Fitting Demand and Supply: How Identification Brings Appeals and Motives Together

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Abstract (#203)

In this article participants in two demonstrations are compared. The demonstrations took place at two different squares in Amsterdam, at the same day opposing the same governmental policy. Everything was the same except the organizers and their appeals: labor unions with an appeal in terms of threatened interests, on the one hand, and an anti-neoliberalism alliance with an appeal in terms of violated principles on the other. We hypothesized that social cleavages shape mobilising structures and mobilisation potentials. Thereby this study takes an important yet rarely tested assumption in social movement literature serious; namely that grievances are socially constructed. If indeed grievances are socially constructed, one would expect that organizers rooted in different cleavages issue different appeals that resonate with different motives. What made individuals who were protesting the same governmental policy participate at the one square rather than the other? Organizational embeddedness, identification, and appeals that resonate with people’s grievances provide the answer to that question. To test our hypotheses we conducted surveys at both demonstrations. Survey-questionnaires were randomly distributed (response: anti-neoliberalism 209/42%, union 233/47%). The findings supported our assumptions regarding the influence of the diverging mobilizing contexts on the dynamics of protest participation and revealed a crucial role of identity processes.

Key words: collective action; mobilizing context; identity processes; instrumental motivation; ideological motivation; grievances and emotions.
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Saturday 2 October 2004; over 300,000 people participate in two separate demonstrations in Amsterdam to protest against the government’s austerity plans regarding early retirement rights. The largest of the two demonstrations (250,000 participants) is mobilized by the labor unions, the smaller of the two (50,000 participants) by an anti-neoliberalism alliance “Keer het Tij” (Turn the Tide, TrT). In reaction to the economic decline as of 2003, the Dutch government had announced a comprehensive package of cost-cutting measures (inter alia plans to reduce early retirement rights). The government, employers’ organization, and the unions failed to reach an agreement regarding the early retirement rights; the consultations broke down and the government announced that it would put its own plans through. The labor unions declared that in order to reclaim its position at the negotiation table, it had no choice but to mobilize for protest. TrT came from a different direction by principally opposing what it defined as a harsh rightwing climate in the country and as anti-social government policies.

Thus, at exactly the same time on two different town squares of Amsterdam, The Netherlands witnessed two demonstrations, against the same budget cuts. However, these demonstrations were staged by different organizers that emphasized different aspects of the policies proposed by the government. While the unions wanted to be heard and to reclaim influence in the decision making process, TrT wanted to express its aversion of neo-liberal politics. In order to examine the factors that made people protest in the one demonstration

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1 The authors want to thank the anonymous reviewers and the editor dr. Graeme Hayes for their excellent comments.
2 TrT was an anti-neoliberalism alliance founded by organizations that were involved in the anti-globalization movement. At the moment of the mobilization it consisted of 550 political and civil organizations.
staged by the labor unions rather than the other staged by TrT, we surveyed participants in both events.

Our two demonstrations were rooted in different social cleavages; the labour unions rooted in the class cleavage, while TrT with its broad alliance of anti-neoliberalism organizations rooted in the global vs local/centre-periphery cleavage. Following Kriesi and colleagues (1995) we hold that social cleavages mould mobilising structures and mobilisation potentials. Therefore we expect that different organizers assemble different mobilizing structures and emphasize different aspects of the policies proposed by the government, which are appealing to different mobilization potentials. As such, our case adopted a *Most Similar Systems Design* (Przeworski and Teune 1970); almost everything is the same except the mobilizing structures the organizers assembled and the appeals they issued. Set up thus, the possibility was created to investigate whether different mobilizing structures bring different people into the streets and whether different appeals resonate with different motives. Thereby our study takes an important yet rarely tested assumption in social movement literature serious; namely that grievances are socially constructed. If indeed grievances are socially constructed, one would expect that organizers rooted in different cleavages issue different appeals that resonate with different motives. This is what this article is about.

In order to test the assumption that grievances are socially constructed we need to be able to compare demonstrations and their mobilizing contexts. However, most research among participants in protest events concerns single case studies or general surveys retrospectively inquiring whether people have taken part in any protest event in the past so many years (but see Walgrave and Rucht 2010). Such research eliminates context from the design, either because of the absence of contextual variation (i.e. the single case study), or because the contextual variation is unspecified (i.e. general surveys like the World Value Survey). Whilst studies based on general surveys have taught us a lot about general features
of protesters (c.f. Dalton et al. 2009), they provide no information on the demonstrations 
protestors participated in nor do they provide information on the protestors’ motivations. 
These surveys allow us to compare characteristics of those who have demonstrated at some 
point in their lives with those who have not, but do not tell us anything about who participates 
in the one rather than the other demonstration and for what reason. But, even if one aims to 
compare demonstrations, one seldom has the opportunity to compare two demonstrations 
staged by different organizers at the same time in the same city in response to the same 
governmental policy. Would the organizers had decided to join forces, coalition formation 
may have hided from view possible differences between the coalescing movement 
organizations and thus obscured how contextual variation related to motivational dynamics. 
But the organizers did not form a coalition, they decided to stage two separate collective 
actions against the same austerity measures at the same day and in the same city. Thereby 
offering us the opportunity to compare how cleavage-specific appeals issued via cleavage-
specific mobilizing structures translated a similar economic threat into different grievances 
and brought different people into the streets with different motives.

The remainder of this article is dedicated to a comparison of participants in the two 
demonstrations. We will examine how the differences between the two campaigns—the 
mobilizing structures they commanded and the appeals they issued—mobilized people who 
were differentially embedded in social networks and who had diverging motives. We will 
show that identification plays a crucial role in that respect. But, first we will lay out our main 
argument. That is, we will explain that protest has a demand and a supply side (Klandermans 
2004). We will argue that mobilising structures and mobilisation potentials are shaped by 
social cleavages and that cleavage-specific supply assembles cleavage-specific mobilizing 
structures with cleavage-specific appeals which resonate with cleavage-specific demand. 
Embeddedness and identification play a crucial role in that respect. The more people are
embedded in cleavage-specific multi-organizational fields and the more they identify with a movement organization the more its appeals resonate. A similar economic threat may thus be translated into different appeals which resonate with different people. In the pages to come we first theorize about the interaction of supply and demand. In that context we will discuss how social cleavages shape both the supply and demand-side of protest. Next, we present our findings and finally, we discuss whether our expectations are confirmed.

Mobilizing structures and appeals: The supply-side of protest

The supply-side of protest refers to the opportunities to protest staged by organizers. In this paper we focus on the differences between the mobilizing structures the organizers of the two demonstrations assembled and the appeals they issued.

Mobilizing structures. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996: 3) define mobilizing structures as “those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action”. Mobilizing structures form the connecting tissue between organizers and participants and connect the supply of protest to the demand. This includes all formal and informal networks that exist both inside and outside a social movement sector. It is through these networks that material, social, cultural and moral resources are accumulated and redistributed to be used for movement activities (Edwards and McCarthy 2004). At any time, all kinds of groups, organizations and networks that exist in a society can become part of a mobilizing structure. However, none can be assumed to automatically become part of it. Networks need to be adapted, appropriated, assembled and activated by organizers in order to function as mobilizing structures (Boekkooi, Klandermans, and van Stekelenburg 2011). Even networks which primary goal is movement mobilization such as SMOs) might need hard work to be activated to participate in a particular campaign.
Many times social movement organizations decline to participate in a campaign, and thus do not become part of the mobilizing structure. On the other hand, networks with very different goals such as networks of colleagues, churchgoers, friends, and neighbors, might become involved in the campaign and thereby become part of the mobilizing structure. Many studies have shown that the composition of the mobilizing structure is important in explaining differential recruitment and mobilization (e.g. Klandermans and Oegema 1987; Passy, 2001; Snow, Zurcher, and Eckland-Olson 1980). Which organizations join the mobilizing coalition predicts who will participate in the protest (e.g. Heaney and Rojas 2008). Most studies assessing organizational affiliations show that organizations predominantly mobilize their own members. Similarly, networks tend to reach those who are embedded in their structures (Passy 2001). Thus, organizers that assemble different mobilizing structures be it coalitions of formal organizations, or networks of informal networks, or both reach different subsets of a movement’s mobilization potential (Boekkooi 2012).

**Appeals.** Assembling mobilizing structures is an important step in the process of micro-mobilization; i.e. “the various interactive and communicative processes that affect frame alignment” (Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986: 464). In a process called framing social actors, media and citizens jointly interpret, define and redefine states of affairs (Klandermans 1997: 44). Through collective action frames organizers construct meaning for action (Gamson 1992). Organisers work hard to turn grievances into claims, to point out targets to be addressed, to create moral outrage and anger, and to stage events where all this can be vented. As such they weave together a moral, cognitive, and ideological package and disseminate that among their mobilization potential. These appeals ‘snowball’ through the assembled mobilizing structure (Boekkooi 2012). The more persuasive and convincing these appeals, the more people will be motivated to take part in the events (Snow et al. 1986).
Different organizers may however emphasize different aspects of the problem or the solution. In doing so, they play a significant role in the construction and reconstruction of collective beliefs and in the transformation of individual discontent into collective action.

Grievances can be framed in terms of violated interests and/or violated principles. Following Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans and Van Dijk (2009) we hold that depending on which emphasis is taken, a campaign appeals to different motives. We employ Turner and Killian’s (1987) description of action orientations to distinguish appeals: (1) power orientation, or an orientation toward acquiring and exerting influence; (2) value orientation, or an orientation toward the goals and the ideology of the movement, and (3) participation orientation, whereby the activity is satisfying in and of itself. Klandermans (1993) shows that different campaigns may appeal to different participation motives. Comparing participation in three types of movement activity (a strike, a women’s group, and a peace demonstration) he was able to show that the three movements appealed to different motives. As strikes are power-oriented, feelings of efficacy were important in explaining trade unionists’ willingness to strike. In participation-oriented activities like the women’s groups, women participated because participation in itself was perceived as satisfying. In the value-oriented demonstration of the peace movements, the value component rather than the expectancy component carried great weight. Note that these movements did not have one single action orientation. To the contrary, movements have all three orientations, but a specific activity or campaign may emphasize a specific orientation (Turner and Killian 1987; Klandermans 1993). Thus, in the campaigns organizers stage, they may emphasize a specific action orientation that translates into an appeal to some motives rather than others. Following this reasoning we expect that campaigns that emphasize the violation of interests resonate with other motives than campaigns that emphasize the violation of principles. We will address this in the next section on the demand-side of protest.
Embeddedness and Motivation: The demand-side of protest

While the supply-side of protest concerns characteristics of the mobilizing structure assembled and the issued appeals, the demand-side of protest concerns characteristics of a movement’s mobilization potential. A movement’s mobilization potential consists of the people who sympathize with the movement’s cause. It can be described in terms of its socio-political composition; in terms of the networks and organizations people are embedded in; and in terms of collective identities, shared grievances and emotions. We focus on the differences between the participants in the two demonstrations. That is to say, we wonder to what extent the crowds each campaign mobilized differed in terms of socio-political characteristics, organizational embeddedness and motivation.

*Socio-political characteristics.* For a long time it was taken for granted that political protest more frequently attracted male, youth, students, and workers. Meyer and Tarrow’s (1998) review of the literature, however, suggest that the demographic composition of the crowds demonstrating has become more diverse (see also McCarthy et al. 2013; Mayer 2013, Norris, Walgrave and Van Aelst 2005). Demographic characteristics of mobilization potential commonly deemed of interest are age, gender, class, ethnicity, religion, and nationality. As for the political composition of a movement’s mobilization potential we have in mind the ideological left-right distinction. Obviously, mobilization potential of movements varies with regard to the aforementioned characteristics. Such variation is not random, but related to the cleavage a movement roots in and the issues it addresses. Poor quality education more likely bothers students and their parents, while retirement age is more a matter of concern of the elderly. Thus, the socio-demographic characteristics of the cleavage in which the conflict
originates are expected to reflect in the crowd on the street. Hence, if protests originate in different cleavages, their socio-demographic characteristics are expected to differ too.

Social embeddedness, that is, the quantity and types of relationships with others, can have the form of (a) organizational embeddedness as in party membership or being a member of the labour union (cf. Klandermans et al. 2008), (b) informal relationships, such as friends, family colleagues, and (c) virtual relationships such as active participation in blogs, social media, etc. (Van Stekelenburg and Boekkooi 2013). It is within these networks that grievances are formed, aggrieved people are mobilized and social pressure and resources are accumulated which help to transfer intended participation into actual participation (Passy 2001).

Motivation. As for the motivational configuration we rely on a motivation model that combines the working of grievances, identity, and emotions to account for variation in determination to participate in protest. The model assigns a central role to processes of identification (Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and Van Dijk 2011). In order to develop shared grievances and shared emotions a shared identity is needed (Figure 1). According to this model grievances originate in interests and/or principles that are believed to be threatened. The more people feel that interests of the group and/or principles that the group values are threatened, the angrier they are and the stronger their determination to participate in protest to defend their interests and principles and/or to express their anger. Group identification further reinforces the process. The more people identify with a group the angrier they are, when they feel that interest or principles of the group are violated. This is also meta-analytically confirmed (van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008).

<<Figure 1>>
The model makes a distinction between instrumental and ideological motivation.

Instrumental motivation refers to participation as an instrument to improve the situation of the group. Perceived efficacy of that instrument plays a key role in the motivational dynamics (Klandermans 1984; Klandermans 1997; McAdam 1982). Ideological motivation (c.f. Hornsey, Blackwood, Louis, Fielding, Mavor, Morton, O'Brien, Paasonen, Smith, and White 2006; Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and van Dijk 2009; Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and Van Dijk 2011) refers to participation in defense of principles and values that have been violated. Anger is the most frequently encountered emotion in the social psychological protest literature (e.g. van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, and Leach 2004). Group-based emotions theory suggests that the same emotion processes operating at the individual level operate in intergroup relations (Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, and Gordijn 2003). In our motivational model group-based anger works as an amplifier and accelerator; it reinforces both the instrumental and ideological motivation (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2010; Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and Van Dijk 2011). That is to say, strong feelings of efficacy not only help the instrumental motivation grow, but also intensifies group-based anger and thus amplifies the determination to participate in protest. The same holds for ideological motivation, strong feelings of injustice strengthens ideological motivation, but also intensifies group-based anger and thereby amplifies the determination to participate.

We assume that instrumental motives more likely resonate with campaigns that emphasize the violation of interests, because instrumentally motivated participation implies that participation is seen as an opportunity to change a state of affairs at affordable costs. On the other hand, ideological motivation more likely resonates with campaigns that emphasize the violation of principles, because participation on the basis of ideological motives aims at expressing one’s views and venting one’s anger against a target that has violated one’s values.
We assume furthermore that the resonance of appeals and motives holds especially for people who identify with organizations that stage the campaign. Important in that context is that it is not group identification \textit{per se} but the \textit{strength} of such identification that influences group members’ readiness to view themselves and act in terms of their group membership (Huddy 2001). Hence, group identification varies in strength; identifying more or less with a group may make a real difference, especially in political contexts, so Huddy. Group identification is an awareness of similarity, in-group identity and shared fate with others who belong to the same category (Brewer and Silver 2000). It has pervasive effects on what people feel, think and do (Terry and Hogg 1996). Translated to the world of protest this implies that the more individual members of a social movement organization identify with that organization the more individual orientations, values, and beliefs become congruent with those of ‘their’ organization, and the more likely that their motives resonate with the frames provided by ‘their’ organization. Therefore we assume that in case of successful frame alignment—when ideas of individuals and movements resonate—that people adopt the reasons \textit{why} the group mobilizes: the more ‘the group is in me’, the more ‘I feel for us’, the more I incorporate the group’s motives. Hence, organizational embeddedness and identification play a crucial role in that respect. We will argue that mobilising structures and mobilisation potentials are shaped by social cleavages and that cleavage-specific supply assembles cleavage-specific mobilizing structures with cleavage-specific appeals which resonate with cleavage-specific demand. Different mobilizing structures bring different people into the streets and whether different appeals resonate with different motives.

Formation of grievances and mobilization: Social Cleavages
In this study we focus on how the same economic grievance is mobilized within different social cleavages. We argue that social cleavages shape both the supply and demand-side of protest. Therefore different mobilising structures are assembled which issue different appeals that resonate with different sections of the population. Social movements—as carriers of meaning—are deeply involved in the social construction of grievances, connecting them to other grievances and constructing larger frames of meaning that resonate with a population’s cultural predispositions and communicate a uniform message to power holders (Snow and Benford 1992: 136 in Tarrow 1998). However, frames do not resonate randomly. Frame resonance takes place in the context of structural and cultural cleavages in society such as class, gender, religion, centre-periphery, ethnicity, and the like. Cleavages ‘freeze’ fields of actors, both at the supply side of contentious politics (reflected in the fractioned multi-organizational fields) and the demand side of contentious politics (reflected in shared identities, interests and grievances, cf. Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). Depending on their embeddedness in such organizational fields organizers are connected to some people rather than others. People whom they are connected with are more likely to be targeted, but also more susceptible to the views disseminated. They are more likely to learn about those views and more likely to be persuaded. Thus, social cleavages shape mobilising structures and mobilisation potentials where grievances are formed and participants are mobilized (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, and Giugni 1995). Hence, cleavage-specific supply generates cleavage-specific mobilizing structures with cleavage-specific appeals which resonate with cleavage-specific demand.

The more salient a cleavage, the stronger the ‘readiness’ of its mobilisation potential to act in response to that cleavage (Kriesi 1995). Organisers play a crucial role in the transformation of ‘readiness’ into action (Boekkooi, Klandermans, and van Stekelenburg 2011). In order to mobilize potential constituencies, organizers must develop master frames
that link the conflict to the cleavage they represent (Gamson 1992). The better organisers align the threat to ‘their’ cleavage—the more their frames ‘resonate’—the more successful their mobilisation attempts will be.

The Present Research

The aim of the present research is to provide empirical support for our assumptions regarding the differential formation of grievances and mobilization. First we will provide some background information on both protest events. Thereafter, in the Method section, we will explain the procedures we employed to collect data on protesters in the respective events and the measures included in the surveys.

Labor Movement. In a reaction to the declining economy, the government announced a comprehensive package of cost-cutting measures (most notably austerity plans regarding early retirement rights), which worsened the relation with employers organizations and labor unions. The controversy resulted in a breakdown of the consultations between government and employers and unions and eventually the government announced that it would put its own plans through. This is notable in a consensus democracy as The Netherlands. Indeed, one of the characteristics of a consensus democracy is an almost continuous process of consensus-oriented consultations between employers' associations, unions and the government. The labor movement declared that although they continue to support the ‘consultative model’, that entering into consultation with the government no longer seems fruitful; they saw no other alternative than to launch collective action. In their mobilization campaign the labor movement did its utmost to emphasize its effectiveness and ability to exert influence via collective action since consensus-oriented consultation seems no longer effective.
Turn The Tide Alliance. TrT was the other movement staging collective action. TrT is an alliance founded by organizations that were active earlier in the anti-globalization movement. It originated in 2002 in reaction to a stark shift to the right in the political climate, during the 2002 national election campaign. These tumultuous times witnessed the rise of anti-immigrant politician Pim Fortuyn, and his assassination, just a few days before the election. The alliance has made it its goal to oppose the harsh rightwing climate in the country and the anti-social government policies. At the moment of the demonstration the alliance consisted of 550 political and civil organizations; it staged collective action twice a year. By stressing anti-neo-liberal and progressive policies the organizers emphasized the ideology behind their claims, thus giving participants an opportunity to express their discontent and indignation with proposed government policies.

The aim of the present research is to investigate whether the two organizers, which rooted in different cleavages, assembled different mobilizing which issue different appeals that resonate with different sections of the population.. At the supply-side the two demonstrations differed in terms of the composition of their mobilizing structure: labour unions—rooted in the class cleavage—for the one demonstration and a broad alliance of anti-neoliberalism organizations—rooted in the global vs local/centre-periphery cleavage—for the other. We expect that the socio-demographic composition of the two crowds reflects the mobilizing structures commanded by the unions and TrT, that is to say, male, union members, predominantly moderate left with relatively low levels of education at the union demonstration and a highly educated, more extreme left crowd at the TrT demonstration. Next to the socio-demographic composition, we also expect the motives to differ. The labor unions were frustrated by the fact that the government had pushed the usual consensual style of policy making aside and had announced to proceed without further consultation. As far as the unions were concerned, their goal was getting access to the deliberations again. TrT’s
campaign was much broader and much more ideological than that of the labor unions, mobilizing against neo-liberal policies and conservative politics. Thus characterized, we presume that the campaign of the labor unions will be more power-oriented and more in defense of violated interests and that of TtT more value-oriented and more in defense of violated principles. As instrumental motives more likely resonate with campaigns that emphasize the violation of interests, we expect the participants in the union demonstration—especially those who strongly identify with the organizers—to be more instrumentally motivated. Similarly, because ideological motivation more likely resonates with campaigns that emphasize the violation of principles, we expect the participants in the TtT demonstration—again especially those who strongly identify with the organizers—to be more ideologically motivated. Finally, as all our respondents were participants in a demonstration we do not expect to find differences in anger and determination to participate between the two crowds.

Method

Procedure

We went out to survey the participants of the respective protest events in their act of demonstrating. Hence, respondents were asked to participate during the demonstrations. This kind of field research implies that it is conducted in a crowded, unpredictable and erratic environment. In order to guarantee representativeness of the findings we employed the so-called Protest Survey Method developed by Walgrave and colleagues (van Aelst and Walgrave 2001; Van Stekelenburg, Walgrave, Klandermans, and Verhulst 2012; Walgrave
and Verhulst 2010). Although obtaining data by using a protest survey is not new, this systematic application is. So, we outline its basic principles.

The protest survey method implies that data were collected *during* and *after* the demonstrations. That is, some participants were interviewed on the spot, others were given questionnaires to take home and return to the university after they had filled them out. The two demonstrations took place on different squares in Amsterdam. We collected data on each square. The short 3-4 minute face-to-face interviews—conducted *during* the demonstrations—comprise a small subset of socio-demographic questions identical to the extensive postal survey to be filled out *after* the demonstration (which takes on average 20-25 minutes). As we reached response rates close to 100% for the face-to-face interviews, we can make meaningful estimates of what biases might be present by comparing the answers of the face-to-face interviews to the identical questions in the returned postal questionnaires. Obviously, we can only make meaningful estimates provided proper sampling of the interviewees; and that brings us to the sampling strategy. We developed a sampling strategy to make sure that every protester in the area where the protest event took place had an equal chance of being selected by one of the interviewers. Interviewers were positioned around the square on the outer edge of the protest event. They were instructed to select a protester on the outer circle, followed by another, ten steps inwards, and so on until the centre of the circle was reached. In this way, all individual protesters in the two crowds had an equal chance of being selected. The result of all this, is samples that we believe to be representative of the demonstrators present.

Two times 10 interviewers conducted 123 face-to-face interviews at the TrT-demonstration and 115 at the labor movement demonstration. Two times 500 questionnaires were handed out of which 442 questionnaires (209 TrT and 233 labor unions) were returned. The overall response rate was 44% (42% TrT and 47% labor union). A comparison of the
questions in the face-to-face interviews to the similar socio-demographic questions in the postal survey revealed no significant differences for both demonstrations. Hence, we concluded that the postal sample provides a fair approximation of the population of protesters.

Data for the analyses were taken from the extensive postal survey questionnaires only.

Measures

The postal questionnaire comprised the following three components: (a) measures to assess the respondent’s socio-political position; (b) questions about the organizational networks people are embedded in; and (c) measures to assess people’s collective identities, shared grievances and group-based anger.

Socio-political position. As indicators of socio-political position we applied left-right self-placement (1 ‘extreme left’ and 7 ‘extreme right’), educational level (1 ‘primary school’ to 8 ‘university’), gender, protest behavior in the past 5 years (answer categories ranged from ‘this is the first time’, to ‘2-5’, ‘6-10’, ’11-20’ and ‘over 20 times’), and issues these demonstrations were about: peace, anti-racism, human rights, third world issues, social issues, environment, anti-globalisation, and womens issues).

Organizational embeddedness. To assess organizational embeddedness we asked our respondents whether they are a member of one of the organizations involved in the demonstration.

Motivational variables. We assessed the following motivational variables: identification, instrumental and ideological motivation, group-based anger and determination to participate. All motivational variables were measured on a Likert scale ranging from 1 ‘not at all’ to 7 ‘very much’. Identification. We compiled a measure of people’s level of identification consisting of four elements: emotional significance (‘I like being part of this
social movement organization (SMO”), commitment (“I feel committed to this SMO”), shared “we” (“I have much in common with other members”), and involvement (“I am involved in this SMO”). As the items loaded on a single factor we calculated a single measure of identification (Cronbach’s alpha = .96) ranging from ‘1’ no identification to ‘7’ very strong identification. Instrumental motivation. Following Klandermans (1984) and Simon et al. (1998), the instrumental motive was operationalized in terms of grievances and feelings of efficacy. The grievance component was stated as: “To what extent are you (dis)satisfied by the government plans concerning early retirement rights?” The efficacy component was stated as: “To what extent do you think that this demonstration will contribute to persuading the government not to implement its plans concerning early retirement rights?” Ideological motivation was measured by four items: I am protesting because: “I want to take my responsibility/The proposed government policy is against my principles/I find the proposed government policy unfair/I find the proposed government policy unjust”. They loaded on a single factor and accordingly we calculated the ideology motive (Cronbach’s alpha = .80) ranging from ‘1’ no ideological motivation to ‘7’ very strong ideological motivation. Group-based anger. Conform the social psychological emotion literature (van Zomeren et al. 2004 and Mackie et al. (2000), we measured group-based anger with the following two items. “Thinking about the government proposals makes me feel…(angry, furious)”. As the two emotions correlated strongly (Pearson r = .74/ Cronbach’s alpha of .84) we combined them into a single measure of anger ranging from ‘1’ not angry to ‘7’ very angry. Determination to participate. Respondents indicated their determination to participate in answering the following item: “How determined were you to participate in this demonstration?” ranging from ‘1’ not very determined to ‘7’ very determined.

Results
In what follows we test our hypotheses regarding the differential formation of grievances and the mobilization thereof. First we will examine the differences between the two crowds in terms of the socio-political composition and organizational embeddedness. Followed by motivation and the respective motivational configuration of the crowds and the role of identification therein.

Socio-political composition and organizational embeddedness

Our first hypothesis concerning the organizational embeddedness and socio-political composition of the two crowds was clearly supported by the data. Eighty-one percent of the participants in the union demonstration were members of a labor union. Men (48%) and women (52%) were about equally represented. The mean age of the participants was 52 years, and the level of education was high for a union turnout (2% primary school, 19% lower secondary, 19% middle secondary, 30% higher secondary, 7% non-university higher education, 22% university). Two thirds took for the first time in their life part in a demonstration. The one third that did take part in demonstrations before participated predominantly in demonstrations regarding social-economic problems. The participants’ political preference leaned more toward the Social Democrats (45%) than toward the far left parties—the Greens (12%) or the Socialist Party (19%). In the TrT demonstration men were in the majority (56% of the participants). Mean age of these participants was 44 years, and the level of education was much higher than in the union demonstration (1% primary school, 11% lower secondary, 5% middle secondary, 29% higher secondary, 11% non-university higher education, 42% university). Of these participants, 56% were members of an

3 Traditionally the social basis of the labor movement comprises mostly of craft and production workers with relatively low educational levels (Eggert and Giugni 2012).
organization affiliated to the TrT-alliance. More than half of the participants (55%) has taken part in demonstrations before, mostly on issues of peace and war. The political preference was more oriented to the far left—the Greens (26%) and the Socialist Party (30%)—than to the Social Democrats (33%).

Notwithstanding some overlap the two crowds were really different. Obviously, both are from the left side of the political spectrum, but in the union demonstration more moderately oriented, while the TrT-demonstrators were leaning more to the far left. The TrT-demonstrators have more frequently taken part in demonstrations in the past than the union-demonstrators, while their protest histories differed significantly, unionists more often in typical class matters around socio-economic issues and TrT-ers more often on typical centre-periphery issues around war and peace. Finally, the TrT-demonstrators are far higher educated than the union demonstrators. Overall, the impression is a more traditional left-to-the-centre crowd at the union demonstration and a typical ‘new social movement’, new left crowd at the TrT-demonstration. Given the two mobilizing structures and the cleavages in which the respective movements are rooted—the labour unions in the class cleavage and TrT in the local/centre-periphery cleavage—this is what we expected.

Motivation

Our second set of hypotheses concerns the motivation of the participants. A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with the two demonstrations as the fixed factor reveals that the motivational dynamics of the two crowds are different (F = 3.875, df = 6, p < .001). This statistical difference is due to two variables, namely, identification (Union mean = 4.42, TrT mean = 3.77; F = 6.823, df = 1, p = .009) and the grievance component of the instrumental motivation (Union mean = 4.98, TrT mean = 4.25; F = 8.554, df = 1, p = .004). Participants in
the union demonstration identified stronger with the organizers than participants in the TtT demonstration. In view of the fact that 81% of the participants in the union demonstration were members of a union, while 56% of the participants of the TtT demonstration were members of one of the organizations in the alliance this is not so surprising. Indeed, controlling for membership the difference in identification between participants in the two demonstrations is small and actually the other way around—members in the TtT demonstration identify more with the organizers than members in the union demonstration (means .61 and .44 for the TtT and the unions resp. Among non-members the respective values are –1.05 and –1.19 (main effect demonstration F=4.261, df=1, p=.04; main effect membership F=480.239, df=1, p< .001). As expected, union-demonstrators were more instrumentally motivated than TtT-demonstrators, because they valued the immediate goals of the demonstration (early retirement) higher.

Finally, as expected participants in the two demonstrations did not differ in terms of group-based anger and in terms of determination to participate. Unexpectedly, however, ideological motivation did not differ for the two groups of demonstrators. We will get back to this when we have discussed the link with identification.

Motivational configurations

The reported MANOVA results confirmed our hypotheses that participants in the two demonstrations were on average equally angry while their determination to participate was equally strong. This is not to say that emotions and motivations were identically patterned for the two crowds. On the contrary, the configuration of emotions and motivations varied considerably. In the next sections we walk in a few steps through increasingly complex analyses—zero order correlations first, followed by regression analyses, mediations analyses,
moderation analyses, and structural equation modeling—demonstrating how the motivational configurations among participants in the two demonstrations diverged.

Correlations. A first indication that the motivational configurations among participants in the two demonstrations diverged is provided by the two correlation matrices in Table 1. Important differences can be observed in the patterns of correlations for the two crowds. Among the TtT-demonstrators instrumental motives were unrelated to the other motives (Ideology: Pearson r = .09, ns, group-based anger Pearson r = .06, ns) and to people’s determination to participate (Pearson r = .12, ns), and in line with the MANOVA discussed above, negatively correlated to identification (Pearson r = -.16, p < .05). On the other hand, ideological motives, group-based anger and determination were strongly correlated (Pearson r = .42, p < .01, Pearson r = .58, p < .01 respectively). In their turn, ideology and determination were correlated to identification (ideology: Pearson r = .24, p < .01, determination: Pearson r = .27, p < .01). For these four variables we found a similar pattern among union-demonstrators, be it that the correlations between ideology, anger and determination were more moderate. The main difference between the two groups in terms of the motivational configuration concerns the instrumental motives. Among the union-demonstrators we found systematically positive correlations between the grievance- and the efficacy-component of the instrumental motive and all other motivational variables. The correlational pattern of the efficacy-component, in particular, shows us that the motivational constellation of union-demonstrators concur around these instrumental motives while this is not the case for TtT-ers. As hypothesized, instrumental motives resonate with power-oriented campaigns, and not with value-oriented campaigns. Ideological motivation resonated—unexpectedly—with both campaigns. Note however, that identification and ideological motivation are significantly related in the TtT protest (Pearson r = .24, p < .05) while they are unrelated in the union protest (Pearson r = .13, ns). This correlation pattern is a first indication that instrumental frames
resonate stronger with power-oriented campaigns—especially for those respondents who strongly identify with the organizers—while ideological frames resonate stronger with value-oriented campaigns—again especially for those respondents who strongly identify with the organizers.

Regression analyses. So far, our findings suggest that the two demonstrations generate diverging motivational configurations among their participants. This is further evidenced by two hierarchical regression analyses in which determination is regressed on the remaining motivational variables for the two demonstrations separately (Table 2). In the model in Figure 1 determination is thought to be determined by instrumental and ideological motives and anger. Contextual variation made us expect different configurations for the two demonstrations. We expected that for the union demonstration instrumental motives would be more prominent, while ideological motives were expected to be more prominent in the TtT demonstration. This turns out to be the case, but at the same time the regression analyses reveal a more nuanced picture.

TtT protesters’ determination to participate is, as hypothesized, spurred by ideological motives, identity and anger. Instrumental motives do not significantly influence their determination to participate (see Model 1 - 5, upper panel Table 2). This implies that TtT-demonstrators participate because they are angry about the violation of their principles. The union demonstration is a different story. Union protesters’ determination to participate is, as
expected, spurred by instrumental motives (mainly efficacy), identity, and group-based anger and, unexpectedly, by ideological motives (see Model 1 - 5, lower panel Table 2). Although ideological motives unexpectedly influence the determination to participate of union protesters, it should be noted that the influence of ideological motivation on determination is much stronger for TtT-ers ($\beta = .46, p < .001$) than for union demonstrators ($\beta = .24, p < .001$). Note also that entering identification in the model (Model 4) lowers ideological motives but not instrumental motives for TtT-ers, while it lowers instrumental but not ideological motives for union protesters. This tells us that part of the link between identification and determination is indirect. But more important, it is an indication that the two different appeals mobilized people with diverging motives and how identification seems to play a crucial role in that respect. We will zoom in on the role of identification in the mediation and moderation analyses.

Mediation analyses. The motivational model allows for two such indirect meditational links; one from identity to group-based anger via ideological motivation and the other via instrumental motivation. We hypothesized that the ideological route is the most likely for TtT while we expected the indirect instrumental route the most likely for the union. This is indeed what we found. Sobel-tests reveal significant Z-values indicating full or partially mediations. As no relationship was observed with the grievance-component of instrumentality, we only tested mediations for the efficacy component. In the TtT demonstration, ideology mediates between identity and anger ($Z=3.229, p<.001$), while no such mediating effects were found for instrumentality. This in contrast to the union demonstration, where efficacy mediates

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4 Mediation and moderation approaches are both tests to increase our understanding of the psychological processes by which independent variables affect dependent variables. Moderation approaches test psychological mechanisms, while mediation is typically the standard for testing theories regarding process (Rucker et al. 2011). Translated to our model, how identification as a mechanism makes Unionists or TtT-ers more determined (identification as mechanism and thus moderation), and what process raises Unionists or TtT-ers anger (the process whereby Unionists perceive their interests to be violated and TtT-ers their principles to be violated, the process of violation and thus mediation).
between identity and anger (Z=2.41, p<.01), while no such mediating effects were found for ideology. This implies that TtT-respondents are angry about felt injustice—especially the strong identifiers—while union-respondents are angry about threatened interests—again, especially the strong identifiers.

In the motivational model group-based anger works as an amplifier and accelerator. Therefore we expect that ideological and instrumental motives raise anger, which in its turn strengthens the determination to participate. We hypothesized that TtT- demonstrators would be angrier about the felt injustice and that this spurs their motivation. In statistical terms:

anger mediates between ideology and motivation, this hypothesis is confirmed (Z=4.745, p<.001). This tells us that the more campaigns stress violated principles, the angrier participants are about the felt injustice and the stronger their determination to participate. The union demonstration is again a different story. Unexpectedly, we did not find a relationship between instrumental motivation and determination, while instrumental motivation did affect anger. This implies again a mediating role of anger, however, a full mediation, as instrumental motivation is fully translated into anger rather than also having an effect on people’s determination. And indeed, anger mediates between efficacy and determination (Z=2.63, p<.01). This tells us that the more efficacious union-demonstrators feel, the more their motivation is spurred by anger, and thus that part of the motivation in this power-oriented campaign, stems from anger over threatened interests. We observed one more interesting indirect effect, namely that of ideology via anger on determination to participate (Z=3.253, p<.001). This suggests that—unexpectedly—part of the motivation of union-demonstrators also stems from anger over violated principles.

In sum, union-respondents were angry because their interests and principles were threatened. However, the more they identified with the unions staging the demonstration, the more they were instrumentally motivated. TtT-respondents were angry because there
principles were violated. The more they identified with organizations staging that
demonstration, the more they were ideologically motivated and the less instrumentally.
Indeed, motivational configurations seem to vary as a function of the mobilizing context,
especially for the strong identifiers. In the next section we will test that assumption.

**Moderation Analyses.** We expected the motivation of the participants in the two
demonstrations to resonate with the respective appeals of the organizers especially among the
strong identifiers. In order to test that assumption, we ran a two-way MANOVA with
demonstration and strong versus weak identification\(^5\) as fixed factors and instrumental and
ideological motivation as dependent variables. The results of that analysis confirm our
expectations.

Together demonstrations and levels of identification accounted for significant
proportions of the variance in the instrumental motive (3% of the grievance component,
\[F=3.352, \text{df}=3, p<.05\]; 9% of the efficacy component, \[F=12.388, \text{df}=3, p<.001\]), and of the
variance in the ideological motive (5%, \[F=6.585, \text{df}=3, p<.001\]). The variance in the
dependent variables is basically explained by the main effects of identification and the
interaction of demonstration and identification. Confirming the central role of identification,
demonstrations as a factor per se did **not** make any difference, while identification **did** have a
significant influence on the instrumental motive (especially the efficacy component of
instrumentality--\[F=29.783, \text{df}=1, p<.001\]; 7% of the variance explained) and on the
ideological motivation (\[F=17.382, \text{df}=1, p<.001\]; 4% of the variance explained). This tells us
that strong identifiers believed more in the efficacy of this event than weak identifiers and that
strong identifiers were more ideologically motivated than weak identifiers.

Most important for our reasoning, however, is a significant interaction of
demonstration and identification as displayed in Figure 2. Figure 2 visualizes how the

\(^5\) We employed a median split to construct two identity-groups; ‘strong identifiers’ rank ‘5 or higher’
on our 7-point scale, ‘weak identifiers’ rank ‘lower than five.’
interaction term respectively impacts on the two components of the instrumental motive (grievance-component: F=8.729, df=1, p<.01, 2% of the variance explained; efficacy-component: F=4.494, df=1, p<.05, 1% of the variance explained), and the ideological motive (F=2.367, df=1, p=.125, 1% of the variance explained).

The interactions tell us that the participants in the two demonstrations must be distinguished in those who identify strongly with the organizations that staged the demonstration and those who identify weakly. For those who identified strongly the appeals issued by the organizers resonated with instrumental motives for the union demonstration and ideological motives for the TtT demonstration. As a consequence, TtT-demonstrators who identified strongly with organizations staging that event were highly ideologically motivated (Panel a). In fact—as Panel b reveals—high levels of identification reduced the instrumental motivation among TtT-respondents. On the other hand, union-respondents who identified strongly were highly instrumentally motivated (Panel b & c). This corroborates our hypotheses. Employing structural equation modeling we will in a final step test the model as a whole for the two demonstrations.

**Structural equation modelling.** Figures 3 and 4 depict the models for the two demonstrations with the best fit. But we tested first the model that was presented in the theoretical introduction (Figure 1). For both demonstrations this resulted in poor fits ($\chi^2=18.429$, df=3, p=.00, CFI=.84, NFI=.83, RMSEA=.15 for the union demonstration and $\chi^2=8.529$, df=3, p=.04, CFI=.96, NFI=.94, RMSEA=.09 for the TtT demonstration). Indeed, we did not expect good fits for the full model, as we hypothesized that the participants in the union demonstration would lean toward instrumental motivation and the participants in the
TrT demonstration toward ideological motivation. This we tested in our next analysis. This improved the fit for the TrT demonstration ($\chi^2 = 10.664, df=6, p=.10, CFI=.96, NFI=.92, RMSEA=.06$), but not to a satisfactory level. The fit for the union demonstration did not improve ($\chi^2 = 20.974, df=4, p=.00, CFI=.82, NFI=.81, RMSEA=.13$). But remember that the regression analyses revealed for both demonstrations a direct link between identification and determination to participate, while for the union demonstration ideological motives played a more important role than we expected. Furthermore, the mediation analyses made apparent that anger fully mediated the link between instrumental motives and determination. These results from our preliminary analyses were built into two new models—the models displayed in Figures 3 and 4. These models revealed excellent fit indicators ($\chi^2 = 1.086, df=3, p=.78, CFI=1.00, NFI=.99, RMSEA<.001$ for the union demonstration and $\chi^2 = 6.191, df=5, p=.29, CFI=.99, NFI=.96, RMSEA=.03$ for the TrT demonstration).

<<Figure 3 & 4>>

The SEM analyses tell us that TrT-demonstrators were exclusively ideologically motivated. The more they identified with the organizations staging the demonstration the stronger their ideological motivation. Ideological motives translated into anger, which in turn reinforces their determination. But ideological motives and identification fed also directly into determination. Instrumental motives, especially feelings of efficacy, are exclusively relevant for union-demonstrators. The more participants identify with the unions organizing the demonstration the more efficacious they feel they are. Efficacy is not directly linked to the determination to participate but feeds into ideological motives and anger. Indeed, anger is evoked by both instrumental and ideological motives. Identity, anger and ideology in their turn are linked directly to determination. All in all, these findings about the path models for
the two demonstrations confirm our hypotheses, be it that in addition to the hypothesized indirect instrumental and ideological paths we observed direct links between identification and determination to participate among the participants in both demonstrations as well as direct links between ideological motivation and determination. Interestingly, union-demonstrators’ instrumental motivation also fostered ideological motivation. Both instrumental and ideological motivation spurred anger which in turn reinforced the determination to participate in the demonstration.

Discussion

This study shows that organizers rooted in different cleavages issue different appeals that resonate with different motives. Thereby it tested an important yet rarely tested assumption in social movement literature; namely that grievances are socially constructed. To test this assumption, this study compares participants in two different demonstrations that were held at the same time, in the same city, in opposition to the same governmental policy. The two demonstrations addressed the same issue, but their claims were rooted in different cleavages. As a consequence, their appeals differed, more in terms of threatened interest as far as the unions were concerned, and more in terms of violated principles as far as TiT was concerned. Staged at the same time in the same city the two demonstrations formed an almost perfect most similar systems design. Thus, we were able to compare the diverging mobilizing dynamics that the two campaigns generated. We hypothesized that the diverging orientations of the organizers and the mobilizing structures they assembled made for diverging crowds on the squares of Amsterdam consisting of participants displaying different motivational configurations. To be sure, they were all opposing the government’s austerity plans, but the
participants in the two demonstrations had different motives resonating with the diverging appeals of the two organizations.

In order to investigate the diverging motivational configurations, we applied a motivational model consisting of identification, instrumental and ideological motives, anger, and determination to participate. Motivation we defined as the desire to achieve a goal combined with the energy to work toward that goal. Thus conceived, identification, instrumentality, and ideology generate the energy that makes the motivational engine run; they raise anger and reinforce the determination to protest. Grievances generate anger because interests are threatened and/or principles are violated and the angrier people are the stronger their motivational drive. Anger thus amplifies existing determination. Identification also appears to be a motivational force in and of itself. The more someone identifies with the organization(s) staging the demonstration the more she is persuaded by the appeals of that organization.

Our findings confirm the presupposed working of the motivational dynamics. Indeed, identity, instrumentality, ideology, anger and determination hang together in ways we expected them to do, including the differential effects of mobilizing context on the motivational configuration. Participants in both demonstrations were equally angry and motivated, but, for the TrT demonstration only ideological motives motivated the crowd; while instrumental motives were only relevant for participants in the union demonstration. The ideological versus instrumental motivation of the two crowds is what we expected, however, against our expectations participants in the union demonstrations were next to instrumentally motivated also ideologically motivated. Apparently, not only appeals in terms of interest but also appeals in terms of principles resonated with the motives of the participants in the union demonstration. Indeed, “there is now general support for there being
two main routes for union commitment and union support, the instrumental route and the ideological route” (Blackwood, Lafferty, Duck, and Terry 2003, p. 488).

Identity processes appear to play a central role in differentiating the motivational dynamics of participation. This was conceived of theoretically and corroborated empirically. Identification with the organization staging the demonstration works both way. On the one hand, it makes people more susceptible to appeals of the organization; on the other hand, it makes people more prepared to act on behalf of the organization. This was reflected in the interaction of demonstration and identity revealing that strong identifiers were persuaded by the appeals of the organizations they identified with, and in the direct link between identification and determination showing that identification with the organization can be a motivational force in itself. On further consideration, this direct effect of identification was not so surprising. Both in case studies (Simon et al 1998), longitudinal studies (Klandermans, Sabucedo, Rodriguez and De Weerd 2002; Stürmer and Simon 2004) as well as meta-analytically (Van Zomeren et al 2008) a direct impact of identification on protest participation is confirmed. Our study confirms this direct relation and specifies its indirect effects. That is, the stronger protesters attending a demonstration identify with the organization, the more they (will) come to agree with the agenda the organization putted forward.

People and movements are embedded in society (Klandermans et al., 2008). This holds equally for the mobilizing structures organizers assemble during their campaigns. Our study clearly showed that different societal actors command diverging mobilizing structures and that therefore the composition of the crowds they manage to mobilize varies both in terms of socio-political characteristics and in terms of motivational make-up. Indeed they mobilize different subsets of the mobilization potential. Depending on their organizational embeddedness individuals are more or less likely to be targeted by specific organizers. The more individuals are embedded in the organizer’s networks, the more likely that they are
targeted and the more they identify with the people and organizations in those networks, the
more likely that their frames of reference resonate with the mobilizing frames of the
organizers. As mentioned these processes are highly contingent: a specific appeal works for a
specific audience but not for another, while a specific audience is more likely to be
approached by appeals they are susceptible for.

The two separate actions against the same austerity measures at the same day and in
the same city created the unique chance to show with most similar systems comparative
control that different segments in society translate a similar economic threat into different
grievances and bring different people into the streets with different motives. Despite a similar
economic threat, those who took part in the union demonstration felt that their interests were
at stake, while those who took part in the TiT demonstration felt that their principles were
violated.

As unique as it may be, our study has limitations as well. Individuals might be pushed
by their motives or pulled by the organization’s appeals, or individuals might be brought to
the streets by a combination of these push and pull factors. As everything is correlational we
are not able to formulate and test strict causal reasoning. Future research—based on
longitudinal designs or experiments—might focus on these causal issues. Our cleavage
argument needs further research too. Indeed, the cleavage concept occupies a central place in
literature on conventional political participation (e.g. Jansen, Evans, and Graaf 2012), but is
remarkably absent in literature on unconventional political participation. This study is a first
step to show that the formation of grievances and the mobilization of aggrieved people takes
place in the context of cleavages within society. It shows that cleavage-specific motives and
appeals are brought together, and that organizational embeddedness and identity processes
play a central role thereby. But the role of social cleavages in unconventional participation is
far from clear. The relation between social cleavages and different protest issues and how
cleavage salience might affect the dynamics of protest might be a fruitful direction for future research. Our findings regarding the relationship between identification, motivation and emotions confirm findings reported by van Stekelenburg, Klandermans and van Dijk (2011), Yet, our study comprises only two demonstrations in a single country. Generalization of these findings might test the robustness (but see Klandermans et al forthcoming, which describes a study which encompasses 60 demonstrations in seven different countries where our findings are replicated). Furthermore, we did our utmost to develop sampling procedures that give every single participant an equal chance to be selected. Yet, even the best organized street demonstration is too chaotic to draw perfect samples. Moreover, less than ideal return rates are yet another source of additional biases. But, we applied all kinds of tests and procedures to estimate the possible bias resulting from it (Walgrave, et al. 2012). Altogether, we feel that the potential biases stay within acceptable limits.
References


URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/csms Email: social_movement_studies@pol.keele.ac.uk


Figure 1 Factors influencing the determination to participate in collective action
Figure 2 Interaction of demonstration and identification
Figure 3 Motivational configuration of the Union demonstration
Figure 4 Motivational configuration of the TtT demonstration
Table 1
Correlations, means, and standard deviations for instrumental, identity, and ideology motives, and determination for the union and the TtT demonstration

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<td>.23**</td>
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<td>.25**</td>
<td>.11</td>
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Note: N Union = 210 and TtT = 172, * p < .05, ** p < .01
Table 2
Hierarchical regressions of determination to participate on the remaining motivational factors

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<td></td>
<td>.20***</td>
<td>.20***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Model F</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.55*</td>
<td>6.58***</td>
<td>10.35***</td>
<td>9.97***</td>
<td>9.07***</td>
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<td>(1,208)</td>
<td>(2,207)</td>
<td>(3,206)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$R^2$ change</td>
<td></td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.18</td>
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| Note: Coefficients are standardized regression weights (betas); * $p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001