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Wild property and its boundaries – on wildlife policy and rural consequences in South Africa

Dhoya Snijders

Against the backdrop of post-Apartheid neoliberal reform, South African landowners have gained the option to acquire full ownership over wild animals on their land. Corresponding with this, approximately one sixth of South Africa’s total land has been ‘game-fenced’ and converted for wildlife-based production (i.e. hunting, ecotourism, live trade and venison production). This article analyzes the institutional process in which authority concerning access to wildlife is being restructured, and argues that the unfolding property regime leads to an intensified form of green grabbing. To demonstrate this, the article singles out three particular wildlife policy institutions which make clear (a) how private property rights to wildlife are negotiated and implemented, (b) how wildlife ownership is firmly interlocked with land ownership, (c) how natural entities are being converted to robust political and economical assets, and (d) what social consequences this has for rural South Africa.

Keywords: wildlife policy; neoliberal nature; conservation and development; agrarian reform

1. Introduction

In most contemporary states wildlife is strictly managed by the state. ‘Owing to their fugitive mobility, their intractability to domestication and their complex ideological associations with wild and “free” nature’ (Robbins and Luginbuhl 2007, 25) private possession and commercialization of wild animals has generally been prohibited by law (Muir-Leresche and Nelson 2000). In Southern Africa, however, a number of initial economic successes with wildlife on private land triggered an exceptional shift in wildlife policy design (Carruthers 2008, Dasmann and Mossman 1961, Wels 2003, 18–32). Where the prevailing aphorism used to be that ‘one cannot ranch in a zoo’, South African land owners and policy makers fundamentally changed their perspectives and developed various forms of wildlife ranching (Child 1988, Muir-Leresche and Nelson 2000, 7). Covering up to one sixth of South Africa’s land, the shift to wildlife-based production, i.e. ecotourism, hunting, venison production and live trade, has been recognized as the most rapidly expanding agricultural activity of...
the last three decades (The National Agricultural Marketing Council 2006, JG. Du Toit 2007). Research that has been done on this subject illustrates that most commercial farmers are in some way involved in this industry and have diversified their business by running traditional stock-farming activities in tandem with wildlife-based ventures (Smith and Wilson 2002, 1). In a personal interview, an executive manager of Wildlife Ranching South Africa (WRSA) stated that ‘there’s no free-roaming game in South Africa anymore; there may be some springbok or impala, but at least 95 percent of game is owned by people’ (February 20081).

Following a neoliberal agenda, the shift to private wildlife management is increasingly aligned with societal challenges to protect biodiversity and to carry out fundamental land and market reform. Whereas these governmental restructurings were initially explained as a necessary short-term ‘shock treatment’, many authors have evaluated South Africa’s last decades as an enduring neoliberal project (Bassett 2008, Bond 2000, Habib 2008). Within this project, a complex institutional process is unfolding in which authority concerning access to wildlife is being restructured. This contribution addresses this process and argues that it has led to an intensified form of green grabbing: the appropriation of land or resources for ‘green’ ends. The paper has a particular focus on the process and effects of resource individuation: how boundaries are created to detach certain elements from nature for the purpose of commodification (Castree 2003). These boundaries are produced in a material domain, by means of fencing and other forms of physical control, but are also negotiated and enforced in a legal domain, by means of definitions, classifications and laws. By analysing South Africa’s wildlife policy and industry, the paper contends that the process of resource individuation is characterized by imprecision and can thereby be disruptive to both environmental and social dynamics.

Instead of focussing on a particular locality, I single out three wildlife institutions as case studies to demonstrate how key neoliberal mechanisms such as privatization, commodification and deregulation are being applied to wildlife management. The Game Theft Act of 1991, firstly, is the main law that deals with wildlife ownership and theft. I argue that in its reformulation of ‘wildlife’ as an ownable good the act has facilitated the privatization of a vast amount of land and natural resources by making it possible for ‘wild property’ to be absorbed into financial markets. This new property administration is implemented by means of provincial fencing regulations such as the Eastern Cape game fencing specifications – the second case study – which are analyzed to demonstrate how wildlife ownership is firmly interlocked with land ownership. Thirdly, I discuss a novel conservation stewardship program, which aims to deregulate public conservation to private land owners. Together these three institutions mark an important shift away from preceding legislation, and give insight into the intensification of green grabbing as a result of neoliberal policy.

After having outlined the particulars of these institutions, the fourth section analyzes the social consequences of ‘wild property’ regulations. The section documents the rising prices and physical expansion of ‘wild property’ in relation to the described legislation. A more ethnographic account of labour relations on

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1Names of respondents and personal details have been altered or omitted to preserve the anonymity of the respondents.
game farms in the Eastern Cape is presented to assess the question how livelihoods are being reshaped by specific green grabs.

Data in this article stem from fieldwork that was carried out in South Africa between 2008 and 2011. To obtain a better understanding of the sort of public-private relationships that are enacted in neoliberal governance I did ethnographic fieldwork in ‘rural’ settings, studying interactions between land owners, farm workers and government officials on various ecotourism and hunting reserves in the Eastern Cape province; as well as in bureaucratic settings, by participating in various stakeholder forums concerning wildlife policy. My research aims to show that these two settings are not merely collections of local units; they are ‘connected with one another in such ways that the relationships between them are as important as the relationships within them’ (Hannerz 2003, 206).

2. Crafting boundaries: green grabbing in a neoliberal shell

Over the last decade a surge of literature has investigated the advancement of ‘market environmentalism’ (Bakker 2005, Castree 2010, Heynen et al. 2007, Peluso and Lund 2011). This body of literature explores how human-nature relationships, facilitated by new property frameworks, are transformed to meet the dynamics of capitalism. Most publications place the shift to market-led managing within a broader political context of neoliberalism, a political project which has globally, and certainly in South Africa, become a hegemonic governmental disposition. Herewith, the deployment of markets is commonly brought forward as the solution to environmental as well as societal problems (Bakker 2007, 431). The neoliberal agenda is growth-oriented: ‘it is a process of commodity production, distribution, sale, servicing and consumption whose central goal is to realise more wealth (notably, in the form of money capital) than was required to make, move, maintain, sell and dispose of commodities in the first place’ (Castree 2010, 1736). It seeks, the late Foucault stated, ‘to extend the rationality of the market, the schemes of analysis it proposes and the decision-making criteria it suggests, to areas that are not exclusively or not primarily economic’ (Foucault 2010, 206).

Consequences of these shifts are intricate new forms of social dynamics, of which two domains stand out specifically in this paper. Firstly, neoliberal nature necessarily brings about new relationships between the state and society, particularly between the state and the private sector. Human relationships change at the intersection of these spheres as novel visions of nature are debated and institutionalized: in government meetings, stakeholder platforms and through legal standings (Mac Donald 2010). Secondly, human relationships change where biophysical entities are being ‘neoliberalized’. New jobs are created, new knowledge systems are implemented, and new boundaries are erected as the place of humans ‘in nature’ is reconsidered.

The crafting of boundaries is key in both domains. Because nature, according to market environmentalism, is seen as part of a country’s ‘capital’ that should be exploited in a rational capitalist way (West et al. 2004, 483), boundaries need to be implemented to discriminate natural entities and convert them into products. This involves a process of individuation: by means of socio-technical advancements and legal framing, natural ‘noun-chunks of reality’ are ‘cut’ from the dynamic complexity of the world and are enacted as commodities (Castree 2003, 280). These ‘cuts’ are
effected through legal and material boundaries: by means of fences, firearms, wildlife policies and other social appraisals (Harvey 1974, 272). The process of green grabbing by means of material and legal individuation is, as explored in this paper, often messy and imprecise. Material green grabs target elements of an intrinsically boundless ‘nature’ and therefore unavoidably affect the environment. In their inaccuracy, material boundaries do not only individuate the desired resource, but may also confine or obstruct the advancement of other beings. This applies equally to legal green grabs which, in their quest to assign clear-cut, legally enforceable private property rights, aim to ‘free up’ nature and make it legible (McCarthy and Prudham 2004, Scott 1998). In the process of being reshaped to fit the logic of the market, nature is inevitably classified in a generic manner that erases certain individual specificities. ‘Aspects of environments and people that do not fit the categories’, West et al. write, ‘are reduced to irrelevance or even hindrance’ (West et al. 2004, 491).

3. Wildlife policy and green grabbing: three cases

South Africa’s official framework principally classifies animals as either domesticated or wild. The two categories are rigidly separated by law, administration and institutions. Wildlife falls under the Department of Environmental Affairs; domesticated animals fall under the Department of Agriculture. Wildlife is to be protected, while domesticated animals are ‘to be improved’. Wildlife has traditionally been classified as common property, while domesticated animals are traded by individual owners. With the ongoing shift to wildlife-based production, this legal dichotomy has come under pressure and considerable efforts have been made to either alter or blur it. The institutional event that most significantly contributed to this blurring was the adoption of the Game Theft Act of 1991. Moving back through time, this section aims to give insight into the debates that led South Africa to wildlife ownership and the restructuring of wildlife management.

3.1 Wildlife ownership in South Africa

Starting in the 1960s, a handful of landowners developed business models that were based on the commodification of wildlife (Carruthers 2008, Nell 2003, Wels 2003). Backed by agricultural unions, they formed provincial and later national associations (most prominently the South African Game Ranching Organisation, or SAGRO) to discuss what they perceived as legal prejudices against their industry. Landowners were dismayed particularly because authorities actively prevented production and trade in wildlife, while financial institutions such as the Land Bank did not recognize wildlife as economic assets. Because wildlife was – in a legal sense – uncontrollable, it constituted a risk in the eyes of financial executives and agricultural officials, who consequently did not provide game farmers with subsidies, loans or reliefs. After a lengthy lobby with a range of government departments, talks on the privatization and legal domestication of

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2See for example the respective preambles of the Animal Improvement Act, No. 62 of 1998; and the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, No. 10 of 2004.
wildlife accelerated when former Prime Minister of the Republic Mr. P.W. Botha accepted a personal invitation to open the National Game Conference in 1989 (personal communication with former SAGRO executives). Partly prepared by the organizing body, his speech centred on South Africa’s Boer culture of hunting (Annual report of SAGRO 1989/1990). The Prime Minister recognized farmer’s problems concerning the legal protection of game and instructed the Law Commission to work on resolving these issues:

We are aware that game farms do not enjoy the same rights as stock farms. Punishment for poaching and damages are experienced as being inadequate. That is why the government has decided to urgently reconsider the position of game farmers concerning theft and so on. The South African Law Commission will consider this matter and will give a legal opinion to government. I thus expect positive results in the near future (Annual report of SAGRO 1989/1990).

The Law Commission gathered shortly after the conference and focused on the question whether wildlife could be accommodated by agricultural legislation such as the Stock Theft Act. One of the main hurdles was that, as far as could be traced, no specific legal definition of wildlife existed (South African Law Commission (SALC) 1990). No South African court had ever been asked to decide if an animal was either wild or domesticated. In an attempt to set the required categorical boundaries, the Law Commission faced serious concerns. If the definition of wildlife were to be made too broad, the system would create ownership and protection of species that were ‘superfluous’, even bothersome, to landowners. Farmers, so was the reasoning, would merely be frustrated by legal conflicts regarding meerkats, moles, skunks, lynxes or insects (notes to SALC 1990). The commission did not know how to tackle this issue adequately and opted for a new Act that would rule over all utilizable wild animals, i.e. ‘game’.

The new Game Theft Act principally set out to re-interpret 17th century common law on animal ownership. Wildlife had always been classified as res nullius, as common things that belonged to nobody, of which ownership was only possible through occupatio, or physical control. Because of its fugitive nature, physical control was interpreted as the killing of wildlife; merely wounding an animal or owning the land on which it moved did not provide sufficient conditions to own it (Rabie and van de Merwe 1990). Effectively this meant that wildlife could be legally taken by anyone in any location, even if one was trespassing. Game farmers wanted to alter this to gain more control over their wildlife and their land. The proposed solution was to reconfigure the concept of occupatio by arguing that enclosing, rather than killing, an animal was sufficient to show one’s intention to physically control it (notes to SALC, 1990). Adequate enclosure, the commission suggested, could be attained by erecting 2.4-meter (m) tall game fences around one’s land.

In the phase of public commenting, a Kwazulu Natal game farmer critically noted that the consequences of the legislation would ‘be divisive’. The respondent warned that the Act would turn individual landowners into wealthy game owners overnight and that it would in all probability lead to ‘the erection of game fences across major sections of the entire country’ (notes to SALC, 1990). This line of reasoning was not repeated in parliamentary debates and the Game Theft Act was unanimously accepted and enacted as Act No. 105 of 1991. The bearer of a Certificate of Adequate Enclosure (CAE) was from now on the official owner of wildlife on his property and was
exempted from many conservation laws. The new rulings bestowed land owners with the right to (a) capture and keep most species without having to apply for separate permits, (b) to hunt at any time of the year and (c) to market, sell or donate animal commodities at will. Hereby, the legislation implicitly tightened the land owner’s command over his entitlements and weakened the position of nolanders and farm dwellers who found themselves increasingly restricted from access to wildlife and land. Those who lived from wild animals and did not own land faced strict new poaching regulations. Their actions were now classified to be unlawful.

3.2 Boundary markers
Specific requirements to show one’s intention to physically control, transport and trade wild animals in South Africa are based on provincial legislation. To give insight into green grabbing and its particular biophysical consequences this section portrays the necessary technical requirements for wildlife ownership in one province, the Eastern Cape. This exercise shows how notions of wildness, space and specific animal traits are knotted together to facilitate the industry’s economic model. The game fencing specifications additionally demonstrate how wildlife ownership and land ownership are interlocked: those who do not own large tracts of land are barred from owning and trading wildlife.

To start with, the Eastern Cape Department of Environmental Affairs prescribes that no CAE will be approved for areas that are less than 400 hectares (ha) (DEDEA 2008). Furthermore, the quantity and also quality of animals is taken into account: ungulates that weigh over 150 kilograms (kg), for example, are deemed to require at least one ha of land (10,000m²) per four animals (DEDEA 2008). The recommended minimum amount of land which is necessary to introduce ‘dangerous game’ (lion, leopard, hyena, serval, elephant, rhinoceros and hippopotamus) is higher, at 2000 ha, and for these animals topography, habitat, and prey availability are to be considered. Hence, regulations which seem merely technical implicitly come with a particular vision of how wild property should be enacted. Somewhat paradoxically, it is necessary to respect the various degrees of wildness of different game species, while also erecting fences to prove the intention to physically control them.

The height and security level of fences are equally dependent on the species that is introduced. ‘Large animals’ are grouped together under the denominator ‘Class I’ and require 2.4-m high fences, while ‘Class II’ species require 1.4-m high fences. It is reasoned that these particular species are grouped together because of their characteristics in relation to human boundaries, particularly their ability to destroy fences or jump over them. Amongst game farmers, ecologists and officials, there is a constant debate about the shifting of species between these categories. Many game farmers are of the opinion that the lists are both over- and under-inclusive, stating that kudus, for example, can jump over the highest fence with ease, and the

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3The CAE system was already enforced in the Cape Province in the 1970s to relieve landowners from conservation measures; it was not enforced nationally, though, and did not provide one with ownership rights.

4Although environmental legislation differs somewhat between the nine provinces, it is generally similar in outline among provinces.

5Large animals are: kudu, impala, giraffe, eland, cheetah, lion, leopard, spotted hyena, brown hyena, serval, elephant, African wild dog, nyala, fallow deer, sambar deer, red deer, Pere Davids deer, Indian black buck, scimitar-horned oryx, addax, sitatunga, lechwe and waterbuck.
springbok purportedly cannot be contained by low fences. Animal agency has thereby become a heated ingredient of wildlife politics that serves as a proxy to optimize stakeholders’ economic interests.

A closer look at fencing particulars shows how ownership regulations trigger environmental as well as social impacts. Creating rigid boundaries, class I fences must consist of at least 17 wires with boxed straining posts at 1.8 m from each other, planted at 90 centimeters’ (cm) depth, with four strands of recommended electrified wire. Class II boundaries ought to be standard wire, netted stock-proof fences with optional but recommended electrification. Heightened security measures are required for Eastern Cape’s dangerous game. These animals must be kept in a compound that prevents human contact with game and has double electrified entry and exit gates, a minimum voltage of 5000 V, 24/7 manned security, barbed wire, live wire, and fenced river access (DEDEA 2008, 11). Besides the game farm parameters, staff housing, lodging and other facilities where humans dwell need to be fenced properly to protect persons from wild animals, particularly dangerous ones. Whereas farmhouses and guest lodges are typically fenced off, housing for workers is frequently reported to be in unshielded sections of the game farm (interview with two Eastern Cape fencing inspectors, March 2010).

By marking game farms as dangerous spaces that ought to be fenced, guarded, and uninhabited, environmental policy measures which aim to defer ownership rights thus equally control the mobility of persons on land. This is illustrated by the following quotation which shows how fencing arrangements are not merely used to keep wild animals in:

On my open farm the guys poached many sheep, you won’t believe it. Even kudu and springbok and whatever there is to poach… On the new farms, well, it’s fully fenced so you just can’t get in there. I have put up double fences with a buffer that does not contain much. In this remote area now you can’t see what we have from the road, no one knows what I’ve got here (Bedford game farmer, personal communication, 2009).

Wildlife boundaries, particularly those intended to control dangerous game, thus serve to secure property from animal outbreaks and from human break-ins. Besides stopping intruders with malignant intentions, the erection of fences may, however, impact existing mobility patterns (see Section 4).

3.3 Stewardship programs, or deregulation of public wildlife management

As the private wildlife industry has fenced almost three times the amount of land that government has set for conservation purposes (16.7 percent versus 6.2 percent), government is unfolding policies to reclassify private wildlife land as conservation land to realize its protected area targets. After a successful pilot project in the Western Cape a “Stewardship Programme” is currently being adopted on a national level. In this program land owners are recognized as conservation custodians of South Africa’s biodiversity:

Biodiversity stewardship plays a central role in the implementation of the National Protected Area Expansion Strategy (NPAES) and the achievement of South Africa’s biodiversity:

6Successes in the Western Cape include 40 Contract Nature Reserves, 12 Biodiversity Agreements and 19 Conservation Areas through the Stewardship Programme.
protected area targets. It can also play a critical role in securing threatened ecosystems, in most of which establishment of large traditional state-owned protected areas is no longer feasible. Biodiversity stewardship provides a cost-effective mechanism for government to carry out its conservation mandate and achieve biodiversity and protected area targets (SANBI/DEAT 2008).

The conservation mandate is determined by national legislation, while the protected area targets are mainly informed by international conventions to which South Africa is a signatory. The Convention on Biological Diversity, for instance, prescribes that 12 percent of South Africa’s land ought to be ‘protected’ by 2015. As only half this percentage was considered to be protected in 2009 many millions of ha of land are to be amalgamated to this territory in the coming years. Three ways that the government expects to reach these targets are by means of (a) private land acquisitions, (b) the declaration of state land as protected areas, and (c) contract agreements with private landowners (SANBI/DEAT 2008). Because the state sees only limited applicability in the first two options due to fiscal constraints, public-private partnerships are actively being pursued. To incentivize land owners to cooperate in such programs, the treasury aims to recognize and offset the monetary risks landowners incur. A set of fiscal mechanisms was therefore introduced in the Revenue Laws Amendment Act (December 2008) to provide incentives for biodiversity conservation by private landowners and to promote conservation stewardship. The extent of fiscal incentives depends on specific agreements, but it ranges from tax deduction for the removal of alien species, to having the value of the land deducted from one’s taxable income:

- **Alien and invasive vegetation**: Expenses incurred are to be allowed as a fiscal deduction for farming purposes.
- **Biodiversity Management Agreement**: Requires a minimum contract of five years. All conservation and maintenance expenses incurred under the agreement are treated as expenditure incurred in the production of income and for purposes of trade, and are thus deductible as an expense for tax.
- **Protected environment, nature reserve, national park**: Requires a minimum contract period of 30 years. All conservation and maintenance expenses are deductible from taxable income.
- **Nature reserve or national park**: Requires a minimum contract period of 99 years. In addition to the conservation and maintenance expenses above, the value of the land declared that is used only for conservation purposes can be deducted from the taxable income over a ten year period. (SANBI/DEAT 2008, 75).

When asked for the sort of conservation principles that are required to participate in this stewardship program, the Director of Cape Nature mentioned the recognition of ‘normal’ colour phenotypes, encouraging pure bred animals as hunting trophies or tourism attractions, discouraging demand for genetically modified animals, promotion of or incentivised hunting in natural distribution ranges, and the removal of alien taxa (personal communication, 2010). Conservation officials and wildlife industry members have been at loggerheads about many of these principles.

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7The government has stated that 12 percent is too high a target and aims to protect an additional 2.2 percent (2.7 million ha) by 2014, which is in line with other international conventions such as Goal 7 of the Millennium Development Goals.
especially now that the breeding of rare species is proving to be exceptionally lucrative. Nevertheless, most government officials and wildlife representatives reason that the establishment of public-private partnerships is a key mechanism to foster ‘win-win’ solutions that benefit both biodiversity and the economy. This was exemplified during a government presentation to the Wildlife Forum (a government-industry stakeholder platform) in March 2010, when a high-placed Environmental Affairs officer concluded his presentation with the following Microsoft PowerPoint slide:

- A sustainable future is possible for nature conservation and the game industry
- We need to develop practical and achievable incentives with commercial game farms/ranches
- The game industry should be sustainable and beneficial to conservation objectives
- Let us explore options for self-administration in partnership
- Conservation authorities should commit to provide a more professional service to the game industry (Field Notes, Wildlife Forum 2010)

4. Social implications

After the initial institutional parameters of wildlife ownership were set, wildlife production was increasingly perceived as an appealing alternative land-use. The Game Theft Act’s security measures boosted the wealth of numerous land owners by adding financial value to their wildlife as well as their land. Wildlife became a legally protected asset that could result in bank loans, credit, and novel tradable and insurable commodities. By ‘putting a price on wildlife’s head’ (a common phrase in the wildlife industry), a marketing system commenced in which prices of utilizable wildlife species inflated and wildlife utilization on private land surged. Furthermore, the repositioning of wildlife ranchers as conservationists fortified land owners’ economic position in South African society. This section examines the effects of these new legal and material boundaries by documenting the expansion of ‘wild property’ and its consequences for rural mobility, labour, and livelihoods.

4.1 Making a buck: spatial and economic extent of the industry

Smith and Wilson’s study on changing land-use trends in the Eastern Cape shows that an ‘unprecedented boom in game based operations’ occurred from 1991 onwards (Smith and Wilson 2002, 10–11), parallel to the legal privatization of game. This did not happen solely because of wildlife policy: the enclosures occurred amid larger political economic transitions in the field of agriculture (Robbins and Luginbuhl 2007), important changing political configurations in South Africa, and the extended opening of borders to tourists and investors. With the emergence of large-scale, feedlot-centred production systems and decreasing agricultural subsidies after the demise of Apartheid agricultural policies, producer margins declined and this put traditional farming properties in peril (Love and Burton 1999, Van Zyl et al. 2001). Wildlife production was and still is ‘predicated on the need to reduce farm labour, the prevalence of farm murders and security issues generally as well as the threat of land restitution claims and expropriation’ (Carruthers 2008, 161).

With the sharp decline of farm units from 57,980 in 1993 to 39,982 in 2007, and their relative increase in size, comparatively few farmers now take up the lion’s share of South Africa’s countryside (StatsSA 2007). Popular industry statistics show that
up to a quarter of these businesses had fully converted 16.8 percent of South Africa’s land for wildlife production by the year 2006 (Palmer et al. 2006, The National Agricultural Marketing Council 2006, J.G. Du Toit 2007). There is a general lack of industry statistics, however, and authors have called the existing information fragmentary, anecdotal and self-referential. Nonetheless, the Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries reiterated these industry figures in 2009, stating in a written reply to parliament that ‘there are currently 9600 wildlife ranches’.9

Besides running full-time game farms, wildlife operators, in their search for diverse hunting experiences for their clients or for wildlife commodities in general, also bring traditional farm land into play through so-called concessions. It has been reported that not one sixth, but up to 90 percent of agricultural land is knotted into wildlife business (Interview with Prof. Van Niekerk, February 2008). This claim was bolstered in personal interviews with farmers and game farmers throughout the Eastern Cape (2008–2011). One told me: ‘I don’t know a single farmer around here that does not make some cash off wildlife’ (Tarkastad game farmer, personal communication, 2010). A respondent who runs a large sheep farm explained how many landowners are integrated into the industry: ‘Well, you see, I’ve got 300 springboks on my farm. Once every while we let in some hunters or they come with helicopters and take some out: that’s an integral part of my farming business’ (personal communication, March 2009).

The rise in wildlife-based operations has been paired with the escalation of commodity value. Ellof’s study of auction prices shows a tenfold increase of wildlife prices in the period 1991–2001 (cited in Aylward and Lutz 2003), right after the Game Theft Act of 1991 was adopted. Nowers 2010 (cited in Van Hoving 2011) builds on these figures and shows that whereas the quantity of sold wildlife did not necessarily increase after 2001, the turnover of wildlife sales notably did (see Table 1). Particularly after 2007, when breeding and trading rare wildlife such as roan, buffalo and sable gained attention, prices multiplied. A WRSA board member explains:

If you look at buffalo and sable prices and all the others, it is expensive animals which make it very interesting for people with a lot of money to invest in those. There will be capital growth, and they will be multiplying naturally: you have got the calves and all that so your return on investment on game farming is incredible in relation to sheep or cattle farming (personal communication, 2010).

Whereas a record price of 7000 Rands was paid for a sable antelope in 1987 (SAGRO 1990), a buyer put down 3.1 million Rands for a sable in March 2010 (Farmer’s Weekly 2010). Comparing data from the Professional Hunters’ Association of South Africa (PHASA) and the Department of Environmental Affairs from 1995 and 2010, Figure 1 shows the increasing average trophy fees of the nine most expensive wildlife species in South Africa (Carroll 2010, Wels 2003, 160–161). Although the five most expensive species did not change, the prices increased by up to

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8See for instance: Scholes, R.J., D. Grossman and J. Barnes. Unpublished. The shift from domestic livestock to wildlife-based land use in South Africa and Namibia, 1970–2008. Basic statistics are not provided by government and this makes it difficult, if not impossible, to say precisely (1) how much land has been converted to wildlife farms, (2) how many wildlife farms there are, and (3) how many persons live or are employed on these properties. Game farms are not categorized or counted separately by government and no central database exists to count land that has been ‘adequately enclosed’.

9Question 1485: Friday 09 October 2009 [IQP No 20–2009], first session, fourth parliament.
500 percent for each of them. Furthermore, animals such as the elephant and rhinoceros were not included in commodity lists in 1995 due to their conservation status, or, as is the case with the Golden Gnu (a rare colour variation) because the species was not marketed yet. In a period of fifteen years official hunting taxonomies significantly increased in length: 56 different species are now hunted in the Eastern Cape, compared to 16 in the Western Cape (Carroll 2010). Although it is difficult to quantify the economic force of wildlife in South Africa, it is noted that South Africa now harbours the continent’s largest hunting industry (Lindsey et al. 2006, Lindsey 2007).

Not every stakeholder is content with rising wildlife prices, though. Driven by well-to-do tourist demands, local hunters argue that less land and fewer animals are now available for them. A Bedford game farmer explains:

See, the locals don’t pay like overseas guys who pay 10–15 thousand US dollars to shoot one animal. Those local guys, I want to have them come over and give them animals to shoot…but if I buy kudu bulls on auctions and am paying two or three thousand Rand myself, I can’t make a buck there. That guy won’t even pay me that amount to shoot. They should go and look for kudus somewhere else (personal communication, 2010).

The government’s position on game farms is ambivalent as well. It derives significant revenue from wildlife, grossing a total of 973 million Rands merely in ‘daily hunting fees’ in 2008 (Carroll 2010). But whereas the Department of Environmental Affairs has been synchronizing and collaborating with the wildlife industry, the Departments of Agriculture, Rural Development and Land Reform have been more critical. Mr. Nkwinti, the Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform, has described game farms as ‘elitist’ and said they effected a ‘re-colonisation

Table 1. Quantity and turnover of wildlife sold from 1991–2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Wildlife sold</th>
<th>Turnover</th>
</tr>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>8,292</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
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<td>87,000,473</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>20,022</td>
<td>105,192,180</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>19,645</td>
<td>102,420,445</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>21,101</td>
<td>104,547,756</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>17,569</td>
<td>93,549,300</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>15,697</td>
<td>94,821,703</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>12,084</td>
<td>91,880,192</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>12,206</td>
<td>144,259,757</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>14,047</td>
<td>255,158,804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>13,973</td>
<td>303,570,757</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of the countryside’ (Haywood 2007). When a new bill on land reform was negotiated in 2010 officials in his department stated game farms were being looked at for nationalization, as they ‘do not contribute to food security’ (P. Du Toit 2010). Former minister Thoko Didiza of the Department of Agriculture and Land Affairs also questioned the production value of game farms and suggested a moratorium on game farms at the 2005 land summit (Govender 2005). Former agricultural minister Lulama Xingwana threatened to regulate or even prevent farmers from converting their livestock farms into game farms by means of a Land Use Management Bill (Steyn 2010), while at an election rally in Kimberley on 7 May 2011, ANC Youth League president Julius Malema said land should be taken back from land owners ‘because the whites took our land without paying and transformed them into game farms’ (Grobler 2011).

4.2. Working with wild property

NGOs and scholars have substantiated criticism of the wildlife industry by showing that conversions to game farms are often economically disruptive for rural dwellers and communities (Association for Rural Advancement 2003, Eastern Cape Agricultural Research Project/Southern Cape Land Committee 2006) and have resulted in (forced) migration (Luck 2005, Wegerif et al. 2005). With approximately three million people living on private farms in South Africa (Ntsebeza and Hall 2007, 95), it is clear that land-use conversions have serious consequences. Research by the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS), presented at a government stakeholder meeting in March 2011, notes that farm owners who convert to wildlife-based production implicitly require farm dwellers to convert their livelihoods as well. Because of the game-fencing policies and wildlife practices described above, farm dwellers on game farms may be denied access to grazing land and livestock after these conversions. Additionally, those dwellers who used the land for their own livelihoods, to travel to school, home, or work, are forced to reckon

10Presentation by Dr. Hall to the Portfolio Committee on Rural Development and Land Reform, 16 March 2011.
with new boundaries. An affidavit by Nesiwe Beauty Bashe, an Eastern Cape farm
dweller, attests to this:

1. Prior to the conversion to the game farm, I owned five cattle. All occupiers on
the farm had access to four grazing camps. Our livestock had grass for grazing
because we were able to practise rotational grazing. After the conversion the new
owners took three grazing camps for their game farming operation. The one
grazing camp is inadequate for my cattle.

2. Before the farm was converted to the game farm, I had access to a dam, where we
used to get drinking water. With the conversion to the game farm, we are forced
to share this water source with the game animals. This water source is drying up
because of these animals. We fear contracting diseases from consuming water that
is contaminated by animal waste.

3. Before the conversion, there were no fences with gates that were always locked.
After the conversion fences were erected, gates were put up and are locked at all
times.

4. Due to the fact that the main gate is always locked, the occupiers were forced to
make a hole in the fence which is the only exit and entry point to the farm. This
hole in the fence is inadequate because it presents many problems for us. When
we purchase groceries, we have to off-load them near the hole. We then wait for
our children to bring a wheelbarrow to carry our groceries to our homes
(Eastern Cape Agricultural Research Project/ Southern Cape Land Committee
2006, 33).

The conversions also have labour implications, both for farm dwellers and for land
owners. Ian Christy is the owner of a medium-sized trophy hunting farm and is
passionate about his land and animals. He was once the owner of a large factory in
Port Elizabeth, and now that he has made enough money he decided to follow his
childhood dream to be closer to nature and hunt more. When I inquired about his
new job, he replied as follows:

Boring, it’s simply very boring. There is not much happening and it’s seasonal; we start
hunting in March and finish end of October, then what do you do? Well, nothing. On a
game farm you check fences and water holes, it’s not like you have to go in every day
and plant plants and so on. I have got these little self-dipping boxes by the waterholes so
the animals dip themselves. They just step on it and then it sprays, for all the ticks and
that. Then you have to control the jackal and caracal. The guys do that when they walk
around... they kill them (personal communication, May 2009).

Most labour is irregular in its function and occasion, he told me, and one does not
need a large labour force to run the operations.

DS: How many employees have you got?
IC: On the farm? Well, 1, 2... 3.
DS: And do they work there full-time, all year round, or is it when clients come in?
IC: No, they stay on the farm. They have got their houses in town, in Uitenhage, but
they want to stay on the farm.
DS: Is it the guys who were with you on the bakkie?
IC: Yes, the old man has got his wife here and the younger one brings his girlfriend in
when we have hunts and she will help in the house; cleaning, cooking, doing the beds
and all that.
DS: And then you’ve got part-time people coming in for fencing?
IC: No, we do our own. I told ya, there’s not much to do here. Only if it is very serious work like building some structure, do we get a subcontractor in, a guy who has got ten guys to do things quickly.

Work on a game farm is, on the one hand, presented as boring, almost redundant, while on the other hand it is taken for granted that workers, who often live on the land, will take care of the farm throughout the year. Because there is ‘not much to do’, few people work on the maintenance of a fairly large area. Professor Bothma, an authority on South African wildlife management, confirms this by stating that land and wildlife purchases make up 80 percent of the necessary capital to develop a game ranch, and running expenses can be relatively low, ‘especially since a game ranch is usually not a labour-intensive industry’ (Bothma 2002, 71–72). This is echoed by others (Smith and Wilson 2002, 11) although the need to distinguish between different kinds of game farms is noted.

Various reports show that ecotourism reserves generally employ more people than traditional farms (Langholz and Kerley 2006), while hunting farms usually employ less. Great (inter)national unemployment has led to an easily substitutable work force and workers are generally not professionally trained. George Shumba, for instance, works at a game farm near Queenstown and has many roles on the property: he patrols the land, monitors fences, checks the animals, helps with hunts, reports irregularities on the farm, and does construction labour. I asked him about his salary and he said it is ‘not much, around 1000 Rands per month’. South Africa has no country-wide minimum wage, but so-called sectorial determinations are established by the Department of Labour for those jobs that are underrepresented in collective bargaining strategies. When asking Mr. Shumba about his wage in terms of sectorial determinations he answered that he and all other persons on the plot are seen as farm workers. The interview took place by his security post where he was controlling the gate of the property, and he told me he should be paid more as a security officer, but fears losing his job by demanding this.

If they find out we went to the Department of Labour, we are gone. Yuuuu. We cannot go there – the inspectors will come here to check us and then what? They will find out and fire us.

Mr. Kepi, an inspector from the Cradock Department of Labour, told me that the sectorial determinations are often used to the advantage of land owners (personal communication, February 2010). Especially in the game farming sector, where hospitality, hunting assistance and security are part of the offered services, people are frequently miscategorised as farm workers (Table 2 shows the great disparities between the salaries).

The quotations above are supported by a novel study by Bhorat and colleagues who present ‘disturbingly high’ estimates of minimum wage violation throughout South Africa (Bhorat et al. forthcoming). Utilizing data from the National Labour Force Survey, the study shows that 45 percent of workers are paid less than the sectorial minimum wage they should get; the security, forestry and farming sectors show the highest numbers of violations. In reply to a parliamentary question in November 2010, Minister of Labour Mildred Oliphant came to a slightly lower estimate, saying that based on her department’s
inspections of 1744 farms, 35 percent of workers were found to be underpaid (Fin24 2010).

5. Discussion and conclusions

By examining three specific wildlife institutions that shape human-nature relations, I have aimed to show how a rationale of economic liberalism (Tisdell 2004) has moved into the domain of wildlife management in South Africa. The examined institutions were implemented to regulate wildlife theft and to expand public conservation, although they have similar underlying economic principles related to a process of individuation: they enforce material and legal boundaries on nature to facilitate the privatization and commodification of wild animals. The Game Theft Act of 1991 creates a legal framework in which natural entities that were beforehand classified as common goods can now be opted for private property. This move bolstered the price of both an expanding list of wildlife species and of wilderness land. Fencing provides the key mechanism to reinforce entitlement over wild animals, while simultaneously establishing physical control over private land. The described stewardship program, lastly, intensifies this control over wild property by devolving state tasks and thereby repositioning land owners to be officially endorsed conservationists.

Wild animals have hereby become attractive resources. They are seen as highly mobile, self-reproducing survival machines that are adapted to the country’s land, climate and biodiversity. By removing or fencing out threats to their existence – such as predators, poachers and diseases – and applying basic farming practices, game farms effortlessly produce surplus biomass. What distinguishes them from traditional farm animals, however, is that human predators are willing to pay not only for the corporeal resource, but also for ‘experiencing’ wild animals and removing them from the land. In this way, the animals can be knotted into capital flows multiple times. The ecotourist pays for the experience of seeing the animal, the trophy hunter buys the experience of hunting and killing the animal, game-capture teams pay to translocate animals or cull surplus creatures for meat, the abattoir buys the carcasses of the animal, taxidermists pay a commission for the skin and horns of the animal, tourists buy leftover body parts that are produced into ornaments and employees accept residual meat as partial wages.

More than ever, South African wild animals now are commodities; an increasing list of species may be kept, sold, traded, and consumed, but they are distinct from most other commodities in terms of governance. One cannot merely keep a wild animal on a shelf, in a box, or ship it to any place in the world. Strict restrictions apply in terms of usage, production, consumption, and trade. Wild animals are

Table 2. Sectorial determinations in South Africa: 2010/2011.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hospitality (more than 10 employees)</th>
<th>Hospitality (less than 10 employees)</th>
<th>Farm Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rpm</td>
<td>Rpw</td>
<td>Rph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2209.00</td>
<td>509.83</td>
<td>11.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The minimum wage for private security officers is more difficult to establish, but, ranging from 1579 to 3603 Rands per month (Rpm) depending on the region, years of employment and training, lies significantly higher than farm workers’ salaries. Rpw = Rands per week; Rph = Rands per hour.
understood to be entities that have certain freedoms and even certain entitlement to land. Man may be seen as their stewards, but they are also acknowledged as intrinsic beings that deserve space now that their land is being parcelled and their numbers are waning. Keeping wildlife on land that is not large enough is seen as bad practice, an inhumane treatment of beings. Provisions for wild property hereby cook up a paradoxical concoction: one must respect the wildness of an animal, while also showing the intention to own it. The result of this seeming contradiction is a system that insists on borders that are high and strong enough to incarcerate any animal, while also insisting on substantial terrain that respects their fugitive nature. Wild property therefore is exclusive; only those who can afford large tracts of land and can erect costly electrified fences are to be owners. These owners can enjoy relatively high turnovers as well as significant side-effects related to aesthetics, privacy, and protection. The fortified borders of a game farm, as well as the presence of dangerous animals, guns and guards, contribute to a sense of human security in a country that is recognized for its prevalent physical crime. In South Africa’s post-Apartheid neoliberal state wild animals are thereby taking on new roles as proxies to legitimate land ownership. Their containment may be costly and inflexible, but it endows the owner with an impressive strongbox that, as of late, can be subsidized through public-private partnerships with conservation officials. Guided by conservation decrees, owning wildlife thus does not only legitimize the possession of large tracts of fenced land, it also legitimizes a particular wilderness landscape that is void of domestic animals, crops, houses and humans.

References


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