim.90a-d, posits the primacy of the intellect, the ideal of contemplation,²⁴ the correlation of spirituality and true knowledge. The doctrine of creation not only gives this anthropology a foundation, but affirms the rational structure of the entire cosmos, derived from its model, the κόσμος νοητός situated in the divine Logos. Contemplation of the cosmos' rational order impels the soul to seek the vision of God. The acquisition of knowledge of God as true Being is beyond the reach of human reason. Nevertheless the highest form of worship is the attempt to come to know God, as Moses did on the mountain when he asked God to reveal himself, as the disciple of Moses can do in the

synagogue or in his study by studying the Law. The worship and service of God culminates in the formulation of a doctrine of God, a *theology*.

But Philo is and remains a Protean figure. If you think you have him pinned down, he assumes another appearance and manages to elude your grasp. It is undoubtedly true that, in spite of the influence of Greek intellectualism which I have pointed out, there are numerous occasions when he speaks of God with a spirituality quite different in flavour to that found in the works of Greek philosophers, a spirituality closer to the Psalms than the tenth book of Plato's *Laws* or the theological chapters of Albinus.²⁵ There are passages in the *Allegorical Commentary* which anticipate the *Confessiones* of Augustine in the intimacy with which the soul addresses God as its refuge and support.²⁶ Yet it should not be overlooked how often nearness to God means departure from the world of the *senses*, how often the blessings bestowed by God are related to the activity of the *mind*, how often the journey of the soul is portrayed as culminating in the possession of *knowledge and wisdom*.²⁷ God is served not with a pure heart but with a pure mind. In Philo religion is not merely interiorized (Harl), it is also intellectualized.²⁸ It is also undoubtedly true that Philo is keenly aware of the limitations of the human mind and the knowledge it can obtain. Especially the nothingness of the interpreter confronting the riches of scripture is heavily underlined. But one should recall that the paragon of Philo's anthropology is not the lowly interpreter but Moses himself, the great prophet and sage who is called by scripture a 'god', at least in relation to the mindless fool. The logical outcome of Philo's adoption of Greek intellectualism is the affirmation of man's potential apotheosis, that the mind can gain a place in the noetic world on the level of the divine. Not surprisingly he hesitates to draw this conclusion, reserving such privileges for the sages of old.²⁹

On the basis of these considerations we conclude that Sandmel's division between Philo's Jewish intuitions, assumptions and loyalties and the Greek content of his thought is in one respect too clear-cut. Philo's loyalty to scripture and devotion to scriptural study is reinforced by the assumption of Greek philosophy that the exercise of the intellect is man's highest calling and enables him to become pleasing to God.

In an evaluation of Philo's thought the historical context should not be overlooked. Philo's writings are a product of and a witness to the extensive interaction and rivalry that existed between Alexandrian Greeks and Jews in his lifetime. In this perspective it is undubitably correct to read an *apologetic* motive behind every single word that Philo wrote. Further appreciation of these apologetic intentions is hampered by the difficulties encountered in

determining which audience(s) his writings are directed at.³⁰ Nevertheless I believe that an excessive emphasis on the apologetic aspects of Philo's intentions can lead to distortions in our view of his thought. The impression given by many scholars (notably Völker and Weiss) is that Philo uses Greek philosophical doctrines as a kind of icing to make his message palatable to Greek and/or Jewish intellectuals, a scaffolding that needs to be dismantled, an instrument to be used and then discarded.³¹ The fundamental coherence of Philo's undertaking and the indispensable role of philosophical doctrines in it lead me to the conclusion that such minimalization of the contribution of Greek philosophy is unconvincing.

More acceptable is the conclusion of Heinemann that Philo consciously strove to produce a 'synthesis' between his Judaism and Greek culture and that he did this out of a 'personal need'.³² Once again question marks can be placed. The notion of a 'synthesis' or 'reconciliation' presupposes a division into distinct blocks much clearer to us than it was to Philo, on whom we should not foist a pagan-Christian antithesis *avant la lettre*. To speak of a 'personal need' is perhaps to presume a greater insight into Philo's existential and experiential concerns than we are actually given. Be that as it may, I am persuaded that it is in the triangular reciprocation between loyalty to his Judaic heritage (the Law), love for the Greek *paideia* (philosophy), and concern for his people's welfare (apologetics) that Philo's literary career finds its *raison d'être*.

Can we now, at the end of our study, feel justified in describing Philo as a *philosopher* in his own right? Certainly, if the question is posed from his own viewpoint, there is no need for any misgivings. Philo considers himself to be practising the authentic philosophy, which will lead him to the possession of wisdom. Even though he might not wish to be called a σοφός, the description φιλόσοφος would not be disclaimed. If the word 'philosopher' is given another meaning, that of a 'person who contributes to the development of philosophical ideas', the verdict on its applicability to Philo must be more nuanced. The impact of Philo's thought on the further development of Greek philosophy was nil, at least until the time that Christianity forced itself upon the attention of the philosophers. Wolfson's attempt to argue to the contrary was a failure.³³ On the other hand, Philo's undertaking to fuse together philosophical ideas and the Biblical message was a step of monumental significance in the history of thought, a step with greater consequences for the development of philosophy and religion than its author could possibly have foreseen. And so we come back once more to the theme which we started this section, the relation between exegesis and philosophy.

A distinction which may advance our discussion of Philo's status as

philosopher is that between exegetical philosophy and philosophical or (as I prefer) philosophically orientated exegesis. Exegetical philosophy is produced when a text is used as a springboard for a philosophical discussion or argument which advances far beyond the contents of that text (no matter how generously circumscribed). An extreme example of such philosophizing that comes to mind is the deep thought extracted by M. Heidegger from Presocratic texts and phrases. But also the use in Patristic and Medieval philosophy of Biblical texts such as Ex.3:14, Sap. Sal. 11:20, Rom. 11:36 and so on falls under this category. Philo too has his favourite texts which he uses over and over again, e.g. Gen. 1:27, Ex. 7:1, Num. 23:19 etc., and these are sometimes given a systematizing purpose. But for the most part it is philosophically orientated exegesis which we find in his writings. This approach to exegesis has at least two features: (1) the attempt is made to interpret the scriptural text in relation to accepted (but not systematically expounded or proven) ideas; (2) the primacy is given to the actual text, which the commentator is obliged to follow wherever it leads, though he naturally reserves the right to relate it to other parts of the sacred word. It is abundantly clear that Philo does not, pace Wolfson, attempt to create a system of Mosaic thought which bears even the slightest resemblance to the distillations of Platonic doctrine found in Middle Platonism. His almost exclusive use of the commentary method renders such an attempt impossible.³⁴ It is no less clear that Philo cannot be regarded as a 'problem-solver' in the manner that Osborn regards as characteristic of the philosopher.³⁵ To be sure, he is deeply preoccupied with philosophical and theological problems, but these are seen almost exclusively as exegetical problems, and are dealt with as they are confronted in the Biblical text. The task of the exegete, according to Philo, is to extract the philosophical ideas concealed in the text, not to use the commentary as a platform for his own reflections. But this disavowal of systematic thought should not lead to a negative evaluation. There remains a double coherence in Philo's thinking which gives it a unity deserving of admiration. Firstly his aims and methods as a commentator of the Pentateuch have a clear and consistent rationale, the clue to which must be sought in the exalted figure of Moses. Secondly our study has shown in a detailed way the reciprocal influence which Pentateuchal text and philosophical ideas exert on each other.³⁶ The text calls forth the ideas, but the ideas shape the manner of understanding the text. The philosophical doctrines that Philo has learnt from Plato, and in particular from the Timaeus, give a coherence to his exegesis which compensates for the numerous inconsistencies which the critical eye can locate on the micro-exegetical level.

Philo's philosophically orientated exegesis thus has as concrete result a Platonically tinted interpretation of the Pentateuch. Because Philo should be

regarded above all as a philosophically orientated exegete of scripture, it is better, in my view, not to describe him without qualification as a 'philosopher'. I must admit, however, that this caution is prompted more by a reaction against the diverse aberrations of Philonic scholarship than out of the strong conviction that the title is in his case entirely inappropriate.

If it should be concluded that Philo is primarily a philosophically orientated exegete of scripture, does this not leave his so-called philosophical treatises in an anomalous position? For this part of his oeuvre is concerned not with the interpretation of scripture but with philosophical argument. It is necessary, I submit, to divide these treatises further into two sub-groups. The treatises De Providentia I & II and De animalibus are in the first place directed at the wayward Alexander.³⁷ We may safely assume that this 'free-thinker' would have been quite insensitive to any appeals to the authority of scripture. Philo thus takes recourse to the 'objective' and prestigious arguments of philosophy in an attempt to guide his nephew back to the theism of his ancestral beliefs. The other two treatises, Quod omnis probus liber sit and De aeternitate mundi, have a less overt apologetic motivation.³⁸ The philosophical themes of these works come into view at regular intervals in the exegetical treatises,³⁹ but Philo discusses them here with a wealth of argument and illustratory material (including overt references to Greek philosophers and the interpretations of their doctrine) which is quite unparalleled elsewhere in his oeuvre. A close examination of these works will show, I believe, that Philo's attitude to philosophy *does not essentially differ* from that which has so far been outlined in the concluding sections of our study. The philosophical material which Philo presents is not only adjudicated in accordance with the Mosaic perspective on the matter, but is also strictly controlled by the Biblical quotations and allusions which are strategically placed in the structure of the works.⁴⁰ It is thus not necessary to reach the conclusion that the two treatises are incongruous remnants from an earlier period in Philo's career, when he had not yet been converted to the view that the true philosophy is exegesis of the Law of Moses.⁴¹

2.3. Brief comparisons

A final exercise which may help give Philo's achievement some extra relief is a brief comparison with other thinkers. The aim of the comparisons cannot, in this concluding part of our study, be to discuss the various specific doctrines and ideas put forward, but rather to take a glance at the

'foundations' on which these edifices of thought have been constructed. We shall, of course, concentrate on those men who lived at approximately the same time and in approximately the same cultural environment as Philo, or who were later in a position to make acquaintance with his writings. But it would be uncharitable not to begin with the great philosopher, whose influence on Philo has been the chief subject of our investigations.

It has been endlessly debated whether it was or was not PLATO's intention to construct a philosophical system.¹ What he aimed to put before his readers was, I suggest, φιλοσοφία καὶ λογικὴ καὶ στοχαστικὴ. It was λογικὴ because it advocated and itself engaged in the quest for the intuitive vision of the rational unity and coherence of transcendent noetic being, suddenly achieved after long years of exercise in the science of dialectics. It was στοχαστικὴ because that vision was scarcely attainable (in this life) and, if attained, could not be put into words. The form of the dialogue, containing the dialectics of actual discussion, was required to point the way, each dialogue adding new insights or revising what had gone before.² Given Philo's debt to Platonism, it is not surprising that a rather precise correspondence exists between the 'foundation' of his thought and that of Plato. The vision of the Good in Plato runs parallel to the illumination received by Moses and embodied in the Law, while the task assigned by Plato to dialectics is taken over in Philo by the labour of exegesis. Philo has more confidence than Plato in the capacity of the written word to convey truth, but less trust in the powers of human reason. The path to true knowledge and wisdom is through exegesis of the written text and meditation on the hidden verities discovered there. For Philo philosophy can only be attained through philology.³ Plato's ambition to reach the truth by means of the concentrated efforts of his own mind was, in Philo's eyes, only successful to a very limited degree, as is evident when his thought is compared with the riches of the Law. But when it comes to the kind of knowledge that it is possible and desirable to acquire concerning the phenomena of this sensible world, the views of both thinkers have much in common. Philo had read his copies of the Timaeus and the Republic only too well. Man's gaze should be directed towards God and world of immutable noetic being, situated according to Moses in the divine Logos.

Though they are considerably separated in time and space, there is a link which joins together the Roman senator and man of letters CICERO and the upper-class Alexandrian Jew Philo, namely their high regard for and great indebtedness to the achievements of Greek science and philosophy.⁴ In many respects they share the same Hellenistic culture, as can be gauged from the frequent parallels between their works.⁵ The two men in fact had a common problem; they both had to struggle to avoid an inferiority complex over against the cultural

supremacy of Greece. For Cicero Plato is the princeps philosophiae, but it is the Socratic, not the Pythagorean, Plato to whom he gave his allegiance.⁶ Taking the side of Philo of Larissa against Antiochus of Ascalon, he prefers to avoid dogmatism, giving his support to the probable. Cicero is by no means a genuine sceptic. His studies in Greek philosophy do not have the effect of turning him against the religious traditions of his people.⁷ This is well illustrated by the unexpected conclusion of the De natura deorum. He is inclined to favour the Stoic arguments on theology, because they are the more probable, but also because they give support to his ancestral traditions. There remains in Cicero a greater gap between Greek philosophy and religious tradition than in Philo, who is able to put the Hellenistic paideia to effective use in the *exegesis* of the Mosaic Law.⁸ Philo's profound conviction of the limitations of man's ability to gain secure knowledge reminds in some ways of Cicero. But the dilute Platonism found in Cicero would by no means have been sufficient for Philo in his task of expounding the thought of Moses. On God's transcendence and creatorship of the cosmos there are dogmatic pronouncements to be made. Between Cicero's Platonism and Philo's Platonizing Mosaicism there is the crucial watershed of the beginning of Middle Platonism.

A comparison between Philo and the MIDDLE PLATONISTS can be pared down to essentials, for we have already devoted almost an entire chapter to this subject.⁹ An illuminating parallel was found between Philo's Mosaic exegesis and the exegetical study which the Platonists made of the works of their master. One could argue that Platonic exegesis and the construction of a dogmatic system based thereon have virtually taken over the role of dialectics envisaged by Plato himself. Among the various Platonists there are notable differences of approach and method. Men such as Atticus and Albinus are rather narrow and scholastic, adhering closely to the words of Plato. Others such as Plutarch and Numenius have wider interests, and are prepared to investigate whether the Platonic truths are also to be found in the myths and traditions of the exotic peoples of the East. Above all the writings of NUMENIUS remind us of the spirit and contents of Philo's 'authentic philosophy', though the hieratic tone exudes more confidence than we find in Philo and there can be no question of his showing any real allegiance to Moses, only a strong interest in the 'wisdom of the ancients'.¹⁰ In our earlier discussion it was concluded that the Middle Platonists show a far greater concern than Philo for systematic and technical aspects of the Greek philosophical tradition. Their exegesis of Plato in fact tends to lead to what we have called exegetical philosophy, as becomes very clear in the philosophy of PLOTINUS. The founder of Neoplatonism certainly regarded himself as exegete of Plato,¹¹ but uses the Platonic record as a launching-base for his own contemplation of the intelligible world and

ultimate union with the ground of all reality, the One. He thus reenacts the same experience which he interpreted Plato as having had in the vision of the Good. Philo, in contrast, is not prepared to affirm that he could reach the heights traversed by the God-beloved Moses.

There can be no doubt whatsoever that it is among the EARLY CHRISTIAN apologists and theologians of the second to fourth centuries A.D. that we find the kind of thought closest to Philo's. This is due not only to the Judaic heritage held in common, but also to the fact of direct dependence. In the writings of JUSTIN it remains unclear whether or not he had the benefit of access to the works of Philo.¹² Certainly Justin's presentation of the true philosophy which 'was sent down' from heaven amounts to an extrapolation of Philonic ideas.¹³ This philosophy begins with Moses and the prophets, and culminates in Christianity. The Greek philosophical schools, and especially the Platonists, have glimpsed part of the truth, but their doctrines remain deficient. In the literary remains of CLEMENT of Alexandria direct and sometimes even slavish use of Philonic material is manifestly present.¹⁴ Clement is not just indebted to Philo for matters of detail in exegesis and allegory. He takes over the same positive attitude to the Greek *paideia*, placing it in service of his Christian convictions. In some aspects we discern an advance in clarity. The growing pains of the Christian community constrain a deeper reflection on the relation between simple faith and gnostic knowledge. The fundamental difference between Philonic and Clementine thought can be succinctly stated. Clement, as a Christian, recognizes Jesus Christ as the divine Logos become flesh, who has come into the world to fulfil the Law given to Moses. In the person and example of Christ the Law becomes fully comprehensible and man can fully participate in the divine *logos* (note that Philo's intellectualism continues unabated). Clement is not so insensitive to history as Philo. The allegories of the Patriarchs are typological, anticipating the coming of the Logos. Christ the great instructor takes over the place of Moses in Philo. Clement's attitude to the Law of Moses has a double aspect.¹⁵ On the one hand the Law embodies the *logos* revealed to Moses and the prophets; it is older and more authentic than Greek philosophy, the source of the philosophers' doctrines. On the other hand the Law is *παλαιά χάρις*, fulfilled by the *ἀδύτος χάρις* of the Christ the Logos. Clement's writings amount to a patchwork of Biblical quotation and allusion. Scriptural study leads, as in Philo, to apperception of the truth. That truth has appeared in Christ, and so the Law loses its exclusiveness as avenue to knowledge. Exegesis of the Mosaic Law accordingly does not assume the same central position that it holds in Philo.¹⁶ And yet, in a paradoxical way Philo's Mosaic exegesis decisively influenced the way that Christ's role as the Logos was understood. Philo has been called the

father of Arianism; just as easily he can be held responsible for the heresy of Docetism as well.¹⁷ However troublesome these developments may have been for the early Church, *we* at least should be grateful. Because of the interest the Christians showed in Philo most of his writings survived.

We cannot end this short series of comparisons without mentioning those thinkers who shared the same ethnic and religious background as Philo, the JEWS. But there is in fact not very much to say. Not long after Philo's death the dark clouds which he himself had seen – first on the horizon and then much closer – finally burst, and the political and cultural decline of Alexandrian Judaism set in. Among Palestinian Jews only JOSEPHUS appears to have derived any benefit from an acquaintance with Philo's writings.¹⁸ A comparison of his account of creation with Philo's *De opificio mundi* shows how little he learnt.¹⁹ In choosing to study the Law without direct recourse to the doctrines of Greek philosophy, the RABBIS chose also to ignore Philo. The portal giving access to Philo's writings might have been inscribed ΑΠΑΙΔΕΥΤΟΣ ΜΗΔΕΙΣ ΕΙΣΙΤΩ. His fellow Jews possessed neither the qualifications nor the inclination to pass through it.

2.4. Final remarks

In the perspective of the history of philosophy Philo is a *pioneer*. Pioneers do much good work. They dare to confront the unknown, blazing new paths in uncharted areas. Much of their back-breaking labour is forgotten by the later generations who benefit from it. Pioneers also make mistakes. Carried away with their own expectations and ambitions, they fail to understand the newness of their situation. They chop down too many trees and cause erosion of the soil. They wipe out native fauna and introduce foreign animals which threaten to destroy the balance of nature. A thorough pioneer ensures – for good or for ill – that his land will almost certainly never regain its pristine appearance.

Given the impressive discoveries and great prestige of the Greek *paideia* and philosophy on the one hand, and the profound conviction of God's covenantal relation and intervention in history experienced by the Jewish people on the other, it was predictable, indeed virtually inevitable, that an attempt would be made to bring these two currents of thought and experience in relation to each other. Philo was the first to make this attempt on a grand scale. One aspect, manifestly important but amounting to no more than a part of the whole, has been analysed in this study. We have seen that, by taking over certain fecund ideas from Plato's *Timaeus*, Philo discovered that he could

demonstrate to his own satisfaction that the Mosaic creational account was intellectually respectable and philosophically profound.

As a pioneer Philo was by no means able to foresee all the consequences of what he was attempting. He plunged himself unreservedly into the task of exegesis. As we saw, he did not devote much time or effort to theoretical reflection on the correlation between scripture and philosophy which he was undertaking. Wolfson's monumental study on Philo's philosophy is so misleading precisely because it accredits Philo with a dogmatic and systematic certainty on all the issues that were to dominate philosophy for more than a millenium and a half. And yet Wolfson's main thesis is fundamentally correct. Philo's attempt to bring together scripture and philosophy marks a pivotal point in the history of thought, the result of which only gradually became apparent in the centuries after his death. There remains a pressing need for further reflection on what Philo's pioneering attempt has meant for the development of Jewish, and above all Christian, thought.

SAMENVATTING

De Hellenistisch-Joodse denker PHILO VAN ALEXANDRIË (ca. 20 voor Chr. – 45 na Chr.) is de voornaamste vertegenwoordiger van een Grieks-sprekende richting in het Jodendom, die enerzijds trouw wenste te blijven aan de Wet van Mozes, maar anderzijds een poging ondernam om een diepere betekenis in die Wet te ontdekken met behulp van ideeën uit de Griekse filosofie. Deze dissertatie stelt zich ten doel een grondige studie te maken van het gebruik dat Philo heeft gemaakt van Plato's beroemde kosmologische dialoog, de Timaeus, zowel in zijn vele exegetische geschriften als in de kleine groep filosofische traktaaten. De drie voornaamste onderwerpen zijn: de *wijze* waarop Philo gebruik maakt van de Timaeus; de *invloed* die de dialoog op zijn denken uitgeoefend heeft; Philo's verhouding tot de lange traditie van de *interpretatie* van de Timaeus (I 1.). De studie zelf bestaat uit vier delen.

In het eerste deel, getiteld INLEIDING, wordt achtergrondinformatie geboden, die relevant is voor het bestuderen van het onderwerp. Een overzicht van een vijftal recente studies over Philo laat zien dat er vier belangrijke ontwikkelingen in het Philo-onderzoek gaande zijn: (a) de groeiende aandacht voor methodologische vragen; (b) het besef dat hij gezien moet worden tegen de achtergrond van zijn eigen tijd; (c) de toenemende realisering van de centrale rol van de exegese in zijn werk; (d) de erkenning van de grote invloed van het Platonisme op zijn denken. Onze studie kan bij deze ontwikkelingen goed aansluiten (I 2.). Philo's werk wordt geplaatst in de context van de historische situatie waarin hij als lid van een vooraanstaande Joods-Alexandrijnse familie verkeerde (I 3.). Belangrijk voor het specifieke onderwerp van de studie is een schets van de lange traditie van de interpretatie van de Timaeus vanaf Plato tot aan Plotinus. Het beslissende keerpunt in deze traditie is niet de bijdrage van Posidonius van Apamea of Antiochus van Askalon, maar het begin van het zgn. Middenplatonisme, dat we waarschijnlijk in Alexandrië vlak vóór de geboorte van Philo moeten dateren. De interpretatie van de Timaeus was cruciaal voor de ontwikkeling van deze filosofische richting. Men heeft deze dialoog dan ook wel 'de Bijbel van de Platonisten' genoemd (I 4.). In het laatste hoofdstuk wordt de methode van het onderzoek uiteengezet en geargumenteerd (I 5.)

In het tweede deel, met als opschrift ANALYSE, worden alle Philoonse teksten die op het onderzoek betrekking hebben, verzameld en geanalyseerd. Dit gebeurt in de vorm van een soort 'Commentaar' op Plato's Timaeus zoals deze door Philo gelezen en gebruikt wordt. De 'Commentaar' bestaat uit tien

hoofdstukken, die aansluiten bij de structuur en thematiek van de Platoonse dialoog. De wijze van behandeling van de Philoonse teksten wordt voornamelijk bepaald door de inhoud van de teksten zelf. De procedure is als volgt. (1) Ruime aandacht wordt geschonken aan de context (veelal exegetisch van aard) van de teksten. (2) De manier waarop Philo gebruik maakt van de Timaeus (citaat, zinspel, enz.) wordt vastgesteld. (3) Als er sprake is van een zeer intensief gebruik van de Timaeus, wordt de betreffende tekst in detail becommentarieerd. (4) Steeds wordt onderzocht hoe Philo de Platoonse passages en leerstukken verstaat en hoe deze interpretatie zich eventueel verhoudt tot de Mozaïsche tekst die uitgelegd wordt. (5) Deze interpretaties worden tenslotte in hun historische context geplaatst door ze te vergelijken met die van andere Griekse filosofen (waarbij uiteraard gewaakt dient te worden tegen 'parallelomanie').

We realiseren ons dat er een gevaar schuilt in de opzet van de 'Commentaar'. Omdat hij de structuur en thematiek van de Timaeus volgt, is hij eigenlijk te 'Platonocentrisch'. Idealiter zou er een tweede 'Commentaar' aan toegevoegd moeten worden, waarin de volgorde van de boeken van Mozes wordt aangehouden. Ter compensatie wordt in een bijlage een lijst gegeven van alle Pentateuch-teksten, die met behulp van ideeën uit de Timaeus uitgelegd worden.

In het derde deel, dat de titel SYNTHESE draagt, worden de resultaten van de voorafgaande tekstanalyses geordend en gerelateerd aan de drie hoofdonderwerpen van de studie.

Het eerste hoofdstuk behandelt de wijze waarop Philo gebruik heeft gemaakt van de Timaeus. Hoewel hij de dialoog betrekkelijk zelden expliciet citeert, blijkt hij een zeer grondige kennis van het werk te hebben en er zeer frequent op impliciete wijze gebruik van te maken (III 1.1.). Toch zijn bepaalde gedeelten voor hem belangrijker dan andere, m.n. Tim.28-47,69-72 en 90-92. De belangstelling voor deze gedeelten laat zien dat Philo meer aandacht schenkt aan de kosmogonische en filosofische dan aan de natuurwetenschappelijke en fysiologische aspecten van de dialoog (III 1.2.). Het ligt voor de hand dat de Timaeus vooral veel gebruikt wordt in traktaten die betrekking hebben op het Mozaïsche scheppingsverhaal (De opificio mundi, Legum allegoriae, vgl. ook De plantatione 1-45, Quis heres 133-214) of zich bezighouden met de leer van het geschapen zijn van de kosmos (De aeternitate mundi, De Providentia). Aan het gebruik in deze zes traktaten wordt dan ook speciale aandacht besteed (III 1.4.). Verrassend breed bleek echter de scala van plaatsen door héél Philo's oeuvre, waar ideeën uit de Timaeus aan de orde komen (III 1.3.). Dit is te verklaren als gevolg van zijn exegetische methode. De verschillende manieren waarop Philo gebruik maakt van de Timaeus worden verder toegelicht

door middel van een 'taxonomie' met een zevental categorieën: (1) taal en woordkeuze; (2) beeldgebruik; (3) literaire reminiscenties; (4) exegetische illustratie; (5) exegetische uitleg; (6) makro-exegetische doeleinden; (7) zuiver filosofische discussies (zeldzaam) (III 1.5.). Als Philo's gebruik niet verder zou gaan dan de vierde categorie, zou men mogen concluderen dat de Timaeus in zijn ogen uitsluitend een exegetisch instrument was. Maar juist vanwege de laatste drie categorieën is het duidelijk dat de Timaeus hem in staat gesteld heeft te komen tot een dieper verstaan van de Pentateuch en met name van het scheppingsverhaal en dat de dialoog derhalve een zeer grote invloed op zijn denken gehad heeft (III 1.6.).

In het tweede hoofdstuk wordt een schets gegeven van de invloed die de Timaeus op Philo's denken uitgeoefend heeft. Plato's onderscheid tussen ware kennis en een 'waarschijnlijk betoog' werkt door bij Philo, zowel in zijn kijk op de zintuiglijk-waarneembare wereld als in zijn beoordeling van eigen exegetische inzichten (III 2.1.). Zeer belangrijk is dat Mozes en Plato ieder een scheppingsorde presenteren en dat deze verrassend veel overeenkomsten vertonen. De bedoeling van beide filosofen is paideutisch: ze willen beiden inzicht geven in de structuur van de kosmos (III 2.2.). De uitdrukking 'maker en vader' (Tim.28c) bevat twee metaforen voor het scheppingsproces, een demiurgische en een biologische. Philo kan ze beide gebruiken, maar geeft evenals Plato de voorkeur aan de eerste (III 2.3.). Het grootste probleem van de antieke interpretatie van de Timaeus, nl. of men de kosmogonie letterlijk of niet-letterlijk moet opvatten, is ook van toepassing op het Mozaïsche scheppingsverhaal. Philo's veronderstellingen en argumenten met betrekking tot dit probleem zijn zelf nogal problematisch. Onze conclusie is dat hij een protologische interpretatie prefereert boven een ontologische, d.w.z. de kosmos is in een scheppingsdaad geschapen, niet in de tijd maar als begin van de tijd (III 2.4.). De theologie is de sluitsteen van Philo's denken. Wanneer Philo wil uitleggen welke opvattingen men over de God van de Pentateuch dient te hebben, ontleent hij ideeën aan de Griekse filosofische theologie. De Timaeus (geherinterpreteerd door latere Platonisten) geeft inzicht in Gods scheppende activiteit, nl. dat hij eerst een scheppingsplan uitdenkt en vervolgens dat plan uitvoert. Door het beschouwen van Gods scheppende en onderhoudende activiteit ontvangt de mens kennis van Gods existentie maar niet van zijn essentie. Laatstgenoemde transcendeert het scheppingsgebeuren volkomen (III 2.5-6.). Het begrip van de goddelijke Logos (dat aspect van God dat in relatie staat tot de kosmos) is minder verwant aan de Timaeus. Toch gebruikt Philo drie ideeën uit de interpretatie van het werk om de functies van de Logos nader te preciseren (III 2.7.). Philo's gedachten over de materie zijn weinig uitgewerkt. De Platoonse notie van het 'receptaculum' wordt niet gebruikt, wèl

Aristotelische en Stoïsche formuleringen die in het schema van de Timaeus geplaatst worden. Men zou kunnen spreken van een 'monarchisch dualisme' (III 2.8-9.). De bewondering die Plato toont voor de kosmos werkt sterk door bij Philo. Deze bewondering blijft echter wel een relatieve, ondergeschikt als ze is aan de absolute bewondering die God als schepper van de kosmos afdwingt (III 2.10.). De principes, waarop de Platoonse kosmologie berust (rationele structuur, volmaaktheid, teleologie, hiërarchie van levende wezens, parallelie van makro- en mikrokosmos, enz.), worden dankbaar door Philo overgenomen. In de gedetailleerde uitwerking is hij in mindere mate van de Timaeus afhankelijk (III 2.11.). Zowel voor Mozes als voor Plato vormt de schepping van de mens de climax van het kosmogonische betoog, resp. scheppingsverhaal. Diverse aspecten van de Platoonse antropologie kunnen Philo helpen in zijn uitleg van het dubbele scheppingsverhaal over de mens in Gen.1 en 2, al blijven vele details exegetisch zeer lastig. Ook elders is Philo sterk beïnvloed door Plato's kijk op de mens. Hoogst significant is zijn overname van de veronderstelling van een dualistische en intellectualistische antropologie. De mens is verwant aan God en onsterfelijk, omdat hij de logos bezit; hij wordt gelijkend op God (het Platoonse 'telos') door middel van zijn mentale en geestelijke activiteit (III 2.12.)

Philo's verhouding tot de traditie van de interpretatie van de Timaeus komt aan de orde in het derde en laatste hoofdstuk van deel III. Zijn kennis van de Aristotelische uitleg van en kritiek op de Timaeus is gebaseerd op de exoterische geschriften (met name de De philosophia). Van de interpretaties voorgesteld door Plato's opvolgers in de Oude Academie is hij minder goed op de hoogte (III 3.1.). Vele ideeën uit de Timaeus werden overgenomen door de Stoa en ingepast in hun filosofisch systeem. Deze zijn vaak weer terug te vinden bij Philo, ook in zijn lezen van de Timaeus (twee principes, Logos, hegemonikon, enz.). Toch is Philo zeker geen Platoniserende Stoïcijn (III 3.2.). In de 'Commentaar' kwam vooral sterk naar voren hoeveel overeenkomsten Philo's werkwijze en opvattingen vertonen met de Middenplatoonse interpretatie van de Timaeus. De vele overeenkomsten worden nu verder gepreciseerd met betrekking tot methode van benadering, filosofische inhoud en fundamentele filosofisch-theologische vooronderstellingen (III 3.3.). Het is duidelijk dat Philo gebruik heeft gemaakt van Middenplatoons bronnenmateriaal. Parallellen met een geïsoleerd fragment van Arius Didymus en met geschriften van Timaeus Locrus, Plutarchus en Albinus wijzen in de richting van een concentratie van ontwikkelingen in de traditie van het Platonisme in Alexandrië. Philo's 'bewijsmateriaal' is des te interessanter omdat we van deze periode in de geschiedenis van de filosofie zo weinig afweten (III 3.4.). Kunnen we Philo als een Middenplatonist beschouwen? Deze vraag moet beslist ontkennend beantwoord

worden. Philo is geen Platonist om verschillende redenen: hij toont geen loyaliteit jegens Plato, hij is weinig geïnteresseerd in technische aspecten van de filosofie, hij blijft vaak nogal dicht bij de Bijbelse tekst en doet geen moeite om een consistent filosofisch systeem te construeren. Platoonse leerstukken vormen een onmisbare pijler voor zijn denken, maar zij worden nooit een zelfstandige constructie. Philo ziet zichzelf als een leerling van Mozes en wil dat blijven (III 3.5.)

In het vierde deel, getiteld CONCLUSIE, worden de resultaten van het onderzoek in een breder perspectief geplaatst. Aan twee van deze resultaten wordt eerst nog nadere aandacht geschonken. De indrukwekkende overeenkomsten die Philo dacht te kunnen vinden tussen Mozes en Plato hebben hem stellig gesteund in zijn overtuiging dat ideeën en leerstukken uit de Griekse filosofie bruikbaar waren voor zijn exegetische arbeid. Het centrale thema van Philo's denken, de migratie van de ziel, ontvangt vanuit theologisch, kosmologisch en antropologisch gezichtspunt een structurele fundering door middel van de filosofische ideeën uit de Timaeus, die hij in het Mozaïsche scheppingsverhaal kan inlezen (IV 1.). Maar als wij over 'inlezen' spreken, moeten we ons goed realiseren dat Philo zelf er heel anders over denkt. De ideeën zijn aanwezig in de Bijbelse tekst. De exegeet moet iets van die grote rijkdom aan het licht brengen (IV 2.1.). De studie wordt afgesloten met een bespreking van de verhouding tussen exegese en filosofie bij Philo (IV 2.2.), een serie korte vergelijkingen met enkele tijdgenoten (IV 2.3.), en een slotopmerking (IV 2.4.). Philo moet als een pionier worden beschouwd. Zijn poging om de Bijbel en de Griekse filosofie samen te brengen bleek achteraf een keerpunt in de geschiedenis van de filosofie te zijn. De consequenties van zijn pionierswerk voor de ontwikkeling van het Joodse en vooral het Christelijke denken verdienen verdere aandacht.

STELLINGEN

I

Het frequente gebruik dat Philo van Plato's Timaeus maakt, vindt zijn verklaring in het samenspel van drie factoren: de opvatting die hij heeft van zijn taak als exegeet van de boeken van Mozes, de centrale plaats van de scheppingsleer in zijn denken, en zijn grote eerbied voor de Griekse wetenschap.

II

Als alle grote denkers òf vossen òf egels zijn en Philo een groot denker is, dan moet hij gerekend worden tot de egels.

Vgl. Archilochus fr.201 West; I.Berlin, Russian thinkers (London 1978) 22.

III

De moeilijkheden die voortvloeien uit het feit dat een deel van Philo's oeuvre in een Armeense vertaling is overgeleverd, worden niet zelden schromelijk onderschat. Het is methodisch niet legitiem een argument dat betrekking heeft op Philo's filosofische opvattingen te baseren op gegevens in Armeense teksten wanneer die gegevens worden weersproken door teksten die nog in het oorspronkelijke Grieks toegankelijk zijn.

Contra G.Reale, 'Filone di Alessandria e la prima elaborazione della dottrina della creazione' in Paradoxos Politeia: Studi patristici in onore di Giuseppe Lazzati (Milano 1979) 247-287; D.Winston, Philo of Alexandria: The contemplative life, The giants, and Selections (New York 1981) 14-16.

IV

Het is niet mogelijk een studie over Philo's denken te schrijven waarop de titel 'De denkweg van Philo van Alexandrië' toepasselijk zou zijn.

Vgl. J.A.Aertsen, Natura et creatura: de denkweg van Thomas van Aquino (diss. VU Amsterdam 1982).

V

Het localiseren van de goddelijke demiurg op het ontologische niveau van de (wereld-)ziel leidt tot een deficiënte interpretatie van Plato's Timaeus.

Contra H.Cherniss, Aristotle's criticism of Plato and the Academy vol.1 (Baltimore 1944) 606.

VI

Dat P.Boyancé zich er over verbaast dat de door hemesignaleerde inconsequentie in Pl.Tim.41d-e nog nooit door iemand opgemerkt is, is geheel ongegrond, want er is geen inconsequentie.

Zie 'Dieu cosmique et dualisme: les archontes et Platon' in U.Bianchi (ed.), The Origins of Gnosticism (Leiden 1967) 342.

VII

In Philo De aeternitate mundi 1 moet de lezing van de handschriften νόvoc gehandhaafd worden.

VIII

In Seneca Epistulae morales 58.28 leze men vinciens i.p.v. vincens.

IX

In Albinus Didaskalikos XIV p.83.3 Louis leze men ἐξαχὴ νευθεῖσα i.p.v. ἐξ ἀρχῆς νευθεῖσα.

X

In de problematiek van de veelomstreden chronologie van de Brieven van Synesius van Cyrene kan aanzienlijke vooruitgang worden geboekt, wanneer men steeds de brieven die aan één zelfde correspondent gericht zijn per groep afzonderlijk behandelt.

XI

Een cursus in de geschiedenis van de filosofie schiet tekort, indien aan Philo van Alexandrië geen aandacht geschonken wordt.

XII

Als zinspreuk voor een universiteit is AUXILIUM NOSTRUM IN NOMINE DOMINI zinvoller dan POSTERA CRESCAM LAUDE.

XIII

Het afwijzen van ieder direkt schriftberoep in discussies inzake ethische vragen, met als grond een verwijzing naar de hermeneutische problematiek, veroorzaakt veel schadelijke verwarring in de Gereformeerde kerken, m.n. op kerkeraadsniveau.

XIV

Geregeld fietsen bevordert het produceren van een proefschrift.

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