Coercion, Prohibition, and Great Expectations. The continuing failure of the Common European Asylum System
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The Common Market Law Review is designed to function as a medium for the understanding and implementation of European Union Law within the Member States and elsewhere, and for the dissemination of legal thinking on European Union Law matters. It thus aims to meet the needs of both the academic and the practitioner. For practical reasons, English is used as the language of communication.
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The Common Market Law Review was established in 1963 in cooperation with the British Institute of International and Comparative Law and the Europa Institut of the University of Leyden. The Common Market Law Review is designed to function as a medium for the understanding and analysis of European Union Law, and for the dissemination of legal thinking on all matters of European Union Law. It aims to meet the needs of both the academic and the practitioner. For practical reasons, English is used as the language of communication.

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COERCION, PROHIBITION, AND GREAT EXPECTATIONS: THE CONTINUING FAILURE OF THE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM

MAARTEN DEN HEIJER, JORRIT RIJPMA AND THOMAS SPIJKERBOER

Abstract

This contribution explains the European asylum policy crisis from three structural weaknesses of the Common European Asylum System: its reliance on coercion within the EU, its unrealistic expectations of what borders can achieve and the premise of prohibition of refugee movement in its external dimension. The article then critically reviews the proposals that the EU has submitted since the publication of the European Migration Agenda in May 2015, in the light of recent developments.

1. Introduction

In Europe, the refugee crisis is first and foremost a policy crisis. Although as many as 1.5 million irregular migrants may have entered the EU in 2015, this represents a mere 0.3 percent of the 508 million inhabitants of the European Union. Yet, the EU was unable to respond effectively to the arrival of hundreds of thousands of people in Greece and Italy. By consequence, the system collapsed. The disorderly movements of refugees within the EU put Schengen in jeopardy and questioned both the ability and willingness of the Member States to meet their obligations towards refugees.

This article first sets out to explain the events in 2015 from fundamental flaws in the design of the common European asylum policy. In the first half of the paper, we identify three paradigms in the common asylum policy that are not delivering (section 2). First, within the EU, the allocation of asylum seekers is premised on the false idea of a level playing field, which is maintained by a system of coercion, leading to constant stress and obstructive behaviour on the part of both asylum seekers and the Member States. Second,
at the external border, the focus on control and deterrence is misconceived, as it overestimates, practically as well as legally, the ability of borders to bar irregular entry or prevent secondary movements. Third, beyond the external border, the series of prohibitive measures taken to prevent asylum seekers from arriving at the EU border has not stymied migration but incentivized migrant smuggling, potentially leading to more instead of less migration. The difficulties in designing effective policies are moreover exacerbated by the multi-layered nature of EU governance in the areas of asylum and border control, which pits national sovereignties against Union values.

Thereafter, in the second half of the article, we critically review whether the proposals and actions undertaken by the EU since the publication of the European Agenda on Migration in May 2015 constitute a shift in these paradigms (section 3). Is the EU fundamentally rethinking its policies? We conclude that, for the most part, the direction which European asylum law and policy is now taking, reproduces and in important ways intensifies the structural problems that caused the crisis (section 4).

2. Structural weaknesses of the European asylum policy

2.1. Coercion within the European Union

Secondary movement of asylum seekers within the EU is related to real as well as to perceived differences in attractiveness of Member States. Apart from physical safety, important determinants in choosing a destination country are the presence of family and existing asylum communities, colonial and linguistic links, geographical proximity, as well as perceptions about the economic climate, the levels of xenophobia and the country’s immigration policies. Studies further point out that destination choices are often made during the migration process and often depend on information and advice provided by human smugglers, as well as on social media.

The EU is only to a limited extent able to address these disparities between Member States. The EU cannot directly influence some determinants, including those which in some studies are identified as the most dominant ones, namely existing asylum communities and the country’s income level. Moreover, despite the reduction of secondary movements by harmonizing asylum laws being a central aim of the European asylum policy, the EU is a long way from having created a level playing field for asylum seekers. Recognition rates continue to differ widely, and the same is true for procedural standards, reception conditions and the content of protection.

Multiple factors contribute to the EU’s failure to create a level playing field. First, the EU rules on asylum do not comprise a set of fully harmonized standards. Even though the revision of the asylum directives in 2011–2013 aimed at further approximation (i.e. a uniform status and a common procedure), they still contain the basic principle that Member States may introduce or retain more favourable provisions. In essence therefore, EU law only sets a threshold which national legislation must meet. This explains, for example, why Sweden could decide to immediately grant permanent residence to Syrian refugees, even though EU law merely requires the granting of residence for 3 years; and why in Sweden a refugee is allowed to work immediately upon applying for asylum, in Germany after three months, in the Netherlands after six months and in France after nine months. Second, refugee status (as well as subsidiary protection status) is legally constructed as treatment to be accorded on par with nationals in such fields as education,

\[\text{4. See Neumayer, op. cit. supra note 2; see also Haton, “Seeking asylum in Europe”, 19 Economic Policy (2004), at 5–62.} \]

\[\text{5. Directive 2011/95/EU, on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast), O.J. 2011, L 337/9, Recital 13; Directive 2013/32/EU, on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, O.J. 2013, L 180/60, Recital 13; Directive 2013/33/EU, laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection, O.J. 2013, L 180/96, Recital 12.} \]

\[\text{6. When corrected for the varying demographic composition of the asylum population, recognition rates vary from 25% to almost 70%, see Leerkes, “How (un)restrictive are we? ‘Adjusted’ and ‘expected’ asylum recognition rates in Europe”, WODC Working Paper (The Hague, 2015). In 2014, recognition rates of Iraqi and Afghan applicants varied prominently and ranged from 13% to 94% for the first and from 20% to 95% for the latter group of applicants: see EASO Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the EU (2014), at 27.} \]

\[\text{7. Ibid. See also EASO Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the EU (2013).} \]

\[\text{8. Directive 2011/95/EU, Art. 3; Directive 2013/32/EU, Art. 5; Directive 2013/33/EU, Art. 4.} \]

welfare and healthcare.\textsuperscript{10} As long as these public services fall outside the remit of the EU, refugee status can simply not become uniform in the EU, despite proclamations to that effect in various EU policy documents. Third, the EU directives on asylum require implementation in national law and practice. This inevitably results in interference with national understandings and conceptions. Many differences between asylum procedures in the Member States can be explained from divergent procedural traditions, different understandings of the role of the judiciary and distinct administrative environments.\textsuperscript{11}

Different levels of attractiveness of Member States are not necessarily problematic, as experiences in federal States such as the United States and Germany show. In Germany, a quota is calculated for each Land taking account of tax revenues and population size (\textit{Königsteiner Schlüssel}).\textsuperscript{12} In the United States, the federal government works with nine private resettlement agencies. The agencies match the particular needs of each incoming refugee with the specific resources available in a local community, giving priority to the presence of family members and, if these are absent, try to find the best match between a community’s resources and the refugee’s needs.\textsuperscript{13} As in Germany, this tends to allocate refugees to regions and cities that are relatively wealthy and have low unemployment rates. In both these systems, socioeconomic factors, play a key if not decisive role.

A problematic factor is that Dublin is founded on an altogether different idea of allocation. Apart from the preferential position given to unaccompanied minors and asylum seekers with family members already residing in a Member state, Dublin disregards the preferences of asylum seekers and refugees, and builds on the (false) premise of a level playing field – that it does not matter where the asylum seeker ends up and that, therefore, he or she does not need to care. Obviously, the asylum seeker does care. This results in a system in which Member States try to coerce asylum seekers to subject themselves to an asylum procedure in a particular place, and in concomitant forms of disobedient behaviour on the part of asylum seekers. The perverse incentives associated with Dublin have amply been demonstrated in a range of reports and studies, mentioning such behaviour as

\begin{itemize}
\item See Arts. 22, 23 and 24 of the 1951 Refugee Convention and Arts. 27, 29 and 30 of Directive 2011/95/EU.
\item Staffans, \textit{Evidence in European Asylum Procedures} (Martinus Nijhoff, 2012).
\end{itemize}
avoiding registration, lying about one’s travel route, or cutting off one’s fingertips.\textsuperscript{14} That the Dublin system is under constant stress is highlighted by several more recent studies pointing out its lack of effectiveness.\textsuperscript{15} In 2013, for example, of the total of 76,358 requests for transfers, 56,466 were accepted by the receiving Member States but only 15,938 (20\%) were actually carried out.\textsuperscript{16} Yet, the tendency is to find solutions in the stricter and more coercive application of the Dublin rules, including securing fingerprints by force and systematic detention of asylum seekers who are subject to transfer decisions.\textsuperscript{17}

Two further features distinguish the U.S. and German systems from that of the EU. First, the object of distribution is the group of recognized refugees instead of asylum seekers. Because refugee status determination is a federal responsibility in Germany and the U.S., there are no issues relating to diverging reception conditions, procedural standards or eligibility criteria.\textsuperscript{18} Centralized status determination bypasses many incentives for Member States and asylum seekers to frustrate the Dublin system. Second, although allocated to a particular State that may bear special responsibilities towards the refugee, including responsibility for giving effect to the rights associated with refugee status,\textsuperscript{19} in Germany and the U.S. refugees are free to accept employment


\textsuperscript{17} E.g., the Commission issued proposals in a Working Document which places particularly strong emphasis on the importance of fingerprinting all those who arrive, see Commission Staff Working Document of 27 May 2015 on Implementation of the Eurodac Regulation as regards the obligation to take fingerprints, SWD(2015)150 final.

\textsuperscript{18} In the U.S., however, considerable discrepancies in asylum adjudication remain, see Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz and Schrag, “Refugee roulette: Disparities in asylum adjudication”, 60 Stanford Law Review (2007), at 295–411.

\textsuperscript{19} In Joined Cases C-443 & 444/14, Alo and Osso, EU:C:2016:127, the ECJ found that the imposition of a residence condition on international protection beneficiaries for receiving social benefits, with the objective of facilitating their integration, did not necessarily run counter to their right of free of movement guaranteed in Art. 33 Directive 2011/95/EU.
anywhere in the country and to settle elsewhere. This contributes to economic dynamism and reduces chances that refugees end up in situations of unemployment and long-term dependence. A further important effect is that the initial allocation to a particular State is less consequential, as the refugee may choose to settle elsewhere later in time. Under EU rules, by contrast, a conditional right to accept work in another Member State is granted only after five years of legal residence. Under EU law, refugees are trapped in one particular Member State (except for the right to move freely for up to three months within the Schengen area in a six-month period), which may well be neither to their liking nor to that of the Member State.

The design of the Common European Asylum System not only leads to avoidance behaviour of asylum seekers, it also encourages disobedient and competitive behaviour on the part of Member States. The Dublin system, together with the method of harmonization, whereby each Member State remains within certain limits competent to devise its own asylum policy, may tempt Member States into providing lower levels of protection, for fear of being inundated by asylum shoppers – the so-called race to the bottom. Avoidance behaviour of Member States is reinforced by the sentiment that the system is fundamentally unfair. The default position of the current system is that each Member State has to fend for itself, no matter how many asylum seekers are coming in. The Dublin Regulation simply assigns Greece responsibility for the hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers who entered the country irregularly from Turkey. It is striking that at present, the chief avenue by which relief is provided to countries like Greece and Italy, is simply by suspending the Common European Asylum System. Italy and Greece organize their own relief by not registering asylum seekers and stimulating their secondary migration. The other Member States provide relief to Greece by not applying the Dublin rules in respect of that country. It was only natural that with the peak of asylum seekers travelling onwards from Greece in 2015, the next countries along the route – Hungary, Slovenia, Austria – neglected their duties as well.

Statistics predating the current influx already indicated that the Dublin system leads to considerable disparities among Member States. In 2012, Member States receiving a disproportionate share of asylum applications relative to their size or population were wealthy Member States such as

21. Art. 21(1) Schengen Implementing Convention.
22. Described by Noll as “the common market of deflection”; see Noll, Negotiating Asylum: The EU Acquis, Extraterritorial Protection and the Common Market of Deflection (Martinus Nijhoff, 2000).
Belgium and Sweden, but also a selection of border States in the south and east (Malta, Cyprus, Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary).\textsuperscript{24} Other countries at the external border, however, such as Spain, Portugal, Poland and the Baltic States, are free riders and receive only very little asylum applicants. On the basis of this data, it would seem that Dublin results in distribution largely on the basis of geographic location of the Member States, and to some extent on the asylum seeker’s preference for lodging an application in a particular Member State. If the Dublin system were applied in all cases, there would be an even larger distributive effect towards Member States at popular points of entry into the EU. Some reports have estimated that in 2014, for example, only half of the persons entering Italy and asking for asylum somewhere in the EU, were registered in Italy as asylum seeker.\textsuperscript{25} The criteria for distributing asylum seekers laid down in the Dublin Regulation fall short of fair-sharing, as there is no attempt to make allowances for any State which is particularly burdened, nor is there any attempt to take into account capacities of Member States to offer protection. Instead, past\textsuperscript{26} and current efforts of correcting uneven burdens are based on voluntary and ad hoc arrangements – normal practice in the international community at large, but described as “unacceptable within a European Union committed to close integration between Member States”.\textsuperscript{27}

EU law does provide for some mechanisms of relief: the early warning mechanism in the Dublin Regulation, the Temporary Protection Directive (2001/55) and the power of the Council to adopt provisional measures for the benefit of the one or more Member States confronted with an emergency situation as laid down in Article 78 TFEU.\textsuperscript{28} But the present crisis illustrates the lack of effectiveness of these mechanisms. Although all three mechanisms make the EU competent as crisis manager, they do not prescribe how burdens should be shared between the Member States. The early warning mechanism rather vaguely refers to “guidance on any solidarity measures” and the Temporary Protection Directive assumes that Member States will receive displaced persons “in a spirit of Community solidarity”.\textsuperscript{29} A key reason why this Directive was not set in motion is that that very spirit has dissipated.

\textsuperscript{24} Eurostat, Asylum applicants and first instance decisions on asylum applications: 2012, Issue No. 5/2013.
\textsuperscript{25} See Guild et al., op. cit. supra note 15, at 55 with further references.
\textsuperscript{26} See esp. the EU relocation scheme for Malta: EASO fact finding report on intra-EU relocation from Malta, July 2012.
\textsuperscript{28} Art. 33 Regulation (EU) 604/2013, O.J. 2013, L 180/31; Directive 2001/55/EC, on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons, O.J. 2001, L 212/12; Art. 78(3) TFEU.
\textsuperscript{29} Art. 33(4) Regulation (EU) No. 504/2013, O.J. 2013, L 147/1; Art. 25 Directive 2001/55/EC.
A further free rider element is that it is possible to be part of Schengen, but not to partake in the Common European Asylum System. Denmark, for example, has opted out of all EU asylum instruments except the Dublin Regulation. It actually made use of this opt-out in its decision to halve social security benefits to refugees so as to make itself less attractive for asylum seekers. This is arguably in violation of the Refugee Convention but not in violation of EU law.\(^{30}\) Similarly, Denmark is not taking part in the Council Decisions to relocate 160,000 asylum seekers who arrived in Greece and Italy. On the other hand, Denmark fully enjoys the benefits of the Schengen free travel area and has a ratio of incoming and outgoing requests for Dublin transfers of 1:3.\(^{31}\) In these various ways, EU law fosters disobedience and free rider behaviour on the part of Member States. Moreover, Dublin seems to have created a sense of historic entitlement on the part of some Member States not to have to share in the burden at all.\(^{32}\) Ironically, now that the traditional reluctance of quite a few North-Western Member States to revise Dublin seems to be waning, a new coalition of other Member States has formed who embrace its non-redistributive effects.

In sum, the European asylum system seeks to coerce both asylum seekers and crucial Member States to act in ways they have no interest in and understandably consider unfair. Why should an Afghan refugee accept being assigned to a Member State which is likely to reject her asylum claim while another one would in all probability accept it? Why should Greece and Italy spend considerable resources on registering migrants, with the mere effect that they get saddled with them on the basis of Dublin? Why should Germany and Sweden bear the brunt of the failure of the European asylum system, while most other Member States behave as unresponsive bystanders? In the Frankfurter Allgemeine,\(^{33}\) Kay Hailbronner described EU asylum law as “Schönwetterrecht” (good weather law) – created at a time in which refugees were a marginal issue in the EU. Because EU asylum law is not consonant with the interests of key players (asylum seekers and Member States), it could only work if it contained means to coerce them to comply. The problem is not that there are no judicial enforcement mechanisms, but that there is often no interest in activating them. Rather than launching procedures in Greece for not being granted proper relief, asylum seekers travel to another Member State.

\(^{31}\) Eurostat, supra note 24.
And although the European Commission is responsible for ensuring the proper transposition of EU law and correct application of EU rules by the Member States, it has only on rare occasions launched infringement procedures in the area of asylum law.34

2.2. Great expectations at the borders of the European Union

The Common European Asylum System is intimately linked with a common policy for the external borders. Both were considered a *conditio sine qua non* for the lifting of checks at the internal borders.35 Ideally a European system for the management of the external borders supports and facilitates a common European migration and asylum policy. However, the flaws described above clearly resonate within the EU’s border policy, which suffers from similar free-rider behaviour.

Member States have remained individually responsible for the management of their part of the external borders. It has become commonplace to state that the external border is as strong as its weakest link. But what is more important is that some Member States, due to the length of their borders or their geographical location, have carried a disproportionate share of this responsibility. In the case of Greece, it has also been the weakest shoulders that have had to carry this burden. European “solidarity” has been limited to financial support, as well as operational support from Member States under the coordination of Frontex.36 There have thus been few incentives for Member States to reinforce controls of their part of the external borders as this will not only trigger their responsibility for asylum seekers under the Dublin system, but also for the return of irregular migrants under the Return Directive.37

The incapacity or unwillingness to deal with flows or refugees and irregular migrants may trigger the reinstatement of internal border controls that have been witnessed in recent times. Already in 2011, the influx of Tunisians in Italy in the wake of the Arab spring resulted in a diplomatic clash between

Italy and France, ultimately resulting in the introduction of Article 26 in the Schengen Borders Code, allowing for the reinstatement of checks at the internal border in case of a serious deficiency in border controls jeopardizing the functioning of the Schengen area.38

The focus on border controls, be it at the internal or external borders, is however fundamentally flawed for three reasons.

First, it overestimates the capacity of borders to bar irregular entry or prevent secondary movements. Even when internal border controls in Europe were still fully in place, Member States were at times confronted with large inflows (e.g. during the wars on the territories of former Yugoslavia), and secondary movements were a problem already before the Schengen agreements were negotiated.39 Of course, a militarization of the external border, as in totalitarian regimes, which can be observed to some extent at the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, may reduce the number of irregular entries at the militarized stretch of the border. However, it comes at enormous costs, both in terms of the disruption of the flow of border traffic, as well the cost for setting up and maintaining such border infrastructure, even if supported with state-of-the-art surveillance and intelligence.40 There is no such thing as an impermeable border, and a border which gets close (like the one between the Koreas) is not only inhuman and questionable from a human rights perspective; it also strangles the economy. For example, reports indicate that the Hungarian border fence leads to displacement of migration to other Member States, and is even failing to keep people out of Hungary itself.41 Sealing off all of the 42,673 km of sea borders and 7,721 km of land borders is simply not a realistic prospect.

A second flaw of the present focus on external border control is that tightened border controls will worsen the humanitarian crises at the external borders. Border controls do not address the root causes of migratory and refugee flows. They will make access to Europe more difficult and result in the emergence of new routes, which are the harder, longer and more dangerous ones. As the past twenty-five years have shown, this will increase the reliance of people trying to reach Europe on human smugglers, and it will increase the


40. See e.g. the recent report of the Bertelsmann Stiftung at <www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/NW_Departure_from_Schengen.pdf>.

number of border deaths. To the extent that tightened borders do succeed in keeping people out, the result will be that many will remain in limbo: unable to return to their country of origin and stuck in countries in the EU’s neighbourhood which themselves are not in the position to provide for a minimum of assistance. This is the situation on the Balkans right now. Even if these people are not in direct need of international protection, it does not mean that they are devoid of rights.

A third flaw of the approach to borders is legal in nature. Not only practically, but also legally border controls as a solution to curb refugee flows are not feasible. Although international refugee law does not allow for a right to be granted asylum, there is a binding obligation of *non-refoulement*, i.e. not to return a person (either directly or indirectly) to a country where there is a risk of persecution. This obligation applies also at the border and on the high seas, and applies within the EU as a general principle as well as under Article 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. EU secondary law provides for a right to asylum or subsidiary protection once the conditions of the Qualification Directive have been fulfilled. The Procedures Directive clearly states that an asylum request can also be made at the border, and the Schengen Borders Code provides in numerous provisions that its application shall be without prejudice to these rights. Member States can apply the concept of a European safe third country in order to declare an asylum request inadmissible. However, this concept cannot be used for the immediate return of refugees at the border. Its application is bound to strict conditions and safeguards, including individual assessment and judicial control. In a consistent line of cases, the European Court of Human Rights has also made it clear that the return of third country nationals requires an individual assessment of the personal circumstances of the person involved and that mere identification does not suffice if it is to respect the prohibition of collective

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44. Art. 13 (“shall grant”), Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 Dec. 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast), O.J. 2011, L 337/9.
expulsions in Article 4 of Protocol 4 to the ECHR. \(^\text{47}\) Currently Member States put all their cards on qualifying Turkey as a European safe third country, \(^\text{48}\) but such a policy can only succeed if proper asylum procedures and judicial control are organized in Greece.

2.3. Prohibition outside the territory of the European Union

The external dimension of European refugee policy is based on prohibition. The guiding principle is that refugees and asylum seekers are not allowed to travel. This was implemented initially by harmonizing European visa policies. Until 1990, each Member State had its own visa policy, based on historical ties, trade relations and international politics. This meant that citizens of most countries in the world could reach at least one Member State without a visa. In the framework of the 1990 Schengen Implementing Agreement, these policies were gradually harmonized. Since 2001, Regulation 539/2001 enumerates the third countries whose nationals must have a short-term visa when crossing external borders, and those whose nationals are exempt from the visa requirement. Nationals from all refugee-producing countries are subject to a visa requirement, and therefore cannot legally enter the EU without one. \(^\text{49}\) Simultaneously, the technical quality of documents was improved drastically, with the consequence that it became much more difficult to travel on forged documents. The Schengen Implementing Agreement also harmonized the externalization and privatization of the visa requirement by means of carrier sanctions. \(^\text{50}\) This has

\(^\text{47}\) ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy; ECtHR, Georgia v. Russia (I), Appl. No. 13255/07, judgment of 3 July 2014; ECtHR, Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, Appl. No. 16643/09, judgment of 21 Oct. 2014; ECtHR, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, Appl. No. 16483/12, judgment of 1 Sept. 2015.

\(^\text{48}\) Whether it would be lawful to qualify Turkey as a safe third country is questionable; see Roman, Baird and Radcliffe, “Why Turkey is not a ‘safe country’”, Statewatch, Feb. 2016, and the sources quoted there; Ulusoy, “Turkey as a safe third country?”, available at <www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2016/03/turkey-safe-third>.


\(^\text{50}\) Art. 26 obliges the signatory States to oblige carriers (such as airlines) to ensure that passengers are in possession of the required documents (including visas), and to impose fines for carriers who fail to do so. Art. 4 Directive 2001/51/EC of 28 June 2001 supplementing the provisions of Art. 26 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985, O.J. 2001, L 187/45, provides that the minimum fine will not be less than € 3 000 and the maximum not less than € 5 000 per passenger. See more extensively Rodenhaus, “Another brick in the wall: Carrier sanctions and the privatization of immigration control, 26 International Journal of Refugee Law (2014), at 223–247.
resulted in a considerable decrease in the number of people applying for asylum at European airports.

The successful enforcement of the harmonized visa policies by airlines closed off one route to Europe. Asylum seekers and refugees were still able to travel to countries neighbouring the European Union, and to try to enter European territory from there. In the context of the Schengen process, European States began harmonizing their safe third country policies, which had their roots in German and Dutch asylum policy in the late 1970s.51 The central notion was that, if asylum seekers are returned to third countries for their claim to protection to be assessed, they will figure out that it is fruitless to come to Europe and will stop coming. This notion of automatic return without individual assessment was at the core of the 1993 German constitutional reform.52 A harmonized version of the safe third country concept is laid down in Articles 35, 38 and 39 Directive 2013/32. Even apart from the legal obstacles (such as the possibility for the individual to rebut the safety of the country concerned in the individual case, see above), during the past 40 years application of the safe third country principle on a scale of any significance has been prevented by the third countries’ obstruction or outright refusal to readmit asylum seekers and refugees. An exception is the cooperation between Spain and the North-African and West-African countries from where boat people approached Spanish territories, which seems to have led to a radical drop in the number of people trying to reach Spain by boat (and the subsequent increase of boat people trying to reach Italy).53

Apart from trying to return asylum seekers and refugees to third countries, European States have also sought to cooperate with neighbouring countries in


order to prevent departure from there to Europe, and to prevent the entry into these countries of people who might subsequently try to travel onwards to Europe. Until 2011, Italy sought to cooperate with Libya, with a measure of success varying according to the negotiation tactics used by the Libyan Government. Since the outbreak of the armed conflict in Syria, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia have introduced visa requirements for Syrians, most likely under pressure from the EU. This made it harder for Syrians to access the well-functioning route from the Libyan coast to Italy, and may have resulted in a shift of Syrian refugee migration from the central Mediterranean route to the eastern Mediterranean route (Turkey-Greece).

Visa requirements for Syrians 2010 (Source: Mau et al.)


56. We have established this by comparing the data of Mau et al., op. cit. supra note 49, with data from IATA, at <www.timaticweb2.com/home> in Feb. 2016.
To the extent that the EU succeeds in convincing third countries to cooperate, this logically has onward effects in countries closer to the source countries of refugees. Lebanon\textsuperscript{57} and Jordan\textsuperscript{58} now refuse to admit Syrian refugees, while Turkey has announced it will only allow Syrians in directly from Syria,\textsuperscript{59} but reports hold that two border crossing points have been closed.\textsuperscript{60}

The effect is that private and public third parties (carriers and third countries) have been incentivized to prevent refugees from reaching the territories of EU countries. At the same time, the international community (including the EU) has not enabled refugees to subsist in the countries where they find themselves. Let us take Syria again as an example. Syria had an estimated 23 million inhabitants before the war.\textsuperscript{61} Since 2011, the conflict has forced half of the population to flee: 7.5 million refugees within Syria,\textsuperscript{62} 4


\textsuperscript{58} On 18 Jan. 2016, the Financial Times reported that 16 000 Syrians were stranded in the desert at the Jordan border.


\textsuperscript{61} <www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Syria>.

\textsuperscript{62} <www.unhcr.org/pages/49c486a76.html>.
million outside Syria (635,000 in Jordan, or some 8% out of 8 million inhabitants, 1 million in Lebanon, or some 17% out of 5.8 million inhabitants, 2.5 million in Turkey, or some 3% out of 77.6 million inhabitants). These conservative estimates concern registered refugees; the actual number of refugees is likely to be much higher. The reception of Syrian refugees in the region is seriously under-funded. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance reported that for 2015, 56 percent of the required funding had been received. The World Food Programme reports that critical funding shortages forced the organization to reduce the level of assistance, with most refugees now living on 50 cents a day.

Resettlement of Syrian refugees in other parts of the world – crucial in order to enable especially Lebanon to host Syrian refugees – is not occurring on a scale of any significance. Since the beginning of the conflict, only 162,151 Syrian refugees have been resettled elsewhere in the world – 4 percent of the 4 million Syrian refugees outside Syria, and merely 2 percent of all Syrian refugees.

The most likely understanding of what happened in 2015 is that the combination of the prohibition approach to refugees, the lack of resettlement, and the inability for refugees to get an acceptable form of subsistence in the region led to a rapid increase in the demand for the services of smugglers on the Turkey-Greece route. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this initially led to a sharp increase in prices. The resulting increase in profit margin attracted more people to the smuggling sector. This led to a rapid increase in supply, which resulted in falling prices. This triggered others than just Syrians (refugees such as Eritreans of Afghans as well as non-refugees) to travel to Europe. This could explain why not only the number of Syrians entering the EU via Turkey has increased sharply, but that of other nationalities as well.

In this analysis, the combination of prohibition and not giving refugees a

70. <www.wfp.org/emergencies/lebanon>.
viable alternative in the region has had the opposite effect of the intended one: it led to more migration, not just of Syrians but also attracting migrants to the eastern Mediterranean routes who would otherwise not have migrated to Europe. If this analysis is correct, it exposes a structural problem in European asylum policy. It combines prohibition and the lack of a viable alternative for refugees in the region. This disregards the interests of both refugees and of countries in the region, who have a shared interest in onward movement of refugees to other regions, for Syrians concretely: to Europe. In order to realize this shared interest, however, there is no other option than illegality. This boosts the smuggling economy and attracts service providers to the smuggling business. The prohibition approach not only incentivizes Syrian refugees to use smugglers, but also stimulates a smuggling economy which leads to more, instead of to less migration. In this analysis, European policy completely backfires and leads to more migration. At present, the data required to put this hypothesis to the test are lacking, but it is this hypothesis which is in line with dominant migration sociology, and which best explains the data which are available on irregular migration to Europe in the period since 2011.

2.4. **Multi-level governance**

Key to understanding some of the failures of the European asylum and border policies is the fragmented nature of EU governance in these fields. The Schengen project has proceeded on a basis of mutual recognition and minimum harmonization. There is no common asylum law, there are no federal asylum courts, and the EU does not have executive powers. The implementation of the EU’s policies is fully in the hands of the Member States. The Member States have steadfastly opposed the formation of a European corps of border guards and have likewise been unwilling to vest any executive power in the European Asylum Support Office, which is only allowed to assist Member States’ asylum authorities. The EU has no operational assets of its own. Moreover, any EU intervention in the field of asylum and border control requires the consent of the host Member State.

This form of cooperation is vulnerable not only because it allows for considerable disparities between Member States but also because the achievement of commonly formulated goals depends on the effective
cooperation of Member States. Multi-level governance can function effective only if the constituent parts identify with their common government and take seriously their duty to work together towards their common values.\(^{75}\) However, within the field of asylum, national interests are often perceived to run contrary to Union interests.

The present crisis vividly demonstrates the shortcomings of the European cooperation model in the field of Justice and Home Affairs. The unwillingness of Member States to cooperate and their actual resistance to the system explain the difficulty of making border guards and asylum experts available to Member States facing a high influx; explain the delays in making the hotspots in Greece and Italy operational;\(^ {76}\) explain why the asylum systems in the Member States display fundamental differences; explain why some Member States bear the brunt while others are unresponsive bystanders; explain why even the financial part of the EU-Turkey deal is not materializing; and explain why Balkan countries received little and late EU support in offering basic amenities to transiting asylum seekers. For example, the European Commission acknowledged that under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, which is designed to offer practical support to countries overwhelmed by a crisis situation, “so far, too few Member States have responded to … calls” to provide teams, equipment, shelter, medical supplies, expertise and non-food items to assist the Balkan countries.\(^ {77}\)

It is also rather odd that UNHCR, which was never intended to function as an operational humanitarian assistance agency but took up that role in States that were incapable of doing so themselves, has become a key player in aiding refugees on the Greek islands by providing emergency shelter and support – forcing UNHCR, which is already facing huge financial and operational challenges elsewhere, into making new emergency appeals to donors.\(^ {78}\) UNHCR is doing the job, because the EU does not have the required mandate and assets. The deployment of NATO in order to “conduct reconnaissance,


\(^{78}\) “UNCHR aids refugees on the Greek Islands”, at <www.unhcr.org/563ccbb86.html>; “UNCHR launches appeal to aid refugees as winter hits Europe”, at <www.unhcr.org/563b4c186.html>.
monitoring and surveillance of the illegal crossings in the Aegean” also shows the EU’s lack of operational effectiveness.  

3. The EU strategy for reform

Considering that the root causes of current refugee flow lie beyond the EU’s regulatory powers in the area of migration and asylum, it seems evident that the EU should at least try to control what is within the scope of its competences. And indeed, as far as this is a European refugee crisis, it is a crisis of the EU’s own making, bearing in mind the flaws in its Common European Asylum System, both in set-up and implementation, as explained above.

3.1. Toward a strong common asylum policy?

The European Agenda on Migration describes the current fragmentation of the asylum system as a weakness, as it contributes to asylum shopping and leads to a perception in EU public opinion that the current system is fundamentally unfair.  It would seem, indeed, that a number of concerns that we identified above are shared by the European Commission and that steps are being taken to address these.

First, the Commission proposes a new systematic monitoring process to strengthen the implementation of the asylum rules. In September 2015, a total of 40 infringement procedures were launched against several Member States for failing to implement EU asylum legislation, which were taken a step further in seventeen cases in December 2015 and February 2016. Most of these cases concern the failure of effective fingerprinting of asylum seekers, failures in transposing the Asylum Procedures Directive, Reception Conditions Directive and failure to extend the regime of the Long-Term Residents Directive to refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection.

81. Ibid.
Second, the Commission proposes to step up operational cooperation between Member States. European Asylum Support Office (EASO) should develop into a role as “the clearing house of country of origin information”, encouraging more uniform decisions. EASO would also step up training of asylum officers and the suggestion is made that the agency would administer a network for the pooling of reception places in times of emergency.83

Third, the Commission is not proposing a further approximation of the Reception Conditions Directive, Asylum Procedures Directive and Qualification Directive, but it has proposed a common list of safe countries of origin, which would amend the Asylum Procedures Directive.84 The idea behind the common list is that all Member States will expeditiously deal with asylum claims made by persons from countries with generally high application numbers but low recognition rates, with a view to causing a deterrent effect and increasing the overall efficiency of asylum systems.

For the longer term, the Commission will initiate debate on further development of the Common European Asylum System, including a possible common Asylum Code and the mutual recognition of asylum decisions, and even “a longer term reflection towards a single asylum decision process”.85 Key, moreover, is that the Commission undertakes an evaluation of the Dublin system in 2016, which will start the debate over a permanent revision of the legal parameters for distributing asylum seekers.

On reflection, the proposals in the sphere of further harmonization of asylum standards are quite meagre. Moreover, on substance they illustrate rather than address the current limitations of EU law to arrive at a truly common asylum policy. It is doubtful, for example, whether the safe country of origin proposal will lead to further convergence, because the legal consequences of applying the concept are not fully harmonized. The proposal obliges Member States to regard countries on the common list as safe countries of origin, but the Procedures Directive leaves it to the Member States (“may provide”) to decide whether they process applications of persons from such countries in a border procedure or accelerated procedure (Art. 31(8) Dir. 2013/32). Moreover, the Procedures Directive specifies only in limited detail what an accelerated or border procedure entails. Some Member States have rather short accelerated asylum procedures with a maximum duration of only a few days (such as Malta, Bulgaria and the United Kingdom), but it may take longer in other Member States such as France (15 days), Poland (30 days) and Sweden and Greece (three months). And some EU Member States, like Italy

83. Commission Communication, cited supra note 80, at 12.
85. Commission Communication, cited supra note 80, at 17.
and Hungary, have no accelerated asylum procedure at all. Further, in view of divergent recognition rates in the Member States, it is quite problematic to arrive at a common conception of which third countries are safe.

Likewise, the trend towards the production of European country of origin reports may well “encourage” (the word use by the Commission) more uniform decisions, but does not guarantee them. For example, a joint report written by country analysts from Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden about the safety situation in Libya published in December 2014 did not result in a common approach adopted in individual procedures to the question whether expulsion to Libya could be executed. This is to be attributed to the fact that the Member States remain largely autonomous in legally qualifying facts in terms of EU law.

3.2. **Relocation and hotspots: A way forward?**

There is a growing consensus among academics but also among Member States that the legal parameters of Dublin must be revised. In September 2015, the European Commission tabled a proposal for a crisis relocation mechanism, which would function as emergency valve in the Dublin Regulation. We will not enter into the debate of what a revised Dublin should look like, but limit our observations to the functioning of the two emergency decisions of the Council providing for the relocation of 160,000 asylum seekers from Italy and Greece. These decisions by and large follow the model of the proposed revision of the Dublin Regulation and could provide a foretaste of the future EU approach. We will show that the

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87. ECRE reported e.g. that the recognition rate for Albanians (Albania is on the proposed list) during the first quarter of 2015 varied from 0% in The Netherlands and Ireland to 54% and 33% in Italy and Switzerland; see ECRE Comments on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an EU common list of safe countries of origin and amending the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (COM(2015)452), Oct. 2015, available at <www.ecre.org/component/content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/1231-ecre-argues-against-a-common-eu-list-of-safe-countries-of-origin.html>.


90. See e.g. Guild at al., op. cit. supra note 15; Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken, op. cit. supra note 15.

relocation mechanism is not working as intended,\textsuperscript{92} because it is still based on the idea of coerced transfer; is premised on a distorted idea of solidarity; and because the EU has neither the mandate nor operational capacity to implement the mechanism.

The relocation mechanism centres on the concept of hotspots, introduced in the Agenda on Migration, which would take on an increasingly important meaning in the year to follow. In areas of high migratory pressure, EASO, Frontex and Europol would work on the ground with what are now frequently called “frontline” Member States swiftly to identify, register and fingerprint incoming migrants and asylum seekers. Frontex was to become the main actor in setting up these hotspots.\textsuperscript{93} In fact, the concept was first coined in a consultancy study on the feasibility of a European system of border guards.\textsuperscript{94} This prominence of Frontex seems to contradict the multi-actor approach underlying the hot spot concept, and once more demonstrates the focus on border control as opposed to protection needs.

Although the relocation system takes account of the private, family and personal circumstances of asylum seekers in making relocation decisions, it does not require the consent of the persons involved.\textsuperscript{95} NGOs report that relocation is not popular among asylum seekers because they have no idea of where they will be sent\textsuperscript{96} – while, as indicated above, they have high stakes in ending up in some Member States and not in others. The reality is that the majority of arrivals are not going through the hotspots, but elect to relocate themselves. Although the combination of a distribution key coupled with so-called “matching” looks good on paper, UNHCR reports that matching takes place not on the basis of asylum seekers’ needs or preferences, but on the basis of Member States’ indications of what kind of persons they are willing

\textsuperscript{92} As of 10 Feb. 2016, 218 persons were relocated from Greece and 279 from Italy; see Annex 4 to the Commission Communication on the state of play of implementation of the priority actions under the European agenda on migration, COM(2016)85 final.


\textsuperscript{95} Recital 34: “Therefore, in order to decide which specific Member State should be the Member State of relocation, specific account should be given to the specific qualifications and characteristics of the applicants concerned, such as their language skills and other individual indications based on demonstrated family, cultural or social ties which could facilitate their integration into the Member State of relocation”.

to accept.\textsuperscript{97} This is selection rather than matching. The importance of procuring consent of the asylum seeker was noted by EASO in its evaluation of the Malta relocation scheme: “In general, respondents asserted that relocation should always be a voluntary decision both on the side of the beneficiary and that of the receiving country. If the voluntary aspect is removed, integration difficulties might arise, which could lead to secondary movements….”\textsuperscript{98} This does not necessarily mean that voluntariness is an absolute requirement for a distribution system to work, but it is likely to contribute to its effectiveness.

Although the second relocation decision distributes asylum seekers in accordance with a key in which GDP and population size are the primary determinants, its full implementation would only result in an even more unbalanced distribution of asylum seekers among the Member States. Apart from capping the total relocation number at 160,000 (thus assigning each person above that number entering Greece and Italy to those countries), the Decisions only apply to those nationalities whose applications have a 75 percent recognition rate (i.e. Syrians, Iraqis and Eritreans), making Italy and Greece \textit{de jure} responsible for processing all other nationalities. That Greece is organizing buses to the border with Macedonia instead of to a relocation hotspot and is accused of other forms of feet-dragging demonstrates its ambivalence towards the scheme, which is, however, perfectly comprehensible. At the receiving end, the distribution key hardly considers whether a Member State has already taken in a high number of asylum applications. Member States which are already doing more than their share such as Sweden, Austria or Germany are only allotted more asylum seekers in the relocation decisions.\textsuperscript{99}

A major liability of the relocation system is that it depends on the consent and operational capacity provided by twenty-five Member States (excluding the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark). The European Commission identified as main bottlenecks the time it takes to get approvals from receiving Member States and the low number of relocation pledges by Member States.\textsuperscript{100} The Commission also reports that insufficient officers are made

\textsuperscript{97}. According to UNHCR, some Member States have attached to their indications a long list of preferences and additional limiting conditions related to \textit{inter alia} language skills and vulnerabilities. Other Member States have limited places to just one of the qualifying nationalities due to a lack of interpreters, or have explicitly excluded vulnerable cases; Ibid., at 6.


\textsuperscript{99}. The distribution key does take previous intake into account, but with a 10\% weighting.

available to EASO and Frontex, and that too little humanitarian aid and means of transport, such as buses, are made available to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism.\footnote{COM(2016)85 final, Annex 2.} Delays in registration have discouraged asylum seekers from applying for relocation, and delays in executing transfers have caused asylum seekers to abscond.\footnote{UNHCR, cit. supra note 96.} As UNHCR has stressed, an absolute prerequisite for the successful implementation of the relocation schemes is the availability of adequate reception capacities, not only to ensure the presence of asylum seekers throughout the procedure but also to make the deal attractive to them. Greece struggles, however, in making these facilities available, and is further urged to provide leaders for EASO and Frontex teams, as well as interpreters and legal aid.\footnote{Supra note 101.}

In short, the relocation mechanism would seem to be the proverbial cart before the horse. It is premised on a functioning asylum system, which is absent in Greece and also, though to a lesser extent, in Italy; and it is premised on the willingness of other Member States to share the burden, a willingness which is also mostly absent. The mechanism is failing, because it is built on existing weaknesses in the fabric of the common European asylum policy.

3.3. \textit{Towards a shared management of the external borders?}

The European Agenda on Migration’s short-term response to the refugee crisis consisted of a reinforcement of joint operations under the coordination of Frontex and the establishment of EU-Navfor, a Common Foreign and Security Policy mission targeting human smugglers.\footnote{Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 of 18 May 2015 on a European Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED), O.J. 2015, L 122/31. The operation has since been named “Sophia”;} Although still a civilian mission, more precisely a police mission with military means, EU-Navfor is not a border management operation. The legal framework within which it operates is indicative of the security dimension that this crisis has taken in the eyes of European policy makers.

Long term, the Agenda announced “reflections” on the shared management of the European border. This would include a European System of Border Guards, as well as a possible European Coast Guard.\footnote{Commission Communication, cited supra note 80, at 17.} Within the context of the refugee crisis it only took a few months to move from reflections to a concrete proposal in December 2015 to transform Frontex into a European Border and Coast Guard Authority.\footnote{Commission Proposal, cited supra note 93.} A number of factors played a role in the
momentum for such proposal. Politically it was very important to counter the image of uncontrolled flows of people entering the European Union. The management of the external borders now became a prerequisite to save Schengen. It would allow for the “economic” migrant and potential terrorist to be separated from the “genuine” asylum seeker and individual Member States would be disciplined into either remedying the deficiencies in their border controls or forcing them to put human and technical resources at the disposal of Frontex.

Already in 2002, in its Communication on European Border Management, the Commission had contemplated the establishment of a true European corps of border guards, disposing of executive powers independent from the Member States. Resisting this move, Member States in the Council adopted Frontex as a regulatory agency tasked merely with the coordination of Member State cooperation. Frontex’s powers and resources have been consistently reinforced in the first decade of its existence, however always resisting a true centralization and transfer of executive power. From that point of view, the Commission’s proposal constitutes an evolution rather than revolution, because it does not change that fundamental premise. The proposal does qualify border management as a shared responsibility and makes the Agency responsible, as a primus inter pares, for a European strategy for integrated border management, with which national strategies must be in line. The two biggest innovations however are the obligation to make border guards available for joint operational activity, as well as the power for the Agency to intervene in emergency situations irrespective of an EU Member State’s approval, based on a prior Commission decision.

The Commission proposal is also significant in that it proposes giving Frontex an important role in the evaluation of Member States’ border management systems (“vulnerability assessment”) through the posting of liaison officers in the Member States. This would reinforce the Schengen Evaluation System as adopted in 2011 under which the Council can issue an implementing decision with recommendations for improvement.


110. Council Regulation (EU) 1053/2013 of 7 Oct. 2013 establishing an evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis and repealing the Decision of the Executive Committee of 16 Sept. 1998 setting up a Standing Committee on the
proposed Regulation the Agency could issue such a decision with corrective measures.

It is questionable whether the proposal as it stands will be acceptable to the Member States. Indeed, in the Council negotiations, the “right to intervene” was deleted and the obligation to make border guards available weakened.\(^{111}\) Still, what was initially contemplated as a long-term solution is now presented as a quick fix. Making the EU and its Member States jointly responsible for the management of the external border sounds good in practice, but as long as the Agency does not have actual powers of command and control, it seems to remain a legal fiction.

3.4. Toward legal channels for forced migration?

Although the provision of legal channels for forced and voluntary migration is an oft-repeated mantra, the outcome in relation to this element in the Agenda is almost nil, and not likely to amount to much in the near future. The EU has not changed its visa policies for the countries of origin of asylum seekers and refugees, nor has it changed its carrier sanction policy. Countries neighbouring source countries have imitated the European prohibition paradigm, either under European pressure or because they saw no other option. In the European Agenda on Migration, the Commission announced that it aims at an EU-wide resettlement scheme for 20 000 refugees per year, to be distributed over the Member States on the basis of criteria such as GDP, size of the population, unemployment rate and past numbers of asylum seekers and refugees. The target of 20 000 should be reached in 2020.\(^{112}\) The Commission adopted a Recommendation asking Member States to resettle 20 000 refugees over a period of two years, based on a distribution key.\(^{113}\) More specifically, as a beginning of the cooperation with Turkey (see below), the Commission adopted a Recommendation for a


\(^{112}\) Commission Communication, cited supra note 80, at 4–5.

\(^{113}\) Commission Recommendation of 8 June 2015 on a European resettlement scheme, COM(2015)3560 final. A number of 5,331 persons were due to be resettled in 2015, with confirmation that only 779 had been resettled. 22,504 refugees are due to be resettled by the end of 2017, see Commission, “Refugee crisis: Commission reviews 2015 actions and sets 2016 priorities”, Press release of 13 Jan. 2016, at <europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-65_en.htm>.
voluntary readmission scheme with Turkey, which should lead to resettlement of Syrian refugees from Turkey in the EU. These resettlement numbers are minimal, and no reports on the implementation of even this are available.

Return policies are to be improved by pressuring third countries to take back their own nationals residing irregularly in Europe, where necessary with an EU laissez-passer and spurred by European Migration Liaison Officers. This will be enforced by high-level dialogues at the EU level, regular bilateral meetings, enhanced cooperation and – where necessary – the use of “adequate leverage”, most notably visa policy – even though the Commission itself notes that this is hardly useful as the relevant countries are subject to visa requirements not likely to be lifted. Development cooperation and trade policies are mentioned as additional sources of leverage. Existing fora such as the Rabat and the Khartoum Process will be fully used to enhance cooperation on readmission. A pilot project with Pakistan and Bangladesh will show the way forward. Furthermore, North-African countries must be motivated to readmit third country nationals who transited through their territory and will be stimulated to return migrants to their country of origin before they try to reach Europe. The Commission will explore ways to expand the support provided by Frontex to

115. Commission Communication, cited supra note 80, at 9; the Commission’s approach is supported by the Council, EU CO 26/15, 16 Oct. 2015, at 2(o), (p), and (q).
117. Ibid., at 10. A term used in this respect is also improving the coherence of EU policy, COM(2015)285 final, at 9.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid., at 11.
120. Ibid., at 10–11.
122. Commission Communication, cited supra note 80, at 10–11.
countries in the EU’s neighbourhood. In order to assist countries of origin and transit to cooperate in readmission, the EU will focus on “readmission capacity building”, which consists of “development of centralized automated civil registers and of systems for issuing biometric passports and identity documents, launching automated means of transmitting and processing readmission requests (such as fingerprinting machines), or providing material resources necessary for processing readmission requests and receiving returnees, such as means of transport or temporary accommodation facilities”.

In the Agenda on Migration, the Commission envisions to promote stability in Libya and Syria, as well as providing humanitarian, stabilization and development assistance inside Syria and helping Syrian refugees in countries like Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Iraq. The EU will help to mitigate the impact of the refugee crisis at the local level by being a major donor.

Concrete examples of the intention to combine the prohibition approach with assistance to refugees in the region are the EU plans on Turkey and the Western Balkans. On 15 October 2015, the Commission announced an EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, which was welcomed by the Council, and which was implemented in March 2016. The plan has the dual aim of supporting Syrians in Turkey, and of preventing migration to the EU. As to the

125. Ibid., at 8.
127. Commission Communication, cited supra note 80, at 5, refers to “€ 3.6 billion in humanitarian, stabilization and development assistance inside Syria and to help Syrian refugees in countries like Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Iraq”.
128. Ibid., at 8: “The EU is a leading international donor for refugees with EUR 200 million in ongoing projects from development assistance and over EUR 1 billion of humanitarian assistance dedicated to refugees and IDPs since the beginning of 2014. A strategic reflection is now under way to maximise the impact of this support, with results expected in 2016”.
first aim, the EU pledges to mobilize new funds, notably through the EU Trust fund for the Syrian crisis, while Turkey promises to continue giving international protection to Syrian refugees. The EU is to contribute €3 billion in 2016 and 2017, with €1 billion to be financed from the EU budget and €2 million by Member States. The first €95 million projects were announced on 4 March 2016. As to the second aim, the EU pledges to support Turkey in combating migrant smuggling and irregular migration, while Turkey agrees to strengthen its interception capacity, and smoothly readmit irregular migrants who entered the EU via Turkey. In March, the EU and Turkey agreed to return “all new irregular migrants” to Turkey as of 20 March 2016. For every Syrian returned to Turkey, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU. The Commission has proposed to use 54,000 places which were reserved for relocation from Greece and Italy for resettlement from Turkey. It is not clear which Syrians would benefit, and it is not clear which Member States would accept Syrians from Turkey, nor is it clear what legal status the Syrians should have (the proposal speaks of “resettlement, humanitarian admission or other forms of legal admission”).

The first reports on the implementation of this plan reveal a number of legal issues. Asylum seekers seem to be routinely detained, which does not sit easily with Article 26 of Directive 2013/32/EU (the Procedures Directive), which provides that asylum seekers shall not be detained for the sole reason that they have applied for asylum. Furthermore, the provision that “all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into the Greek islands as of 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey” suggests that the EU intends to engage in collective deportation, which is contrary to Article 4 Protocol 4 to the ECHR. On the other hand, it is foreseen that all migrants will be allowed to apply for asylum in accordance with European law. Whether and how the tension between the

135. Art. 4 of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing without authorization, O.J. 2014, L 134/3, provides that Turkey shall readmit without formalities third country nationals in an irregular situation if, inter alia, they have illegally and directly entered the territory of a Member State after having stayed on, or transited through, the territory of Turkey.
137. Ibid. at 2.
intention of the EU-Turkey agreement (return of all migrants) and international and European asylum law (under which return to Turkey is evidently problematic, see footnote 48 above) can be resolved remains to be seen.\textsuperscript{138} UNHCR has announced that it does not want to be involved in implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement,\textsuperscript{139} while other humanitarian organizations likewise have pulled out from activities which could support it.\textsuperscript{140} Further elements also bode ill for the viability of the agreement. Immediately after the EU-Turkey agreement, the Turkish ambassador to the EU indicated that Turkey is not willing to give up the geographical limitation to the Refugee Convention, which results in Turkey not having obligations under the Refugee Convention for non-European refugees (such as Syrians).\textsuperscript{141} Furthermore, hours after the agreement was reached, Amnesty International reported that Turkey expelled Afghans in violation of international law,\textsuperscript{142} consistent with earlier reports on refugee law violations by Turkey.\textsuperscript{143} Both gestures suggest that Turkey may not see an interest in being a safe third country. One of the elements of the EU-Turkey cooperation, which is meant to incentivize Turkey, is visa liberalization and re-energizing the accession process with Turkey.\textsuperscript{144}


\textsuperscript{139} “UNHCR redefines role in Greece as EU-Turkey deal comes into effect”, Briefing Notes of 22 March 2016, <www.unhcr.org/56f10d049.html>. For UNHCR’s view on the legal aspects, see “Legal considerations on the return of asylum-seekers and refugees from Greece to Turkey as part of the EU-Turkey Cooperation in Tackling the Migration Crisis under the safe third country and first country of asylum concept”, 23 March 2016, at <www.refworld.org/docid/56f3ee3f4.html>.


\textsuperscript{141} At <www.euobserver.com/migration/132779>.


\textsuperscript{144} See e.g. Council Conclusions of 16 Oct. 2015, EUCO26/15, at 2(2); IP/15/6162; Meeting of heads of State or government with Turkey, “EU-Turkey statement of 29 Nov. 2015, Statements and Remarks 870/15”, at <www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2015/11/>
On 25 October, a meeting was held in Brussels with representatives of Greece, Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, Austria and Germany. Together, these countries form the corridor between Turkey and the heart of the European Union. The three main points of the action plan are to provide more shelter along the route; to register migrants (under the rubric of “migration management”); and to combat irregular migration (under the rubric “border management”). For providing shelter, it was specifically agreed that Greece would increase its reception capacity to 30,000 places by end 2015, while UNHCR was to provide for at least 20,000 more people; “financial support for Greece and UNHCR is expected”. Further along the route, UNHCR was to increase reception facilities by 50,000 places. In order to manage migration flows together, it was agreed that all arrivals were to be registered, that information about them would be exchanged and that return policies were to be intensified. For combating irregular migration, the action plan emphasizes cooperation with Turkey (see above), as well as intensifying cooperation in the field of border controls (Operation Poseidon Sea, support for various land border controls in the region, among which 400 police officers to be deployed through bilateral arrangements in Slovenia within a week). In February 2016, the EU framework was disregarded by a meeting of Croatia, Slovenia and Austria (with Bulgaria as an observer) with “the Western Balkan 6” (i.e. Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia & Herzegovina) which sought border closure and put less emphasis on refuge rights. One of their conclusions – “It is not possible to process unlimited numbers of migrants and applicants for asylum” – can be taken as a direct rebuff of Angela Merkel’s “Wir schaffen dass”.

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146. From the State of play report of 15 Dec. 2015, it seems clear that Greece has not implemented this (in the column “what remains to be done”, it is stated: “Create the extra 23,000 places committed by Greece to reach the 50,000 target”); see Commission, “Managing the refugee crisis: Western Balkans route: State of play report”, at <www.ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/western_balkans_route_state_of_play_report_en.pdf>.

147. Ibid., states that 20,000 of these have been created.

148. Ibid., mentions that 200 had been deployed by then.

Germany and Greece, underlines the lack of agreement among Member States on the approach to be taken and on the Common European Asylum System.

So we can see that the prohibition approach is intensified, not just by stepping up enforcement at the European external borders (including collective returns to Turkey), but also by pressuring Turkey to expand visa obligations. At the same time, promises are made about resettlement and more funding for refugee assistance in the region, but these are not operational. Also, all attention is focused on Turkey, while Lebanon and Jordan (facing a substantially bigger problem than Turkey, but with no shared borders with the EU) do not receive substantial attention. In addition, while the idea is that Turkey will patrol Europe’s borders and readmit refugees and asylum seekers, there is very little attention for why Turkey would have any interest in doing so, or why Turkey would find it fair to shoulder a much bigger part of the refugee issue than Europe is willing to. Therefore, to the extent that the intensification of the prohibition approach is successful, it is likely to boost the market for smuggling services, and hence to increase irregular migration towards Europe. This is all the more likely as elements in the EU’s response in 2015 which might contribute to interrupting the smuggling market cycle (increasing assistance capacities in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey; resettlement) are barely worth the paper they are written on.

3.5. Toward federalization?

In suggesting a longer term reflection towards establishing a single asylum decision process and a common asylum code, the Commission does appear to recognize the limitations of the current approach. This is in line with what seems to be a growing discourse on the need for transferring more competence to the EU, including the power to decide on individual asylum applications. Goodwin-Gill, for example, observed recently that “[t]he strategy of implementing a common policy through twenty-eight national systems … was always bound to fail, no matter how comprehensive the top-down, legislative agreement on qualification, standards and criteria”. He suggests setting up a European Migration and Protection Agency competent “to fulfil collectively and to implement the individual obligations of Member States”. Hailbronner also suggests the transfer of competence for implementing a single asylum procedure, to be carried out in central reception centres in the hot spots. Appeals procedures should in

his view only be based on EU asylum law and should be dealt with by specialized EU courts. There are also several reports calling for centralized asylum decision-making. The question is whether this could be done on the current Treaty basis of Article 78(2) TFEU. Although some argue that implied in this article is that asylum decisions need to be made by the Member States (Art. 78(2)(e) TFEU refers to establishing rules for determining responsibility), we do not believe such transfer of power would be impossible on the basis of this article in view of the Treaty’s clearly stated objective of a Common European Asylum System.

Although we share the analysis behind these suggestions, we are nonetheless hesitant in embracing federalization as panacea for the current failures. There are certain risks to a further transfer of competences which need to be thoroughly thought through. It could add a further level of fragmentation whereby competences at the EU level may interfere with national competences and vice versa. Decisions on asylum applications may, for example, have legal effects in the spheres of detention, reception, return and relocation. Centralizing status determination without a concurrent transfer of power in the spheres of border control, return and detention (as is proposed by ALDE, for example) will give rise to complex issues of cooperation between Member States and the EU. As long as Member States remain responsible for executing part of the EU asylum policy (detention, return, relocation), the system is vulnerable. There are also a range of practical issues, such as the question which Member State becomes responsible for taking in failed asylum seekers whose return cannot be effectuated.

There are also important constitutional limits to the transfer of executive powers to Union bodies outside the EU institutions. It is true that in the ESMA case the Court limited the effects of the Court’s anti-delegation (“Meroni”) doctrine, by allowing for the establishment of agencies with decision-making power as “operational support mechanism” in the internal market. It seems tempting to transpose that logic to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. However, it is submitted that border management is essentially a policing power, which may involve the use of force and coercion, which requires a level of discretion that is difficult to regulate, in any case in absence of a European rules of engagement. In this different policy context, the limitations of the

151. Hailbronner, op. cit. supra note 33.
152. Guild et al., op. cit. supra note 15, at 59; Carrera et al., “What priorities for the new European agenda on migration?”, CEPS, 22 April 2015.
Meroni doctrine, such as the need for a precise delimitation of powers, will apply much more readily.  

Although a full transfer of powers to a European Asylum Authority or European Border Agency would have the obvious advantage of a clear-cut division of responsibility, it would require judicial review of decisions taken by these agencies, such as against the refusal to grant asylum or a decision to deny entry at the border. As such an agency would be a European body, an appeal against its decisions would have to be brought before the CJEU. One could envisage a novel system, following the example of the proposal for a European Public Prosecutor’s Office, under which delegates of the European agencies would operate within specific Member States, subject to the control of national courts. There are some signs that the hotspot approach is moving in that direction. The Greek Government tabled a bill in February 2016 for a new detention and reception regime in the hotspots, which would grant EASO and FRONTEX the power to observe or participate in reception and identification procedures. In theory, this model could be extended to give, to the extent deemed necessary, EU agencies delegated executive power under Greek law. Such arrangements obviously depend on Greek cooperation and consent, but seem more feasible than the federalization of asylum-decision-making.

A full centralization of powers of in border management would also undermine the constitutional principle that the Member States are ultimately responsible for their own internal security (Art. 4(2) TEU and Art. 72 TFEU). This point was first raised in 2007 when an amendment to the Frontex Regulation introduced the obligation to make national border guards available for Rapid Border Interventions. That obligation was therefore qualified, allowing Member States to refuse deployment of their national border guards when “faced with an exceptional situation substantially affecting the discharge of national tasks”. The removal of this exception, as well as the power to intervene without the request of a Member State, in the current proposal for a European Border and Coast Guard Agency, seem to encroach upon this principle. It also seems rather odd that whereas the Treaty explicitly

155. See Rijpma, op. cit. supra note 108.
states in relation to Eurojust and Europol that coercive measures remain with the Member States, a similar limitation would not apply to a European Border Agency, which would be based on the much more broadly formulated Article 77(2)(d) TFEU.\(^{160}\)

As we argued above, the present “confederal” model is likely to work more smoothly if the Member States have a sincere interest in cooperating. In view of the legal, practical and political constraints to federalization, it is all the more imperative that the right incentives are put into place for Member States as well as asylum seekers to work with instead of against the system. We agree that the Commission should be invited to play its role as guardian of the treaty more forcefully, but one cannot hope the Union, be it in a federal or confederal constellation of governance, to enforce compliance with a system which meets resistance on so massive a scale.

4. Conclusion

The European response to the refugee policy crisis is premised on an intensification of the prohibition of the cross-border movement of refugees, combined with neglect of the position of refugees in the region. It is unlikely that even the number of resettlements proposed by the Commission (which are entirely inadequate) will be realized. The prohibition approach to refugee movement is both unrealistic (refugees are bound to seek safety, whether we like it or not), and it is illegitimate morally (Art. 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights grants everyone the right to seek asylum) as well as legally (the principle of non-refoulement). At the external borders, the European response does not do away with the unrealistic expectations of what borders can achieve, because it is assumed that border controls can bring down the number of migrants, and because policy makers still dream on about push-backs without meaningful individual assessment. In the Common European Asylum System, the uneven sharing of the burden among Member States and the drastic divergence in the protection afforded by Member States to refugees remain to be addressed.

It has to be emphasized that the present European crisis is a crisis of refugee policy, not a refugee crisis. The numbers in themselves are not the problem; the way in which the European Union deals with them is. The direction in which the European Union is now taking asylum law and policy mainly reproduces, and in important ways intensifies, those elements of EU law and policy which have caused the crisis. Therefore, the EU response is likely to make the crisis worse. This is tragic, all the more so because it is not necessary.

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\(^{160}\) Arts. 85 and 88 TFEU.
A less disastrous approach would require doing away with the tunnel vision in which EU policy makers are presently caught – would require doing away with the idea that if policy doesn’t work, more of the same policy is the appropriate response. It would require a reconsideration of the very foundations of the Common European Asylum System: coercion, prohibition, unrealistic expectations of what borders can do, and a confederate approach without addressing legitimate concerns of Member States, third States and refugees.
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